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Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987

Author(s): David Strang


Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 429-454
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International
StudiesQuarterly
(1991) 35, 429-454

Global Patternsof Decolonizaton, 1500-1987


DAVID STRANG

CornellUniversity
This paper examinesglobalpatternsin thebreakdownofWesternoverseas
of worldempiresbetween1500 and 1987. It counterposestheimplications
argumentsforthetimingofdecolonizaeconomy,Marxist,and institutional
tion.Nonparametric
analysesindicategreatvariationin therateofdecolonino variationoverdependencyage.
zationoverhistoricaltime,and virtually
This suggeststhat the processesproducingdecolonizationare primarily
externalratherthaninternalto the dependency.The presenceof a hegemonicpower,the rise of an anticolonialpoliticaldiscourse,and diffusion
processeswithinand across empireshelp to explain shiftsin the rate of
decolonizationover historicaltime.

One of the fundamental regularities of the Western state system seems to be the
transitionfrom colonial dependency to sovereignty.Beginning with Britain's continental colonies in 1783 and ending with the Caribbean islands of Saint Kitts and
Nevis in 1983, 165 colonial dependencies have become new independent states or
have been fullyincorporated into existing sovereign states. As a central feature of
the expansion of the Western state system,decolonization finds a parallel only in
the process of imperial conquest and colonization. It is far more central than the
recognition of non-Western states as sovereign members of the Western "family of
nations," which occurs only a handful of times.
This paper seeks some insight into the conditions facilitating decolonization
through an analysis of when decolonization occurs. Three broad perspectives on
internationalrelations are counterposed as explanations of the rate of decolonization.
The firstis a world-economy perspective focusing on global cycles in hegemony and
economic growth. The second is a Marxist analysis interpretingpolitical change in
the light of social structuralchange in the dependency. The third is an institutional
account emphasizing the cognitive dimensions of politicsand the impact of dominant
models of political organization.
In prior work (Strang, 1990), the author has examined these arguments in event
historyanalyses of decolonization between 1870 and 1987. The relativelyshort time
frame of the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies permits a rather detailed
analysis, where theoretical arguments can be represented by variables at three levels
of measurement: the dependency, the empire, and the world system.Results point
to thejoint action of several processes of theoreticalinterest.Perhaps most strikingly,
Author'snote: The author thanks Stephen D. Krasner, John W. Meyer, Ann Swidler, Nancy B. Tuma, and
Lawrence L. Wu, and the reviewersand editorsof ISQ for theircommentson earlier versionsof thispaper. This
research was supported in part by a MacArthurDissertationGrant received under the auspices of the Stanford
Center for InternationalSecurityand Arms Control.
? 1991 InternationalStudies Association

430

1500-1987
GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,

decolonizationseems affectedby a combinationof politicalopportunitiesprovided


byAmericanhegemony,the globalmovementtowardspoliticalmodelsgroundedin
and the impactof priordecolonization.
popular sovereignty,
are taken into
Even aftera varietyof dependencyand imperialcharacteristics
account,thereis substantial"systemlevel"variationin therateofdecolonizationover
to unpack thisvariation,sincethe hypothesized
century.It is difficult
the twentieth
causal factors(global economic cycles,hegemony,the legitimacyof colonialism)
to gauge
changeslowlyovertimeand are highlycorrelated.In addition,itis difficult
decolonizationare. For
how generalthecausal factorsinvolvedin twentieth-century
Americanhegemony,thataccelerates
example,is it hegemonyper se, or specifically
decolonization?
This paper seeks to address these issues by examiningthe relationshipbetween
systemicconditionsand decolonizationover a considerablylongerperiod, 1500 to
permitsmorepowerfultestsof theimpact
1987. This enlargedtemporalframework
of slowlychangingglobaleconomicand politicalconditions.This powercomes at a
to examineor controlfortheeffects
makeitdifficult
price,however;data limitations
over fivehundred years. The low
of dependencyor metropolitancharacteristics
here shouldthusbe seen as comfrequencydynamicsof decolonizationinvestigated
to,and as providinga contextfor,analysisofthelocalconditionsfacilitatplementary
ing decolonization.
TheoreticalPerspectives
World-Economy
Arguments

Studentsof the world economyare nearlyalone in havingproduced quantitative


Bergesenand Schoenberg(1980),
analysesofglobalpatternsin Westernimperialism.
over timeto
McGowan(1985) and Boswell(1989) connectlevelsof imperialactivity
and economicgrowth.Whiletheirattensystemicprocessesof powerconcentration
theirargumentsalso apply to
tionfocuseson the totalamountof imperialactivity,
the processof decolonizationper se.
ofpoweramongcorestates.World-economy
A firstconcernis withthedistribution
of power,wherea
theoristsfocuson the contrastbetweena hegemonicdistribution
and a multicentric
distribution,
whereno suchstateexists.
singlestateis predominant,
Economicpoweris emphasized;forexample,Wallerstein(1983) defineshegemony
in termsof simultaneouspre-eminencein production,commerce,and finance.
distributions
are arguedtolead tostrongpoliticalcontrolsoverperiphMulticentric
eral areas, while hegemonyloosens these controls.Chase-Dunn and Rubinson
ofcompetitive
advantagein thecore
(1979:464) arugethat"A moreequal distribution
leads to greatercompetitionamongcore statesand a moreformaland monopolistic
structureof controlbetweencore statesand peripheralareas." Realiststudentsof
internationalpoliticaleconomymake a parallel argumentabout the action of the
hegemonicstate.Krasner(1976) suggeststhata hegemonhas boththeincentiveand
thecapabilityto constructan open tradingregime,whilerelativeparityamongstates
traderegime(also see Kindleberger,1973; Lake,
international
leads to a fragmented
1984).
A second line of argumentconcernsthe rate of globaleconomicgrowth.Periods
and maintenance
ofglobaleconomicstagnationarethoughttolead totheconstruction
of formaldependencies,whileperiodsof economicexpansionproduceloosertiesto
withinthecore.A falling
peripheralareas. Again,theargumentstressescompetition
whileperiods
rateof profitleads core statesto tightentheircontrolof theperiphery,
forinternalinvestment
makecontrolslessnecessary(Chasemarkedbyopportunities
Dunn and Rubinson,1979).

DAVID STRANG

431

The looseningof politicalcontrolsover peripheralareas should affectdifferent


ways.On theone hand,hegemonyand economic
formsofdecolonizationin different
expansionshouldacceleratedecolonizationthroughnationalindependenceor unificationwithanotherperipheralstate.On the other,hegemonyand economicexpanintothemetropolis
sionshouldslowdecolonizationin thesenseof fullincorporation
(or any othercore state).Incorporationmaybe expectedto tightenpolitical,social,
and the metropolis.
and economiclinkagesbetweenthe overseasterritory
To formulateexpectedpatternsof decolonization,it is necessaryto specifyhow
theoristsargue thatboth
theseconditioningfactorsvaryover time.World-economy
This is characteristic
of the
hegemonyand economicgrowthfollowcyclicrhythms.
paper "Cyclical
world-economy
perspective;less than a page in the programmatic
Rhythmsand Secular Trends of the CapitalistWorld-Economy"(WorkingGroup,
1979) is devotedto seculartrends.
Cyclesof hegemonyare argued to resultfromtheinternaldynamicsof a capitalist
and thestate'sinterworldeconomy.Unevendevelopment,pressuresforinnovation,
of capital.But dominanteconomiestendto decline
ferencelead to theconcentration
due to thediffusionof technologicaladvancesand the overrelativeto competitors,
(Chase-Dunnand Rubinson,1979:464).
head costsof maintainingsystemicstability
These argumentsare bolsteredby workon militaryhegemony,whichemphasizes
commitments
(Thompson and Zuk, 1986)
cyclesgroundedin the trapof territorial
and the costsof attainingglobal supremacy(Raslerand Thompson, 1983).
literatureidentifiesglobal economiccycleswithKondratieff
The world-economy
wavesare hypothesizedcyclesin pricesand productionof about
waves.Kondratieff
fifty
yearsin duration,argued to resultfromfactorsas diverseas capitalinvestment,
and capitalistcrises.Goldstein(1985, 1988) reviewsthis
technological
breakthroughs,
evidenceforglobalcyclesin pricessincethe
literatureand providessome systematic
sixteenthcentury.
World-economy
argumentsthus suggestthatdecolonizationshould be synchronized to cyclesin hegemonyand global economic expansion. Decolonizationvia
independenceshouldbe morerapidin periodswhena hegemonicpoweris present,
and duringeconomicboomsin theworldeconomy.Decolonizationvia incorporation
should showthe reversepattern.1
MarxistArguments

of economicprocessesand
Whileworld-economy
argumentsfocuson theinteraction
politicalactionat thelevelof thesystemas a whole,classicalMarxistargumentsfocus
of peripheraleconomies.2Politicalcontrolsare seen
transformation
on thestructural
economiesor at the
as essentialto primitiveaccumulationoccurringin precapitalist
fringesof capitalizedeconomies.But over time,capitalistarrangementssupplant
primitiveaccumulationbased on simplecoercion.Subsistenceeconomiesare monetizedand drawnintoworldmarkets,peasantsare drivenintothe city,and national
and compradorbourgeoisemerge.
It is at the shiftfromprimitiveaccumulationto incorporationinto the world
lookedto urban
economythatdecolonizationshouldoccur.Marxistshaveclassifically
workersand the bourgeoisieas nationalrevolutionaries(Wallerstein,1976). And
1
As a reviewerforthispaper pointedout, however,a world-economytheoristcannotpredictwhetherdecolonization itselfshould appear cyclicwithoutexamininghow hegemonic cyclesand Kondratieffwaves overlap.
2 It
may seem strangeto counterposeworld-economyand Marxistarguments,since the world-economyperspectiveis underpinned by a variantof classicalMarxism(Szymanski,1981). But for the case of decolonization,worldof productiverelations
economytheoristshave attended to competitionwithinthe core ratherthan transformation
in the periphery.It thus seems importantto keep the two argumentsconceptuallydistinct.

432

1500-1987
GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,

fromthepointofviewofexternalcapital,thereis littleneed ofovertpoliticallinkages


to the largerworld systemonce strongeconomiclinkagesare in place (Bergesen
and Schoenberg,1980). At thisstagethe overheadcostsof formalpoliticalcontrols
outweightheirremainingadvantages.
The generalprediction,
then,is thatdecolonizationshouldincreaseovertime,since
it is exposure to Westerncapitaliststructuresthattransforms
peripheralsocieties.
Two measuresoftimeappear relevant.Byone lineoftheory,
thelevelofdevelopment
of Westerncapitaliststructures
determinesthe speed of peripheraltransformation
(Szymanski,1981). This impliesthatthe rateof decolonizationshouldincreasewith
historicaltime.
MainstreamMarxistaccountsalso maintainthatimperialismacceleratesthe economic transformation
of non-Westernsocieties.In contrastto the world-economy
perspective,the driveto exploitcolonialmarketsis argued to lead to the exportof
capital fromthe imperialcenterto the periphery(Marx, 1853; Lenin, 1917). This
impliesthatdependencyage (the lengthof timesincecolonization)should be positivelyrelatedto thechancesof decolonization.Sincethisprocessofinternaltransforto one of externaldevelopment,a Marxistperspective
mationis complementary
suggeststhattherateof decolonizationshouldincreasewithbothhistoricaltimeand
dependencyage.
InstitutionalArguments

additionto modesofpolitical
Institutional
argumentsforman increasingly
important
analysis(Ashley,1984; Marchand Olsen, 1984; Krasner,1988). They have entered
stresson thecollectiveunderinternational
relationsthroughtheregimeliterature's
standingsand proceduresthatorganizestateinteraction
(Krasner,1983; Kratochwil
and Ruggie, 1986). A related set of arguments,also restingon the notion of a
statesociety(Bull, 1977) or worldpolity(Meyer,1980),emphasizethe meaningand
An institutional
accountsuggeststhatbehavioris
legitimacyof politicalstructures.
constrainedand guided by models of possibleand appropriateaction (Meyerand
Rowan, 1977).3
One argumentflowingfromthispremiseis thatdecolonizationinvolvesthetransmodel fromWesternpowersto theirdependencies.Elite
missionof the nation-state
and mass educationin the peripheryprovidechannelsfor the exportof Western
and a broadlyincorporativestate.While Marxists
notionsof popular sovereignty
accountmight
pointto the rise of the bourgeoisieand wage labor,an institutional
pointto the rise of Westerneducated elites,teachers,and civilservants.
A second argumentconsidersdecolonizationas a diffusionprocess,whereprior
decolonizationincreasesthe rateof futuredecolonization.Even the firstinstanceof
decolonization,the (North)AmericanRevolution,seemed to generateimitationin
Haiti and HispanicAmerica.In thetwentieth
century,theindependenceof India is
oftenseen as a crucialturningpoint,whileGhana'sindependenceservedas a catalyst
fornationalliberationmovementsall over Africa.And once decolonizationwas in
fullswingin the 1960s,perceptionsof possiblechangeblossomedintotheconviction
thatdecolonizationwas inevitable.This convictionappears to have had an especially
in the 1970s,whicha decade before
strongimpacton the emergenceof microstates
were thoughtincapableof self-rule.
in theiremphasison externalpoliticalmodBothof thesearguments,institutional
els,suggestthatratesof decolonizationshouldincreaseoverhistoricaltime.Liberal,
corporatist,and state socialistvariantsof expanded popular sovereigntybecame
3 Elsewhere (Strang, 1990) I have referredto institutionalargumentsin the internationalcontextas forminga
"world polity"perspective.

DAVID STRANG

433

dominantmodelsofpoliticalorganizationduringthetwentieth
century(thoughtheir
promise of high levels of participationand enhanced citizenshiprightswas not
necessarilyrealized in practice).By the 1960s the worldcommunityhad come to
espouserapiddecolonization,
groundingthisstancein notionsofpopularsovereignty
and individualrights.
Diffusionargumentsare also closelylinkedto historicaltime.It is "external,"global
timethatmarkstheeffectsof priordecolonization.And formalmodelsof diffusion,
whichgenerateS-shapedaggregateratesofdecolonization,
implyinstantaneous
transitionratesthatrise monotonically
withtime(Strang,1991). Internalmeasuresof
time(i.e., measuresof timespecificto the individualratherthanthe environment)
have no postulatedrelationto diffusioneffects.
The "Life Histories" of Dependencies
An examinationof temporalpatternsin decolonizationrequiresknowledgeof the
foundingand dissolutiondates of colonialdependencies.This sectiondiscussesthe
criteriadefiningmovementinto and out of dependent status,some of the issues
involved,and the data set constructedon the basis of thesedefinitions.
The dependenciesof Westernstateswere created in two ways. In many cases,
European statesregarded non-Europeanlands as unoccupied or unclaimedby a
legitimateruler.Westernstatesthereforecreatedmanydependencieswithoutreference to existingpolities,organizinga colonial governmentdirectlyor chartering
ofan administrative
privateindividualsor corporationsto do so. I treattheformation
structureas thecriterionforthecreationof a dependency;a mereclaimto territory
is not sufficient.
The second main route to imperialexpansionwas throughconquestof or treaofa colonialadministrator
witha non-Western
tymaking
polity.Eithertheassignment
(as above) or the signingof a treatywherea non-Europeanrulercedes significant
are thedefinitive
actsofpoliticalimperialism.
These include
aspectsofhissovereignty
whilerelinquishing
protectorates,
wherea rulerretainsinternalsovereignty
external
loose formsof politicaldepenindependence.This approachalso includesrelatively
dency,such as Britain's"protectedstates"and U.S. controlof the publicfinanceof
Haiti and Nicaraguain the earlytwentieth
century.
Politiesmove out of dependentstatusin a varietyof ways,only some of which
involvemovinginto sovereignstatus.First,dependencies may exit the world of
whentheyare abandoned (as Mauritiuswas in thesevenWesternpoliticaldefinition
teenthcentury)or conquered by non-Westernforces(as when Oran was seized by
theOttomansin 1708). They mayalso mergeto forma largerpolityor separateinto
that
componentdependencies.In each ofthesecases,one can utilizetheinformation
the politicalunitdid notbecome sovereignduringitscareeras a dependency.
Dependenciesgenerallybecomesovereignas newindependentstates.The general
criteriaforindependenceis recognitionby the metropolitanpower.Britain'scontinentalcoloniesare coded as sovereignin 1783, at the signingof theTreatyof Paris,
and notat thedeclarationof independence(1776) or theexpulsionof Britishtroops
(1781). Sincetheunitof analysishereis thedependency,notthenewsovereignstate,
the decolonizationof 13 Americancoloniescountsas 13 events,and the creationof
a sovereignIndia and Pakistanout of BritishIndia as a singledecolonizationevent.
Wheremetropolitan
as a whole
recognitionand thatof theinternational
community
are at variance,the latteris takenas authoritative.4
'The independence of Spanish South America is thus coded as 1830, when the U.S., Great Britain,and France
had all recognizedthe sovereigntyof the Latin Americanrepublics.Spain acceded to Latin Americanindependence
in 1836.

434

GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,
1500-1987

of thedependency
A secondrouteto sovereignstatusis throughfullincorporation
intoan existingsovereignstate.Alaska and Hawaii's acquisitionof statehoodform
as does thereorganization
ofFrance'scolonies
instancesof thistypeof decolonization,
anciensas overseasdepartments.In othercases,dependenciesare incorporatedinto
statesotherthantheirmetropoles,as whenPortugueseGoa became partof India in
of a dependencyas an integralpart of the
1961. When a metropole'sredefinition
domesticpolityis widelydisputedby otherstates,as was the case for Portuguese
coloniesafter1951, the dependencyis not consideredto become sovereign.
bytheorganizationof concreteadministrative
Dependenciesare thusconstructed
structuresor the proclamationof formaltreaties,but become sovereignthrough
formalrecognition.This changein emphasismirrorstheshiftfroma position"outside" theWesterninternational
systemto membershipwithinit. Imperialexpansion
by Westernpowersoccurredwithoutreferenceto otherstatesor the international
systemas a whole-in fact,itwas thepositionof non-Europeanpeoples and polities
ofnations"thatmadeimperialism
legitimate.
Bycontrast,
outsidetheWestern"family
the emergenceof a new polityas a sovereignstate involvesmore than de facto
independence;it impliesinternationalacceptanceof the polity'srightof internal
jurisdictionand externalfreedomof action.
The data set attemptsto coverthe formalpoliticaldominationof non-European
territories
byWesternstates.It excludes"internal"coloniessituatedwithinEurope,
Empire,and also thedependensuchas theregionsmakingup theAustro-Hungarian
states.Temporally,the studybeginsin 1500 and ends in 1987.
cies of non-Western
This periodprovidesthecontextof a Westerneconomicand politicalsystemthatall
threetheoreticalperspectivespresuppose (Wallerstein,1974; Levy, 1983; Ruggie,
1983).5
Comprehensivelistingsof politicalentitiesprovidedby Henige (1970) and Banks
(1987) servedto establishthe foundingand decolonizationdates of mostdependencies. The definitionof decolonizationwas changed to mean sovereignrecognition,
ratherthanremovalofthecolonialgovernor.This led to newdatesofdecolonization,
in thecases of nineteenth-century
independencestrugglesin theAmeriparticularly
and generalizedrecognicas (de factocontrolof territory,
metropolitan
recognition,
tionare nearlysimultaneousin thetwentieth
century).It also led to thediscoveryof
decolonizationevents.For example, France elevated its overseas colonies to full
equalitywiththe metropolisin the Constitutionof the Year III (1795)-a kind of
decolonizationincludedin thisdata set thoughunrecordedby Henige. (They were
returnedto dependentstatusunder Napoleon in 1803, and reenterthe data set as
adminisdependenciesat thattime.)Secondarysourceswereused to code indirectly
in theMiddleEast,Caribbean
tereddependencies(forexample,Britishprotectorates
South Africa's
protectoratesof the United States in the early twentieth-century,
homelands).The appendix liststhe dependenciesanalyzedin thispaper.6
Time Dependence in Decolonization
The analysisof temporalpatternsbeginswitha plotof thenumberof dependencies
thenturnstoa moredetailed
in existenceeachyearbetween1500 and 1987.Attention
5 Boswell (1989) argues thatit is necessaryto ignore eventsoccurringin the last thirtyyears,due to shiftsin the
colonial "regime."I disagree,and regardmassivedecolonizationafter1960 as somethingimportantto be explained.
If the discoursesurroundingformaldependency shiftsin the post-World War II era, I would treatthisas a factor
in modellingdecolonization ratherthan a rationale for truncatingthe analysis.
6
hasten to add thatI do not claim close local knowledgeof all colonial arrangementson the scale of thisstudy,
and I am sure additional informationwould improvethe qualityof the data set. I would be surprised,however,if
fullerinformationaltered the resultsreported here.

435

DAVID STRANG

160
150140
T

130

o 120
T
A 110
L
100
D
E go.
P
E 60
N
D 70
E
N 60C
1 50-

S 40
30
2010
0
1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

HISTORICAL
TIME
FIG. 1. Non-European dependencies, 1500-1987.

Here, nonparametric
examinationof movementfromdependencyto sovereignty.
eventhistorymethodsare employedto describetemporalpatternsin the instantaneous transitionrate of decolonization.
occurs 165 timesbetween 1500
The transitionfromdependencyto sovereignty
involve
and 1987. Of theseevents,132 produce a new sovereignstate,twenty-three
and teninvolve
of thedependencyintothemetropolis,
thefullpoliticalincorporation
the incorporationof the dependencyinto some othersovereignstate.These three
formsof decolonizationare combinedin the graphicalanalysis.
Figure1 plotsthenumberofdependenciesin existenceforeach yearbetween1500
478 dependencieswerein existenceduringsome partof this
and 1987. Altogether,
period. In 1500, nine overseas dependenciesof Westernstatesexisted,including
AfricanenclaveslikeTangier and Ifni,theCape Verde and CanaryIslands,and the
firstAmericandependency,Santo Domingo (founded in 1496). The number of
dependenciesrose steadilyover the next 150 years,reachinga plateau in the midseventeenthcentury.The count then fluctuatedaround a level of ninetyWestern
dependenciesuntilthe late nineteenthcentury-duringthistime,new colonization

436

GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,
1500-1987

2.5

Aalen IntegratedHazard

21.51
0.5
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900

1920 1940 1960 1980

HistoricalTime
* IntegratedHazard

95% C.l.

- 95% C.I.

timeforwesterndependencies,1500-1987.
byhistorical
FIG. 2. Decolonization

and themergersof existingdepenis roughlymatchedbymovementto sovereignty


dencies. From 1880 to 1920 a second massiveincreasein the numberof colonies
occurred.Numerically,Westerncolonialismpeaked at 154 dependenciesin 1921.
in 1978. By
The numberthen fellrapidly,passingone hundredin 1961 and fifty
1987, thirty-five
non-Europeandependenciesremained.
toSovereignty:
HistoricalTime
Movement
WhileFigure1 givessomesenseofthehistorical
itcombines
timingofdecolonization,
the resultsof too many processes (rates of colonial creation,abandonment,and
merger,as well as decolonization)to providea sound basis fordescription.I make
to focuson thetimingofdecolonization.Here, the
use of eventhistorymethodology
centralquantityis the instantaneoustransitionrate (oftenshortenedto rate,and also
referredto as the hazard),whichis definedas

limPrjk(t,t+ At)
(1)
At
At
I0
of an eventbetweent and t + At.Intuitively,
the rate
wherePr(-) is the probability
is akin to the ratio of the numberof eventsoccurringduringan intervalof time
divided by the numberof cases "at risk"of experiencingan event. An excellent
is providedbyAllison(1984); moretechnicalpresentamethodologicalintroduction
tionsinclude Kalbfleischand Prentice(1980) and Tuma and Hannan (1984).
Graphicalanalysisof the relationshipbetweenrate of decolonizationand timeis
performedvia nonparametricestimatesof the integratedhazard (Nelson, 1972;
Aalen, 1978). In theseplots,theestimatedrateof decolonizationis givenbytheslope
linesignalstheabsenceof temporalvariation
of thecurve.This meansthata straight
in therateof decolonization;an increasing(decreasing)slope signalsthattherateof
decolonizationis increasing(decreasing)over time.
Figure 2 plots the integratedhazard of decolonizationagainst historicaltime.
Dramaticvariationin the slope of the curve indicatesfourdistincthistoricaleras.
rjk(t)=

DAVID STRANG

437

From the beginningsof European colonizationin the fifteenth


centuryto the late
eighteenthcentury,the transitionrate is virtuallyzero. No dependenciesbecome
sovereignduringthisperiod,eitheras independentstatesor throughintegration
into
an alreadysovereignstate.This is an era when dependenciesare creaturesof the
metropole,as tradingenclavesor plantations(Parry,1963).
The curverisessharplybut brieflyfromthe late eighteenthcenturyto the 1830s.
This is theperiodof Americanwarsof independence,firstin theBritishcontinental
colonies,and thenin Brazil,Haiti,and SpanishCentraland SouthAmerica.Though
thelargestsettlercolonieswontheirindependenceduringthisperiod,muchterritory
remainedin dependentstatus:mostimportant,
thelucrativeplantationeconomiesof
theCaribbean,and thedomainsoftheBritishand NetherlandsEastIndia Companies.
The thirdperiod is one of resumed stabilityof dependent relations.The only
oftheMoskitoCoast
transition
occurringbetween1831and 1923is theincorporation
into Honduras,whichfolloweditscessionbyGreatBritainin 1860. The nineteenth
of Europe. The
centuryis theperiodof the Pax Brittanicaand theindustrialization
last threedecades of the nineteenthcenturysaw the rapid expansionof Western
in the feveredpartitionof Africa.
empires,mostspectacularly
The fourthperiod begins at the close of World War I and continuesuntilthe
present.It witnessesa massivewave of decolonization,both more rapid and more
extensivethanthepreviouswaveof Americandecolonization.Over theseventy-year
tookplace in 1924,
period,130 dependenciesbetweensovereign.The firsttransitions
overtheDominicanRepublic
whentheUnitedStatesrevokeditsrightsofinterference
and the USSR fullyincorporatedthe CentralAsian statesof Khiva and Bukhara,
Seventeendependenciesbecame
whichImperialRussia had held as protectorates.
sovereignbetween1924 and 1945,includingCanada, Australia,theUnion of South
Africa,and severalArab nations.
The rate of decolonizationincreasedrapidlyin the post-WorldWar II era. It
reached a peak in 1960, when eighteenAfricandependenciesbecome sovereign
states.The rateof decolonizationremainedhighthroughthe 1970s,withtwenty-five
insular"microstates"
becomingsovereignin thatdecade. Onlyin the 1980s did the
waveof twentieth-century
decolonizationseemto exhaustitself.Fiveeventsoccurred
between1980 and 1987: theindependenceofBrunei,Belize,SaintKitts,and Antigua
and Barbuda, and the incorporationof the Cocos Islands intoAustralia.
This historicalpatternis consistentat a generallevel withthe predictionsof all
threeperspectives.Fromone pointof view,it maybe interpretedas evidenceforan
underlyingcyclicprocess.This is the positiontakenby Bergesen and Schoenberg
increasesduringperiodsof systeminstability
(1980), whoargue thatimperialactivity
and decreasesduringperiodsof stability
and hegemony.They
and multicentricity,
connectthefirstwaveof decolonizationto thePax Britannica,and thesecond to the
Pax Americana.Bergesenand Schoenbergbelievea thirdwaveofheightenedpolitical
controlsover the peripheryis alreadyunderway,due to the decline of American
hegemony.
Fromanotherpointofview,themostremarkablefeatureof Figure2 is themassive
increasein the rate of decolonizationover the last half century.7If thereare two
wavesof decolonization,the second is much more completethanthe first.Between
1783 and 1833,thirty-four
decolonizationeventstookplace,reducingthetotalnumber of dependenciesfromninety-sixto seventy-eight.
By contrast,the twentiethcolonialdependencenturywaveofdecolonizationsawa drop from153 to thirty-five
cies,with130 decolonizationeventsoccurringover sixtyyears.Marxistand institu7 This is not an artifactof the larger number of colonies at the outset of the twentiethcentury.The rapid
increase in the rate of decolonizationindicatesmore rapid decolonizationper existingdependency,not more total
decolonization events (a quantitythatincreases even faster).

438

GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,
1500-1987

1.2

Aalen IntegratedHazard

0.8
0.60.40.2
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Dependency Age (Time since Colonization)


* IntegratedHazard

+ 95% C.I.

i - 95% C.I.

FIG. 3. Decolonization
bydependencyage forwesterndependencies,1500-1987.

offertwocompetingexplanationsofthisseculartrend:theintensitionalperspectives
ficationof the worldcapitalisteconomyand the rise of the nation-state.
Movement
toSovereignty:
Dependency
Age
Substantialhistoricalvariationsin the rate of decolonizationdo not eliminatethe
possibility
thatdecolonizationalso varieswiththe age of the dependency.In fact
"age dependence"can giveriseto apparentdependenceon historicaltimeifratesof
colonizationvaryover time(whichtheydo).
To examinethepatternofage dependence,Figure3 displaystheintegratedhazard
of decolonizationversusdependencyage. Dependencyage is definedhere as time
ofexposuretoWesterneconomic
whichpinpointstheeffects
sinceinitialcolonization,
institutions.
Dependencies are plottedonly for the firsttwo hundred years after
colonization.Beyond thattimethereare so fewcases at riskof decolonizationthat
littlecan be said about patternsof variation.
The slope of the integratedhazard is close to linear in Figure 3, signallinga
transitionrate thatis constantwithrespectto the age of the dependency.There is
thus littleindicationin these figuresof an effectof a structuraltransformation
initiatedby colonization.While dependenciesmay undergo structuraltransformation,thisdoes not appear to affectthe rateof decolonization.8
Moderateeffectsofdependencyage mightbe maskedbya largeeffectof historical
time.But parametricmodels includingboth age and historicaltimeshowthatonly
the latterbears a significant
relationto the rate of decolonization.Substantively,
externalprocessesof change in the largerworldenvironmentappear to dominate
internalprocessesof change withinthe dependency.
8 I also explored the possibility
thatdecolonizationmightvarywithtimesince the presentcolonial administration
was formed,due to a "liabilityof newness" prior to the developmentof solid administrativeand politicalcontrols.
The rate of decolonization was invariantwiththisalternativeconceptualizationof age as well.

DAVID STRANG

439

Models of Decolonization
The previoussectionrevealed suggestionsof both cyclesand a secular trend in
decolonizationover historicaltime.As such,theseresultsdo not arbitratebetween
some of the centralpredictionsof the world-economy,
Marxist,and institutional
perspectives.
Nor do theyprovidea strongtestof thepredictionsof each theory.For
example,decolonizationmightoccurinwaves,butthesemightnotbe synchronized
to
thefactorsidentified
byworld-economy
arguments.This sectionexploresparametric
modelssimultaneously
examiningtheimpactofspecificfactorssuggestedbydifferent
theoreticalperspectives.
Variables
Wallerstein's(1983) periodizationof hegemonyis used to examineworld-economy
of economicpoweramongcore states.Wallerstein
argumentsabout thedistribution
claimsthattherehavebeen threeperiodswhena singlestateis dominantin manufacturing,commerce,and finance:the UnitedProvincesof the Netherlandsfrom1625
to 1671, Great Britainfrom 1815 to 1873, and the United States from 1945 to
1967. The variableEconomicHegemonyequals one duringtheseperiodsand zero
otherwise.
"Hegemony"is oftenused in a differentsense to referto a militarTily
dominant
powerwithintheworldsystem(Modelski,1978; Modelskiand Thompson,1988). In
the presentcontext,thereis considerableoverlap betweenthe effectsof military
and economicdominance;forexample,Bergesenand Schoenberg(1980) develop
and instability.
To examine
argumentsaboutbothindistinguishing
periodsofstability
theseargumentsI make use of Modelskiand Thompson's(1988) measuresof naval
a military
capacity,sincea navyis necessaryformaintaining
presencein the dependency.MilitaryHegemonyis definedas theproportionof theworld'snaval capacity
possessedby the largestnaval power.
wavesis used to explorethe effects
Goldstein's(1985, 1988) workon Kondratieff
of globaleconomiccycles.Goldsteindevelopsa periodizationofelevenupswingsand
wave literature
downswingsin the worldeconomysince 1495 fromthe Kondratieff
(data fromthe 1985 articleare used). The variableEconomicUpswingequals one
duringperiodsof global expansionand zero duringperiodsof contraction.
Diffusioneffectsare centralto manyinstitutional
arguments,suggestingone way
thatexternalpressurescan acttohomogenizeactiondespitelocaldifferences
(Tolbert
and Zucker, 1983). They may be measured in an event historycontextby using
the numberof priordecolonizationeventswithinthe populationas an explanatory
variable.This strategyrepresentsan individual-level
analogue to classicepidemic
models (Strang,1991).9
However, an institutional
understandingof diffusionformsonly one possible
of the effectof priordecolonization.One mightalso stressthe way
interpretation
metropolitanresourcesare stretchedby multiplenationalliberationmovements,or
institutional
theimpactof previousdecolonizationon imperialpolicy.To distinguish
twovariablesare constructed.The firstcounts
effectsfromalternativemechanisms,
the numberof previousdecolonizationeventswithinthe empire,and is susceptible
The secondvariablecounts
and noninstitutional
to bothinstitutional
interpretations.
onlydecolonizationeventsoutsidetheempire,and representstheinstitutional
argumentin a purer form.
Finally,the institutional
perspectivepointsto the importanceof globalideologies
and politicaldiscourse.As notedabove,thepost-WorldWar II era witnesseda shift
9 More complex diffusionformulations,such as models permitting"infectiousness"to wear off over time,are
only beginningto be developed in the event historycontext(Strang and Tuma, 1990).

440

1500-1987
GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,

as theproductoftheracialor socialsuperiority
imperialism
fromtheorieslegitimating
as contrary
to basichumanrights.(Early
of theWestto condemnationof imperialism
maybe seen as a halfwayhouse
doctrinesof imperial"trusteeship"
twentieth-century
in thisshift.)I use theUnitedNation'sDeclarationon theGrantingof Independence
ofanti-imperialism
toColonialCountriesand Peoples(1960) todatethecrystallization
as thedominantpositionin globalpoliticaldiscourse.The variableU.N. Declaration
equals one after1960 and zero before.
Modelling Framework

The followinganalysestestparametricmodelsof therateof decolonizationthrough


intoan existingstateotherthantheformer
nationalindependenceor incorporation
discusmetropolis.Incorporationintothemetropolisis excluded,sincethetheoretical
in theprecipitants
of
sionand some descriptiveanalysessuggestpossibledifferences
thereare twofewcasesofincorpora10Unfortunately,
thetwotypesofdecolonization.
analysisfocusingsolely
tion,overtoo longa historicalperiod,to sustaina multivariate
on thistypeof event.
examinetheeffectsof predicThe chiefgoal of theseanalysesis to simultaneously
and institutional
perspectives.Since thetwoformsof
tionsfromtheworld-economy
hegemonyrepresentdifferentfacetsof a single argument(and likewisefor the
variables),theyare keptseparatein theanalysespresentedbelow.Four
institutional
combinationof meamodelsare thusreported,each of whichexaminesa different
sures fromthe threetheoreticalperspectives.This approach permitssome insight
intothe robustnessof the predictionsmade by each perspective.
Analysescontrolfordependence on historicaltimeto providea strongertestof
the contributionmade by the variablesdescribedabove. Technically,I employa
Gompertzframework,
rjk(t) =

exp(X/3+ yt),

(2)

where the rate is an exponentialfunctionof explanatoryvariablesand historical


time.11

Results

examiningtheimpactof global
Table 1 reportstheresultsof modelssimultaneously
process.The lattertwoarguments
economicexpansion,hegemony,and institutional
ways,so modelsA throughD representthefour
are each measuredin twodifferent
referto likelihoodratio
of thetwosetsof variables.x2statistics
possiblecombinations
testscomparingthe model to a baselineGompertzmodel,whichincludesonlythe
in thefitof the
improvement
effectof historicaltime.Large valuesimplysignificant
model as a whole,wheredegreesof freedomequal the differencein the numberof
parametersin thetwomodels.All modelsare estimatedusingRATE (Tuma, 1980).
raises the rate of
In both models A and C, Economic Hegemony significantly
decolonization.This is in line withBoswell's(1989) analysisof netcolonization,and
perspective.Holding other
witha varietyof argumentswithinthe world-economy
effectsconstant,estimatedratesof decolonizationare about fivetimeslargerwhen
10Resultsare robustwithrespect to the definitionof the eventsof interest.The omissionof incorporationinto
other statesor the addition of incorporationinto the metropolisdo not produce findingssubstantiallydifferent
than those reported below.
" Semiparametrictechniques for controllingfor time dependence, Cox's (1972) partial likelihood method, are
inappropriatehere since it cannot estimatethe effectsof system-levelvariables.

441

DAVID STRANG

TABLE 1. ML ParameterEstimatesfortheTransitionfromDependency to SovereignIndepen-

dence, 1500-1987 (standard errors in parentheses); 142 decolonization events occurred.

Variable
go
Economic Hegemony
MilitaryHegemony
Economic Upswing
Prior Decolonization
WithinEmpire
Outside Empire
U.N. Declaration
HistoricalTime
Log Likelihood
Likelihood Ratio x2
versus r(t) = exp(/30+ 'yot)
(d.f.)

A
Estimate

B
Estimate

-11.61**
(0.97)
1.64**
(0.26)

- 10.80**
(0.80)

-0.68*
(0.27)

0.93*
(0.47)
0.33
(0.20)

C
Estimate
11.09**
(0.82)
1.54**
(0.26)
-0.69*
(0.26)

D
Estimate
- 10.36**
(0.67)
1.02
(0.55)
0.34
(0.18)

0.012**
(0.004)

0.01 1**
(0.004)

0.010**
(0.002)
-757

1.63**
(0.24)
0.012**
(0.002)
-719

1.73**
(0.24)
0.009**
(0.001)
-737

122.3**
5

198.0**
5

162.1**
5

0.030**
(0.004)
0.014**
(0.003)

0.029**
(0.004)
0.013**
(0.003)

0.012**
(0.002)
-736
164.5**
5

** p < 0.01
p < 0.05

a singlepower is economicallydominantin the world system(exponentiatingthe


of the estimatedratewhenthebinaryvariableequals
coefficient
givesthe multiplier
one).
MilitaryHegemonydoes not bear as clear a relationto decolonization.It has a
one in model D. This is
barelysignificant
effectin model B, and an insignificant
sinceAmericanmilitary
somewhatsurprising,
hegemonyprovidesa betterexplanation of decolonizationin the 1970s and 1980s than does its decliningeconomic
variablesprovidea moreconsistent
accountof the
hegemony.However,institutional
rapid rise in decolonizationafterWorld War II than eitherof these factors.And
military
hegemonyprovidesa weakermatchto pre-twentieth
centuryvariationsin
the rate of decolonizationthandoes economichegemony.12
Periodsof economicexpansion(upswingsin Kondratieff
waves)are inconsistently
relatedtodecolonizationacrossmodelspecifications.
They decreasetherateof decolonizationwhen economichegemonyis includedin the model,but are positiveand
Both resultsrun counterto the
whenmilitary
insignificant
hegemonyis substituted.
world-economy
argumentthatcolonialpowersare lessconcernedtoretaindependenciesduringperiodsofeconomicgrowth.It maybe thatmoreattentionshouldbe paid
to themotivesof actorsin thedependency.Globaleconomicexpansionmayproduce
withintheimperialframework,
additionaltradeopportunities
theappeal
diminishing
of nationalindependence.
12 Models includingboth economic and militaryhegemonyfound positiveand significant
effectsof the former
and insignificanteffectsof the latter.

442

GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,
1500-1987

The numberof priordecolonizationeventswithinthe empireconsistently


raises
therateof decolonization.As discussedabove,thereare a varietyof mechanismsby
whichpriordecolonizationmightinfluencepresentaction.In some cases,theloss of
a keydependencymayreducethevalue of otherdependenciesin metropolitan
eyes.
For example,a numberof Britishcolonieswere acquiredto safeguardthe routeto
India; thesesuddenlybecameexpendablewhenIndia and Pakistanbecamesovereign
diffusionmayresultfromcommunicationand
states.In othercases,intra-imperial
imitationamong dependencies.
Models A and B shows thateventsoutside the empirealso increasethe rate of
decolonization.Since bothhistoricaltimeand eventswithinempiresare includedin
the equation,thiseffectgivesstrongevidenceforthe way decolonizationcame to
be fueledby itsown momentum.Priordecolonization,even in geographicallyand
of the legiticulturallydisconnecteddependencies,added to globalunderstandings
of decolonization.And whileits coefficient
is about half the
macyand inevitability
forpriordecolonizationwithintheempire,theestimatedimpact
sizeofthecoefficient
of decolonizationoutsidethe empireis generallylarger,sinceabout threetimesas
manyeventsoccurredoutsidethaninsidethe averagedependency'sempire.
This processis capturedin a different
waythroughtheshiftin politicaldiscourse,
heremarkedbytheUnitedNation'sdeclarationopposingcolonialism.Models C and
D indicatethatthe estimatedrate of decolonizationis more than fivetimeshigher
after1960 thanbefore,holdingothereffectsconstant.The twovariablesare notonly
coincidentbut substantively
bound together,since the United Nations'
historically
declarationwas based on the votesof formerdependencies.
In all four models,the additionof exogenous variablesincreasesthe fitof the
modelas a whole.Theyalso halvetheestimatedeffectofhistorical
time,whichequals
0.022 whenno covariatesare includedin the model. Mostof thisshiftis due to the
introductionof the institutional
variables.This is natural,since these effectsare
intendedto providea theoreticalaccount for the seculartrendin decolonization.
Models includingonlyworld-economy
measures,designedto index cyclicprocesses,
do not help to accountforthe trend.
dateofthestudy.Analyses
These resultsare quiterobustwithrespecttothestarting
beginningin 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia,oftentreatedas the beginningsof the
moderninternational
system)gave verysimilarresultsto thosepresentedabove. A
second set of exploratoryanalysesare conditionedon the AmericanRevolution,
similarto those
beginningthe analysisin 1783; here,too, resultswere substantially
reportedin Table 3.
Resultsdo vary,however,when recentdecolonizationis excluded fromanalysis.
In particular,truncationof the analysisprior to 1960 weakensthe impactof the
institutional
variables.Of course,no effectcan be estimatedfortheU.N. Declaration
unlesstheanalysisextendsbeyond1960. And iftheanalysisis truncatedin 1945,or
even 1955,theimpactof priordecolonizationoutsidetheempirecannotbe disentangled fromthatof historicaltime.13The main evidencefordiffusionis the surge in
decolonizationthroughthe 1950s, 1960s,and 1970s. This surge is too rapid to be
accountedforbyhistorical
time,and continuestoolongtobe explainedwithreference
of theinstitutional
variablesto theendingpointof the
to hegemony.The sensitivity
studythusdoes notsuggesta lackof generality.
Instead,itmakesexplicitthefeature
of the historicalpatternof decolonizationexplainedby the institutional
arguments
measuredhere.
effectto historical
Byascribinga substantial
time,themodelsin Table 3 leave much
unexplained.Whatis itabouthistoricaltimethatincreasestherateof decolonization,
13 Diffusionacross empires has a strongand significanteffectacross all definitionsof the study period when
dependence on historicaltime is not built into the analysis.

DAVID STRANG

443

net of measured covariates?As noted above, two plausible factorsare structural


changesin nationaleconomiesand the worldeconomyin general,and ideological
changesin dominantmodelsof politicalorganization.Whilethispaper is unable to
and dependency-level
factors
testthesearguments,analysesof metropolitandirectly
decolonizationpointto thelatterprocess(Strang,1990). Decoloin twentieth-century
nizationaccelerateswhen the metropolitanstatehas a broad suffrageregime,and
it is unaffectedbythe
institutions;
whenthe dependencyhas electedself-governing
economicdevelopmentof thedependency(as measuredbyurbanizationand foreign
trade per capita).
Overall, these findingssupport predictionsfromboth the world-economyand
Economichegemonyhelpsto explainthecycliccomponent
institutional
perspectives.
of
ofdecolonizationshownin Figure1. Diffusionacrossempiresand theconstruction
an anti-imperialist
globaldiscoursehelptoexplaintheseculartrendin decolonization.
Furtheranalystsof decolonizationmay find it useful to probe the interaction
betweenthesetwosetsof processes.The resultspresentedheresuggestthatone way
todo so istoconsiderhowtheimpactofhegemonyvariesovertime.In theseventeenth
of colonial
century,Dutchhegemonyled notto decolonizationbutto thereshuffling
Britishhegemonyaided
possessionsamong imperialpowers. Nineteenth-century
independencemovementson one continent,when the Britishnavystood ready to
century,American
blockthe reconquestof Spanish America.And in the twentieth
hegemonylent broad ideological support to nationalistmovements,accelerating
rapid, worldwidedecolonization.One can speculatethatin each case the rise of a
whiletheextentto whichthis
hegemonicstatedisruptedexistingimperialstructures,
disruptionresultedin decolonizationvarieswiththepoliticalmodelsand institutions
of the era.

Conclusions
patternofdecolonizationin theWestern
This articlehas discussedthebroadhistorical
internationalsystem.In doing so it has tried to explicitlylink these patternsto
of theWesterninternational
system.This strategyallows
theoreticalunderstandings
of a numberof specificargumentswithintheworldthisstudyto examinetheutility
betweenperperspectives(whilenot arbitrating
economy,Marxist,and institutional
spectivesas generalaccounts).It suggestsa "big picture"whichmayinformstudies
withmore depth and less breadth.
The chieffindingsof the graphicalanalysesare thatthe rate of decolonization
withhistoricaltimeand is invariantwithrespectto dependency
variesdramatically
inducedby
age. This is contraryto Marxistnotionsof socioeconomictransformation
closercontactwiththeWest,and moregenerallyat odds withemphaseson processes
occurringwithindependencies. It thus seems crucial to focus on change in the
largerworldeconomicand politicalsystem.There is some suggestionof cyclesin
butevenmoreofa massiveseculartrendwhereratesofdecolonization
decolonization,
increaseover historicaltime.
and institutional
In the parametricanalysis,world-economy
argumentsidentify
specificconditionspromotingdecolonization.The presenceofan economicallydominantstatehelpstoexplainpartofthecycliccomponentin decolonization.Institutional
its acceleration
processesprovidean explanationof the seculartrend,particularly
on whichfurtherresearch
after1945. These resultssuggesta contextualframework
thestudyofdecolonizationshouldbenefitfrom
maybe able toelaborate.In particular,
and institutional
theoreticaland empiricalworkseekingto combineworld-economy
perspectives.

444

1500-1987
GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,

Appendix. Westerncolonial dependencies, 1500-1987.


This appendix liststhe dependenciesanalyzedin thispaper. It does so in termsof
"dependencyspells,"definedas thetimeintervalduringwhichthe politicalunitwas
a colonialdependencyofa Westernpower.Notethatthenamesgiveninthisappendix
are those of the dependency,not the polityit becomes afterindependence.For
example,thereferenceis to Ubangi ShariratherthantheCentralAfricanRepublic.
Data sourcesand codingcriteriaare describedin the text.
If the dependencyspell ends in decolonization,the dependencyis markedwitha
singleasterisk(*) when thisinvolvesincorporationintothe colonialpower,and by
two asterisks(**) when decolonizationinvolvesindependenceor union withsome
otherstate.
Nameofthe
dependency
Ifni
Venezuela
Rio de Janeiro
Gran Canaria
Margarita
Rio de Janeiro
Ceara
Hormuz
Tenerife
Sao Jorge da Mina
Sergipe d'el Rei
Ceuta
Malacca
Paraiba
Oman
New Holland
New Sweden
Ceylon
Mauritius
Jamaica
Tangier
Tayowan
New Haven
Providence
Willoughby
St Kitts
Nevis
Antigua
Buenos Aires
Tortola
New Netherlands
Fort Dauphin
Bantam
Tangier
Surat
Pomeroon
New Plymouth
New Hampshire
Tortuga
Mombasa
East New Jersey

Start
date

End
date

1478
1528
1574
1480
1525
1608
1534
1515
1496
1482
1590
1415
1511
1582
1508
1641
1638
1598
1638
1509
1471
1624
1643
1641
1651
1623
1628
1635
1661
1648
1624
1642
1613
1661
1612
1657
1620
1680
1641
1593
1667

1524
1556
1578
1589
1600
1612
1619
1622
1625
1637
1637
1640
1641
1645
1650
1654
1655
1658
1658
1660
1661
1662
1664
1665
1670
1671
1671
1671
1671
1672
1674
1674
1682
1684
1687
1689
1692
1692
1697
1698
1702

Colonial
power
SPAIN
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
SWEDEN
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
U.K.
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
SPAIN
U.K.
HOLLAND
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
PORTUGAL
U.K.

DAVID STRANG

445

Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency
West New Jersey
Oran
Sao Vicente
Mauritius
Acadia
Saint-Christophe
Plaisance
Pernambuco
Esprtu Santo
Mombasa
Saint Thomas
Saint Johns
Principe
Itanhaem
Saint Croix
Saint Johns & Saint Thomas
Ft William
Lousiana
Bahia
Florida
Quebec
Senegal
Montreal
Grenada
Ile Royale
Ile SaintJean
The Gambia
the Misiones
Dominica
Maranhao
Rio deJaneiro
Nuevo Mexico
Sacramento
Senegambia
Tobago
Nevis
Virginia
Massachusetts
Maryland
Connecticut
North Carolina
Rhode Island
South Carolina
New York
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Georgia
New Hampshire
East Florida
West Florida
Essequibo
Montserrat
Demarara
Barinas

Start
date

End
date

1676
1509
1532
1664
1604
1628
1662
1534
1535
1728
1672
1684
1500
1624
1733
1734
1700
1699
1534
1567
1612
1626
1642
1649
1710
1720
1661
1607
1632
1652
1763
1598
1679
1763
1763
1671
1607
1629
1632
1639
1663
1663
1663
1664
1681
1702
1733
1741
1763
1763
1624
1632
1750
1786

1702
1708
1710
1710
1713
1713
1713
1716
1718
1729
1734
1734
1753
1755
1756
1756
1758
1762
1763
1763
1763
1763
1763
1763
1763
1763
1766
1767
1771
1775
1775
1777
1777
1778
1781
1782
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1783
1784
1784
1784
1789

Colonial
power
U.K.
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
DENMARK
DENMARK
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
DENMARK
DENMARK
U.K.
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
SPAIN
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
HOLLAND
U.K.
HOLLAND
SPAIN

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

GlobalPatternsofDecolonization,
1500-1987

446
Appendix (continued)

Nameofthe
dependency
Quebec
Oran
Tobago
Guadeloupe
French Guiana
Reunion
Saint-Domingue
Ile de France
Sainte-Lucie
Louisiana
Carnatic
Trinidad
Ceylon
Louisiana
Louisiana
Orleans
Berbice
Cape Colony
Demarara and Essequibo
Seychelles
Ile de France
Brazil
Cape Colony
Malabar Coast
Florida
Cape Breton
Santo Domingo
Canary Islands
Gold Coast
Guatemala
Louisiana
Coromandel Coast
Malacca
Haiti
Montevideo
Nueva Espana
Peru
Nueva Galicia
Charcas
Nueva Granada
Yucatan
Ecuador
Rio de la Plata
Venezuela
Chile
Barbados
Madras
Bombay
Grenada
St Vincent
Dominica
Tobago
St Lucia
Upper Canada

Start
date

End
date

1763
1732
1781
1635
1644
1664
1697
1715
1756
1762
1780
1735
1640
1800
1803
1804
1627
1652
1784
1794
1803
1775
1795
1663
1783
1763
1587
1589
1632
1670
1804
1608
1641
1803
1816
1521
1542
1549
1559
1564
1617
1767
1777
1777
1778
1627
1641
1661
1763
1763
1771
1793
1803
1791

1791
1792
1793
1795
1795
1795
1795
1795
1795
1800
1801
1802
1803
1803
1804
1812
1814
1814
1814
1814
1814
1815
1815
1818
1819
1820
1821
1821
1821
1821
1821
1825
1825
1825
1828
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1830
1833
1833
1833
1833
1833
1833
1833
1838
1841

Colonial
power
U.K.
SPAIN
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
SPAIN
U.K.
SPAIN
HOLLAND
FRANCE
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
HOLLAND
HOLLAND
HOLLAND
U.K.
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
HOLLAND
SPAIN
U.K.
SPAIN
SPAIN
U.K.
SPAIN
U.S.A.
HOLLAND
HOLLAND
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.

*
*
*
*
*
*

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

DAVID STRANG

447

Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency
Lower Canada
Tranquebar
Curacao
Saint Eustacius
Sattara
Sumbulpore
Danish Gold Coast
Nagpore
Ste-Marie de Madagascar
Jhansi
Oudh
Berar
Cooch Behar
Hyderabad
Mysore
Cochin
Travancore
Scindia
Gurhwal
Goree
Moskito Coast
Bay Island
The Gambia
Kaffraria
Vancouver Island
Gold Coast
Lagos
Dutch Gold Coast
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Russian America
Upper and Lower Canada
Porto Novo
Rupert's Land
Nicobar Islands
Assiniboia
Grand Bassam
BritishColumbia
Basutoland
Prince Edward Island
Turks and Caicos I
St Barthelemy
Nosy Be
Ste-Marie de Madagascar
Griqualand West
Leeward Islands
Nevis
Basutoland
Walvis Bay
Assab
Danakil
Rivieresdu Sud
Pahang
Perak

Start
date
1791
1620
1634
1636
1818
1803
1659
1803
1819
1818
1797
1803
1792
1798
1799
1800
1800
1803
1815
1854
1740
1852
1843
1847
1849
1850
1851
1642
1749
1784
1821
1841
1863
1670
1756
1811
1843
1858
1868
1763
1848
1784
1840
1853
1873
1671
1782
1871
1874
1882
1885
1882
1874
1874

End
date
1841
1845
1845
1845
1848
1849
1850
1853
1853
1854
1856
1856
1858
1858
1858
1858
1858
1858
1858
1859
1860
1860
1866
1866
1866
1866
1866
1867
1867
1867
1867
1867
1867
1869
1869
1870
1871
1871
1871
1873
1874
1878
1878
1878
1880
1882
1882
1883
1884
1890
1890
1893
1895
1895

Colonial
power
U. K.
DENMARK
HOLLAND
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
DENMARK
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
RUSSIA
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
DENMARK
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
SWEDEN
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
ITALY
ITALY
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.

**

Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987

448
Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency

Selangor
Bechuanaland
Negri Sembilan
Nosy Be
Diego Suarez
Zululand
Guam
Puerto Rico
Phillipines
Marianas
North Solomon Island
Porto Novo
Niger Coast Protectorate
Cuba
New South Wales
Tasmania
WesternAustralia
South Australia
Victoria
Queensland
Niue
Middle Congo
Lagos
Chad
Protectorateof S Nigeria
Labuan
Cape Colony
Natal
Orange River Colony
Transvaal
NorthernAustralia
N E Rhodesia
N W Rhodesia
Middle Congo
Mayotte
Comoro Islands
Melilla
Ceuta
NorfolkIsland
Protectorateof N Nigeria
Comoro Islands
Tokelau
Danish West Indies
Marianas and Carolines
Libya
German SW Africa
German East Africa
German New Guinea
German Samoa
Kameroun
Togo
Khiva
Bukhara
Dominican Republic

Start
date

End
date

1874
1885
1889
1878
1886
1887
1668
1508
1565
1668
1885
1883
1885
1764
1788
1823
1832
1836
1851
1859
1900
1894
1886
1900
1900
1846
1815
1843
1848
1852
1863
1895
1897
1906
1841
1886
1556
1668
1788
1900
1912
1877
1756
1899
1912
1884
1885
1885
1899
1884
1885
1873
1873
1907

1895
1895
1895
1896
1896
1897
1898
1899
1899
1899
1899
1900
1900
1901
1901
1901
1901
1901
1901
1901
1901
1903
1906
1906
1906
1907
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1911
1911
1911
1912
1912
1913
1913
1914
1914
1914
1916
1917
1919
1919
1920
1920
1920
1920
1922
1922
1924
1924
1924

Colonial
power
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
SPAIN
GERMANY
FRANCE
U.K.
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
SPAIN
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
DENMARK
GERMANY
ITALY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
U.S.A.

*
*
**

DAVID STRANG

449

Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency
Cuba
Middle Congo
Svalbard
Alula and Obbia
Cirenaica
Tripolitania
Weihaiwei
Jan Mayen Land
Canada
Upper Volta
Iraq
Middle Congo
Nicaragua
Union of South Africa
Haiti
Levant States
Papua
Australia
Great Lebanon
Iceland
Tuva
Nauru
Br New Guinea
Papua
Martinique
French Guiana
Guadeloupe
Reunion
StraitsSettlements
Federated Malay States
Phillipines
WesternSamoa
Transjordan
India
New Zealand
Indian PrincelyStates
Niue
Italian East Africa
Ceylon
Tokelau
Palestine
Burma
Neth East Indies
Newfoundland
Bhutan
Oman
Libya
Eritrea
Ifni
Egypt
Greenland
Laos
Cochin China
Cambodia

Start
date

End
date

1901
1911
1920
1889
1919
1919
1898
1920
1867
1919
1920
1929
1912
1910
1915
1919
1883
1901
1941
1415
1914
1921
1922
1942
1635
1803
1803
1803
1867
1895
1899
1914
1920
1765
1841
1858
1901
1935
1803
1916
1920
1937
1609
1729
1910
1798
1928
1890
1934
1883
1894
1897
1862
1863

1925
1925
1925
1926
1928
1928
1930
1930
1931
1932
1932
1932
1933
1934
1934
1941
1942
1942
1943
1944
1944
1945
1945
1945
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
1946
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1948
1948
1948
1948
1949
1949
1949
1951
1951
1952
1952
1953
1953
1953
1954
1954

Colonial
power
U.S.A.
FRANCE
NORWAY
ITALY
ITALY
ITALY
U.K.
NORWAY
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
FRANCE
U.S.A.
U.K.
U.S.A.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
DENMARK
RUSSIA
U.K.
U.K.
AUSTRALIA
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.S.A.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
ITALY
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
ITALY
ITALY
SPAIN
U.K.
DENMARK
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE

**
*

**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*

*
*
*
*

**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
*
**
**
**

450

Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987

Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency
Annam
Tonkin
Tunis
Morocco
Spanish Morocco
Gold Coast
Jamaica
French Equatorial Africa
Spanish West Africa
French Guinea
Chad
Senegal
Alaska
French Sudan
Hawaii
Singapore
Gabon
Cyprus
Leeward Islands
BritishSomaliland
Madagascar
Windward Islands
Belgian Congo
Italian Somaliland
Ivory Coast
Dahomey
Ubangi Shari
Mauritania
Federation of Nigeria
Niger
Cameroun
Togo
Middle Congo
Upper Volta
Chad
Federation of Mali
Goa
Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda
Sierra Leone
Trinidad and Tobago
Kuwait
Tanganyika
French India
Algeria
Falkland Islands
Uganda
Ruanda-Urundi
WesternSamoa
Neth New Guinea
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago
Aden
Br North Borneo
Kenya

Start
date

End
date

1883
1888
1881
1911
1912
1874
1670
1882
1884
1893
1920
1778
1867
1880
1898
1942
1845
1878
1882
1884
1885
1885
1887
1889
1893
1894
1894
1902
1906
1911
1922
1922
1941
1947
1958
1959
1510
1650
1792
1802
1904
1920
1668
1830
1834
1894
1920
1946
1949
1961
1961
1839
1877
1887

1954
1954
1956
1956
1956
1957
1958
1958
1958
1958
1958
1959
1959
1959
1959
1959
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1963
1963
1963

Colonial
power
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
SPAIN
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.S.A.
FRANCE
U.S.A.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
BELGIUM
ITALY
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
FRANCE
U.K.
U.K.
BELGIUM
NEW ZEALAND
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.

**
**
**
**
**
**

**

*
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

451

DAVID STRANG

Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency
Sarawak
Zanzibar
Malaya
Malta
Nyasaland
N Rhodesia
Maldives
Cook Islands
The Gambia
BritishGuiana
Barbados
Basutoland
Bechuanaland
Federation of S Arabia
Grenada
Dominica
Antigua
Mauritius
Equatorial Guinea
Swaziland
Nauru
Ifni
St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla
Fiji
Tonga
Turks and Caicos I
Bahrain
Trucial States
Qatar
Bahamas
Portuguese Guinea
Grenada
Cape Verde Islands
Sao Tome and Principe
Angola
Surinam
Mozambique
Papua and New Guinea
Spanish Sahara
Ste Pierre et Miquelon
Gilbertand Ellice I
East Timor
Seychelles
Comoro Islands
Br Indian Ocean Territory
Djibouti
Solomon I
Panama Canal Zone
Dominica
Ellice I
St Lucia
St Vincent
GilbertI
Southern Rhodesia

Start
date

End
date

1888
1891
1946
1799
1889
1911
1887
1888
1888
1831
1855
1883
1895
1959
1960
1960
1962
1814
1855
1902
1945
1958
1962
1874
1900
1962
1861
1891
1916
1670
1879
1967
1462
1485
1575
1667
1752
1945
1958
1763
1892
1896
1903
1947
1965
1862
1893
1903
1967
1976
1960
1960
1976
1893

1963
1963
1963
1964
1964
1964
1965
1965
1965
1966
1966
1966
1966
1967
1967
1967
1967
1968
1968
1968
1968
1969
1969
1970
1970
1970
1971
1971
1971
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1980

Colonial
power
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
SPAIN
U.K.
AUSTRALIA
SPAIN
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
PORTUGAL
U.K.
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
HOLLAND
PORTUGAL
AUSTRALIA
SPAIN
FRANCE
U.K.
PORTUGAL
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
U.S.A.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500-1987

452
Appendix (continued)
Name ofthe
dependency

BritishHonduras
Antigua and Barbuda
Brunei
St Kitts-Nevis
Netherlands Antilles
Bermuda
St Helena
French Polynesia
Hong Kong
Macao
New Caledonia
Pitcairn
Guam
Puerto Rico
American Samoa
Wallis and Futuna I
Virgin Islands
Namibia
Niue
Micronesian Trust Territory
Tokelau
Ciskei
Bophuthatswana
Transkei
Venda
Lebowa
Gazankulu
KaNgwane
KwaNdebele
KwaZulu
QwaQwa
Br Virgin Islands
Montserrat
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Cook Islands
Anguilla
Br Indian Ocean Territory
Mayotte
Ste Pierre et Miquelon
NetherlandsAntilles
Aruba

Start
date

End
date

1786
1967
1888
1969
1845
1609
1651
1841
1843
1849
1853
1898
1898
1899
1900
1917
1917
1920
1947
1947
1948
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1960
1960
1962
1962
1965
1969
1976
1976
1985
1986
1986

1981
1981
1983
1983
1986
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987

Colonial
power
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
HOLLAND
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
U.K.
PORTUGAL
FRANCE
U.K.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
FRANCE
U.S.A.
SOUTH AFRICA
NEW ZEALAND
U.S.A.
NEW ZEALAND
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
NEW ZEALAND
U.K.
U.K.
FRANCE
FRANCE
HOLLAND
HOLLAND

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454

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