B.

Eminent Domain
7. City Govt of QC v Ericta
FACTS: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 which regulates the
establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within
the jurisdiction and providing penalties for the violation, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
ISSUE: W/N Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain?
RULING: NO. The Court held that expropriation requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell
to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear
from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of
the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of
power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to
cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating.
The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been
impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
MAIN PT OF THE CASE: Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to
condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. Thus, to satisfy the Art.
III Sec. 9 of the Constitution, just compensation is required.

8. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v Sec. of the DSWD

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, as
amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF
insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as
a tax deduction.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution,
which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of
the States police power.
ISSUE: W/N the challenged governmental act is valid exercise of eminent domain?
RULING: YES. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, under Art. III Sec 9, property
interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of
just compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to
the expropriating authority. However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction
of the property is not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be present.
Although the private property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of just
compensation is warranted because of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of
the public. Thus, burden of proof lies upon the party alleging it.
MAIN PT OF THE CASE: Under the specific circumstances of this case, such determination can
only be made upon the presentation of competent proof that deprivation or reduction of profits or
income must be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.

9. OSG v Ayala Land Incorporated

FACTS: Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee
Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las
Pias intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar
establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal
sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of
the Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
ISSUE: W/N prohibition against the respondents collection of parking fees, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties?
RULING: The Court notes that, under Article III Sec 9 Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. Thus, a regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of
his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so
slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. The prohibition in this case is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from
profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and
operation of the required parking facilities.
MAIN PT OF THE CASE: The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of
just compensation.