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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187401
September 17, 2014
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos
(Campos) to assail the Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated February 16,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction
of Campos for fourteen (14) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
1
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P50,000.00. She issued several
postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of
these checks drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family BankHead Office, however, were dishonored when presented for payment, particularly:
3
Check No.
Date
Amount
138609
August 15, 1995
P3,333.33
138610
August 30, 1995
P3,333.33
138611
September 15, 1995
P3,333.33
138612
September 30, 1995
P3,333.33
138613
October 15, 1995
P3,333.33
138614
October 30, 1995
P3,333.33
138615
November15, 1995
P3,333.33
138616
November30, 1995
P3,333.33
138617
December15, 1995
P3,333.33
138618
December31, 1995
P3,333.33
138619
January 15, 1996
P3,333.33
138620
January 31, 1996
P3,333.33
138621
February 15, 1996
P3,333.33
138622
February28, 1996
P3,333.33
P46,666.62
The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account."
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with
violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings
after being arraigned.
5
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen
(14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus legal
interest from date of default until full payment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007,
the RTC of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos conviction. A
motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit.
7
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008
its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion
was denied via a Resolution dated February 16, 2009. Hence,this petition for review on
certiorari which cites the following issues:
8
1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH

REGISTERED MAILIS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P.
22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF
THE CHECKS DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THEIR PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND
TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS] CASE.
10
Campos argues that the crimes element requiring her knowledge at the time of the checks
issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having
received a notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the
MeTCs reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through
registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with
FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
11
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written
demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a
line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of
dishonor, although not as an element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the
issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank
dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22.
Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, as it
reads:
12
13
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing, and issuance of
a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTCs finding that the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still
maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering
that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented
by the prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of
registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written
notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by
affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded
as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the
second element of the offense.
1wphi1
14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos'
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the
checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos
categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she
was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations
subsequently after the dishonor of the checks." Clearly, this statement was a confirmation
that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred
to in her statement were receipts dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998
15
16
and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging
from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged
arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had. not received a notice of
dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the
bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or
making arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case.
She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to
establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts
covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been
presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and
thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former counsel for
alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial, it is settled that the
negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no
cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution
dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this
Court), with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and
Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 27-33.
1
Id. at 35.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 28; CA rollo, p. 55.
Rollo, p. 29.
Id.
Id. at 27-33.
Id. at 35.
10
Id. at 16-17.
11
San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 660, 665.
See Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 592,
601; Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 116, 120;
Moster v. People, 569 Phil. 616, 626 (2008).
12
13
Alferez v. People, supra note 12, at 122.
14
Resterio v. People, supra note 12, at 602.
15
Rollo, p. 20. (emphasis ours)
16
Id. at 36-37.
17
Id. at 21.
GRIFFITH V CA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002]
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE
MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS.,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision [1] dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Courts decision [2] finding
petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period
of six months on each count, to be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of
Appeals resolution[3] dated July 8, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of
Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:
FarEastBankandTrustCo.CheckNo.06BC075065,datedApril15,
1986forP100,000.00,payabletoPhelpsDodgePhils.Inc.;and
FarEastBankandTrustCo.CheckNo.06BC075066,datedMay1,1986
forP115,442.65,payabletoPhelpsDodgePhils.Inc.[4]
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
Thesechecksarenottobepresentedwithoutpriorapprovalfromthis
CorporationtobegivennotlaterthanMay30,1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However,ifwrittenapprovalofLincolnGerard,Inc.isnotgivenbeforeMay
30,1986,PhelpsDodge,Phils.shallpresentthechequesforpayment.Thisis
finalandirrevocable.[5]
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for
payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor
strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.[6]
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer
Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the
Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving
in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed in our
compound and under our custody.[7]
On June 2, 1986,[8] when no further communication was received from Lincoln
Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored
by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps
Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the
checks and asking him to fund them within the time prescribed by law.[9] Lincoln Gerard
still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining
Lincolns inability to fund said checks due to the strike. [10]Subsequently, on June 19, 1986,
Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps
Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, [11]despite
Lincoln Gerards protest.[12]
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 73260 and 73261 were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court. The motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his
petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash
filed before the RTC. Griffith then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals that was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69,
against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction sale. [13] On July
19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but
applied the proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerards arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge
to return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess.[14] The court stated:
Theevidenceshowsthatdefendantcorporationhadalreadyreceivedthe
amountofP254,600asaresultoftheinvalidauctionsale.Thelatteramount
shouldbeappliedtotherentalinarrearsowedbytheplaintiffcorporationto
thedefendantcorporation(P301,953.12).Thus,theplaintiffcorporationstill
owesthedefendantcorporationtheamountofP47,953.12asrentalarrears.In
ordertogetthetrueandrealdamagesthatdefendantcorporationshouldpaythe
plaintiffcorporation,thebalanceoftherentalarrearsshouldbedeductedfrom
theamountofP1,120,540.00,thetotalvalueoftheitemsbelongingtothe
plaintiffcorporationandsoldbythedefendantcorporationatapublic
auction.ThenetresultisP1,072,586.88.[15]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final
and executory.[16]
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were
remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that
expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found
Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22,[17] and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thiscourtfindstheaccusedGEOFFREY
F.GRIFFITH,GUILTYOFVIOLATIONofSection1ofBatasPambansaBlg.
22,otherwiseknownastheBouncingChecksLawontwocounts.
Theaccusedisthereforeherebysentence(sic)tosufferimprisonmentfora
periodofSIX(6)MONTHSinCriminalCaseNo.41678andanotherSIX(6)
MONTHSinCriminalCaseNo.41679,bothofwhichshallbeserved
consecutively.
Consideringthatthecivilaspectofthesecaseshasalreadybeendecidedbythe
RegionalTrialCourtBranch69,Pasig,regardlessofitsfinality,ofwhichthis
courthasnorecord,thisCourtshallnotresolvethesamebecausetheyare
eitherResJudicataorPendenteLitis.
SOORDERED.[18]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated
decision dated March 14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE,absentanyprimafaciemeritinit,thePetitionforReview
underconsiderationisherebyDENIEDDUECOURSE.Costsagainst
petitioner.
SOORDERED.[19]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the
appellate court in a resolution dated July 8, 1997. [20] Hence, this petition seeking reversal
of the CA decision and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN
MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT LAID
DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE
BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH
NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980)
INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME
TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND

ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE
RULING IN THE CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE
TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED
TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, ARE CONTRAY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE. [21]
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the
voucher attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of
their issuance.Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put
worthless checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as
regards the second check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be
any violation of B.P. 22 with said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds is absent. Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance that the
postdated check would be dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the
constitutional proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner
would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an
obligation when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the
proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise
violation of B.P. 22 are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made
beyond the five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and
thus did not extinguish petitioners criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps
Dodge, through the note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be
covered with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was final and
irrevocable.[22] The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check
that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with
knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since
according to the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check that is dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.[23]
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodges
notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P.
22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was
made only after the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond
the five-day period, from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of
Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and
sentence of six months imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge
Manuel Villamayor was upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed
by the respondent Court of Appeals. But private respondent appears to have collected
more than the value of the two checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the
case for violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted
and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the alleged payment of
the amount of the checks two years prior to the filing of the information for violation of
B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this
case, however, does not appear to us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A
purported constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if essential to the
decision of a case and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on
other grounds. Well to remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that
are not the very lis mota of a case.[24]
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental
payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the
president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that
the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to
be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance
owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the companys inability
to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher
attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before
May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable,
according to the note that was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by
petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge
had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to spare,
through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards properties earlier
impounded by Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is
meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account user.[25] It was not designed to favor or
encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention
of the purpose of the law.[26] Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this
Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations
rather than imprisonment to best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the
classical school that imposes penalties for retribution,[27] such retribution should be aimed
at actual and potential wrongdoers.[28] Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps
Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard
allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it
bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were
later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting
to P1,120,540[29] to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was
already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving
into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said
rentals was only P301,953.12.[30] Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and
auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks,
totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in
excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the
auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time,
the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer
subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary.
[31]
That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected,
however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges
against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered
to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate
court. We cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioners conviction and sentence
could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For
Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through
foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.
That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier
rendered in deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros
Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioners motion to quash the
charges herein before they were tried on the merits.[32]
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and
Asaali S. Isnani:
Wearepersuadedthatthedefensehasgoodandsoliddefensesagainstboth
chargesinCriminalCasesNos.7326061.Wecanevensaythatthedecision
renderedinBranch69inCivilCaseNo.55276,wellwrittenasitis,hadputup
aformidableobstacletoanyconvictioninthecriminalcaseswiththefindings
thereinmadethatthesalebypublicauctionofthepropertiesofLincolnwas
illegalandhadnojustificationunderthefacts;thatalsotheproceedsrealizedin
thesaidsaleshouldbedeductedfromtheaccountofLincolnwithPhelps,so
thatonlyP47,953.12mayonlybetherentalsinarrearswhichLincolnshould
pay,computedatP301,953.12lessP254,600.00;thatoutofwhathadhappened
inthecaseasthetrialcourthadresolvedinitsdecision,Phelpsisdutyboundto
payLincolnindamagesP1,072,586.88fromwhichhadbeendeductedthe
amountofP47,953.12representingthebalanceoftherentalinarrearages;and
thatconsequently,thereisabsolutelynoconsiderationremaininginsupportof
thetwo(2)subjectchecks.[33]
Petitioners efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was
frustrated on procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy.[34] In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction
including grave abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22
is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for
payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically.[35] We must find if the application
of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et
cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone
but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a
debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the
checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president
to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has
already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed,
we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and
justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks
issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a
distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for
being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8,
1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED
of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 34-42.
[2]
Id. at 118-139.
[3]
Id. at 44-45.
[4]
Id. at 35, 58-59.
[5]
Id. at 60.
[6]
Id. at 61. For brevity, Inc. is omitted henceforth.
[7]
Records, p. 102.
[8]
Id. at 403.
[9]
Rollo, p. 35.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Records, p. 404.
[12]
Rollo, p. 36.
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Rollo, p. 87.
[15]
Ibid. See also CA Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[16]
Rollo, p.15. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36426 and the decision was dated December 29,
1995.
[17]
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
[18]
CA Rollo, p. 61. Phelps Dodge did not appear to have made a reservation regarding the civil aspect of
the B.P. 22 case. The trial court was referring to the civil case for damages that Lincoln Gerard had earlier
filed against Phelps Dodge.
[19]
Id. at 98.
[20]
Id. at 125-126.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[22]
A second note on the voucher states that if Lincoln does not give written notice to Phelps before May
30, 1986, the checks would be deposited for payment. This is final and irrevocable, it further says. This
note was in fact written by an officer of Phelps. See Rollo, pp. 14, 74.
[23]
Citing Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, 146 SCRA 323, 338 (1986).
[24]
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Br. 25, Iloilo City, G.R. No. 125465, 309 SCRA 340, 354 (1999).
[25]
Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, 210 SCRA 471, 478 (1992).
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
L.B. REYES, I THE REVISED PENAL CODE 21 (13th ed., 1993).
[28]
Supra, note 25 at 479.
[29]
Rollo, p. 87.
[30]
Id. at 85.
[31]
Id. at 40.
[32]
Id. at 99-106, Decision marked as Annex M.
[33]
Id. at 103.
[34]
Id. at 104-105.
[35]
Supra,, note 25 at 473.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of
one (1) count of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated
June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as
his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered
the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the
printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment"
order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and
during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said
checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two
demand letters to petitioner, dated My 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private
complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. After the lapse
of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from
the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was
able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the
bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC), to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR

INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Big. 22 committed as follows:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to
apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated July 15, 1998,
payable to Cash in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of
issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from
the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT
STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make
arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 - CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.R Big. 22 committed as follows:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to
apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated June 30, 1998
payable to Cash in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the time of
issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from
the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT
STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make
arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2)
counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC),
and on July 20, 2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931), because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases
where the essential ingredients of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The decision of the
lower court with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside
for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22
with respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00
plus costs. No findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with the lower court that the
check was paid, is affirmed and there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to
pay fine, the accused shall undergo subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the
criminal case against him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks
even before the Informations against him were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v.
Court of Appeals.6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise recommends the acquittal of
petitioner, opining that Griffith7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of
the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an
amount greater than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances
in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this case are
personal checks, while the check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence, some
confusion or miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check and the
corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present case are not exactly the
same as those inGriffith, it should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to
petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner
merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor
who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign
materials, for which the checks were used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied
on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take
delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily
complying with the instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's word that there is no
longer any valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless,
two months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which
was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving
thesubpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was
motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid
prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even
voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the
proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property. In said case, the Court did not
differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check had
actually been paid before the Information against the accused was filed in court. In this case,
petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no
justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and
in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the
Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the accused
in Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated inGriffith is
herein reiterated, to wit:
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance
of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not
apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the
purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, el cessat lex. (When the reason for the law
ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it
life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the
ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient
amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that
holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has
already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed,
we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and
justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,9 the foregoing principle
articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case.
Therein, the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big. 22 being "(1) The accused
makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment."10 To facilitate proving the second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that the drawer
of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay
the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however, is made
good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is
rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is no longer present and the
drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within the period prescribed by the
law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace
period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court
further elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Big. 22 two years after the said
collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. In that case,
the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to the institution of
the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of
the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the
acquittal of the petitioner.
cralawred
xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in
possession the four buses - trust properties surrendered by petitioner in aboutmid 1991 and March
1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about P6.6
million." It thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored checks - P1,785,855.75 -, x x
x was more than fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9,1992 letter of
demand. In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored
checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine
whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x
x11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be
abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan,12 petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact
that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having
received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the
Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the credibility
and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently
made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been
filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has
already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every
intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then
there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of
the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated
from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the
essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In
such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal
liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties
for violation of B.P. Big. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6)
months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping
with justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No.
07-249932.
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and
Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
1
Id.
CA rollo, p. 40.
Id. at 39.
3
4
Rollo, pp. 40-41.
428 Phil. 878 (2002).
Supra.
Griffith v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 892.
575 Phil. 485 (2008).
10
11
12
Id. at 494.
Id. at 496-497. (Underscoring ours)
Supra.
BUEBOS & BUEBOS V PEOPLE
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DANTE BUEBOS and G.R. No. 163938
SARMELITO BUEBOS,
Petitioners, Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* J.,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
**
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
THE PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 28, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only
among members of the bar, but also among those of the bench. The
bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what penalty to
impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners
are liable for simple arson or arson of an inhabited house which merits a
penalty of up toreclusion perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification
that[2] of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante
Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe
was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her
sick child.[3] She was lying down when she heard some noise around the
house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused,
Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.
congregating in front of her hut.[4] When she went out, she saw the roof of
her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her
immediate succor, the four fled.[5]
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for
help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Years
Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people
jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able
to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.[6] He
also saw Rolando Buela running away.[7]
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos,

together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson
in an Information bearing the following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 oclock in

the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof
of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latters damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was

principally supplied by private complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano
Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line
of petitioners and their co-accused. The trial court summed up the defense
evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time
of the incident; Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents house
on occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos
also claimed to have been at Romeo Callejas having gone there in the
evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 oclock noontime
of January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence
at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the
incident happened and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr.
likewise claimed to be at his residence at Agas after having visited his inlaws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the
incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were
likewise presented by the accused to corroborate their testimonies.[9]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of arson. The dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused

ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and
ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate
court. In their appeal, they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding
them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding
conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and
credence to their defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate
Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be
convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning
of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate
court, the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime
committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its
simple form.[12]
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present
recourse. The following arguments are now raised for the Courts
consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS
OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.[13]
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of
annotation on this part of our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of
the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and
bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of
the Revised Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other
forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding
articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes
involving destruction), Article 325 (burning ones own property to commit
arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the
offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of
arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the

successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613
supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the
said presidential issuance read:
SECTION 1. Arson. Any person who burns or sets fire to the
property of another shall be punished by prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his
own property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or
property of another.
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where
explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are
stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any
edifice devoted to culture, education or social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where
people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft,
or conveyance for transportation of persons or
property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any
legislative, judicial, administrative or other official
proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing
tenement, shopping center, public or private market,
theater or movie house or any similar place or
building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated
in a populated or congested area.
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is
any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of
its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine
shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain

field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. The
penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards
the owner or occupant of the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed
by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group
of three (3) or more persons.
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or
on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. Any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of
the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or
materials are stored within the building not necessary
in the business of the offender nor for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or
combustible substances or materials soaked therewith
or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical,
chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start a
fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are
found in the ruins or premises of the burned building
or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially
more than its actual value at the time of the issuance of
the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance
policy more than two fires have occurred in the same
or other premises owned or under the control of the
offender and/or insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the
effects insured and stored in a building or property had
been withdrawn from the premises except in the
ordinary course of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration

was made before the fire in exchange for the desistance
of the offender or for the safety of other person or
property of the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. Conspiracy to commit
arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which

is the object of arson including the land on which it is situated shall be
confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove
that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the
exercise of due diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No.
1744. The new law expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of
reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory
legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment
on destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993,
Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one
single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous
burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to
the public in general or where people usually gather or
congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop,
meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender
had knowledge that there are persons in said building
or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also
of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or
airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or
for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service
of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation
of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or

defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be
imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is
merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an
overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or
general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24,
2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a capital offense.[14]
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to
petitioners culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on
circumstantial evidence. They argue that the inference that they were
responsible for the burning of private complainants hut was not duly proven
by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the
evidence established.Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct
testimony would result in setting a felon free.[15]
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the

commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its
finding of guilt.Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead
the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction.[16] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule
133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.[17]
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
for a conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to
justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[18]
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find
that the circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify
petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant
Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her
house at around 3:00 a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant
saw petitioners, together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of
the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant
desperately shouted for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved
through positive testimony.[19] Evidently, these circumstances form an
unbroken chain of events leading to one fair conclusion the culpability of
petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the
circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the
arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated
action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by
both the trial and appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy
was premised on speculation and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need
not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of
the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to
the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper
upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to
fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of
all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the
crime committed.[20]
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated

movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood
outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the
group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together
while the roof of Adelinas house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their
joint purpose and design, and community of interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellants assertion that conspiracy has not been established is

belied by the accounts of the prosecution witness. The manner by which
the accused-appellants behaved after the private complainant shouted for
help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on
the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence
showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof
of the house on fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very
seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of
things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in
writing.[21]
Crime committed and the penalty

The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with violation of P.D. 1613
without specifying the particular provision breached. The information
having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not
having been established that the house is situated in a populated or
congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to have only been
charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of
the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision
mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case
at bar accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium period as provided under Article 321,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential
Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision
correccional.[22]
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section
3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion

temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is
any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
[23]
Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned
was an inhabited house or dwelling.That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the
court to pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged
in the information.[24]
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house

intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather,
the information merely recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire
the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latters damage
and prejudice.[25]
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the
petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied
retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given
retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.[26]
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under
Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of
occasions, modified the RTC and CA judgments for having applied the
wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano,[27] the accused was
found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic
review, the Court held that he should be held liable only for simple
arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be

Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The
descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly
refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art.
320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the

case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple
Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with
a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a
lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to
convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned cannot be
appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more
on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred
that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse
than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing
circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus,
accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under
Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited
house or dwelling.[28]
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more
recent case of People v. Malngan.[29] Said the Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accusedappellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime

of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under
Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of
the damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is
known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and
deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing
conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the
State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The
exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious
burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions
against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators;
and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political
fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of
The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson.
This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses,
dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways,
bus
stations,
airports,
wharves
and
other
industrial
establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to
prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and
political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted
to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the
need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts
committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. [Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple
Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson
are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of
the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite
evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple
Arson for having deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential
house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an
inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building,
together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by
fire. [Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the
case of People v. Soriano. The accused in the latter case caused the
burning of a particular house.Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted
down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused
guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through
Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be
Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases
of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant
are specifically described as houses, contemplating
inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The
descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information
particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as
buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore
be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the

Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal
laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed
strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at
bar.
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was
charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential
house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed
seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at
the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime
of simple arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the
designation of the offense in the information, the information remains
effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of
the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate,
x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as
Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be
imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by
reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in
the Information, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.[30]
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision
correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain
it.
WHEREFORE, the
is AFFIRMED in full.
petition
is DENIED. The
appealed
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
judgment
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Vice Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, who is on official leave per Special Order
No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
**
Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
[1]
Rollo, 65-72. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (now deceased), with Associate
Justices B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 26-28. Criminal Case No. T-2563. Penned by Judge Mamerto M. Buban, Jr, RTC, Branch
18, Tabaco, Albay.
[3]
TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 5.
[4]
Id. at 6.
[5]
Id. at 12.
[6]
TSN, December 8, 1994, p. 14.
[7]
Id. at 16.
[8]
Id. at 25.
[9]
Id. at 27.
[10]
Id. at 28.
[11]
Id. at 72.
[12]
Id. at 71.
[13]
Id. at 16.
[14]
Those found guilty of destructive arson would now be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
[15]
People v. Matito, G.R. No. 144405, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 617.
[16]
People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.
[17]
Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, Sec. 5 reads:
Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[18]
People v. Casitas, supra.
[19]
TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 4-29; TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 3-38.
[20]
People v. Quinao, G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 495; People v. Saul, G.R. No.
124809, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 636; People v. Mozar, 215 Phil. 501 (1984).
[21]
Rollo, p. 71.
[22]
Id. at 71-72.
[23]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 367.
[24]
People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 125784, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 193.
[25]
Rollo, p. 25.
[26]
People v. Vallejo, supra.
[27]
Supra note 23.
[28]
[29]
[30]
Id. at 374-376.
G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 294.
People v. Malngan, id. at 327-331.
ECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the
August 26, 2002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City,
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecutions evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant
broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
(manabla ko).3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4
cralaw virtualaw library
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellants house. He
got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. 5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house
was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire
extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling
bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air.6 The
appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. 7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric also
returned to his house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellants house; and that it had
been intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in
hisbarangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel
in assessing the damage.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-storey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. 12 He admitted that he felt
angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had
been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn
his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his
neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellants cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the
appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellants
brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was
asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke out. 16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC. 17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTCs factual findings
since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held
that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant
was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty
imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial
evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellants culpability to the crime
charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first,
the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at
around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant
stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang
saw a fire in the appellants room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his
house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the
fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who
would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire;
and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection
revealed that the fire started in the appellants house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the
appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent
his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had
nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his
loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for
a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying
(and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to
quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the
fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging
fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke
out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellants indifferent attitude
to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with
his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant
failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended,
which reads:
cralawlibrary
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:
1.
One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2.
Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop,
meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited
to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless
of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at
the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or
not.
3.
Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4.
Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5.
Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors
or to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1.
Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2.
In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
cralawlibrary
In sum, Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3
of this law provides:
cralawlibrary
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetuashall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1.
Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2.
Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3.
Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4.
Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
5.
Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6.
Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson. 23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements
have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his
own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had
been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used asdwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellants act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellants act does
not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:
cralawlibrary
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the
medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on
the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
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(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Rollo, pp. 5-16; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Edgardo A. Camello and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
1
Records, pp. 453-460; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.
TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 6.
TSN, March 4, 2002, p. 8.
TSN, January 28, 2002, pp. 8-9.
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8-10.
TSN, March 4, 2002, pp. 7-8.
TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 9.
nadcralawlibrary
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp.19-20.
10
Records, pp. 99-101.
11
TSN, April 12, 2002, pp. 5-11.
12
TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 3-4.
13
Id. at 7-8.
14
Id. at 9-11.
15
TSN, May 2, 2002, p. 8.
16
Id. at 27-28.
17
Records, p. 4.
18
Id. at 12.
re dcralaw
See Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 210, 223, citingPeople v.
Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.
19
20
21
People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 741, 752.
A Decree Amending the Law on Arson.
22
People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 443 (2006).
23
People v. Soriano, 455 Phil. 77, 93 (2003).
24
Supra note 19, at 228.
red cralawlibrary
We also point out that there is a discrepancy between the affidavit-complaint of Barangay
Chairman Ligtas and the certification issued by the City Social Welfare and Development
Department with regard to the names and number of fire victims, and the estimated cost of the
damage to their respective properties.
25

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented

by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed
or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in
the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between
the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood
relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage
which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332
cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national.
Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of
Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being
duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters.
Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as
Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the
possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the
children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992,
their father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure
the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby
my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made
her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay
City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the
Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother
because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign
involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind
almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence
of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor
Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sisters widower William
Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the
belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind,
that the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found
buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds
of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series
of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No.
68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby
Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public
Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the
deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her
father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmothers properties. She attests that
Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148
and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid
proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper
accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai
paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735,
and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as
stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose
or to refuse her fathers orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William
Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver
the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he
refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of
the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato.
x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued
by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to
the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an
Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87:6
I N F O R M AT I O N
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par.
3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already
then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated
November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making
her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said
document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or
otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as
follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less
and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 forP250,000.00
and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds
of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of
sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who
was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces
this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death
of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not
erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law]
and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death
of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal,
but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves
family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief,
where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only
civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals 12 which, however, in a
decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother
Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that
nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the
fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private
respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private
respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner
administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa
against private respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the Carungcong
and Sato families as private respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with
her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private
respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is
clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of
Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same
Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private
respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the
exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be
no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only
distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a
distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the
lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does
not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial
court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein
from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the
property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the
estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos
wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because,
under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her
mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came
about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer
existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked
in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the
death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and
mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from
criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports
petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and
Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the
Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s
provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from
criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the
relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and
malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him
from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children. 17 By virtue
thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief
against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;19 by the
stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son
who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones spouse,
does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by
affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this
case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence
and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two
views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting
views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether
there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26).
However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if
the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship
by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the
dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec.
288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of
the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the
blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through
the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333). 25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with
the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship
of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply
coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably
and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as
the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by
affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the
death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale is that the relationship is
preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both
parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between
the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death
of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or
not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the
marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that
the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification
and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the
purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives
by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity
view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the
same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones
deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her
parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without
doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as
a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of
the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a
State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this
connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.35The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of
the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and
harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to
resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for
the accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to
the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the
basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In
this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship
by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased
spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The
same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of ones relatives under
Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and
the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same
Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said
crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply
where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such
as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. 39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the
crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information
of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the court. 44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally
defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and
induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her
taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor
daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolitas properties
in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the
damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to
Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in
fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that
document were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done about
her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such
intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not
have read) because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In
signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted
the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her
taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Satos proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that
Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it
pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained
were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute
Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal
use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified
document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This
was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This
meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of
consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually
received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolitas
properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also
falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the
deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple
estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of
attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the
absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex
Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa
by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not
be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People. 46 It means that the
prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document
as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply
because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said
provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one
of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that
complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article
332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to
mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime
that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of
estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex)
crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers
the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family
members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not
apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer
simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 47 Thus, the
action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties
as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the
matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and
liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an
act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate
the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes
separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and
falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex
crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g.,
homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a complex
crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts,
each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the
diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime,
the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where
the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex
crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or
real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each
of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the
concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime
in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the
same are more conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The
offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires
that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal
liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification.
The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but
component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered
separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would
disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and
material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are
considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa
Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that
the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the
estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission
of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively
his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the
Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime,
like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the
same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means
of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial
document.59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the
consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 61 The damage to another is caused by
the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. 62
1avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA
to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her
taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so
particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no
damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification
of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for)
the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made
Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In
that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the
execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only
have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as
if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be
prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the
crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to
try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Per letters of administration dated June 22, 1995 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 104 in SP. Proc. Q-95-23621.
1
Docketed as I.S. No. 96-19651. Rollo, pp. 89-90.
Id.
Id., pp. 85-88.
Resolution No. 313, s. 2000 dated February 17, 2000. Id., pp. 81-84.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-91385. Id., pp. 91-92.
Id.
Penned by Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. Id., pp. 126-129.
Id.
10
Dated April 26, 2006. Id., pp. 130-131.
11
Id., p. 131.
12
Docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260.
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by

Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong (retired) and Sixto C. Marella, Jr. of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 28-40.
13
14
Id.
15
Id., pp. 42-43.
An absolutory cause is a circumstance which is present prior to or simultaneously

with the offense by reason of which the accused who acts with criminal intent,
freedom and intelligence does not incur criminal liability for an act that constitutes a
crime (Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus, Third Edition, 61-62 [2007]).
16
17
Id., p. 736.
18
People v. Alvarez, 52 Phil. 65 (1928).
Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Grio Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III,
374 (1997), citingPeople v. Adame, CA 40 O.G. Supp. No. 12, p. 63.
19
20
Id. citing People v. Tupasi, 36 O.G. 2086.
21
Id. citing People v. Patubo, CA-G.R. No. 10616-R, 15 August 1953.
22
Id. citing People v. Navas, CA 51 O.G. 219.
23
Id. citing People v. Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473 (1949).
24
Blodget v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27, 1837 WL 1956 (Vt.).
Sta. Maria, Melencio, Persons and Family Relations Law, Fourth Edition, 228-229
(2004).
25
Back v. Back, L.R.A. 1916C,752, 148 Iowa 223, 125 N.W. 1009, Am.Ann.Cas.
1912B, 1025 citing Blodget v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27; Noble v. State, 22 Ohio St.
541; State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747, 21 Am. St. Rep. 790; Wilson v.
State, 100 Tenn. 596, 46 S. W. 451, 66 Am. St. Rep. 789; Johnson v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 609, 54 Am. Rep. 535; Pegues v. Baker, 110 Ala. 251, 17 South. 943; Tagert v.
State, 143 Ala. 88, 39 South. 293, 111 Am. St. Rep. 17; Bigelow v. Sprague, 140
Mass. 425, 5 N. E. 144; Vannoy v. Givens, 23 N. J. Law, 201; 1 Bishop, New Crim.
Procedure, 901; 26 Cyc. 845.
26
27
In this connection, one of the commentators on the Revised Penal Code wrote:
Death of the spouse terminates the relationship by affinity (Kelly v. Neely, 12
Ark. 6[5]7, 659, 56 AmD 288; Chase v. Jennings, 38 Me. 44, 45) unless
the marriage has resulted in issue who is still living, in which case the
relationship of affinity continues (Dearmond v. Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191;
Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, 5 NE 144).
See Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, Book I, Fifteenth Edition Revised
188, (2001).
28
In re Bourdeux Estate, 37 Wash. 2d 561, 225 P.2d 433, 26 A.L.R. 2d 249.
29
Carman v. Newell, N.Y. 1 Denio 25.
In re Bourdeux Estate, supra. This view has been adopted and applied in Security
Union Casualty Co. v. Kelly, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 286; American General
Insurance Co. v. Richardson, Tex.Civ.App., 132 S.W.2d 161; Simcoke v. Grand
Lodge of A. O. U. W. of Iowa, 84 Iowa 383, 51 N.W. 8, 15 L.R.A. 114; Faxon v. Grand
Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and M. E. Rhea, 87 Ill.App.
262; McGaughey v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of State of Minnesota, 148 Minn. 136,
180 N.W. 1001; Hernandez v. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, Tex.Civ.App., 80
S.W.2d 346; Renner v. Supreme Lodge of Bohemian Slavonian Benevolent Society,
89 Wis. 401, 62 N.W. 80 following Jones v. Mangan, 151 Wis. 215, 138 N.W.
618; Steele v. Suwalski, 7 Cir., 75 F.2d 885, 99 A.L.R. 588; Benefield v. United
States, D.C., 58 F.Supp. 904; Lewis v. O'Hair, Tex.Civ.App., 130 S.W.2d 379.
30
Indeed, Kelly v. Neely, supra note 27, Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331,
333, Chase v. Jennings, supranote 27, Dearmond v. Dearmond, supra note 27
and Bigelow v. Sprague, supra note 27 are all jury disqualification cases.
31
Or between the child of a living parent and the surviving child of a deceased parent
(in case of a stepchild with respect to the stepparent).
32
33
Section 12, Article II and Section 1, Article 15.
34
Section 2, Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997).
35
Aquino and Grio Aquino, supra note 19.
See Justice Renato C. Coronas separate (concurring) opinion in People v.

Temporada (G.R. No., 173473, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 318-328).
36
37
See Section 14 (2), Article III, Constitution.
38
Justice Coronas separate (concurring) opinion in People v. Temporada, supra.
39
Regalado, Florenz, supra note 16, p. 736.
40
Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, 21 September 2007, 533 SCRA 643.
Id. citing People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. 49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 426
and Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.
41
42
Id. citing People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 09 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.
Herrera, Oscar, Remedial Law, Volume Four Criminal Procedure, 59 (1992

Edition reprinted in 2001).
43
44
People v. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960 (1928).
While the parties as well as the CA and RTC decisions spoke of an amended
Information, the said amended Information was not included in the records of this
case.
45
46
G.R. No. 150910, 06 February 2006, 481 SCRA 569.
Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Grio Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III,
374 (1997).
47
48
Regalado, supra note 16, p. 172.
49
Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Grio Aquino, supra note 47 at p. 662.
50
Id.
51
Regalado, supra note 6, p. 172.
52
Id.
53
Id., p. 176.
54
Reyes, supra note 8, p. 650.
55
People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1989, 184 SCRA 671.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Reyes, supra note 20 at p. 226.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
See United States v. Berry, 5 Phil. 370 (1905) and United States v. Malong, 36 Phil.
821 (1917).
63
64
See United States v. Capule, 24 Phil. 12 (1913).

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Republic of the Philippines

September 17, 2014

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner,

August 15, 1995

August 30, 1995

September 15, 1995

September 30, 1995

October 15, 1995

October 30, 1995

January 15, 1996

January 31, 1996

February 15, 1996

1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Id. at 28; CA rollo, p. 55.

Alferez v. People, supra note 12, at 122.

Resterio v. People, supra note 12, at 602.

Rollo, p. 20. (emphasis ours)

[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002]

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND

Rollo, pp. 34-42.

Id. at 35, 58-59.

Id. at 61. For brevity, Inc. is omitted henceforth.

Ibid. See also CA Rollo, pp. 54-55.

Rollo, pp. 17-18.

L.B. REYES, I THE REVISED PENAL CODE 21 (13th ed., 1993).

Supra, note 25 at 479.

Id. at 99-106, Decision marked as Annex M.

Supra,, note 25 at 473.

CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR

Rollo, pp. 40-41.

428 Phil. 878 (2002).

Griffith v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 892.

575 Phil. 485 (2008).

BUEBOS & BUEBOS V PEOPLE

Republic of the Philippines

REYES, R.T., J.:

Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the

On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos,

That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 oclock in

The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was

RTC and CA Dispositions

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused

On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain

7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration

SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which

of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or

At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated

Accused-appellants assertion that conspiracy has not been established is

Crime committed and the penalty

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of reclusion

Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be

inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime

be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO