Securitatea informationala si serviciile speciale in Germania

Dup semnarea Tratatului de la Versailles din 1919 aprarea german dorea cu ardoare s-i
mbunteasc sistemul de comunicaie prin achiziionarea unei mainrii destinat iniial pieii. Nu a
durat mult pn cnd armata german i-a inventat un model propriu de mainrie cu care avea s transmit
mesaje codate. n 1928 a fost achiziionat de armat iar n 1933 de forele aeriene.
Enigma
Inventat de germanul Arthur Scherbius pentru companiile comerciale care doreau s-i stabileasc
un sistem codat de comunicaie , maina electric pe rotor Enigma a fost repede construit de germani
pentru transmiterea de mesaje codate. Piesele componente ale mainii Enigma erau: 1. tastatura, care
fusese mprumutat de la mainile de scris obinuite; 2. placa cu lmpi, o lamp n locul fiecrei taste care se
aprindea n momentul n care tasta era acionat i punea n lumin litera inscrip ionat pe ea; 3. placa
comutatoarelor pe care se aflau prizele, una pentru fiecare liter, fiecare conectat de celelalte; 4. trei rotoare
detaabile, fiecare dispunnd de un set format din 26 de contacte, cte unul pentru o liter; 5. roata fix, cu o
form identic cu a rotoarelor dar care nu se putea detaa i care avea un set de 26 de contacte grupate n
perechi; 6. baterie pentru alimentarea circuitelor. Dei germanii credeau ca mesajele codate nu vor putea fi
descifrat de inamici , maina a fost reconstruit i de polonezi care au oferit-o sprgtorilor de coduri
britanici pentru a descifra semnalele Germaniei n timpul celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial.
Maina Enigma permitea unui operator s tasteze un mesaj care apoi era btut dup neles de 3
sau 5 rotie zimate care artau litere diferite din alfabet. Cel care primea mesajul trebuia s cunoasc foarte
bine mecanismul acestor rotie pentru a putea descifra mesajul. Dup ceva timp germanii au mbuntit
maina adugndu-I un rotor cu circuit electric.
Sprgtorii
n 1931 britanicii ntmpinau probleme n a descifra codul Enigmei, dar nici francezii nu reuiser
nc. Doar dup ce biroul polonez de descifrare a dat mai multe detalii , britanicii au reuit s descifreze o
parte din coduri. Polonezii, datorit legturilor cu industria german, au reuit s fac o main identic cu
cea a germanilor cu care au reuit s citeasc mesajele armatei germane ntre 1933 i 1938.
Enigma nu a fost de la nceput foarte eficient. Doar n 1941 munca depus pentru a descifra
codurile i-a artat efectele. n primvara anului 1941 britancii au descifrat planurile armatei germane de a
invada Grecia, ns nu au avut ocazia s exploateze aceast informaie deoarece nu aveau suficient fort
militar pentru a opri invadarea. n mai, britanicii, descifrnd mesajele codate ale italienilor , au ajutat flota
admiralului Cunningham s-I nving pe italieni n btlia de la Matapan.
Scurtarea rzboiului
n 1942 germanii au introdus a patra roti la mainile Enigma de pe vasele germane pentru a spori
securitatea mesajelor secrete. Rezulatatul au fost mainile Triton sau Shark, cum le denumiser
britanicii. Timp de aproape un an dup ce germanii au mbuntit mainriile, britanicii nu au putut s
descifreze nici mcar un cod, asta ducnd la anse tot mai mari de nfrngere pentru Aliai n Atlantic.
Datorit mesajelor descifrate, cel de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial a fost scurtat. Faptul c britancii tiau
orice micare pe care armata german o fcea i-a ajutat s-l in departe de Egipt pe generalul german Erwin
Rommel, chiar dac nu n 1941, ci un an mai trziu cnd l-au oprit n Gazela.

Succesul Enigmei a avut nevoie mereu de ajutor complementar dar faptul c Aliaii au inut secret
mainria pn n 1947 arat ct de mult a nsemnat pentru ei.
INTRODUCERE
Rezistand unui secol turbulent si violent, Germania este in prezent unul dintre liderii mondiali ai
guvernelor liberal democratice, dar pentru sistemul naional de informaii si agentiile de securitate, depasirea
mostenirii lasate de rolul lor in cele doua razboaie mondiale s-a dovedit a fi o adevarata provocare.
In timpul secolului al XIX-lea si in Primul Razboi Mondial, Abwehr-ul german a fost una dintre
agentiile de informatii de succes. Abwehr-ul a mentinut una dintre cele mai mari retele de spionaj si a facut
progrese enorme in tehnologia de spionaj, criptare si SIGINT. In timpul celui de al doilea Razboi Mondial,
Abwehr-ul a participat in multe operatiuni, in special in recrutarea de agenti dubli care s-au infiltrat in
sistemele militare aliate.
Dupa cel de-al doilea Razboi Mondial, Germania a fost impartita in doua ari separate. Germania de
Est, sub influena sovietica, a organizat un serviciu de informaii puternic, cunoscut sub numele de STASI.
In 1989, dupa caderea regimului comunist, a inceput procesul de reunificare a Germaniei. Dupa eforturi de
decenii pentru a vindeca ranile nazismului, guvernul german a trebuit sa abordeze mostenirea opresiva de
agentiilor fostului guvernul est-german. Dupa reunificarea Germaniei, liderii guvernului au stabilit o
campanie extrem de mediatizata de restructurare si reforma a sistemelor de informa ii nationale reemergente si agentiilor de securitate, comunitatea de informatii germana de azi incercand in mod activ sa se
distanteze de predecesorii sai.
Prima agentie de informatii a Germaniei este Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), (Federal Intelligence
Service, Serviciul Federal de Informaii) si se ocupa atat de informatii interne cat si externe. Face parte din
Biroul cancelarului federal si activeaza in sediul guvernului german. BND gestioneaza o retea substantiala
HUMINT la nivel mondial si conduce un sistem radio extins de supraveghere si semnalare, atat in
Germania cat si in intreaga Europa, lucrand in cooperare cu alte agentii de securitate, in special cu Poliia
Federala.
BND colecteaza informatii relevante pentru localizarea si urmarirea in justitie a grupurilor teroriste,
traficantii de droguri, spalarii de bani si comerciani ilegali de arme. In conformitate cu dreptul international,
BND efectueaza operatiuni de informatii menite sa previna proliferarea tehnologiei si materialelor
nucleare.
Sistemul de informaii militare este coordonat de catre structuri departamentale ale Ministerului
Apararii. Agentia de informatii militare esteNachrichtenwesen Amt der Bundeswehr (ANBw), care
coordoneaza operatiunile diferitelor ramuri de informatii militare si faciliteaza schimbul de informatii vitale
cu agentiile civile in cadrul comunitatii de informatii germane. ANBw evalueaza, in primul rand, puterea
militara, teatrele de operatii si pozitia politica de militara a altor state.
Abschirmdienst Militaerischer (MAD), Serviciul militar de Securitate, are in responsabilitate
operatiunile de contraspionaj. Un department din MAD colecteaza informatii cu privire la operatiunile
informative straine si evalueaza sistemele de securitate destinate proteciei informaiilor clasificate.
Ministerul de Interne din Germania administreaza agentiile civile de informatii. Insarcinati cu
colectarea si analiza informatiilor interne si informatiilor de securitate, principalele agentii civile germane
sunt Sicherheit Bundesamt fr in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Oficiul Federal pentru securitatea in
tehnologia informatiei, si Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz (BFV), Biroul Federal pentru Protectia
Constitutiei. BSI este responsabil pentru securitatea tehnologiei informationele guvernamentale, conduce
supravegherea reelelor de Internet si obine informatii privind infractiunile prin internet.
Oficiul Federal pentru Apararea Constitutiei (BFV) evalueaza riscurile generate de diverse grupuri
extremiste. Agentia desfasoara operatiunile de supraveghere si infiltrare in grupurile extremiste pentru a
aduna informatii despre organizare, resurse financiare, arme si planuri de actiune, misiunea sa fiind
de monitorizare a extremistilor si gruparilor paramilitare care reprezinta o potentiala amenintare pentru
interesele nationale.
Germania participa in multe operatiuni de informatii internationale, inclusiv masuri globale antiterorism.
In ultimii ani, comunitatea de informatii germana a devenit una dintre principalele surse de informatii
asupra organizatiilor extremiste politice si grupuri subversive in intreaga Europa.

Elementele de culegere a informaiilor sunt fortele, mijloacele si sistemele utilizate pentru a observa,
supraveghea, identifica, inregistra si comunica date si informatii referitoare la fapte, evenimente, situatii si
conditii.
Informatiile culese de acestea provin din mai multe tipuri de surse, numite si discipline de culegere,
astfel:
Informatii din surse acustice (ACINT) sunt informatii provenite din culegerea si procesarea
fenomenelor acustice. Datorita naturii originii sunetului ACINT vizeaza in primul rand miscarea si
informatiile derivate din aceasta.
Informatii din surse umane (HUMINT) sunt o categorie de informatii derivata din informatiile
culese si asigurate de sursele umane. HUMINT au valoare particulara in confirmarea sau completarea
IMINT si SIGINT.
Informatii obtinute din imagini (IMINT) sunt informatii din imaginile obtinute de senzorii care
pot fi dispusi pe sol, pe mare sau pe platforme aeriene
/spatiale. Informatia transmisa de o imagine este clara, concisa, fara echivoc si in cele mai multe
cazuri este folosita pentru confirmarea informatiilor din alte surse.
Informatii cu privire la caracteristicile tintei (MASINT) reprezinta informatiile stiintifice si
tehnice derivate din analiza datelor obtinute de la senzori cu scopul identificarii caracteristicilor distincte
asociate cu sursa, pentru a facilita identificarea ulterioara.
Informatii din surse deschise (OSINT) reprezinta informatiile derivate din informatiile publice
disponibile si informatiile neclasificate cu distribuire sau acces public limitat.
Informatii culese prin radar (RADINT) sunt informatii obtinute prin utilizarea radarului ca
instrument de detectie, precum identificarea si localizarea unei tinte care poate fi recunoscuta sau nu, pe o
anumita directie si la o anumita distanta sau simpla detectare a miscarii unei tinte.
Informatii obtinute din mediul electromagnetic (SIGINT) reprezinta informatiile obtinute prin
interceptarea si procesarea semnalelor electromagnetice si cuprinde informatiile obtinute din comunicatii
(COMINT) si informatiile obtinute din non-comunicatii (ELINT).
Informatii obtinute prin analizarea echipamentelor tehnice/ tehnologice (TEHINT) reprezinta
informatiile cu privire la dezvoltarile tehnologice, care au, sau eventual pot sa aiba, o aplicare practica in
scopuri militare.
Cunoasterea capabilitatilor si limitarilor activitaii ageniilor de informaii de catre comandantii,
planificatorii si operatorii de la toate esaloanele este obligatorie, pentru a sti ce sa ceara si ce sa astepte de la
sistem, modul de angajare al capabilitatilor acestuia, modul de compensare a cerintelor cu resursele si
riscurile identificate.
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) is a federal agency with the mission to promote
IT security in Germany. It is the central IT security service provider for the German government but also
offers services to IT manufacturers, as well as private and commercial users.
Tasks of the Federal Office
(1) The Federal Office shall promote the security of information technology. To do so, it shall perform
the following tasks:
1. prevent threats to the security of federal information technology;
2. gather and analyse information on security risks and security precautions and provide the results to
other authorities as needed for them to fulfil their tasks or preserve their security interests;
3. studying security risks involved in the use of information technology, and developing security
precautions, especially information technology processes and devices for information technology security
(IT security products) as needed by the Federation to fulfil its tasks, including research as part of its legally
mandated tasks;
4. developing criteria, procedures and tools to test and evaluate the security of information technology
systems or components and to test and evaluate compliance with IT security standards;
5. testing and evaluating the security of information technology systems or components and issuing
security certificates;
6. testing information technology systems and components and confirming compliance with IT
security standards defined in the Federal Offices technical guidelines;

7. testing, evaluating and approving information technology systems or components to be used in

processing or transmitting official confidential information in accordance with Section 4 of the Security
Clearance Check Act (SG) in the federal area or by companies in the context of federal contracts;
8. producing key data and operating cryptography and security management systems for federal
information security systems used to protect official confidentiality or in other areas at the request of the
authorities concerned;
9. providing support and advice on organizational and technical security measures and carrying out
technical tests to protect confidential official information in accordance with Section 4 of the Security
Clearance Check Act against unauthorized access;
10. developing technical security standards for federal information technology and for the suitability
of information technology contractors in special need of protection;
11. making IT security products available to federal bodies;
12. providing support for the federal bodies responsible for the security of information technology,
especially where these bodies undertake advisory or supervisory tasks; support for the Federal
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information shall take priority and shall be provided in
line with the independency granted the Federal Commissioner in carrying out his/her tasks;
13. providing support for a) the police and prosecution authorities in carrying out their legally
mandated tasks, b) the authorities for the protection of the Constitution in analysing and evaluating
information derived from surveillance of terrorist activities or from intelligence activities as authorized by
federal and state law, c) the Federal Intelligence Service in carrying out its legally mandated tasks. This
support may be provided only where necessary to prevent or investigate activities directed against the
security of information technology or activities carried out using information technology. The Federal Office
shall keep a record of requests for support;
14. advising and warning federal and Lnder bodies as well as producers, distributors and users with
regard to the security of information technology, keeping in mind the possible consequences of the lack of
security precautions or of inadequate security precautions;
15. creating appropriate communications structures to recognize crises at an early stage, respond and
manage crises and to coordinate efforts to protect critical information infrastructures in cooperation with
private industry. (2) The Federal Office may assist the Lnder in securing their information technology upon
request.
BSI Standarts1:
1. BSI Standard 100-1 defines the general requirements for an ISMS. It is completely compatible
with ISO Standard 27001 and moreover takes the recommendations in ISO Standards of the ISO 2700x
family into consideration. It provides readers with easily understood and systematic instructions, regardless
of which methods they wish to use to implement the requirements.
2. BSI-Standard 100-2: IT-Grundschutz Methodology The IT-Grundschutz Methodology progressively

describes (step by step) how information security management can be set up and operated in practice. The
tasks of information security management and setting up an security organisation are important subjects in
this context. The IT-Grundschutz Methodology provides a detailed description of how to produce a practical
security concept, how to select appropriate security safeguards and what is important when implementing
the security concept. The question as to how to maintain and improve information security in ongoing
operation is also answered.
3. BSI-Standard 100-3: Risk Analysis based on IT-Grundschutz To cover these issues, the BSI has worked out
a method of analysing risks that is based on IT-Grundschutz. This approach can be used when companies or
public authorities are already working successfully with the IT-Grundschutz Manual and would like to add
an additional security analysis to the IT-Grundschutz analysis as seamlessly as possible. There may be
different reasons for this:
- the protection requirements of the company or the public authority go beyond the normal measure (high or
very high protection requirements).
- the institution operates important components, which are (still) not treated in the IT-Grundschutz Catalogues
of the BSI
1 www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Publications/BSIStandards/BSIStandards_node.html

the target objects are operated in application scenarios, which are not designated within the framework of the
IT-Grundschutz.
4. The BSI Standard 100-4 points out a systematic way to develop, establish and maintain an agency-wide or
company-wide internal business continuity management system.
TeleTrusT is a widespread competence network for IT security comprising members from industry,
administration, consultancy and research as well as national and international partner organizations with
similar objectives. With a broad range of members and partner organizations TeleTrusT embodies the largest
competence network for IT security in Germany and Europe. TeleTrusT provides interdisciplinary fora for
IT security experts and facilitates information exchange between vendors, users and authorities. TeleTrusT
comments on technical, political and legal issues related to IT security and is organizer of events and
conferences. TeleTrusT is a non-profit association, whose objective is to promote information security
professionalism, raising awareness and best practices in all domains of information security. TeleTrusT is
carrier of the "European Bridge CA" (EBCA; PKI network of trust), the quality seal "IT Security made in
Germany" and runs the IT expert certification programs "TeleTrusT Information Security Professional"
(T.I.S.P.) and "TeleTrusT Engineer for System Security" (T.E.S.S.). TeleTrusT is a member of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The association is headquartered in Berlin, Germany.
Unul dintre cele mai mari atacuri cibernetice din istorie s-a petrecut la nceputul lunii august, atunci
cnd civa hackeri rui au furat 1,2 milioane de date, sub form de identiti digitale i parole. Oficiul
federal pentru securitate n tehnologia informaiei (BSI) a fcut imediat un apel ctre providerii de internet,
pentru mai mult siguran a datelor.
De atunci ns, autoritile germane au lucrat la msuri concrete n acest sens: n viitorul apropiat, va
intra n vigoare o nou legislaie, prin care sistemele IT ale companiilor vor respecta standarde stricte de
securitate. Pentru c i Germania devine tot mai des victima atacurilor sau a spionajului cibernetic.
Standardele de siguran nu mai sunt opionale
Ministrul federal de Interne, Thomas de Maiziere, a declarat c vizate sunt n special companiile de
telecomunicaii, transport, asigurri, domeniile sntate, gastronomie i providerii de energie. Erori n
sistemele IT ale acestor sectoare ar putea avea urmri grave, dac nu chiar dramatice pentru ntreaga
societate, e de prere de Maiziere.
Noua legislaie i va obliga pe ntreprinztori s aplice anumite standarde de securitate digital. Cine
i pune i pe alii n pericol prin utilizarea IT trebuie s-i asume rspunderea de a-i proteja, scrie de
Maiziere, ntr-un articol publicat n cotidianul Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Cu alte cuvinte,
implementarea unor standarde de siguran n sfera digital nu va mai fi o chestiune opional.
Noi locuri de munc pentru siguran n IT
Statul, e de prere ministrul de Interne, trebuie s asigure o centur de siguran pentru sistemele IT
cu o infrastructur critic. Mai mult dect att, prin aceast lege a securitii digitale, sistemele IT din
Germania vor fi printre cele mai sigure din lume, spune de Maiziere.
Se preconizeaz printre altele i nfiinarea a ctorva sute de locuri de munc n plus la Serviciul
federal de informaii interne (BfV), la Oficiul federal de criminalistic (BKA) i la Oficiul federal pentru
securitate n tehnologia informaiei (BSI). Costurile anuale pentru locurile suplimentare de munc depesc
20 milioane de euro.
Dincolo de proiectul de lege, n aceast sptmn, Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), mpreun cu
Ministrul federal al Economiei, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) i ministrul Transporturilor, Alexander Dobrindt
(CSU) vor prezenta Agenda digital 2014-2017, o serie de msuri care vizeaz evoluiile n domeniul
digital.

Denial of service
Situation
So far in 2014 there have been over 32,000 DDoS attacks in Germany alone.
Virtually every sector is afflicted by DDoS attacks.
The Alliance for Cyber Security14 survey found that over a third of the companies questioned
reported being the target of a DDoS attack on their websites during the past three years.
A quarter of the companies surveyed had suffered DDoS attacks on their network infrastructure.
Since 2013 there has been increased use of reflec tion attacks, whereby the target system is not
attacked directly but rather through the misuse of publicly available Internet services (e.g. DNS15 or
NTP16). These involve attackers sending small queries to a public service in the name of their victim. The
services then send their replies to the victims system. Because the replies are usually a lot larger than the
queries, even a small number of attacking systems can do great damage and cripple the victims system. In
reflection attacks unwitting parties such as the service providers become unwilling accomplices.
To date the largest DDos attack took place in February 2014, involving a bandwidth up to 400
gigabits per second. This attack was based on NTP reflection.
The number of NTP servers in Germany which could be exploited for this kind of attack fell between
June 2014 and August 2014 from over 4,000 systems to around 2,500. This was due to information given to
the operators by the BSI.
Spam
Situation
2014 saw major growth of around 80 per cent as compared with 2013, bucking the trend of recent
years in which spam volumes had stagnated (see Fig. 2).
Germany is midway down the Top 10 in the global list of spam senders. 2014 saw a 36 per cent rise
in e-mails with malware in the attachments.
Since the beginning of 2014 a trend towards the generation and sending of pseudorandom malware
variants has been observed.
Criminals increasingly send Office documents as attachments, with malware being downloaded via
macros in these documents.
Due to identity theft spam is increasingly sent via compromised user accounts utilising established email service providers.
Malware
Situation
The total number of PC-based malware variants is now estimated at around the 250 million mark. In
Germany there are at least one million malware infections a month. The number of malware variants
increases at a rate of about 300,000 a day.
The most c ommon ways of spreading malware are drive-by exploits, spam attachments and botnets.
The most frequently detected malware types are adware and Trojans.
Microsoft Windows is by far the operating system most frequently affected by malware, accounting
for around 95 per cent of all instances.
Mobile platforms: at least three million mal ware programs exist for mobile devices such as
smartphones or tablets. 98 per cent of these are designed for the Android operating system.
Malware for mobile platforms usually masquer ade as legitimate apps. They are predominantly
distributed via alternative app stores or websites rather than official app stores like Google Play, or are
installed unwittingly by the users themselves.
Attackers deployment of malware is increasingly professional, for instance involving improved
methods of concealing the control servers, the use of Twitter channels or Google Docs as com mand-andcontrol (C&C) servers, as well as the use of cutting-edge encryption techniques such as elliptic curve
cryptography to safeguard the communication.
Alongside classical malware which steals data or manipulates online banking activities, ransom ware,
malware which blocks access to systems or encrypts user data in order to then extort ransom money, has
become a further everyday tool in the cybercriminals arsenal.
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany
1. Protection of critical information infrastructures The protection of critical information
infrastructures is the main priority of cyber security. They are a central component of nearly all critical

infrastructures and become increasingly important. The public and the private sector must create an
enhanced strategic and organizational basis for closer coordination based on intensified information sharing.
To this end, cooperation established by the CIP implementation plan is systematically extended, and legal
commitments to enhance the binding nature of the CIP implementation plan are examined. With the
participation of the National Cyber Security Council (cf. objective 5), the integration of additional sectors is
examined and the introduction of new relevant technologies is 1 German Army 4 considered to a greater
extent. Whether and where protective measures have to be made mandatory and whether and where
additional powers are required in case of specific threats have to be clarified, too. Furthermore we will
examine the necessity of harmonizing rules to maintain critical infrastructures during IT crises.
2. Secure IT systems in Germany Infrastructure protection requires more security with regard to IT
systems used by citizens and small and medium-sized businesses. Users need appropriate and consistent
information on risks related to the use of IT systems and on security measures they can take to use
cyberspace in a secure manner. We will organize joint initiatives with groups from society to pool
information and advice consistently. Furthermore we will examine whether providers may have to assume
greater responsibility and make sure that a basic collection of appropriate security products and services are
made available to users by providers. We want to provide specific incentives and funds for basic security
functions certified by the state (e.g. electronic proof of identity or De-mail) to be used by the vast majority
of citizens. To support small and medium-sized businesses in the secure use of IT systems, the Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology has set up a task force on IT security in industry with the
participation of industry.
3. Strengthening IT security in the public administration The public administration will further
enhance the protection of its IT systems. State authorities have to serve as role models for data security. We
will create a common, uniform and secure network infrastructure in the federal administration (federal
networks) as a basis for electronic audio and data communication. We will continue to press ahead with the
implementation plan for the federal administration. Should the IT security situation get worse, this plan may
be aligned accordingly. Effective IT security requires powerful structures in all federal authorities. For this
reason resources must be deployed appropriately at central and local level. To facilitate implementation
through uniform action by authorities, joint investments into the Federal Governments IT security will be
made regularly in line with budgetary possibilities. Operational cooperation with the federal Lnder,
particularly with regard to CERTs (computer emergency response teams), will be further intensified by the
IT planning council.
4. National Cyber Response Centre 5 To optimize operational cooperation between all state authorities
and improve the coordination of protection and response measures for IT incidents we will set up a National
Cyber Response Centre. It will report to the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and cooperate
directly with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Office of Civil
Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). Cooperation in the National Cyber Response Centre will strictly
observe the statutory tasks and powers of all authorities involved on the basis of cooperation agreements.
The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Federal Police (BPOL), the Customs Criminological Office
(ZKA), the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Bundeswehr and authorities supervising critical
infrastructure operators all participate in this centre within the framework of their statutory tasks and
powers. Quick and close information sharing on weaknesses of IT products, vulnerabilities, forms of attacks
and profiles of perpetrators enables the National Cyber Response Centre to analyse IT incidents and give
consolidated recommendations for action. The interests of the private sector to protect itself against crime
and espionage in cyberspace should also be adequately taken into account. At the same time respective
responsibilities must be observed. Every stakeholder takes the necessary measures in its remit on the basis of
the jointly developed national cyber security assessment and coordinates them with the competent
authorities as well as partners from industry and academia. Since security preparedness is best achieved by
early warning and prevention, the Cyber Response Centre will submit recommendations to the National
Cyber Security Council both on a regular basis and for specific incidents. If the cyber security situation
reaches the level of an imminent or already occurred crisis, the National Cyber Response Centre will
directly inform the crisis management staff headed by the responsible State Secretary at the Federal Ministry
of the Interior.
5. National Cyber Security Council The identification and removal of structural causes for crises are
considered an important preventive tool for cyber security. For this reason we want to establish and maintain
cooperation within the Federal Government and between the public and the private sector within the

responsibility of the Federal Government Commissioner for Information Technology more visible and set up
a National Cyber Security Council. The Federal Chancellery and a State Secretary from each the Federal
Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Ministry
for Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Federal
Ministry of Education and Resarch and 6 representatives of the federal Lnder will participate. On specific
occasions additional ministries will be included. Business representatives will be invited as associated
members. Representatives from academia will be involved, if required. The National Cyber Security Council
is intended to coordinate preventive tools and the interdisciplinary cyber security approaches of the public
and the private sector. The National Cyber Security Council will complement and interlink IT management
at federal level and the work of the IT Planning Council in the area of cyber security at a political and
strategic level.
6. Effective crime control also in cyberspace The capabilities of law enforcement agencies, the Federal
Office for Information Security and the private sector in combating cyber crime, also with regard to
protection against espionage and sabotage, must be strengthened. To improve the exchange of know how in
this area we intend to set up joint institutions with industry with the participation of the competent law
enforcement agencies, which will act in an advisory capacity. Projects to support partner countries with
structural weaknesses will also serve the aim of combating cyber crime. To face up to the growing
challenges of global cyber crime activities we will make a major effort to achieve global harmonization in
criminal law based on the Council of Europe Cyber Crime Convention. Furthermore, we will examine
whether additional conventions in this area may be necessary at UN level.
7. Effective coordinated action to ensure cyber security in Europe and worldwide In global cyberspace
security can be achieved only through coordinated tools at national and international level. At EU level we
support appropriate measures based on the action plan for the protection of critical information
infrastructures, the extension and moderate enlargement of the mandate of the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) in view of the changed threat situation in ICT and the pooling of IT
competences in EU institutions. The EU Internal Security Strategy and the Digital Agenda provide guidance
for further activities. We will shape our external cyber policy in such a way that German interests and ideas
concerning cyber security are coordinated and pursued in international organizations, such as the United
Nations, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the OECD and NATO. An increasingly multilateral approach
must be brought in line with the necessity of sovereign evaluation and decision-making powers. In this
context, a code for state conduct in cyberspace (cyber code) should be established, which is 7 signed by as
many countries as possible and includes confidence-building security measures. In the G8 framework we are
currently working on intensifying anti-botnet activities. NATO serves as the basis of transatlantic security.
Hence, NATO must take cyber security appropriately into account in its entire range of responsibilities. We
are in favour of the alliances commitment to establishing uniform security standards, which Member States
may also use for civilian critical infrastructures on a voluntary basis, as foreseen in NATOs new Strategic
Concept.
8. Use of reliable and trustworthy information technology The availability of reliable IT systems and
components must be ensured on a permanent basis. The development of innovative protection plans for
improved security which take into account social and economic aspects is strongly supported. To this end,
we will continue and intensify research on IT security and on critical infrastructure protection. Furthermore
we will strengthen Germanys technological sovereignty and economic capacity in the entire range of core
strategic IT competences, include them in our political strategies and develop them further. Wherever it
makes sense, we will pool our resources with those of our partners and allies, particularly in Europe. We are
in favour of diversity in technology. Our aim is to use components in critical security areas which are
certified against an international recognized certification standard
9. Personnel development in federal authorities Given the strategic importance of cyber security, it
must be examined as a priority whether additional staff is necessary in authorities in the interest of cyber
security. Furthermore, intensified personnel exchange between federal authorities and appropriate further
training measures will enhance interministerial cooperation.
10. Tools to respond to cyber attacks If the state wants to be fully prepared for cyber attacks, a
coordinated and comprehensive set of tools to respond to cyber attacks must be created in cooperation with
the competent state authorities. We will continue to assess the threat situation regularly and take appropriate
protection measures. If necessary, we have to examine whether additional statutory powers must be created
at federal or Lnder level. Above all, the aims, mechanisms and institutions mentioned above must be

internalized through a permanent exercise process with the relevant federal and Lnder authorities as well as
businesses.
References:
1. www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/german-cyber-security-strategy-2011-1
2. www.teletrust.de/en/startseite/
3. Managementul strategic al infrastructurilor critice. Accesat pe:
http://www.scritub.com/management/LUCRARE-DE-DISERTATIE-MANAGEME32586.php
4. The State of IT Security in Germany 2014. Accesat pe:
www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-SecuritySituation-in-Germany-2014_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
5. Act to Strengthen the Security of Federal Information Technology of 14 August 2009. Accesat pe:
www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/BSI/BSI_Act_BSIG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile