Sun Insurance vs Asuncion

STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. Private respondent claims that the ruling in
Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was
filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete , wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this
case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the rescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE
PLEADING. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment.
Yuchengco vs Republic of the Philippines
On July 16, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for recession,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and Prime
Holdings, Inc. (PHI). Alleging ownership of the properties of the Marcoses sought to be forfeited by the Republic,
petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint-inintervention on August 11, 1988
impleading the Republic, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
Marcos and PHI as defendants-in-intervention. Petitioner paid a docket fee of P400.00. Later, the petitioner amended
its complainant-in-intervention to implead Imelda Cojuangco and the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco as additional
defendants-inintervention. After the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended complaint-inintervention, the Republic and
the PHI filed their answers-in-intervention.
Thereafter, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint-in-intervention on the ground, among others, that the petitioner did not pay the correct docket fees, in
violation of the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation, et al . vs. Court of Appeals. Contrarily,
petitioner claimed that no docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 11 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended. Subsequently, petitioner also filed an amended motion for early resolution to avoid
prescription of action. He also moved that he be allowed to post a bond to answer for whatever docket fees he may
be held to pay. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner's motion to post bond and it ordered petitioner to pay
the balance of the docket fee in the amount of P14,425.00. Petitioner paid with reservation. On June 11, 1996,
petitioner moved that the amount of P14,425.00 be refunded to him, insisting that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan should be free of charge.
However, on October 9, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. Hence, this
petition. The Court held that the ruling that the timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar. It
should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of this Court on the matter have always been influenced by the
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances surrounding each case. Equitable considerations are equally significant.
Unlike the basis of the Manchester ruling, there was no evidence in the present case that the petitioner tried to evade
the payment of correct fees or in any way tried to mislead the Sandiganbayan court and its employees. On the
contrary, petitioner paid dues and asked the Sandiganbayan what are the correct docket fees, if the dues paid are not
accurate. When the Sandiganbayan came out with its own computation, petitioner paid the corrected amount.
Petitioner's position that subsequent amendments to PD 1606 did not expressly repeal Section 11 thereof was
untenable. Petitioner failed to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases

impliedly amended the same and Section 1, Rule IV, Part I of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover,
the Supreme Court enjoys exclusive power to promulgate the rules on pleading, practice, and procedure. Hence,
Rule 141, Section 7(a), of the Rules of Court applies to petitioner's complaint and/or amended complainants-inintervention.
Petitioner was ordered to submit to the Sandiganbayan the value of the properties it seeks to recover and to pay the
proper docket fees therefor within thirty (30) days upon determination thereof.
Manchester vs Court of Appeals
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE; RENDERS NULL AND VOID AND
COMPLAINTS AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WHERETO. The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the
amended pleading.
COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT OF MANDAMUS MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY BUT ALSO
IN THE PRAYER. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The court acquires jurisdiction
over any upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Cu- Unjieng vs Court of Appeals
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; STATUTORY NATURE THEREOF EXPLAINED. Doctrinally
entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely statutory and a party seeking to avail of that right
must comply with the statute or rules.
MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR PAYMENT OF DOCKET AND OTHER FEES WITHIN
THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD, JUSTIFIED. Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal. For,
to stress, appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final
order of the RTC to the CA must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice. And within this period, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the decision sought to be appealed final and
executory. For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as
provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (c) of Rule
50.
RULES OF PROCEDURE MAY BE RELAXED ONLY FOR PERSUASIVE AND WEIGHTY REASONS; NOT
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. True, the rules may be relaxed but only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. So it is that in
La Salette College vs. Victor Pilotin, we held: Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat, we held that late payment of docket
fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required
fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for herein petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were
paid six (6) days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees
in this case was effected by petitioner only after four (4) months following the expiration of the reglementary period to

take an appeal. With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was belatedly made
four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction
over petitioner's appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the
RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law. We must emphasize that
invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed.