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The
Mpilitarization
of Marxismn,
1
19m14-i192
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by Jacob W. Kipp
Kansas State University
CarlvonClausewitz.
Lithograph
byF. Michelis
afterthe
painting
byW.Wach,1830.(Original
inthepossession
of Professor Peter Paret, Stanford;used with
permission.)
184
MILITARYAFFAIRS
Two doctrinesformedthe centralthemes of Lenin's materialism: the externalrealityof the worldand the "copy" theoryof
knowledge.This can stillbe foundas the epistemologicalfoundation of all Soviet writingson philosophy, includingthose
relatingto militaryaffairs.
WITH
time.2"
at a given
The firstobservationto be made concernsthe revisionof Clausewitzdone by Lenin. In Vom Kriege, war is thecontinuationof
politics but these are conducted by the supra-class, rational
state in the name of the general interestsof the entirepopulation, which the state seeks to mediate. In Lenin, the state is
stillMarx's executive committeeof the rulingclass, and so its
policies are, at best, the realisticinterestsof the rulingclass, or
worse, the irrationaland self-destructiveinstinctsof a class
caughtin irresolvablecontradictions.22
Althoughwell aware of
the influenceof Kantian philosophyon the youngClausewitz,
Lenin chose to attributea philosophicaland historicalrelationship to Hegel. Now, in fact, as modern scholarshipon Clausewitz has acknowledged, there is an implicit relationship
between Hegel and the Prussian generalin the latter'smode of
exposition. As Peter Paret has observed, German philosophy
did provide Clausewitz "with a fundamentalattitudeand with
the intellectualtools to express it." More specifically,Clausewitz employed the dialectic as his method in developinghis
conceptions, i.e., the posing of opposites to be defined and
compared not only so thateach partcould be more completely
understood,but also so thatall thedynamiclinkagesconnecting
all of the elements of war could be examined in a state of
permanentinteraction.23
The reality of war and the bitterintersocialistpolitics of
1915-1916broughtLenin to a radical revisionof Marxistthought
on war. If the European workingclass could not deter war
throughsolidarityand proletarianinternationalism,then the
question became one of how to benefitfromanomaly. The
answer was to transformthe imperialistwar into a civil war.
Lenin embraced Clausewitz in a fashionneverdone by Marx or
Engels. Indeed, Engels' referencesto Clausewitz are either
banal or of a purelyperipheralnatureto the subject and topic
under discussion, i.e., the level of education of the Prussian
officercorps.24Lenin's readingof Clausewitz assumed central
significance with the increasing militarization of Lenin's
thoughtfromthe questions of organizingan armed insurrection
to the command of the forces of the new Bolshevik state. The
Prussian provideda model of the applicationof the dialectic to
issues of militaryscience, allowing Lenin to break down the
"immutabiltyof the firmprinciplesof militaryscience" and to
reformulatehis own conceptions of war and the armed forces.
An examinationof Lenin's referencesto Clausewitz in the
period after his reading of Vom Kriege is most instructive.
Marxism has always retained a predictiveelement, thanksto
utopiantractsand the Enlightenment'sfaithin humanprogress,
but in the face of a worldwar, whichchallengedthe most pious
hopes of socialists. doctrinerequiredanothertypeof foresight,
a tool for immediateuse in assessing and analyzing the conflictingtrends. In the Summer of 1915, Lenin articulatedhis
own synthesisof Marx and Clausewitz in the formof an historical typologyof wars coveringthe period 1789 to 1914. In this
essay, "The Principlesof Socialism and the War, 1914-1915,"
Lenin drew the conclusionthatwar had been transformed
from
bourgeois-nationalstruggles,which he identifiedas just struggles by the bourgeoisieagainst the survivingfeudal order,into
imperialistwars among capitalist powers. The firstera had
lasted until1871,and since thenas a consequence ofthe uneven
developmentof capitalismthe number,extentand intensityof
local wars had been growing over colonial questions, culminatingin the general imperialistwar. In this typology,war
had become a central feature of the capitalist international
systemand was presentedas a consequence of internal,i.e.,
class, politics. '*War is a continuationof politicsby other,i.e.,
violent, means" becomes in Lenin's hands, a tool fora class
analysis of the imperialistwar and the emergence of anticolonial strugglesoutside Europe. It is also a weapon to be
turnedupon his opponents, those Social Democrats who had
MILITARY AFFAIRS
M. N. Tukhachevsky,a formertsaristofficerhimself,wrote
to Lenin that the new regime was unlikelyto get eitherthe
brightestor the best fromthe formertsaristofficercorps. Much
of it was badly educated and thereforeprofessionallyincompetent.Many oftheverybest had alreadygiventheirlives on the
battlefieldsof the Eastern Front, and of the rest, many had
already chosen to side withthe Whites.3"Others,most notably
the TsaritsynShaika (gang) whichgrew up aroundJ. V. Stalin,
K. Voroshilov and S. M. Budennyi,raised politicalobjections
and called intoquestionthe loyaltiesof voenspetsysentto their
theater.4"
Lenin and Trotskyanswered these critics by assertingthat
they grossly underestimatedthe positive role that v'oenspetsy
could play, failedto appreciate the value of bourgeoismilitary
science, and overestimated the value of partisan warfare.4
Under conditionsof dire emergencyand withappropriatepolitical controls to guarantee theirloyalty,they saw the voenspetsy and bourgeois specialists in general as critical to the
survival of Soviet power. The regimeneeded professionalexpertisefromany source that could provide it:
regime:
8MI
TA
AFFAIRS
ENIN has come full circle. War and politics have been
transposed as subject and object. Here politics have become a continuationof war by other means. The NEP was a
tactical device to restore the national economy and regain
peasant supportin theface of armed uprisingsat Kronstadtand
in the Tambov region.The NEP's success as an economic and
political measure was in no small degree dependent upon the
demobilizationoftheRed Army,and Lenin in his last monthsof
activitybeforehis finalillness supportedthecreationofa mixed
cadre and territorial
militaryforce.>' The militarypolicy of the
Party and its general line were thus fused. Indeed, during
Lenin's final illness V. Sorin wrote in Pravda that in a discussion withhim,Lenin had recommendedthatPartyworkers
read Clausewitz since politicaltacticsand militarytactics were
iadjoining fields" (Grenzgebiet).'2
Lenin's militarizationof Marxism involved a substantial
shift in the place of war in socialist ideology. War, while
previouslyseen as a social evil imposed upon the workingclass,
had never stood at the centerof Marxistanalysis of capitalism.
Lenin put it there. He emphasized the inevitabilityof wars
among capitaliststates in the age of imperialismand presented
thearmedstruggleofthe workingclass as the onlypathtowards
the eventual eliminationof war. With war at the center of his
analysis of capitalism, Lenin and his followers, when confrontedby civil war and foreignintervention,
extendedwar and
the systematicpreparationfor war as indispensable elements
for the survival of the Soviet state, surroundedas it was by
capitalist powers. Lenin hoped to use a policy of peaceful
coexistence to aid in therecoveryof the Soviet economyand to
OCTOBER 1985
. .
. The com-
REFERENCES
1. 1. A. Shavrovand M. I. Galkin,eds., Metodologiia voennonlli(chnog(o/oznaniia (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1977), 96.
2. A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, ed., FilosoJfkoenasledie V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoi voiny (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1972), 95-96.
3. Recent works dealing withthe disintegrationof the Russian armedforcesin 1917includeAllen K. Wildman,ThleEnd of
the Russian ImperiailArmyand the Soldiers' Revolt (MarchApril 1917), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980);
Norman Saul, Sailors in Revolt: The Baltic Fleet in 1917 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978); Evan Mawdsley,
The RuissitnReviolutionand theBaltic Fleet: Wlarand Politics,
February1917-April19/8(New York: Barnes and Noble. 1978);
and M. Frenkin.Riisskaitaarmiia i revoliuitsiia(Munich: Logos,
1978).
4. P. H. Vigor,The Soviet Vietwof'War,Peace and Neutrality
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 9-10.
5. Soi'ctskaia voennaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Slovaro-Entsiklopedicheskoe Izdatel'stvo,
1933). 1, cc. 834-835. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, Karl
Marlx Frederic/h
Engels Werke,21 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972),
350-351. On Engels' subsequent views of socialist movement
and the prospectsforrevolutionsee David McLellan, Marxism
AfterMcarxv
(Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1979), 9-17;
W. 0. Henderson,The Lifev
of'FriedriclIEngels (London: Frank
Cass, 1976), 11, 416-446; and Marx and Engels, Karl Marx
Frederic/hEngels Werke, 22 (Berlin: Dietz Verleg, 1972),
509-527.
6. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structureof ScientificRevolutions
(Chicago, 1970), 2nd Edition, 43-76.
7. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Rev,olution (Boston:
HoughtonMifflinCompany, 1960),321 and Karl Korsch, Mirxismus iund Pliilosopiy, Ed. F. Halliday (London: NLB, 1970),
61ff.
8. Robert Tucker, Marx and Engels Reader (New York,
1978), 2nd Edition, 145.
9. McLellan, 20-54.
10. V. I. Lenin, Polnoc Sobranie soclhinenii,27 (Moscow:
Progress, 1965-1970),299-426.
11. Marxism-Leninismon War and Army (Moscow: Progress, 1972).
12. The literatureon Lenin as a militarytheoristis quite
extensive.The followingworksare reflectiveof thegeneralline
of Soviet scholarshipon the topic. A. Strokov, 'V. 1. Lenin o
zakonomernostiakhvooruzhennoibor'by, o vsaimosviazi, razvitii i smene sposobov i form voennyky deistvii," Vestnik
l'oennoiistorii,Nalclinve /lapiski,2 (1971), 3-25; 1. Korotkov,
"K istoriistanovleniiasovetsko voennoi nauki," Vestnik wOennoi istor-ii,
2 (1971), 42-70; A. N. Lagovskii,
naiwtlinyea,)piski,
V. I., Lenin i soietskaia loennailanatika,2nd Edition(Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1981).
13. Lenin, Polnoc sobrinie sochiinenii(Moscow, 1958-1966),
1, 164.
14. A. A. Bogdanov (nee A. A. Malinovsky)was a physcian,
economist, writer,and early Bolshevik. Bogdanov had a large
followingin the left wing of the Bolshevik faction and quarrelledwithLenin over tactical issues, includingparticipationin
the electionto the ThirdDuma. On philosophicalissues, Lenin
seems not to have demanded any single line and toleratedthe
early effortsto develop a philosophical system in which the
physicistErnst Mach's concept of sensual materialismfigured
prominently.Bogdanov's Empiriomnonism,
which combined
Mach withideas taken fromBerdiaev and Lunacharsky,called
into question the philosophical foundations of Marx's own
materialism,which had their roots in Spinoza and Holbach.
Lenin did not, however, attack this philosophical revisionism
untilBogdanov's Empiriomonismwas identifiedin printas the
philosophyof Bolshevism and threatenedto bringdown upon
the factionthe charge thatLenin mostfeared ideological revisionism. Then Lenin enteredinto the philosophicalarena to do
battle in the name of orthodoxyand in order to separate BolshevismfromEmpirimonismand Bogdanov. On Bogdanov and
Lenin see S. V. Utechin,'Philosophy and Society: Alexander
Bogdanov," in Leopold Labedz, ed., Re)visionism:Essalys on
thecHi.storyof Maxrxist
Idccas (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), 117-125.
15./Ibid., 35.
190
JacobW.Kippis Professor
ofRussianHistory
atKansasState
Forthelasttwoyearshe has beena visiting
University.
professor
at MiamiUniversity
inOxford,
Ohio.A graduateofShippensburg
he receivedhis PhD fromthe Pennsylvania
University,
State
in1970.He is co-editor,
University
withRobinHigham,
ofSoviet
Aviation
andAirPower(Westview,
1977)andservedas associate
editorof Military
Affairs,
1979-1983.He has publishedmany
articleson Russianand Sovietnavaland military
history.
This
articlewas acceptedforpublication
inFebruary
1985.
by David Kahn
CARLISLE