Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COURT OF
AUTHOR:
APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH
DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 150276 February 12, 2008
TOPIC: Rule 40-56
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
1. Sometime Feb and March 1986 petitioner, in Sogod, Southern Leyte,
represented to private complainants Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo
Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza
Florendo that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment
and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad.
a. She then asked from them payment of placement and processing
fees (total: P15,000.00).
b. Viewing this as a golden opportunity for the amelioration of their
lives, the private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to
Manila, relying on her promise that they would be deployed by July
1986.
c. They never left the country on said date.
d. Petitioner informed tham that there were no available plane tickets
and that theyd leave by Sept.
2. Nov 1986 still here.
a. prompted private complainants to suspect that something was
amiss, and they demanded the return of their money.
b. Petitioner assured them refund of the fees and even executed
promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her
assurances were mere pretenses.
3. Early months of 1987 complainants then initiated formal charges for
estafa against petitioner.
a. After preliminary investigation the Provincial Prosecutor filed with
RTC Maasin, Southern Leyte 7 separate infos for Estafa, defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2(a) RPC.
b. On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly
heard by the trial court.
4. TRIAL
a. petitioner testified
i. that she was an employee of the Commission on Audit who
worked as a part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency
owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez;
ii. that she received the amounts claimed by the complainants
and remitted the same to Ramirez;
iii. that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not
with her; and
iv. that she was only forced to execute the promissory notes.
5. Nov 9, 1994 RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the charges of estafa.
6. CA - affirmed the RTC ruling.
a. The CA ruled that the complainants positively identified petitioner,
their townmate, as the one who falsely presented herself as
possessing a license to recruit persons for overseas employment.
b. The seven (7) complainants relied on that representation when they
paid the amount she required as a condition for their being
employed abroad.
c. Petitioner even admitted receiving the said fees.
d. The prosecution had then satisfactorily proved that she committed
the offense of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC.
e. Her defense that she was merely an agent of the real recruiter was
deemed as merely a last-ditch effort to absolve herself of authorship
of the crime.
f. The CA noted that Ramirez was never mentioned when petitioner
conducted her recruitment activities, and no evidence was further
introduced to show that petitioner remitted the said fees to Ramirez.
7. May 30, 2001 (within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review) petitioner filed with the appellate
court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.
a. June 28 the CA, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
8. Petitioner then filed an MR of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA.
a. CA denied it on Aug 17, in the other assailed Resolution.
9. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing, among others, that:
a. (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed
her right to file a motion for reconsideration of the CAs decision, and
consequently an appeal therefrom;
b. (2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her previous counsel
especially when the latters negligence and mistake would prejudice
her substantial rights and would affect her life and liberty;
c. (3) the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed
petitioners conviction for the other four (4) criminal casesCriminal
Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269absent any direct testimony
from the complainants in those cases;
d. (4) she was deprived of her constitutional right to cross-examine the
complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; and
e. (5) she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to
her guilt in all the seven (7) criminal cases.
ISSUE(S): WON Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy NO.
of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an
affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land;
that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in
favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had
later issued to the respondents.
2. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being
friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence.
3. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Considering further that the land
subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain,
consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to
the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar
Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been committed
in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the
Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction
over the nature of this action.
4. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
5. The petitioners had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that
certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the
proper remedy to assail the trial courts dismissal of the case
HELD:
No. Nonetheless, the CA should have given due course to the petition.
RATIO:
1. The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari,
considering that the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a
final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper
remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy,
is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
2. Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action
for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light
order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the
denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or
final order itself.
7. The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997
version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the
time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included
an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order
reconsideration;
denying a
motion
12. Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not
being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is
better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome
the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a
void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law
and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be
defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus,
and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a
superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.
13. The petitioners complaint self-styled as being for the quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate,
reconveyance and damages would challenge the efficacy of the respondents
certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid transfer or
assignment from the petitioners predecessor in interest to the respondents
of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit assigning such rights
and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
14. The petitioners cause of action for reconveyance has support in
jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish a right in a
piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya, in order that a transfer of
the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally
effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and
submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and
registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a
holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person
considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon,
such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law.
Under Director of Lands v. Rizal, the purchaser in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot
purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in
full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that
of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.
15. Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, had grantee Teofilo Reterta
perfected his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him
and taken title from him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
to the Foundation.
(f) In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner
and respondent decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation
consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of funds, the title
was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.
(g)
that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this,
and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property
went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey
her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, petitioner
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.
(h)
that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated.
Petitioner left respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly
ignored, disrespected, and insulted her. Respondent claimed, however,
that petitioner left because she detested his act of firing their driver. It
was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.
8. RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was
clearly between petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent, disposing of the case in this wise: involves recovery of
possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and tried
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has
jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly
a real action.
9. Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC
denied
10. Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction
and treating pets complaint as a real action.
11. While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court,
petitioner passed away on November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel
prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's
estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son,
Father Roberto A. Latorre.
ISSUE(S): WON petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure
questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at
bar.
HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible
error in the trial courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although
the trial court obviously meant to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
RATIO:
First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead
of the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the
recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied
AUTHOR:
10.
CA: affirmed RTCs dismissal on the 2nd cause of action, but held that the
RTC should have conducted trial on the first cause of action.
10.1 CA adjudged the petitioners liable for damages.
11.
Hence this petition.
11.1 Petitioners assert that respondents appeal was filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003,
and he only had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11,
2003.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time?
HELD: No. It was filed on time.
RATIO:
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary
appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original
judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing
or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,
596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period
rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This
would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to
cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes
rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of
Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The determinative issue is whether
the fresh period rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September
2, 2003 of the RTC dismissing his complaint on September 26, 2003.
Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received
on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal.
Clearly, under the fresh period rule.
4
5
6
b Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective
Deeds of Donation, in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban
Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Subsequently, on September 2, 1994,
petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and
Reconveyance of the subject property. However, the Deeds of Revocation were not
registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the Foundation.
c Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was
owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally
demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however,
refused to heed.
d Petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse
claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in
favor of respondent.
e claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged by
respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration
for her share of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was
improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection
and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth
the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent
insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half
() portion of the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City,
respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City
and not of Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he
was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an
international organization.
RTC issued a TRO, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent
RTC denied respondent's MTD. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or
personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after,
and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
RESPONDENT filed an Answer Ad Cautelam:
a insisting, that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid.
b that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation in 1987 after he was
maltreated.
c that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for
petitioner's needs.
d for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties.
e To spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it to the Foundation.
f In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent
decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation.
However, due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred but remained in the name of
the Foundation.
g that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this, and the fact that the
rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that
petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that,
petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.
h that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left
respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly ignored, disrespected, and insulted
her. Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she detested his act of
firing their driver. It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.
8 RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between
petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this
wise: involves recovery of possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and
tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear
the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.
9 Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied
10 Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction and treating pets
complaint as a real action.
11 While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on
November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the appointment of a
representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners
other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.
ISSUE(S): WON petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to
Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC
is the proper remedy in the case at bar.
HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial
courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
RATIO:
First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of
Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property
on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to
Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the
denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that
respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner's
assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his
ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions
of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes
of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by
Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.
In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on
the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative
value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate
this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly
clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will
not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower
tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.
driving a Mitsubishi L300 van and was sent to fetch some employees of
Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon
City. Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia Vargas
Street in Pasig City. He was headed towards Meralco Avenue at a
cruising speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, when he noticed a tenwheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the
latters lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to avoid a
collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a
result, petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained physical
injuries and both vehicles were damaged.
3. October 15, 1997: the management of Maxims required petitioner to
submit, within 48 hours, a written explanation as to what happened
that early morning of September 27, 1997. He complied but his
employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was
preventively suspended for 30 days, effective October 20, 1997.
4. November 19, 1997: Maxims terminated petitioner for cause.
5. Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause
for the severance of his employment, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
6. Labor Arbiter: found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to
avoid the collision.
7. October 8, 1998: instead of filing the requisite pleading for appeal,
petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC. The
NLRC opted to treat petitioners motion as an appeal.
8. NLRC: reversed LAs decision petitioner was not negligent ->
respondent filed a MR-> denied
9. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals alleging that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in: (a) giving due
course to petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration notwithstanding
that it was a prohibited pleading under Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure and despite want of showing that it was
seasonably filed; and (b) for substituting its own findings to the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter.
10.
CA: in favor of respondents
ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration can be
considered as an appeal to the NLRC
HELD: Yes. A motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a
Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration
shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an
appeal (nakacomply si Petitioner)
RATIO:
9 Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the Fourth (4th) Division of the CA.
Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper mode
of appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of appeal due to
the reference by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing procedure for
appeals to the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be
followed, not Section 60. The reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an
ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the proper manner of appealing decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts on just compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.
ISSUE(S): whether ordinary appeal is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts
HELD: NO. A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting
an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases
involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of
RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There
is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for construction, but only application
RATIO:
First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of
Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference
to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to
the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of
Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax
Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.
Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is
prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial
agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)
included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for
review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately
classified as a quasi-judicial agency.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the
proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by
this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.
Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with
Section 60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for
review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of
Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that
RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be
conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is
necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to designate the mode by which the appeal is
to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the
procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.
According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should
prevail over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary
interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the underprivileged.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the
adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 60 of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can coexist.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided
by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct
amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such
objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for
review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the governmentacquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case
at bar in which the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No.
47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division
(CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.
Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the
reglementary period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special
Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
85!!!!!!!!!!!!
FACTS:
In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego,
Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila
to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were
accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who introduced them to the agencys
President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes
asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told
to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.
On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the
processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called
appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees.
Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from
the Taiwan employers.
Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private
complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellantwho
told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to
Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money
she received from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus, on
January 13, 1999, private complainants filed their complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of
appellant.
On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private
complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellants
sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from
participation in the case against appellant.
For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal
recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of
Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary
for three months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on
the telephone and told her to receive private complainants processing fees.
In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was
absent, she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she
thereafter remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agencys
license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.
RTC: accused Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby found guilty of the offense
charged in the Information for violation of Sec. 6 (l), (m) in relation to Sec. 7
(b) of R.A. 8042 without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of facts of the trial court in this case
should be adopted by this Court
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court.
However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception
obtains in this case.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and
found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary,
had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant
started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked
to hold and document employment contracts from the foreign employers.
She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the
business was managed. The trial courts finding that appellant, being the
secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non
sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the
prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused
for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non
qui negat, i.e., he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The
conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of
the agency. As already established, appellant received the processing fees of
the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to
receive the same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to
deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More
importantly, she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day
before she received the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to
the suspension of the license, an event which appellant did not have control
of. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was
because the money had been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she
received it from them.
While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters
and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment
abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the
guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite
moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other
persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated the crime.
Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted.
Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
PAL vs CA
Rule 45
Facts:
Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor,
represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor Carlo Benitez,
represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint[3] for damages
RTC:
RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private
respondents.
Note: that the RTC believed the testimony of the complainants that
they indeed arrived on time, and that the reason as to why they were
not allowed to board the plane was that other non-revenue passengers
took their place. (non-revenue passenger was not defined in the case)
CA:
Affirmed the RTC ruling
SC:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
Ang gusto kasi mangyari ng PAL dito is that there be another
determination as to the aspect of determining facts of the
case.
PAL insists that the reason why the complainants were not
allowed to board the plane was that these passengers checked
in late.
56
PONENTE: Azcuna, J.
The
real
character
of
the
contract is not the title given,
but the intention of the parties.
Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) to annul and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title
to, real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of a holddeparture order from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio.
Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance
and damages.
2. In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she
bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio
and the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other coheirs; that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10,
1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy
received [a down payment] or earnest money in the amount of
P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the
contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title
covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the
purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their
individual certificates of title; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the
other half of the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio
refused and still refuses to deliver to [respondent] the certificates of
title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of
Luz Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of
the two certificates of title covering their share in the disputed lots;
that respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and
the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates
of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance;
3. As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT
AUTHOR:
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
FACTS:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de
Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield)
bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No.
2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters. Springfield developed these
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the
property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the case was docketed
as DARAB. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.
Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as
residential and not suitable for agriculture.
The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision
became final and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the
property.
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of
the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555. In its Decision
dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course
to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the
property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.
The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of
Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of Twelve
Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos
(P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the value of the property since the
property has already been developed into a subdivision.
On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the
RTC, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995
and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB
decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing.
On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated
June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil
action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 44563. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed
before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color.
In the assailed Decision dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the
DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.
CA simply denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution
dated February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues raised
concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.
ISSUE(S): whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the
DARAB.
HELD: NO, Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC
and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore
correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the
DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
RATIO:
Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, there is no
provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
DARAB judgments. Petitioners, however, contend that the RTC may take
cognizance of the annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the
RTC with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered under
such general jurisdiction.
Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision
was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law
is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on
August 10, 1981.
It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129, a court of
first instance has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment
rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same
court. This was the Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals. Yet, in
subsequent cases, the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of
comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the
branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court
or branch which heard the main action.
The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, where the
Court expressed that pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine
of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts should be
regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified
or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments
was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129
also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in
paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg.
129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to
the CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling acts,
certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are coequal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the
control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its
decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in
sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to
entertain the same.
This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the
DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section
9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It
does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, the Court affirmed the
ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was
reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled that that the
CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment
of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In Macalalag v. Ombudsman, the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions
covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner."
Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more
so, since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an
aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only, and the right to appeal is not to be
considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find application in the present
case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, on annulment of judgments are identical.
NATIONAL
HOUSING
vs.
JOSE EVANGELISTA, respondent.
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a
stranger.1
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Housing Authority
assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646, granting
respondents petition for annulment of judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed part of paragraph No. 3 of
the dispositive portion of the decision dated November 29, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. CIII, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 is hereby
declared void, non-binding and inapplicable in so far as petitioners TCT No.
122944 is concerned.
Let a copy hereof be furnished the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
proper annotation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
FACTS:
NHA filed a case for recovery of property docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9110071.5 Said case involves a real property measuring 915.50 square meters and
located in V. Luna Road, Quezon City, originally awarded in 1968 by the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to a certain Adela
Salindon.
After the death of Salindon, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the
property was transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo
and Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana. However, in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544,
entitled "Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding Judge of
Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al.," rendered by the Court on May 19, 1984,
the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared
the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurers
Office on April 23, 1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final
deed of sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and
confirmation of sale, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 84). Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 28182 in the name of Sarte, who divided the property into Lot 1-A,
measuring 570.50 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108070, and Lot 1-B,
measuring 345 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108071. 6
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City
Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants.
While the case was pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista,
a Deed of Assignment dated December 2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A. 7 TCT No. 108070
was cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the name of respondent on
December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No.
122944 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner.
On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants. The
proposed additional defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1B.10 The trial court, however, denied the motion in its Order dated May 17, 1995. 11
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages,
against Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI
Agricultural Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-95-23940.12
RTC dismissed this second case on the ground of litis pendencia.
In a decision dated November 29, 1995, the trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, with the following dispositive portion:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff National
Housing Authority as follows:
1. The auction sale is null and void
2. TCT No. 28182 subsequently issued in the name of defendant Luisito Sarte is
hereby null and void.
3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the
parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or
his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case
are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of
title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the
cancellation of such TCTs;
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial courts judgment,
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer,
assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged
extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent, since he was not a party to Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest
over the property, and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.15
The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision insofar as petitioners title to the property is
concerned.16 The CA found that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-9110071 and the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also
ruled that the judgment violated respondents right against deprivation of the property
without due process of law.17
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner took the
present recourse.
Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the trial courts denial of its motion to
include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Petitioner also claims
that the auction sale of the property by the City Treasurer of Quezon City is void ab
initio because it was never supposed to be included in the auction sale as petitioner,
which has been declared by the Court in G.R. No. L-60544 as the owner of the
property, is exempt from payment of taxes. Hence, Sarte cannot claim any right over
the same and respondent, having bought it from Sarte, does not acquire any better
right thereto. Petitioner also alleges that respondent is not a buyer in good faith
because the latter was aware of the pending litigation involving the property.18
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial courts
decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. 19 Jurisprudence and
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for
annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.20
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final
order and resolution are void.21 A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons.22
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court.23 Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision decreed that "(A)ny
transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land
subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns
before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel
or cause the cancellation of such TCTs." Respondent is adversely affected by such
judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and
title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondents title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any
evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. 24 Clearly, the trial courts judgment is
void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial courts denial of its
motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was
not petitioners fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it
was not respondents fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of
the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to include
respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner could have
brought the trial courts denial to the CA oncertiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed Civil
Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages,
against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the ground of litis
pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a party to
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial courts
judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on him.
.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.