Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ZHAO HONG
Zhao Hong is senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI), National
University of Singapore. Before joining EAI, he was professor at the Research
School of South East Asian Studies, Xiamen University, China, teaching
International Political Economy, Big Power Relations, and ASEAN Economy.
His latest published book, China and India: The Quest for Energy Resources in
the 21st Century, was published by Routledge in 2012,
Introduction
From the late 1990s until only a couple of years ago, Chinas approach to
Southeast Asia in general and to its various territorial and maritime disputes in particular was to pursue a good neighbour policy and engage
in bilateral negotiations. This reflected Beijings concern for the views of
others about Chinas rise and the China Threat. So Beijing tried hard to
be benign and adhere to Deng Xiaopings previous guidance to shelve
territorial differences for the later generations, while engaging in joint
development. But more recently Beijings actions have become more
assertive in terms of energy exploration and military activities in the
South China Sea. The concerns of some ASEAN countries about
Chinas creeping assertiveness and the China Threat has led them
to deliberately invite the involvement in the area of other big powers,
in particular to welcome renewed American efforts to revitalise bilateral
security ties with Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. This,
taken with Indian and Japanese involvement, has resulted in the South
China Sea increasingly becoming a focal point for big power rivalry,
thus complicating the issues. While most of the rival claimants are
ASEAN member states, traditionally China has tried to discuss the
issue bilaterally with each of the rival claimants, not wanting it to
become an issue in the China-ASEAN relationship, which is essentially
economic.
28
29
Maritime Claims
Brunei
China
Malaysia
Philippines
Spratly Islands
Vietnam
Figure 2 Overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea
China under the Kuomintang government, and the nine-dash line continued to be included in official maps published by the Peoples Republic of
China after 1949
While the Philippines claim to the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands to
China) was first submitted to the United Nations in 1946, its involvement
did not begin in earnest until 1956 when Filipino adventurer Tomas
Cloma proclaimed the founding of a new state, named Kalayaan. The
Philippines claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys are based on res
nullius (nobodys property) and geography. When Japan renounced
its sovereignty over the islands in the San Francisco Treaty in 1951,
the islands became res nullius and available for annexation. The Philippines maintains that, geographically, all the islands it claims lie within
30
Recent incidents
The Philippines, which has had several recent run-ins with China, was
one of several ASEAN claimants to protest against Chinas 2009 submission to the UN of a claim to the South China Sea, based on the
nine-dash line. The Philippines was also one of the more vocal supporters of US Secretary Clintons defence of maritime security and call for
resolution of disputes according to the international law at the 2010
ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi.
31
The Philippines latest confrontation with China was the April 2012
standoff over Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), in which Chinese
government vessels blocked a Philippine naval ship from arresting
Chinese fishermen accused of illegally harvesting coral and poaching
sharks in the disputed waters. Both China and the Philippines used the
incident to more boldly assert their sovereignty over the area. China
took the opportunity to normalise its claims of sovereignty over the
South China Sea area, while Manila used the showdown to spark nationalist fervour, to internationalise the issue and draw the USA, Japan and
ASEAN into the dispute to counter Chinas growing strength.3
Vietnam also has had problems with China. On 26 May 2011, two
Chinese maritime surveillance vessels cut off the exploration cables of
a Vietnamese oil survey ship searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnams EEZ some 120 kilometres off the southern Vietnamese coast. The
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry released videos of a Chinese vessel actually breaking the cable attached to the Binh Minh, a Vietnamese
vessel.4 Jiang Yu, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, declared
that the Chinese vessel had engaged in completely normal marine
enforcement and surveillance activities in Chinas jurisdictional
area.5 On 9 June 2011, a Chinese fishing boat similarly rammed the
survey cables of another Vietnamese survey vessel.
32
sovereignty, resources and security in the South China Sea, there are
deeper strategic drivers beyond the immediate zone of potential conflict.
For China, energy security is the main consideration. The recent Arab
Awakening in North Africa and the Middle East has affected Chinas
overseas energy strategy, posing potential constraints and raising
costs. China was propelled to further implement an energy diversification strategy, and shift its oil and gas development focus to the ocean,
particularly to the South China Sea, which is believed to be a reservoir
of energy, with some estimates of 130 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of gas.9
Domestically, the Chinese government faces increasing nationalism and
pressure. Some Chinese scholars believe that the previous somewhat
passive approach of China in the South China Sea is largely due to its
slow resource development process there. They believe that while
China abides by the maxim of shelving territorial differences and engaging in joint development, Vietnam and the Philippines do not follow
this principle. This gives rise to statements like In the face of big
exploration of oil and gas in the South China Sea by those concerned
countries, China must accelerate the speed of its development in the
South China Sea.10 If China has achieved effective development and
management of the maritime resources within the traditional intermittent
line, the possibility of the increase in the frequency and deterioration of
the South China Sea dispute would likely have been much lower. 11
Under such circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that China would step
up the search for energy resources in those waters and increase support for
the participation of its oil companies in the development of offshore oil
and gas projects. The importance which the relevant ministries and oil
companies in China attach to the development and utilisation of oil and
gas resources in the South China Sea suggests that the South China Sea
will undoubtedly become a main source of Chinas oil and gas supply
in the future, particularly if environmental awareness and energy diversification cause natural gas to gradually replace coal in China.
China is currently Asias largest offshore energy producer, followed by
Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. Currently, Chinas offshore oil production reaches more than 600,000 barrels per day, accounting for
about 15 per cent of Chinas total oil production.12 In recent years,
Chinese oil companies have made great breakthroughs in developing
oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. Currently, most of this production comes from undisputed areas. The Bohai Gulf is currently
33
34
35
of 2012, the USA sent a strong signal of support for the Philippines,
speaking out on the issue at several ASEAN forums, selling the Philippines a decommissioned Hamilton-class coast guard cutter in October
2011 and promising another in 2012, increasing troop rotations and
joint training in the Philippines, and committing to expanding port
visits and joint exercises between US and Philippines navies. All these
have led to a new plateau of distrust and tension in Philippine-China
relations.
36
37
and the Diaoyu (Senkaku) dispute. Hence, in seeking a more active political role in the South China Sea dispute, Japan is strengthening its diplomatic and defence ties with the Philippines and Vietnam, using
multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and
the East Asian Summit (EAS) to check perceived Chinese assertiveness
in the South China Sea.
For example, in 2012, as the South China Sea dispute got tense, Tokyo
decided to strengthen its military cooperation with the Philippines and
planned to provide the Japan Coast Guards oldest 1000 ton patrol
vessels to the Philippines. According to media report, [t]he easing of
the arms export restrictions in 2011 may have played a role in the agreement to transfer these vessels for the purpose of helping the Philippines
in enhancing their maritime security.34 Japan has also undertaken the
training of Filipino coast guard personnel. Prime Minister Noda
agreed with visiting Philippine President Aquino in Tokyo in September
2011 that both countries would increase bilateral vice-minister strategic
dialogue and would help Manila bolster its coast guard.35
Japan is also providing personnel training and material assistance to
Vietnam to strengthen its maritime capability. In October 2011, the Japanese media reported that Tokyo and Hanoi have agreed to reinforce
their defense cooperation in light of Chinas increasing influence in
the South China Sea.36 When Foreign Minister Gemba met with Vietnamese counterpart Pham Binh Minh in Hanoi in July 2012 after attending ASEAN-related ministerial meetings in Phnom Penh, Vietnam
requested Japanese assistance to help train coast guard personnel and
improve its coastal defence capabilities. In exchange, Hanoi may purchase Japanese nuclear power plants and extract rare earth minerals
for sale to Japan.37
Besides strengthening ties with the Philippines and Vietnam, Japan has
always sought to use the ARF and EAS to deal with the South China Sea
dispute. For example, in October 2011, Japanese Foreign Minister
Gemba Koichiro floated a proposal for a maritime regime for the EAS
meeting to be held in Bali, Indonesia, the following month.38 The key
Japanese idea was a multilateral approach, to include Japan and
ASEANs other dialogue partners, to construct a maritime regime in
the South China Sea based on the freedom of navigation, international
law and peaceful settlement of disputes. Not surprisingly, Tokyos
attempts to build a new maritime architecture for the South China Sea
has been viewed as muddying the water by Beijing.39
38
Thus, Indian and Japanese involvement in the area and their developing
ties with Vietnam and the Philippines are making the situation in the
South China Sea more difficult and increasing the risk that there will
be a miscalculation by one of the parties.
39
40
Conclusion
As China rises as an economic and political power, some ASEAN
countries remain uncertain about Chinas long-term intentions in Southeast Asia. This uncertainty, their rising domestic nationalism and their
active search for energy resources in the South China Sea will continue
to create tension in their bilateral relations with China.
Chinas economic rise has boosted national confidence to levels unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution. Chinese nationalists increasingly blame the government for perceived inaction and are pressing
for a more muscular stance, while the USA is reasserting its presence
in the Asia-Pacific region and making efforts to strengthen ties with
the Philippines and Vietnam. The involvement of India and Japan has
also served to raise the temperature. It is to be hoped that the increasing
bellicosity of recent statements does not foreshadow a more difficult
situation on the ground, or rather on the Sea.
However, at this stage there is no reason to regard military confrontation
as likely or inevitable. Economically, China and ASEAN countries have
become increasingly interdependent, as China is currently the second
largest trade partner of ASEAN, and ASEAN is the third largest trade
partner of China. In the light of increasing economic ties and mutual
desire for regional peace and stability, China and ASEAN-related
countries are likely to make every effort to stabilise their bilateral
relations. President Aquino stated during his state visit to China in
August 2011 that China-Philippines relations will not be affected by
the dispute over the South China Sea, reiterating the need to deal
with the disputes through peaceful dialogue, and to continue to maintain
regional peace, security and stability, creating a favorable environment
for economic growth.43 And it is important to note that some procedural
progress was made in 2011. In November 2011, China made a goodwill
41
NOTES
1.
Shen Jiangming, Chinas sovereignty over the South China Sea islands: a historical perspective. Chinese Journal of International Law Vol. 1. Issue 1 (2002): 94
157.
2. Zou Keyuan, The Chinese traditional maritime boundary line in the South China
Sea and its legal consequences for the resolution of the dispute over the Spratly
Islands. International Journal of Marine Coastal Law Vol. 14. Issue 1 (1999): 52.
3. Taiwan should cooperate with China on South China Sea. Focus Taiwan, May 13,
2012.
4. Alex Watts, Tensions rise as Vietnam accuses China of sabotage. The Sydney
Morning Herald, June 2, 2011. http://www.smh.com.au/world/tensions-rise-asvietnam-accuses-china-of-sabotage-20110601-1fgno.html.
5. China reprimands Vietnam over offshore oil exploration. Reuters, May 28, 2011.
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL3E7GS07E20110528.
6. Richard Javad Heydarian, USs pivots on the Philippines. AsiaTimes online,
September 27, 2012.
7. Tokyo concerned by Chinese build-up. The Strait Times, August 3, 2011.
8. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving the
Peoples Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2011, p.55.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf.
9. Jane Perlez, Rising stakes in South China Sea. International Herald Tribune, June
1, 2012.
10. An ying-min, Lun nanhai zhengyi quyu youqi ziyuan gongtong kaifa de
moshi xuanze (On the mode of jointly developing oil and gas in South
China Sea). Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific (Dangdai yatai) No. 6 (2011):
124 140.
11. Li liang, nanhai: jiakuai kaifa caineng huajie zhengyi (South China
Sea: further development can solve disputs). http://sdfa.chinajournal.net.cn/
EditorB/WebPublication/paperDigest.aspx?paperID=SDFA201104010&isCnki=
ck01 [accessed July 23, 2012].
42
12. Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, Energy nationalism goes to sea in Asia.
Asias Rising Energy And Resource Nationalism, NBR Special Report #31, September 2011.
13. Wang kang-peng, zhonghaiyou shiyou meng (CNOOCs oil dream). http://
china5e.com/show.php?contentid-160243&page=3 [accessed June 28, 2012].
14. Picking apart nationalist rhetoric around Chinas new oil rig. The Wall Street
Journal, May 11, 2012.
15. Vietnam: Vietsovpetro finds more oil at Bach Ho field offshore Vietnam. EnergyPedia News, June 29, 2011. http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/vietnam/
vietsovpetro-finds-more-oil-at-bach-ho-field-offshore-vietnam .
16. Philippines to seek more oil in West Philippine Sea. Inquiry Global Nation, June
29, 2012. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/5034/philippines-to-seek-more-oil-inwest-philippine-sea.
17. Philippines pulls markers from disputed waters. channelnewsasia.com, June 15,
2011. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1135238/1/.
html.
18. Tulay (Philippines), November 6, 1995.
19. David G. Wiencek and John C. Baker, Security Risks of a South China Sea Conflict, in John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek (Eds.), Cooperative Monitoring in
the South China Sea: Satellite Imagery, Confidence Building Measures, and the
Spratly Island Disputes. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002, p.54.
20. Xihua News Net, Mei lalong Feilibin, Feilibin huiying Nanhai buxuyao Meiguo
(The US to win over the Philippines, the Philippines said the South China Sea does
not need the US). http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-08/12/content_14003259.
htm [accessed June 28, 2012].
21. Jerry E. Esplanada, Del. Rosario defines 3 pillars of foreign policy. Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 3, 2011.
22. Renato Cruz De Castro, The Philippines in 2011. Asian Survey Vol. 57. Issue 1
(2012).
23. Joseph Santolan, Tensions escalate over the South China Sea. May 3, 2011. http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2011/may2011/phil-m03.shtml [accessed July 23, 2012].
24. Margie Mason, Former enemies US, Vietnam now military mates. USATODAY.
com, August 8, 2010. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2010-0807-1453818316_x.htm.
25. US, Vietnam start military relationship. DefenseNews, August 1, 2011. http://
www.defensenews.com/article/20110801/DEFSECT03/108010307/U-S-VietnamStart-Military-Relationship.
26. Lien Hoang, US, Vietnam inch closer together. AsiaTimes online, June 12, 2012.
27. Rizal Sukma, Indonesia-China relations: the politics of re-engagement. Asian
Survey, August 2009.
28. Although Chinas nine-dotted line map overlaps part of the Exclusive Economic
Zone extending from Natuna Islands, Beijing has repeatedly ensured Jakarta in
unofficial diplomatic interactions that it has acknowledged Indonesias sovereignty
over the Natuna Islands.
43
29. Craig Whitlock, US to end ban on Indonesias special forces, angering human
rights groups. The Washington Post, July 23, 2010.
30. Indrani Bagchi, China harasses Indian naval ship on South China Sea. Times of
India, September 2, 2011. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/
india/30105514_1_south-china-sea-spratly-ins-airavat.
31. Ananth Krishnan, South China Sea projects an infringement on sovereignty, says
China. The Hindu, September 19, 2011, ,http://www.thehindu.com/news/
international/article2468317.ece?css = print.
32. Sachin Parashar, New Delhi tries to snap Beijings string of pearls. The Times of
India, October 20, 2011. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-10-20/
india/30302032_1_nguyen-phu-trong-thein-sein-naypyidaw.
33. China needs to show restraint in South China Sea. Mainichi Daily News, June 30,
2011.
34. Disputes in the South China Sea: Is Japan Coming to the Rescue?. Japan Security
Watch, May 26, 2012.
35. China urges Vietnam, India to pursue peaceful actions. China Daily, October 15,
2012.
36. Japan, Vietnam agree on defense cooperation. Asahi Shimbun, October 25, 2011.
37. Japan pledges to help Vietnam bolster coastal defense. Kyodo, July 14, 2012.
38. Editorial: Government must boost security, economic ties with ASEAN. Daily
Yomiuri, October 15, 2012.
39. Japan muddies the waters in the South China Sea. China Daily, October 10, 2011.
40. Chinas Customs Statistics Yearbook, 2011.
41. National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook, 2011.
42. Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng, Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early twenty-first
century. Asian Survey Vol. 51. Issue 2 (2011).
43. Joint Declaration of the PRC and the Republic of the Philippines. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of PRC. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/1179/t854349.
htm [accessed June 28, 2012].