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079 CECILIA B. ESTINOZO v.

COURT OF
AUTHOR:
APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH
DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 150276 February 12, 2008
TOPIC: Rule 40-56
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
1. Sometime Feb and March 1986 petitioner, in Sogod, Southern Leyte,
represented to private complainants Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo
Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza
Florendo that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment
and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad.
a. She then asked from them payment of placement and processing
fees (total: P15,000.00).
b. Viewing this as a golden opportunity for the amelioration of their
lives, the private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to
Manila, relying on her promise that they would be deployed by July
1986.
c. They never left the country on said date.
d. Petitioner informed tham that there were no available plane tickets
and that theyd leave by Sept.
2. Nov 1986 still here.
a. prompted private complainants to suspect that something was
amiss, and they demanded the return of their money.
b. Petitioner assured them refund of the fees and even executed
promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her
assurances were mere pretenses.
3. Early months of 1987 complainants then initiated formal charges for
estafa against petitioner.
a. After preliminary investigation the Provincial Prosecutor filed with
RTC Maasin, Southern Leyte 7 separate infos for Estafa, defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2(a) RPC.
b. On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly
heard by the trial court.
4. TRIAL
a. petitioner testified
i. that she was an employee of the Commission on Audit who
worked as a part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency
owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez;
ii. that she received the amounts claimed by the complainants
and remitted the same to Ramirez;
iii. that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not
with her; and

iv. that she was only forced to execute the promissory notes.
5. Nov 9, 1994 RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the charges of estafa.
6. CA - affirmed the RTC ruling.
a. The CA ruled that the complainants positively identified petitioner,
their townmate, as the one who falsely presented herself as
possessing a license to recruit persons for overseas employment.
b. The seven (7) complainants relied on that representation when they
paid the amount she required as a condition for their being
employed abroad.
c. Petitioner even admitted receiving the said fees.
d. The prosecution had then satisfactorily proved that she committed
the offense of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC.
e. Her defense that she was merely an agent of the real recruiter was
deemed as merely a last-ditch effort to absolve herself of authorship
of the crime.
f. The CA noted that Ramirez was never mentioned when petitioner
conducted her recruitment activities, and no evidence was further
introduced to show that petitioner remitted the said fees to Ramirez.
7. May 30, 2001 (within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review) petitioner filed with the appellate
court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.
a. June 28 the CA, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
8. Petitioner then filed an MR of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA.
a. CA denied it on Aug 17, in the other assailed Resolution.
9. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing, among others, that:
a. (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed
her right to file a motion for reconsideration of the CAs decision, and
consequently an appeal therefrom;
b. (2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her previous counsel
especially when the latters negligence and mistake would prejudice
her substantial rights and would affect her life and liberty;
c. (3) the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed
petitioners conviction for the other four (4) criminal casesCriminal
Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269absent any direct testimony
from the complainants in those cases;
d. (4) she was deprived of her constitutional right to cross-examine the
complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; and
e. (5) she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to
her guilt in all the seven (7) criminal cases.
ISSUE(S): WON Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy NO.

The Court rules to dismiss the petition.


RATIO:
1. Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question
the appellate courts issuances.
a. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order
or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review
on certiorari.
b. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special
civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of
last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
2. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate
remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on
appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law
will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a
special civil action.
3. Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an
appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for
because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the
challenged issuances.
a. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day
reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases
before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound
discretion grant the extension requested.
b. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration
of the period sought to be extended.
c. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioners Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.
4. It is well to point out that with petitioners erroneous filing of a motion for
extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration
or a petition for review from the CAs decision, the challenged decision
has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court.
a. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost
appeal certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning
party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a
decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to

review the said judgment.


b. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to
naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement
of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.
5. We reiterate what we stated in Amatorio v. People that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.
6. As a final note, we remind party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from
filing frivolous petitions for certiorari.
a. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that:
i. x x xHowever, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the
same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay,
or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. In such event, the court may award in
favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to
administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
b. The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitor, other
disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently
dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition
for certiorari under
Rule
65
are
mutually
exclusive
remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate
remedy.
080 HEIRS OF SPS. RETERTA v. SPS. AUTHOR:
MORES
NOTES: (if applicable)
G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011
TOPIC: Rules 40-56
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in
the RTC in Trece Martires City, averring that they were the true and real
owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite,
having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983;
that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his
occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in
interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession

of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an
affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land;
that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in
favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had
later issued to the respondents.
2. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being
friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence.
3. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Considering further that the land
subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain,
consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to
the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar
Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been committed
in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the
Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction
over the nature of this action.
4. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
5. The petitioners had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that
certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the
proper remedy to assail the trial courts dismissal of the case
HELD:
No. Nonetheless, the CA should have given due course to the petition.
RATIO:
1. The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari,
considering that the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a
final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper
remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy,
is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
2. Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action
for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light

of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second


paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court (An order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being
an appeal from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial
of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section
1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared
that an order denying amotion for reconsideration was not appealable. They
remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided
that in the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The petitioners position has no basis.
3. For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain
relief from was the order granting the respondents motion to
dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact
that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for
thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for
the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead
of certiorari, as the correct remedy. (Prelude to #9)
4. The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one
hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined
in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz:
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one
which has become final (or executory as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses
an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining
the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.
Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to
await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of

the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking


of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of
the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, final and executory.
xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the
parties contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to
file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or
denying applications for postponement, or production or
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment
or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be
taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
5. Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the
petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the
petitioners motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order
dismissing the action upon the respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule
explicitly states thusly:
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from the judgment or final order.
6. The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for
reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and
reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue,
or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only
seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same
issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded
are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. [10] By denying
a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial
court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final

order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the
denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or
final order itself.
7. The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997
version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the
time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included
an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order
reconsideration;

denying a

motion

for new trial or

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion


seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims
and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. (n)

8. It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December


27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order
denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a
procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on
that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly
applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed
final order.
9. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the
final order when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court
rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the
petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the
broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due
course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would
befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC
granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
10. On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has
declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of
exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages
and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice;
(d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where
the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved;
and (g) in case of urgency.
11. Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a
remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party
from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an
equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the
writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order
annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to
comply with the Rules of Court.

12. Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not
being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is
better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome
the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a
void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law
and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be
defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus,
and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a
superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.
13. The petitioners complaint self-styled as being for the quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate,
reconveyance and damages would challenge the efficacy of the respondents
certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid transfer or
assignment from the petitioners predecessor in interest to the respondents
of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit assigning such rights
and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
14. The petitioners cause of action for reconveyance has support in
jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish a right in a
piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya, in order that a transfer of
the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally
effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and
submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and
registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a
holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person
considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon,
such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law.
Under Director of Lands v. Rizal, the purchaser in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot
purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in
full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that
of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.
15. Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, had grantee Teofilo Reterta
perfected his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him
and taken title from him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the

execution of the deed in favor of the respondents be held invalid, the


interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the petitioners and the deed
should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the petitioners claim was
their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of the land.
Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners opposition to the motion to dismiss of
the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land.
16. Given the foregoing, the petitioners complaint made out a good case for
reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well
warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the
petitioners.
17. RTC has jurisdiction over the case, not LMB. The authority of LMB under
Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar
lands, did not include the petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to
have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private
person and title duly issues in the latters name. By ignoring the petitioners
showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by
disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and
capriciously.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

082 Latorre v. Latorre


AUTHOR: Pat
G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010
TOPIC: Rules 40-56
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1. PETITIONER Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed
of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son,
herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre (respondent), and one Ifzal Ali
(Ifzal).
2. Petitioner averred:
(a)
thatrespondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a
1,244-square meter real property, at Dasmarias Village, Makati City
(subject property). Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor,
declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the subject
property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration was
erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners in equal
shares.
(b)
Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent
executed their respective Deeds of Donation, in favor of The Porfirio D.
Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the
Foundation). Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and
respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and
Reconveyance of the subject property. However, the Deeds of
Revocation were not registered; hence, the subject property remained

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

in the name of the Foundation.


(c)
Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that
the subject property was owned in common by both of them. To protect
her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the
payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused
to heed.
(d)
Petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject property,
claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of
respondent.
(e)
claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her
signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never
received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration for her share
of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of
the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was
denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real
action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent
insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of
ownership over one-half () portion of the subject property. Since the
subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that
petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not
of Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction,
asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the
Asian Development Bank, an international organization.
RTC issued a TRO, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent
RTC denied respondent's MTD. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action
whether real or personal was determined by the allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to
recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after, and as a
result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
RESPONDENT filed an Answer Ad Cautelam:
(a)
insisting, that the case was a real action and that the venue was
improperly laid.
(b)
that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation
in 1987 after he was maltreated.
(c)
that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000,
and that he provided for petitioner's needs.
(d)
for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of
several real properties.
(e)
To spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it

to the Foundation.
(f) In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner
and respondent decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation
consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of funds, the title
was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.
(g)
that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this,
and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property
went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey
her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, petitioner
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.
(h)
that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated.
Petitioner left respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly
ignored, disrespected, and insulted her. Respondent claimed, however,
that petitioner left because she detested his act of firing their driver. It
was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.
8. RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was
clearly between petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent, disposing of the case in this wise: involves recovery of
possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and tried
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has
jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly
a real action.
9. Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC
denied
10. Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction
and treating pets complaint as a real action.
11. While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court,
petitioner passed away on November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel
prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's
estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son,
Father Roberto A. Latorre.
ISSUE(S): WON petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure
questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at
bar.
HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible
error in the trial courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although
the trial court obviously meant to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
RATIO:
First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead
of the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the
recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied

respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.


Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC
denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is
clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper
venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss
was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such
denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that
the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil
Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid
down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3)
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for
review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court
of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode
of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to
such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is
a question of fact.

In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court


decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the
examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented,
taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this
controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus
becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
by immemorial tradition.
081 Manaloto v. Veloso III
GR No. 171365, Oct. 6, 2010
Topic: Fresh Period Rule

AUTHOR:

FACTS: (chronological order)


1. The petitioners filed a case for unlawful detainer against the respondent.
2. MTC: decided in favor of the petitioners. MTC ordered the respondents to vacate
and to pay rentals.
3. The respondents appealed to the RTC.
While the case is pending in appeal.
4. Separately, the respondents filed a case for breach of contract.
4.1 1st cause of action: damages. Because they allegedly suffered
embarrassment.
4.2 2nd cause of action: breach. The respondents alleged that the petitioners as
lessors failed to make continuing repairs on the property.
5. Petitioners countered by filing MTD alleging no cause of action.
6. RTC: dismissed the case for splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and
failure to disclose the pendency of the related case.
Order of Dismissal received on Sept. 26, 2003
7. Petitioners filed an MR on Oct 10, 2003 (14 days after receipt of dismissal)
8. MR of petitioner denied.
Order of denial of MR received on Feb. 20, 2004.
9. The respondents fled notice of appeal to CA on March 1, 2004 (9 days after
receipt of denial of MR)

10.
CA: affirmed RTCs dismissal on the 2nd cause of action, but held that the
RTC should have conducted trial on the first cause of action.
10.1 CA adjudged the petitioners liable for damages.
11.
Hence this petition.
11.1 Petitioners assert that respondents appeal was filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003,
and he only had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11,
2003.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time?
HELD: No. It was filed on time.
RATIO:
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary
appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original
judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing
or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,
596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period
rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This
would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to
cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes
rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of
Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The determinative issue is whether
the fresh period rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that

procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September
2, 2003 of the RTC dismissing his complaint on September 26, 2003.
Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received
on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal.
Clearly, under the fresh period rule.

082 Latorre v. Latorre


AUTHOR: Pat
G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010
TOPIC: Rules 40-56
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1 PETITIONER Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a
Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre
(respondent), and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).
2 Petitioner averred:
a thatrespondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-square meter real
property, at Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract,
respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the
subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration was erroneous because
she and respondent were co-owners in equal shares.

4
5
6

b Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective
Deeds of Donation, in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban
Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Subsequently, on September 2, 1994,
petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and
Reconveyance of the subject property. However, the Deeds of Revocation were not
registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the Foundation.
c Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was
owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally
demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however,
refused to heed.
d Petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse
claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in
favor of respondent.
e claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged by
respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration
for her share of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was
improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection
and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth
the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent
insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half
() portion of the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City,
respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City
and not of Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he
was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an
international organization.
RTC issued a TRO, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent
RTC denied respondent's MTD. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or
personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after,
and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
RESPONDENT filed an Answer Ad Cautelam:
a insisting, that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid.
b that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation in 1987 after he was
maltreated.
c that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for
petitioner's needs.
d for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties.
e To spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it to the Foundation.
f In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent
decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation.
However, due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred but remained in the name of

the Foundation.
g that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this, and the fact that the
rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that
petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that,
petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.
h that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left
respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly ignored, disrespected, and insulted
her. Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she detested his act of
firing their driver. It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.
8 RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between
petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this
wise: involves recovery of possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and
tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear
the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.
9 Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied
10 Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction and treating pets
complaint as a real action.
11 While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on
November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the appointment of a
representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners
other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.
ISSUE(S): WON petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to
Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC
is the proper remedy in the case at bar.
HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial
courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
RATIO:
First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of
Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property
on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to
Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the
denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that
respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner's
assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his
ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions
of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes
of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by
Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.
In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on
the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative
value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate
this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly
clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will
not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower
tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

083 ARIEL A. TRES REYES, vs. AUTHOR:


MAXIMS TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN NOTES:
POON
G.R. No. 140853. February 27,
2003
Topic: Rule 40-56 (rule 43)
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Maxims Tea House (Maxims) had employed petitioner Ariel
Tres Reyes as a driver since October 1995. He was assigned to its M.H.
del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila branch. His working hours were from
5:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M., and among his duties was to fetch and bring to
their respective homes the employees of Maxims after the restaurant
closed for the day.
2. In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, petitioner was

driving a Mitsubishi L300 van and was sent to fetch some employees of
Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon
City. Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia Vargas
Street in Pasig City. He was headed towards Meralco Avenue at a
cruising speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, when he noticed a tenwheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the
latters lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to avoid a
collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a
result, petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained physical
injuries and both vehicles were damaged.
3. October 15, 1997: the management of Maxims required petitioner to
submit, within 48 hours, a written explanation as to what happened
that early morning of September 27, 1997. He complied but his
employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was
preventively suspended for 30 days, effective October 20, 1997.
4. November 19, 1997: Maxims terminated petitioner for cause.
5. Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause
for the severance of his employment, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
6. Labor Arbiter: found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to
avoid the collision.
7. October 8, 1998: instead of filing the requisite pleading for appeal,
petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC. The
NLRC opted to treat petitioners motion as an appeal.
8. NLRC: reversed LAs decision petitioner was not negligent ->
respondent filed a MR-> denied
9. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals alleging that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in: (a) giving due
course to petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration notwithstanding
that it was a prohibited pleading under Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure and despite want of showing that it was
seasonably filed; and (b) for substituting its own findings to the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter.
10.
CA: in favor of respondents
ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration can be
considered as an appeal to the NLRC
HELD: Yes. A motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a
Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration
shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an
appeal (nakacomply si Petitioner)
RATIO:

Arguments of the Parties


Petitioner
- argues that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the
NLRC has gravely abused its discretion in treating his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration as an appeal. Petitioner asserts that when a motion for
reconsideration of a decision of a Labor Arbiter is filed, the Commission
will properly treat it as an appeal.
- under labor law, rules of procedure should be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive
settlement of disputes. Hence, technicalities should not prevail over
substantial merits of the labor case.
Respondent
- granting without admitting, that the NLRC did indeed correctly treat
petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration as an appeal,
nonetheless, it still behooves petitioner to comply with the other
requisites for perfection of an appeal.
- said motion contained no statement when petitioner received a copy of
the Labor Arbiters decision to determine the timeliness of the motion
cum appeal, as required by Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
- Petitioners failure to pay the necessary filing fees
- appellate court committed no reversible error when it ruled that
petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration failed to comply with the
requisites of a valid appeal, hence fatally defective, e.g. for want of
verification and absence of proof that it was filed within the
reglementary period.
1. Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or
award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for
reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the
requisites of an appeal.
2. We have minutely scrutinized the records of this case, particularly the
questioned Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but we find no basis for
the appellate courts finding that said pleading did not contain a
statement as to when petitioner received a copy of the decision in
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08773-97
3. All that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with
respect to material dates is a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision. We rule that petitioners declaration in
his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on
September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said

requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the


motion in question was filed with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on
the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt by petitioner of his copy of
the Labor Arbiters decision. Otherwise put, said pleading was filed
within the reglementary ten-day period, as provided for in Section 1,
Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law on the timeliness of an
appeal from the decision, award, or order of the Labor Arbiters, states
clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof to appeal to the Commission. Needless to say, an appeal filed
at the last minute of the last day of said period is, for all intents and
purposes, still seasonably filed.
4. We find that petitioner verified his motion to reconsider the Labor
Arbiters decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same day that it was
filed. We must, perforce, rule that petitioner has substantially complied
with the verification requirement as provided for in Section 3, Rule VI of
the Commissions Rules of Procedure.
5. The records clearly show the basis for the finding of the Commission
that the appeal fees were paid (P110.00)
6. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense.1[18] They are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result
in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice,
technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted
to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be
better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed.
*** There being no clear showing that petitioner was culpable for gross
negligence, petitioners dismissal is illegal.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

084 Land Bank of the Phils. Vs De Leon


AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002]
NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Rule 40-56
PONENTE: Corona, J.:
FACTS: (chronological order)
1 The petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners
of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac covered by TCT No.
163051 with a total area of 50.1171 hectares. The subject property was voluntarily offered
for sale to the government pursuant to RA 6657 at P50,000.00 per hectare.
2 The DAR made a counter offer of P17,656.20 per hectare, or a total amount of
P884,877.54, but the same was rejected. Another offer was made by DAR increasing the
amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appellees failure to respond to the
new offer made by DAR, the DARAB took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec. 16 (d)
of RA 6657.
3 Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to
recompute the value of the subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992.
4 In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, filed with the RTC, which is the designated Special
Agrarian Court in the area, petitioners-appellees asked the court, among others, to fix the
just compensation of the subject property.
5 On March 17, 1998, the DAR filed in the CA a petition for review of the decision of the
Special Agrarian Court. The said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47005, was
assigned to the Special Third (3rd) Division of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also
initiated in the CA an appeal of the same decision of the Special Agrarian Court by filing
a notice of appeal. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60365, the said ordinary appeal was
assigned to the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals.
6 On November 6, 1998, the Special Third Division of the appellate court, rendered in CAG.R. SP No. 47005 a decision:he decision dated February 9, 1998 is partially
reconsidered. The trial court is ordered to recompute the compensation based on the
selling price of palay at 213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6%
of the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full payment is made by the government
7 Thereafter, on February 15, 2000, the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner LBPs ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365), in a resolution dated February
15, 2000: In dismissing the ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) instituted by
petitioner LBP, the appellate court reasoned that the mode of appeal followed by the
petitioner was erroneous considering that Section 60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that appeals from decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed by
LBP was ineffectual and did not stop the running of the period of appeal
8 Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution
dated May 22, 2000.

9 Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the Fourth (4th) Division of the CA.
Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper mode
of appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of appeal due to
the reference by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing procedure for
appeals to the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be
followed, not Section 60. The reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an
ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the proper manner of appealing decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts on just compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.
ISSUE(S): whether ordinary appeal is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts
HELD: NO. A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting
an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases
involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of
RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There
is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for construction, but only application
RATIO:
First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of
Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference
to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to
the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.
Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of
Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax
Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.
Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is
prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial
agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)
included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for
review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately
classified as a quasi-judicial agency.
What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the

proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by
this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.
Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with
Section 60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for
review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of
Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that
RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be
conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is
necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to designate the mode by which the appeal is
to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the
procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.
According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should
prevail over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary
interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the underprivileged.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the
adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 60 of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can coexist.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided
by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct
amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such
objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for
review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the governmentacquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case
at bar in which the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No.
47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division
(CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.
Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the
reglementary period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special

Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
85!!!!!!!!!!!!

086 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AUTHOR:


vs. ELIZABETH BETH CORPUZ
NOTES: (if applicable)
G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003
TOPIC: RULE 40-56
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego,
Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila
to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were
accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who introduced them to the agencys
President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes
asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told
to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.
On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the
processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called
appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees.
Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from
the Taiwan employers.
Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private
complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellantwho
told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to
Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money
she received from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus, on
January 13, 1999, private complainants filed their complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of
appellant.
On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private
complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellants
sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from
participation in the case against appellant.
For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal
recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of
Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary
for three months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on
the telephone and told her to receive private complainants processing fees.
In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was
absent, she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she
thereafter remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agencys
license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.
RTC: accused Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby found guilty of the offense
charged in the Information for violation of Sec. 6 (l), (m) in relation to Sec. 7
(b) of R.A. 8042 without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstances

attendant to its commission, without applying the benefit of the


Indeterminate Sentence Law, Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby sentenced to
suffer a life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of facts of the trial court in this case
should be adopted by this Court
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court.
However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception
obtains in this case.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and
found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary,
had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant
started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked
to hold and document employment contracts from the foreign employers.
She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the
business was managed. The trial courts finding that appellant, being the
secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non
sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the
prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused

for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non
qui negat, i.e., he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The
conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of
the agency. As already established, appellant received the processing fees of
the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to
receive the same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to
deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More
importantly, she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day
before she received the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to
the suspension of the license, an event which appellant did not have control
of. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was
because the money had been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she
received it from them.
While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters
and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment
abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the
guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite
moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other
persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated the crime.
Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted.
Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

PAL vs CA
Rule 45
Facts:
Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor,
represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor Carlo Benitez,
represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint[3] for damages

against petitioner due to the latters failure to honor their confirmed


tickets.
On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew
of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR
178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a
certain Dra. Emily Chua.[5] They were accompanied by Atty.
Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at
the check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three persons
behind him[6] while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the station
manager to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be allowed to use
the ticket ofDra. Chua.[7] While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked
by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the
counter. Fojas wrote something on the tickets which Gonzales later
read as late check-in 7:05
Even though they clearly arrived on time, they were not allowed to
board the plane. Later on it was found out that there was over booking
and that non-revenue passengers were allowed to board the plane.
They tried to ride the bus but the bus had already left for manila.
They decided to return to the airport for an afternoon flight, the flight
was subsequently cancelled due to aircraft malfunction.

RTC:
RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private
respondents.
Note: that the RTC believed the testimony of the complainants that
they indeed arrived on time, and that the reason as to why they were
not allowed to board the plane was that other non-revenue passengers
took their place. (non-revenue passenger was not defined in the case)
CA:
Affirmed the RTC ruling
SC:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
Ang gusto kasi mangyari ng PAL dito is that there be another
determination as to the aspect of determining facts of the
case.
PAL insists that the reason why the complainants were not
allowed to board the plane was that these passengers checked
in late.

According to PAL the findings of the RTC is grounded entirely on


speculations, surmises or conjectures. Hence, exception daw ito sa
general rule that findings of facts of the appellate court is binding upon
the sc.
Sc ruled that the exception is not applicable in this case and that the
complainants have sufficiently proven that they arrived on time to
check in for their flight.
What is the doctrine of this case? It pertains to rule 45!!!!!!
Doctrine:
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties
and passed upon by this Court. [18]Factual findings of the appellate court are
generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the
findings of the trial court. [19] This is because it is not our function to analyze
or weigh the evidence all over again. [20] However, this general rule admits of
exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;
(c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and,
(h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record
AGUSTO V RIOS

089 Escueta v. Lim


AUTHOR:
TOPIC: Section 3 of Rule 38; Rule 40- NOTES:

56
PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

The doctrine of estoppel is not only


that which prohibits a party from
assuming
inconsistent
positions,
based on the principle of election, but
that which precludes him from
repudiating an obligation voluntarily
assumed after having accepted
benefits therefrom. To countenance
such repudiation would be contrary
to equity, and would put a premium
on fraud or misrepresentation.

The
real
character
of
the
contract is not the title given,
but the intention of the parties.
Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) to annul and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title
to, real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of a holddeparture order from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio.
Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance
and damages.
2. In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she
bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio
and the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other coheirs; that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10,
1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy
received [a down payment] or earnest money in the amount of
P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the
contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title
covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the
purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their
individual certificates of title; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the
other half of the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio
refused and still refuses to deliver to [respondent] the certificates of
title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of
Luz Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of
the two certificates of title covering their share in the disputed lots;
that respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and
the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates
of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance;
3. As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the

disputed lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it


is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected
by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by
Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondents title.
4. Respondent has no cause of action, because the subject contract of
sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned,
since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that
respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally
promised on or before May 1, 1990.
5. Respondent has no cause of action, because Rubio has not entered into
a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his daughter Patricia
Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virginia Rubio
Laygo Lim (Lim for brevity) who was the one who represented him in
the sale of the disputed lots in favor of respondent; that the P100,000
respondent claimed he received as down payment for the lots is a
simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
ISSUE(S): Whether the contract of sale between petitioners and respondent
is valid.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners
and respondent is valid. Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-infact, Alejandrino Baloloy.
- In the Baloloys answer to the original complaint and amended complaint,
the allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the Baloloys are
clearly admitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48282, dated October 26, 1998 and
January 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
RATIO:
Consequently, Ignacio Rubio could no longer sell the subject properties
to Corazon Escueta, after having sold them to respondent. "[I]n a
contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and
cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded
x x x." The records do not show that Ignacio Rubio asked for a
rescission of the contract. What he adduced was a belated revocation
of the special power of attorney he executed in favor of Patricia Llamas.
"In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been
stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon
the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may
pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for
rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or
by a notarial act.
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court

Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence


exists in order that the petition for relief may be granted (Rule 38
Sec1). There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that "prevents a party from
having a trial x x x or from presenting all of his case to the court"
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the abovecited rule. "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party
acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not
from the date he actually read the same."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
PRE-TRIAL is mandatory.
The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their
former counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is charges with
the duty of notifying the party represented by him. He must see to it
that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial.
What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in
their motion is the belated receipt of the special power of attorney, not
that they have not received the notice or been informed of the
scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special
power of attorney in their motion, they are not deemed to have waived
it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings.
For lack of representation, Baloloy was properly declared in default.
SEC 3. TIME FOR FILING PETITION; CONTENTS AND
VERIFICATION - a petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within 60 days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be
set aside, and not more that 6 months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense as the case
may be.
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above
rule. the 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired
knowledge of the order, judgment, or proceedings and not from the
date he actually read the same. Further, no fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence exists in order that the PETITION FOR RELIEF may
be granted.

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT

AUTHOR:

The rule is that where legislation


provides for an appeal from decisions
of certain administrative bodies to
the CA, it means that such bodies are
co-equal with the RTC, in terms of
rank and stature, and logically,
February beyond the control of the latter.

CORPORATION, INC. vs.


HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
G.R. NO. 142628
6, 2007
TOPIC:

PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:

Given that DARAB decisions are


appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a
co-equal body with the RTC and
its decisions are beyond the
RTC's control. The CA was therefore
correct in sustaining the RTC's
dismissal of the petition for
annulment of the DARAB Decision
dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC
does not have any jurisdiction to
entertain the same.

FACTS:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de
Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield)
bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No.
2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters. Springfield developed these
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the
property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the case was docketed
as DARAB. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.
Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as
residential and not suitable for agriculture.
The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision
became final and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the
property.
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of

the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555. In its Decision
dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course
to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the
property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.
The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of
Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of Twelve
Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos
(P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the value of the property since the
property has already been developed into a subdivision.
On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the
RTC, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995
and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB
decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing.
On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated
June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil
action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 44563. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed
before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color.
In the assailed Decision dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the
DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.
CA simply denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution
dated February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues raised
concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.
ISSUE(S): whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the
DARAB.
HELD: NO, Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC
and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore
correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the
DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
RATIO:

Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, there is no
provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
DARAB judgments. Petitioners, however, contend that the RTC may take
cognizance of the annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the
RTC with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered under
such general jurisdiction.
Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision
was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law
is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on
August 10, 1981.
It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129, a court of
first instance has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment
rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same
court. This was the Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals. Yet, in
subsequent cases, the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of
comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the
branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court
or branch which heard the main action.
The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, where the
Court expressed that pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine
of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts should be
regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified
or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments
was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129
also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in
paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg.
129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to
the CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling acts,

are specifically appealable to the CA.


Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the
RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court
ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the
decisions of the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial
body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg.
129, in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the
conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC
had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior
courts and administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This
is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court
recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final
judgments. Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the RTC had
the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final
judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal
ranking with such inferior courts.
The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether the DARAB is
a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior court such that the RTC
may take cognizance of an action for the annulments of its judgments. The
answer is no.
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and
129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 1988
specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders,
rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order,
award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute
or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the
Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly
provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of

certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are coequal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the
control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its
decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in
sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to
entertain the same.
This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the
DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section
9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It
does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasijudicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, the Court affirmed the
ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was
reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled that that the
CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment
of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In Macalalag v. Ombudsman, the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions
covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner."
Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more
so, since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an
aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only, and the right to appeal is not to be
considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find application in the present
case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, on annulment of judgments are identical.

Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to


annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like
the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
92 DIONA v. BALANGUE
R failed to pay P for loan so P filed
G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013
case. RTC rendered decision imposing
TOPIC: Rule 47: Annulment of
5% monthly interest but the
Judgment; exception to final
complaint only prayed for 12% per
judgment rule; lack of due process as annum interest. Former counsel for R
additional ground
was negligent, bobo. R filed w/ CA
DEL CASTILLO, J.
petition for annulment of judgment,
thru new counsel, saying that the RTC
decision deprived them of property
w/o due process as the 5% monthly
was in excess of the relief sought in
the complaint which is 12% per
annum (violation of sec3(d) rule9).
SC: Annulment of judgment was
proper. While extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction are the only grounds,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul
a judgment.
FACTS:
1. Respondents obtained a loan of P45K from petitioner payable in 6
months and secured by a REM. Respondents failed to pay despite
demand. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC praying that
respondents be ordered to pay petitioner the principal obligation and
12% interest, actual damages, attys fees, and to issue a decree of
foreclosure upon failure to fully pay, and costs.
2. Respondents were served summons thru respondent Sonny Balangue.
3. Oct 17, 2000- RTC declared respondents in default and allowed
petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. The RTC ordered
respondents to pay petitioner P45K plus 5% interest per month, P20K
attys fees, and in the event of failure to pay, an order of foreclosure
will be issued.
4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution.
5. Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming not all of
them were duly served with summons. Sonny did not inform them of
the summons. Thus, respondents prayed that the RTC decision be set

aside and a new trial be conducted.


6. RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, however, it was cannot
be satisfied. Thus, petitioner moved for the public auction of the
mortgaged property. A certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.
7. Respondents filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set
Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in writing
of any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for 12%
interest per annum but the RTC awarded 5% month interest until full
payment.
8. May 7, 2002- RTC granted respondents motion and modified the
interest to 12% per annum.
9. Petitioner filed for Certiorari with CA.
10.
CA for petitioner: the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding 5%
monthly instead of 12% per annum. However, the proper remedy was
not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. No legal rights
can emanate from a resolution that is null and void. The RTC order of
May 7, 2002 is annulled and set aside.
11.
Thus, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.
12.
CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment: the monthly
interest of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties as the complaint of
petitioner clearly sought 12% per annum. Following the mandate of
sec. 3 (d) of Rule 9 of the ROC, the CA concluded that the awarded rate
of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the
complaint.
13.
CA annulled the judgment allowing 5% monthly interest and the
sale at public auction. It also ordered that the judgment debt be
recomputed at the rate of 12% per annum.
ISSUE: WON the RTC order awarding 5% monthly interest may be set aside in
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
(WON the CA erred in granting the respondents petition for annulment of
judgment as a substitute or alternative remedy for lost appeal. NO.)
(WON the CA erred in granting the respondents petition for annulment of
judgment despite the fact that the RTC decision has become final and
executor contrary to the doctrine of immutability of judgment. NO.)
HELD: YES. The award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due
process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
RATIO:
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final
judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a


remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which
was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same.
The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment, litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to rest.
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional
ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon
mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been
issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due
process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings
or in excess of what is being sought by the party. In the case at bench, the
award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in
the pleadings and the evidence on record. The REM executed by the parties
does not include any provision on interest and the complaint merely prayed
for a 12% interest per annum. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity
to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe
that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in
her Complaint.
Respondents former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the
case of his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of
new trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds
the client.1wpA recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were
grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their clients cause and such
amounted to a deprivation of their clients property without due process of
law.

Manifest indifference of respondents former counsel:


(1)
Filed motion to extend period to answer but former counsel let the
extension pass without filing answer thus respondents were declared in
defaults
(2)
He did not question the 5% monthly award despite receipt of RTC
decision. A simple reading shows that it was exhorbitant but he did not
do anything.
(3)
He instead filed a motion to set aside judgment OTG of lack of
jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact of the erroneous 5% would deprive
respondents of property without due process.
(4)
He allowed the RTC decision to become final by not perfecting an
appeal neither did he filed a petition for relief therefrom.
It was only a year later, thru their new counsel, that respondents filed a
motion to correct/amend judgment and to set aside execution sale.
Judging from how respondents former counsel handled the cause of his
clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting their
rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due
process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be
attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented
them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for
relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable
expectations that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the
trial of the case
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
November 24, 2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul a judgment.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
092 NHA vs EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 140945

May 16, 2005

NATIONAL
HOUSING
vs.
JOSE EVANGELISTA, respondent.

AUTHORITY, petitioner,

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a
stranger.1
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Housing Authority
assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646, granting
respondents petition for annulment of judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed part of paragraph No. 3 of
the dispositive portion of the decision dated November 29, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. CIII, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 is hereby
declared void, non-binding and inapplicable in so far as petitioners TCT No.
122944 is concerned.
Let a copy hereof be furnished the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
proper annotation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
FACTS:
NHA filed a case for recovery of property docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9110071.5 Said case involves a real property measuring 915.50 square meters and
located in V. Luna Road, Quezon City, originally awarded in 1968 by the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to a certain Adela
Salindon.
After the death of Salindon, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the
property was transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo
and Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana. However, in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544,
entitled "Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding Judge of
Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al.," rendered by the Court on May 19, 1984,
the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared
the owner of the property.

Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurers
Office on April 23, 1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest
bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final
deed of sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and
confirmation of sale, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 84). Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 28182 in the name of Sarte, who divided the property into Lot 1-A,
measuring 570.50 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108070, and Lot 1-B,
measuring 345 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108071. 6
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City
Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants.
While the case was pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista,
a Deed of Assignment dated December 2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A. 7 TCT No. 108070
was cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the name of respondent on
December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No.
122944 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner.
On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants. The
proposed additional defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1B.10 The trial court, however, denied the motion in its Order dated May 17, 1995. 11
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages,
against Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI
Agricultural Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-95-23940.12
RTC dismissed this second case on the ground of litis pendencia.
In a decision dated November 29, 1995, the trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, with the following dispositive portion:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff National
Housing Authority as follows:
1. The auction sale is null and void
2. TCT No. 28182 subsequently issued in the name of defendant Luisito Sarte is
hereby null and void.
3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the
parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or

his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case
are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of
title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the
cancellation of such TCTs;
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial courts judgment,
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer,
assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged
extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent, since he was not a party to Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest
over the property, and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.15
The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision insofar as petitioners title to the property is
concerned.16 The CA found that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-9110071 and the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also
ruled that the judgment violated respondents right against deprivation of the property
without due process of law.17
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner took the
present recourse.
Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the trial courts denial of its motion to
include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Petitioner also claims
that the auction sale of the property by the City Treasurer of Quezon City is void ab
initio because it was never supposed to be included in the auction sale as petitioner,
which has been declared by the Court in G.R. No. L-60544 as the owner of the
property, is exempt from payment of taxes. Hence, Sarte cannot claim any right over
the same and respondent, having bought it from Sarte, does not acquire any better
right thereto. Petitioner also alleges that respondent is not a buyer in good faith
because the latter was aware of the pending litigation involving the property.18
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial courts
decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. 19 Jurisprudence and
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for
annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.20
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final

order and resolution are void.21 A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons.22
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court.23 Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision decreed that "(A)ny
transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land
subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns
before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel
or cause the cancellation of such TCTs." Respondent is adversely affected by such
judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and
title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondents title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any
evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. 24 Clearly, the trial courts judgment is
void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial courts denial of its
motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was
not petitioners fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it
was not respondents fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of
the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to include
respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner could have
brought the trial courts denial to the CA oncertiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed Civil
Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages,
against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the ground of litis
pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a party to
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial courts
judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on him.
.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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