LABOR RELATIONS

CASE DIGESTS SET 6

WON Dir. Bitonio committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying the appeal of petitioners.

Collective Bargaining
(Art 250-257)

HELD:
No. The Court upheld Dir. Bitonio's Decision and
dismissed the petition.

65. UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU), et al. vs.

DIR. BITONIO JR., et al.
G.R. No. 131235 - November 16, 1999
FACTS:
Herein Private Respondents-Appellees were the
duly elected officers of the USTFU, which had a
subsisting 5-year CBA with UST until May 1998.
After the holding of a GA that culminated in the
election of new union officers, which was actually
issued with a TRO, they filed for injunctive reliefs
seeking nullification of the results contending that
it was a violation of the Constitution and By-Laws
(CBL) of the union.
Following the TRO issued by the MA, the
respondents filed a motion for another TRO,
brought about by their receipt of a notice to
vacate the union office. According to the
appellants, however, the MA has no jurisdiction
over petitions for prohibition including the
ancillary remedies, which are merely incidental to
it - Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction.
In December 1996, appellees again moved for
the issuance of a TRO to prevent appellants from
making further representations especially with
regard to a new agreement with UST and
reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were
usurping the their duties and functions. Over the
appellants insistence that the issue of jurisdiction
should first be resolved, the MA issued a TRO
directing the respondents to cease and desist
from performing any and all acts pertaining to the
duties and functions of the officers and directors
of USTFU.
Petitioners then appealed the Resolution to the
SoL, who transmitted the records of the case to
the BLR, which rejected their contention. Dir.
Bitonio held that contrary to their claim, the CBL,
which constituted the covenant between the
union and its members, could not be suspended
during the GA of all faculty members, since that
assembly had not been convened or authorized
by the union. He also said that the election could
not be legitimized by the recognition of the newly
elected set of officers by UST or by the alleged
ratification of the new CBA by the general
membership of the USTFU.
ISSUE:

As properly decided by Dir. Bitonio, the unions

CBL is the fundamental law that governs the
relationship between and among the members of
the union. It is where the rights, duties and
obligations, powers, functions and authority of
the officers as well as the members are defined. It
is the organic law that determines the validity of
acts done by any officer or member of the union.
Without respect for the CBL, a union as a
democratic institution degenerates into nothing
more than a group of individuals governed by
mob rule.
Furthermore, the privilege of determining who the
union officers will be belongs exclusively to the
members of the union. Said privilege is exercised
in an election proceeding in accordance with the
union's CBL and applicable law. To allow
appellants to become union officers on the
strength of management's recognition of them is
to concede to the employer the power of
determining who should be USTFU's leaders. This
is a clear case of interference in the exercise by
USTFU members of their right to selforganization.
The Petitioners frustration over the performance
of private respondents, as well as their fears of a
fraudulent election to be held under the latters
supervision, could not justify the method they
chose to impose their will on the union.
----The election held can neither be called a union
election nor a certification election, because the
procedure laid down in the USTFUs CBL for the
election of officers was not followed.
The
participation of non-union members in the
election aggravated its irregularity.

66.
R.
TRANSPORTATION
vs.
HON.
LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993

67.
CMC-ALLIANCE
OF
CONCERNED
EMPLOYEESUNIFIED FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS
(CMC-ACE-

UFSW) vs. Undersecretary LAGUESMA,

CMC-EAALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CMCEA-AFW)
and CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER INC.
G.R. No. 118915 - February 4, 1997
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to
reverse and set aside the Order of USec.
Laguesma, which dismissed the petition filed by
CMC-ACE for CE and further directed CMC to
negotiate a CBA with respondent union CMC-ASAFW.
Appellant union filed a petition for CE among the
R&F EEs of the Capitol Medical Center (CMC),
which was granted. After the election, it was held
as
the
sole
and
exclusive
bargaining
representative of such employees. It thereafter
invited CMC to the bargaining table by submitting
its economic proposal for a CBA. The latter,
however, refused to negotiate and instead
challenged the unions legal personality through
a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
registration. The union was left with no other
recourse but to file a notice of strike against
CMC for ULP, which eventually led to a strike.
In the meantime, the other union, CMC-AFW filed
a petition for certification election among the
R&F EEs of the CMC, arguing that it is the
certified bargaining agent of the R&F EEs of the
hospital. It stressed that it was not remiss in
asserting its right for it continuously demanded
the negotiation of a CBA despite the hospitals
avoidance to bargain collectively. It was even
constrained to strike in 1993 and that majority of
the signatories who supported the petition were
managerial and confidential employees and not
members of the R&F, which was without invalid
disaffiliation of its members,
contrary to
petitioners allegations.
Petitioner CMC-ACE, however, opposed the
petition and moved for its dismissal. It claimed
that there is no legal impediment to the conduct
of a certification election as more than 12 months
have lapsed since CMC-AFW was certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent and no CBA was
concluded thereafter. It contended that since
there is no evidence on record that there exists a
CBA deadlock, the law allowing the conduct of a
CE after twelve months must be given effect in
the interest of the right of the workers to freely
choose their sole and exclusive bargaining agent.
CMC-AFW answered that the petition to conduct a
CE was immoral and in manifest disregard of the
decisions rendered by the SoL and by the Court.

It
claimed
that
CMC
employed
legal
obstructionisms in order to let 12 pass without a
CBA having been concluded between them so as
to pave the way for the entry of petitioner union.
MA Fadrigon issued an Order granting the petition
for CE among the R&F EEs. Since no CE was held
within one year from the date of issuance of a
final CE result and there was no bargaining
deadlock between CMC-AFW and the employees
that had been submitted to conciliation or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout, there is no bar to the holding of a CE.
CMC-AFW appealed from the said Order, to which
CMC-ACE did not file any opposition to. But when
USec. Laguesma rendered a Resolution granting
the appeal and directed CMC to negotiate a CBA
with respondent union CMC-AFW, both unions
separately filed motions for reconsideration while
the hospital contended that it cannot be ordered
to bargain collectively with a union since the only
issue involved is the determination of the
bargaining agent of the employees. USec.
Laguesma dismissed both petitions.
ISSUE:
WON USec. Laguesma committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for
certification election of CMC-ACE, and in directing
the hospital to negotiate a CBA with the said
respondent union.
HELD:
No. The errors pointed to by petitioner can be
classified as mere typographical errors. Such
errors do indicate that the assailed resolution was
prepared with indecent haste, as the petitioner
claims. It cannot materially alter the substance
and merit of the assailed resolution.
It was not even denied due process as it was
given an opportunity to be heard but lost it when
it refused to file an appellees memorandum the
record shows and it failed to file its opposition.
And for CMC-ACE to capitalize on the ensuing
delay which was caused by the hospital and
which resulted in the non-conclusion of a CBA
within the certification year, would be to negate
and render a mockery of the proceedings
undertaken before the DOLE and would put an
unjustified premium on the failure of the
respondent hospital to perform its duty to bargain
collectively.
If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification
election when there is a bargaining deadlock
submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more
reason should it not be conducted if, despite
attempts to bring an employer to the negotiation

table by the "no reasonable effort in good faith"

on the employer certified bargaining agent, there
was to bargain collectively. It is only just and
equitable that the circumstances in this case
should be considered as similar in nature to a
"bargaining deadlock" when no certification
election could be held.
A "deadlock" is the counteraction of things
producing entire stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed forces. The word is
synonymous with the word "impasse," which
presupposes reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does
not conclude in agreement between the parties.

68. PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA

TRIUMPH
INTERNATIONAL-UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL
WORKERS OF THE PHILS. vs. FERRERCALLEJA and
TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL
G.R. No. 85915 January 17, 1990
FACTS:
The petitioner is the recognized CB agent of the
R&F employees of Triumph International with
which the latter has a valid and existing CBA
effective up to September 1989.
In 1987, a petition for CE was filed by the
respondent union with the DOLE. A motion to
dismiss the petition for certification election was
filed by Triumph International on the grounds that
the respondent union cannot lawfully represent
managerial employees and that the petition
cannot prosper by virtue of the contract-bar rule.
The LA, however, issued an order granting the
petition for CE and directed the holding of it to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all monthly-paid administrative,
technical, confidential and supervisory employees
of Triumph International.
ISSUE:
WON the LA gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate holding of a certification
election among the workers sought to be
represented by the respondent union.
HELD:
Where the supervisory employees sought to be
represented by the union are actually not
involved
in
policy
making,
and
their
recommendatory powers are not even instantly
effective since they are subject to review by at
least three 3 managers (department, personnel

and general manager), then it is evident that

these employees does not possess managerial
status.
The fact that their work designations are either
managerial or supervisory is of no moment,
considering that it is the nature of their functions
and
NOT
SAID
NOMENCLATURES
which
determines their respective status.
A careful examination of the records of this case
reveals no evidence that rules out the
commonality or community of interest among the
rank-and-file members of the petitioners, and the
herein declared rank-and-file members of the
respondent union. Instead of forming another
bargaining unit, the law requires them to be
members of the existing one.
The ends of unionism are better served if all the
rank-and-file members with substantially the
same interests and who invoke their right to selforganization are part of a single unit so they can
deal with their ER with just one and yet potent
voice.
The
EEs
bargaining
power
with
management is strengthened thereby.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the
petitioner
is
the
exclusive
bargaining
representative
of
R&F
EEs
of
Triumph
International.

69. LA SUERTE CIGAR COMPANY vs.

DIRECTOR OF
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-55674 July 25, 1983

FACTS:
The La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory
Provincial and Metro Manila Sales Force
Association applied for and was granted chapter
status by the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU). Sometime later, 31 local union members
signed
a
joint
letter
withdrawing
their
membership in NATU. The local union and NATU
filed a petition for certification election.
The company opposed on the ground that it was
not supported by at least 30% (now 25%) of the
proposed bargaining unit because:
(a) of the alleged 48 members of the local union,
31 had
withdrawn prior to the filing of the petition,
and
(b) 14 of the alleged members of the union were
not
employees of the company but were
independent

contractors.

70. TOYOTA

The BLR director denied the companys objection.

ISSUE:
WON the withdrawal of 31 union-members
affected the petition for certification election
insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned.
HELD:
Yes. The SC reversed decision of the BLR, it
appearing that the 31 union members have
withdrawn their support to the petition BEFORE
the filing of said petition. It would be otherwise if
the withdrawal was made AFTER the filing of the
petition for it would then be presumed that the
withdrawal was not free and voluntary.
The presumption would arise that the withdrawal
was procured through duress, coercion or for
valuable consideration. In other words, the
distinction must be that withdrawals made before
the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary
unless there is convincing proof to the contrary,
whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the
petition are deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the
withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing
of the petition, the names of employees
supporting the petition are supposed to be held
secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such
withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in
the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it
becomes apparent that such employees had not
given consent to the filing of the petition; hence
the subscription requirement has not been met.
We hold and rule that the 14 members of
respondent
local
union
are
dealers
or
independent contractors. They are not employees
of petitioner company. They are independent
contractors and not employees of the company
based on the dealership contracts stating that the
terms and stipulations. Such were clear and left
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties. They voluntarily executed with La Suerte
a formal dealership agreement which signifies
that
they
were
acting
as
independent
businessmen.
With the withdrawal by 31 members of their
support to the petition prior to or before the filing
thereof, making a total of 45, the remainder of 3
out of the 48 alleged to have supported the
petition can hardly be said to represent the union.

71. ALEXANDER REYES vs. CRESENCIO

TRAJANO
G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
FACTS:
BLR authorized the conduct of CE among the
employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation.
The competing unions were the TUEU-OLALIA and
TUPAS.
Of the 384 workers initially deemed to be
qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the
election. Among the 240 who cast their votes,
141 were members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK)
The ballots provided for 2 choices:
(a) TUPAS;
(b) TUEU-OLALIA; and
(c) NO UNION.
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141
INK members. They were segregated and
excluded from the final count because the
competing unions agreed earlier that the INK
members should not be allowed to vote because
they are not members of any union and refused
to participate in the previous certification
election.
The INK employees protested the exclusion of
their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the
election alleging that it was not fair and the
result thereof did not reflect the true sentiments
of the majority of the employees.
TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended
that petitioners do not have legal personality to
protest the results of the election because they
are not members of either the contending unions,
but of the INK which prohibits its followers to, on
religious grounds, from joining or forming any
labor organization.
The MA, seeing no merit in the INK employees
petition, certified the TUEU-OLALIA as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees. And upon appeal, BLR denied
their petition.
ISSUE:
WON the INK members may vote in a CE.
HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the right NOT to join,

affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is
subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or
assist any union, and to maintain membership
therein.
The right to form or join a labor organization
necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain
from exercising said right. It is self-evident that
just as no one should be denied the exercise of a
right granted by law, so also, no one should be
compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
The fact that a person has opted to acquire
membership in a labor union does not preclude
his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
In a Certification Election, all members of the
unit, whether union members or not, have the
right to vote. Union membership is not
prerequisite. If majority of the unit members do
not want a union, as expressed in the certification
election, such majority decision must be
respected.

72.
LUZON
DEVELOPMENT
BANK
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK
EMPLOYEES
249 SCRA 162 (1995)
FACTS:
LDB and the Association submitted to arbitration
to resolve WON the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and
the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994,
on the promotion of employees.
The parties agreed to submit their respective
Position Papers in December1994. Atty. Ester S.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator,
received ALDBE's Position Paper in January 1995.
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its
Position Paper.
In May of the same year, without LDB's Position
Paper, VA Garcia rendered a decision finding that
the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision
nor the MOA on promotion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of a VA may be directly be
appealed to the SC.
HELD:
The Court referred the case to the CA stating that
elevating a decision or award of a VA to the
Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari is in
effect equating the VA with NLRC or the Court of

Appeals, which in its view is illogical and imposes

an unnecessary burden upon it.
Obiter as regards the issue on VA:
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference
of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have
bound themselves to accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding.
Art. 260.
Grievance
Machinery
and
Voluntary
Arbitration.
The parties to a CBA shall include provisions that
will ensure the mutual observance of its terms
and conditions. They shall establish a machinery
for the adjustment and resolution of grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation
of their CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance
machinery which are not settled within seven (7)
calendar days from the date of its submission
shall automatically be referred to voluntary
arbitration prescribed in the CBA. For this
purpose, the parties shall name and designate in
advance a VA or panel of VAs, or include in the
agreement a procedure for the selection of such
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified
voluntary arbitrators duly accredited by the
Board. In case the parties fail to select a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators, the Board shall designate the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators, as may be necessary.
Arbitration may either be compulsory or
voluntary. Compulsory arbitration is a system
whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled
by the government to forego their right to strike
and are compelled to accept the resolution of
their dispute through arbitration by a third party.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand,
referral of a dispute by the parties is made,
pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their
collective agreement, to an impartial third person
for a final and binding resolution.
Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such
that once an award has been rendered by an
arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both
parties but to comply with the same. After all,
they are presumed to have freely chosen
arbitration as the mode of settlement for that
particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have

chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall

hear and decide their case. Above all, they have
mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's
decision.

with a prayer for the resolution of the issue of

jurisdiction.

73. SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNIONPSSLU vs. LA CANIZARES, et al.

G.R. No. 101619 - July 8, 1992

ISSUE:
WON the LA has jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS:
PSSLU signed a CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc.
which was to run from July 1989 to June 1994.
The same CBA contained a union security clause
which required that all union members retain
their membership in good standing with the union
as condition for their continued employment with
the company.
In
February
1990,
PSSLU
informed
the
management of the cancellation of the
membership of several employees due to antiunion activities and for joining another union,
KAMAO. Following their continuous exercise of the
violations even after executing a pledge of
cooperation with PSSLU, they were recommended
for dismissal. Such recommendation provided
that the dismissal of the members is without
prejudice to their right to receive termination pay
should the management decide to grant them,
and suggested a dialogue before the Grievance
machinery before their actual dismissal.
The company did not receive any information on
whether or not said employees appealed to
PSSLU, and so it considered them dismissed as of
March 1991. Two months after, the dismissed
employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for
illegal dismissal, to which PSSLU filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the LA was without
jurisdiction over the case. (Basis: Art 217 (c) cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining
agreements shall be disposed of by the labor
arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration.)
The employees opposed the motion to dismiss,
arguing that the LA had jurisdiction over the case
which was a termination dispute, and that there
was nothing in the CBA needs interpretation or
implementation.
LA, 7 August 1991: resolution suspended until
both parties fully presented their position papers,
and the issue of jurisdiction shall be covered in
the final determination.
Following the said Order, PSSLU filed another
motion to resolve motion to dismiss complaint

LA, 4 September 1991: assumed jurisdiction over

the complaint, hence this petition.

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the LA and not the
Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has
the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints
of the private respondents, as the case involves
"termination,"
not
"interpretation
or
implementation" of a collective bargaining
agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of
company policies. Acordingly, the case was
dismissed.
The Court reiterated the view of the SolGen, with
him distinguishing that where the dispute lies in
the
interpretation,
implementation
or
enforcement stage, it may be referred to the
grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by
voluntary arbitration; but where there was
already actual termination or violation of rights, it
is cognizable by the LA.
It ruled that while it appears that the dismissal
was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU
pursuant to the union security clause provided in
the CBA, such fact does not come within the
phrase
"grievances
arising
from
the
interpretation or implementation of a CBA and
those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies," the
jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance
Machinery or to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators.
The Labor Code provides that a GM shall be
established to ensure the mutual observance of
the terms and conditions of the CBA, and for the
adjustment and resolution of grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the
same. It also requires that the parties to a CBA
shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if
the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators.
Obviously, the parties to a CBA are the union and
the company thus, only disputes involving them
shall be referred to the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the
company have agreed on the dismissal of private
respondents. There is no grievance between
them which could be brought to GM.

And as the problem or dispute is between the

union and the company on the one hand and
some union and non-union members who were
dismissed, on the other hand; it has to be settled
before an impartial body. The grievance
machinery with members designated by the
union and the company cannot be expected to be
impartial against the dismissed employees. Due
process demands that the dismissed workers
grievances be ventilated before an impartial
body. Since there has already been an actual
termination, the matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
74. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., vs.
NLRC and URBANO SUIGA
G.R. No. 95940 July 24, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent was hired by petitioner in
1964 as a bus conductor and eventually joined
the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO. At
the age of 52, after having rendered twenty five
years' service, he retired with a retirement fee
given to him. The basis of his retirement was the
compulsory retirement provision of the collective
bargaining agreement between the petitioner and
the union.
Unexpectedly, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. 2 other cases of
similar facts and issues was consolidated to case
with the Labor Arbiter deciding in favor of the
complainant and ordered PANTRANCO for their
reinstatement.
Petitioner appealed to public respondent, which
issued the questioned Resolution affirming the
labor arbiter's decision in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON
the CBA stipulation on compulsory
retirement after twenty-five years of service is
legal and enforceable?
RULING:
Yes. We agree with petitioner and the Solicitor
General. Art. 287 of the Labor Code as worded
permits employers and employees to fix the
applicable retirement age at below 60 years.
Moreover, providing for early retirement does not
constitute diminution of benefits. In almost all
countries today, early retirement, i.e., before age
60, is considered a reward for services rendered
since it enables an employee to reap the fruits of
his labor particularly retirement benefits,
whether lump-sum or otherwise at an earlier
age, when said employee, in presumably better

physical and mental condition, can enjoy them

better and longer. As a matter of fact, one of the
advantages of early retirement is that the
corresponding
retirement
benefits,
usually
consisting of a substantial cash windfall, can early
on be put to productive and profitable uses by
way of income-generating investments, thereby
affording a more significant measure of financial
security and independence for the retiree who, up
till then, had to contend with life's vicissitudes
within the parameters of his fortnightly or weekly
wages. Thus we are now seeing many CBA's with
such early retirement provisions. And the same
cannot
be
considered
a
diminution
of
employment benefits.
It is also further argued that, being a union
member, private respondent is bound by the CBA
because its terms and conditions constitute the
law between the parties. 11 The parties are bound
not only to the fulfilment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
It binds not only the union but also its members.