The value for the round is Morality, as the word ought denotes a

moral obligation.
The value criterion for the round is Maximizing Expected WellBeing. I have three independent justifications for the value criterion.
First, all questions of value depend on consequentialist experiences,
making moral value is just an expression of well-being. Sam Harris
explains,
Sam Harris (CEO Project Reason; PHD UCLA Neuroscience; BA Stanford Philosophy). The Moral
Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. 2010.

all questions of value (right and wrong, good

depend upon the possibility of experiencing such value.
Without potential consequences at the level of experiencehappiness,
suffering, joy, despair, etc.all talk of value is empty. Therefore, to say
that an act is morally necessary, or evil, or blameless, is to make (tacit)
claims about its consequences in the lives of conscious creatures
Here is my (consequentialist) starting point:
and evil, etc.)

(whether actual or potential). I am unaware of any interesting exception to this rule. Needless to say,
[For example,] if one is worried about pleasing God or His angels, this assumes that such invisible
entities are conscious (in some sense) and cognizant of human behavior. It also generally assumes
[and] that it is possible to suffer their [his] wrath or enjoy their approval, either in this world or the
world to come. Even within religion, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the
foundation of all values.

To describe morality is to describe well-being. Our conceptions of

morality depend entirely on consequences. The word ought implies
consequentialism.
Second, basic respect for human equality demands that just societies
adopt a consequentialist view of morality. David Cummiskey
elaborates,
David Cummiskey (Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College). Kantian Consequentialism.
Ethics, Vol. 100, No. 3. 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810.

If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily,
and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may

have dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth that transcends any market value

persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that

some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The
(GMM 436), but

concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some

If one focuses on the equal value of all rational

beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to
sacrifice some to save many.
Third, there is no act-omission distinction for governments, thus even if
respecting rights is the moral duty of a government, it devolves to a
consequentialist perspective of maximizing well-being. Sunstein and
Vermuele explain.
cost in order to benefit others.

Sunstein and Vermuele. Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life
Tradeoffs, Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17.
In our view,

any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes

wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral
agent. If correct, this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law. Whatever the general
status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy, the distinction is least

impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible underlying considerations do

unlike individuals,
governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among
possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between
acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it
is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most
generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and
prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it
is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act.
Icontendthatterroristhegreatestthreattoanynation.
not apply to official actors. The most fundamental point is that,

Delivery is easy and terrorists empirically can steal nukes

McKinzie 4 [(Kishore Kuchibhotla, NYU Langone Medical Center, Skirball Institute of
Biomolecular Medicine and Matthew McKinzie, Senior Scientist, Land & Wildlife
Program and Director, Nuclear Program) Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Accidents in
South Asia Stimson Center Report, February 01] AT
availability of radioactive materials worldwide makes the threat of radiological
terrorism plausible.
radioactive materials
are stored and used
throughout India and Pakistan
materials that save or improve
lives on a daily basis can threaten the public well being, if used by terrorist groups.
Widespread

19 The use of

in medicine and industry has been globalized. Radioactive materials

for cancer therapy, food irradiation, and medical product sterilization. The same

From publicly available

information, we have put together a small sample of the known locations where radioactive sources are used for beneficial purposes in India and Pakistan (Figure 4). As can be seen, they are spread throughout both countries and have varying levels of security. Many of
these sources have been produced in the region, but some are imported from abroad. There are many private and public suppliers of radioactive materials and each year, many of these sources are lost and can no longer be tracked. In the United States and European
Union, over 370 sources are lost on an annual basis. Thousands have been lost from countries that were once part of the Soviet Union and have yet to be recovered. Additionally, there have been 643 recorded incidents of nuclear smuggling, 80 of which involved the use
of radioactive materials with malevolent intent, such as extortion, bribery, and murder.20 Based on data available from the IAEA, India has reported several cases of stolen, and lost sources over the last few years. There have been twenty-five reported cases of missing
radioactive materials. Of these, thirteen have never been recovered and 52 percent have occurred by theft.21 Nearly 10,000 radioactive sources are used throughout India (Table 3) of which about 400 are particularly worrisome. Comparable data from Pakistan are not

efficacy of existing radiological regulatory practices in India and Pakistan remains

opaque to outside analysts.
individuals in
India stole small gauges filled with Co-60.
publicly available. The

Typically, only one or two radiation safety officers control each source in hospitals, research laboratories, and industrial plants.22 Security practices are sometimes deficient. On August 17,

2003, the Times of India reported that

Jamshedpur,

23 These deficiencies are by no means confined to

India or Pakistan. The US Department of Energy has compiled a list of recommendations to upgrade security at US facilities, including the following measures: Establish a national RDD protection level Develop a national threat policy Initiate development of a
national source tracking system Develop an integrated national response strategy for rapid recovery of unsecured sources Develop an integrated national strategy for disposition of unsecured sources Enhance coordination and communication among governmental

Terrorist
Detonation of a Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon This section posits scenarios involving the
detonation of a low-yield nuclear weapon. There are five basic nuclear weapons effects
agencies Continue coordination with the IAEA24 Every country that possesses poorly guarded, RDD-usable radiological materials has a responsibility to improve public safety and to guard against radiological terrorism.

. Blast and shock

effects are the primary damage- producing mechanisms for soft targets such as cities and are often the only effective mechanism for destroying underground structures such as missile silos.25 Immediately after a nuclear explosion, a high-pressure wave moves from
ground zero outwards. This wave is usually reflected off the ground creating a secondary blast wave. Overpressure is a key measurement of the strength of the blast wave and can be defined as the pressure in excess of the normal atmospheric value.26 Thermal
effects are responsible for producing burns and eye injuries and could also lead to the ignition of combustible materials. Fire damage from a nuclear detonation has historically been viewed by the United States military as difficult to quantify but may result in up to five
times the amount of damage from nuclear blast. The fourth effect is radiation. There are two types of radiation: initial radiation, which is emitted within the first minute after a detonation, and residual radiation, which is emitted thereafter. Residual radiation leads to the

there is the electromagnetic pulse effect. This effect occurs at the moment of nuclear
detonation.
EMP is a short but extremely
powerful electrical disturbance
It disables electronics and
communications equipment almost instantaneously.
fallout effect. Finally,

It can be thought of as a very strong electrical disturbance akin to an extremely powerful, fast, and expansive bolt of lightning. This effect will be discussed in greater detail below.27 Electromagnetic Pulse An Invisible Effect

Simulations help visualize the physical and health damage that would result from nuclear blasts. Here we describe an easily overlooked weapons effect, electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
, akin to a very strong and very fast bolt of lightning.

It has two primary modes of damage: physical damage, such as shorts and burnouts, and temporary operational

instabilities, such as power loss and fluctuation. The EMP is particularly devastating to advanced electronics, such as computers, servers, avionics equipment, and other technologies. Older technologies, such as motors and vacuum tubes, are less susceptible. EMP effects

EMP robustness of civilian infrastructure

can be
summarized as being entirely non-existent.
EMP effects can also severely hamper military command, control,
communications and intelligence.
can devastate civilian infrastructure. As a Pentagon EMP expert has noted, The
...[

the

of the United States

Our civilian telephone, electricity, broadband communications, and electrical plants are all naked.28 Moreover, in the United States, 95

percent of military communication routes through civilian systems.29

Referring to battlefield operations in the event of a low-yield nuclear weapon, a Marine Corps officer writes that, The Marine Corps...will have problems with the

EMP...The command control systems will be knocked out. The generals and their staff will not be able to talk to their front line troops and they will not be able to receive instructions from higher headquarters in the United States.30 The EMP effect is not limited to a
high-yield weapon. At low yields, the EMP effect can also be extremely intense, as this effect is only weakly dependent on yield. Although there is a 100,000 percent increase in weapon yield from a one KT device to a ten-megaton device, the maximum EMP effect only

the EMP effects from a low-yield surface burst would far

outdistance the blast and fire damage.
If a nuclear weapon detonated near the Gateway of India in
Mumbai
the EMP effect would be devastating.
Electronics and
communication systems may be inoperable. Power grids may be affected
it is unclear whether
transportation would be feasible.
increases by twenty-five percent.31 Using basic EMP calculations, we have been able to show that

Although the blast would destroy an area of approximately one square kilometer, the EMP from the nuclear detonation would be twenty-five times as large.

Most of the electronics and communications capacity in this region would be ruined.

(see scenario below), the blast effects would not reach out to the Mumbai stock exchange, but

The greatest EMP effects would occur

within the twenty-five square kilometers surrounding the blast, but even out to almost 100 square kilometers, the EMP damage would be significant. Post-detonation complications would be severe.

in an area even outside the city limits. If this were to

occur, communication among and between leaders could be compromised, as would be their transportation. With planes and helicopters using advanced avionics and with air trafficking systems affected,

It took the United States and Soviet Union decades to harden military nodes against EMP, and they are still susceptible to considerable damage. Just as importantly, US

civilian systems are fully unprotected against such an attack. Fissile Material Availability The severe damage caused by a nuclear weapon necessitates an examination of how non- state actors might acquire such a capability. Although estimates vary, the production of a

Reports of theft or unaccounted for nuclear

material are widespread
forty kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen from
poorly protected nuclear facilities
this is the tip of the iceberg and that more than ten times that
amount might actually be missing.
There are no binding IAEA standards of protection, accountancy,
and security for weapon-grade material, and most states would be reluctant to accept
intrusive foreign assistance to upgrade existing practices Stolen nuclear material can reach
its destination by many different routes.
trafficking routes,
snake
through Central Asia toward South Asia
An instance of nuclear terrorism involving
HEU or plutonium would have very grave consequences.
functional nuclear weapon may require only a few kilograms of plutonium or about fifteen to twenty-five kg of uranium.

and have recently been compiled by Stanford Universitys Institute for International Studies (IIS). The Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) has reported

that about

in the former Soviet Union during the last decade.32 Although most of this material has since been retrieved, there still remains two kilograms of highly enriched

uranium that is unaccounted for. A researcher at the IIS argues that

In 1998, the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) thwarted a plan by nuclear facility employees to divert 18.5 kg of HEU.33 Had this not occurred, there would

have been almost enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon.

Stanford Universitys DSTO monitors

and as can be seen, these routes

(Figure 5).

The likelihood of this eventuality is perhaps less than the likelihood of radiological terrorism involving

the use of a dirty bomb, but the consequences would obviously be far greater. More scientific skills would be needed to produce a nuclear weapon utilizing stolen HEU, and the material handling challenges associated with a plutonium bomb would be quite severe.

the possibility of nuclear terrorism using HEU or plutonium cannot be discounted in

South Asia
Nonetheless,

or elsewhere. We therefore analyze two scenarios based on the detonation of a five-kiloton yield device in Mumbai and a similar-sized nuclear weapon detonated in Islamabad.

Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now consistent data

William Tobey 14, is a senior fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs. Major General Pavel Zolotarev is a retired member of the
Russian Armed Forces and deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies
of the Russian Academy of Sciences., 1/13/2014, "The Nuclear Terrorism Threat",
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/nuclearterrorismthreatthailand2014.pdf
A joint U.S.-Russian View q First ever U.S.-Russian joint threat assessment q Concludes the
danger is real, urgent action is needed to reduce it
retired military, intelligence experts

q Endorsed

by broad range of

Could terrorists cause a security Fukushima? q Fukushima caused by

inadequate preparation and an extraordinary natural disaster q Reaffirmed that a

nuclear accident can cause

extraordinary terror, disruption, and cost qAl Qaeda, Chechens, and other terrorist groups have considered
sabotaging nuclear reactors. Nuclear safety and security are closely linked you cant be safe without being secure. Cs-137 dirty
bomb q Potentially dangerous sources used in hospitals, industry, in almost every country qAl Qaeda, Chechens have

repeatedly considered dirty bomb attacks With nuclear material, terrorists may be able to
make crude nuclear bombs qWith HEU, gun-type bomb as obliterated Hiroshima very plausibly
within capabilities of sophisticated terrorist group q Implosion bomb (required for plutonium) more difficult,
still conceivable (especially if they got help) Doesnt need to be as complex as Nagasaki bomb Source: NATO Doesnt take a
Manhattan Project -- >90% of the effort was focused on producing nuclear material. And
making a crude terrorist bomb is far easier than making a safe, reliable weapon With nuclear
material, terrorists may be able to make crude nuclear bombs (II) q Government
elsewhere

studies

in the United States and

have repeatedly concluded that a sophisticated terrorist group could

plausibly make a nuclear bomb . A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified
literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device... Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be
contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required. -- U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1977 qU.S. security rules for
some types of material based on preventing adversaries from setting off a nuclear blast while they are still in the building Al

Qaeda has actively sought to get nuclear bombs

Repeated attempts to

purchase nuclear material or nuclear weapons q Repeated attempts to recruit nuclear

expertise

q Focused

program that reported directly to Zawahiri

q Reached

the point of

carrying out crude (but sensible) explosive tests for the nuclear program in the Afghan
desert Al Qaeda has actively sought to get nuclear bombs (II) q 2001: Bin Laden and Zawahiri meet with 2
senior Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss nuclear weapons - Now-sanctioned UTN network was
helping with chemical, biological, nuclear efforts also offered nuclear weapons technology to Libya q 2003: - bin Laden gets fatwa
from radical Saudi cleric authorizing use of nuclear weapons against civilians - Saudi al Qaeda cell negotiating to buy 3 nuclear
devices if Pakistani expert confirms they are real q 2008: Zawahiri reiterates, elaborates arguments of

nuclear fatwa North Caucasus terrorists have pursued nuclear and radiological terrorism qMultiple cases: 2 cases of teams
carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage sites 2 more on nuclear weapon transport trains Repeated threats to attack
nuclear reactors terrorists who seized Moscow theater in 2002 considered seizing reactor at the Kurchatov Institute Repeated
threats to use radiological dirty bombs buried Cs-137 source in Moscow park Captured documents indicate plan to seize a
Russian nuclear submarine (possibly with nuclear weapons on board) Aum Shinrikyo sought nuclear weapons before its nerve gas
attacks qAums efforts Cult leader Shoko Asahara was obsessed with nuclear weapons Repeated shopping trips to former Soviet
Union acquired wide range of conventional weapons, recruited thousands of followers, sought to buy nuclear weapons and materials
Purchased farm in Australia, stole enrichment documents idea to mine, enrich its own uranium Turned to chemical and
biological weapons when nuclear proved too slow No intelligence agency was aware of their nuclear, biological, or chemical work
until after nerve gas attacks Has the threat disappeared? q Bin Laden dead, core al Qaeda profoundly

disrupted, key North Caucasus terrorist leaders killed qN uclear security is substantially improved
many sites many sites have no weapons-usable material left q

at

But: al Qaeda has proved resilient

could resurge Emirate Kavkaz terrorists in North Caucasus strengthening Other groups have pursued
nuclear weapons as well with 2-3 groups having gone the nuclear path in last 15 years ,
cannot expect they will be the last Intent is enduring; capability may increase as technology spreads;
strong nuclear security needed to remove opportunity

The problem of nuclear terrorism and the need

for nuclear security will be with us for decades no room for complacency The
scale of the catastrophe q Tens of thousands killed; tens of thousands more burned, injured,
irradiated Radioactive fallout would require large-scale evacuation q Terrorists may claim they had more
bombs hidden in cities, threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met
Potential for widespread panic, flight from major cities, resulting economic and
social chaos qHuge pressure on leaders of attacked state to take any action necessary to
prevent further attacks and to retaliate

Effects on international affairs likely far

larger than 9/11 Notions of sovereignty and civil liberties may be radically altered
every states behavior affects every other Nuclear
qNot just a risk to the United States q

reverberate worldwide
an attack to occur, it

terrorism anywhere would be a global catastrophe

Economic, political, military consequences would

Likely shut-down of much of world trade,

for a period Were such

would not only cause widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world

economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty . [A]ny nuclear
terrorist attack would have a second death toll throughout the developing world . Kofi Annan,
A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism, March 10, 2005 q Political consequences would doom prospects for large-scale nuclear
growth, putting nuclear industry at risk Insecure nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere.