Cayetano vs.

Monsod201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and
a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the
requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsods past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and social proceedings and other similar work which involves the
determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.
: JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964
FACTS: Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna
Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section
2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to
them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio
until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem
who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus
Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of
the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio
Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or
of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept
5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case.
Romulo Cui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente
Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifi cations
tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may
be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews
therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the
meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospiciode Barili.
- C o u r t
a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means
that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and

therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both
by the defendant and by theintervenor.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.
(YES)
RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of
the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession.
The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of personswho are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, andupon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Barexaminations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the
Clerk of Court, this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws initself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance
with therequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all
theprescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education."
For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there areinstances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had notgone through any formal legal education in
college were allowed to take the Barexaminationsand to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the
academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio
de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in
that order; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.
A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which
invalids andincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it
thattherules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct;
and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a
working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under
this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office
of administrator.As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant
wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previousdisbarment
were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,
grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in
thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a
son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise
equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by
line and successivelytothe descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are
named. Thus, heargues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio
Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs.
This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.