Washingtonpost.

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International Decision Making: Leadership Matters

Author(s): Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.
124-137
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International
Decision Making:
Matters
Leadership
G. Hermann
& JoeD. Hagan
byMargaret

hen conversationsturn to foreignpolicy

and international politics, they often

focus on particular leaders and evaluations of their leadership. We grade Bill Clinton's

abroad;argueaboutwhy BenjaminNetanyahuis or is
performance
not stallingthe MiddleEastpeaceprocess;debateMohammed
Khatami's intentionsregardingIranianrelationswith the United States;
andponderwhatwillhappenin SouthAfricaorRussiawhenNelson
Mandelaor BorisYeltsinleavesoffice.In each case,ourattentionis
rivetedon individualswhoseleadershipseemsto matterbeyondthe
bordersof the countriesthey lead.
for the
Yet,thoughmanyof us find suchdiscussionsinformative,
pastseveraldecadesmostscholarsof worldpoliticswouldhave discountedthem,proposinginsteadto focuson the internationalconstraintsthatlimitwhatleaderscando.Theirrationalewentasfollows:
Becausethe systemicimperatives
of anarchyor interdependence
areso
clear,leaderscan choosefromonly a limitedrangeof foreignpolicy
Iftheyareto exerciserationalleadership
andmaximizetheir
strategies.
state'smovementtowardits goals,only certainactionsare feasible.
leadersandleadershipinto generaltheoConsequently,
incorporating
riesof international
relationsis unnecessary
sincesuchknowledgeadds
MARGARET G. HERMANN is professor
scienceat OhioStateUniversity
ofpolitical
andtheeditorof theMershonInternational
StudiesReview.JOE D. HAG AN is proscience
at WestVirginia
fessorofpolitical
University
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Hermann
& Hagan

little to our understanding

of the dynamicsof conflict,cooperation,
andchangein international
affairs.
In the bipolarinternational
the ColdWar,
systemthatcharacterized
sucha rationalemighthaveseemedreasonable.
Buttodaythereis little
consensuson the natureof the "newworldorder"andmoreroomfor
andmiscommunication.
innovation,misunderstanding,
interpretation,
In such an ambiguousenvironment,the perspectivesof the leaders
involvedin foreignpolicymakingcan have moreinfluenceon what
do. Moreover,
as international
constraints
on foreignpolgovernments
have
become
more
flexible
and
the
of
indeterminate, importance
icy
domesticpoliticalconcernshas increased.Scholarsof international
relationshavebegunto talknot onlyaboutdifferentkindsof statestransitional
andautocracies-butalsoabout
democracies,
democracies,
how domesticpoliticalpressures
can help to definethe state-strong,
And
weak;stable,unstable;cohesive,fragmented;
satisfied,revisionist.
they have startedto emphasizethat governmentleadershave some
choice in the rolesthat their statesplay in international
politicsdoves,hawks;involved,isolationist;unilateral,multilateral;
regional,
radicals.
Thesedifferences
differentkinds
global;pragmatists,
preordain
of reactionswithinthe international
arena.
some
of
the
more
illustrations
of the effectsthat
Ironically,
interesting
leadersanddomesticpoliticscanhaveon worldpoliticshaveemergedin
theveryliterature
thatoriginally
dismissed
theirsignificance.
Researchers
havetriedto accountforwhystateswithsimilar
in
international
positions
affairshavereactedin varied(andoftenself-defeating)
ways.Forexamrelaple, in examiningthe crisesof the 1930s,studentsof international
tions have puzzledover why the democracies
of the time reactedin
andwhytheyfailedto balance
divergentwaysto the GreatDepression
againstseeminglyobvioussecuritythreats.Scholarsseekingto answer
suchquestions
havelookedat domesticpressures
andleadership
arrangementswithan eyetowarddeveloping
a theoryof statebehavior.
Althoughinterestin leadersand domesticpoliticshas ebbedand
the foreignpolicyprocess
flowed,scholarswhofocuson understanding
have madeprogressin identifyingthe conditionsunderwhichthese
factorsdo matterandin specifyingthe natureof theireffects.Building

on the research of Graham Allison, Michael Brecher, Alexander

George, Morton Halperin, Ole Holsti, Irving Janis, Robert Jervis,
ErnestMay,JamesRosenau,and RichardSnyder,they have explored
how leadersperceive and interpretconstraintsin their international
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125

Decision
International
Making

makedecisions,andmanagedomestic
anddomesticenvironments,
political pressureson their foreignpolicy choices. These scholarscontend that state leadersplay a pivotal role in balancing international
imperativeswith those arisingfrom,or embeddedin, domesticpolitics.
What has emerged is a more nuanced picture of the processesthat
drive and guide the actions of states in worldpolitics.

THE ROLE LEADERS

PLAY

Leaders Perceive and Interpret Constraints

Leadersdefine states'internationaland domesticconstraints.Basedon
theirperceptionsand interpretations,
they buildexpectations,planstrategies,and urgeactionson theirgovernmentsthat conformwith theirjudgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their
positions.Suchperceptionshelp framegovernments'orientationsto international affairs.Leaders'interpretationsarise out of their experiences,
goals,beliefsaboutthe world,and sensitivityto the politicalcontext.
The view that the worldis anarchic-embodied in formersecretary
of state Henry Kissinger'saxiom that "tranquilityis not the natural
state of the world;peace and securityarenot the law of nature"-leads
to a focus on threatsand security,a sense of distrust,and a perceived
need for carefullymanaging the balance of power. Leaderswith this
view must alwaysremainalert to challenges to their state'spowerand
position in the internationalsystem.John Vasquezhas arguedthat the
rise to power of militant hardlinerswho view the world in such
realpolitikterms is a crucialprerequisitefor war.Thus, the American
road to war in Koreaand Vietnam was markedfirst by the demise of
formerPresidentFranklinRoosevelt'saccommodationof nationalism,
then by the fall of George Kennan'sselective containment strategy,
and ultimatelyby the rise of formersecretaryof state Dean Acheson's
focus on militarycontainment. Describingthe vulnerabilityof empire,
Charles Kupchanhas observedthat the entrenched belief that one's
state is "highlyvulnerable"has led the leadersof declining states to
appease perceived rising powers (consider British behavior before
WorldWarII) and encouragedleadersof risingpowersto become overly competitive (Wilhelmine GermanybeforeWorldWar I).
Drawingon a moreoptimisticview of humannature,scholarssuch as
BruceRussetthave arguedthat democraciesdo not fight one another
becausedemocraticleadersassumetheir peershave peacefulintentions,
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Hermann
& Hagan

adhereto cooperativenorms,and face domesticpoliticalconstraintson

the use of force.Otherssuch as IdoOren andJohnOwen have proposed
that leaderswho followa liberalideologyinterpretthe worldin this manner and act accordingly-they place a higherdegreeof trustin the leadersof countriesthey currentlyperceivearedemocratic.
LeadersOften Disagree
But whathappensif thereis no singledominantleaderor no set of leaderswho sharea common interpretationof the world?What if a government is led, as in the People'sRepublicof China,by a standingcommittee
whosemembersrangein viewsalonga continuumcomposedof hardlinOr what if thereis a coalitiongovernmentsuchas the
ersand reformers?
one PrimeMinisterNetanyahumustlead in Israel,composedof leaders
with differentinterestsand constituenciesand, as a result,variousperspectiveson what is at stakein the peaceprocess?
Beforeaction is possible,leadersmust achieve consensuson how to
interpretthe problem,what options arefeasible,what furtherinformation is needed and from whom, who gets to participatein decision

.46C-A

AW

Three who counted: Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Joseph Stalin

making,and where implementationwill occur. If consensusis highly

unlikely,dealing with the problemwill probablybe postponeduntil a
decision is forcedor the decision unit can be reconstituted.
At issuearethe rulesof aggregationthat facilitateconsensusbuilding
when disagreementexists among those who must make policy. Ideas
derivedfromstudiesof groupdynamics,bureaucratic
politics,and coaliSPRING 1998

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127

DecisionMaking
International

the factorsthatinflutionbuildinghaveprovedusefulin understanding

ence the shiftfromindividualto collectivedecisions.Thus,scholars
and
havefoundthatexcessivegroupcohesioncanproduce"groupthink"
closurearoundoptionspreferred
by the morepowerfulpolipremature
interestsgenerally
the
bureaucratic
onlyyieldto compromise;
cymakers;
it
of
some
credit"-be
vital
control
information,
possession
"idiosyncrasy
over a criticalresource,expertise,or charisma--canlead that party's
positionto prevail;the lack,or failure,of "rulesof the game"usually
meansdeadlockanda politicallyunstablesituation;logrolling
provokes
overcommitment
andoverextension.
Sohowcanwedetermine
whosepositions
countinforeignpolicy?
Durand
crisis,whenthevaluesof thestatearethreatened
ingan international
timefordecisionmakingis short,authority
tendsto concentrate
among
thosepersonsor groupsthatbearultimateresponsibility
formaintaining
the governmentin power.How these individuals,
cabinets,juntas,or
theproblem
willdominatethe state'sreacstandingcommittees
interpret
tions.Littleoutsideinputis soughtor tolerated.
The experiences,
fears,
and
of
these
decision
makers
remainunfettered
and
interests, expectations
affectanyactionthatis chosen.Considerthe Britishcabinetduringthe
IslandscrisisortheBushadministration
Falkland
duringtheGulfWar.In
bothcases,thetendencywasto closeranksandinsulate
from
policymakers
bothdomesticandinternational
influences.
Eachgrouprecognized
thatits
wouldriseorfalldepending
on itsdecisions,
andthatanovergovernment
ly participatory
processcouldmeandangerous
decision-making
delays.
The natureof the foreignpolicyproblemcan alsohelp to dictate
whosepositionscount.Economic,security,
andhuman
environmental,
for
all
be
handled
different
issues,
rights
example,may
by
partsof the
or
different
sets
of
each
actors,
government by
broughttogetherto
is
interpretwhat happeningandmakejudgmentsaboutpolicy.These
actorsmaynot be at the apexof powerbut areoften givenultimate
authorityto makeforeignpolicydecisionsforthe governmentbecause
of theirexpertise,pastexperience,particular
pointof view,or official
position.The recentthreatof the U.S. FederalMaritimeCommission
to detainJapanese-flag
linervesselsin Americanportsoverquestions
of marketaccessis an extremeexampleof a well-documented
fact:The
power to negotiate-and then ratify-trade agreementsis generally
dispersedacrossministries,legislatures,and interestgroups.
Another crucialfactoris the extent to which rivalriesexist within a
domestic political system. When authoritybecomes fragmentedand
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Hermann
& Hagan

competition for power turns fierce, an unstable situation is likely to

ensue, with each person,group,or organizationacting on its own in an
uncoordinatedfashion.Witness the disparateactions in Iranof radical
students,relativelymoderatepoliticiansin the ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment,hard-lineclericsdominatingthe RevolutionaryCouncil, and AyatollahRuhollahKhomeinifollowingthe 1979 seizureof the
U.S. embassyin Tehran.Until Khomeini consolidatedhis power and
coordinatedaction, a coherent Iranianforeignpolicy was impossible.
When authorityis dispersedbut little competitionfor powerexists, the
result is an oligarchylike that of the Soviet Politburoduringthe late
1960s and early 1970s: Buildingconsensusamong these leaderstook
time since no one wanted to concede any authority.The currentdivision in the U.S. governmentbetween a Democraticadministrationand
a Congressdominatedby Republicansservesas an exampleof whathappens when consolidatedauthorityis combinedwith strongcompetition
for power-each side questionsthe other'sforeign policy record and
often attemptsto block the other'sinitiatives.
Leaders and Domestic Opposition
In addition to interpretingpotential constraintsin the international
arena, leadersmust also respondeffectively to domestic pressures.As
RobertPutnamand Andrew Moravcsikhave observed,leadersare the
"centralstrategicactors"in the "two-levelgame"that links domestic
politics and internationalbargaining.In the domestic political game,
they face the dual challenge of building a coalition of supportersto
retain their authority while contending with opposition forces to
maintain their legitimacy.
An appreciationof the alternative strategiesthat leaders use to
respondto domestic opposition is key to understandinghow domestic
politics affectsforeignpolicy. Leaderswho preferto avoid controversy
at home often seek to accommodatethe opposition by grantingconcessionson foreignpolicy.The resultis frequentlya policy that is largely unresponsive to international pressuresand involves little risk.
Note, for example,how nationalisticfeelings in both RussiaandJapan
have precludedthe leadersof these countriesfromresolvingownership
issues over the islands that constitute Japan's"NorthernTerritories,"
despite the likely diplomaticand economic benefits of a peace treaty
and normalizedrelations. Leaderscan also seek to consolidate their
domestic position by pushing a foreignpolicy that mobilizesnew supSPRING

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DecisionMaking
International

interests,or undercutsthe opposiport,logrollswith complementary

tion. By this logic,the politicalattractionof NATOexpansionforthe
Clintonadministration
is that it garnerssupportfromtwo otherwise
contentiousgroups-liberalinternationalists,
who favorthe spreadof
andconservativeinternationalists,
whoworryaboutresurdemocracy;
gent threats.Anotherstrategyis to insulateforeignpolicyfromdomesorignoringopposition.
tic pressures
altogether
bycoopting,suppressing,
Leadersof nondemocracies
can moreeasilyinsulatetheirforeignpolicies fromdomesticpressures
than theircounterparts
in democracies.
Leadersin transitionaldemocracies
arelearningthis the hardwayas
theyfacethe unfamiliar
challengeof havingtheiragendasscrutinized
by an inquisitivepressandelectedlegislatures.
BRIDGING

TOMORROW'S

GAPS

As AlexanderGeorgehasobserved,practitioners
findit difficultto use
academicapproaches
that"assume
thatallstateactorsarealikeandcan
be expectedto behavein the samewayin givensituations."
Instead,
modelsthatgraspthe
policymakers
preferto workwith "actor-specific
differentinternalstructures
andbehavioralpatternsof eachstateand
leaderwithwhichtheymustdeal."
Today,scholarswho studythe dynamicsof foreignpolicydecision
makingrecognizethe needto bridgethe gapbetweentheoryandpractice. In particular,
skeletaltheoreticalframeworks
mustbe fleshedout
withnuanceddetail.Here,the issueof contextloomslarge.Whattype
of stateis beingexamined?
Citizensin advanceddemocracies
havedifferentwantsand expectationsthan those in transitionalstates,poor
economies,or statesinvolvedin ethnicconflicts.Theywillbe attracted to differentkindsof leadersto pushfortheiragendas.How do the
leaderswho areselectedviewtheirstate'splacein the world?Do they
viewtheirstateasparticipating
in a cooperative
international
systemor
as strugglingto maintainascendancyin an anarchicworld?Do they
view it as part of a regional(Europe),cultural(Arab), ideological
(socialist),religious(Hindu),or ethnic(Serbian)grouping?
Whichleaders'
offoreignpolinterpretations
prevailin theformulation

icy dependson the natureof the decision unit and who is ultimately
responsiblefor makinga decision.Is an individual(for example,Deng
Xiaoping),a singlegroup(such as the junta in Burma),or a coalitionof
actors(much like the IsraeliLabor-Likud
coalitioncabinetof the 1980s)
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&Hagan
Hermann

leadermakesthe decisions,the focus

in charge?
Whenone predominant
and
is on theoriesthatexplorepoliticalcognition,politicalsocialization,
he
or
view
is
and
how
does
she
the
that
like,
person
leadership-what
Whenthedecisionunitis a singlegroup,
worldandinteractwithothers?
bureaucratic
the focusshiftsto theoriesgrowingout of groupdynamics,
doesmemberloyaltylie,andis
politics,andpublicadministration-where
If the decisionunitis a coalitionof
therea sharedviewof the problem?
and
actors,thenattentionmustturnto theoriesof bargaining
contending
andinstitution
negotiation,
politicalstability,
building-isoneactormore
pivotalthanothers,andis compromise
possible?
Determiningthe natureof the decisionunit is not alwaysas obviousas it wouldseem.A rulingoligarchymightbe dominatedby a sinA leaderwhoseauthorityappearsunchallengedmight
gle personality.
be answerablein realityto a coalitionthat helpskeephim or her in
power.Who, for instance,is currentlyin chargeof foreignpolicyin
Iran?PresidentKhatamiraisedeyebrowsin the Westwhenhe called
recentlyforimprovedrelationswiththe UnitedStates.ButIran'sspiritual leader,AyatollahAli Khamenei,who controlsits securityservices and enjoysthe supportof the conservativeMajlis,has openly
ruledout anydialoguewith the "GreatSatan."
Also considerthe Japanesegovernment.As PeterKatzenstein
has
some
view
scholars Japan's
as a highlycentralpointedout,
govemrnment
izedstatebureaucracy,
as evidencedby the LiberalDemocraticParty's
for40 years.Haruhiro
abilityto remainin powerwithfewinterruptions
Fukuiandothers,however,
havesuggested
thatJapanese
are
governments
bestdescribed
ascorporatist
systemsthatgrowoutof a deeplyembedded
consensusbuildingacrosspartyfactionsand
politicalnormthatrequires
businessinterests.
IranandJapanserveasreminders
thatunderstanding
a
formal
structure
is
less
than
whose
government's
important understanding
positionsactuallycountat a particular
pointin time.
The Originsof Preferences
To whatextentareleadersthe productsof theircultures,genders,and
domesticpoliticalsystems?SamuelHuntington,J. Ann Tickner,and
BruceRussettwouldhave us believethat these ties arequitestrong.
Socializationinto Christian,democratic,or male-dominatedcultures,
they would argue, imbues people with certain predispositionsand
expectations. In sharp contrast,James David Barberhas pointed out
that the leadershipstylesof Americanpresidentsoften derivefromthe
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International
DecisionMaking

sametechniquesthat helpedthem achievetheirinitialpoliticalsuccesses.RonaldReagan,whowaspresidentof the ScreenActors'Guild

whenthatorganization
foughtoffa communisttakeover,learnedfrom
his experiencethat the United Statescouldonly negotiatewith the
SovietUnionfroma positionof strength.
Otherscholars
haveshownthattheworldviews
ofleaders
areshapedin
the
that
be
born
to
largepartby generation theyhappened
into-specifically,by whatcriticalpoliticaleventstheyandtheircohortshavefaced
duringtheirlifetimes.Yet,we havealsoobservedleaderswho appearto
haveundergone
substantial
Consider
former
changesintheirperspectives.
Anwar
el-Sadat
and
his
to
former
Egyptian
president
journey Jerusalem,
IsraeliprimeministerYitzhak
Rabinandhispursuitof the Osloaccords,
andex-president
RichardNixonandhisdecisionto openU.S. relations
withChina.Arguments
aboundas to whethertheseleadersthemselves
to changesin the interchangedorwhethertheyweremerelyresponding
nationalscene,theirowndomesticarenas,orperceived
to
opportunities
attaingoalsthatmightpreviously
havebeenforeclosed
to others.
thisdebateis thequestionconcerning
theextentto which
Underlying
leadersshapetheirownpreferences.
On theonehand,wehaveleaderssuchasformerBritishprimeminister
ThatcherandCubanpresMargaret
identFidelCastro-whoarecrusaders
orideologues,
to
highlyinsensitive
information
andconstituencies
unlessthesecanhelpfurthertheircauses
orspreadtheirworldviews.
Theseleaders
areinterested
in persuading
othOn theotherhand,wehaveleaders-former
ers,not in beingpersuaded.
IranianpresidentAli AkbarHashemiRafsanjani
amongthem-who
theirviewsmirroring
whateverotherimportant
appearchameleon-like,
aresayingordoingatthemoment.Theyseekcuesfromtheirenviplayers
ronmentto helpthemchoosewhicheverpositionis likelyto prevail.In
betweenthesetwo extremes,
we findleaders-suchas Syrianpresident
Hafezal-Assad-whotakea morestrategic
approach;
theyknowwhere
want
to
but
with
incremental
forever
they
go
proceed
steps,
testingthe
watersto see if the timeis rightforaction.Thus,preferences
tendto be
morefixedforcrusaders
andmorefluidforpragmatic
andstrategic
leaders.
BalancingForeignand DomesticPressures
At times, governmentscan seem nearlyobliviousto the international
arena,focusinginsteadon mattersat home. Considerthe CulturalRevolution in China, the Botha regimein South Africa,and formerpresident LyndonJohnson'sinner circle of advisers,the "TuesdayLunch
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& Hagan
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Ineachcase,domesticconditionsisolatedthestate'sleadership
Group."
in worldpolitics.Duringthe CulturalRevolufromfull participation
no
one
was
tion,
effectivelyin chargeof China.All attentionhadto be
directedtowardthe returnof politicalstability.FormerpresidentP.W
it regardforapartheid
andintenton maintaining
Bothawasa crusader
less of worldopinionand sanctions.And the TuesdayLunchGroup
its skepticismanddoubtaboutU.S. involvementin Vietsuppressed
nam ratherthan lose favorwith the president.With theirattention
capturedby events at home, these decisionunits turnedtheirfocus
inward,intent on maintainingtheirauthorityand legitimacyon the
domesticfront.But the oppositealso provestrueat times.Decision
unitsmaydecideto useforeignpolicyto helpthemdomestically.
aboutthe innerworkings
of decisionunitscanofferclues
Knowledge
or extemrnally
oriented.The
as to whethertheireffortswillbe intemrnally
currentliterature
focuseson domesticpressuggeststhatthe leadership
sureswhen its oppositionsits close to the centersof power,controls
manyof the resourcesneededto deal with the problem,challenges
domesticpoliticalorder,or has legitimacyof its own-in otherwords,
when the leadershipfeels vulnerabledomestically.Considerhow
Netanyahu'scurrentresistanceto internationalpressurefor greater
Israelicooperation
in the peaceprocessreflectsnot onlyhis ownhardline convictionsbut the Likud-ledcoalition'stenuousmajorityin the
Knesset,his dependenceon cabinethardliners
holdingkey ministries,
more
the
of
Israeli
and,
generally, realignment
partypoliticsin the 1990s.
Therecanbea timelag,however,
beforecertaindecisionunitsrespond
to suchdomesticpressures.
Thecrusading
leaderorthehighpredominant
to
the
oroptto
ly cohesive,loyalrulinggroupmaytry suppress opposition
in
several
activities
before
the seriengage
diversionary
foreign
realizing
ousnessof the domesticsituation.In coalitionswhereminorityparties
havea veto-as whenFourthRepublicFrancestalledoverthe question
of granting
to AlgeriaorwhenDutchcabinetsdeadlocked
independence
overacceptingNATO
cruisemissiles-foreignpolicymaybe paralyzed
as
thedifferent
a government.
partiesworkto preserve
StrategicAttribution
Much of what goes on in world politics revolves aroundinteractions
between governments-two or more states trying to gauge the rationales behind the other'sactions and anticipate its next moves. Here,
the critical issue is how leadersassessthe intentions and attitudesof
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DecisionMaking
International

derivedfrompersonAre theseassessments
theirforeigncounterparts.
al interactionswith the leadersof the other state, are they filtered
throughotherpeoples'lenses,oraretheyhunchesandguessesbasedon
the pastbehaviorof thatstate,a sharedidentity,or nationalinterests?
Leaderstend to extrapolatefromtheir own perspectivesin solving
problemswhentheyhavehadlittleor no contactwith theircounterpartson the otherside.Butevenwithcontact,a decisionunitledby a
crusadingleader,for example,will see whatthat leaderwantsto see.
the consequencescan be
When leadersmakeincorrectassessments,
serious.NikitaKhrushchev's
attempteddeploymentof Sovietmissiles
to Cubain 1962is one exampleof how strategies
can backfireif there
is doing.
is confusionas to whatthe otherside'sleadership
is
leadersmustnot
to
the
the
realization
that
complexity
Adding
own perceived
in
two-level
of
their
this
only engage
game balancing
but mustsimultaneously
domesticand internationalpressures,
tryto
comprehendthe natureof the balancingact in whichtheircounteris criticalin today'smultipolar
partsareengaged.Suchcomprehension
where
in
their
leaders
of how international
world,
vary
interpretations
politicsshouldworkand face increasedpressurefromconstituentsat
homewhoclamorforan everimproving
qualityof life.Moreover,
governmentsare becomingawareof the importanceof knowingwhose
positionscountin otherstatesandtowardwhichsideof the internalexternaldebatethese individualsare likely to lean. Withoutsuch
information,it is difficultto predictwhichdecisionmakerswill take
the stabilityof internationalrelationsfor grantedand retreatfrom
international
affairsto dealwithdomesticones,whichwillstandtheir
groundand takebold initiatives,andwhichwill engagein behavior
thatcouldcausetheirstatesto implode.
UNDERSTANDING

LEADERSHIP

The leaderswho dominatedthe worldstageat the beginningof the

Cold War-Stalin, Churchill,De Gaulle,and Truman-often seem
uponreflectionto havebeen largerthanlife.Today,withthe collapse
of the Soviet Union and the expansionof marketdemocracies,
it is
hard to imagine such leaderscoming to power with the same kind of
authority.In fact, much of contemporaryinternationalrelationstheory would contend that with the end of the Cold War we have merely
exchangedone set of constraintsfor another.Leadersare said to be as
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&Hagan
Hermann

limited now as they were when superpowerrivalrydefinedtheir

actions.The key systematicconstraintsno longercenteron security
issuesbuton economicandenvironmental
ones.
stillmatters.Leaders
Yet,evenin today'smultipolar
world,leadership
arecalledon to interpretandframewhatis happeningin the internationalarenafortheirconstituencies
Inaddition,more
andgovernments.
leadersarebecominginvolvedin the regionalandinternational
regimes
definingthe rulesandnormsthat will guidethe international
system
intothe twenty-first
for
Clinton
must
convince
Thus, example,
century.
a skeptical
thatit is in theirbestinterpublicanda recalcitrant
Congress
eststo freeupfundsfortheUnitedNationsandthe International
MonFund's
bailout
of
as
well
as
to
a
strike
Asia,
etary
try
bargainwith
that
will
Democrats
him
fast-track
congressional
grant
authority.
Ratherthanproceedwiththedebateoverwhetherornot leadersmatter,it is essentialto continuethe studyof how leadersworkto balance
whattheysee as the important
international
factorsimpinging
on their
withwhattheybelievearetheirdomesticimperatives.
countries
The lessonto be learnedso faris thatinternational
constraints
onlyhavepolicy
whentheyareperceivedassuchbythe leaderswhoseposiimplications
tionscountin dealingwitha particular
Whetherandhowsuch
problem.
leadersjudgethemselvesconstraineddependson the natureof the
domesticchallengesto theirleadership,
how the leadersareorganized,
andwhattheyarelikeaspeople.Tochartthe shapeof anyfutureworld,
weneedto be ableto demarcate
whichleadersandleadership
groupswill
becomemorecaughtupin theflowof events,andthusperceiveexternal
forcesaslimitingtheirparameters
foraction,andwhichwillinsteadchalthe
international
constraints
lenge
theyseein theirpath.

WANT

TO

KNOW

MORE?

Foroverviewsof recentresearchon leaders,domesticpolitics,andforeignpolicy,consultValerieHudson's

"ForeignPolicyAnalysisYesterInternational
Studies
(Mershon
day,Today,andTomorrow"
Review,vol.
39: supplement
2, October1995)andHaraldMuller& ThomasRisseKappen's"Fromthe Outside In and from the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy" in David
Skidmore& Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy (Boulder,
CO: Westview,1993). Twovolumescoveringa wide rangeof leadership
SPRING

1998

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

135

Decision
International
Making

phenomenaareTimothyMcKeown& Daniel Caldwell,eds., Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander George
(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,1993) and LauraNeack, JeanneHey, &
PatrickHaney,eds.,ForeignPolicyAnalysis:Continuityand Changein
Its Second Generation(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall,1995).
The waysin which leaders'experiences,beliefs,and goals can shape
their interpretationsof international and domestic constraints are
describedin Yuen Foong Khong'sAnalogies at War (Princeton, NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress,1992); CharlesKupchan'sThe Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); John
Owen'sLiberal War, Liberal Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997); John Vasquez'sThe War Puzzle (New York,NY: CambridgeUniversityPress,1993); as well as Henry Kissinger'sDiplomacy
(New York,NY: Simon and Schuster,1994).
Comprehensive statements on psychological perspectives of foreign policy decision making are found in Yaacov Vertzberger'sThe
Worldin Their Minds: InformationProcessing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Stanford,CA: Stanford
University Press, 1990) and in Nehemia Geva & Alex Mintz, eds.,
Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational
Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1997). The different
roles leaderscan urge on their governmentsare discussedin Margaret
Hermann& CharlesKegley,Jr.'s"Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology" (InternationalStudiesQuarterly,December 1995), and Richard Herrmann&
Michael Fischerkeller's"Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral
Model: Cognitive-StrategicResearch after the Cold War" (InternationalOrganization,Summer 1995).
How leaderswithin a governmentresolvetheir differencesand build
consensus is detailed in Jonathan Bendor & Thomas Hammond's
"RethinkingAllison's Models" (AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,vol.
86: 2, 1992); Paul Hart, Eric Stem, & Bengt Sundelius,eds., Beyond
Groupthink:Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Making
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1977); Ze'ev Maoz,
National Choicesand InternationalProcesses (Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and David Welch's "The Organizational
Process and BureaucraticPolitics Paradigm:Retrospectand Prospect"
Security,Fall 1992). Applicationsof decision-makingmod(International
els by areaspecialiststo non-U.S. settingsaresurveyedin chaptertwo of
136

FOREIGN

POLICY

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Hermann
& Hagan

Joe Hagan'sPolitical Oppositionand Foreign Policy in Conmparative

Perspective(Boulder,CO: LynneRiennerPublishers,1993).
The influencethat domesticpolitics can have on foreignpolicy and,
in turn, on internationalaffairs,has received increasedattention in
recent years.Some of the most importantworkson this topic areBruce
Bueno de Mesquita & David Lalman'sWar and Reason: Domestic
and International Imperatives (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1992); Peter Evans, HaroldJacobson,& Robert Putnam, eds.,
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic
Politics (Berkeley,CA: Universityof CaliforniaPress,1993); Miroslav
Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York,NY: Columbia
University Press, 1992); Richard Rosecrance & Arthur Stein, eds.,
The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca,NY: Comrnell
University Press, 1993); Bruce Russett, Controllingthe Sword (Cambridge,
MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1990); Beth Simmons'Who Adjusts?
Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar
Years (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,1994);JackSnyder's
Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca,NY:Comell UniversityPress,1991); and Stephen Walt'sRevolution and War (Ithaca,NY: Comell University Press,1996).
For links to relevantWeb sites, as well as a comprehensiveindex of
relatedarticles,accesswww.foreignpolicy.com.

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137