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Medieval Theories of
Consequence
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First published Mon Jun 11, 2012

Latin medieval theories of consequence are systematic analyses by
Latin medieval authors[1] of the logical relations between sentences[2],
in particular the notions of entailment and valid inference. When does a
sentence B follow from a sentence A? (For example, from Some
human is an animal one may infer Some animal is a human.) What are
the grounds for the relation of entailment/consequence? Are there
different kinds of consequences? These and other questions were
extensively debated by these authors.
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Theories of consequence explicitly acquired an autonomous status only

in the 14th century, when treatises specifically on the concept of
consequence began to appear; but some earlier investigations also
deserve the general title of theories of consequence, in view of their
scope, sophistication and systematicity. Taken as a whole, medieval
theories of consequence represent the first sustained attempt at
adopting a sentential/propositional perspective[3] since the Stoics in
Greek antiquity, and unlike Stoic logic, which had little historical
influence provide the historical background for subsequent
developments leading to the birth of modern logic in the 19th century.
Indeed, it will be argued that the medieval concept of consequentia (in
its different versions) is the main precursor of the modern concept of
logical consequence.
1. Preliminary Considerations
1.1 A genealogy of modern conceptions of consequence
1.2 What are medieval theories of consequence theories
of?
2. Early Theories of Consequence
2.1 Predecessors
2.2 Abelard
2.3 13th Century
3. 14th Century Theories of Consequence
3.1 The emergence of treatises on consequence in the 14th
century
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3.2 Burley and Ockham

3.3 Buridan and the Parisian tradition
3.4 The British School
4. Conclusion
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Secondary Literature
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Related Entries
1. Preliminary Considerations
1.1 A genealogy of modern conceptions of
consequence
In his much-discussed 1936 paper On the concept of logical
consequence, Tarski presents two criteria of material adequacy for
formal accounts of logical consequence, which jointly capture the
common notion of logical consequence (or so he claims). They are
formulated as the following condition:
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If in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X we replace

the constant terms which are not general-logical terms
correspondingly by arbitrary other constant terms (where we
replace equiform constants everywhere by equiform constants)
and in this way we obtain a new class of sentences K and a new
sentence X, then the sentence X must be true if only all sentences
of the class K are true. (Tarski 2002, 2.3)
In more mundane terms, the two core aspects that Tarski attributes to
the so-called common notion of logical consequence can be
formulated as:
(TP) necessary truth-preservation: it is impossible for the
antecedent to be true while the consequent is not true;
(ST) substitution of terms: the relation of consequence is preserved
under any (suitable) substitution of the non-logical terms of the
sentences in question; this is now often referred to as the
formality criterion.
Different accounts of logical consequence can be (and have been)
formulated on the basis of (TP) and/or (ST): they can be viewed as both
necessary but independent components of the notion of logical
consequence, as Tarski seems to suggest in the passage above; they can
also be viewed as closely related, in particular if (TP) can be reduced
to (ST) (i.e. satisfaction of (ST) would entail satisfaction of (TP) and
vice-versa) a view that Etchemendy (1990) attributes to Tarski; or
one may hold that the actual core of the notion of (logical)
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consequence is (TP), and that (ST) simply specifies a particular

subclass of valid consequences, often referred to as formal
consequences (Read 1994).
Tarski correctly identified these two features as key components of the
notion of logical consequence as entertained by philosophers and
mathematicians of his time (and also today). But the question arises:
why these two features and not others? In particular, through what
(historical) processes have they come to constitute the conceptual core
of the notion of logical consequence? These questions are even more
pressing in view of the fact that both features have recently been
questioned as to whether they truly capture the conceptual core of
logical consequence see e.g. Etchemendy (1990) for the centrality
of formality and (ST); Fields (2008) for the centrality of necessary
truth-preservation in view of the semantic paradoxes.
To make further progress in these debates, an important element is
arguably the historical development of the notion of (logical)
consequence over the centuries, so that we may come to understand
where the so-called pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence
comes from. Engaging in what could be described as a project of
conceptual genealogy may allow for a better grasp of the reasons why
this notion (now widely endorsed) established itself as such in the first
place. If these are compelling reasons, then they may count as
arguments in favor of the centrality of formality and necessary truthpreservation; but if they rest on disputable, contentious assumptions,
then the analysis may provide elements for a critical evaluation of each
of these two components as truly constitutive of the concept of logical
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consequence.
From this point of view, the historical developments in the Latin
Middle Ages, in particular from the 12th to the 14th century, occupy a
prominent position. As will be argued, it is in this period that concepts
and ideas inherited from Greek Antiquity (Aristotle in particular, but
also the ancient commentators) were shaped and consolidated into
conceptions of consequence that bear a remarkable resemblance to the
Tarskian condition of material adequacy presented above. Thus, an
analysis of these historical developments is likely to contribute
significantly to our understanding of the notion(s) of logical
consequence as currently entertained.
Naturally, as with any historical analysis, an investigation of these
developments has intrinsic historical value in and of itself,
independently of its possible contribution to modern debates. Indeed,
medieval theories of consequence are a genuine medieval contribution:
while medieval authors are clearly taking ancient Greek sources and
ideas as their starting point, the emergence of theories of consequence
as such is a Latin medieval innovation. But as it turns out, following the
thread provided by the two key notions (TP) and (ST) as formulated
above provides a suitable vantage point to investigate the development
of the notion of consequence in the Latin Middle Ages. In other words,
historical and conceptual analysis can easily be combined in this case.
1.2 What are medieval theories of

consequence theories of?
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At first sight, it is not immediately clear what the object of analysis of

medieval theories of consequence is (Boh 1982). Is it the semantics of
conditional sentences? Is it the validity of inferences and arguments? Is
it the relation of consequence, construed as an abstract entity? In fact,
at times it seems that medieval authors are conflating these different
notions, perhaps betraying some conceptual confusion. After all, these
are very different concepts: a conditional is a sentence, which can be
true or false; an argument or inference is an act, a consecution of
assertions, which can be valid or invalid; a consequence is a relation
between sentential/propositional entities, which can hold or fail to hold
(Sundholm 1998).
However, even though the medieval authors may use the same
terminology to refer to these different concepts, this does not mean
that they are not aware of the relevant differences, in particular between
a conditional and a consequence. As Buridan (Tractatus de
Consequentiis (henceforth TC), 21) remarks, it is for the most part a
matter of terminology: he says he will adopt the definition of
consequence as a true hypothetical sentence, but then throughout his
text also uses the terminology of a consequence being valid or holding
rather than simply being true or false. At any rate, it seems fair to say
that, even though analyses of conditionals are often in the background
(as is especially obvious in Boethius and Abelard, and in analyses of the
syncategorematic term si, if), the main focus of medieval theories
of consequence tends to be the logical relations between
sentential/propositional components (King 2001; Read 2010),
essentially (though not entirely) in the spirit of modern accounts of the
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notion of logical consequence (Shapiro 2005). Some modern scholars

(e.g. Spade in his translation of Burley's De Puritate; Read 2010)
prefer to translate the medieval term consequentia as inference, but
arguably consequence is a more appropriate translation, both for
etymological and for conceptual reasons.
One may also wonder to what extent medieval theories of consequence
really add anything novel to the Aristotelian logical legacy. Kant
(in)famously claimed that Aristotle had discovered everything there
was to know about logic, and insofar as they deal with logical relations
between sentences, it might be thought that theories of consequence
would not have added anything substantially new to Aristotle's theory of
syllogistic in particular. In fact, the relations between theories of
syllogistic and theories of consequence at different times seem
essentially to fall within one of three categories:
1. Syllogistic and consequence are essentially disjoint concepts,
each having their own foundations and scope. In such cases, the
framework of Aristotle's Topics is often (though not always)
summoned to provide the foundations for non-syllogistic
arguments/consequences.
2. All valid arguments, including non-syllogistic ones, are
ultimately to be reduced to syllogistic arguments, as syllogistic
offers the grounds for the validity of every single valid argument.
A proponent of this approach is the 13th century author Robert
Kilwardby.
3. Theories of consequence are seen as an expansion and
generalization of syllogistic; syllogistic is a special case of
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generalization of syllogistic; syllogistic is a special case of

consequence. In these cases, syllogistic is absorbed by
consequence, which is also more general in that it can deal with
arguments having fewer or more than two premises (syllogistic
only treats of arguments with exactly two premises). The 14th
century author John Buridan, for example, treats extensively of
syllogisms, both assertoric and modal, in his treatise on
consequence.
It is fair to say that approach 3 became predominant in the 14th century,
the golden age of medieval theories of consequence; but the earlier
Boethian view that all valid arguments (including syllogistic arguments)
are valid in virtue of topical rules can also be seen as belonging to
category 3. However, given that medieval theories of syllogistic are
treated extensively elsewhere (see the entry on medieval theories of
the syllogism of this encyclopedia), in what follows we shall focus on
non-syllogistic consequences/arguments, but with the proviso that
many of the interesting developments in syllogistic in the 14th century
are presented in treatises or chapters on consequence.
Another point worth mentioning is the fact that medieval discussions of
the concept of consequence cover both what we would now describe as
philosophy of logic and as logic proper. As for the latter, a number
of medieval authors such as Abelard (Martin 2004), Burley (De
Puritate), and Buridan (TC) formulated rules of inference and proved
theorems about them. Many authors had for the most part understood
the logical behavior of what we now view as the main
sentential/propositional operators, such as ifthen, or, negating
terms, as well as meta-level rules such as the transitivity of
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consequence, from the impossible anything follows, or the necessary

follows from anything (the latter two were however not unanimously
endorsed see (Martin 1986), (Read 1993, 2010)). (For discussions
of the rules formulated by different authors, see (Pozzi 1978), (Boh
2001), (Dutilh Novaes 2008)). They also offered sophisticated
investigations of the logical behavior of e.g. modal terms (Buridan,
TC).
Alongside with this more technical layer, medieval authors also
discussed extensively the very nature of the notion of consequence:
what counts as appropriate grounds for a valid consequence, adequate
definitions, subdivisions of kinds of consequence etc. In what follows,
the predominant focus will be on the philosophy of logic side of
medieval theories of consequence, i.e. how they articulated this very
notion, rather than on spelling out the exact inferential rules endorsed
by the different authors. But some medieval treatises on consequence
also contain a high level of technical sophistication, even though the
language used is the regimented academic Latin of the time the only
symbolic device present is the use of schematic letters, which in fact
dates back to Aristotle.
2. Early Theories of Consequence

2.1 Predecessors
Without a doubt, the most important ancient source for the
development of theories of consequence by medieval authors is,
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unsurprisingly, Aristotle. The Prior Analytics and the theory of

syllogistic provided the main model for the correctness/validity of
arguments for centuries, and even though theories of consequences can
be seen as a generalization of the rather narrow theory of validity
presented in the Prior Analytics, it is clear that syllogistic remains one
of the key elements in the background. Indeed, the famous definition of
a valid deduction (syllogism) at the beginning of the Prior Analytics is
already a formulation of the necessary truth-preservation criterion
(TP):
A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated,
something other than what is stated follows of necessity from
their being so. (24b19-20)
Retracing the historical sources for the development of this notion
would take us too far afield, but it seems that the emergence of the idea
of following of necessity is closely related to dialectical practices of
debates, both in philosophy/logic (Marion and Castelnerac 2009) and in
mathematics (Netz 1999). But while it is a necessary condition,
necessary truth-preservation is notoriously not a sufficient condition
for syllogistic validity. For example, as is well known, Aristotle's
syllogistic does not validate the principle of reflexivity, i.e., A implies
A for any sentence A, even though this principle is the most
transparent occurrence of necessary truth-preservation one can think
of. Instead, it seems that syllogistic validity requires a great deal more
to hold (Thom 2010). Indeed, it has been claimed that
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Ancient logics were all in some sense relevance logics. They

insisted that for an argument to be valid, conditions must be met
that guaranteed both that it would be impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion false and that there would be
connections of various kinds between the premises and
conclusions. (Normore 1993, 448)
We shall see that, besides variations of (TP) and (ST), criteria of
relevance and containment will also appear frequently in the writings of
medieval authors.
The extent to which (ST) is present in the Prior Analytics is also a
moot point (Thom 2010). Aristotle does not apply the concepts of
form and matter anywhere in his logical writings, but his consistent use
of schematic letters and many of his argumentative strategies in this
work suggest that he relies on something resembling what we now refer
to as the logical form of arguments. What is not clear is whether
Aristotle relies on (ST) merely as a convenient technical device to
capture the more fundamental property of necessary truth-preservation,
or whether for him (TP) and (ST) are independent core components of
the concept of a syllogism/deduction.
The Prior Analytics is not the only Aristotelian text providing the
historical background for the development of the notion of
consequence. Equally important is one of his (presumably) older
logical texts, the Topics; this text, which unlike the Analytics clearly
presupposes a dialectical background, presents rather unsystematic
considerations on how to argue well in the dialectical contests of
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Plato's academy (see the entry on ancient logic of this encyclopedia,

section 2.1). But by discussing which moves are allowed in a debate, it
also ends up touching upon the general idea of what follows from
what. As we shall see, the Topics became an important starting point
for discussions on the validity of arguments; the theory of syllogistic
only covers a rather limited range of arguments (two-premised
arguments containing only the four kinds of categorical sentences), and
the framework of the Topics was often called upon to fill in the gap
between what syllogistic had to offer and the much larger range of
putatively valid arguments one might be interested in.
Two other ancient traditions which may have contributed to the
development of medieval theories of consequence are the Stoic
tradition (see the entry on ancient logic of this encyclopedia, section
5) and the tradition of the ancient commentators (Barnes 1990, 2008;
entry on the ancient commentators of this encyclopedia). But in fact,
while a Stoic connection is prima facie plausible unlike Aristotelian
term-based logic, Stoic logic is also largely sentence-based
historical evidence for direct Stoic influence remains elusive; for now,
no record of actual channels of influence has been identified.[4] The
ancient commentators, by contrast, had significant (both indirect and
direct) impact on the development of the notion of consequence at
first via Boethius, later via the Arabic authors, and as their
commentaries were translated and read by the Latin authors in the 13th
century and onwards.
While the notion of necessary truth-preservation was already quite
mature in the Prior Analytics, the conceptual development of the
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substitutivity criterion is essentially a later contribution of the ancient

commentators (Barnes 1990, 2008; Dutilh Novaes 2012a). Recall that
Aristotle had not applied the metaphysical notions of form and matter
to logical objects such as sentences and arguments in any systematic
way; this crucial step was undertaken by the ancient commentators.
References to the form and matter of syllogisms are pervasive in their
writings, especially in commentaries on the Prior Analytics, from that
of Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd century AD) up to that of Ammonius
(6th century AD). The ancient commentators not only distinguished
between the form and the matter of syllogisms: they sometimes also
suggested (though usually rather obliquely) that the form of an
argument is precisely that in virtue of which it is valid and reliable. This
would later pave the way for the distinction between formal and
material consequences and the idea of validity in virtue of form. Here
is an illustrative passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias:
Combinations are called syllogistic and reliable if they do not alter
together with differences in the matter i.e. if they do not
deduce and prove different things at different times, but always and
in every material instance preserve one and the same form in the
conclusion. Combinations which change and alter configuration
together with the matter and acquire different and conflicting
conclusions at different times, are non-syllogistic and unreliable.
(Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr 52.2024, 114)
Alexander also comments on Aristotle's use of schematic letters, and
clearly relates what takes the place of schematic letters to the matter
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of the argument:
He uses letters in his exposition in order to indicate to us that the
conclusions do not depend on the matter but on the figure, on the
conjunction of the premises and on the moods. For so-and-so is
deduced syllogistically not because the matter is of such-and-such
a kind but because the combination is so-and-so. The letters, then,
show that the conclusion will be such-and-such universally, always,
and for every assumption. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr
53.2854.2, 116)
In first instance, the Greek logical heritage was almost single-handedly
(though selectively) passed on to the Latin tradition by one man, the
neo-platonic philosopher Boethius. Prior to the late 12th century
(Aristotle's and other ancient texts became widely read again in the
Christian parts of Europe only in the 12th century see (Dod 1982)),
what the medieval authors had inherited from Greek logic had been
almost exclusively transmitted by Boethius, who had also established
the logical terminology in Latin. His translations of Aristotle's
Categories and De Interpretatione were widely read, as well as his
textbooks on syllogistic and his two texts De hypotheticis syllogismis
(On Hypothetical Syllogisms HS) (dating 516522) and De topicis
differentiis (On Topical differentiae TD) (dating 522523).
Boethius uses the term consequentia to refer to that which a
hypothetical sentence such as If it's day, then it's light signifies:
For it [the sentence] does not propose that it's day and it's light, but
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rather that if it's day, then it's light. Whence it signifies a certain
consequence (consequentia) and not the being [of things].
(Boethius, Commentary on On Interpretation 2, 10910,
translation in Martin 2009, 67.)[5]
It is from Boethius that later authors inherited the term consequentia,
but the influence of Boethius is not only terminological. In HS, he
focuses on conditionals of the form If something's (not) A, then it's
(not) B (si (non) est A, (non) est B), and lists a number of principles
and rules governing the logical behavior of such sentences (Martin
2009, 6678). Boethius' considerations are not sufficiently worked out
as to be viewed as a full-fledged theory of consequence, and indeed
there are a number of tensions and inconsistencies in his doctrines. But
HS will prove to be an important source for the later development of
theories of consequence. For example, in this text Boethius introduces
the distinction between natural and accidental consequences, which
then remains the main subdivision of consequences up until the 14th
century (when it is surpassed by the distinction between formal and
material consequences). For Boethius, both kinds of consequences,
natural and accidental, entail inseparability, roughly meaning that the
antecedent cannot be true while the consequent is false (i.e. a version
of (TP)), but natural consequences entail something more, namely a
real causal, metaphysical connection between the items in question.
The other text mentioned above, De topicis differentiis, is equally
significant for the development of later theories of consequence. It is
presented as a commentary on Cicero's Topics, which in turn claims to
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have been inspired by Aristotle's Topics. Cicero's work, however, is

very different from Aristotle's, and Boethius in some sense attempts to
offer a unification of both approaches. One of the key concepts
introduced by this text is the concept of maximal propositions, which
he claims are the general principles underlying the correctness of
topical arguments. As described by C. Martin,
Such [maximal] propositions may either appear as a premise in a
categorical syllogism or, much more importantly for the history
of logic, as the warrant for an inference. In this second case they
are the generalizations of the consequential relation which may
hold between the premises and conclusion of an enthymeme or the
antecedent and the conclusion of a conditional proposition.
(Martin 2009, 79)
Crucially, topical arguments were originally seen as merely probable,
contrasting with the necessary truth-preservation of syllogisms. So for
maximal propositions to serve as grounds for the relation of
consequence, a transformation on the status of topical arguments (from
probable to necessary) had to occur at a later stage (Stump 1982, 290).
Moreover, it is important to notice that, although Boethius is familiar
with the work of the Greek ancient commentators and incorporates
some elements from their discussions, he does not explicitly apply the
form vs. matter distinction to syllogisms, as the earlier authors had
done. Barnes (1990) suggests that the logical hylomorphism (i.e. the
application of Aristotle's doctrine of form and matter to logic) of these
authors is nevertheless present in Boethius' terminology, such as in the
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opposition between propositionum complexio and rerum natura (the

structure of a sentence vs. the nature of things) (e.g. HS II ii 5). But
Boethius does not present the idea of substitution/variation of terms as
a property related to the validity of arguments, as Alexander of
Aphrodisias had suggested. In other words, substitutivity of terms as
captured by (ST) is not a key element of Boethius' account of validity
neither terminologically nor conceptually.
2.2 Abelard
From Boethius in the 6th century to Abelard in the 12th century, Latin
authors did not have anything particularly new and remarkable to say
about the concept of consequence (at least judging from the textual
sources currently available). The Dialectica formerly attributed to
Garlandus Compotista (11th century) and now thought to have been
written by Garlandus of Besanon (early 12th century) is an exception
worth mentioning (Boh 1982, 303305). But for the most part, it
seems that the Boethian approach to consequence prevailed essentially
uncontested. It was only in the 12th century, in Abelard's Dialectica,
that a novel and highly sophisticated theory of consequence/entailment
was to be formulated. Abelard's starting point is the same material
inherited from Boethius which had been available for centuries, and yet
what he does with it is quite extraordinary; in particular, he understood
better than anyone before him the nature of what we now refer to as
propositional operations. And yet, his account is ultimately untenable
(Martin 2004).
Tellingly, his theory of consequence is presented in the part of the
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Dialectica dedicated to the topical framework (the book De Locis),

which again illustrates the close historical connections between
theories of consequence and the Topics. Abelard speaks mostly of
inferentia rather than consequentia, as the latter is for him a
subspecies of the former. He defines the concept of inferentia as
follows:
Therefore, inference consists in the necessity of consecution, that
is, in that the sense (sententia) of the consequent is required
(exigitur) by the sense (sensus) of the antecedent, as is asserted
with a hypothetical proposition (Dial. 253, translation from
(Martin 2004, 170))
The phrase necessity of consecution could be viewed as Abelard's
formulation of the criterion of necessary truth-preservation (TP), but it
is a property he attributes to the sense (meaning) of the antecedent
sentence. Thus, it may be argued that Abelard requires something more
than mere truth-preservation, namely a connection of relevance
between antecedent and consequent (Martin 2004, section II.5). Indeed,
in addition to variations of (TP) and (ST), there is a third recurrent
theme in medieval discussions on consequence:
(Co) In a valid consequence, the conclusion is contained/understood
in the premises.
Different interpretations of this clause run through medieval
discussions of consequence, ranging from the 12th to the 15th century
and beyond; some (e.g. Abelard in the passage just quoted) seem to
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treat the notion of containment in semantic/relevantist terms, while

others (in particular the British authors of the second half of the 14th
century) lean more heavily towards what appears to be an epistemic
interpretation (see section 3.4).
Abelard then further distinguishes perfect from imperfect inferences,[6]
and this distinction sets him apart from the whole preceding tradition:
But inferences are either perfect or imperfect. An inference is
perfect when, from the structure of the antecedent itself, the truth
of the consequent is manifest, and the construction of the
antecedent is so disposed that it contains also the construction of
the consequent in itself, just as in syllogisms or in conditionals
which have the form of syllogisms. (Dial. 253/4)
He goes on to argue that what warrants a perfect inference, i.e. its vis
inferentiae, is the construction itself: the truth of perfect inferences
comes from the structure (complexio), not from the nature of things
(Dial. 255). This is a novel development, as for authors such as
Boethius and those following him, the warrant of all consequences is
ultimately to be found in the nature of things, and is captured by
means of topical principles. (Abelard then goes on to provide
arguments directed against this Boethian view.) What Abelard refers to
as the construction/structure of an inference is indeed roughly what we
now understand as a schema (see entry on schemata of this
encyclopedia), as his discussion of examples suggests: it is the
substitution of terms by other terms while preserving the consecution
(i.e. a version of (ST)) that is the hallmark of perfect inferences.
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Whatever terms you substitute, whether they are compatible or

incompatible with one another, the consecution can in no way be
broken. (Dial. 255, translation from Martin 2004, 171)
Now, while proto-traces of the substitutional conception of validity
could be perceived in Aristotle as well as in some of the ancient
commentators, with Abelard it is (arguably) for the first time presented
as providing the grounds for a certain class of consequences. And yet,
Abelard's conception of consequence is not reduced to (ST), given that
imperfect inferences are just as legitimate/valid as the perfect ones:
imperfect inferences are those that fail the substitution criterion but
satisfy the necessity of consecution criterion. Thus, for Abelard, (ST)
defines a special subclass among valid inferences, but (TP)
(supplemented by (Co)) remains the true core of his notion of
inference/consequence; indeed, in his subsequent discussion he deals
with imperfect inferences much more extensively than with the perfect
ones.
Many of Abelard's logical concepts were tacitly absorbed by later
authors, though not by means of direct influence, and often with no
explicit attribution to Abelard (Martin 2004). It is revealing that we
now have only one surviving copy of his Dialectica, a clear sign that it
was not widely read.
2.3 13th Century

The two main features of 13th century logic are arguably the emergence
of the terminist tradition (authors such as Peter of Spain, William of
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Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre/Lagny) and the absorption of the

newly rediscovered Aristotelian texts and other Greek sources. The
latter resulted in the distinction between three groups of logical
theories: what became known as the logica vetus (topics emerging
from the traditional texts which had remained available throughout: the
Categories, On Interpretation, Porphyry's Isagoge); the logica nova
(covering the material from the newly discovered Aristotelian texts);
and the logica modernorum (topics not directly related to the
Aristotelian corpus, such as consequence, insolubles and obligations).
The terminist authors did not address consequence as an autonomous
topic of investigation; their views on the matter are scattered along
their analyses of sentences, the Topics, fallacies and syncategoremata
(the syncategorema si in particular). For instance, William of
Sherwood recognizes the distinction between natural and accidental
consequences inherited from Boethius, as well as the distinction
between absolute and as-of-now (ut nunc) consequences (Stump 1982,
291) the latter remained ubiquitous in the 14th century (Dutilh
Novaes 2008). But one cannot really speak of full-fledged theories of
consequence among the terminist authors, given the rather
unsystematic and piecemeal nature of their analyses (Stump 1982,
281283; Boh 1982, 306307).
Perhaps more significant for the overall development of the concept of
consequence is the growing presence of Aristotelian hylomorphism in
logical contexts. While hylomorphism had not been entirely unknown
to Latin authors prior to the rediscovery of the remaining Aristotelian
texts in the late 12th and 13th centuries, in this period an explosion of
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applications of Aristotelian metaphysical concepts in other areas

occurred, especially in logic (Spruyt 2003). In particular, applications
of the form-matter distinction to arguments (syllogisms in particular)
became frequent again, after a hiatus of many centuries since the
ancient commentators. Such applications can be found in the only
known 12th-century commentary on the Prior Analytics, the Anonymus
Aurelianensis III (Ebbesen 1981), in the Dialectica Monacensis (an
anonymous text of the early 13th century, edited in De Rijk 1962/7),
and in Robert Kilwardby's commentary on the Prior Analytics (1230s
see (Thom 2007)), among other texts. The significance of these
applications is that they paved the way for the consolidation of the
notion of formal consequence in the 14th century (Dutilh Novaes
2012b), which in turn was to have a huge impact on the rest of the
history of logic.
Indeed, one of the earliest known uses of the phrase formal
consequence can be found in Simon of Faversham's questions on the
Sophistical Refutations, written in the 1280s:
When it is said that an animal is a substance; therefore a man is a
substance is a good consequence I reply that this consequence
does not hold in virtue of form (ratione formae), but rather in
virtue of matter. Because according to the Commentator
[Averroes] on the first book of the Physics, an argument which is
valid (concludens) in virtue of form must hold in all matter. This
consequence, however, holds only for features which are essential
[] and so this consequence is not formal (formalis). (Simon of
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Faversham, Quaestiones Super Libro Elenchorum, quaestio 36,

200; translation from (Martin 2005) 135.)
It is significant that Simon refers to Averroes' commentary on the
Physics, thus illustrating the importation of the Aristotelian
(meta)physical framework into logical analyses. We here have the
notion of valid in virtue of form (as with Abelard's complexio), and
the association of form and formality with the idea of substitution of
terms (ST). Other authors of the same period, John Duns Scotus for
example, also use the phrase consequentia formalis and its variants,
but not in the substitutional sense of holding in all matter (Martin
2005).
Now, this is the historical background for the consolidation of the
distinction between formal and material consequences in the 14th
century: a progression towards general theories of consequence rather
than exclusive focus on syllogisms, and the increasing application of
hylomorphism to arguments at first to syllogisms, and later to
arguments and consequences in general.
3. 14th Century Theories of

Consequence
3.1 The emergence of treatises on
consequence in the 14th century
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The precise historical origins of 14th century theories of consequence

are still debated among scholars. The fact is that, at the beginning of the
14th century, treatises and chapters bearing the title De consequentiis
and similar titles began to appear. Why then, and not before? Naturally,
the subject itself, that is, the logical/inferential relations between
sentences, had been extensively discussed by earlier authors, as we
have seen. But no treatises or chapters were specifically dedicated to
the topic or bore such titles before the 14th century.
According to a once influential hypothesis, medieval theories of
consequences would have emerged from the tradition commenting on
and discussing Aristotle's Topics (Bird 1961; Stump 1982). At first
sight, this hypothesis may seem plausible: traditionally, the role of the
topical framework was often that of accounting for the patterns of
(correct) inference and reasoning which did not fit into the syllogistic
system presented in the Prior Analytics. So, conceptually, it would
seem quite natural that the tradition on the Topics might represent the
historical origins of theories of consequences. Moreover, as we have
seen, some earlier discussions of the notion of consequence were
conducted explicitly within the context of the topical framework,
following Boethius.
However, on closer scrutiny, this hypothesis fails to receive historical
and textual confirmation. (Green-Pedersen 1984, chapter E in
particular) is (still) the most comprehensive study on this subject,
covering virtually every text known to us that is relevant for the
hypothesis. Green-Pedersen argues (1984, 270) that the late 13th
century literature on the Topics, that is, the period immediately
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preceding the emergence of treatises on consequences, gives

absolutely no indication of what was to come. In other words, there are
no significant similarities between the contents of these 13th century
treatises on the Topics and the 14th century treatises on consequences.
Therefore, we may conclude that the Topics could not have been the
main, and in any case certainly not the only, source for the emergence
of 14th century theories of consequences.
Be that as it may, the importance of the Topics for the development of
14th century theories of consequences should not be dismissed
altogether. It is worth noticing that two of the first authors who
presented systematic discussions of consequence in the 14th century,
namely Ockham and Burley, are both in some way or another
influenced by the Topics. Burley explicitly says that all valid
consequences are based on dialectical Topics (On the purity, p. 158
and 162). In contrast, the relation of Ockham's theory of consequence
to the Topics is more convoluted; Green-Pedersen argues convincingly
that Bird's reconstruction of Ockham's theory within the framework of
the Topics (Bird 1961) is not satisfactory (Green-Pedersen 1984,
268), but he also confirms that Ockham's intrinsic and extrinsic
middles, crucial concepts for his theory of consequence (to be
explained shortly), are concepts essentially taken (albeit in modified
form) from the topical framework.
In short, although the current availability of texts still does not allow
for definitive conclusions, the picture that at this point seems most
plausible is that different strands of traditional logical theories
converged in order to give rise to the 14th century theories of
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consequences. It seems that at least four traditions contributed

substantially to these developments: treatises on syncategoremata,
especially in connection with the syncategorema si; discussions of
hypothetical syllogisms; commentaries on the Prior Analytics; and the
tradition of the Topics. Different elements of each of these traditions
contributed to the development of different aspects of the theories of
consequence.[7] Green-Pedersen (1984, 295) argues, for example, that
the late 13th-century treatises that most resemble early 14th-century
treatises on consequences are the treatises on syncategorematic words
and a number of sophism-collections arranged after syncategoremes.
The different 14th century treatises on consequences can be divided
into four main groups:
1. The treatises on consequences from the very beginning of the
14th century: Burley's De consequentiis and two anonymous
treatises of roughly the same time (Green-Pedersen 1981). They
are in fact rather unsystematic collections of rules of
consequence/inference; it seems that their purpose was solely to
provide rules of thumb to deal with sophismata related to some
syncategorematic terms. No conceptual or systematic discussion
of the nature of consequence is presented.
2. The second group is represented by Burley's De Puritate, the
chapters on consequence in Ockham's Summa Logicae (III-3), a
few Pseudo-Ockham treatises, and the Liber consequentiarium
(edited in Schupp 1988). In these texts, the concept of (intrinsic
and extrinsic) middles and other topical concepts occupy a
prominent place. They display a much deeper interest in the very
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nature of consequence than the previous group, presenting

general definitions and criteria for what is to count as a
consequence, as well as divisions of kinds of consequence.
3. The third group is represented by Buridan's treatise on
consequence and the treatises inspired by it, most notably Albert
of Saxony's (a chapter of his Perutilis logica) and Marsilius of
Inghen's (as yet unedited) treatise on consequence. There is also
the interesting commentary on the Prior Analyics formerly
attributed to Scotus[,8] which is thought to have been composed
before or in any case independently of Buridan's treatise
(Lagerlund 2000, chapter 6). In these treatises, topical vestiges
such as the doctrine of intrinsic and extrinsic middles have
disappeared completely. What characterizes them as a group is
the definition of formal consequence based on the substitutivity
criterion, in the spirit of (ST) (more on this below). This tradition
can be referred to as the Parisian/continental tradition on
consequences.
4. The fourth group of treatises is predominantly British, and is
represented by a significantly greater number of surviving
treatises than group (3). It is represented by the treatises of
Robert Fland, John of Holland, Richard Billingham, Richard
Lavenham, Ralph Strode, and the Logica Oxoniensis, among
others (Ashworth and Spade 1992). What characterizes this group
as such is the definition of formal consequence in terms of
containment of the consequent in the antecedent, in the spirit of
(Co), usually interpreted in epistemic terms.
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Chronologically, the development of theories of consequence in the

14th century is thus characterized by an early and rather primitive
stage (1), then by a stage of further development, in which,
nevertheless, topical notions still play a prominent role (2), and then by
two further traditions which run more or less parallel, namely the
Parisian/continental tradition (3) and the British tradition (4). While
they differed in particular in the various definitions given to the formal
vs. material consequence distinction, they all agreed that necessary
truth-preservation (TP) is a necessary condition for something to count
as a (valid) consequence (Dutilh Novaes 2008).
It is important to note that, in the 14th century, rules of consequence
were often discussed against the background of the genre of oral
disputation known as obligationes (see entry on obligationes of this
encyclopedia). It is common to encounter formulations of rules of
consequence in obligational terms, for example: if you have conceded
the consequence and its antecedent, then you must concede the
consequent. Thus, interesting reflections on consequence are also to be
found in obligationes treatises (and vice-versa).
3.2 Burley and Ockham

Walter Burley is the author of the oldest treatise on consequence with
known authorship (edited by Brown in 1980), but it is in his later work
De Puritate, longer version, that one finds his fully developed theory
of consequence. The shorter version of De Puritate is thought to have
been composed before Ockham's Summa Logicae, and contains only a
section on consequence and a section on syncategoremata. The
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received view is that, after becoming acquainted with Ockham's Summa

Logicae, Burley abandoned the text of what is now known as the shorter
version of De Puritate and began to work on a new draft, which was to
become the longer version (Spade 2000). The theory of consequence
presented in the shorter version is based on ten basic principles, four of
which are clearly sentential/propositional, while the other six take
terms as the basic logical unit (Boh 1982). The only distinction of
consequence that Burley discusses is that between simple and as-ofnow consequence, a traditional distinction which remained popular in
the 14th century:
First therefore I assume a certain distinction, namely this one: One
kind of [consequence] is simple, another kind is as-of-now (ut
nunc). A simple [consequence] is one that holds for every time.
For example A man runs; an animal runs. An as-of-now
[consequence] holds for a determinate time and not always. For
example Every man runs; therefore, Socrates runs. For that
[consequence] does not hold always, but only while Socrates is a
man. (Burley, De Puritate, 3)
This temporal understanding of the simple vs. as-of-now distinction is
the one adopted by most authors, both before and after Burley
(however, see Pseudo-Scotus' formulation, discussed in the next
section), and is repeated verbatim in the longer version of On the
Purity (p. 146). Another interesting feature of the shorter version is
the fact that it treats syllogisms under the concept of consequence, thus
illustrating the absorption of syllogistic by theories of consequences in
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the 14th century. Burley's mature theory of consequence, as presented

in the longer version of De Puritate, is best discussed against the
background of the theory of consequence presented in Ockham's
Summa Logicae, so let us now turn to Ockham first.
Ockham's Summa Logicae is thought to have been written in the first
years of the 1320s; section 3 of Part III is entirely dedicated to
consequences. In chapter 1 of III-3, Ockham presents a somewhat
confusing account of consequences based on nine distinctions,
including the simple vs. as-of-now distinction; the distinction between
formal and material consequence is the last one presented.[9] It seems
that this important distinction was discussed systematically for the first
time in this very text (Martin 2005), but Ockham offers virtually no
justification for his use of the notions of form and matter with respect
to consequences. It is also clear that Ockham deliberately ignores the
well-entrenched distinction between natural and accidental
consequences, as is obvious from the fact that he mentions nine
distinctions, but not this one. Here is how Ockham introduces the
notion of a formal consequence:
Formal consequences are of two kinds. Some hold in virtue of an
extrinsic middle, which concerns the form of propositions. For
example, such rules as from an exclusive to a universal, with
transposition of terms, is a good consequence; if the major
premise is necessary and the minor premise is assertoric (de
inesse), the conclusion is necessary. Others hold immediately in
virtue of an intrinsic middle, and mediately in virtue of an extrinsic
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middle regarding the general conditions of the proposition, []

such as in Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running.
(William of Ockham, Summa Logicae III-3, ch. 1, lines 4554)
Thus, according to Ockham, formal consequences are those that hold in
virtue of middles, be they intrinsic or extrinsic. A consequence holds
immediately in virtue of an intrinsic middle when it holds in virtue of
the truth of a different sentence formed from its terms. For example,
Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running holds in virtue
of this middle: Socrates is a man, since if Socrates is a man is not
true, the consequence does not hold. These are typically enthymematic
consequences, i.e. consequences with a missing premise (with the
additional premise, they become a valid syllogism). An extrinsic
middle, by contrast, is a sentence not containing the terms that form the
antecedent and the consequent of the putative consequence, but which
is a general rule describing the fact that warrants the passage from the
antecedent to the consequent (reminiscent of Boethius' maximal
propositions), and which concerns the form of sentences. Ockham's
example of a consequence holding immediately in virtue of an extrinsic
middle is Only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man,
which holds in virtue of this general rule: an exclusive and a universal
with transposed terms signify the same and are convertible.
Notice however that Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not
running and Only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man
are both formal consequences for Ockham (since both hold in virtue of
middles), whereas the former is clearly an enthymeme, not valid in all
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substitutional instances of the terms Socrates, man, and running

(thus not satisfying (ST)). The latter, on the other hand, is valid in all
substitutional instances of donkey and man, and indeed this seems to
be the case of most, if not all, of Ockham's formal consequences
immediately valid in virtue of extrinsic middles; he explicitly says for
example that syllogisms are of the latter kind. Effectively, formal
consequences immediately valid in virtue of extrinsic middles satisfy
the (ST) criterion of being valid in all matter, but the same does not
hold of Ockham's (enthymematic) consequences valid in virtue of an
intrinsic middle.
Curiously, while Ockham can be credited with having been the first to
use the terms formal consequence and material consequence
systematically, the content of his distinction did not pass on to later
authors. This is arguably because Ockham's distinction is cast in terms
of intrinsic and extrinsic middles, peculiar concepts belonging to the
Boethian framework which was already losing its influence by
Ockham's time (Green-Pedersen 1984). Indeed, one seldom
encounters the concept of middles in writings of the post-Ockham
period, except for texts under direct Ockhamist influence.
As for material consequences, it is not entirely clear how exactly
Ockham intended to define this class of consequences. He says that
material consequences are those that hold in virtue solely of (the
meaning of) their terms (Ockham, Summa Logicae III-3, ch. 1, lines
5557) but the two examples he gives are of a consequence with an
impossible antecedent and a consequence with a necessary consequent.
This suggests the reading that this category consists exclusively of
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consequences of this sort (ex impossibili and ad necessarium

consequences), but there is no conclusive evidence supporting this
interpretation; in particular, he did not offer any explicit motivation for
his use of the concept of matter to characterize this class of
consequences.[10]
As mentioned above, the longer version of Burley's De Puritate is
thought to be largely a response to Ockham's Summa Logicae, not
exclusively but also with respect to consequence. Burley recovers the
natural vs. accidental distinction which had been deliberately neglected
by Ockham, but in fact formulates it with a terminology similar to that
used by Ockham for formal consequences, namely in terms of the
concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic topics (rather than middles, but this
appears to be above all a mere terminological difference):
Simple [consequence] is of two kinds. One is natural. That happens
when the antecedent includes the consequent. Such an inference
holds through an intrinsic topic. An accidental inference is one
that holds through an extrinsic topic. That happens when the
antecedent does not include the consequent but the inference
holds through a certain extrinsic rule. (Burley, De Puritate, 146)
One may conjecture that Burley sought to neutralize Ockham's
distinction between formal and material consequences in terms of
intrinsic and extrinsic middles by formulating the traditional distinction
between natural and accidental consequences in terms of containment
and intrinsic/extrinsic topics. Moreover, when discussing the notion of
formal consequence later in the text (pp. 171173, replying to a
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possible objection), Burley seems to be criticizing Ockham's definition

of material consequences as those which hold solely in virtue of the
meaning of terms:
Thus for a [consequence] to hold by reason of the terms can
happen in two ways, either because it holds materially by reason of
the terms, or because it holds formally by reason of the terms
that is, by the formal reason of the terms. (Burley, On the Purity,
173)
In other words, Burley seems to be saying that Ockham's formulation
of the distinction is ineffective and thus inadequate. The exact
formulation of the distinction between formal and material
consequences presented by Ockham was indeed not adopted by later
authors, but it would be excessively speculative to attribute this
outcome to Burley's criticism. In effect, even less of a Burleian legacy
is to be found in later authors specifically with respect to consequence,
in particular as the formal vs. material distinction became the main
subdivision of consequence later on (albeit under different
formulations).
3.3 Buridan and the Parisian tradition

John Buridan's treatise on consequence (TC, edited by H. Hubien in
1976) quite likely represents the pinnacle of sophistication for (Latin)
medieval discussions of the concept of consequence.[11] Its modern
editor dates it to the 1330s, thus belonging to the early stages of
Buridan's career. We currently know much less about Buridan's
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immediate predecessors than about Burley's or Ockham's, so it is not

clear who Buridan takes inspiration from or is criticizing. The treatise
is composed of four books: Book I presents general considerations on
the very notion of consequence; Book II treats of consequences
involving modal sentences; Book III treats of syllogisms involving
assertoric (i.e. non-modal) sentences; Book IV deals with syllogisms
involving modal sentences. Each of them is remarkable in its own way
(Book III for example represents a radical subversion of Aristotelian
orthodoxy, with the suggestion that third-figure syllogisms are more
foundational than first-figure syllogisms), but here we shall focus on
the first two books (Book I in particular), given the methodological
decision of leaving syllogistic aside in the present analysis.
In Book I, Buridan presents the general definition of a consequence in
the familiar terms of necessary truth-preservation:
Many people say that of two propositions, the one which cannot be
true while the other is not true is the antecedent, and the one which
cannot not be true while the other is true is the consequent, so that
every proposition is antecedent to any other proposition when it
[the rst proposition] cannot be true without the other being true.
(Buridan, TC, 21)
He then goes on to reformulate the definition for reasons related to his
view that only actually produced sentences (sentence-tokens) can have
a truth-value (Klima 2004; Dutilh Novaes 2005). No sentence is
negative, therefore no donkey is running comes out as a valid
consequence according to the criterion thus formulated, because No
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sentence is negative can never be true: its mere existence falsifies

itself whenever it is produced. According to Buridan, this example
should not count as a valid consequence, and one reason he gives for
this is that its contrapositive Some donkey is running, therefore some
sentence is negative is not a valid consequence. He formulates a
definition of consequences in terms of howsoever the
antecedent/consequent signifies things to be in order to accommodate
such counterexamples, but adds that in most cases, the simpler
definition is sufficiently accurate.
Commitment to sentence-tokens aside, Buridan's notion of
consequence clearly has necessary truth-preservation as its
fundamental component. So for him, enthymematic consequences such
as a man runs, therefore an animal runs are just as valid as syllogistic
consequences or other consequences satisfying the criterion of
preservation of validity under term substitution (ST). However, Buridan
does recognize that there is an important distinction between
consequences which do and those which do not satisfy the
substitutional criterion; giving continuation to a tradition which
includes Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simon of Faversham, he
conceptualizes this distinction in hylomorphic terms, more specifically
in terms of the distinction between formal and material consequence:
Formal consequence means that [the consequence] holds for all
terms, retaining an analogous form. Or, if you want to express it
according to the proper force of discourse, a formal consequence
is that which, for every proposition similar in form which might be
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formed, it would be a good consequence, such as what is A is B;

thus what is B is A. (Buridan, TC, 2223, my emphasis)
Material consequences are those which do satisfy the necessary truthpreservation criterion (TP) but do not satisfy the substitutional
criterion (ST). At first sight, Buridan's distinction between formal and
material consequence seems very similar to, for example, Abelard's
distinction between perfect and imperfect inferences. There is,
however, a fundamental difference; nowhere does Buridan suggest that
formal consequences are valid in virtue of their form, as Abelard had
claimed for the complexio of perfect inferences. He does say that the
validity of a material consequence is made evident only by means of a
reduction to a formal consequence (TC, 1.4), but this observation
pertains to the epistemic level of how the validity of a consequence is
made apparent to us, not to the quasi-metaphysical level of what
grounds it.[12]
Buridan also comments explicitly on what is to be understood as the
form and the matter of a consequence:
In the present context, the way in which we here speak of matter
and form, we understand by the matter of the proposition or
consequentia the purely categorematic terms, i.e. subjects and
predicates, omitting the syncategorematic terms that enclose them
and through which they are conjoined or negated or distributed or
forced to a certain mode of supposition. All the rest, we say,
pertains to the form. (Buridan, TC, 30)
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The view that the form of a consequence/argument pertains to its

syncategorematic terms while its matter pertains to its categorematic
terms is presupposed in both earlier and subsequent texts, but here with
Buridan it receives a rare explicit formulation. A modern version of
this idea still survives, in the form of the doctrine of the logical form
of arguments and the modern preoccupation with logical constants
(Read 1994; Dutilh Novaes 2012a; entry on logical constants of this
encyclopedia). However, it is worth emphasizing once again that
drawing the line between the form and the matter of an
argument/consequence in this manner still does not entail the thesis
that the form is that in virtue of which a valid argument is valid; nor
does it entail the thesis that only the arguments/consequences
satisfying the substitutional criterion are indeed valid. Buridan, in
particular, does not hold either one of these theses.
In the final section of Book I, Buridan formulates a series of general
principles which follow from his proposed definition of consequence,
such as that from the impossible anything follows (first conclusion),
the principle of contraposition (third conclusion), and also many
principles pertaining to the semantic properties of the categorematic
terms in a consequence (see entry on medieval theories of properties
of terms). Thus, here again we see that medieval theories of
consequence never completely abandon the term perspective to adopt
an exclusively sentential/propositional perspective.
Book II of Buridan's treatise presents a sophisticated analysis of the
logical behavior of modal sentences. Modal sentences can be either
composite or divided, depending on where the modal term occurs: if it
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is either the subject or the predicate of the sentence, while the other
term is an embedded sentence in nominalized form (in dictum form,
in the medieval terminology), then the sentence is a composite modal
sentence. If however the modal term occurs as an adverb modifying the
copula, then it is a divided modal sentence. Buridan then proves a series
of conclusions and equivalences for each kind of modal sentences,
such as that B is necessarily A is equivalent to B is not possibly not
A.
The other treatises on consequence in the Parisian/continental tradition
do not seem to have anything of substance to add to Buridan's, with one
possible exception: the commentary on the Prior Analytics formerly
attributed to Scotus (edited in Yrjnsuuri 2001), and whose authorship
remains controversial. The dating is equally problematic; crucially, it is
not clear whether it was written before or after Buridan's treatise, but
some scholars (Lagerlund 2000, chapter 6) have argued that at any rate
Pseudo-Scotus displays no knowledge of Buridan's treatise (likewise,
there is no obvious evidence that Buridan was familiar with PseudoScotus' text).
The treatise proceeds very much in the spirit of chapter 3 of Book I of
Buridan's treatise: a putative definition of consequence is proposed, but
then quickly a counterexample is found, namely something that should
not count as a consequence and yet satisfies the criterion, or the other
way round (Boh 1982, 307310).[13] But while Buridan rests his case
after the third proposed definition, Pseudo-Scotus goes on, and
formulates a counterexample to the definition that Buridan settles on:
God exists, hence this argument is invalid. If this consequence is
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valid, then it has a necessary antecedent and a false consequent (since

the consequent says that it is invalid). But then it is invalid. In sum, if it
is valid, it is invalid; thus, by the consequentia mirabilis ((A ~A)
~A), it is invalid. But if it is invalid, it is necessarily so, since the
premise is a necessary sentence; therefore, we have a consequence with
a necessary consequent, thus satisfying the necessary truthpreservation criterion, but which is plainly invalid. This has been
described as a proto-version of Curry's paradox.[14]
The treatise of Pseudo-Scotus also offers an interesting formulation of
the simple vs. as-of-now distinction: in contrast with e.g. Burley,
according to Pseudo-Scotus this distinction applies only to material
consequences (recall that for him, a formal consequence is the one that
satisfies the substitutional criterion), and amounts to the modal value
of the missing premise that can be added in order to turn the
(enthymematic) consequence into a formal one. That is, if the missing
premise is a necessary sentence, then the consequence is an
absolute/simple one. But if the missing premise is a contingent truth (it
has to be true with respect to the time indicated by the verbs of the
consequence, otherwise the original material consequence does not
hold), then the original material consequence holds only in some
situations, namely the situations in which the contingent sentence
happens to be true, and is thus an as-of-now consequence. The same
formulation of the simple vs. as-of-now distinction can be found in
Buridan's treatise, Book I chapter 4, which again illustrates the
conceptual connection between the two texts.
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3.4 The British School

In the British tradition, which is then continued in Italy in the late 14th
century and 15th century (Courtenay 1982), the definition of
consequence in terms of necessary truth-preservation (TP) is also
unanimously adopted, as for example in Billingham (Billingham/Weber
2003, 80), Strode (cited in (Pozzi 1978, 237)) and Paul of Venice
(Logica Parva, p. 167). In fact, these authors present variations of (TP)
without much discussion or analysis, contrary to what is found in
Buridan's treatise, for example. More generally, the treatises in this
tradition are characterized by a lesser degree of conceptual
sophistication if compared to the earlier treatises by Ockham, Burley
or Buridan. The goal seems to be mostly pedagogical, i.e. presenting
rules of thumb to argue correctly, rather than presenting a systematic,
conceptual analysis of the concept of consequence.
Still, what is potentially novel in this tradition is a specific
interpretation of the idea of the conclusion being contained/understood
(intelligitur) in the premises that is, condition (Co) which these
authors rely on extensively to define the concept of formal
consequence. We have seen that for Abelard, this is a necessary
condition for all consequences/inferences, which Martin (2004) spells
out in terms of a criterion of relevance. 13th century authors, such as
Kilwardby (for whom (Co) provided the definition of natural
consequences) and Faversham, also discussed variations of this idea
(Read 2010, 177/8), but prior to the late 14th century, it was typically
not formulated in epistemic/psychological terms. The authors in the
th
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14th century British tradition typically formulate the definition of

formal consequence on the basis of variations of (Co), but giving it a
more explicitly epistemic twist.
Lavenham, for example, says (as quoted in King 2001, 133): A
consequence is formal when the consequent necessarily belongs to the
understanding of the antecedent, as it is in the case of syllogistic
consequence, and in many enthymematic consequences. Strode
presents a similar formulation:
A consequence said to be formally valid is one of which if it is
understood to be as is adequately signified through the antecedent
then it is understood to be just as is adequately signified through
the consequent. For if someone understands you to be a man then
he understands you to be an animal. (Translation in Normore 1993,
449).
Several other authors held similar definitions, such as Billingham
(Weber 2003, 80) and Fland (Fland/Spade 1976). Normore (1993,
449) argues that a significant transformation occurred in the 14th
century British tradition, which puts in play the idea that deduction is
not an objective relation between abstract objects or sentences but a
mental operation performed on the bases of what can be understood or
imagined. This is noticeable not only in the definitions of formal (as
opposed to material) consequence, but also in the very definitions of
consequence which begin to mention mental acts, such as: a
consequence is a derivation (illatio) of the consequent from the
antecedent (Strode, quoted in Normore 1993, 449).
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The epistemic/psychological interpretation of these formulations of

formal consequences has not gone uncontested; arguably, they are
equally compatible with a semantic interpretation emphasizing the
signification of sentences (Read 2010, 178). But it is clear that, while
the Parisian tradition defined the concept of formal consequence in
terms of (ST), the British tradition formulated the same concept in
terms of (Co). Both were ideas that had been floating around for
centuries, but which yield very different conceptions of what counts as
a formal consequence. These two approaches are not only intensionally
divergent; they also disagree on the extension of the class of formal
consequences. (ST)-formal consequences do not include enthymematic
consequences such as Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an
animal, but (Co)-formal consequences typically do. For British
authors, the class of material consequences is often composed
exclusively of consequences of the kind from the impossible anything
follows and the necessary follows from anything, which satisfy the
truth-preservation criterion (TP) a fortiori, but typically fail
relevant/containment criteria. God does not exist, therefore you are a
donkey counts as a valid consequence according to (TP) (God does
not exist is considered to be an impossible sentence), but the
consequent is not contained in the antecedent in the same way as in
Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal. To mark this
distinction, 14th century British authors would typically view the
former as a material consequence and the latter as a formal
consequence (Ashworth & Spade 1992).
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4. Conclusion
We started by surveying the ancient background for the emergence of
Latin medieval theories of consequence, in particular Aristotle's Topics
and Prior Analytics, the commentaries by the ancient commentators,
and Boethius' influential logical texts. Theories of consequence only
became an autonomous topic of investigation in the 14th century, but
previous developments, in particular Abelard's theory of
inference/entailment and the increasing application of hylomorphism
to logic in the 13th century, are equally deserving of attention.
Nevertheless, the golden age for theories of consequence was
undoubtedly the 14th century, when different theories were proposed by
Burley, Ockham, Buridan, Billingham, Strode, Paul of Venice, and
many others. As with much of scholastic logic, the topic of
consequence continued to be explored in the 15th century and beyond
(Ashworth 1974, chapter III), providing the background for much of
what was to come in the history of logic, in particular the persistent
association between logic and forms (MacFarlane 2000).
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Some papers by Stephen Read on medieval theories of
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John Buridan's Theory of Consequence and his Octagons of
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The Medieval Theory of Consequence
Related Entries
Abelard [Abailard], Peter | Albert of Saxony | Aristotle, commentators
on | Aristotle, General Topics: logic | Boethius, Anicius Manlius
Severinus | Buridan, John [Jean] | Burley [Burleigh], Walter | insolubles
[= insolubilia] | logic: ancient | logical consequence | logical constants
| medieval philosophy | modality: medieval theories of | obligationes,
medieval theories of | Ockham [Occam], William | Paul of Venice |
schema | syllogism: medieval theories of | Tarski, Alfred | terms,
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properties of: medieval theories of
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Stephen Read and E. Jennifer Ashworth for very helpful
comments on earlier drafts of the text.
Copyright 2012 by
Catarina Dutilh Novaes <c.dutilh.novaes@rug.nl>
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First published Mon Jun 11, 2012

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Theories of consequence explicitly acquired an autonomous status only

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3.2 Burley and Ockham

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If in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X we replace

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consequence is (TP), and that (ST) simply specifies a particular

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1.2 What are medieval theories of

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At first sight, it is not immediately clear what the object of analysis of

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notion of logical consequence (Shapiro 2005). Some modern scholars

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generalization of syllogistic; syllogistic is a special case of

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consequence, from the impossible anything follows, or the necessary

2. Early Theories of Consequence

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unsurprisingly, Aristotle. The Prior Analytics and the theory of

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Ancient logics were all in some sense relevance logics. They

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Plato's academy (see the entry on ancient logic of this encyclopedia,

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substitutivity criterion is essentially a later contribution of the ancient

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have been inspired by Aristotle's Topics. Cicero's work, however, is

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opposition between propositionum complexio and rerum natura (the

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Dialectica dedicated to the topical framework (the book De Locis),

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treat the notion of containment in semantic/relevantist terms, while

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Whatever terms you substitute, whether they are compatible or

2.3 13th Century

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Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre/Lagny) and the absorption of the

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applications of Aristotelian metaphysical concepts in other areas

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Faversham, Quaestiones Super Libro Elenchorum, quaestio 36,

3. 14th Century Theories of

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The precise historical origins of 14th century theories of consequence

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preceding the emergence of treatises on consequences, gives

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consequences. It seems that at least four traditions contributed

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nature of consequence than the previous group, presenting

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Chronologically, the development of theories of consequence in the

3.2 Burley and Ockham