Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No.

139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169

(Special Proceedings Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by
Habeas Corpus)
FACTS: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration
but denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for
habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium
as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda
visitation rights.
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
to live with her in their conjugal dwelling.
HELD: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment,
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be
the subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its
authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003. ATTY. EDWARD
SERAPIO, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORGENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents. CALLEJO,
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees
and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock,
non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to
research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
PetitionerSERAPIO, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a
donation in the amount of (P200 Million) from Luis "Chavit" Singson.
Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the
Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation's account
with the Equitable PCI Bank.
Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on
the illegal numbers game known asjueteng. This triggered the filing with
the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations with
plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the
accused, including petitioner.
Sandiganbayan finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
issued an Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner. When apprised
of said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same
day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner
has since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.

Page 1 of 68

He filed a petition for bail but such was postponed several times. The bail
hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended
Information. He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law. Hence, the filing
of writ of harbeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due should thus be
released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: NO.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes." Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become
invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not
completely deprived of their liberty.
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule thathabeas corpus does not lie where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the
same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Ombudsman of
the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities upon
learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in
view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present case
because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy
for asserting one's right to bail.It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not
even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application
for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but
would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending
application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith
proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

Lacson vs. Perez

G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an
angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacaang, issuedProclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
rebellion were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests,
and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a
semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four
related petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to resolution, the state

of rebellion was lifted in Metro Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is
constitutional
RULING:
As to warrantless arrests
As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is
being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons
in connection with the rebellion. xxx
With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to warrantless arrests
should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant.
The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a state of rebellion.
Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers?
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty
(PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a state of rebellion is
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment
on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
determine or interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule
on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
expressly provides that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out sucharmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered
for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual standards
that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at
such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances,
the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to
call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human
lives and mass destruction of property. xxx
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at
this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
On The Writ of Habeas Corpus
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without
these rights, all other individual rights may not exist. Thus, the very first
section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against
government impairment, Section 2 thereof provides:

Page 2 of 68

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any
person acting under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The
existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only authorizes the
President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
declaration of martial law authorizes the President to order the arrest of any
person. The only significant consequence of the suspension of the writ
ofhabeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ
whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself
authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even then, the
Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration of a "state of rebellion," at
most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration
does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

SANGCA VS. CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU

G.R. No. 175864
June 8, 2007 524 SCRA 610
FACTS: The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Regional
Office VII, received information that Lovely ImpalAdam was engaged in
illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu City and neighboring cities and
municipalities. After evaluating the information, Police Chief Inspector
JosefinoLigan,
PDEA
VII
Asst.
Regional
Director
for
Administration/Operation, together with FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2
Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an entrapment operation.On July 7, 2006, the
team, including Yap Tuliao and the informant, proceeded to Fuente
Osmea, Cebu Cityfor the said purpose. Upon arrival thereat, Yap and the
informant proceeded to Pizza Hut while Tuliao stayed behind near the
parking area and so with the members of the team closely watching them.
When Yap and the informant entered Pizza Hut, respondent was already
there waiting for them. They had a short conversation and Yap asked
respondent if she has with her the item. Respondent told him that it is in her
car at the parking area. Respondent asked where the money is. Yap told her
no problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the money.
Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking area so that she
could give it to him and there, she got inside her car. She took the shabu
inside the compartment of her Toyota Fortuner with plate number YCX 965
and handed to him one (1) packed medium size of heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet filled with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Upon receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it was really
shabu or not and when he noticed that it was shabu, he immediately
miscalled the members of the team informing them that the transaction was
consummated and subsequently held respondent. He then introduced
himself as PDEA 7 operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car,

assisted Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering and
transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed her that she is under
arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and likewise apprised
her of the Miranda Doctrine in the language she knew and understood but
she opted to remain silent. After which, they asked her name and she
introduced herself as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married,
businesswoman and a resident of Celiron, Iligan City. The entrapment
operation led to the arrest of Adam. The inquest prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor.
Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5,
Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filedbefore the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 58. On petition for review before the Department of
Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold Adam
liable for the offense charged, ruling that no payment was ever made by the
police officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust operations. The
police officers have not even alleged in their affidavits that payment was
made to respondent in exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money was
ever presented. The certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust
money. The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the Justice Secretary. Finding that Adam could not be held liable
for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order granting the Motion to
Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless
otherwise held for another valid ground.

RULING: NO. Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process

cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is not in the
nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial courts
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The
writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might
be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.

ISSUE: Whether a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is proper in the case.

Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her
cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas petition for
habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the
warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so. (NOTE: The authority of
the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26SC.)

HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement

or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its
essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The
singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the
basic freedom of physical liberty. In the instant case, records show that
Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007.
Therefore, the petition has become moot

MANGILA VS. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739
July 17, 2013 701 SCRA 355
FACTS: On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner
Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting
and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from
the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line
application the private complainants without lawful authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan,
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the
complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila
and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the
cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate
action in accordance with the prevailing rules. Mangila was arrested on
June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Mangila filed with the CA this petition for writ of Habeas Corpus. CA
denied it for lack of merit. Mangila moved for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal via petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that habeas corpus was not
the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention.

Page 3 of 68

The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of

whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and
void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance
of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are
extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a
writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the
trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that
where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which
do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release
of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. The
proper remedy, at the time, would have been for petitioner to file with the
Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the
grounds alleged in the instant petition. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through
habeas corpus.
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

CHANGE OF NAME vs. CORRECTION/ CANCELLATION OF

ENTRIES
ELEOSIDA vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 130277
May 9, 2002

Facts:Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth
certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should
be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should
be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition,
petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24,
1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and
that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's

surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and
Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.

Issue: Whether or not corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth

pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature?

Decision:Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure

for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature.
If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.

G.R. No. 170340

of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in
his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and
effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of
the offspring.

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents
were married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with
significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the
changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known
as An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation
to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections
to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.

29 June 2007 26 SCRA 177

FACTS: Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of
various details in theirbirth certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John
from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira.

The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on

Republic ActNo. 9048, which allows first name and nickname in birth
certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved of
the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground
that the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial
proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.

ISSUE: Whether or not Khos request for change in the details of

their birth certificate requires an adversarial proceeding

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN

CARULASON WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
454 SCRA 155
G.R. No. 159966
March 30, 2005
TINGA, J.:

LIM

This is a Petition seeking to drop the petitioners middle name and have
his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February
20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to live in
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together
with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are
not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do
not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for
these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang.
ISSUE: Whether the change of name / dropping of the middle name of the
petitioner should be granted

RULING: It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought

to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth
certificate and delete the married status of Carlitos parents in his and his
siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage

Page 4 of 68

DECISION: NO. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must

show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the

name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or

pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion
when he reaches the age of majority.26 As he is of tender age, he may not
yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
BRAZA VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174
December 4, 2009 607 SCRA
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo SicadBraza, Jr.were
married on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners
Paolo Josefand Janelle Ann on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively,
and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular
accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.During the wake following the
repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular
(Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made
inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificatefrom
the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Ma.
Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her copetitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.Contending that Patrick
could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for
(1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his
legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of
the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to
DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration
of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous. Patrick filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, which
the court granted, thus dismissing the case without prejudice, it holding that
in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting
as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action
to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of
Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage
and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil
registrar.
RULING: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Codecharts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a

Page 5 of 68

mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of

name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.The allegations of the petition filed before
the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.Petitioners position does not lie.
Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art.
171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in
a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize
that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.

G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged that his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
DantesSilverio" in his certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can change of his name and sex in
his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil
Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
HELD:NO. A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a
right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,

therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now

primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,
form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname
may be allowed in any of the following cases: (lacers)
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change
of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official
name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To
Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record
or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no

Page 6 of 68

reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it

covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female" or "the distinction between male and female." Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young" and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." For
these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes
the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there
is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in
his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument
about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters
of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008 565 SCRA
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth

Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan

and her gender from female to male.
It appeared that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up
with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan
presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation
of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling the validity of the
change of sex or gender and name or the respondent.
RULING: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the
petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil
registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not
without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent
furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish
on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course
of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a
persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this
case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in
this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate
the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that
respondent is undergoing. Intersexuality applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing
of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male
nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law
and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that
evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
PERALTA, J.:

Page 7 of 68

FACTS:Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her

Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8,
1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and SoteraLugsanay. Her
Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in
fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport
bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an
illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she
had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a
Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname
Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the
corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted. However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear
such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent. The RTC concluded that
respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third
party. It also held that the names "Norma SyLugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer
to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma
SyLugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to
avoid confusion.
CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents
failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication. As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents
filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents
were not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly
state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is
Filipino. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.
HELD:NO.We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she
is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and SoteraLugsanay. In
filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and
surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship
from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and
notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings
as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or
corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the
nature of the proceedings taken.A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to
different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the
petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead
and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication
of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise
excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is
mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.

MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
FACTS: Fujiki married Maria Paz in 2004. However, his parents objected
to his marriage with Maria Paz so he was not able to bring Maria Paz to
Japan when he returned. In 2008, Maria Paz married another Japanese,
Maekara, who was able to bring him to Japan. There, Fujiki and Maria Paz
met again. When she recounted her ordeal to Fujiki, he helped her secure a
judgment from the Family Court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Maria Paz and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujuki then
filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying that: 1)
the Japanese judgment be recognized; 2) the marriage between Maria Paz
and Maekara be declared void for being bigamous; and 3) the Local Civil
Registrar be directed to annotate the Family Court judgment on the
marriage certificate of Maria Paz and Maekara.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Fujiki. It ruled that
based on the provisions of Sec. 2 on the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, only the husband or the wife may file the petition, hence
Fujiki is not the proper party to file the petition.
Fujiki moved to reconsider. According to him, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is not applicable to this case, this being a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment. The rule applies only to void or
voidable marriages. Rule 108 is the applicable rule.
The RTC denied his motion for reconsideration. Among others, it justified
its ruling by holding that Fujiki is a stranger to the marriage between Maria
Paz and Maekara. A Rule 108 proceeding is not the proper remedy to
nullify a marriage as ruled in the case of Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. According to the RTC, the nullity of
marriage can only be attacked in a direct action, not thru a collateral attack
such as petition for correction of entry.
Fujiki appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under
foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.
G.R. No. 189538
February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean

Page 8 of 68

National, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),

Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed
that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
RTC rendered judgment stating that the petition is granted in favor of
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract
of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latters prayer
to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio. RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding.
HELD: YES. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries
in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination
of
filiation;
(n)
voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition,
or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in
which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either
be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic
v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person
in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that
the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband
Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki
v. Maria Paz GalelaMarinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage.Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not.

1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes,
came in the morning of April 16, 2006, came in to the property armed with
bolos and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, took possession
of the disputed property of the Sansons and built a nipa and bamboo
structure.

PREROGATIVE WRITS
TAPUZ ET. AL. VS. DEL ROSARIO (SPOUSES SANSON)
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008 554 SCRA

Petitioners claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the
final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to
life, liberty and security; There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue
of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with
finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted

FACTS: The Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of

Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible entry with damages against the Tupazs
(Tupaz family and about 120 John Does). The Sansons allege that they own

Page 9 of 68

The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had
previous possession of the disputed land since 1993 up to 2006 when the
land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction prayed for. The petitioners
(Tupazes) appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the RTC
granted the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and also issued
a writ of demolition against the Tupazes. The MR filed by the Tupazes was
denied.
So the Tupazes went to the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and
Writ of Demolition reviewed. While in the CA, the sheriff of Aklan served
the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to the Tupazes. Thus, the Tupazes
came before the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under Rule 65, the
issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of the writ of Amparo.
ISSUE: May a Writ of Amparo be issued for the Tupazes in this case.
RULING: The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. What it is not, is a writ
to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with
the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

CANLAS vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008 554 SCRA
FACTS: The petitioner seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim
that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and or rights to shelter
enshrined and embodied in our Constitution. Their dwelling/houses have
either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to
be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They claimed that fraudulent
and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land Officials. These Land
Officials should be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances
of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the Private
Respondents.
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in
Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwelling/ houses have either been
demolished as of the time of the filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.
RULING: The petition dismissed.

Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their
claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty
and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.The
factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not
alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights
and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of
the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the
filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
CASTILLO VS CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009 605 SCRA
FACTS: Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband
Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province)
which intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the
property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the
MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents
filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo

et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a
memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property, entered the
property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest
them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other
forms of light threats.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule

was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: What it is
not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into
the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a
day after their arrest.

On the second issue:

Respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded
against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property

rights;
and,
Whether Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case
already filed.

RULING :

On the first issue: Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but
also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Page 10 of 68

RAZON vs. TAGITIS

G.R. No. 182498 June 22, 2010 606 SCRA

FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World

Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of
October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately
checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a
boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong
looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based
secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a

UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the
IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a
month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis,
through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police
(PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director,
ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the Court of Appeals
(CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and
set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type

of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this
Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement
on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause
of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and
security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise
be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life,
liberty or security are present.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the

disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed
the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction,
the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the
CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed
the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life,
liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander
Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG,
not the military, that was involved.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision,

but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the
ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is
indispensable in an amparo petition.

2.

Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the

petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court to
grant the privilege of the writ.

3.

Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint

criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the
subject of the petition for the writ.

RULING:
1.

No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner

under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and
security through State or private party action.

2.

Yes.

3.

No.

1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be
read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo Rule
never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of
the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be

Page 11 of 68

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs

only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a
Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show
that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a
violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and
the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The
[characteristics of amparo proceedings] namely, of being summary and
the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to
the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo
Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe
extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected
in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and
investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly
comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo
petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must
then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced
disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on
the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the
Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to
arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote
Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from
the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of
the witness As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate
truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their
probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the
material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought
of and prefabricated story.
3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF
AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or
at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [The

writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of

violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a
remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case,
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these
cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his liberty and security are restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its
directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ,
as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and
procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its
directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence
and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction The Amparo Rule expressly provides that
the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically covers
enforced disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in
this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the
Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule
initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of
enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance
of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away
with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee
instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to
address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the
law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on
the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the
countrys constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power
of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive
laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, since
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and
purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional
rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts
power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide
can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.

Page 12 of 68

ROXAS vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. No. 189155 07 September 2010 630 SCRA
FACTS: Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in
the United States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with
the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her
companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat.
While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions
and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to
abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named
RC that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations
Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the
Order of Battle.
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular
phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to
the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her
family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the
cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the
sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the highranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the
belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction
and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case
to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and
habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it
was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction
and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is
applicable in an amparo petition.
2.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
3.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.
RULING:
1.
No.
2.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence.
3.
Yes.
1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
WRIT OF AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is
legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as
justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.

The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of

Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures
and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in
a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of command
responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.

was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas based on the positive

identification of the witness.

2.

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated
directives issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary
diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered
his
arrest
in
connection
with
Jonas
disappearance.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over

mere circumstantial evidence In amparo proceedings, the weight that
may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military
involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3.

EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to

privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable
requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended An
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended
is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In
the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened
violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents
were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of
Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in
violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant
of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

BURGOS vs. ESPERON

G.R. No. 178497 February 04, 2014 715 SCRA

FACTS: These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution
referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as
the Courts directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of
the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction with the obligation
to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court.
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation
Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in
compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. On the basis of the gathered
evidence, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph
T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and
security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
In July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered,
we issued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA
CA issued its decision pursuant to the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution
referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for
appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions. For Petition
for Habeas Corpus . the CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas
corpus is not the illegal confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas
corpus. While it ruled that Writ of Amparo is proper. The CA found that the
totality of the evidence supports the petitioners allegation that the military

Page 13 of 68

To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided

under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Petitioner filed
an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order the
persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CAG.R. SP
No. 00008WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the
basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the
motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the newly
discovered evidence.
ISSUE: Whether issuance of a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence is proper.
RULING:
On the

Urgent

Ex

Parte

Motion

Ex

Abundanti

Cautela

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already
ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as these
terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of
the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioners prayer to issue
the writ of
Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioners request for the
reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be
redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed
by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation
directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court
a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it
cannot (without violating the nature of the writ ofAmparo as a summary
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would
complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas
was
a
victim
of
enforced
disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioners motion, we do not thereby rule
on the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence
submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation
by the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities
whose identities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas
may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings. Considering that
the present case has already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioners
motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and
prosecutory agencies of the government.

DOLOT vs. PAJE

G.R. No. 199199
August 27, 2013 703 SCRA
FACTS: Sometime in 2009, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners) protested the iron ore
mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit
Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and
Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to
protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and
confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction,
ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after
investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the
required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit,

which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code.
The petitioners prayed for, among others, the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in
the Municipality of Matnog.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court but it was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is dismissible on the ground that there
is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on
RULING: No.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing
mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for
the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part
II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition
or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with
the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed
under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality
or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ,
viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government
agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a
duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or
a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law.

Page 14 of 68

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be

availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion
on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of
the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental
case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which
shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
EVIDENCE
PRLEIMINARY CONSIDERATION
ONG CHIA V. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 127240 March 27, 2000
328 SCRA 749 (2000)
FACTS: Petitioner Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, Chia.
He moved to the Philippines when he was 9 years old and has stayed in the
country since then. In July 1989, (at age 66) Ong Chia filed a petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law. In his
petitioner, he stated that he previously submitted a petition for citizenship
under LOI 270 with the Committee on Naturalization (under OSG) but the
same was not acted upon (halted due to 1986 revolution). During the
hearing, petitioner presented 3 witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The
prosecutor was impressed with his testimony that he did not adduce any
evidence to prove the contrary and mentioned that petitioner does indeed
deserves to be a Filipino citizen. The trial court granted the petition and
admitted Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship. However, the State, through
OSG appealed the same contending that:
a. He failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known
b. He failed to state all his former place/s of residence as required by law
c. He failed to conduct himself in a property and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines
d. He has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared. OSG also annexed to the appellants
brief a copy of petitioners 1977 petition for naturalization in which he
stated in addition to his name Ong Chia, he was also known as Loreto Chia
Ong; IRT copies petitioner allegedly filed from 1973 to 1977 which shows
that his income can barely support himself. CA reversed the trial court
decision and denied petitioners application for naturalization, citing that
due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded
from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for
the first time on appeal
ISSUE: WON CA erred in considering the documents which had merely
been annexed by the State to its appellants brief and on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial courts decision
HELD: No. Ong Chia failed to note that under Rule 4 ROC: These rules
shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. Based on the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132 Sec 34) being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is practicable and convenient. This is not the case
here, since reliance upon the documents provided by the State appears to be
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of
the same documents. The reason for the rule prohibiting admission of
evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he
was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted by the State.
ZULUETA vs CA G.R. NO. 107383 February 20, 1996
253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable,
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent

Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards,
cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from
forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in
court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
HELD: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public
safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
PEOPLE vs YATAR
G.R. NO. 150224 May 19, 2004
FACTS: On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers
(Isabel Dawangs) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City,
as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am,
accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where
Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first
cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black
pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at
the back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual since
Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon
Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had
been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black
shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were
reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of
Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off,
the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to
check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein
was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a
knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house,
she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding
out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments
beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with
blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile,
semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When
subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an
appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos
decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving
much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu
of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2)
the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against

Page 15 of 68

self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on

prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm
specimen may be used as evidence for Yatars conviction?
HELD: Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was
three (3) years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs.
Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so
long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then
as the DAUBERT TEST.
At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the
legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on
2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative
weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of
the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in
conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including
accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework
and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the
testing result, as hereinafter provided.
DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the
probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars
blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers
vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable
and relevant.
In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be
determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the evidence is
relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime; In giving probative
value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood
sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the
victims vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the
DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been
performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the
said case, the DNA test was done at the
UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem
Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to
be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA
analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The
analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly
appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be
admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.

PEOPLE vs YATAR
G.R. NO. 150224 May 19, 2004
FACTS: On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers
(Isabel Dawangs) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City,
as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am,
accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where
Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first
cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black
pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at
the back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual since
Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon
Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had
been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black
shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were
reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of
Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off,
the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to
check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein
was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a

knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house,
she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding
out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments
beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with
blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile,
semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When
subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an
appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos
decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving
much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu
of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2)
the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on
prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm
specimen may be used as evidence for Yatars conviction?
HELD: Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was
three (3) years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs.
Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so
long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then
as the DAUBERT TEST.
At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the
legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on
2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative
weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of
the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in
conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including
accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework
and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the
testing result, as hereinafter provided.
DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the
probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars
blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers
vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable
and relevant.
In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be
determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the evidence is
relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime; In giving probative
value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood
sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the
victims vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the
DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been
performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the
said case, the DNA test was done at the
UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem
Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to
be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA
analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The
analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly
appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be
admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
TATING vs. MARCELLA
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007 519 SCRA
FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale
was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for
tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972,

Page 16 of 68

1973 , 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession
Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that
she actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement
between her and Nena was simply to transfer the title over the subject
property in favour of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging
the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business
expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled
and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs . In a letter
dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and as
a consequence , they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply .
Efforts to settle the case amicably proved the futile.
Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification
of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decided in favor of the plaintiff and was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sworn Statement should have been rejected
outright by the lower courts.
RULING: The court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed
error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no
longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC
and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no
more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship
was created between them.

PEOPLE vs. SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012 666 SCRA
FACTS: The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993
Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila;
that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still
able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek
help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was
Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the
stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then
still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.
RTC found him guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under
Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.On appeal, the CA
affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying
declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and
Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.
ISSUE: Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae.
RULING: The appeal lacks merit. It appears from the foregoing
testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to
seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly
dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had
stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be
having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk
anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency
ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead.
Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying
declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and
right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its

hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d)
that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending
death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which
occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for
the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be
shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the
opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on
the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration
was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was
the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
G.R. No. 128538

February 28, 2001

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private

respondent DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo,
obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the
amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30%
plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the
principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure
the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent
LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand
letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner
contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of
action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of
consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet
out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was
reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and
the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its
merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue
and to be sued in
this present action;

Page 17 of 68

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant

SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement
of account of
even date which were both received by the herein
defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC
Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E.
Arrieta and Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last
December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity
date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not
the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the
liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The crossexamination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason
or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several
times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right
to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in
favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondents witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely
executed as required
by law.
3. Whether the best evidence rule should be applied.
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI
was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his
personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative
value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed
to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for
this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is
settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim
that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the right to
cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to crossexamine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other
party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to
cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner
to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note
by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed
to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission
having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must
be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the
documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pretrial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand
letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its
admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its
obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof
of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No
reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held
petitioner liable on its obligation
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the
registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San
Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330
hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to
palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 as amended, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order

No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
Series of 1994, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank), petitioner,
made a valuation.
Respondents rejected the valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of
R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was
conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated
as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just
compensation. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank.
Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare
for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
The trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land at
P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00,
which is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The court further
awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. In determining the
valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established
in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez vs.
DAR, et al.)
The Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases?
HELD: NO. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.[24] They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the
knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of
a material issue in the case.
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

PEOPLE vs KULAIS
G.R. NO. 100901, July 16, 1998
FACTS: On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom
and threeinformations for kidnapping were filed before the RTC of
Zamboanga City againstCarlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, JalinaHassan de Kamming, Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, ImamTaruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The informations for kidnapping
for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of
thevictims. The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of
the RevisedPenal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances,
except the names of thevictims. Of the twelve accused, only nine were
apprehended.The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of
kidnapping for ransom andone count of kidnapping a woman and public
officer, for which offenses it imposed uponhim six terms of life
imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight
illegaldetention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco.On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos,
Norma Sahiddan deKulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of
Appeal. In a letter dated February 6,1997, the same appellants, except
Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
amnesty. In a Resolution dated March 19, 1997, it granted the
motion.Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of
this Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court is faulted with the following errors:
a. In taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by
Lt.Melquiades Feliciano
b. On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of

Page 18 of 68

HELD: The conviction of appellant Kulais as principal in five counts of

kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is affirmed, but
the penalty imposed is modified.
As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending
in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the
same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has
the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. Having said that,we note, however, that even if the court a quo did
take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use
such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, appellant
Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the
positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims. The elements of
kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private
individual, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court
thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of
kidnapping for ransom.
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000
324 SCRA 414
FACTS: Sometime in 1978 plaintiff Laureano was employed on a contract
basis for twoyears as an expatriate B-707 captain by defendant company
Singapore Airlines. His first term was then extended for another 2 years.
However, defendant was hit by are cession and initiated a cost cutting
measure. Plaintiff was advised to take advance leave. Realizing that the
recession would not be for a short time, Singapore Airlines decided to
terminate its excess personnel including plaintiff. Subsequently, Laureano
instituted a case and a claim for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo. Singapore Airlines filed a
motion to dismiss alleging inter alia that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over the case. The defendant postulated that Singapore should apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine laws should be applied and Philippine
courts should have jurisdiction over the instant case
HELD: The Supreme Court concurred in the assumption of jurisdiction by
the RTC which rightly ruled on the application of Philippine laws. The SC
further stated that neither can the court determine whether the termination
of Laureano is legal and under Singapore laws because of the Airlines
failure to show which proves the applicability of the foreign law. It is a well
settled rule that the party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has
the burden of proof and where said party has failed to discharge the burden,
Philippine laws apply. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore,
Philippine law should be applied.

MAQUILING vs. COMELEC

G.R. NO.195649 April 16, 2013 700 SCRA
FACTS: Rommel Arnado y Cagoco is a natural born Filipino citizen. He
underwent naturalization as a US citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and on July 10, 2008, he took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was granted an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition. On April 3,
2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, where he declared that he is a
Filipino citizen and that he is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to,
a foreign country. Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy contending that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality
of Arnado as USA-American. Balua also showed travel records showing
that Arnado has been using his US Passport in his trips in and out of the
country in 2009. While the case was pending, the 2010 elections were held
and Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed as
the
winning
candidate
for
Mayor
of
Kauswagan.

The Comelec First Division held that Arnados continued use of his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation. It treated the petition of Balua as one for
disqualification, annulled the proclamation of Arnado and applied the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner CasanMacodeMaquiling who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 mayoral elections, intervened in the case. He
contests the application of Section 44 of the LGC and argued that, as the
second placer, he should be proclaimed as the winner. The ComelecEn
Banc reversed the Division and held that the use of a US passport did not
undo Arnados earlier renunciation of his US citizenship.
ISSUE: Can our local court take judicial notice of Foreign Laws by mere
publication.
RULING: The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which
must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American
citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local
elective position.

PEOPLE VS BAHARAN
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011 639 SCRA
FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual
southbound route along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around
6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, two men aboard the bus. Andales, the bus
conductor immediately became wary of the two men, because of their
unusual behaviour. The two men insisted on getting off the bus at Ayala
Avenue. Later, Andales felt an explosion.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of
Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of
the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio that the group had a
Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As
stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad and Baharan gave ABS-CBN
News Network an exclusive interview and confessed their participation.
Asali, which later became a state witness, gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February
2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
RRCG bus on the evening.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does
were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment
for themultiple frustrated murder charge, accused Asali pled guilty.
Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to
both charges.
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty
to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency
in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two
accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness
for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and
Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

Page 19 of 68

ISSUES:
1.Whether the accused should be acquitted because of the error of the judge
in not conducting searching inquiry. (No, they made judicial and
extrajudicial confession)
2. The testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. No
RULING: Denied. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of
the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This
requirement is stringent and mandatory.
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by
which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where
the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these
corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television
interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing. Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Second Assignment of Error
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to
Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible
only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the
Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon,
the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused
as they are deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine him. A judicial confession is admissible
against the declarants co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions
and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. Mercenes admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness
stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried
together for the same offense, the testimony of a coaccused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 155832

December 7, 2010

662 SCRA

FACTS: Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any
property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda
Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in
Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such
order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG
Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning
the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the

PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the
validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in
the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when
the Olot Rest house was sequestered; and that she intended to delay
proceedings
by
filing
the
motion
to
quash.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration
order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2
agents.
Hence
the
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
RULING: No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the
Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a
prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court
nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
PCGG.
In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence
of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the
Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and
consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's
evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what
makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its
acquisition.
As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot
be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the
view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration
order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on
sight.
*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis
pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the
Republic in another civil case.

RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
OBJECT/ REAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE vs. MALLILIN
G.R. NO. 172953 APRIL 30, 2008 553 SCRA
FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the
RTC of Sorsogon City, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team
was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto
Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the
presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual
morsels of the said substance.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The trial court
reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was
prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict
him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over
which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It
also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. In his Appeal Brief filed
with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to
certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was
conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced
that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the
members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false
charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly
performed their duties should prevail.
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence

Page 20 of 68

to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17)

years as maximum. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition which raises
substantially the same issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as
evidence.
RULING: NO. A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they
are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close
its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in
the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or
otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the
same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to
the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the
people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon
and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of
the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the
confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person
to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical
analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the
circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable
mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court
as evidence?
The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized
items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were
the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and
acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of
Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she
did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she
delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of
establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not
only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to
the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility
of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the
five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.

PEOPLE vs. PAGADUAN

G.R. No. 179029 August 12, 2010 627 SCRA
FACTS: In an buy-bust operatin leaded by PO3 Almarez, the appellant was
arrested for the sale of shabu to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a buyer of
shabu in the amount of P200.00.
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory
examination (Exh. "C").The appellant was transferred to the Diadi
Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on December 29,
2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory
examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and
found it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. "B").
The defense claimed that the appellant was apprehended as a result of an
illegitimate entrapment operation.

The RTC, in its decision of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the
crime charged.

apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of

R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act
effectively negates this presumption.

The appellant appealed to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the appellant despite
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act.

(1)

RULING: After due consideration, the court resolve to acquit the appellant
for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act.
Requirement under Section 2.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,physically
inventoryand photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required
because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise.The records of the present case are bereft of
evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure
despite its mandatory terms.
From the foregoing exchanges during trial,No physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of
the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on crossexamination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when
asked whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the
appellant.At any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in
the records.
EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is
not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the
present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained
in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation
to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose
core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute
the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs
this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain
of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from
the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory
for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the
absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body
of the crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.In effect,
the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability.
Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This
presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself,
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the
presumption unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the

Page 21 of 68

SALAS vs. MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013 705 SCRA
FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the RTC of
Cabanatuan City. She claimed that Petitioner is the father of her child,
Christian
Paulo
Salas.
Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only
24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an
apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the
delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and
hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned
respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Petitioner denied the allegations. RTC and CA ruled infavor of Respondent
ISSUE: whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the
illegitimate child of petitioner.
RULING: GRANTED. In relation to Article 175 and 172 of the Family
Code
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing
of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to
establish
filiation
to
the
alleged
father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may
be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect
to
the
childs
paternity.
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten
notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and
respondent
inside
their
rented
apartment
unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father
are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits E and
F32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit
thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account 33 (Exhibit
C) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner
is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners admission in his
answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child
as
an
act
of
charity.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not
sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were
not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of
the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed
by
the
parent
concerned.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like

his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his

name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records,
we find the totality of respondents evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner
is
the
father
of
Christian
Paulo.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

As held in People v. Llanita40 as cited in People v. Ara:

RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do
not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x We have
emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Briefly stated,
non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and
its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the
apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.

PEOPLE vs. GANI

G.R. NO. 198318 NOVEMBER 27, 2013 711 SCRA
PEOPLE vs. POSING
G.R. No. 196973 July 31, 2013 703 SCRA
FACTS: Accused-appellant RUPER POSING y ALAYON was charged
with the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in
violation of Sections 5 and 11 respectively, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Upon arraignment, Posing entered a plea of not guilty on both charges.
The trial court found Posing GUILTY of violation of both Sections 5 and
11, Article II, of R.A. 9165. On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended
that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the police
officers failure to comply with the proper procedure in the handling and
custody of the seized drugs, as provided under Section 21 of R. A. No.
9165, which ultimately affected the chain of custody of the confiscated
drugs.
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that
although the requirements under Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165 has been
held to be mandatory, non-compliance with the same, does not necessarily
warrant an acquittal. In addition, it was averred that the police officers are
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. Finally, the accused-appellant did not interpose any evidence in
support of his defense aside from his bare denial.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal

sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
Whether the integrity of the evidence was preserved in the
course of the investigation and trial.

FACTS: SI Saul received information from a confidential informant that

accused-appellant Normina , alias Rohaima, was looking for a buyer of
shabu. SI Saul agreed to meet the informant and accused-appellant
Normina for negotiation at the Pearl Hotel in Manila, just in front of the
NBI Headquarters. They eventually met at Jollibee restaurant beside the
Pearl Hotel. SI Saul was introduced by the informant to accused-appellant
Normina as an interested buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant Normina
initially offered to sell 500 grams of shabu to SI Saul, but the two later on
agreed on the sale of 100 grams of shabu for One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P150,000.00) to be consummated in the afternoon of the following
day, May 6, 2004, at FTI Complex corner Vishay Street, Taguig City.
After the exchange of money and shabu , SI Saul lighted a cigarette, which
was the pre-arranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that the
transaction had been consummated. When SI Saul already saw the buy-bust
team members approaching, he grabbed accused-appellant Asirs hands and
introduced himself as an NBI agent. Accused-appellants were arrested and
duly advised of their constitutional rights, during the search incidental to
accused-appellants arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accusedappellants possession two other sachets of shabu, the marked money,
accused-appellant Asirs .45 caliber pistol, and the motorcycle. The buybust team and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall.
At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items
recovered from accused-appellants, including the two plastic sachets of
shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES2 05-06-04," representing SI Sauls initials and the date of the buy-bust. All
these were done in the presence of accused-appellants and two barangay
officials. SI Sauls inventory report, however, did not include the two other
sachets of shabu seized from accused-appellants possession. Thereafter, the
buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the NBI Headquarters in
Manila.
RTC found accised-appellants of the crime charged. CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court.

RULING:
1.

2.

YES. Both the trial and the appellate court agree that the illegal
sale of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the
successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller,
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
YES. In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody
requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs
are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the

testimonies of its witnesses that the integrity of the seized item was
preserved every step of the process.
Further, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict
compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not
necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.

Page 22 of 68

ISSUE: Whether or not the object evidence of the prosecution produced a

detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants and
proved all the essential elements of the crime charged against them?
HELD: YES. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer
and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as
evidence.
It has been clearly established herein that a buy-bust operation took place
on May 6, 2004 conducted by a team of NBI agents. SI Saul, as the poseurbuyer, and accused-appellants, as the sellers, agreed on the price of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for One Hundred (100)
grams of shabu. After SI Saul handed over the buy-bust money to accusedappellants, the latter gave him, in exchange, two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. Thereafter, accused-appellants were
immediately arrested by the buy-bust team. During the search incidental to
accused-appellants arrest, a .45 caliber handgun, the buy-bust money, and
two more sachets of suspected shabu were recovered from their possession.
Chemical examination confirmed that the contents of the two plastic
sachets sold to SI Saul were indeed shabu. These two sachets of shabu,
marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and with a total weight of
98.7249 grams, together with two other sachets, were duly presented as
evidence by the prosecution before the RTC.

The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially
complied with the rule on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as
provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has
decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to
make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well
as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs
inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain
of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution
proved that immediately after accused-appellants arrest, they were brought
to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was there, in the presence of two barangay
officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two plastic sachets of
shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from
accused-appellants possession during the search conducted incidental to
accused-appellants arrest. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul
marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants
as "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Sauls initials and
the date of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with
accused-appellants, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI
Headquarters, SI Saul made a request for examination of the two plastic
sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," and
personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI
Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together with NBI Forensic Chemist III
Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory examination of the contents of
the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and kept
said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as
evidence during trial.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of
the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon
seizure and at the site of accused-appellants apprehension, and to mark and
make an inventory of the same in the presence of all the persons named in
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the
seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able
to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the
seized drugs and, hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had
been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the
prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay
officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the
testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and
would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner operates a credit card system through which it extends
credit accommodations to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and
services from its member establishments. The purchases are later on paid
for by cardholders upon receipt of the billings or statements of account
from the company. Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one such cardholder.
On December 14, 1990, he applied for membership with petitioner. After
his application was approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A. Mastercard No.
5423-3920-4457-7009.
Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit
card, the cardholder undertakes to pay all the purchases made using the
card within the period indicated on the statement of account or within thirty
(30) days from the date or dates of its use. Charges that remain unpaid
within the period fixed in the monthly statement of account shall earn
interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per month plus a penalty fee equivalent to
5 percent of the amount due for every month or even a fraction of a months
delay.
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly,
he was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered
various payments.
Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent
stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Several
times it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming that
the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His
refusal prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The RTC, in an Order dated
April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the

Page 23 of 68

amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati City. During the trial, petitioner presented several
sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only P24,388.36.
Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to
bear the signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient
proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the
MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision ordered him to pay petitioner the
amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.
The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the
photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to
F-4, were competent proofs of the obligations of respondent. These were
the only evidence presented by petitioner that could prove the actual
amount of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former. In reversing
the trial courts, the CA ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove
any liability on respondents part.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge
slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in
evidence.
HELD: Petitioner contends that the testimony[10] of its principal witness
- Mark Hernando, assistant manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -proves the following:
a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices which
sufficiently proved respondents liability of P24,388.36;
b) the loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices; and
c) petitioners reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the originals.
It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of
respondent on the sales invoices, having recognized them as identical to the
signature on the latters credit card application form.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the
due execution of the sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not
privy to such execution and could not have properly or competently
declared that the signatures on the invoices and on the application form
belonged to the former. The latter was not the person before whom the
application form was signed, executed or acknowledged; he was not even
present then. As to the sales invoices and respondents alleged signatures
thereon, he saw them only after the Complaint had been filed in court or
long after those invoices had been executed. He was therefore not
competent to identify the signatures.
Because Hernandez had not actually witnessed the execution of the sales
invoices and the application form, respondent concludes that petitioner
failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the contents of the original may be proven by the testimony of
witnesses.
Finally, respondent contends that the alleged loss or unavailability of the
original sales invoices was not sufficiently established. Allegedly,
Hernandez had requested the originals from Equitable Credit Card
Network, Inc., but failed to show in court that he had followed up his
request as advised by another witness, Zen Hipolito. Therefore, the
requirement of reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the originals was not satisfied, because he had shown no
proof of having followed up the request.
The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case
based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases,
the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to
prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of
P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had
presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been
admissible, they would still have had little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the
alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As
such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove
any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals,
respondents obligation was not established.
LOON vs. POWER MASTER, INC.
G.R. NO. 189404 DECEMBER 11, 2013 712 SCRA
FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services
employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro
Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their
officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the
respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not
paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made

them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended
their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They
claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for
the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr.
Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents behalf.5 The respondents
counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5,
2001.6 However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor
proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the case. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Both parties appealed the LAs ruling with the National Labor Relations
Commission. The petitioners disputed the LAs denial of their claim for
backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays. Meanwhile, the
respondents questioned the LAs ruling on the ground that the LA did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with
summons and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the
petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and thirteenth month
pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and computerized copies of
payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. They further maintained
that the petitioners were validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners
repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their
violations of the company rules and regulations constituted serious
misconduct and willful disobedience.
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental
appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of
employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental
appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the
employees ATM cards.11 They also attached documentary evidence
showing that the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been
accorded due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not photocopied documents have probative value in
administrative proceedings.
HELD: The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought
to be proven. Why the respondents photocopied and computerized copies
of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
serious question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we
generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present
the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted
their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with
no option but to rule that the respondents failure to present the originals
raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced.
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that
"[i]t is of common knowledge that there are many people who use at least
two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial notice
that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where
the petitioners themselves disown the signatures in the respondents
assailed documentary evidence. The NLRCs position is unwarranted and is
patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the
employees. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employers
cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the employees evidence.

FACTS: Respondent spouses Monteiro along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa,

and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages
before the RTC, against the petitioners alleging co-ownership. Spouses
Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by
the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that
there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that
the subject property had long been partitioned equally between her two
sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the
northern-half portion to Vitaliano.
Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit
Amended Complaint.4 The RTC granted their motion. The amended
complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the
recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property since the
Dimaguilas admitted in their original answer that the subject propetiy had
already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition.
During the trial, several documents were presented like a certified true copy
of cadastral map presented by an employee from the Office of the
Municipal Assessor. A DENR officer also testified that as part of her duties,
she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral
maps from the region. RTC and CA ruled in favour of the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence aliunde should not have considered by the
Court due to timely objection and pursuant to the best evidence rule.
Note: Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission
of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even
without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything,
the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the
petitioners' admission.
RULING: The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral
map and the list of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the
ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132
provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding
list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two
public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal
Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was
Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies
and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certifieed true copies of original
public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
Additional: As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to
the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists
in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a
witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
PAROLE EVIDENCE

DIMAGUILA vs. SPOUSES MONTEIRO

G.R. No. 201011
January 27, 2014 714 SCRA

Page 24 of 68

RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

OSCAR INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997
FACTS: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two
(2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of
P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute sale
covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 while the second
deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273. Private respondents

received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver
the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the
former the delivery of said titles.[3] Private respondents, however, refused
on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another
person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to
certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance
before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were
never reflected in the deeds of sale:
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the
defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that
all the following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398
sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the
segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of
defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may
be incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's
timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions
was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim. On appeal CA affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parole evidence introduced are admissible?
HELD: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party
who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale
were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.
Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the
sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of
Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court
ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol
evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this
case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that
it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which
were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this
case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other agreement. In fact,
the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to
the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written
instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of
the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
parties.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract,
"it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in
this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol
evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules,
specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of
the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere
reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject
matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the
facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation
of the instrument."
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they
"put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to

Page 25 of 68

express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents
did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did
not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private
respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." Private respondents
merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they
tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be
done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the
parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the
contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the
agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer
(and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" of his signing a
deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the
deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer
of title to said lots were conditional.
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it
should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the
record to sustain the existence of the alleged conditions. Not even the other
seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such conditions

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, Petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING
CORP., Respondents.
G.R. No. 126006 January 29, 2004
FACTS: Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained
four loans from Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory
notes in the amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire obligation became
due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank. The Bank filed with the
RTC a complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan,
jointly and solidarily, of the sum representing their loan obligation,
exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs.
The Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that
Tan obtained the loans in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit
and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the Bank. The
Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in
his capacity as its President any promissory note and that the Bank fully
knew that the loans contracted were made in Tans personal capacity and
for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or
indirectly, there from.
For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his
personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be
paid from the proceeds of Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu
Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by
promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over)
every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as
petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid
shares. According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee
required him to affix two signatures on every promissory note, assuring him
that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their
agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to
the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with
their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation was included as party
thereto further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the respondent Bank
made no demand on him. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the
court a quo by deleting the award of attorneys fees in favor of the
respondent Bank for being without basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the parole evidence rule?
HELD: The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans
allegation that he was made to sign blank loan documents and that the
phrase "IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY" was superimposed
by the respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation.
The Court is hard pressed to believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans
stature could have been so careless as to sign blank loan documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed upon
their faces that they are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as
contracted by petitioner Tan "in his official and personal capacity."
Moreover, the application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of
the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation, as well as New
Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were
signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation.
These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically establish that
the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and
petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to
reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement

between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
"[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement."
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and
the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as
follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5,
1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear
and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a
year-to-year basis or "rolled-over" annually until paid from the proceeds of
petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this
purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the
terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had
been made by the petitioners in this case.
Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the petitioners jointly and
solidarily liable as it applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity. The petitioner Foundation asserts that it has a personality separate
and distinct from that of its President, petitioner Tan, and that it cannot be
held solidarily liable for the loans of the latter.

spurious documents, it behooves this Court to annul these certificates of

title. Hence, this petition for review.

LEOVERAS vs. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011 652 SCRA

By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the

disputed property in his name, the petitioner holds the title to this disputed
property in trust for the benefit of the respondent as the true
owner; registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records title
already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the
expense of others. Hence, the CA correctly ordered the reconveyance of the
disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent.

FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered
owners - three-fourths () and one-fourth () pro-indiviso, respectively of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna
Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When
Benigna died in 1944,she willed her three-fourths () share equally to her
sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa
each owned of Benignas shares. Alejandras heirs sold their
predecessors one-half () share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square
meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Also,
Josefa sold her own share (subject property) to the respondent and the
petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent
and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the
subject property. The petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took possession of
their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their
name for taxation purposes.
The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on
the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on
the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the
petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title.
The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on
the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters
identified in the parties Agreement.
The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles by
contesting the authenticity of the petitioners documents. Particularly, the
respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benignas death
certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a
deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in
1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that
neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her three-fourths () share
in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932.
The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration
that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his titles.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by
ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. As the
totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the respondents]
claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and

Page 26 of 68

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the

parcel of land covered by the TCT No. 195813 to the Respondent.
RULING:NO. We rule that the respondent adequately proved his
ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties Affidavit of
Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties Agreement, which cover the subject
property.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of
these documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since
the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit
was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties true intention.
The petitioners argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence
rule] i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written
agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence
of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows
a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention
of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the
parties.

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
HEIRS OF SABANPAN vs COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003
FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
against respondents before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial
Court.
The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor of LotNo. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del
Sur with an area of 1.2hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his
children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a
problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of [Marcos]
Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son,
[Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out
of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco
Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was
carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject
matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among
them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his
possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to
vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed
that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. A complaint was filed with the barangay
office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was
issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by
petitioners against respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the
complaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their
own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the

said lot way back in 1960 and upto the present time; that they have acquired
just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or
extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR,
Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question
when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors and
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment
in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. The CA affirmed
the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and
err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling giving weight to the
CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda
HELD: Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22,
1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a
mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr
.and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents
for the first time on appeal. We are not persuaded.
In Garvida , the Court held: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process
involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing
the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no
way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile
referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida . The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in
banking, financial, and business transactions.
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as
evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order .The Certification
was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able
to file their position paper. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence
would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

TORRES vs. PAGCOR

G.R. NO. 193531 DECEMBER 14, 2011 661 SCRA
FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter
Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then
Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and
internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with
slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation
Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of
such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was
committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot
machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a
slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR
receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the
CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips
issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU
identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such
CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y.
Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to
petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous
SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing
within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be
sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension
effective immediately until further orders.

Page 27 of 68

On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter

explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any
involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or
padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal
investigation of the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from
Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource
and Development Department, dismissing him from the service.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against
PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among
other things, that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and
reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007
addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the
Merit Systems Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his
letter reconsideration.
Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same
has already prescribed.
The CA dismissed the case on the same ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by
means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
RULING: A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or
personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the
same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the
envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other
hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date
stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from
receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4,
2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted
either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007.
However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's
letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by
PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission,
such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used
by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the
motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy,
one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each
area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as
a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by
the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper
position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an
exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of
whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages"
or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce
Act.

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.

Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and
the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one
and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment
of the deed of donation before the RTC of Masbate.
Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC
granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would be hearsay as
she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their
motion. Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which however, dismissed their petition. The CA likewise denied their
motion for reconsideration.

ANG vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 618 SCRA

FACTS: Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were

sweethearts. However, Irish broke up with him when she learned he had
taken a live-in partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Rustan convinced her
to elope with him for he did not love the woman whom he was about to
marry, but Irish rejected the proposal. She changed her cellphone number
but Rustan managed to get hold of it and send her text messages.
Irish received through multimedia message a picture of a naked woman
with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the figure. The senders
cellphone number, stated in the message, was one of the numbers used by
Rustan. After she got the obscene picture, she received text messages from
Rustan threatening her that he will spread the picture he sent through the
Internet.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
number he used in sending the picture and text message. She asked him to
meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his motorcycle and walking
towards Irish, the police intercepted and arrested him. The police seized his
cellphone and several SIM cards.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case.
RULING: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a
text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
DISQUALIFICATION
MARCOS vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO
G.R. No. 198240 July 03, 2013 700 SCRA
FACTS:Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left
behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were survived by their daughters
Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and
the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are
the respondents herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on
the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit
is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a
handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2

Page 28 of 68

ISSUE: Whether or not PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.

RULING: No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a
witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is
qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC
for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC
rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a witness
on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamanis signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such
that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford
in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in
and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the
CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC
ruling.
MENTAL INCAPACITY OR IMMATURITY
. MENTAL INCAPACITY
PEOPLE vs. GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225

April 2, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.
NOTE:A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation
of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness,
no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency
of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to (Citing People v. Trelles).
However, It can not be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows, If his or her
testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
FACTS: Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental
retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2,
1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and
custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador
Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing,leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the
situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after
she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7 As he poked at
her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his
penis into her vagina.9 His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her.
Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns halfsister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch
Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City
where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellants home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her
sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought
her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches,
Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that
Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became
pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse
with her while holding a knife.
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal
complaint for rape against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulan, Sorsogon,
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed
Decision, convicted appellant as charged. Hence, the accused appealed, he
argues that the mind of the victim is not normal. He further alleged that
Evelyns testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions,
thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability. He further
ISSUE: whether Evelyn, a mental retardate is disqualify as a witness.
DECISION: No. Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein
mentally retarded private complainants testimony irregardless of her
"monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity,"
this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not
being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted

Page 29 of 68

that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is

not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as
the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable
narrative of the matter testified to.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her
testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity
as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the
remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available
who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the
modern trend of evidence.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a
mental retardate
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
ALVAREZ vs RAMIREZ
G.R. NO. 143439 October 14, 2005
FACTS: Maximo Alvarez is accused of Arson for setting on fire the house
of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez. Susan Ramirez, the Respondent, called
on Esperanza the estranged wife of Maximo who has been separated de
facto from him for 6 months, to testify against him. Petitioner Alvarez
initially did not raise an objection. In the course of Esperanzas direct
testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled emotions,
prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings. Then, petitioner,
through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying
against him pursuant to the rule on marital disqualification. Respondent
filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial
court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other
witnesses.RTC rule in favor of Alvarez. Aggrieved, Ramirez sought
nullification of the RTC ruling via Certiorari. CA granted certiorari. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in said
Criminal Case.
HELD: YES.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec.
22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
oragainst the other without the consent of the affected spouse ,except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger
of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases
for offenses committed by one against the other. Where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave avoid in the
unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner,
directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza.
His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him
,eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes
People v Castaneda
Facts: Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of
Public Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San
Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed
of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of
Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her marital
consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the

defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130.
The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a
husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
Held: No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule.
WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other. In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said
house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the
deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have
been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same
breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the
victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by
the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is
undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which
seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to
be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such
a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will
be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home.
DEATH OR INSANITY (DEAD MAN'S STATUTE)
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
G.R. No. 143340

August 15, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership
with Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
business name of their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted
by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly
his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting,
inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the
partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending
that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits,
interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a
cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners filed
a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence,
this petition.

Page 30 of 68

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto
from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to
show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues
that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of
respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership
three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners
invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent
and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain
claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render
respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.
RULING:
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or
persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound
mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this
case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents
in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that
when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death
of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the
estate or representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not
make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means
"assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a

right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff.

Bordalba v. CA(G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
Facts:
In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an
Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot. Shecaused the
subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the
conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondents,however,
claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an extrajudicial partition
made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint todeclare void the
Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles issued. The trial court,
finding that fraud was employed by petitioner inobtaining the Free Patent,
declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, the purchaser and mortgagee ofthe two parcels conveyed were
declared in good faith, hence, upheld their rights over the property. Both
petitioner and private respondentsappealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that
private respondents areentitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner
should be ordered to reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents.
Petitionercontends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private
respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of
hermother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
violated the dead man's statute. Likewise, petitioner questions theright of
private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion
Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between thedisputed lot and the parcel
of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.

drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced
him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her
wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but
when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got
worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim

Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine
and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the
RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there
confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to
submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered
by physician-patient privilege.The RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielenes motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting
her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the CA. The CA denied
Josielenes petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?
Held:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in anyother way
than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication
made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses
in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed ofExtra-judicial
Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications
with the deceased, the questioned testimonies wereproperly admitted by the
trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents
are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other
than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was
presented by them to substantiate their allegations.Besides, in order that an
heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly
denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of
the physician-patient communication.

RULING: NO.

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
xxxx
CHAN vs. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013 702 SCRA

FACTS: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara filed before the

RTC of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her.
Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and
that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant

Page 31 of 68

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in

a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that

a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient

cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any

facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history
of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to
make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure.
Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court
and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

The right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the

documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily
and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the
Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very
questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN
REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge
simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the
plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion
for Reconsideration.
xxxx

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are
not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that
may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.

[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and
presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of
the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the
Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say
more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That
the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in
Question is That Homelot:

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the

hospital recordsthe results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patients records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latters prior consent.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch
30, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCOJACOBA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 5921
March 10, 2006
FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff
Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer against
defendant Federico Barrientos. The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to
the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge
Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom
issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of
Veneracion. Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with
Request for Inhibition). The resolution was signed by Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the JacobaVelasco-Jacoba Law Firm. pertinent portions of which read: (NOTE: Read
this as this is central to the case)

THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the

Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x
This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in
Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took
Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the SubjectMatter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that
JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and
not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously
ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As
Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the
Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court
Judge.
xxxx

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it
is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x xHOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The
mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx

Page 32 of 68

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best
illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS
conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial
MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!

Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and

explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001

motion. In her Explanation, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows

beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show
that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this
case." Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to
degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any
form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice." She
rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic,
strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent
words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then
collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and
utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a
staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be
called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their
feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their
good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the
Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors
deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters involved
were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a
spade. x x x14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for
whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded
discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and gone out of
bounds." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases
stricken off the record.
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine
of P1,000. Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that
on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba
("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na,
baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.)
She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind
faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life
and future." This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which
Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the
practice of law. Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her
guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing.

purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal
effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court
document. Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July
2001 motion only because of her husbands request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According
to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this
happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other." By
Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule
7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a
ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other
ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear
in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of VelascoJacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion. The Court
cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead,
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he
"trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to
be gigantic and monumental." Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version
of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events
was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the
controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in
Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she had not
"actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying
that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before
deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari
anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacobas handiwork.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by
failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct
that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba
who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

SAMALA vs. VALENCIA

Judge Lacurom issued another order, this time directing Jacoba to explain
why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied, wherein he denied
that he typed or prepared the motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements
implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500. Judge Lacurom
filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Respondents did not file an answer and neither did
they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro.
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10
October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the
practice of law for six months. Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought
reconsideration of the IBP Board decision.

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007 512 SCRA

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Clarita J. Samala against Atty.

Luciano D. Valencia for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving
on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly
misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c)
initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and
(d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING: Yes.
a. On serving as counsel for contending parties Canon 21

ISSUE: Whether Jacoba may invoke the marital privilege rule in evidence
HELD: The Marital Privilege Rule was waived.
a By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified
that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the

Page 33 of 68

The fact that respondent filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v.
Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is
protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between
him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is
required. Respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against

Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in
another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's
adversary either in the same case or in a different but related action. A
lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former
client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly
or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the former client.

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He
learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez

and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez
against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which
merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have
withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being
warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge
of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK.

b. On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary

evidence Canon 10
Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted
was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in
1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership. What is decisive in this case is
respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one,
TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not
misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent
in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the
fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.

c. On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental

fees Dismissed for lack of sufficient basis
The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of
his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made
the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the
same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the
interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a
practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his
client.
d. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children Canon 1, Rule 1.01
The Court found respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three
children by TeresitaLagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first
wife was still alive. In this case, the admissions made by respondent are
more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that
may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer,
immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community. Thus, in several cases, the
Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in
defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. That
respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his
wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to
mitigate his liability.
In sum, the Court found respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia guilty of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for
three years.
1.

Almonte v. Vasquez

G.R. No. 95367

May 23, 1995
Mendoza

FACTS: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires

petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services
Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing
his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena
duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and
a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a
syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating
funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency
Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last
Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone,
Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB
agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and
brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the
allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the

Page 34 of 68

subpoena

and

the

subpoena

duces

tecum

but

was

denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of

privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of
EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and
this
could
"destroy
the
EIIB."
ISSUE: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating
to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that
such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of
laws.
DECISION: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case
at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed
by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made
for
a
privilege
resting
on
other
considerations.
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB
were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in
1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel
records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the
people
of
the
Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the
laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved
parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn
statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before
the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a
manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot
afford
to
hire
lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum
would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to
state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public
records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are.
Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for
personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason
why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent
Ombudsman.

ADMISSIONS
CONSTANTINO vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR.
G.R. No. 181508

October 2, 2013

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for nullification of a

document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and tax
declarations issued on the basis of such document. Petitioners claimed that
the document was valid, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary
agreement between and among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Also, that Respondents through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver, hence they already has their share. Pre-trial conferencewas
conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as
well as identification of the issues to be litigated.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents finding both the

parties in pari delicto. CA ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring that
the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" since the lot actually belongs to
Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the CA stipulations

and admissions during the pre-trial conference.

RULING: Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the

admissions made no less by the respondents during the pre-trial conference
where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534
belongs to Pedro Sr.

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions.
Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the
issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court
emphasized that:Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed
by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of
the disadvantage. (Highlighting ours)

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that: A party who

judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions
are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary
of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.4

706 SCRA

FACTS: Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and
respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is the subject
lang. Upon his death, he was survived by 6 children. Of of those is Pedro

Page 35 of 68

Constantino, Jr (grandfather of respondents) and Santiago Constantino, who

was survived by his 5 children (one of those is petitioner Oscar Tolentino)

We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial
admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the
course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pretrial can still be taken up.

GR No. 147201
January 15, 2004
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the
general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party
making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when
it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2)
when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation
before and during the trial.

DOLDOL vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164481

ISSUE: Did accused validly waive his right to counsel? Did the police
afford the accused the right to be inflormed?

September 20, 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Conformably to the Memorandum[1] dated April 6, 1995 of the

Provincial Auditor, a team of State Auditors conducted an audit of the cash
and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund, Special
Education Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November
30, 1994 to June 8, 1995. Doldol and the Municipal Accountant were
present during the audit. On two occasion that the The State Auditors
conducted an audit, they discovered that Doldol had a shortage
of P801,933.26 and P149,905.92, respectively. He was directed directed
him to submit within 72 hours a written explanation why he incurred such
shortage. Ob both instances, he failed to respond.
On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting
that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash account, taking exception
to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for a
re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15,
1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which
he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the
balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995,
and P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged
on his promise.
Provincial Auditor requested that Doldol be charged for malversation of
public funds. Two informations for malversation of public funds were then
filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City.
RTC AND CA ruled against Doldol.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred In convicting the accused-petitioner
on the basis of an erroneous and incomplete audit and that it was
not proven that the funds were used for personal benefit
Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no
competent and credible evidence to prove that the missing funds were
actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner
could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the
recipients and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover,
the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the
missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995,P200,000.00
on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995.
He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to
remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners
of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the
missing funds. The ruling of the CA on this matter is correct:
We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with
appellants commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing
funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied
admission of appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing
funds to his personal use.[15]
CONFESSIONS
People vs. Sayaboc

Page 36 of 68

FACTS: On December 2, 1994, accused, committed murder. On March 8,

1995, witnesses identified Sayaboc at the PNP Headquarters as the gunman
who shot victim to death. On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao
was called to take the statement of Sayaboc. Before taking the statement of
Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc
told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since
Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a
lawyer wherein they brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then
conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say,
okay, he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo
remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning
Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room.
That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect.
He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon
Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty.
Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.

DECISION: The SC ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional
right to counsel. The facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration
of the custodial investigation. The right to a competent and independent
counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct
of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. In People v.
Deniega, the SC said that the desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired. The SC likewise ruled that the police
did not afford the accused the right to be informed. The right to be informed
requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. The police
failed in this regard.

TANENGGEE VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013 699 SCRA
FACTS: Carlos Tanenngee was a manager of a branch of Metropolitan
Bank and was charged with five counts of estafa for forging the promissory
notes which he caused to appear to be executed by a long time client of the
bank. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office
of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the
form of questions and answers. In said interview, Tanenggee admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging
the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or
personally received by him although it should be the client of the bank who
should receive the same. All the answers of the appellant were contained in
a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by
him. Among others, Tanengge alleged that said written statement was taken
in violation of his rights under the Constitution, particularly of his right to
remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against
him.
The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals admitted the written
statement of Tanenggee and found him guilty of Estafa.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in
evidence of the petitioners written statement based on its finding that he
was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same
was taken.
RULING:No. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is
applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means
any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant manner. While it is undisputed that petitioner gave an

uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the
branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained
of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly,
petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have
been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement. The right to counsel "applies only to admissions made in
a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation."
It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary,
his written statement was found to have been executed freely and
consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
CONDUCT AND CHARACTER
PEOPLE VS NARDO
G.R. No. 133888
March 1, 2001
Per Curiam
FACTS: The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accusedappellant. She was born on September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the
incident, was fourteen (14) years old. During the trial, the defense
endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were
cited wherein the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her
parents' permission to leave the house. The defense also presented Atty.
Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes the victim
as the one capable of concocting lies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of rape was established.
DECISION: While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the
falsehoods committed by the victim assuming them for the moment to be
true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging
one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious
repercussions. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that:
"Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like."
On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have
given credence to the witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a
member of the bar, the court reasoned out that the witness took the witness
stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity
as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be
accorded him by the trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar.
He did not appear in that case as an officer of the court but as a mere
witness, and hence should be treated as one.
Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court
find nothing which would destroy the moral certainty of accusedappellant's guilt. While there may be some inconsistencies in the testimony
of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies which serve to
strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of
falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses,
as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such
minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard
against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected to
recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her
virtue.
REPUBLIC OF THE PH VS. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA G.R.
No. 146030. December 3, 2002]
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained through fraud
or misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive
period provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking
for the reversion of property acquired through such means.
Facts:
-Felipe Alejaga filed Patent application on Dec. 28, 1978.

Page 37 of 68

-But Dec. 27, 1978, Efren Recio, land inspector, already submitted report
of his investigation and verification to District Land office.
-He was approved of his application and was issued OCT.
-2 years after, Felipe mortgaged the property to PNB for a security of a
loan.
-Ignacio Arrobang filed through counsel in a letter-complaint requested
the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land
Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
[respondent].
-Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division,
Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his
Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land
Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands
appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No.
(VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15
in the name of [respondent].
-Solicitor General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas
City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent
Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899
hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
RTC: declared that the approval of patent application was null and void
and cancelled the patent and title
CA: reversed decision; petitioner failed to prove that respondents obtained
the patent through fraud or mistake
Issue:
1) whether or not the grant was valid
SC:
-free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void.
Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land
Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property
acquired through such means
1) This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over
the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or
fraud, signs of which were20 ignored by the Court of Appeals.
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance
with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.22 Under Section 91
thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are
true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient
notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in
order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their
claims.24 Note that this notice and the verification and investigation
of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an application for free
patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
verification should have been done only after the filing of the
application.
the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted
is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself,
which bears no signature.
>>the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not
been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted
that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios
alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the
latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself
to cross-examination, the Investigation Report33 he had submitted to
the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony.
Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal
knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.34 On the
other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered
as
independently
relevant.35
>>The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be

admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were

actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue36
or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The
information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court
as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the

investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and
was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court

DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE vs MONTAEZ
G.R. No. 148257
March 17, 2004

HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE

PATULA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012 699 SCRA 135
FACTS: Patula was a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
and was accused of Estafa for allegedly failing to turn over the collected
sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the
express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to the said company. The prosecution presented two witnesses,
the manager of the store who testified on the duties and responsibilities of
Patula and auditor Guivencan of the company who testified on her findings.
Guivencan testified that she conducted her audit by going to the customers
in places from Mabinay to Zamboanga and Negros Oriental, and then in
Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the
receipts petitioner submitted to the office. The difference was stipulated in
her written report to the manager. The prosecution offered various
documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to
each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of
the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives.
In the course of Guivencans direct-examination, Patulas counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in
the exhibit and their derivatives, were hearsay because the persons who had
made the entries were not themselves presented in court. RTC, stating that
inasmuch as Patula had opted not to present evidence for her defense the
Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted, found
Patula guilty of estafa. Patula went straight to the Supreme Court via
Petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the list of
customers covered by Patula with difference in record is not hearsay.
RULING: Yes, the trial court erred in not finding the list hearsay hence
inadmissible. Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan
prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided
in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness
derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath
to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then

Page 38 of 68

NOTES:Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the
brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that
death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial
evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization
that he was in a dying condition.
FACTS:This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals under
Section 14, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court dated September 19, 1995
convicting the appellant of murder, as principal by direct participation, and
set aside the Order of the trial court dated November 17, 1995 modifying its
decision and convicting the appellant of murder, but only as accomplice.
On August 11, 1993, an Information was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Tangub City charging the appellant of murder.
Edmundo Ollanes testified that in the evening of July 20, 1993,
he was fishing along the seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven
Hintogaya and his younger brother, Perlito Ollanes. They stopped fishing
by 11:00 a.m., sold their catch, and went home. Edmundo took a shortcut,
while Joven and Perlito walked home together. He and Perlito had a
flashlight with them, while Joven carried a kerosene lamp. Perlitos house
was only about forty meters from his, and Joven lived only about eighteen
meters away.
As Edmundo was climbing the stairs to his house, he heard
gunshot coming from the direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the
scene and passed by Jovens house. He then saw his brother lying prostrate
nearby. As he was facing towards the ground, the left side of his face tilted
towards his left shoulder, he saw the appellant, who was armed with a long
firearm.
Edmundo carried his brother in his arms and noticed the gunshot
wounds on the latters chest. He was still alive, but barely breathing. Perlito
told him that he was on the verge of death. When Edmundo asked Perlito
who shot him, the latter declared that it was the appellant. Perlito
mentioned the appellants name three times. Edmundo carried Perlito to the
hospital, but the latter died on the way.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Edmundo regarding the statement
of Perlito that it was Cesario Montanez who shot him is admissible.
HELD: YES.
Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying
declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity
when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is
gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the
declarant did not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the
degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded
shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a
dying condition.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
THEODORE BERNAL
NOTES: "Declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the
same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had
no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other

persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged
with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an information dated
July 13, 1992.A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his
arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while
Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they
invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a few minutes,
Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch
his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked
the latter if he was "Payat." When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled
out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run
because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a score to
settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately
went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the
abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain
Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with
Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping.
Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
A certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr.
money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to
do it again because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife's
infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher
arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.
On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal
"guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the
abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of
P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering."
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the
prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him
when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Enriquez is admissible.
HELD: YES
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest
and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the
present provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has
been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary,
proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following
requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that
it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he
made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary
to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify
and believed such declaration to be true."
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon
to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his
own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in

Page 39 of 68

evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his

own detriment.
DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Tison vs CA
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an
apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an
apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him
and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison
et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed
property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The
respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is
inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for
cross-examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is
inadmissible.
DECISION: The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their
admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right
to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made
ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy
has arisen thereon.
FAMILY REPUTATION
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case
was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39
years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in
1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina
alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for
her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco
Jison.
DECSION: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous
and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally,
but
continuously.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences
offered by Monina:

1.
2.

That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and
conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos
lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school
records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity.
With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of
age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if
Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that
Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high
standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous
possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance
of
evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate,
Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive
provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
RES GESTAE
PEOPLE vs. LOBRIGAS
G.R. No. 147649
December 17, 2002

are

DECSION: YES
The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be
deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by
the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same
are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made
to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.

Page 40 of 68

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
PEOPLE vs. VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011 647 SCRA 43

NOTE: Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the

fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity
thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the
statements are admissible as evidence.
FACTS; This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 9694, convicting accused-appellant
Frank Lobrigas of the crime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as actual, exemplary and moral damages.
The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On
February 19, 1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining
and he had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix
returned to Castor Gudens house with bruises on his face and injuries all
over his body. He told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant
Frank Lobrigas, accused Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at the
store. Felix spent the night in Castors house and left the following morning
to go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his wounds
in the saltwater. However, the next day, Felix Taylaran died.
Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the
mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by
Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He told her that he
was in pain and felt weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar
apparently to recuperate.
Dr. Tito Miranda of the Municipal Health unit of Loon, Bohol conducted an
autopsy on the body of the victim and concluded that the immediate cause
of death was internal hemorrhage caused by the severe beating and mauling
on the chest portion of the victims body.
An information for murder was filed. After trial, the court a quo rendered
judgment, finding herein accused Frank Lobrigas GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
Accused-appellant contends that there was no direct evidence linking him
as one of the assailants. He claims that while there were ante-mortem
declarations made by the victim to the two prosecution witnesses pointing
to him as one of the maulers, the trial court, nevertheless, dismissed them as
invalid dying declaration since they were uttered by the victim not under a
consciousness of an impending death. Neither should such declarations be
considered as part of res gestae since the victim was drunk and very mad at
Teodorico Mante for confiscating his knife while he was being attacked by
his assailants.
ISSUE: whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
admissible

A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as

an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal
act, the mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations
were made shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still
under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The
declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix
Taylaran. However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does
not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a
day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence
was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solartes testimony
on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements
distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof,
but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.

FACTS: Villarico et al. were charged and convicted for the Murder of a
certain Haide Cagatan. During trial, the prosecution was able to present the
sister-in law and the father of the victim, both of whom positively identified
Villarico et al, as the perpetrators of the crime. In their testimony, they
actually saw the defendants at the time of the shooting because it took place
in their house (in the kitchen). Both of them testified that by their position
near the kitchen, they were able to see clearly all of the accused outside
their nipa hut. In addition, the mother of the victim who was in the sala at
that time testified that right after she heard gunshots, Haide called out for
help and exclaimed that it was Berting who had shot him. Shortly after he
was rushed to the hospital, the victim died. All of the accused pleaded not
guilty and offered an alibi. The RTC found all of them guilty of homicide
but this was modified by the Court of Appeals and ruled that they
committed Murder. Upon appeal, the accused contends that the prosecution
has failed to prove the identity of the assailant as the testimony of the
mother of the accused did not actually saw Berting shoot Haide.
ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
the mother of Haide who did not see the actual shooting.
RULING: No. The court was correct admitting the testimony of the mother
of Haide. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot
by the group of Berting uttered in the immediate aftermath of the
shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res gestae.
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had

time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act the shooting of
Haide was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother
about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time
to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the
shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling
occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the
assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for
being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS
ILANO,
DANIEL
ILANO
AND
FELIPA
JAVALERA, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros
Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros
Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264
from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for
Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in August 1985.
Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the following:
1. CHECK-IN TIME Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in
counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight.
We will consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted
passenger if you fail to check-in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED
departure time. (Exhs. (1-A-A, 2-A-1, S-A, O-A-1, tsn. Nov 23, 1987, p. 8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of
the defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published
departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before
departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the
employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats
awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and
seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach
of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of
contract of carriage. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the
questioned decision by the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial
court's finding that defendant-appellant is liable for damages on the sole
issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the material
admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that
substantiate the defense of defendant-appellant.
HELD: It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who
checked-in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p.
13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary
evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses
are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets
of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the
printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well
as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in
clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the
passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the nonaccommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents)are entries
made in the regular course of business which the private respondents failed
to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing
or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are
evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts,
is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force
than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory
and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p.
654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written
document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de

Page 41 of 68

Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is
amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in
their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the counter until
thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time and that the
employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2)
and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different
PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. TSNs of
November 17, 1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private
respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving
cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as
statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the
main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate,
qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32
C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to
believe the version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased their
tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract
of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The terms of the
contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not
militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the
result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their
tickets by PAL is only proper.
ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD
RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.,
INC., respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck which

was insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co. While the policy was
in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in
Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck,
, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the
insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained
damages.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds
from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company
on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was
found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a
proper drivers license at the time of the accident. The restriction in
Leonardo Anits drivers license provided that he can only drive fourwheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured
truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated
the authorized driver clause of the insurance policy. In addition,
respondent cited the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo
INP, to wit:
C-UN-85
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES R/
IMPRUDENCE
11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at
Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa,
assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date
at the aforementioned place, a collision took place between a truck (Hino)
with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE
Y COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142
and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG-538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver
(sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya,
Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482.
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact
another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured
truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive
vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As
evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report [7] wherein
the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was
Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said
report was made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985.
However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the
claim.

Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. RTC dismissed
the case for plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of action against the defendant.
CA affirmed

likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries

he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the
investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the
blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the
investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

ISSUE: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

THE LOWER COURT RELIED MAINLY ON SECTION 44, RULE 130
OF THE RULES OF COURT IN UPHOLDING THE ENTRY IN THE
POLICE BLOTTER WHICH STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE
INSURED VEHICLE WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, WHO WAS
NOT AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION 44,
RULE 130 ITSELF HOWEVER, THE POLICE BLOTTER IS MERELY A
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN WHICH
MAY BE NULLIFIED BY OTHER EVIDENCE/ The admissibility and
probative value of the police blotter as evidence

SABILI vs. COMELEC

G. R. No. 193261 APRIL 24, 2012 670 SCRA 664

HELD: Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight

given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC and
the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle
Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself,
attesting that it was Giddie Boy Coyel, not Leonardo Anit, who was driving
the insured vehicle.[16]
Respondent avers that the same police report and testimony were of
dubious nature. Both trial and appellate courts noted that the report was
made three days after the accident and did not form part of the official
police records.[17]
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the
Rules of Court.[18] Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for
its admissibility:
(a)

that the entry was made by a public officer, or by

another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b)

that it was made by the public officer in the

performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;

(c)

that the public officer or other person had sufficient

knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.[19]

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police
blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records.
[20]
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of
the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact
therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or
nullified by other competent evidence. [21] Although police blotters are of
little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information
subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit
was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is
unlike People v. Mejia,[22] where we said that entries in the police blotters
should not be given undue significance or probative value, since the Court
there found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in material
particulars.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and
formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was

Page 42 of 68

FACTS: When Sabili filed his Certificate of Candicay for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of
the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections,
he had been twice elected as Provincial Board Member representing the
4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th
District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that
when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas.
Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification against him before the COMELEC. He
alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner
falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident
of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May
2010 local elections. Sabili, to prove his residence in Lipa, presented
among others the Certificate of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade.
Despite garnering the highest number of votes in the Mayoralty elections,
Sabili was ruled to be disqualified by the COMELEC. The COMELEC did
not take into consideration the certificate of residency executed by the
baranggay captain on the ground that it was not notarized. Hence, upon the
petition for review with the Supreme Court, another certificate was
submitted which has been duly notarized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in not considering the
certificate of Residency executed by the baranggay captain
RULING: Yes. We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the
Barangay Captains Certification and find the same tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary public,
Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but
would also be entitled to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community
Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. The Supreme Court explained that the
following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to
be admissible in evidence:
a)
b)
c)

The entry was made by a public officer, or by another

person specially enjoined by law to do so;
It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and
The public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must
have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local

Government Code to keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay. Regarding the second requisite, it is recognized that it is the
business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own
barangay. Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captains exercise of
powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to
these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in
faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification
on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

COMMERCIAL LISTS
QUISUMBING vs MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 142943
April 3, 2002
FACTS:Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022
.
Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private
corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the
government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized
and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
"Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of
a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City,
which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos.
They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of
furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the
1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a
member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the
Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of
Chamber of Furniture.
"On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-thespot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House
no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffsappellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of
asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which
was granted.
After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to
the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had
been tampered and unless they pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing
the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina
informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard
operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that
questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the
disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC)
may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal
Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio
instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffsappellees' electric service which the latter faithfully complied.
"On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish
electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted
with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting
their power supply which was done without due process, and without due
regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business
reputation.
ISSUE: whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed
by respondent.
HELD: YES
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been
conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96
that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this amount
was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer
Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary
evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding
computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and
examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been
meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical
consumption.
TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING
G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LANIE
ORTIZMIYAKE accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar

Page 43 of 68

del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false
pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan
alone.
A judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both
crimes as charged. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large
scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was
a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with
two counts of estafa. In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment
case, the court adopted the facts and conclusions established in the estafa
decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in
the case before it.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ADOPTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OF THE
FACTS STATED IN THE DECISION OF THE PARAAQUE TRIAL
COURT FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION AS THE EXCEPTION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW
PURSUANT TO SEC. 47 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT
RULING:
NO. Under the law, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it
is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already
testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the
hearsay rule previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious (section 47 of Rule 130).
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated
in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception
to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers
only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments. In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies
made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa
case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a
basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was
the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment,
while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. [30] It may not be used to prove that the
accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a
subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.
GO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 677 SCRA 213
FACTS: Go et al were criminally charged with Other Deceits under the
RPC for mortgaging a chattel with Highdone Ltd. et al misrepresenting the
same to be the first mortgage where the truth is it already had a prior
mortgage. Consequently, damages were sustained by the company.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to
the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take
Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung
infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health. MeTC granted the motion but this was nullified by
the RTC on the ground the rule on taking of depositions of witnesses in
civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific
provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness
against him face to face. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals held because
no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in
criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely
objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the
witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on deposition may be applied suppletorily

in the criminal case
RULING: No. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an
Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It
is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking
of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable
for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place
at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly
nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court
concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge
presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in
the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not

Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus, armed
with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Terrified,
Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father. Thereafter,
she saw her mother, Rowena, running out of their house and crying for
help.
Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However,
Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was pronounced dead on
arrival.
The three accused were charged with murder before the RTC. Edwin and
Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large.
Thereafter, trial ensued
The defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different
version of the events. The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the
sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being at the scene
of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.
RTC held that the accused were guilty which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rachel was a competent witness considering that
she is a mere child.
RULING: Yes, the SC ruled that Rachels testimony cannot be taken
lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the
incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing
that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating
the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may
be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.12 Thus, petitioners flimsy objections
on Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel
as to who killed her father.
OPINION RULE

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly

applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special
proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official
under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial
examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically
ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules
of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
CHILD WITNESS RULE
PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
GR 197813 September 25,2013 706 SCRA 358
FACTS: On 29 Aug 2004, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was
invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin making them
a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredos daughter, an adolescent at the time, was
underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a neighbor, three (3)
meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his companions were
ostensibly in merrymaking.
Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo
relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and
hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as
his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by

Page 44 of 68

EXPERT WITNESS
PEOPLE vs PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL
G.R. No. 123137
October 17, 2001
NOTE: There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is
sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3)
presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based.
FACTS: On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350
for murder and CBU-33664 for illegal possession of firearms, finding
appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms.
The facts of the case are as follows:
At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news
reporter then aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in
P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when he heard a couple of gunshots. He
looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the intersection
of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man
was shouting "Tabang, tabang!" ("Help! Help!"). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red
"Jiffy" make a U-turn near the gate of the city central school that nearly ran
over the man shouting for help. The man turned back and staggered towards
the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after a few
meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.
Meanwhile, the "Jiffy" followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a
tall, thin man alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure.

He boarded the "Jiffy" which sped away towards Leon Kilat Street. Romeo
Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on the victim.
While the patrol cars were chasing the "Jiffy," another police team
proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This team from
Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the
Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police
Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from
the victim's body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain,
and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics
testing.
An information for murder and illegal possession of firearms were file
against Abriol. When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Abriol was convicted.
Appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel
Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is
ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer,
goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with "the
required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject
by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the
caliber of a bullet." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and
expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and
cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the
crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's failure to take the
necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE: whether the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the
prosecution's ballistics is credible.
HELD: YES. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or
calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses
special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is
sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3)
presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based.
The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert
opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.
In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics
ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the
absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the
Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and
conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion
based on his examination deserves credit. He found the
impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were testfired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the
scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into)
the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence
that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply
imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to
that gun and that gun alone. These marking might be
microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their
origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification,
as the print left by the human finger.
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics
expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command
and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had
previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not
present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to
support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing
that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is
sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar
characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
BAUTISTA vs. CA
G.R. No. 158015
August 11, 2004
NOTE: A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of
handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still
exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.
FACTS: On appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure is a Decision of the Court of Appeals in

Page 45 of 68

CA-G.R. CV No. 45549,1 reversing and setting aside the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83179002 and entering a new one declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of
Absolute Sale between the late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null and
void.
The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda (formerly
Washington) Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of approximately
105 square meters. This parcel of land was previously owned and registered
in the name of the late Cesar Morelos under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 27604. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being
the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos.
Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children.
Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15, 1982. During
his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in
favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 254843 was issued in the name of petitioner Laura
Bautista.
Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of
Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 83-17900, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII. At
the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the
signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his.
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness
to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and
petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring the Deed of
Sale dated April 5, 1982 executed between the late Cesar Morelos in favor
of Laura Bautista valid, and dismissed for insufficient evidence the claims
and counterclaims for damages of the parties.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside
the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF EXPERT
WITNESSES ARE CONCLUSIVE TO BE A STRONG BASIS TO
NULLIFY A DULY EXECUTED AND NOTARIZED DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE.
HELD: NO. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony
of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge
still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same
sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or
molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over
allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of
the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the
contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an
expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed
the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been
physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura
Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioners.
AVELINO VS PEOPLE
GR 181444 July 17, 2013 701 SCRA 477
FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Chairman Hispano was shot by three men
while driving his owner type jeep at Tondo Manila. The incident was
witnessed by Alfredo Manlangsang. According to the witness he was not
able to identify the two assailant but was able to recognized the third
assailant as Bobby Avelino when the latter pulled his bonnet down to his
chin.
The accused denied the accusation and presented as evidence the
testimonies of PO2 Galang, Adonis Bantiling and SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
Moreover, the accused advance the defense of denial and alibi.
RTC held the accused guilty which was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not giving credence to the testimony of

SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regard the position of the gun men.
RULING: No, the CA was correct in not giving credence to the opinion of
SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the position of the gunman when the
latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board
the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to
Manalangsangs testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan
was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the
location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were
found is immaterial.
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one
that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an
expert.27 In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the
necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
ORDINARY WITNESS
PEOPLE vs. DURANAN
GR Nos. 134074-75 January 16, 2001
FACTS: This criminal case for the rape of Mania Lozada was filed against
"kalbo". The prosecution presented, among others the mothers of the
victim, Virginia de Lara Lozada to establish the mental condition of the
victim. This was opposed by the accused on the ground that the mother is
not an expert witness.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence is admissible.
RULING: Yes, the mother of an offended party in case of rape, though not
a psychiatrist if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party
how she was born what she was suffering from, and what her attainments
are is competent to testify on the matter. It is competent for the ordinary
witness to give opinion as to the sanity and mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe speed,
manner, habits and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is
required that the witness details, the factors and reasons upon which he
bases opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of
verneout said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another when based upon the conversations or dealings which
he has had with such person or upon any fact learning upon his mental
condition with the witness own knowledge and observation he having first
testified of such conversations, dealings, appearance or another observed
facts as the basis for his opinion.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DEOPITA y GUZMAN
GR NO 130601 DECEMBER 4, 2000
FACTS: At about 9:00 PM in the evening of April 16 1995 complaining
witness Dominga Pikit-pikit was walking on her way home from work,
when a man suddenly appeared from behind, lopped his arm around her
neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man dragged
her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields. When Dominga
shouted for help, the man pushed her on the ground and punched her on the
stomach. Dominga got a good look at the man, who turned out to be
accussed-appellant Rafael Deopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and
proceeded to divest her belongings- ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian
diamonds, wedding ring and P1000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on
his face, the victim clearly saw Deopita place the items on the right pocket
of his shorts. Thereafter, accused-appellant Deopita announced his desire to
have carnal knowledge of Dominga. As he was sexually assaulting her,
Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts
proved futile until he finally satisfied his lust. During the investigation,
Dominga positively identified the accused-appellant and pointed at him
from the 4 men in police line-up. Thus, Deopita was detained while the
others were released. The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi.
Accuses-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 in the evening of
April 16, 1995 he was with his wife Flora, sin Ryan and fellow Jehovah's
Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio
Nisnisan for an informal bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan.
Accuses-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he never left the
place, Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and
testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith.
The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of
the crime charged. Consequently, the accused-appellant is now before us on
appeal.

Page 46 of 68

ISSUE: Whether or not accussed-appellant is guilty of the crime charge.

RULING: We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by
accused-appellant in his brief. He tenaciously maintains that it was
impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and
that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man
and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the
position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against
any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in
the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good
moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the
failure of the trial court to give credence to the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs Witnesses, and as
such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his
whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the
first. We quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of
the trial courts ruling on this point x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time.
The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his comembers in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when
the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at
best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the
facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated (underscoring
supplied).
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best
and most competently performed by the trial court who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available
but not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on
the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would affect the result of the case. There is no
compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF PROOF

FEBTC VS CHANTE
GR 170598 October 9, 2013 707 SCRA 149
FACTS: Robert Mar Chante (Chan), was a depositor of FEBTC. FEBTC
issued him an ATM Card. The card, known as a "Do-It-All" card to handle
credit card and ATM transactions, was tagged in his current account.
As a security feature, a PIN, known only to the depositor, was required in
order to gain access to the account. With the use of the PIN, Chan could
then deposit and withdraw funds from his current account from any FEBTC

ATM facility, including the MEGALINK facilities of other member banks

that included the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
FEBTC alleged that on May 4 and 5, 1992, Chan had used his card to
withdraw funds totaling P967k from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. Such amount withdrawn was more than
the outstanding balance of Chans current account. FEBTC added that at the
time of the ATM withdrawal transactions, there was an error in its computer
system known as "system bug" whose nature had allowed Chan to
successfully withdraw funds in excess of his current credit balance of
P198k; and that Chan had taken advantage of the system bug to do the
withdrawal transactions.
FEBTC filed a complaint to recover the over withdrawn amount (P770k). It
alleged that the ATM transactions in question would not be processed
unless the PIN, which was known only to Chan as the cardholder, had been
correctly entered, an indication both that it was his ATM card that had been
used, and that all the transactions had been processed successfully by the
PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel with the use
of the correct PIN.
Chan denied the liability and claims that he did not make such withdrawals
and further claims that it could possibly an inside job.
RTC ruled in favor of FEBTC and held Chan liable for P770k based on the
acts of the latter of issuing a check amounting to his available balance in
the current account. On appeal, CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not FEBTC was able to discharge the burden of proof.
RULING: No, the fact that Chans account number and ATM card number
were the ones used for the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support
the conclusion that he should be deemed to have made the withdrawals.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different
concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion; and (b) the duty of
producing evidence, In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth
of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law
demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the
duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of
trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking,
burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue.
The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it
because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it.13 Verily, the party
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
PRESUMPTIONS
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC vs CA
G.R. No. 123817
December 17, 1999
NOTE:Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
FACTS:Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and
33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. On March 21, 1976, the
spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein
petitioner]. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the
petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein
private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed
to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged
lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and
awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the
Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on
October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires
two (2) years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial
foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On September 23, 1981,
private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the
redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the
redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots.
The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that
private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.

Page 47 of 68

Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their

redemption of the foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial
foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon
them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed
lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price
before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period.
The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents
had no right to redeem the lots because they were not the real parties in
interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the
right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was no
need of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only
the posting of notice of sale at three public places of the municipality where
the properties are located was required.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents and against the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court. A timely Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 14, 1996. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED
AVAILABILITY OF REDEMPTION DESPITE THE LAPSE OF ONE
YEAR FROM DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE.
DECISION: NO.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not
object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it
could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period
specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply
a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is
proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and
inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two
years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years,
petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was
only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises
when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully
relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects
diligence, meticulousness and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner
diligently reviewed the Certificate of Sale it could have easily discovered
that the period was extended one year beyond the usual period for
redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected
to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than
that expected of an ordinary business firm.
SPOUSES ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN
G.R. No. 128568
April 9, 2003
NOTE:After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the
petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the
contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house
after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
FACTS:On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an, Menas Tanggaan, Virginia III Yvette Tangga-an, Cecil Villaflor, Hermes Tangga-an, Venus
Tangga-an, Jupiter Tangga-an, Yvonne Fri and Vivien Tangga-an filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
R-33928, against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda
Alcaraz.
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of
respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the rest of the respondents)
leased a residential building (house) located at Premier Street, Hipodromo,
Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the
use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the
lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the
National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the petitioner
spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of
P4,000 beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993,
they failed to pay rent. Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in

the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay

the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential
building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same. Respondents
sought to repossess the property for their own use and benefit.
On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the
ownership of the lot on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA
to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio Tangga-an is the son of the
late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of
the other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was
consequently issued in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the
petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the
house resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between
respondents and petitioner spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new
owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents since the
latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.
On January 5, 1995, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants.
MTC held that the petitioner spouses clearly violated the contract of lease
due to non-payment of rent. They failed to show that the subject house
belonged to Virgilio alone. On the other hand, the respondents proved that,
after the death of Virgilia, they registered said house in the name of their
trustees, co-respondents Hermes Tangga-an and his wife. Furthermore,
considering that Virgilios claim of ownership over the lot was the subject
of a pending litigation for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of
property involving the Tangga-ans, the MTC ruled that it "cannot usurp to
pass judgment on the issues, as well as the conflicting claims of the parties
therein."
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Hence, a petition for
review of the decision dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision dated June 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 17, which in turn upheld the decision dated
January 5, 1995 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cebu City, Branch
2, ordering the ejectment of the petitioner spouses from the house they were
renting from respondents.
ISSUE:Whether the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios
assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership
of the building.
DECISION: NO.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive
presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances
of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act,
or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it;
xxx
xxx
xxx
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the
petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the
contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house
after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease
without judicial approval. Due to the change in ownership of the land, the
petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract because
Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title
to the lot. They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their
obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the
house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to
extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the terms thereof.
Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express
stipulation to that effect. What the petitioner spouses should have done was
to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to litigate their
claims and to deposit the rentals in court.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
ROSARIO vs. SORIA
GR194846 June 19, 2013 699 SCRA 232
FACTS: Spouses Luis Rosaroso (Luis) and Honorata Duazo (Honorata)
acquired several real properties in Cebu City. The couple had nine (9)
children namely: Hospicio, Arturo, Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel,

Page 48 of 68

Cleofe, Antonio, and Angelica. On April 25, 1952, Honorata died. Later on,
Luis married Lourdes Pastor Rosaroso (Lourdes).
Hospicio, Antonio , Angelica and Cleofe (Petitioners) alleged the Luis, with
full consent of his second wife, Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
(First Sale) over six (6) parcel of land (Lot 8, 19, 22, 23, 5665 and 7967) in
Cebu on 04 Nov 1991.
Petitioners further alleged that on 23 Aug 1994, Lucilla and Laila, daughter
of Lucilla, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Second Sale), by virtue of
SPA from Luis, over three (3) parcel of Lot in favor of Meridian Realty
Corporation (Meridian) despite the first sale. Such SPA was accomplished
by affixing Luis thumbmark and despite the latter being sick, infirm, blind,
and of unsound mind.
On January 16, 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
with Damages was filed by Luis, as one of the plaintiffs, against his
daughter, Lucila, Laila and Meridian.
Lucilla and Laila submitted that the petitioners were estopped from
questioning the validity of the second sale because of their failure to effect
the registration and annotation of the first sale.
Meridian claimed that they were buyers in good faith.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners because it held that when Luis
executed the second deed of sale he was no longer the owner of the
properties.
On appeal, CA reversed and held that the first sale was void due to lack of
consideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first sale was valid.
RULING: Yes, the first sale was valid.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are
disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and
regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there
was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate
against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They
create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case
they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being
from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside
from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration,
they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It
is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable
presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that
the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of
sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not
pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however,
is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence
required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption
that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed

HEIRS OF TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF CANADA

G.R. No. 175874

December 11, 2013

712 SCRA

FACTS: Cipriano Trazona owned an untitled parcel of land in Minglanilla

Cebu referred to as Lot 5053-H.
In 1949, Dionisio Canada bought the adjacent lot from Pilar Diaz. It was
later found that Dionisio had encroached on a small portion of Lot 5053-H
but no ejectment was filed by Cipriano during his lifetime. Cipriano died on

1982, since then his son Hermogenes cultivated the lot 5053-H. On March
1992, Hermogenes died.
The controversy arose when the Heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Petitioners)
found out that the tax declaration was cancelled and another one was issued
in favor of Dionisio on June 1996 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated 27 June
1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio.
Petitioner filed a Complaint against Heirs of Dionisio (Respondents) for
quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, recovery of possession and
ownership among others. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Sale was a
forgery. Respondent in their Answer alleged that that assailed deed was
genuine document.
Petitioner presented a document examiner of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Region VII as their witness. He testified that according to his comparative
analysis of Ciprianos signature on the assailed deed and standard
signatures on other documents, Ciprianos signature on the deed in question
was a forgery.
Respondents presented Dionisios son Gorgonio, who testified that he was
present when the assailed deed was executed.
RTC ruled in in favor of the petitioner and held that the deed was a forgery
based on the discrepancies of Ciprianos signature on other document
presented.
On appeal, the CA reversed and held that petitioners had failed to prove by
requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery.31
The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of
authenticity and due execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were not able to overturn the
presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.
RULING: Petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence that the
assailed deed is a forgery.
The Supreme Court sustain the findings of the RTC.
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as
regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy
the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.39 Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear
and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed.
First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in
the assailed deed had been forged. In concluding that the signature of
Cipriano in the assailed deed was a forgery, the document examiner found
that there were "significant differences in letter formation, construction and
other individual handwriting characteristics" between the assailed and the
standard signatures of Cipriano The fact that the document examiner
himself admitted that even the standard signatures of Cipriano showed
variations among themselves does not make the formers determination any
less convincing. He explained that while every signature of the same person
varies, the individual handwriting characteristics of the person remain the
same.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the
signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature
was forged through independent observation:
Finally, a scrutiny of the signature on the questioned deed of sale compared
to the eleven (11) signatures on the ten (10) standard documents there exists
a glaring difference in the letter formation of capital letters "C" in Cipriano
and "T" in Trazona. The capital C in questioned signature, the initial stroke
stopped at the upper curve of the letter C while in the standard signatures, it
overlaps from the upper curve. In the word Trazona, the capital T in the
questioned signature is disconnected from the T bar to the body of the
questioned signature whereas, in the standard signatures, the capital T is

connected. These discrepancies can easily be noticed by mere physical

appearance that the letters C and T were written.
Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953
brings into question the regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was never
disputed by respondents at any stage of the proceedings, and was in fact
admitted by them in their Comments to Plaintiffs Additional Formal Offer
of Exhibits.
Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since
the time he acquired it from the government, and even after its purported
sale to Dionisio, until his death.
Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying
the fruits of the property from 1960 until the present controversy. Again, it
is incongruous for petitioners to enjoy the fruits if respondents owned the
property.
Sixth, as the RTC noted, there was an irregularity regarding the place of
issuance of Ciprianos residence certificate indicated in the assailed deed,
as compared with the residence certificates of the other persons indicated
on the same page of the notarial register.

SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY
PEOPLE vs ROBERTO PADRIGONE
G.R. No. 137664
May 9, 2002
NOTE:Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
"evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not
apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative;
and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
FACTS: It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant
Roberto Padrigone and the other accused broke into the house of Rowena
Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion, Buhi,
Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta
poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,2 and
threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to others. They gagged
Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then, appellant
undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her while
his co-accused watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape
Nimfa but failed because she was able to elude him.
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their
turns. Every one of the accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they
warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they will kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police
and identified appellant and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However,
based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was only appellant who
raped her.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist of Cadlan Mental Hospital in Pili,
Camarines Sur, testified that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was
crying, incoherent and had shouting episodes. She was confined at the
Cadlan Mental Hospital for further treatment. Upon further medical
consultation, Dr. Belmonte observed thus:
Rowena was in a depressed mood and at the same time
overactive. She was combative, violent, and was experiencing
auditory hallucination, meaning, she heard things that only she
could hear. She was also grandiously deluded, falsely believing
that she could do things others could not do. By that time,
according to Dr. Belmonte, Rowena had already lost touch with
reality.4
Dr. Belmonte diagnosed her illness as "Acute Psychotic Depressive
Condition."5 She found that her mental disorder was not hereditary because
before the incident took place, she did not exhibit any unusual behavior.
She concluded that her mental illness was strongly related to a traumatic
experience. She noted that at one point in the treatment, Rowena confided
to her that "she was raped."
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel
Ibaneta and Abelardo Triumpante were charged with rape in an amended
information.
All the accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Page 49 of 68

All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the

defense of denial and alibi. Appellant claimed that in the evening of
January 2, 1995, he and his companions, Jocel Ibanita and Michael San
Antonio, visited Rowena at her house. According to him, Rowena was
crying when they arrived. When appellant asked her what was wrong, she
told him that she wanted to elope with him. He replied that he was not
ready as he was still studying. Rowena snapped, "it's up to him but he
might regret it."7 While appellant and Rowena were talking, Jocel Ibanita
and Michael San Antonio were in the kitchen cooking noodles. Later, a
certain Ismeraldo Quirante, in the presence of several barangay watchmen
patrolling the area, passed by the Contridas' house and advised the accused
to go home because it was getting late. They heeded the advice and left the
Contridas' house at around 11:30 p.m.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a
decision convicting the accused.
Appellant interposed the instant appeal. Appellant argues that according to
the prosecution witness, Nimfa, he and his co-accused Michael San
Antonio, Abelardo Triumpante and Jocel Ibanita, took turns in raping
Rowena while Jocel Ibanita also attempted to rape her. However, after
preliminary investigation, the Municipal Trial Court of Buhi, Camarines
Sur, dismissed Nimfa's complaint for attempted rape against Jocel Ibanita
because of its findings that the latter committed only acts of lasciviousness,
considering his voluntary and spontaneous desistance from continuing to
perform the acts leading to carnal knowledge. Furthermore, the
investigating Judge entertained doubts about the truth of her story, which
was uncorroborated.
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution
and by the trial court. He claims that the As a consequence, the trial court
deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she
allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only
appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting
Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments.
DECISION: NO.The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand
cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a
privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense
had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not
present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness
stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet."
The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any
case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact
witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
2. METROBANK VS CA
G.R. No. 122899
June 8, 2000
NOTE:It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a
material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power
to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case
made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce
such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would
operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary (citing
Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals)
FACTS:The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City
consisting of six hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by
businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753
(106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and
business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private
respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with
assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner
METROBANK secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting
in behalf of respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo,
Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to inquire on Mr. Chia's
remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged
with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as
of August, 1980.

Page 50 of 68

The deed of sale 2 and the memorandum of agreement 3 between Mr. Chia
and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September
1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16
September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and
paid one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventyone centavos (P116,416.71), for which METROBANK issued an official
receipt acknowledging payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real
estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty.
Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an
action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr.
Chia.
In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of
sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner
for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the
advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with
respondent GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by
Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11
December 1990 granting the reliefs prayed for by respondent GTP as
plaintiff.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24
October 1994 reversing the trial court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling
in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen
pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to
petitioner METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage
inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past due loans secured by the
subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November
1994 filed before respondent Court of Appeals a "motion for
reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish
appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia.
On 03 July 1995, the now assailed amended decision was rendered
reconsidering the original 24 October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the
11 December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court. Respondent Court
of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously
considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by
the subject property, in concluding anew that "the present case for specific
performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980
did not suffice to pay in full the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas
Chia. There is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the amended decision of public respondent Court of
Appeals was filed by Metrobank.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC.
DECISION: NO
Petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of
Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other
unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It
was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to
defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following
pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals et. al, speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco, find rightful
application, viz.
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact
which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce
evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against
him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence,
the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his
prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. . . .
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to
prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to
prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to
establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the
party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny
or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of
the inferences afforded. . . .
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most

unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure

would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party.
Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only
created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be
heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable
opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.

no actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment

documents which were found to be falsified.

OFFICIAL DUTY
DE LOS SANTOS vs. COA
G.R. No. 198457 August 13, 2013 703 SCRA

ISSUE: Whether or not VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the

disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith
in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of
the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the
implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.

FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Cuenco of Cebu

City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr.
Alquizalas, Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount
of P1,500,000.00 from his PDAF to cover the medical assistance of
indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT
Program). It was agreed,inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and
recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT
Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those
with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an
indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently
disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital
shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside
sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to
reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and
other documents In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of
the TNT Program, wrote petitioner Antoni, Pharmacist V of VSMMC,
requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the
hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which
were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of Health. The said
request was approved.
The Audit Proceedings
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and
falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines
under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Delos
Santos, who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No.
1112, a
fact-finding
committee
to
investigate
the
matter.
Within the same month, Booc, State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit
the hospital, came up with her own review of the account for drugs and
medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the
results of her review as contained in Audit Observation Memoranda
recommending the investigation of the following irregularities:
a.

AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and

falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies and drugs costing
P3,290,083.29;

b.

AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth

P138,964.80 mostly to the staff of VSMMC and TNT Office covering
the period January to April 2004; and

c.

AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and

falsified prescriptions for other drugs and medicines worth
P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters for
drugs and medicines costing P602,063.50.15cralaw virtualaw library
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted
its Report essentially affirming the unseen and unnoticeable irregularities
attendant to the availment of the TNT Program.
In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were
reflected in AOM No. 2005-001 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that:
(a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines for anti-rabies
allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already
paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; (b) 46
prescriptions for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell
Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the
PDAF of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified and (c) 25 prescriptions
for drugs and medicines allegedly issued by Dell Pharmacy costing
P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid by
VSMMC.
Examination by the Special Audit Team (SAT) of the records and
interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported patientsbeneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was

Page 51 of 68

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which
were denied maintaining their solidary liability.

RULING: Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith

and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of
an explicit rule that was violated.For instance, in Reyna v. CoA (Reyna),
the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein,
notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions
violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines Manual on
Lending Operations. In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA (Casal),
sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who
again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and
authorizing the incentive award granted to its officials and employees in
violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant
of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature
unless authorized by the Office of the President. In Casal, it was held that,
even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the
patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of the
CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [approving officers] liable
for
the
refund
[of
the
disallowed
incentive
award].
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to
dispute their respective violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the
Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case
justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations,
and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners neglect to
properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the
validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious
claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell
Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips
and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control system
installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the
hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and
unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot
escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the
TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was
his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the
hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in
the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as a welcome
relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the hospital.

PEOPLE vs. CANDIDIA

G.R. No. 191263
October 16, 2013 707 SCRA
FACTS: On 31 July 2002, Hadji Socor Cadidia while at MIA on her way
Butuan City undergone frisking procedure upon arrival at the departure
area. The said procedure was conducted by Marilyn Trayvilla, a NonUniform Personel of the PNP. The latter noticed something unusual and
thick at the buttocks of Cadidia. Upon inquiry of Trayvilla the accused
respond that it was her sanitary napkin. Not convinced, Trayvilla and coemployee Leilani Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to
check. Upon checking they found two sachets of shabu. The sachets were
turned over to SPO3 Musali Appang.
Due to the incident Cadidia was charged for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Trayvilla corroborated by
Bagsican and SPO3 Appang. Moreover, the two sachets confiscated were
identified as shabu by Forensic Chemist Reyes.
On defense, the accused claimed that upon arrival she was brought by
Trayvilla and Bagsican to the comfort room. The two frisked her but failed
to recover anything. Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they
allegedly found two sachets of shabu. Hence, the accused called her relative
and asked to bring P200k but her relative were only able to raise P6k which
the two policemen found unacceptable.

Further, the accused contended that the prosecution witnesses have

contradicting statements as to who asked the accused to bring out the
contents of the underwear and that Bagsican claims that the sachets of
shabu was placed inside her blazer contrary to Appangs statement that
Bagsican and Trayvilla handed the sachets to him immediately after
recovering such from the accused.
The RTC found the accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the self-serving testimonies of Trayvilla and
Bagsican failed to overcome her presumption of innocence guaranteed by
the Constitution.
RULING: In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon
deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct
opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are
telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of
the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.
Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of events of
the prosecution witnesses. In her direct testimony, Trayvilla testified that
both of them asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her underwear when
she and Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to check what
was hidden inside. However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it was really
Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also inside the
cubicle with the accused. This clarification is sufficient for the Court to
conclude that the two of them were inside the cubicle when the request to
bring out the contents of the underwear was made and the concealed illegal
drug was discovered.
The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what happened
during the confiscation of the illegal drug at the cubicle. The accused
alleges that Bagsican and SPO3 Appang differed in their statements. Upon
review, We find no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after
confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer for
safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the
accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang, in turn,
testified that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room,
they handed to him what was taken from the accused. The statements can
be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken recollection of events.
Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We
have consistently held time and again that minor inconsistencies do not
negate the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a
coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.
What is essential is that the witnesses testimonies corroborate one another
on material details surrounding the commission of the crime.
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for
the police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her
regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered
the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined
notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The
unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The
subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female
friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs
inside accuseds underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on
the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each
other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The
allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on
circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

Page 52 of 68

COHABITATION
G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
JESUS EDUALINO

THE

PHILIPPINES,

NOTE: Moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution

and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be
the victims of rape.
FACTS: The case for the prosecution, as told by complainant Rowena
Nantiza, is as follows:
On 12 May 1994, the complainant and her mother Leonora Caabay were in
Mambalot, Brooke's Point, Palawan to attend a dance. At about ten (10)
o'clock in the evening of that day Rowena saw her cousin Antero Bacosa at
the dance and she asked him to drink beer with her.
Antero got drunk and fell asleep. It was at this time that accused Jesus
Edualino approached her and offered her a glass of beer. Rowena noticed
that Edualino was drunk so she accepted the glass. She then felt dizzy after
drinking the beer.
Edualino then dragged her toward a grassy area where no people were
present. The accused then forced himself on top of her and succeeded in
raping her while she was in a semi-unconscious state.
Rowena further stated that she was continuously resisting the assault upon
her but Edualino was stronger and he even boxed her in the stomach. She
stated that she passed out after the rape was consummated.
Prosecution witness Aileen Yayen testified that she saw the accused in the
act of raping Rowena in the grassy area near the store of a certain Sgt. Edep
and the house of a certain Mrs. Adier.
Aileen stated that she was looking for her cousin Rowena Nantiza in the
early morning of 12 May 1994 at Brooke's Point where a dance was being
held. She saw Rowena with the accused on top of her in a dark grassy area
near the site of the dance. Both the accused and Rowena were naked. She
was able to identify the accused by pointing her flashlight from a distance
of less than two (2) meters away.
She then called her aunt Erlinda de la Cruz, the victim's mother, but when
they returned, the accused immediately left when he noticed their presence.
The defense had a different version of the incident.
Accused Jesus Edualino, while admitting that he was at the dance at
Brook's Point on 11 May 1994, denied that he raped complainant Rowena
Nantiza.
Edualino testified that after leaving the dance, he and a certain Calixto
Flora went to the store or Sgt Edep to drink beer. After he and Flora had
finished a big bottle of beer, complainant Nantiza and a certain Antero
Bacosa arrived. They noticed that Nantiza and Bacosa were already drunk.
Accused Edualino testified that complainant Nantiza then began teasing
him to kiss her. He (Edualino) stood up to get away from her but the latter
followed him Flora then held on to Nantiza's arm to prevent the latter from
following him Edualino testified that he and Flora then went to his house
where the they stayed until the morning of 12 May 1994.
Edualino also testified that Bacosa and Nantiza may have been under the
influence of marijuana since he heard the two (2) talking about having
taken drugs.
Calixto Flora corroborated the accused-appellant's version of the incident.
Felix Alberto, a resident of Brooke's Point, testified that in the evening of
11 May 1994 while they were walking towards the place where the dance
was being held, he and his sister Rose saw complainant Rowena Nantiza
sitting by the roadside with her hands cupped covering her mouth. Upon
seeing them, Nantiza allegedly called out "Rose, halika, tikman mo,
masarap ito." (Rose, come and try this. It's tasty). When they approached
Nantiza, Alberto testified that he saw her holding what appeared to be dried
marijuana leaves Alberto then testified that he even scolded Nantiza saying.
"Why are you doing that? You have already two children and you know that
is bad" Alberto then took his sister and left.
Rodolfo Caabay, then barangay captain of Mambalot, Brooke's Point,
Palawan testified that in the early morning of 12 May 1994, an unusual
incident was reported to him Leonora Caabay complained that her daughter

Rowena Caabay Nantiza was found lying on the ground about eight (8)
meters from the store owned by a certain Sgt. Edep. He found Rowena was
very hysterical and he observed that she had too much to drink. He turned
over Rowena to the police. He later learned that accused-appellant was
picked up for questioning regarding his alleged rape of Rowena Nantiza.
Epifania Caabay, Rodolfo's wife, testified that she accompanied Rowena
and her mother on board the police vehicle which took them to Brooke's
Point District Hospital. She stated that Rowena was hysterical and kept on
shouting in the vernacular, "I want water!" Epifania further stated that
Rowena's mother slapped her and hit her on different parts of the body to
quiet her down. Epifania agreed with the other defense witnesses that
Rowena was quite drunk at the time.
On 23 December 1994, the trial court rendered a decision guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE with penalty of death.

The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution,
particularly to the narration of the young complainant, expressing a quote
from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that
"even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which
(could) put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag
herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame." Hence automatic
review by the SC.
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant
should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct
cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength
for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and
to present any rebuttal evidence.

The conviction of accused-appellant is now before this Court on automatic

review.
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to
show "that there was foreplay before the alleged rape whereby the accused
allegedly kissed her, caressed her breast and bit her nipple; that the accused
was on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and did the push and
pull movement, that she cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew
[accused] had an orgasm after which the accused stood up and left, all this
bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition, a consensual
intercourse. There was no rape."

DECISION: NO. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of

the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of crossexamination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies
may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any
other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what
would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial
court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant

Rowena Nantiza. It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman,
who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at two (2)
o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask
a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant
merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband
had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made
a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May
1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS

PEOPLE vs PEREZ
G.R. No. 142556
February 5, 2003
NOTE:As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules
provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is
usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their
reluctant lips.

ISSUE: Whether the conviction was proper.

FACTS:On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor of Zambales filed an Information charging appellant with the
crime of rape "penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty.
Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty.
Roberto Blanco as appellants counsel de oficio.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following
witnesses: the victim, Mayia Ponseca; the victims mother, Hermie
Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron; and Dr.
Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented
appellant and his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity)
summarized the prosecutions version of the incident in the appellees brief,
to wit:
"On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay
Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia Ponseca was walking
along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant
Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 15, 1998).
Appellant introduced himself as "Johnny" and immediately afterwards,
strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN, December 15,
1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At that point, a dog arrived and
barked at them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while
simultaneously removing Mayias panty. He then inserted his penis inside
Mayias vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain in her private parts
(sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight
totally engulfed her. Her only recourse was to cry while her young body
was being ravished (p. 13, id.).
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants
and ran away.
When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the
latter answered the name "Johnny." (id.) The couple brought their daughter
to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical
examination.
Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the
alleged rape incident, he was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales.
He heard of the rape of a young girl from his manager, Bartolome Tolentino
("Tolentino" for brevity). Appellant further testified that on January 25,
1997, policemen went to the fishpond where he worked. The policemen

DECISION: YES. In the present case, even if accused-appellant's

allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and
that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married
woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding
that she was raped. it should be pointed out that the moral character of a
rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused.
The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
Accused-appellant in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the
charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save her marriage.
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that
she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in
order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape story can
save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.
The other arguments adduced by accused-appellant pertaining to credibility
of the two (2) prosecution witnesses are basically issues that cannot be
reviewed by the Court absent attendant circumstances that do not exist in
this case.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
pertain to minor matters and are even badges that the witnesses were
unrehearsed and honest.
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is
convinced that the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's
innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
PEOPLE vs FABRE
G.R. No. 146697
July 23, 2002
NOTE: The trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a
witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by
the other party.
FACTS: Fabre was indicted in an Information for rape of a 13 year old.
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the
prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her
mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the
doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate
issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal
complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in
the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused
himself. It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.

Page 53 of 68

arrested appellant and brought him to the police station at Palauig. Later,
the policemen took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is
not "Johnny" but "Jessie." He testified that on January 17, 1997, at around
12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa
which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.
The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove
that appellant was employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost
two years before the alleged rape incident. Appellant was purportedly of
good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The
prosecution admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed
with the testimony of Tolentino in open court.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 26,
1999, founding the accused guilty GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was
only 6 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
Hence, this automatic review.
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was
highly irregular.l^vvphi1.net Appellant points out that the prosecutor had
already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the
prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses
that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man
named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark.
Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified
him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification
was not done with the usual police line-up.
ISSUE: Whether allowance of leading questions in the direct examination
of Mayia is justified.
DECISION: YES. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However,
the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender
years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting
or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their
reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing
leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered,
making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained
in People v. Rodito Dagamos:
"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the
courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child
witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000,
namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child
are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice."
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a
child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a
charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part,
subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and reputation,
unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her.
Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia
to identify appellant is without basis. True, Mayia did not identify appellant
in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his cell. However,
appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in
his cell. Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a
police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police
line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the police did
not suggest such identification to the witnesses. The records are bereft of
any indication that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as
the rapist.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist
dispels any doubt as to the proper identification of appellant. Mayia
positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are satisfied
that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist.
IMPEACHMENT
REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM
G.R. No. 90198
November 7, 1995
NOTE:The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not
altogether proscribed. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Page 54 of 68

FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984,

Herminio Mansueto, wearing a blue and white striped t-shirt, maong pants,
Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on his bicycle for Barangay
Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which he would
use to purchase hogs from a certain "Ruby."
In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as Pansing and whose
house was just across the street from the respective residences of the three
accused, saw at the roadside Herminio Mansueto and Roberto
Descartinalias "Ruby" engaged in conversation. Pansing approached them
and asked Mansueto if he would be interested in buying two of her pigs for
P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that he would be right back.
Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito
Descartin and his brother-in-law Rene were also seen going to the place.
After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take Mansueto's bicycle.
Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave and in her desire to
catch up with him, Pansing promptly walked towards the piggery which
was around 100 meters away from her house. She could see Mansueto
leaning on the pigsty with Ruby on his right side and Antonio
Plasencia alias "Tonying" on his left; behind was Joelito. Midway, she was
halted on her tracks; she suddenly saw Antonio stab Mansueto. The latter
staggered towards Ruby who himself then delivered another stab blow.
Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto on the forehead
while Rene held Mansueto's legs. Except for a coconut tree and some ipilipil trees around the area, nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision.
Pansing rushed back home. The image of Antonio waving the weapon and
the thought that she might herself be killed kept her from revealing to
anyone what she saw.
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were
charged of robbery with homicide. When arraigned, all the accused entered
a plea of "not guilty" to the charge; whereupon, trial commenced.
The main defense interposed is one of alibi. Appellant Roberto Descartin,
challenge Francisca Espina's credibility because of her alleged
inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at
the notes written on her palm while testifying.
ISSUE:Whether testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth
since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes
written on her left palm.
HELD: NO, the contention of the appellant is not correct.
The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not
altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any
other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
he knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must
be produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the
trial court. In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused;
the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on
dates and like details.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the
witness stand. Nervousness and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction
particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for the first time.
The real concern, in fact, should be when they show no such emotions.
PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED
CANQUE vs.CA
G.R. No. 96202
April 13, 1999
FACTS:Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under
the name and style RDC Construction. At the time material to this case, she
had contracts with the government for (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo
wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the
asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In connection with these

projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor
Construction Corporation.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C),
containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of
3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner's total account of
P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by private
respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery
receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and
the acceptance thereof by the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of
P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private
respondent as well as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986.
However, she disputed the correctness of the bill
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private
respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by
the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat
it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water,
and [petitioner] has already paid [private respondent]
about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not
issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments
and there is no agreement that [private respondent]
will charge 3% per month interest.
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into
sub-contracts with private respondent.
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vicepresident, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony.
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to
pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per
annum, and costs.
The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not
have any stipulation on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of
damages under Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court's' reliance
on private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis
of Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF
BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BOOK OF
COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON
WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE
BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
SAID ENTRIES.
DECISION: NO
It is argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under
Rule 132, 10 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum.
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or
under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such
case the writing must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may
read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify
from such a writing, though he retain no recollection
of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
writing correctly stated the transaction when made;
but such evidence must be received with caution.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible
for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another
purpose. She cites the following from Chief Justice Moran's commentaries:
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified. Where the offer is general, and the
evidence is admissible for one purpose and
inadmissible for another, the evidence should be
rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or
more purposes and the evidence is incompetent for
one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The
reason for the rule is that "it is the duty of a party to
select the competent from the incompetent in offering
testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the

Page 55 of 68

trial court." Where the evidence is inadmissible for

the purpose stated in the offer, it must be rejected,
though the same may be admissible for another
purpose. The rule is stated thus: "If a party . . . opens
the particular view with which he offers any part of
his evidence, or states the object to be attained by it,
he precludes himself from insisting on its operation in
any other direction, or for any other object; and the
reason is, that the opposite party is prevented from
objecting to its competency in any view different
from the one proposed.
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for
another purpose. Private respondent's counsel offered it for the purpose of
showing the amount of petitioner's indebtedness. He said:
Exhibit "K," your
Honor faithful
reproduction of page
(17) of the book on
Collectible Accounts
of the plaintiff,
reflecting
the
principal
indebtedness
of
defendant in the
amount of Two
hundred ninety-nine
thousand
seven
hundred seventeen
pesos and seventyfive
centavos
(P299,717.75) and
reflecting as well the
accumulated interest
of three percent
(3%)
monthly
compounded such
that as of December
11,
1987,
the
amount collectible
from the defendant
by the plaintiff is
Six hundred sixteen
thousand
four
hundred thirty-five
pesos and seventytwo
centavos
(P616,435.72);
This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a
memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a
witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is
changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself
constitute evidence. As explained inBorromeo v. Court of Appeals:
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the
memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the
witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness
has testified independently of or after his testimony
has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a
witness may not be corroborated by any written
statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be
more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts
even if he did prepare them during the occasion in
dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing
memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even
where this requirement has been satisfied, the express
injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must
be received with caution, if only because it is not
very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of
this nature. This is doubly true when the witness
stands to gain materially or otherwise from the
admission of such evidence . . . .
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal
knowledge, they could only corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony that she
made the entries as she received the bills.

the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the

preparation of said document.

IWASAWA vs. GANGAN

G.R. No. 204169

September 11, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime

in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced
herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two
became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife
about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away.
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This
prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to
private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following
pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private
respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage
between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove
the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the
latters death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two
entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private
respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private
respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to
a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second,
to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above
documentary exhibits during pre-trial.
The RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondents prior existing valid marriage to
another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage
of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified
about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners testimony is unreliable
because he has no personal knowledge of private respondents prior
marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes him a complete stranger to
the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the
latters death certificate. It further ruled that petitioners testimony about

Page 56 of 68

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents
issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight.
RULING: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted
by petitioner are all public documents As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC
erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of
authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not
only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, 16 which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it
was only on said date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo
was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.

ASIAN TERMINALS vs. PHILAM INSURANCE

G.R. No. 181163

July 24, 2013

702 SCRA

FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages

containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2
model, without engine, tires and batteries, on board the vessel S/S "Calayan
Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment was insured with Philam against
all risks.

The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila, and when the shipment
was unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was found that the package marked as
03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes identified two packages, as being dented and broken. Thereafter,
the cargoes were stored for temporary safekeeping inside CFS Warehouse
in Pier No. 5
The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latters
warehouse in Mandaluyong City. Upon the request of Universal Motors, a
bad order survey was conducted on the cargoes and it was found that one
Frame Axle Sub without LWR was deeply dented on the buffle plate while
six Frame Assembly with Bush were deformed and misaligned. Owing to
the extent of the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a
total loss.
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount against
Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal
Motors demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a
Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint for damages
against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the
RTC of Makati City.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and
ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally, with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum by way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule

132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in
four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within
the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness
and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document
is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation
Receipt are private documents which Philam and the consignee,
respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the
exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document
obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for
Philam without being properly authenticated.

The court a quo ruled that there was sufficient evidence to establish the
respective participation of Westwind and ATI in the discharge of and
consequent damage to the shipment. It found that the subject cargoes were
compressed while being hoisted using a cable that was too short and taut.
The trial court acknowledged the subrogation between Philam and
Universal Motors on the strength of the Subrogation Receipt. It likewise
upheld Philams claim for the value of the alleged damaged vehicle parts
for "7 pieces of Frame Axle Sub Without Lower and Frame Assembly with
Bush."
Westwind filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied
in an Order.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. The
appellate court directed Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and
severally with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until fully paid,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subrogation receipt is inadmissible for being
hearsay for not being authenticated by the persons who executed them.
RULING: The nature of documents as either public or private determines
how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public
documents, as enumerated under Section 19, 33 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order
to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is
proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document

Page 57 of 68

ALUDOS vs. SUERTE

G.R. No. 165285
June 18, 2012

673 SCRA

FACTS:Sometime in January 1969, Lomises acquired from the Baguio

City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in
Baguio City, as evidenced by a permit issued by the City Treasurer.
On September 8, 1984, Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent
Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and rights over the
two market stalls (Stall Nos. 9 and 10) for the amount of P260,000.00.
Johnny gave a down payment of P45,000.00 to Lomises, who
acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document executed on the same
date as the agreement:
Johnny made a subsequent payment of P23,000.00; hence, a total
of P68,000.00 of the P260,000.00 purchase price had been made as of
1984. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises backed out of
the agreement and returned the P68,000.00 to Domes and Jaime Suerte, the
mother and the father of Johnny, respectively. The return of the P68,000.00
down payment was embodied in a handwritten receipt.
Through a letter Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted on
the continuation and enforcement of his agreement with Lomises. When
Lomises refused Johnnys protest, Johnny filed a complaint against
Lomises before the RTC for specific performance with damages.

The RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure
to secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The
RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the
Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls.
Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real
agreement between the parties was merely one of loan, and not of sale; he
further claimed that the loan had been extinguished upon the return of
theP68,000.00 to Johnnys mother, Domes.
T he CA rejected Lomises claim that the true agreement was one of loan.
The CA found that there were two agreements entered into between Johnny
and Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other
was for the sale of the improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed
with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack
of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the
improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises private
properties. For this reason, the CA remanded the case to the RTC to
determine the value of the improvements on the two market stalls, existing
at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Lomises moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, contending that no
valid sale of the improvements could be made because the lease contract,
dated May 1, 1985, between Lomises and the Baguio City Government,
supposedly marked as Exh. "A," provided that "[a]ll improvements
[introduced shall] ipso facto become properties of the City of Baguio."
T he CA denied the motion after finding that Lomises lawyer, Atty.
Rodolfo Lockey, misrepresented Exh. "A" as the governing lease contract
between Lomises and the Baguio City Government; the records reveal that
Exh. "A" was merely a permit issued by the City Treasurer in favor of
Lomises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of lease dated May 1, 1985 was never
formally offered in evidence before the RTC and could thus not be
considered pursuant to the rules of evidence.
RULING: The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1,
1985 lease contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as
it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA
admonished Lomises lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was
part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered,
the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight." Although
the contract was referred to in Lomises answer to Johnnys complaint and
marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached.
In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after
Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was
formally offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was
permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. In
other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that
any and all improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio
City Government.

WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. FRANCIA JR.

G.R. No. 194128

December 7, 2011

FACTS: In 1999, Amos Francia Jr was enticed by the manager of

Westmont bank to invest with WestCorp as it offers 3% to 5% higher
interest rate than the regular bank rate. Due to the promise, Amos Francia Jr
together with her sibling Benjamin Francia (respondents) invested P1.4M
and P2.4M respectively.
When the investments matured, Wincorp wasnt able to return the
investment and its corresponding interest due to lack of funds and instead
the latter rolled-over the fund for another 34days and indicated in the
confirmation advices that the fund were borrowed by Pearl Bank.
Despite lapse of the 34days Wincorp wasnt able to return the funds and
interest. Hence, the respondents field a collection case against Wincorp and
Pearlbank before the RTC.
After the testimony of Amos Francia, Jr., the respondents filed their Formal
Offer of Evidence. Pearlbank filed its Comment/Objection, while Wincorp
did not file any comment or objection. After all the exhibits of the Francias
were admitted for the purposes they were offered, the Francias rested their
case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Wincorp attached documents when it
filed an MR with the RTC but such was denied.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification as to the rate of

interest

ISSUE: Whether or not Wincorp the CA should have based its decision on
the express terms, stipulations, and agreements provided for in the
documents offered by the Francias as the legal relationship of the parties
was clearly spelled out in the very documents introduced by them which
indicated that it merely brokered the loan transaction between the Francias
and Pearlbank.

RULING: In this case, the principal-agent relationship between the

Francias and Wincorp was not duly established by evidence. The records
are bereft of any showing that Wincorp merely brokered the loan
transactions between the Francias and Pearlbank and the latter was the
actual recipient of the money invested by the former. Pearlbank did not
authorize Wincorp to borrow money for it. Neither was there a ratification,
expressly or impliedly, that it had authorized or consented to said
transaction.

As to Pearlbank, records bear out that the Francias anchor their cause of
action against it merely on the strength of the subject Confirmation Advices
bearing the name "PearlBank" as the supposed borrower of their
investments. Apparently, the Francias ran after Pearlbank only after
learning that Wincorp was reportedly bankrupt. The Francias were
consistent in saying that they only dealt with Wincorp and not with
Pearlbank. It bears noting that even in their Complaint and during the pretrial conference, the Francias alleged that they did not have any personal
knowledge if Pearlbank was indeed the recipient/beneficiary of their
investments.

Although the subject Confirmation Advices indicate the name of Pearlbank

as the purported borrower of the said investments, said documents do not

Page 58 of 68

bear the signature or acknowledgment of Pearlbank or any of its officers.

This cannot prove the position of Wincorp that it was Pearlbank which
received and benefited from the investments made by the Francias. There
was not even a promissory note validly and duly executed by Pearlbank
which would in any way serve as evidence of the said borrowing.

Another significant point which would support the stand of Pearlbank that
it was not the borrower of whatever funds supposedly invested by the
Francias was the fact that it initiated, filed and pursued several cases
against Wincorp, questioning, among others, the latters acts of naming it as
borrower of funds from investors.

It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its
pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary
value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these
documents werenot formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To
consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine
and rebut them. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 34. Offer of evidence The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence
for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."

The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as
to the evidence presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to
evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears that
Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the
formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE vs. CALISO

G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011 659 SCRA 666
FACTS: The records show that the deceased victim died on June 5,
1997 at around 11:00 am in the river. The immediate cause of her
death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering.
Soledad Amegable, the lone eyewitness, had been clearing her farm
when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy. The
lush bamboo growth in the area made it difficult for Amegable to see
what was going on. She also testified that she subsequently heard
sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girls cries. She
then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding
behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there
she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number 11
mark, who dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he
submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her
body. That the man later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper
water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river, that in that
whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he
always had his back turned towards her; that she nonetheless insisted
that the man was Delfin Caliso, whose physical features she was
familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several
times prior to the incident. She also narrated that after the man fled
the crime scene, she went straight to her house and told her husband
what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the
incident to the barangay chairman.
The Regional Trial Court held Caliso guilty of murder instead of the
crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed Calisos conviction.
The CA ruled that Amegable made a positive identification of Caliso
as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened
at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact
that Amegables view had not been obstructed by any object at the
time that AAAs body had been submerged in the water.
ISSUE: Whether or not Amegables identification of Caliso as the
man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and
reliable.
RULING: No. In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the
identity of the culprit, the accused's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled
to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted.
The decision promulgated by the CA on October 26, 2007 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and
accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
A witness' familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a
positive identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty
due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegable's testimony might have been, her
identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes
could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral
certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other
reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA's killer.
Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of
exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being
mistaken. Amegable's recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants
bearing the number "11" did not enhance the reliability of her
identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind
apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence.
DOCTRINE:
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the
identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of
the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence,
through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by
circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES

G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA
FACTS: The present case involves eight sets of information for Forcible
Abduction with rape filed by private complainant AAA against appellant
Felimon Patentes.

Page 59 of 68

The prosecution alleged that on Dec 5, 1998, at about 11:00am, AAA

boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City. While seated at the rear portion
of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. Subsequently, appellant was
able to force AAA to go with him in his residence in Hacienda Heights in
Davao City. She was allegedly dragged upstairs, tied to a sewing machine,
and was forced to smoke something, causing AAA to feel light and dizzy.
This prevented AAA from fighting back when appellant removed her
clothes, and mounted her to insert his penis into her vagina. For 8 days,
AAA remained in appellants house. On the 8 th day, to free her from her
predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will marry him. They
went back to AAAs house to discuss marital plans with AAAs family.
AAA confessed and recounted her ordeal to her mother. The mother
accompanied AAA to the police, where AAA was also examined by a
doctor, Dr Cruz. In his testimony, Dr Cruz noted the vaginal canal was
negative for spermatozoa.
In his defense, appellant contended AAA agreed that he accompanied her
to Bansalan on Dec 5, 1998. After going around Davao City, AAA
allegedly refused to return home because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her buntog or prostitute. AAA stayed in appellants
house for 7 days, together with appellants parents, siblings and other
relatives. Appellant and AAA slept in the same room and had consented
sexual intercourse. Throughout, AAAs stay, she was free to roam around
the house and even helped in the chores. They agreed to set the wedding
date on May 27, 1999. When they went to AAAs house to discuss the
marital plans on Dec 14, 1998, AAAs mother rejected the proposal
because of the appellants social standing.
Two witnesses, appellants neighbor,Leonora Gerodio, and a common
friend, testified that they saw AAA in appellants house at least twice
during the period Dec 5-12, 1998. Both witnesses also declared that the
couple discussed their marital plans to them on separate occasions.
After the trial, the lower court found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of (1) count of forcible abduction, with Rape, and (7)
counts of Rape. Appellant elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court with modification with regard to damages.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not AAAs testimony, side by side with the
prosecutions evidence, can stand the test of credibility to sustain the
conviction of the accused
RULING: No. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private
complainant have created reasonable doubt. In view of the foregoing
considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must
be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of
the quantum of proof to support a conviction
The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral
certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
Contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled,
slapped and boxed, the medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the
prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted that the medical examination
was conducted the day after AAAs supposed escape from appellant. As
shown by the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical
injuries, save for a kiss mark
The actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of
one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA
to willingly go with her abusers mother, and worse, live with her abusers
entire family for 8 days sans any attempt to escape. Instead of escaping,
AAA visited appellants neighbor. Instead of sharing her ordeal to be
rescued by her friend Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead
described the details of her marital plans.
The CA decision is reversed and set aside. Apellant Felimon Patentes is
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE
A conviction in criminal case must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which means moral certainty that the accused is guilty.

SUPREME COURT vs. DELGADO

Page 60 of 68

A.M. No. 2011-07-SC

October 4, 2011

FACTS: On 2 June 2011, Supreme Court Associate Justice and Second

Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2)
sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court Second Division (OCCSD).1 Contained in the Agenda are the itemized lists of cases taken up by
the Courts Second Division during the sessions held on 30 May and 1 June
2011, as well as the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio showing
the specific actions adopted by the division on each case item. The
transmittal of the Agenda was made for the purpose of allowing the Second
Division Clerk of Court to prepare the draft minutes of the 30 May and 1
June 2011 sessions.
After the Agenda was photocopied it was found out that one of the
duplicate copies had missing pages. Later on. an initial investigation was
conducted.
In the presence of Atty. Laurea, Atty. Tuazon and Ms. Puno, respondent
Delgado candidly admitted during the initial investigation that he took
pages 58, 59 and 70 from one of the copies of the 30 May 2011 Agenda.
However, respondent Delgado also disclosed that he removed the pages
from the subject Agenda only as a favor to herein respondents Madeja and
Florendo
For their part, respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial
investigation that they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in
the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Respondent Madeja even admitted giving his
copy of the missing pages to a certain "Dading." Dading was later identified
to be Mr. Briones a Clerk III in the Office of the Clerk of Court En
Banc. Both respondents Madeja and Florendo attested that court employees
from other Divisions had been requesting for copies of the Agenda, to
which they were inclined to accede in exchange for tokens like "pangmerienda" or "pamasahe."
The OAS submitted to the Supreme Court a Memorandum embodying its
findings and evaluation. In sum, it considered respondent Delgado guilty of
Grave Misconduct for his unauthorized removal of pages 58, 59 and 70 in a
copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. The OAS also found respondents Madeja
and Florendo guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, for their participation in the unauthorized removal of the said
pages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unsubstantiated denial of respondents is not
supported by clear and convincing evidence cannot prevail over the direct
and positive statements of respondent Delgado.
RULING: We begin with the obvious and from the admissions during the
initial investigation when there was yet not enough time for device and
advice. Respondents Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a
copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the
request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of
the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents
Madeja and Delgado. Veritably, the acts of respondents complement each
other; they are but completions of a common Grave Misconduct.
Respondents Complicity
It must be stressed that insofar as the involvement of respondent Delgado is
concerned, there is no longer any issue to be resolved. Respondent Delgado
has been consistent with his admission of involvement during both the
initial investigation in the OCC-SD and the formal investigation of the
OAS. It is, therefore, already settled fact that respondent Delgado was the
person who actually removed the pages 58, 59 and 70 from the subject
Agenda.

What remains in dispute is the participation of respondents Madeja and

Florendo in the removal of the pages in the subject Agenda. As stated
earlier, both respondents Madeja and Florendo vehemently denied having
been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal
investigation of the OAS. This sharply contradicts their reported admission
of complicity during the initial investigation conducted by the OCC-SD.
The evidence at hand, however, point out that respondents Madeja and
Florendo, indeed, connived with respondent Delgado in removing the three
(3) pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. The denial of
respondents Madeja and Florendo, in a complete turnaround from an earlier
admission, is unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and
consistent statements of respondent Delgado.

by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

PEOPLE vs. FONTANILLA

G.R. 177743 January 25, 2012 664 SCRA

First. Respondent Delgados statements, not only in the initial investigation

but also in the formal investigation, were unwavering in their implication of
respondents Madeja and Florendo. Respondent Delgado categorically
identified respondents Madeja and Florendo as the persons who induced
him to remove several pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda and
thereafter obtained them.
Second. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any
ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the
credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied. We find his
statements worthy of belief.
Third. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light
of the direct and positive statements of respondent Delgado. The basic
principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of
truthful witnesses.

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADM. REGION vs.

OLALIA JR.
G.R. No. 153675
April 19, 2007 521 SCRA
FACTS: Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as an
agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of
Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail
terms.
On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained. On November 22,
1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for his extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition
for
bail,
which
Judge
Felixberto
Olalia
granted.
Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order,
but it was denied by the same judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence.
RULING: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove

Page 61 of 68

FACTS: On October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial
road in ButubutOeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla
suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais
fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and TirsoAbunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted
at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their fatherin-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. On
April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an
information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC. The accused pleaded
not guilty. At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the
night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when
Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in
the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that
Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had
thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had
hit the right side of the victims head, causing the latter to fall face down to
the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing
that Olais was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanillas plea of
self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone,
inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to the
victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not
suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that
Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested
to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released
from the hospital; that Fontanillas failure to give any statement at the time
he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of selfdefense;and that the manner of attack against Olais established the
attendance of treachery. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ignoring the accuseds claim of
self-defense
RULING: Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be
appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal
injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a
prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,and he would be held
criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak,
would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the
killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals
that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and,
two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the
mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained
some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any
kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented
himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did
not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to
him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified
that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense
was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not
merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. The Court
considersto be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the
determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend
himself

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.

BALMACEDA AND RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011 658 SCRA 33
FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with
damages against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta.
Cruz, Manila branch. PCIB alleged that Balmaceda, by taking advantage
of his position, fraudulently obtained and encashed (31) Managers
checks.
PCIB impleaded Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of
the proceeds from Balmacedas alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the
number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Managers checks to 34.
Balmaceda was declared in default. In defense, Ramos denied any
knowledge of Balmacedas scheme. He argued that he is a reputable
businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting
cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. He admitted receiving
money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to
Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of
Balmacedas
money.
The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to
prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latters fraudulent
manipulations
ISSUE: Whether or not PCIB had sufficient evidence to prove that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the scheme to defraud
PCIB
RULING: No. PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of
evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in
perpetrating the latters scheme to defraud the Bank. However, PCIBs
pieces of evidence are not sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof that it
carries as plaintiff.
On its face, all that PCIBs evidence proves is that Balmaceda used
Ramos name as a payee when he filled up the application forms for the
Managers checks. But, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the
payee on some of the Managers checks is not enough basis to conclude
that Ramos was complicit in Balmacedas fraud.
A number of other people were made payees on the other Managers
checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank
adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos participation that would
justify
his
separate
treatment
from
the
others.
The evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own
when he applied for the Managers checks against the bank account of
one of PCIBs clients, as well as when he encashed the fraudulently
acquired
Managers
checks.
Mrs. Elizabeth Costes, the Area Manager of PCIB at the time of the
relevant events, testified that Balmaceda committed all the acts
necessary to obtain the unauthorized Managers checks from filling up
the application form by forging the signature of the clients
representative, to forging the signatures of the payees in order to encash

Page 62 of 68

the

checks.

Mrs. Nilda Laforteza, the Commercial Account Officer stated that it was
Balmaceda who forged Ramos signature on the Managers checks where
Ramos was the payee, so as to encash the amounts indicated on the
checks. These testimonies clearly dispute PCIBs theory that Ramos was
instrumental in the encashment of the Managers checks.
Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. (See Encinas v. National
Bookstore)
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to
obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the
burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the
defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if
established, will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim.

DE LA LLANA vs. BIONG

G.R. 182356 December 13, 2014 711 SCRA
FACTS: Petitioner was seated at the passenger side of her brothers car
while they were driving along North Avenue, Quezon City on March 30,
2000. When the signal light turned red across the Veterans Memorial
Hospital, the driver turned to a complete stop. Unfortunately, a dump truck
containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and
its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra.
delaLlana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra.delaLlana did not appear to
have suffered from any other visible physical injuries. The traffic
investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel
Primero. In the first week of May 2000, Dra.delaLlana began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became
more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On
June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr.Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the
nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr.Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra.delaLlanas condition did
not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy. Dr Flores,
a nuero-surgeon operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and C6
vertebrae to release the compression of her nerve. The operation released
the impingement, but incapacitated Dra. DelaLlana from the practice of her
profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.Dra.DelaLlana demanded
form Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
Thus, DradelaLlana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. In defense,
Rebecca maintained that Dra. delaLlana had no cause of action against her
as no reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra.
delaLlanas injury. She pointed out that Dra. delaLlanas illness became
manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident.
She further claims that Dra. delaLlana was physically fit and strong when
they met several days after the vehicular accident. The RTC ruled in favour
of Dra. DelaLlana. It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the
sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the massive
damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It
maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road
visibility diminishes at night. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC. It held that Dra. delaLlana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance
of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra.

delaLlanas whiplash injury.
RULING: Dra.delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case
are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond,
was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages. These elements show that the source of
obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties
that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from noncontractual relations of certain members of society to others. Based on
these requisites, Dra.delaLlana must first establish by preponderance of
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas
liability as Joels employer. Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel arise. In the present
case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels
negligence and Dra.delaLlanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. delaLlana.
She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligence, in
its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury
would not have occurred. Dra.delaLlana, during trial, did not adduce the
factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or
the ultimate fact can be established. She presented three pieces of
evidences, however, none of these show the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In sum, Dra.delaLlana
miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While
we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially
assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. delaLlanasfavor.
Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.

CANDAO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 186659-710 October 19, 2011 659 SCRA

FACTS: On August 5, 1993, Chairman Pascasio S. Banariaof COA

constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an
Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor,
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ORG-ARMM). State Auditors
Heidi L. Mendoza andJaime Roxas were directed to conduct the said audit
under the supervision of Jaime P. Naranjo. From August 24 to September 1,
1993, the expanded audit was thus conducted on the financial transactions
and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993.As
stated in Special Audit Office Report submitted by the audit team, it was
found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of
the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner
Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement
vouchers. There were 52 checks issued and encashed without proper
supporting documents. In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman
Banaria demanded from petitioner Haron to produce and restitute to the
ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full amount of P21,045,570.64
and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours together with the
official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in
acknowledgment of such restitution.On April 17, 1998, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the
Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the

Page 63 of 68

following ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional

Governor), Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao
(Executive Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago (Cashier). They were
charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. At their arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the charge
of malversation. By Decision dated October 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
found petitioner Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A.
Candao who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a
fine equivalent to the amount of the check in each case. The Sandiganbayan
noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances intended
for "peace and order campaign" were spent for public purposes, as in fact
the alleged disbursement vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the
nature of the expense/s such as purchase of equipment, services, meals,
travel, etc. and there were no supporting documents such as the Request for
Issuance of Voucher, Purchase Request and Inspection Report of the items
supposedly purchased. More importantly, the vouchers were not
accomplished in accordance with existing COA circulars because they are
unnumbered and undated. Hence, the belatedly submitted vouchers are of
doubtful veracity or origin, nay, a fabricated evidence or, as pointed out by
the prosecution, "self-serving or an afterthought, belatedly prepared to give
the illegal disbursements amounting to the aggregate amount of more
than P21M, a semblance of regularity."
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the Equipoise
Rule
HELD: All elements of malversation were satisfactorily established by the
prosecution in this case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption
that with the Disbursing Officers (Haron) failure to account for the
illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when demanded
by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their
personal benefit. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error
in holding that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence of misappropriation
arising from Harons failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal
withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and control.
Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire
amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter. There
is therefore no merit in petitioners argument that the Sandiganbayan erred
in not applying the equipoise rule. Under the equipoise rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the
prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that Disbursing Officer
Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon
demand, specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the
said funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction
is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds,
that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct
evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary in
malversation cases.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ANTONIO REYES

G.R. No. 170512 October 5 2011 658 SCRA
FACTS: On January 10, 2001, Jaime B. Acero went to the LTO Office at
Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a drivers license. He was made to take
an examination for drivers license applicants by a certain Tata Penaloza
whose real name is Angelito, a clerk in the said office. After the
examination, Penaloza informed him that he failed in the examination,
however, if he will be willing to pay additional assessment of P680.00

then Penaloza and Reyes will consider his application. Acero agreed, and
handed P1000.00 to Penaloza who in turn handed the same to the cashier.
Penaloza, in turn handed him a change of P320.00, and a little later he
was given the LTO Official receipt, but only for P180.00, which OR
served as his temporary license for 60 days, and the balance of P500.00
was without OR and retained by Penaloza. He then issued an Affidavit to
file charges against the guilty parties. The affidavit was apparently filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, but was later
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, who ordered the
respondents to submit their counter-affidavits. Penalozadenied telling
Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and
Pealoza would reconsider his application. Pealoza stated that he did
administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he
requested their security guard, DominadorDaypuyat, to check the answers
of Acero using their answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Aceros paper,
Pealoza noted the score of 22/40. Pealoza informed Acero of the failing
grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero
then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back
and returned his application documents to Pealoza.The Office of the
Ombudsman called for the parties for a prelimary conference, but such
was waived by Acero. Both parties failed to appear in the preliminary
conference, so the case was then submitted for decision. The counsel for
Pealoza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that his client
was waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. The Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision adjudging Reyes
guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of simple
misconduct.Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Review. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and
reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was
sufficiently proven by substantial evidence.
RULING: Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to
the rights of others.Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave
misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of Office of the
LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in
exchange for the issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding
that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.The
findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence.In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for
or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. In reviewing
administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of the Court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to
the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the
Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an
exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.The exception applies
herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case
should be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.Reyes faults petitioner
for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well
as the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not
furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its
Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to
due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes
was afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be
heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of
petitioners adverse decision.Due process, as a constitutional precept, does

Page 64 of 68

not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents
right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts
of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not
complied with.Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision
that found him guilty of grave misconduct.

RAMOS VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK

G.R. NO. 203186 December 4, 2013 711 SCRA
FACTS: Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually
became its Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans
Division. During his tenure, a client named TrezitaB. Acosta (Acosta)
entered into and obtained several auto and real estate loans from BPI
Family which were duly approved and promptly paid.On December 15,
2004, Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family in the
amount ofP3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle
(subject loan) which had remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not
authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan, rendering the
transaction fraudulent.After investigation, BPI Family discovered that a
person misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the
delivery of a Toyota Prado from the Toyota-Pasong Tamo Branch, pursuant
to the Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by
Ramos and that Ramos released these documents without the prior approval
of BPI Familys credit committee. BPI further found that Ramos was
grossly remiss in his duties since his subordinates did not follow the banks
safety protocols, particularly those regarding the establishment of the loan
applicants identity, and that the promissory note was not even signed by
the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers.As a
consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided
between Ramos and his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos
shouldering the proportionate amount of P546,000.00. The foregoing
amount was subsequently deducted from Ramoss benefits which accrued
upon his retirement on May 1, 2006.In relation thereto, he executed a
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim dated June 21, 2006, agreeing to release the
bank from any claim or liability with respect to, inter alia, his separation
pay or retirement benefits.Claiming that the deductions made by BPI
Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of
retirement benefits and non- payment of overtime and holiday pay and
premium pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that time, Alfonso
L. Salcedo, Jr., before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed Ramos complaint ruling that the deduction made
on his retirement benefits was "legal and even reasonable" since Ramos
was negligent in running his department. In particular, the LA found that
Ramos failed to ensure that his subordinates complied with the banks
Know Your Customer (KYC) safety protocols, and that he issued the PO
and ATD without the prior approval of the credit committee.On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the LA in a Decisionholding that the deduction complained
of was "illegal and unreasonable" in that the alleged negligence committed
by Ramos was not substantially proven as he was not expected to
personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to

require the client to personally appear before him because he has

subordinates to do those details for him. The issuance of the PO and ATD
prior to the loans approval is not an irregular procedure, but an ordinary
occurrence in BPI Family. Furthermore, the deduction does not fall under
the exceptions prescribed under Article 113 of the Labor Code on allowable
deductions. BPI Family moved for reconsideration which was, however,
denied by the NLRC, hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding
that Ramos was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network
Marketing/Auto Loans Division in failing to determine the true identity of
the person who availed of the auto loan under the name "Trezita Acosta".
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it found the deduction made from
Ramoss retirement benefits to be illegal and unreasonable.
RULING: The petition is meritorious. To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show
that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction.In labor disputes, the NLRCs findings are said to be tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when its conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidence.The CA only examines the factual findings of the
NLRC to determine whether or not the conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.As a general rule, in certiorari
proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does
not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding
is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its
decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and
measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRCs findings should be
supported by substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]n cases filed before
administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA
to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramoss retirement benefits
was improper.It would seem unthinkable that respondent bank has had no
knowledge thereof when its credit evaluation committee could have easily
relayed the variations to the management for expedient solution. Any
conscientious, well-meaning banking institution (such as respondent bank,
We imagine) would have raised the red flag the moment the violation is
first discovered. However, in this case, respondent bank did not sound
alarm until the discovery of the first defraudation. Without doubt, its
uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its divisions contributed
to a large extent to the unfortunate attainment of fraud. x xx (Emphasis
supplied). Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramoss action
of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the approval of the credit committee
was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family
itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent ion
his duties. To this end, it is well to note that in loan transactions, banks are
mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the
documentary requirements in relation to the approval and release of loan
applications.As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over
its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is
but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings

LUCAS vs. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 20011 650 SCRA

Page 65 of 68

FACTS: On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to

Establish Illegitimate Filiation before RTC Valenzuela. Petitioner narrated
that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila
from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to
work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate relationship developed
between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was
not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on
told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner
was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of
about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie
refused to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in
vain.Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate
of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio
City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the
same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.Respondent was
not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of
the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial
court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.The case was
dismissed by RTC. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v.
Alba, there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first
establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of
paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific
evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed
that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present.
Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his
mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with
respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about
his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed
by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent,
there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the
latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima
facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative
defenses. CA denied the appeal. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing
order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it essentially ruled that DNA
testing can only be ordered after the petitioners establishes a prima facie
proof of filiation.
RULING: The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first
procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to
discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a

DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a
DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the
Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to
supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving
motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation
cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.The Rule on DNA
Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction
and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA
test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It
seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA
analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused
and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public."Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable,
and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing.The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS AMELIO TRIO AND JOHN

DOE
G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012 671 SCRA
FACTS: Respondent Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch
Manager of petitioner PNB, assigned at PNBs Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS). MWSS
opened Current Account (C/A) No. 244-850099-6 with PNBMWSS and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13. The
account was intended as a depository for a loan from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) to fund a contract. To withdraw from
the account, PNB checks must be issued and three signatures
securedone signatory each from MWSS, Maynilad Water
Services, Inc. (MWSI), and the contractor, China-Geo Engineering
Corporation (China-Geo). Thereafter PNB-MWSS received a
letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP
5,200,000 (plus charges) from C/A 244-850099-6 and the issuance
of the corresponding managers check in the same amount payable
to a certain Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes. The letter-request was
purportedly signed and approved by the duly authorized
signatories. Hence, C/A 244-850099-6 was re-activated in light of
the letter-request. Managers Check No. 1165848 was, thus,
prepared and issued in the name of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes (Atty.
Reyes) for the amount of PhP 5,200,000. Respondent Tria with
Atty. Reyes successfully encashed said check in (PNB-Circle).
The MWSS employee in charge of C/A No. 244-8500996, inquired about the accounts outstanding balance. While she was
trying to reconcile the records of MWSS and PNB, she inquired
about a debit entry in the amount of PhP 5,200,000. She then

Page 66 of 68

notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the
managers check payable to Atty. Reyes. Upon verification with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was discovered that there was
no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in its membership roster. Further,
upon inspection of the PNB-MWSS microfilm copy of Managers
Check No. 1165848, it was shown that the check was negotiated
and encashed at the PNB-Circle and was annotated with ok for
payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS by Tria on
the dorsal portion of the check.
PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought
to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. Following a preliminary
investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
stating that Trias identification of the payee did not consummate
the payment of the Managers Check. Rather, it was held, the
consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval
of the encashment. Undaunted, PNB filed a petition for review
with the DOJ and prayed for the reversal of the Resolutions issued
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP). Then
Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales issued a Resolution dismissing
PNBs petition for review. PNBs motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the existence of probable cause in
the instant case and affirming the OCPs findings that there is no
probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for trial in
the crime of qualified theft.
RULING: According to the CA, it was the approval of the request
for the issuance and for the encashment of the managers check by
the employees of PNB that resulted in the withdrawal of the
amount encashed by Atty. Reyes/John Doe. Hence, according to
the appellate court, the OCP was correct in not pursuing the
criminal case against Tria.
Clearly, the CA in the instant case erroneously overlooked vital
factual circumstances that call for a reversal of its ruling.
While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a
preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the
filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such
authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it
has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And indeed,
grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges
against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed
against him for qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the
filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him,
but only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of
the crime charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused.
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the
encashment of the check provide more than sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause to file an information against him and
John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer
from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified
theft.
While it is truly imperative to relieve a person from the pain of
going through the rigors of trial, it is more imperative to proceed
with the prosecution of a criminal case to ensure that the truth is
revealed and justice served when there is a prima facie case against
him.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012. 664 SCRA
FACTS: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to
serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner
Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody
shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillos
house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate
from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him
with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not

guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge
against him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision.
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who
applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside
from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that
Masnayon (who served the search warrant) was conscious of the falsity of
his assertion or representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was no probable cause to issue the subject
search warrant in this case.
RULING:
This Court finds no merit on the argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable
cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause,
is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not
by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.

PEOPLE vs. ANTICAMARA

G.R. NO. 178771 June 18, 2011 651 SCRA
FACTS: About 3:00am, May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers house located in Rosales,
Pangasinan. Their employer, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of
the house at that time. At that time, AAA was jolted from sleep and
observed about (6) persons enter the house, who she identified later as
accused Dick Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and
appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara, and Fernando
Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas.
The group later took AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by the
Estrellas. Eventually, Sulpacio was shot and buried in a secluded place.
AAA was held captive and raped for (27) days.
On June 4, 2002, AAA managed to escape and report the incident to the
police. Subsequently, Lando, Al, Dick Tado (at large), Robert Tado (at
large), Marvin Lim (at large), Necitas Ordeza-Tado and Fred Doe (at
large) are charged with the crimes of Murder and of kidnapping, in two
separate informations
The Rosales Pangasinan RTC acquitted Necitas for insufficiency of
evidence.Lando and Al, as principal were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No.
4481-R. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to adduce sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and
guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
RULING: Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be

Page 67 of 68

inferred
according
to
reason
and
common
experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with
approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she
and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of
the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
several persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando
Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the latter uttering
somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo
where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and
with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo,
Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo, Alberto
Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the
Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was
dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon
reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her
in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him
uttered: Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets
in his body, and the one left is for this girl.
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA
heard Fred utter Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan,
sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June
23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his
companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA
and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the
fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains
of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by
the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were
found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil
concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The
report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye
sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found
tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of
Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the
appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and
blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.
PEOPLE VS. DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. 185212
February 15, 2012
666 SCRA
FACTS: This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be
considered sufficient to support a finding of guilt in a murder case.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Sultan Kudarat charged the accused Maritess
Alolod (the adopted child of the victims), Efren Deocampo, Edwin
Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the (RTC) of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. The RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of
Lucena and Melanio Alolod, with Efren and Edwin as principals and
Maritess and Elmer as accessories. While the case was on appeal, the (CA)
granted the request of Maritess and Elmer to withdraw their appeals,
leaving only those of Efren and Edwin for its considerationThe CA
rendered judgment, affirming with modification the RTC decision. The CA
reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that
accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based
on circumstantial evidence.
RULING: No, the CA is correct.
The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of
the crime provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a)
There is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and
(c)
The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads
to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of
all others.
Here, those circumstances abound.
1.
Efren had always been banned from the old couples
(Alolod couple) house because they strongly disapproved his relationship
with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around
that house.
2.
The old couple were enjoying good health before the
evening of May 27, 1998.
3.
On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house,
meaning that they were killed on the night of May 27 or early morning of
May 28.

Page 68 of 68

4.
On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman
Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next
to the old couples house. They even tried to conceal themselves in th
school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had
been cut.
5.
At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound
of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig.
6.
At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod
kitchen.
7.
From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old
couples house, with Efren wearing the old mans watch.
8.
Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going
to Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment
when people started looking for them. They were of course buried in the
garden.
9.
A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant
more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house.
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath
those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old
couple was killed does not encourage belief. The security guard saw him
with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the couples house where they
had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that
house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was
not physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it
happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15
kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.