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Ramakant Sinari
60 Sinari
All statements with regard to a given thing reflect different aspects of that
thing. Now, an aspect is something that a person obtains exclusively from his
encounter with the given. The word naya, used by the Jainas to signify the
aspect or view of a thing, suggests the ontological counterpart of a syat statement, for it represents a partial cognition, a partial knowledge, of reality. For
instance, a statement S1, containing a naya N1 perceived at time T1, would be,
according to syadvada, a "may-be" statement in relation to other statements,
say S2, S3, S4 containing N2, N3, N4 obtained at times T2, Ta, T4 respectively.
Of course, between Si and N1, both fastened upon T1, there is bound to be a
necessary relation; and to that extent one could say that Si is absolutely true,
or absolutely false, by virtue of its relation with N1. However, it is not this
problem that the Jainas are concerned about. Since any single aspect of a
thing can never stay inert, insofar as the human mind is concerned, one has
to refer to N1 only retrospectively or from a naya other than N1. When
referred to in this manner, N1 would be seen as merely one in an infinite
number of nayas and, consequently, as relatively valid. Notwithstanding the
fact that Si and N1 are inseparable, neither Si nor N1 can prevent the other
statements and nayas from taking place. The status of N1 is as relative as
that of any other naya, the status of S1 is as relative as that of any other statement, and the status of N1 is as relative as that of S1. The relativism of statements (syadvada) and the relativism of aspects (nayavada) are two sides of
the same epistemic thesis. To hold that a particular statement may be true, or
is relatively true, is the same thing as to hold that the particular aspect of the
world that it expresses is related to an infinite number of other aspects in
respect of which that aspect constitutes only a fractional knowledge of the
world.
According to the Jainas, while a syat statement and a naya stay tied together
so that diverse syat statements reflect diverse nayas, all of these have for their
metaphysical foundation the multiplicity of reality. The doctrine that reality
is multiple-called by the Jainas anekantavada-is an important correlative of
Jainism's relativistic epistemology, and the unique support behind their ethic
of self-improvement. There is an infinite number of atoms and souls, each one
of which is real and open to limitless perspectives. It is impossible for an
individual mind to grasp all the perspectives. Therefore, whatever the apparent
richness of knowledge in any given age, the total acquisition of human intellect
as such is bound to remain always inadequate. Consistent with the tenets of
syadvada and nayavada, anekantavada describes the relativistic manyness of
all the primordial elements of reality and underlines the fact that, if we take
into consideration the frightful innumerability of the "reals," of their nayas,
and of the possible assertions about both, then it would be proper to state that
what man actually knows is only a fragment of what is. However, when a
philosopher, without recognizing the inherently restricted nature of his per-
61
62 Sinari
63
ings. All such meanings have their anchorage in a human system, with all its
enduring aspirations, values, and practical exigencies. The world that human
minds perceive or make judgments about is a world generating an unending
diversity of excitements, that is, a world emitting forces in order to stimulate
innumerable human responses. Every judgment is a syat judgment, or every
object of knowledge is a naya, because it denotes only that which human purposiveness at a particular point of time is able to catch of the given. Had the
Jainas directed their inquiry to the psychological background of naya-formation
they would have unfailingly come upon the central thesis of pragmatism,
namely, that all perceptions and judgments have at their bottom man's concrete
needs and aims, in reference to which the relative truth, the adequacy, and the
emergence itself of them all can be demonstrated.
As in the case of every other inwardly oriented school in Indian philosophy,
the Jainism epistemology centers mainly upon the question of the conditions'
of mundane knowledge. The Jainas were not unaware of the fact that the
relativism they were propounding suggests a verdict of disfavor of all knowledge obtained and obtainable by us in the phenomenal world. For a world
which is divisible into an ever inexhaustible number of points of view and
whose entirety we never comprehend is just inaccessible to empirical sensibilities or rational statements. While pragmatism, therefore, could complement
the Jainas' relativistic epistemology by supplying it with a logical basis, a
subjectivist and teleological justification, it would not change in any way their
conception of the most ideal kind of knowledge, described by them as "complete and full, the unobstructed, unimpeded, infinite and supreme, best knowledge and intuition called Kevalajnina."6 When looked at from this kind of
knowledge, the whole sphere of relative truths-pragmatically risen nayas and
sydt statements-would be found to belong to some lower tier of consciousness
where things glide from the stage of being known to that of being semi-known,
and further to that of being obscure. Besides, it is the absolutely self-evident
and illuminating nature of this knowledge that renders every form of relative
knowledge not only inauthentic but also ultimately useless.
The philosophical tendency underlying the relativistic epistemology of the
Jainas is toward transcendentalism par excellence. It is in fact through a
wholehearted adherence to this tendency that they chose to profess a relativistic
way of meeting earthly situations. Their emphasis on the method of knowledge
was never central to their discipline. Most probably they imagined that by
constructing a non-absolutist skeptical epistemology they would teach themselves
and others that any experience short of the experience of the transcendental,
short of kevalajidana or omniscience, would amount to pseudo-experience.
Their syadvada does not seem to have had a direct bearing on their study of
6 SinclairStevenson,The Heart of Jainism(London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1915),
p. 39.
64 Sinari
the origin and requirements of knowledge. And this is the reason why they
left their ingeniously conceived relativism incomplete. While being beckoned
by the ultimate aim of realizing the innermost stratum of experience, where
the knower-known distinction would no more prevail, they, rather negatively,
embarked upon a program of proving that what is known or expressed by
man during his unenlightened existence is merely a fragment of what is in all
its totality. All debates and discussions, as, for instance, between one group of
Jainas and another, or between the Jainas and the Vedantins, are basically
collisions of nayas, darsanas, points of view, springing from different purposes
in different minds. Their diversity is due to the immanent limitedness of the
very conduct of intellect. The only plane from which the Jainas would want
to resolve them is the plane of kevalajnina or universal vision.