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G.R.No.174536

THIRDDIVISION

ROBERTOY.PONCIANO,JR.,
Petitioner,

versus

LAGUNA
LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

G.R.No.174536

Present:

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.
Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
AZCUNA,**
CHICONAZARIO,and
VELASCO,JR.,***JJ.

Promulgated:

October29,2008

xx

DECISION

CHICONAZARIO,J.:

[1]
In the present Petition for Review, petitioner Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr. primarily
[2]
assailstheResolution dated4September2006oftheCourtofAppealsdenyinghisplea
fortheadmissionofhisMotionforReconsiderationinCAG.R.CVNo.80705andtaking
noactiononsaidMotionsinceitwasfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiod.Petitionerprays
ofthisCourttovacateandsetasidetheassailedResolutionandtoorderthereinstatementof
hisMotionforReconsiderationbytheappellatecourt.Inthealternative,petitionerimplores
[3]
thatthisCourtdirectlyvacateandsetasidetheDecision dated22February2006ofthe
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.80705,thesubjectofhisMotionforReconsideration,
[4]
and render judgment reinstating the Decision dated 10 June 2003 of the Metropolitan
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Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 74, of Taguig, Metro Manila, in LRC Case No. 273, which
confirmedandorderedtheregistrationofpetitionerstitleoverthecontestedparcelofland.

Atthecruxofthepresentcontroversyisaparcelofunregisteredland(Lot8689D,
Csd00000627, MCadm590D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping), situated in Barangay Wawa,
Taguig,MetroManila,measuringabout2,890squaremeters(subjectproperty).

Allegingtobetheownerofthesubjectproperty,petitionerfiledwiththeMeTCon5
[5]
September2001anApplication fortheoriginalregistrationthereof,whichwasdocketed
asLRCCaseNo.273.
TheMeTCsetLRCCaseNo.273forinitialhearingon30January2002at10:00a.m.
CopiesoftheNoticeofInitialHearingwereaccordinglyserved,published,andposted.

On29January2002,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)entereditsappearance
inLRCCaseNo.273ascounselfortherespondentRepublicofthePhilippines.Atthesame
[6]
time,itdeputizedthePublicProsecutorofTaguig,MetroManila,toappearinsaidcase.

[7]
Respondent Republic then filed with the MeTC its Opposition dated 29 January
2002 seeking the denial of petitioners Application for original registration of the subject
propertybasedonthefollowinggrounds:

1. That neither the [herein petitioner] nor his predecessorsininterest have been in
open,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthelandinquestion
forthirty(30)yearsinaccordancewithSection48(b),PublicLandAct,asamendedbyPD
1073andR.A.No.6940.

2. That the muniments of title, the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of
[petitioner],ifany,attachedtoorallegedintheapplication,donotconstitutecompetentand
sufficient evidence of bonafide acquisition of the land applied for or of his open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be
genuineandthetaxdeclarationsand/ortaxpaymentreceiptsindicatepretendedpossession
of[petitioner]tobeofrecentvintage.

3.Thattheparceloflandappliedforisaportionofthepublicdomainbelongingto
[8]
theRepublicofthePhilippinesnotsubjecttoprivateappropriation.

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DuringtheinitialhearingofLRCCaseNo.273heldon30January2002,theMeTC
[9]
issued, upon the motion of petitioners counsel, an Order of general default against the
whole world, except against the government (which, more appropriately, should be the
respondentRepublic),representedbytheOSGthroughthePublicProsecutor.

Hearings were held in LRC Case No. 273 on 6 and 27 February 2002, wherein petitioner
presentedtestimonialanddocumentaryevidenceinsupportofhisApplication.

Petitionersevidence,takenasawhole,paintedthefollowingpicture:

Petitioner purchased the subject property from Dolores Viar Vda. De Roldan
[10]
(Dolores)on27July1998asevidencedbyaDeedofAbsoluteSale
bearing the same
date. Dolores bought the subject property from her father, Eleuterio Viar (Eleuterio), in
[11]
1966or1967
who,inturn,inheritedthesamepropertyfromhisownfather(orDolores
grandfather).ThesubjectpropertyhadbeeninthepossessionoftheViarfamilysince1941,
or even earlier. Witness Crispina Viar Vda. De Garcia (Crispina), Dolores niece and
neighbor,testifiedthatthesubjectpropertyhadbeeninthepossessionoftheViarfamilyfor
[12]
about 70 to 80 years.
The earliest Tax Declaration covering the subject property,
[13]
though,wasissuedonlyin1949inthenameofEleuterioViar.

Petitioner paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) the capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes due on the sale of the subject property from Dolores to him
[14]
hence,theBIRissuedinpetitionersfavoraCertificateAuthorizingRegistration
dated
30July1998.Petitionerlikewisepaidtheappropriatelocaltransfertaxesdueonthesame
sale, so the Municipal Assessor of Taguig, Metro Manila, issued in petitioners name Tax
[15]
[16]
Declarations No. D00903162
and No. EL00902683
in 1999 and 2000,
respectively. Petitioner had been diligently paying the annual real property tax on the
[17]
subjectpropertysincehisacquisitionthereofin1998.
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Doloresalreadyhadthesubjectpropertysurveyedon25March1998,priortoitssale
[18]
to petitioner, and the resulting survey plan was approved on 18 February 1999.
The
UrbanForestryandLawEnforcementUnitoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNatural
ResourcesNational Capital Region (DENRNCR) issued a Certification dated 5 February
2002 verifying that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable land
certifiedandreleasedassuchon3January1968underForestryAdministrativeOrderNo.4
[19]
1141.

The subject property was already surrounded by a fence. Although the subject
propertywasdeclaredasbambooland,ithassincebeenclassifiedasresidential.Petitioner
[20]
intendedtobuildonthesubjectpropertyaresidentialhouseorawarehouse.

Petitioner has taken possession of the subject property. His period of possession,
tackedtothatofhispredecessorsininterest,hasexceeded60years.Thepossessionofthe
subject property by the petitioner and his predecessorsinterest has been open, actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse, never been disturbed by anyone. The subject
property has not been covered by a patent or administrative title, or mortgaged or
[21]
encumbered.

The Public Prosecutor, being deputized by the OSG, did not offer any evidence on
behalfofrespondentRepublic.

The MeTC thereafter considered LRC Case No. 273 submitted for decision as of 8
[22]
May2002.

WhileawaitingthedecisionoftheMeTCinLRCCaseNo.273,respondentLaguna
[23]
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) filed therein its Opposition
dated 17 December
2002 also praying for the denial of petitioners Application for original registration of the
subjectproperty.RespondentLLDAaverred:
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2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map based on the technical
descriptionsappearingintheNoticeoftheInitialHearingindicatedthatthelotsubjectof
this application for registration particularly described as Lot 8689D, Mcadm 590D
containing an area of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Two (sic) (2,890) square
meters more or less are located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters
referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water.Site is, therefore, part of the
bedofLagunaLakeconsideredpubliclandandiswithinthejurisdictionofLagunaLake
DevelopmentAuthoritypursuanttoitsmandateunderR.A.4850,asamended.xxx

3.ThatSection41ofRepublicActNo.4850,statesthat,wheneverLagunaLakeorLakeis
usedinthisAct,thesameshallrefertoLagunadeBaywhichisthatareacoveredbythe
lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters below mean low water (MLLW). Lands
locatedatandbelowsuchelevationarepubliclandswhichformpartofthebedofsaid
lake(Section14,R.A.4850,asamended,underliningsupplied[sic]).

4.Thatonthestrengthofthe[hereinrespondentLLDA]sfindingandapplyingtheabove
quoted provision of law, [herein petitioners] application for registration of the subject
landhasnolegtostandon,bothinfactandinlaw

5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare the land as part of the
Laguna Lake or that of the public domain, the [petitioner] will continue to unlawfully
possess,occupyandclaimthelandastheir(sic)owntothedamageandprejudiceofthe
GovernmentingeneralandtheLagunaLakeDevelopmentAuthorityinparticular

6.Thatmoreover,thelandsoughttoberegisteredremainsinalienableandindisposablein
[24]
theabsenceofdeclarationbytheDirectorofLandsasrequiredbylaw.

[25]
On 10 June 2003, the MeTC promulgated its Decision
in LRC Case No. 273.
Afterrecountingpetitionersevidence,theMeTCadjudged:

WHEREFORE,findingtheallegationsintheapplicationtohavebeensufficiently
established by the [herein petitioners] evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of
[petitioner]ROBERTOY.PONCIANO,oflegalage,Filipino,singlewithresidenceatNo.
30 S. Santos St., Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Metro Manila over the subject parcel of land
designatedatLot8689DC,Mcadm590D,Taguig,CadastralMappingunderConversion
SubdivisionPlanCsd00000627consistingofTwoThousandEightHundredNinety(2,890)
squaremetersandherebyordertheregistrationofthesameinhisname.

AfterfinalityofthisDecisionanduponpaymentofthecorrespondingtaxesdueon
[26]
thesaidlot,letanorderfortheissuanceofdecreeofregistrationbeissued.

Without seeking reconsideration of the aforequoted MeTC Decision, respondent


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Republic,throughtheOSG,fileditsNoticeofAppeal.

TheappealofrespondentRepublicbeforetheCourtofAppealswasdocketedasCA
G.R.CVNo.80705.

After an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered its
[27]
Decision
dated 22 February 2006 in CAG.R. CV No. 80705. The appellate court
rejected the argument of respondent Republic that the subject property was unalienable
because it formed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Republic Act No. 4890, otherwise
knownastheLagunaLakeDevelopmentAuthorityActof1966,asamendedandstillpart
ofthepublicdomain.IttooknotethatrespondentRepublicfailedtopresentanyevidencein
supportofitsposition.

However,theCourtofAppealsproceededtoruleasfollows:
[T]hisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheapplicationforregistrationoftitlewouldprosper.
As pointed out by [herein respondent Republic], [herein petitioner] failed to present any
evidence regarding specific acts of ownership to show compliance with the possessory
requirementsofthelaw.Itissettledthataclaimantmustpresentevidenceastoactstaken
regardingthesubjectparcelofland,whichwouldshowownershipinfeesimpleandcannot
offermerelygeneralstatementssansfactualevidenceofpossession.Thus,inRepublicofthe
Philippinesv.CourtofAppeals,335SCRA693[2000],theSupremeCourtheld:

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its


possessionandthatofitspredecessorsininterest.Theapplicantmustpresent
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer
generalstatements,whicharemereconclusionsoflawthanfactualevidence
ofpossession.Actualpossessionoflandconsistsinthemanifestationofacts
ofdominionoveritofsuchanatureasapartywouldnaturallyexerciseover
hisownproperty.

Thebareassertionofwitnessesthattheapplicantoflandhadbeenin
the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty
(30)yearsishardlythewellnighincontrovertibleevidencerequiredincases
of this nature. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly
establishedbycompetentevidence.

In the present case, [petitioner] merely showed that he bought the land, paid real
estate taxes and had it surveyed.Beyond these actions he failed to site (sic) any other act
whichhetookregardingthelandsuchascultivation,puttingwaysandboundariestoprove
[28]
hisclaimofownership.

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Consequently, the fallo of the 22 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theDecisionoftheMetropolitanTrialCourt
of Taguig, Metro Manila, Branch 74, in LRC Case No. 273 dated 10 June 2003 for
registration of title is hereby REVERSED and the application for registration is hereby
[29]
DENIED.

RecordsshowthatAtty.NestorC.Beltran(Atty.Beltran),petitionerscounselinCA
G.R.CVNo.80705,receivedacopyoftheCourtofAppealsDecisiondated22February
2006on28February2006.Petitioner,thus,haduntil15March2006tofilehisMotionfor
ReconsiderationofthesaidDecisionyet,saidMotionwasfiledonlyon16March2006,or
a day late. Petitioner followed up by filing Manifestations dated 10 and 21 April 2006
begging the indulgence of the appellate court to admit his Motion for Reconsideration,
considering that the delayed filing thereof was a procedural lapse which should be
consideredasexcusablenegligence,andwhichdidnotimpairtherightsoftherespondent
Republic.

[30]
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded. In its Resolution
dated 4 September
2006,theappellatecourtreasoned:

Tobeginwith,basicisthelegaltruisminthisjurisdictionthatanypartyseekingto
reconsider a judgment or final resolution must do so within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof(Section1,Rule52ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure).

Theaboveruleistooelementarytoevencauseconfusionuponanylawyerforthat
matter,unlesscompellingreasonsactuallyexisttojustifytherelaxationoftheprescriptive
periodmandatedbylawwithinwhichtofileamotionforreconsideration.

Having thus established herein [herein petitioner]s MotionforReconsideration was


actuallyfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiod,theassailedDecisiondated22February2006
became final and executory, thereby depriving this Court of any power to review, much
more,modifyoralterthesame.InPhilippineCoconutAuthorityvs.Garrido,374SCRA
154[2002],theSupremeCourtruledthat:

The period for filing a motion for reconsideration is nonextendible.


The Appellate Court is, therefore, correct in ruling that (t)he failure of the
respondents to file their motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period renders the Decision sought to be reconsidered final and executory,
therebydeprivingthisCourtthepowertoalter,modifyorreversethesame.
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In his attempt to persuade this Court to act on his plea to admit his Motion for
Reconsiderationwithfavor,herein[petitioner]posits:

It bears stressing once again that the undersigned got hold of the
Notice of Judgment on March 2, 2006 and the Motion for Reconsideration
wasfiledonMarch16,2006,oronthe14thdayfromreceiptthereof.Upon
verification of the records of the case, however, the undersigned counsel
found out that the maid received the mail on February28,2006 but put the
mailonits(sic)tableonlyonMarch2,2006.Themaidwhoreceivedthemail
earlier from the postman must have accidentally forgot to place the mail
immediatelyontheundersignedcounselstableastimeagaininstructedtoher
(Rollo,pp.115116Underscoringsupplied).

While a deviation from the mandated prescriptive period to file a motion for
reconsideration has been allowed so many times by the Highest Tribunal due to concrete,
validandcompellingreasons,however,thisCourtcannotreallyfinditswaytoevengivethe
slightestconsiderationtothereasonadvertedtoabovebythe[petitioner].Byanystretchof
imagination,theaforecitedexplanationofferedbythe[petitioner]tosubstantiatehisprayer
for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration does not constitute as a justifiable
[31]
reasonasthesameisessentiallylame,ifnotdownrightpreposterous.

Intheend,theCourtofAppealsdecreed:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,[hereinpetitioner]spleafortheadmissionof
his Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Perfunctorily, NO ACTION will be
takenbythisCourton[hereinpetitioner]sMotionforReconsideration,thesamehavingbeen
[32]
filedbeyondthereglementaryperiod.

Petitioner presently comes before this Court raising the following issues in his
Petition:

1.Whetherornotthegrossnegligenceofpetitionerscounselbindshisclientand

2.Whetherornotadecisionbasedonatechnicalityofprocedureisfavoredoveradecision
[33]
basedonthemerits.

In his Memorandum, petitioner, though, restates and presents additional issues for
resolutionoftheCourt,viz:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amountingtolackof,orinexcessof,jurisdictioninrefusingtoconsiderthatthecauseofthe
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delay in filing the Motion for Reconsideration was due to excusable negligence, and in
effect,denyingpetitionersMotionforReconsideration.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninreversingtheDecision,datedJune10,2003,of
theMetropolitanTrialCourt,Branch74,Taguig,MetroManila.

3.WhetherornottheLagunaLakeDevelopmentAuthorityactedwithgraveabuseof
discretion in declaring that the subject property cannot be appropriated or be subject of
privateownership.

4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of, or excess of, jurisdiction for overlooking the evidence presented by
the petitioner for his confirmation of imperfect title and declaring that petitioner failed to
provespecificactsofownershipforconfirmationofhistitle.

5. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to confirmation of title over the property


[34]
subjectmatterofthispetition.

TheCourtaddressesforemosttheproceduralissueofwhetherpetitionersMotionfor
ReconsiderationshouldhavebeenadmittedbytheCourtofAppeals,forthejurisdictionof
this Court over the instant Petition and the other substantive issues raised therein actually
dependsupontheresolutionthereof.

Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within 15 days from notice thereof, with
proofofserviceontheadverseparty.

ThereisnoquestionthatpetitionersMotionforReconsiderationinCAG.R.CVNo.
80705 was filed one day beyond the reglementary period for doing so. Atty. Beltran,
petitionersformercounsel,receivednoticeandacopyofthe22February2006Decisionof
the Court of Appeals on 28 February 2006, and had only until 15 March 2006 to file
petitionersMotionforReconsiderationthereof.However,Atty.BeltranfiledsaidMotionon
16March2006.

The 15day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non
[35]
extendible.
ProvisionsoftheRulesofCourtprescribingthetimewithinwhichcertain
actsmustbedoneorcertainproceedingstaken,areconsideredabsolutelyindispensableto
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the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
[36]
businesses.Strictcompliancewithsuchrulesismandatoryandimperative.

Indeed,therearecaseswherethisCourtallowedtheliberalapplicationofprocedural
rules, but these are exceptions, sufficiently justified by meritorious and exceptional
circumstancesattendanttherein.Noteveryentreatyforrelaxationofrulesofprocedureshall
be so lightly granted by the Court for it will render such rules inutile. In Hon. Fortich v.
[37]
Hon.Corona,
theCourthadtheoccasiontoexplainthat:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due
regardsincetheyaredesignedtofacilitatetheadjudicationofcasestoremedytheworsening
problemofdelayintheresolutionofrivalclaimsandintheadministrationofjustice.The
requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which
guaranteesthat"allpersonsshallhavearighttothespeedydispositionoftheircasesbefore
all judicial, quasijudicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the
parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein this Court
allowedarelaxationintheapplicationoftherules,butthisflexibilitywas"neverintended
to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal
interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper
casesandunderjustifiablecausesandcircumstances.(Emphasisours.)

Uponpetitioner,thus,fallstheburdenofprovingtothesatisfactionoftheCourtthat
cogentreasonsexisthereintoexcusehisnoncompliancewiththereglementaryperiodfor
filingamotionforreconsideration.Unfortunately,petitionerutterlyfailedinthisregard.

Petitioner can only invoke the supposed excusable negligence of Atty. Beltran, his
former counsel in CAG.R. CV No. 80705. Petitioner points out that his Motion for
Reconsideration was dated and ready as of 12 March 2006, yet Atty. Beltran was grossly
negligent in filing said Motion only on 16 March 2006. For his part, Atty. Beltran
manifestedbeforetheappellatecourtthathefiledpetitionersMotionforReconsiderationa
day late because his maid, who received the notice and copy of the 22 February 2006
DecisioninCAG.R.CVNo.80705,didnotimmediatelyplacethesameonhisdesk.

A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, otherwise, there would
neverbeanendtoasuitaslongasanewcounselcouldbeemployedwhocouldallegeand
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[38]
showthatthepriorcounselhadnotbeensufficientlydiligentorexperiencedorlearned.
Whileitistruethatexcusablenegligenceisoneoftherecognizedgroundsforamotionfor
[39]
new trial or reconsideration,
there can be no excusable negligence when ordinary
[40]
prudencecouldhaveguardedagainstit.

The Court imposes upon the attorney the duty, to himself and to his clients, to
invariablyadoptasystemwherebyhecanbesureofreceivingpromptlyalljudicialnotices
during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that
communicationssentbymail,addressedtohisofficeorresidence,mayreachhimpromptly.
[41]
In earlier cases, the Court did not excuse a counsels tardiness in complying with
reglementary periods for filing pleadings attributed to the negligence of said counsels
[42]
[43]
secretary
orclerk.
Inthesamelight,theCourtcanneithersanctionthelatefilingby
Atty. Beltran of the Motion for Reconsideration in CAG.R. CV No. 80705 which he
blamedonhismaid,norfreepetitionerfromtheeffectofAtty.Beltransfauxpas.

Apetitionforreconsiderationonthegroundofexcusablenegligenceisaddressedto
thesounddiscretionofthecourt.Thisdiscretioncannotbeinterferedwithexceptinaclear
[44]
caseofabuse.
Takingintoaccountallthecircumstancesoftheinstantcase,theCourt
finds no such abuse committed by the Court of Appeals in refusing to admit and act on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration since the judgment subject of said Motion had
alreadybecomefinaluponthelapseofthe15dayreglementaryperiodforthefilingofthe
same. At that point, the appellate court had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the
subsequentfilingofamotionforreconsiderationcannotdisturbthefinalityofthejudgment
[45]
norrestorejurisdictionwhichhadalreadybeenlost.

ThattheMotionforReconsiderationwasfiledonlyadaylateisofnomoment. The
Court had previously refused to admit motions for reconsideration which were filed only
[46]
[47]
one
ortwo
dayslate.

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Withoutamotionforreconsiderationofthe22February2006 Decision in CAG.R.


CVNo.80705havingbeentimelyfiledwiththeCourtofAppeals,petitionerhadalsolost
his right to appeal the said Decision to this Court. For purposes of determining its
timeliness,amotionforreconsiderationmayproperlybetreatedasanappeal.Asastepto
allow an inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. When filed beyond
[48]
suchperiod,themotionforreconsiderationipsofactoforeclosestherighttoappeal.

PetitionersMotionforReconsideration,beingfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiod,
didnottolltheDecisiondated22February2006oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CV
No. 80705 from becoming final and executory. As such the Decision is past appellate
review and constitutes res judicata as to every matter offered and received in the
proceedingsbelowaswellastoanyothermatteradmissiblethereinandwhichmighthave
[49]
beenofferedforthatpurpose.

TheCourtiswithoutjurisdictiontomodify,muchless,reverse,afinalandexecutory
judgment.IthasbeenpronouncedbytheCourtinParamountVinylProductsCorporationv.
[50]
NationalLaborRelationsCommission
that:

Wellsettled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a
timelyappeal(oramotionforreconsideration)renderstheassaileddecision,orderor
awardfinalandexecutorythatdeprivestheappellatebodyofanyjurisdictiontoalter
the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L42739, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445
VolkshelLaborUnionv.NLRC,G.R.No.L39686,June28,1980,98SCRA314Acda v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306 Rizal Empire
InsuranceGroupv.NLRC,G.R.No.73140,May29,1987,150SCRA565MAIPhilippines
Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.73662,June 18,1987,151SCRA 196Naragv.NLRC, G.R. No.
69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199 John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No.72096,January29,1988,157SCRA635Bongayv.Martinez,G.R.No.77188,March
14,1988,158SCRA552ManuelL.QuezonUniversityv.ManuelL.Quezon Educational
Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is applicable
indiscriminatelytooneandallsincetheruleisgroundedonfundamentalconsideration
ofpublicpolicyandsoundpracticethatattheriskofoccasionalerror,thejudgmentof
courts and award of quasijudicial agencies must become final at some definite date
fixed by law" [Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322]. Although, in a few
instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals
filedbeyondthereglementaryperiod(SeeFlexoManufacturingCorporationv.NLRC,G.R.
No.55971,February28,1985,135SCRA145FirestoneTire&RubberCo.v.Lariosa,G.R.
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No. 70479, February 27, 1989, 148 SCRA 187 Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No.
81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so on the basis of strong and
compellingreasons,suchasservingtheendsofjusticeandpreventingagravemiscarriage
thereof.(Emphasisours.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the unjustified delay in the filing of petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration in CAG.R. CV No. 80705 is not just a procedural lapse, but
alsoajurisdictionaldefectwhicheffectivelypreventsthisCourtfromtakingcognizanceof
thePetitionatbar.

Petitionercannotclaimthathehasbeendeprivedofdueprocess.Hewasabletofully
participateintheproceedingsbeforetheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.80705.The
CourtofAppealsactuallytookintoconsiderationpetitionersevidencewhenitrenderedits
Decision dated 22 February 2006 only, it found that said evidence failed to establish
specific acts of ownership over the subject property in compliance with the possessory
requirementsofthelawforanimperfecttitle.Petitionerwasnotarbitrarilydeprivedofhis
right to file a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated 22 February 2006 of the
Court of Appeals petitioner failed to avail himself of such a remedy within the
reglementaryperiodprescribedbylaw.

Moreover, even if, for the sake of argument, the Court can take cognizance of the
presentPetitioninitsappellatejurisdiction,itwouldstilldenythesameforlackofmerit.

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
specifically identifies the persons who are entitled to the judicial confirmation or
legalizationoftheirimperfectorincompletetitletotheland,towit

Section48.ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhilippines,occupyinglandsof
thepublicdomainorclaimingtoownanysuchlandsoraninteresttherein,butwhosetitles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificateoftitlethereafter,undertheLandRegistrationAct,towit:
(a)[RepealedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.1073].
(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenin
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
ofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,sinceJune12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title,exceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeure.Theseshallbeconclusivelypresumed
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tohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledto
acertificateoftitleundertheprovisionsofthischapter.
(c)Membersofthenationalculturalminoritieswhobythemselvesorthroughtheir
predecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossession
andoccupationoflandsofthepublicdomainsuitabletoagriculturewhetherdisposableor
not,underabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945shallbeentitledtotherights
grantedinsubsection(b)hereof.(Emphasisours.)

Itistruethatpetitionerwasabletopresenttestimonialevidencethathispredecessors
ininteresthadpossessedthelandpriorto12June1945orevenearlier.Nevertheless,itmust
be stressed that also by petitioners own evidence, particularly, the Certification dated 5
February2002issuedbytheUrbanForestryandLawEnforcementUnitoftheDENRNCR,
ithasbeenestablishedthatthesubjectpropertybecamealienableanddisposableonlyon3
January1968byvirtueofForestryAdministrativeOrderNo.41141.Itisalreadysettled
thatanyperiodofpossessionpriortothedatewhenthesubjectpropertywasclassifiedas
alienableanddisposableisinconsequentialandshouldbeexcludedfromthecomputationof
theperiodofpossessionsuchpossessioncanneverripenintoownershipandunlesstheland
hadbeenclassifiedasalienableanddisposable,therulesonconfirmationofimperfecttitle
[51]
shallnotapplythereto.

Itisalsoworthytopointoutthatpetitionersinsistencethatthesubjectpropertyand
theothersurroundingpropertiesarebeingusedforresidentialpurposesdoesnotworkinhis
favor, and even militates against him. Taken together with the declaration, for realty tax
purposes,bypetitionerhimselfthatthesubjectpropertyisbambooland,aswellastheclaim
of respondent LLDA that the same property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, there is an
apparentandunsettledconfusionontheproperclassificationofthesubjectproperty.

Theclassificationofthesubjectpropertyisimportantforitdeterminestheapplicable
statutory requirements and procedures for the proper disposition thereof. Confirmation or
legalizationofanimperfectorincompletetitleunderSection48,TitleIIofthePublicLand
Act, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands. Lands of the public domain for
[52]
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,
on the other hand, are governed by
Sections 58 to 68, Title III of the same statute. Without a definite classification of the
subject property, there results reasonable doubt as to the appropriate legal means for
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petitionertoacquiretitletothesame.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby


DENIED.CostsagainstthepetitionerRobertoY.Ponciano,Jr.

SOORDERED.

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ANTONIOT.CARPIOADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
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CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedin
consultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
ActingChiefJustice
*PerSpecialOrderNo.531,dated20October2008,signedbyActingChiefJusticeLeonardoA.Quisumbing, designating
AssociateJusticeAntonioT.CarpiotoreplaceAssociateJusticeMa.AliciaAustriaMartinez,whoisonleave.
**PerSpecialOrderNo.521,dated29September2008,signedbyChiefJusticeReynatoS.Puno,designatingAssociateJustice
AdolfoS.AzcunatoreplaceAssociateJusticeRubenT.Reyes,whoisonofficialleave.
***JusticePresbiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.wasdesignatedtositasadditionalmemberreplacingJusticeAntonioEduardoB.Nachura
perRaffledated12March2008.
[1]
Rollo,pp.818.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo
Zenarosa,concurringrollo,pp.3639.
[3]
Id.at2835.
[4]
PennedbyAssistingJudgeSilvinoT.Pampilo,Jr.rollo,pp.1926.
[5]
Records,pp.16.
[6]
Id.at293296.
[7]
Id.at291292.
[8]
Id.at291.
[9]
PennedbyJudgeBenjaminT.Pozonid.at2830.
[10]
Records,pp.222225,
[11]
Accordingtopetitioner,DoloresinformedhimthatsheboughtthesubjectpropertyfromherfatherEleuterioin1967(TSN,
6February2002,p.9).However,petitionerswitness,CrispinaViarVda.DeGarcia,narratedthatthesubjectproperty
wasboughtbyDoloresfromEleuterioin1966(TSN,6February2002,p.19).
[12]
TSN,6February2002,p.20.
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G.R.No.174536

[13]
Records,p.282.
[14]
Id.at233.
[15]
Id.at252253.
[16]
Id.at250251.
[17]
Id.at226232.
[18]
Id.at13,284285.
[19]
Id.at286287.
[20]
TSN,6February2002,p.1316.
[21]
Id.
[22]
OrderpennedbyJudgeBenjaminT.Pozonrecords,p.297.
[23]
Records,pp.301305.
[24]
Id.at30302.
[25]
Rollo,pp.1926.
[26]
Id.at2526.
[27]
Id.at2835.
[28]
Id.at3233.
[29]
Id.at3334.
[30]
Rollo,pp.3639.
[31]
Id.at3739.
[32]
Id.at39.
[33]
Id.at10.
[34]
Id.at103104.
[35]
PhilippineCoconutAuthorityv.Garrido,424Phil.904,909(2002).
[36]
Tanv.Tan,G.R.No.133805,29June2004,433SCRA44,49,citingBascov.CourtofAppeals,383Phil.671,685686
(2000).Macabingkilv.People'sHomesiteandHousingCorp.,164Phil.328,340341(1976).
[37]
359Phil.210,220(1998).
[38]
Tesorov.CourtofAppeals,153Phil.580,588(1973).
[39]
Rule37,RulesofCourt.
[40]
Amilv.CourtofAppeals,374Phil.659,665(1999).
[41]
Republicv.Arro,G.R.No.L48241,11June1987,150SCRA625,630.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Fabellav.Tancinco,86Phil.543,547(1950).
[44]
Id.at548.
[45]
Bolaosv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.L68458,7August1985,138SCRA99,104.
[46]
PhilippineCoconutAuthorityv.Garrido,supranote35at909.
[47]
Vda.DeVictoriav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.147550,26January2005,449SCRA319,330331.
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[48]
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L74191, 21 December 1987, 156
SCRA740,746.
[49]
Melotindosv.Tobias,439Phil.910,916(2002).
[50]
G.R.No.81200,17October1990,190SCRA525,533534.
[51]
Republicv.Herbieto,G.R.No.156117,26May2005,459SCRA183,201202Almedav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.
85322,30April1991,196SCRA476,480481Vallartav.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.L74957,30June
1987,151SCRA679,690Republicv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L40402,16March1987,148SCRA480,492.
[52]
AccordingtoSection59ofthePublicLandAct,asamended,thelandsdisposableunderTitleIIIshallbeclassifiedas
follows:
(a)LandsreclaimedbytheGovernmentbydredging,filling,orothermeans
(b)Foreshore
(c)Marshylandsorlandscoveredwithwaterborderingupontheshoresorbanksofnavigablelakesorrivers
(d)Landsnotincludedinanyoftheforegoingclasses.

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