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The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of
a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority
to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority
to take the acknowledgment of the testratix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the testratix
and the instrumental witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa
Tamio de Buenaventuras last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
CIRILO
CAPITLE
v.
FORTUNATA
FACTS: A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar) covering Lot
1849 (the lot), and situated in Barangay Valle, Talavera, Nueva Ecija on account of which he was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-0-3514.
Respondents Fortunata Elbambuena (F ortunata) and Rosalinda Olar (Rosalinda), spouse and daughterin-law, respectively, of Olar, now deceased, claim that Olar relinquished one-half or 0.9072 hectare of the
lot to Rosalinda by a "Kasunduan" dated July 17, 1992 the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner
Cirilo Capitle; and that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to Fortunata by an undated
document.
Fortunata and Rosalinda, alleged that Sps Capitles requested then that they be allowed to occupy the lot
to pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, however, Sps Capitle did not pay rentals despite demand
therefor, and neither did they heed the demand to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents
to file a Petition for Recovery of Possession and Payment of Back Rentals against petitioners before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Regional Office.
Sps. Capitle claims that they have been in possession of the lot since 1960 and presented a "Waiver of
Rights" executed by Olar wherein he renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle
since 1960; and a Pinagsamang Patunay Fom the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
Chairman and barangay chairman of Valle certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and
possessors of the lot.
Sps. Capitle further claim that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already separated from Olar.
ISSUE/S: W/N the waiver executed by Olar in favor of the Sps. Capitle transferred the questioned
property?
RULING: NO. The DARAB correctly found that petitioners-appellants possession of the questioned
property since 1960 is of dubious legality. No amount of possession under whatever claim (actual tilling
and actual possession) can clothe petitioner-appellants with any lawful right over the questioned property.
It can be gleaned from the factual antecedents that petitioners-appellants stay in Cristobal Olars property
was, or had been, by mere tolerance of respondents-appellees. Indeed, so much is clear from the
averments on page 5 of their petition: "xxx; that Cristobal Olar beginning 1959 up to the time of his death
in 1995 lived all alone by himself and his companions in his house are the Spouses Iluminada and
Cirilo Capitle xxx." These averments, being in the nature of judicial admissions, are conclusive and
binding on petitioners-appellants and can no longer be controverted. This simply meant that no title of
ownership as farmer beneficiary was passed unto the Capitles, thereby rendering ineffective the
certification issued by the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Even the Board Resolution of the Samahang
Nayon of Valle, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, naming the Capitles as new allocatees of the landholding, had no
binding effect, as the said samahang nayon is not the proper authority under the law with power to pass
upon the legal issue as to who rightfully deserves to own Cristobal Olars landholding after him. Besides
which, there was nothing amiss with the DARABs ruling relative to the issuance of the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award to Cristobal Olar, as this was done in the regular course of an official function. It simply
established the fact that petitioners-appellants claim could in no way legally stand against Cristobal Olar,
whose title under the CLOA cannot be overthrown or supplanted by some organizational resolution and/or
barangay attestations/certifications.
On the other hand, Cristobal Olars death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the
subject property to his legal heirs by operation of law. In the case at bench, to herein respondentsSAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 28
RULING: The reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for settlement of
estate, rather than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are genuinely interested in securing
that part of their late fathers property which has been reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory
heirs, then they should simply exercise their actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion
[44]
of legitime. Such relief must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a case for the
settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken jurisdiction over the
settlement of said estate.
GR No. 116775
January 22, 1998
FACTS: Justa acquired the 0.5 hec by inheritance from her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula
Tubil, and 2.2 hec by purchase. Estrada, Justas nephew, claimed to be the sole surviving heir
of Justa on the ground that she died intestate. He further claimed that Pascasio Uriarte who
apparently worked the land as Justas tenant refused to give him his share of the
harvest. Estrada claimed that Uriarte has no right to the entire land but could only claim of
the 0.5 hec. Justa inherited from her parents. While the partition case was pending, Pascasio
died and was replaced by petitioners-heirs. Allegedly, the petitioners were not mere tenants but
Justas heirs entitled to her entire land.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Estrada may inherit from Justa.
RULING: Estrada, as admitted by petitioners, is Justas nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being
Justas half sister. He is thus Justas nearest relative and thus, the only one entitled to her
estate. Estrada is a 3rd degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, petitioners are the children
of Justas cousin. They are thus 5th degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the
nearest excludes the farthest, then Estrada is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother
is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who
may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives the decedent. That Estrada is only
a half-blood is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The
determination of whether the relationship is of full or half blood is important only to determine
the extent of the share of the survivors.
2.
No, the probate or intestate court cannot do so. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the
intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction,
it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with
equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar. In the instant case, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which,
on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in
favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties
covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil
Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership
of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a
probate court.
No. The deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were
contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. Hence, the properties
conveyed thereby are not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under
Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent
to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
61. LOPEZ ET. AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES LOPEZ ET. AL.
G.R. No. 127827
March 5, 2003
PUNO, J
FACTS: A suit was instituted to by the private respondents to recover a parcel of land they inherited from
their father. Petitioners however opposed the same contending that their right as co-owners to the land
was recognized by the private respondents through an Extra-judicial Partition of the real property between
their predecessors in interest. Petitioners argue that respondents are precluded from denying the
contents of these documents based on the principle of estoppel by deed, as such they are entitled to the
partition thereof as co-owners.
ISSUE/S: Are petitioners entitled to partition?
RULING: No. Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other
party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material
facts asserted in it. The principle is that when a man has entered into a solemn engagement by deed, he
shall not be permitted to deny any matter which he has asserted therein, for a deed is a solemn act to any
part of which the law gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker.
A void deed, however, will not work, and may not be the basis of, an estoppel. Covenants do not work an
estoppel unless the deed in which they are contained is itself a valid instrument. In the case at bar, the
deed and instruments at issue were void. The extra-judicial partition did not have an object certain, which
is the subject matter of the deed. The disputed land cannot be their object because petitioners do not
have any right or interest over it. They are not its co-owners as it is owned absolutely by the father of
private respondents. Well to note, the instrument was executed on the mistaken assumption that private
respondents father and the latters brothers inherited the property from their own father. Estoppel does
not operate to confer property rights where there are none.
Prescinding from the lack of co-ownership, petitioners argument that they are entitled to have the land
partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held
in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate
in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference
from the other. Not being co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its partition. They do
not have any interest or share in the property upon which they can base their demand to have it divided.