PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PACIFICO SUMAOY, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and RICHARD

DOE, accused. PACIFICO SUMAOY, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Even if there is no direct evidence showing that the accused
shot the victim, his guilt may be proven by the circumstances obtaining in the case which constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty of the killing of the victim.On the
other hand, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution, argues that the circumstances established by the
prosecution, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that accusedappellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. While there is no direct evidence showing that it was indeed accused-appellant
who shot Zandro in the head, the Solicitor General claims that the testimonies of Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe that
Zandro was last seen alive with accused-appellant and three other men clearly prove that no other person could have
shot and killed Zandro Vargas than accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
circumstantial evidence in this case establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant shot and killed Zandro
Vargas. These circumstances, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, are the following: (a) Zandro was being mauled by
appellant and his companions (p. 5, TSN, June 28, 1990); (b) As Zandro was attempting to run, appellant drew his pistol
and shot Zandro (pp. 5-6, Ibid.); (c) Zandro was hit on the arm (p. 6, TSN, Ibid. and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990); (d) Zandro
fell on his knees (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990); (e) Zandro was dragged towards a motorized pedicab by appellant (p. 6, TSN,
June 28, 1990 and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990); (f) Zandro was loaded on the motorized pedicab and appellant and his
companions boarded the same pedicab (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 28, 1990, and pp. 8-10, TSN, July 13, 1990); (g) Zandro was
found dead (p. 11, TSN, June 28, 1990). Together these circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only
one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty of the killing of Zandro Vargas.
Same; Same; Same; The presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of
the accused.Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted without the presentation of the gun in evidence.
He alleges that the prosecutions failure to match the slugs recovered from the body of Zandro Vargas with accusedappellants own firearm precludes his conviction. This contention has no merit. The presentation and identification of the
weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused. The time which elapsed from the moment the victim
was last seen alive and the moment his body was found narrows the possibility that another agent caused his death,
especially where an aggression was established against the victim before he disappeared with the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Inconsistency on a minor matter negates any suspicion that the testimonies were
perjured or rehearsed.The accused-appellant tries to discredit the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses. He
points out that Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that Zandro was shot in the right arm, while Wilbert Vargas said Zandro was
shot in the left. This is, however, an inconsistency concerning a minor matter which does not impair credibility of the
witnesses. The inconsistency negates any suspicion that the testimonies were perjured or rehearsed. Moreover, findings
of fact of trial courts, particularly with respect to the credibility of witnesses who personally appeared and testified before
them, must be respected on appeal.
Same; Same; Alibi; For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed he must demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or
in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.Accused-appellants defense of alibi is of no moment. Not only
was accused-appellant positively identified as the person who had shot and taken Zandro Vargas to an undisclosed
placed. It is also settled that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that accused-appellant prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The testimony of accused-appellant, T/Sgt. Go and
Pat. Narciso Vismanos failed to show that it was impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. The CIS office
was only one kilometer away from the scene of the crime. In addition, Vismanos admitted that he was so absorbed in his
work that he did not really know whether accused-appellant was in the office premises the entire day of the latters duty.
Same; Same; Homicide; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Where no particulars are known as to the manner in
which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot
be established from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.While the evidence in this
case sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellant for the killing of victim Zandro Vargas, we think he cannot
be held liable for murder because of the absence of evidence as to the manner of the actual killing. Where no particulars
are known as to the manner in which the agression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it cannot be established from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing with
treachery. The evidence shows that the aggression against the victim began when he was still at the J Spot Carinderia. As
a matter of fact, according to Patricio Jacobe, Jr., the deceased was trying to flee from the accused-appellant when the
latter shot him, thus indicating that the victim had been forewarned of a greater aggression against him. The assault on
the victim cannot be said to have been made in a sudden or unexpected manner so as to justify a finding of treachery.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Public Position; The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position
in the commission of the offense requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the influence or reputation of his
position for the purpose of committing the crime.The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of official position in the commission of the offense. This circumstance requires that the accused, as a
public officer, used the influence or reputation of his position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the accused
could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position. In the case
1

before us, no evidence was adduced to show that the killing of Zandro Vargas was in any way facilitated by the accusedappellants public position. It was not even shown whether the accused-appellant wore his uniform or used his service
firearm when he committed the crime. [People vs. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460(1996)]
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao in Criminal Case No. 7245,
finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Zandro Vargas, in the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Accused-appellant was convicted for the killing on July 9, 1988 of Zandro Vargas, a boy 16 years of age, in Tagum, Davao.
Wilbert Vargas, the victim's brother, and Patricio Jacobe, Jr. identified accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy as the assailant,
together with three others who have remained unidentified and at large.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilbert Vargas, Patricio Jacobe, Jr., Enriqueta Vargas and Dr. Jose Lopez.
Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy in a billiard hall on Roxas Street, Tagum, Davao. At 5:45 p.m. of
July 9, 1988, he left the billiard hall to have some beer at the Pacing's Carinderia on Sobrecary Street. Afterward, he went
back to the billiard hall, passing by the J Spot Carinderia at the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the
deceased Zandro Vargas talking to accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. Three other men were with them but Jacobe did
not recognize the three.
Upon reaching the billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled some billiard balls, then went out and stood on the sidewalk. He
was startled by the sound of a gunshot. When he turned to find out where the sound came from, he saw Zandro Vargas
running towards Roxas Street with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas tried to seek refuge at the Try Me beauty parlor,
but he was overtaken by accused-appellant who dragged him towards a waiting tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun.
The accused-appellant and three other men then boarded the tricycle taking Zandro Vargas with them. Jacobe Allegedly
heard one of accused-appellant's companion say that they were taking Zandro to the hospital. Later that evening Jacobe
learned that Zandro was found dead in a kangkong field near the Davao Visayan Village.
The other prosecution witness, Wilbert Vargas, is the brother of the deceased. Wilbert testified that at 6:00 p.m., on July 9,
1988, while he was talking to a friend on Roxas Street near the public market, he was told that his brother Zandro was
being beaten up in a carinderia at the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets. Wilbert immediately proceeded to the J Spot
Carinderia. He saw accused-appellant aiming his gun at Zandro as the latter was running away. Accused-appellant shot
Zandro Vargas, hitting the latter in the forearm, and causing him to fall on his knees. Zandro Vargas was then dragged by
accused-appellant and three unidentified men towards a tricycle. Wilbert Vargas saw his brother loaded onto the tricycle
"like a pig," with Zandro's feet hanging out. Wilbert tried to come to the aid of his brother but accused-appellant pointed
his gun at him, causing him to run home in fear.
Wilbert Vargas told his parents what had happened to his brother. They searched for Zandro. They went to Mangga,
Davao and there learned from Jose Montilla, the driver of the tricycle which accused-appellant Sumaoy and his
companions hailed, that Zandro had been killed and that his body had been dumped in a kangkong field in Visayan
Village, Tagum, Davao. Wilbert and his parents proceeded to the place indicated and there found Zandro's dead body.
Wilbert Vargas identified Pacifico Sumaoy as one of the assailants. Wilbert testified that he recognized Sumaoy because
the latter was assigned to the military detachment in the Diwalwal mining area where Wilbert used to work. Dr. Jose
Lopez, Municipal Health Officer of Tagum, who examined the body of Zandro Vargas, issued a death certificate. Under
questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Lopez testified as follows:
Q You said you placed your findings in the certificate of death, please read the findings, Doctor.
A (Reading) "I hereby certify that I have this 10th day of July 1988 performed an autopsy upon the body of the
deceased Zandro Rinia Vargas and that the cause of death was as follows: Shock, irreversible, due to gunshot wounds
located at (1) right frontal into cranial cavity exiting at right upper occipital; (2) right eyebrow exiting at left lower
occipital; (3) left temporal (no exit); (4) right arm lateral going out at medial and going into right axillary into thoracic
cavity (no exit)".
Q Will you explain your findings to us, Doctor?
A There were four (4) gunshot wounds found on the body of the victim No. 1 was at the right frontal (witness pointing at
his middle forehead) going into the cranial cavity going outside (witness pointing at the back of his head); No. 2, at the
right eyebrow (witness pointing at the middle of right eyebrow) going out to the left lower occipital (witness pointing at
the back of his head, left side near the ear); No. 3 wound is found at the temporal without exit (witness pointing at the left
side of his head, a little above the left ear); and the No. 4 wound is found at the right arm lateral (witness pointing at his
right-upper arm, outside) going at medial aspect then same bullet passed into the axillary region into the thoracic cavity,
no more exit, the right-upper arm as entrance and exit inside of the right-upper arm and then going into the right chest
(witness pointing at the right side of his body just about 3 inches below the armpit). 2
Accused-appellant denies participation in the killing of Zandro Vargas. He claims that the whole day of July 9, 1988 he was
on duty as an enlisted personnel of the 1103rd Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Tagum, Davao. Accused-appellant
identified a document signed by Technical Sergeant Ricardo Go called "Duty Detail" showing that accused-appellant was
on duty from 8:00 a.m. of July 9, 1988 to 8:00 a.m. of July 10, 1988. Ricardo Go, Technical Sergeant, Philippine
Constabulary and Team Leader of the Criminal Investigation Service Command, Tagum, Davao, and Patrolman Narciso
Vismanos, corroborated the accused-appellant's alibi.
On June 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder
qualified by treachery. The trial court noted that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot Zandro while the latter was running
away and held that the three bullet wounds sustained by Zandro in the head showed that he was shot while in a helpless
and defenseless condition. The trial court appreciated the ordinary aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position against accused-appellant Sumaoy.
2

Accused-appellant Sumaoy has appealed from this decision of the trial court. He contends that the prosecution evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty necessary to support a judgment of conviction. He points out that no proof was
presented as to the type of weapon used in the shooting of Zandro Vargas, and he challenges the testimony and
credibility of witnesses Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe, Jr.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution, argues that the circumstances established
by the prosecution, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that accusedappellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. While there is no direct evidence showing that it was indeed accused-appellant
who shot Zandro in the head, the Solicitor General claims that the testimonies of Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe that
Zandro was last seen alive with accused-appellant and three other men clearly prove that no other person could have
shot and killed Zandro Vargas than accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the circumstantial evidence in this case establishes beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. These circumstances, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, are
the following:
(a) Zandro was being mauled by appellant and his companions (p. 5 TSN, June 28, 1990);
(b) As Zandro was attempting to run, appellant drew his pistol and shot Zandro (pp. 5-6, Ibid);
(c) Zandro was hit on the arm (p. 6, TSN, Ibid. and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(d) Zandro fell on his knees (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990);
(e) Zandro was dragged towards a motorized pedicab by appellant (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990 and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(f) Zandro was loaded on the motorized pedicab and appellant and his companions boarded the same pedicab (pp. 6-7,
TSN, June 28, 1990 and pp. 8-10, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(g) Zandro was found dead (p. 11, TSN, June 28, 1990). 3
Together these circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that
the accused is guilty of the killing of Zandro Vargas.
It was established by positive testimony that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot the deceased in the arm and thereafter took
the victim with him to an undisclosed location with the help of three other men. Only the accused-appellant was seen with
a firearm. Less than 24 hours later, the victim was found dead. Not only was accused-appellant identified as the person
with whom Zandro Vargas was last seen alive, he was also positively identified as the person who shot Zandro Vargas in
the arm. There is thus proof of aggression on the part of the accused which, taken with the other circumstances, shows he
had the intent to inflict injury upon the victim.
In the case of People v. Fulinara, 4 the accused were convicted of kidnapping with murder based upon positive testimony
that the victim was last seen alive when he was forcibly abducted by two armed men in army fatigues who were later
identified as the accused. After the victim was abducted by the accused he was later found dead. As in the case before
us, there was no eyewitness at the precise moment the victim was killed.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted without the presentation of the gun in evidence. He alleges that
the prosecution's failure to match the slugs recovered from the body of Zandro Vargas with accused-appellant's own
firearm precludes his conviction. This contention has no merit. The presentation and identification of the weapon used are
not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused. 5 The time which elapsed from the moment the victim was last seen
alive and the moment his body was found narrows the possibility that another agent caused his death, 6 especially where
an aggression was established against the victim before he disappeared with the accused.
The accused-appellant tries to discredit the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses. He point out that Patricio
Jacobe, Jr. testified that Zandro was shot in the right arm, while Wilbert Vargas said Zandro was shot in the left. This is,
however, an inconsistency concerning a minor matter which does not impair credibility of the witnesses. The
inconsistency negates any suspicion that the testimonies were perjured or rehearsed. 7 Moreover, findings of fact of trial
courts, particularly with respect to the credibility of witnesses who personally appeared and testified before them, must
be respected on appeal. 8
Accused-appellant's defense of alibi is of no moment. Not only was accused-appellant positively identified as the person
who had shot and taken Zandro Vargas to an undisclosed placed. It is also settled that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough
that accused-appellant prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
The testimony of accused-appellant, T/Sgt. Go and Pat. Narciso Vismanos failed to show that it was impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime. The CIS office was only one kilometer away from the scene of the crime. In
addition, Vismanos admitted that he was so absorbed in his work that he did not really know whether accused-appellant
was in the office premises the entire day of the latter's duty. 9
While the evidence in this case sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellant for the killing of victim Zandro
Vargas, we think he cannot be held liable for murder because of the absence of evidence as to the manner of the actual
killing. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted
in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere suppositions that the accused
perpetrated the killing with treachery. 10 The evidence shows that the aggression against the victim began when he was
still at the J Spot Carinderia. As a matter of fact, according to Patricio Jacobe, Jr., the deceased was trying to flee from the
accused-appellant when the latter shot him, thus indicating that the victim had been forewarned of a greater aggression
against him. The assault on the victim cannot be said to have been made in a sudden or unexpected manner so as to
justify a finding of treachery. 11
The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position in the
commission of the offense. This circumstance requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the influence or
reputation of his position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime
without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position. In the case before us, no evidence was adduced
3

to show that the killing of Zandro Vargas was in any way facilitated by the accused-appellant's public position. It was not
even shown whether the accused-appellant wore his uniform or used his service firearm when he committed the crime. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of
homicide, and SENTENCING him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro Vargas in the increased sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee vs. PACIANO MADRID, defendant and appellant.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH QUADRUPLE HOMICIDE; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES;
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TALLIES WITH TESTIMONY OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES.The defendant's confession fully
tallies with the government witnesses' testimony. Confirmed by the finding of the tires and the palay in the possession of
the men named by the accused and V. M., and natural and plausible in every sense, the confession and the state
witnesses' oaths have the ring of truth and are convincing. The defendant's I-don't-know-anythingabout-that response to
very damaging imputations, imputations which if false should have evoked indignation and vehement denials from any
innocent person, only strengthens this conviction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S REPUDIATION OF CONFESSION ON GROUND OF TORTURE WHEN IS VAGUE, CONFUSED
AND CLUMSY.The defendant's repudiation of his confession was luke-warm and his account of the alleged torture is
vague, confused and clumsy. Quite aside from all this, the defendant himself admitted that Captain A was friendly and
kind to him, offering him a meal in a restaurant and a bed in the captain's home in Manila. In fact he declared that he
complained to Captain A against the abuses he claims to have suffered at the hands of the captain's men and that at one
time Captain A reprimanded his subordinates for their misbehavior.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.This is not saying that the appellant was maltreated; all indications are that he was not. But his
testimony does go to show that he had no reason to be afraid, and he was not afraid, of Captain A; and, let it be
remembered, it was this officer alone who interrogated him and to whom he made a clean breast of his role in the
macabre enterprise. Much less reason could he have to own before the justice of the peace a directing role in the
commission of a capital offense with which he had nothing to do. A "valued member" of a lawenforcement agency and
fairly cognizant of the ways of courts and of his rights and the consequences of what he was about to do, he swore to his
confession freely and without a murmur, so the justice of the peace affirmed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S GOOD CHARACTER AND VALUABLE SERVICES AS A LAW AGENT IS UNAVAILING; WHERE
EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT IS OVERWHELMING AS TO HlS PARTICIPATION.The defendant's supposed good character
and the valuable services he had rendered as a law agent is unavailing in the face of overwhelming evidence, direct and
circumstantial, of his participation. Furthermore Lt. E, the lone defense character witness, did not express any opinion
that the appellant had not committed, or could not have committed, the crime in question. His reaction seemed to be
rather one of astonishment that the man whom he had appointed to help in the maintenance of peace and order and in
whose uprightness and honesty he had reposed implicit faith, turned the moving spirit in a shocking highway banditry
and cold-blooded murders. He had little realized that appearances deceive, that as the saying goes and common
experience and common observation demonstrate, confidence kills.
5. ID.; ID.; "CORPUS DELICTI" FULLY ESTABLISHED; IT SIGNIFIES THE ACTUAL COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
In this particular case corpus delicti has been established beyond any shadow of doubt. Whether we take this term to
mean the body of the deceased, which is not exactly correct, or the actual commission of the crime charged, which is
what it really signifies, in either case the required proof is there in great abundance. Mortal remains and one grave were
discovered, and their identity as remains of three and the grave of one of the murdered men was attested by the
appellant himself and coincides with the testimony of eye-witnesses as to the places where the offended parties were
shot down and with the state of the bones and the presence of ropes. As to the actual commission of the crime and the
leading part played by the accused therein, these are the main subject of the prosecution. witnesses' testimony and of
the defendant's confession hereinbefore recited at length.
6. ID.; ID.; JURIDICAL CONCEPT OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.The juridical concept' of robbery with homicide does not
limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of human beings in excess of that number
punishable as separate, independent offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite,
integrated, whole that is robbery with homicide so long as all the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery.
7. ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH TREACHERY ALONE WARRANTS IMPOSITION OF EXTREME PENALTY, ACCUSED AS A LAW OFFICER
CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED AS A FACTOR FOR DEALING WITH HlM WITH UTMOST SEVERITY.While the presence of
treachery alone is sufficient warrant for the imposition of the extreme penalty, and without considering the fact of the
appellant being a law officer as an aggravating circumstance in law, we can not, nevertheless, overlook this factor as
additional ground for dealing with the appellant with utmost severity. He committed the crime with the aid of a gun which
he had been authorized to carry as a peace officer; and he succeeded in going through the check point with the stolen
truck and its cargo unmolested and unsuspected of misdeed, thanks to his official position. At the very least, he
deliberately broke the law which it was his sworn duty to uphold, and robbed peaceful citizens whom he was sworn to
4

protect, with malevolence surpassing any displayed by 01-dinary malefactors. By this token his crime is graver and his
responsibility greater. [People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil., 1(1951)]
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The information alleges
robbery with quadruple homicide but the court below found the appellant guilty of a complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The sentences imposed are reclusion perpetua for the first offense and 20 years of reclusion temporal for each
of the last three.
Gaudencio Manuel, Vicente de los Santos and Dalmacio Lacalinao, besides Paciano Madrid, were accused in the
information filed by the provincial fiscal with the Court of First Instance and endorsed to the Justice of the Peace of
Cabanatuan for purposes of preliminary investigation, but only Madrid and Manuel were bound over for trial; De los
Santos and Lacalinao had neither been arrested nor appeared at the preliminary hearing. Consequently, in the court of
first instance, where a new information of the same tenor was filed, Madrid and Manuel alone were indicted; and still
later, before evidence was introduced, the provincial fiscal moved, and the motion was granted, for Manuel's discharge in
order that he might be used as a state witness. This left Paciano Madrid as the sole defendant to be put on trial.
Because of the appellant's denial of any participation in the crime, putting in issue the relative credibility of the witnesses,
and because of the gravity of the offense which carries the extreme punishment authorized by law, it maybe well to
digest separately the several witnesses' testimony as background, starting where the uncontroverted facts leave off. The
facts on which there is little or no dispute are these.
In the latter part of February, 1947, Yosua, otherwise known as S. B. Young, a Chinese merchant in Manila, made a trip to
Isabela in an International truck, of which he was part owner, to buy palay. With him went Ponciano Felicisimo, who drove
the truck, and two laborers by the name Demetrio Sinio and Feliciano Guyapo.
As Young's return to Manila became long overdue, Lina Espiritu Cayetano, Young's partner in business and co-owner in the
truck, set out for Isabela on or about March 4 to find out the trouble. The rice dealer in Isabela, Ha Seng, from whom
Young bought rice informed Mrs. Cayetano that Young had left few days ago with his three companions and 150 cavanes
of palay loaded in the truck.
Back in Manila, Mrs. Cayetano reported to the authorities the disappearance of her partner and his
companions.Whereupon Capt. Nicolas T. Arcales of the Manila MPC Headquarters was detailed to make an investigation,
and with some secret agents he set off for Nueva Ecija. In Cabanatuan, in the course of his investigation, Captain Arcales
found, on undisclosed dates and clues, the missing truck, or most of what remained of it, in the possession of one Valentin
Magno. According to Mrs. Cayetano, who came along with Captain Arcales, the truck had been dismantled; the chasis
without the fender was being used to wall in a damp of palay; the motor was under the house of one Sta. Romana in
whose yard Magno had his house or shop; the railings were near the said yard; the mudguards were scattered under an
acacia tree. Also found were bolts, screws and other parts of the truck, but the exact spots were these and the palay were
kept are not specified in the record.
The tires (12) of the truck were recovered from Cenon Buse and about 70 cavanes of rice from a Chinese merchant, both
in Cabanatuan.
Having been tipped off by an informer whose identity Captain Arcales, for obvious reasons, would not reveal, the
investigator sent for Madrid and this accused was brought in by Lieutenant Estrada for questioning. The details of this
questioning are not disclosed beyond that Madrid was taken by Captain Arcales to Manila and back to Cabanatuan and
allegedly admitted to Captain Arcales complicity in the horrible crime. On March 19, Madrid's statements (Exhibit "A")
were taken down in the form of questions and answers and ratified under oath before the justice of the peace of
provincial capital. The questions were mostly leading, presumably based on facts previously ascertained, and were put
forth to be confirmed or denied. The answers were generally in the affirmative.
The gist of the appellant's confession follows: Declarant was a driver by profession and currently special agent of the
military police appointed by Lt. Nicanor Estrada of Nueva Ecija MPD garrison. On February 27, 1947, he went to Ilagan,
Isabela, in his own jeep to operate or repair a rice thresher and stayed in that town two days, returning to Cabanatuan on
March 2, which was Sunday, at 7:30 a.m. In Isabela, Macario Soriano, Dalmacio Lacalinao and a mechanic, presumably
Gaudencio Manuel, his townmates, asked to ride in his jeep. On the road, which he then thought was in the jurisdiction in
Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, they came upon on overturned bulldozer and he stopped. Afterward, a southbound truck loaded
with palay, empty drums and four men came along. He requested the driver to pull the bulldozer out of the way and the
driver replied that he had no chain. After the driver made that remark, Vicente de los Santos boarded the truck, drew his
revolver and hauled down the Chinese, while Macario did the same with the two laborers. He (accused) was also carrying
a pistol as special agent of the military police. Vicente put the Chinese in the jeep and Macario did likewise to the two
laborers upon Madrid's orders. Madrid warned Manuel and Macario lest the three men would escape, and told Macario to
tie the hands of the two laborers. Macario obeyed. Vicente remained behind in the truck with the driver while Madrid rode
ahead in the jeep (with the Chinese, the two laborers, Manuel, Dalmacio and Macario) to Piut (Putlan?) San Jose
(Carangalan), Nueva Ecija. There he (Madrid) waited for the truck and talked with Vicente about what they should do.
Madrid and Vicente agreed to kill the four men and the appellant attended to three of them. The first one Madrid killed
was the Chinaman, shooting him in the forehead. After killing the Chinese he returned to the jeep, unbound Pandac (one
of the laborers), told Pandac to get off the jeep, marched him to a place somewhat far from the jeep, and shot him in the
forehead, too. After disposing of Pandac, Madrid hurried back to the jeep, ordered the tall man out, and shot him at a
place distant from the jeep. He used a .45 caliber automatic pistol, serial No. 164367, and fired only one shot against
each of the three victims. Vicente killed the driver with another .45 automatic between Mangahan and Putlan, San Jose
(Caranglan), Nueva Ecija, using only one bullet. Declarant said he was present when Vicente shot the chauffeur, that
Vicente threw the driver's body into a ditch on one side of the road, and that from that place he rode the truck to
Cabanatuan where he sold the rice for P2,300 to a man whose name he did not know but whose residence he did know,
and gave the truck to Valentin Magno to do with it as Magno pleased.
5

Several days after making the above statements Madrid was taken along by Captain Arcales and other military police
officers and agents to Caranglan, where the accused allegedly pointed out the spots where he allegedly said he had slain
Young and the two laborers. In one place, Captain Arcales found locks of human hair and a piece of rope. In another place,
which was beside a small trail, he saw two skulls and two forearms still tied with a rope. And about two kilometers further
south, on the provincial road, he was allegedly shown a spot where the truck driver was said to have been shot by Vicente
de los Santos. However, no trace of the driver's killing found other than a grave stated to be that of the said driver, whose
body had been buried by the sergeant of police of Caranglan and other people. Captain Arcales saw the grave, and the
driver's license and photograph were handed to him by the municipal police officer. On the same occasion, the defendant,
according to Captain Arcales, made a "reconstruction" of the crime and posed for pictures in several positions including
one in which he was holding two skulls, pictures which were identified by Captain Arcales at the trial but are not included
in the record sent up to this court.
Macario Soriano, Gaudencio Manuel and Vicente Magno gave evidence for the prosecution. Following is a condensation of
Soriano's testimony, with which Manuel's is in substantial agreement. Soriano testified: He, Gaudencio Manuel and
Dalmacio Lacalinao ran into Paciano Madrid in San Jose, Ilagan, Isabela. They requested and were allowed by Madrid to
ride in his jeep to Nueva Ecija. On the way to the latter province, Madrid brought his jeep to a stop near the boundary
between Nueva Vizcaya and Nueva Ecija where a bulldozer partly blocked the road. Soon after, a Manila-bound truck
appeared. Madrid signaled the truck driver to halt and the driver complied. Madrid requested the driver and the other
men in the truck to help him push over the bulldozer to one side of the highway, but the driver and the Chinaman told
Madrid that they had no chain. Thereupon Madrid "took the Chinaman and transferred him to jeep." The two laborers
alighted and stucked stones under the wheels of the truck to keep the vehicle from rolling down the slope. The two
laborers were also ordered by Madrid to get into the jeep. Then Madrid drove the jeep southward with the witness, the
Chinese, the two laborers and Manuel, leaving Vicente de los Santos and the truck driver behind in the truck. On reaching
the "junction on the right side, he (accused) took that way and we entered that road and stopped on a certain place."
Madrid led the Chinaman "somewhere" and told him (witness) to tie laborers. Soon after, witness heard a gunfire and saw
the Chinese reel down. The accused came back to the jeep running and swore at the witness for not tying the two drivers,
as he had been told. Then Madrid, the witness and the two laborers climbed into the jeep and rode back to the provincial
road. When the jeep was approaching the main road, Madrid told the witness to tie the laborers, which the witness now
did. Near a bridge on the provincial road, Madrid stepped on the brake and told the witness to put water in the tank. As
the witness was starting to fetch water from a creek, the truck arrived, Madrid walked over to the truck and talked with
Vicente de los Santos. Afterward Madrid returned to the jeep and drove on southward until he took a side road going
towards the mountains. In the jeep with Madrid this time were the two helpers who had been tied by the witness,
Gaudencio Manuel and Dalmacio Lacalinao. Reaching a plain, Madrid brought the jeep to a stop and marched one of the
helpers away from it. Soon a shot rang out and the witness saw through the window of the jeep the flash off the gun
barrel. After disposing of one of the helpers, Madrid came back running, took the other helper away from the jeep, and
shot him as well. Returning to the jeep, Madrid drove it back to the provincial road warning Gaudencio Manuel and the
witness not to squeal. The witness assured Madrid that he could rely on him to keep quiet. On the provincial road, Madrid
transferred to the truck where Vicente was and told Soriano, Gaudencio Manuel and Dalmacio Lacalinao to take charge of
the jeep. Gaudencio Manuel drove the jeep behind the truck from this point to San Jose, Nueva Ecija, where the witness
relieved Manuel at the wheel.
Vicente Magno, a motor vehicle driver by occupation testified in substance: He lived in Sangitan, Cabanatuan, where
Madrid also lived. Madrid had him dismantle an International truck without a plate number whose body was made of wood
and galvanized iron. He (Magno) did as he was requested and sold the tires to Cenon Buse, also on instruction of the
accused. The price was P570 which he turned over to Madrid. The truck or parts of the truck were recovered by Mrs.
Cayetano. On cross-examination, Magno said it seemed that it was on March 2, very early in the morning, when he
received the truck, and he sold the tires the next day. He added that he offered the tires to Buse but that it was Madrid
who closed the deal, so Madrid informed him.
The appellant set up an alibi, undertook to prove good character, and repudiated his confession. Answering most of the
questions regarding the truth of the prosecution witnesses' testimony against him, he said, "I don't know anything about
that." He testified that on March 2 through March 15, 1947, he was at home in Sangitan Subdivision, Cabanatuan, and
was in Licab on the 1st where he went by order of Lieutenant Estrada to watch palay threshing; that on February 28 he
went to Bertese, municipality of Quezon, and passed the night in the house of his comadre with whom he returned to
Cabanatuan on March 1; that on the latter date he was at home until 4 o'clock in the afternoon with his wife and his
comadre; that on the following day he took his comadre back to Bertese where, as above stated, he slept that night,
returning the Cabanatuan on March 2. He said he had a jeep "but it was borrowed by Macario Soriano and Vicente" on the
early morning of February 28; that Soriano and Vicente told him that "they would just follow the rice thresher in Isabela";
that on the third day Macario and Vicente returned the jeep in Sangitan, before breakfast: that it was Dalmacio Lacalinao
and the driver who brought the jeep to his place, telling him that Macario had been left behind. He denied that the knew
Gaudencio Manuel, and also denied that he had turned the truck over to Valentin Magno to be dismantled, or that Magno
handed him the proceeds of sale. He stated that what happened was that Magno requested him to help Magno find a
buyer of tires and he recommended a certain Mr. Cenon Buse.
Regarding his confession, Madrid said that he was taken to Manila by Captain Arcales, who assured him that "they were
just going to take a walk." In Manila, he said, "we went to the hotel where we ate", after which they "rode in the
automobile and went to the barracks" in Balintawak. In the barracks, he went on to say, Agent Aquino, Captain Arcales'
companion, told him that he should pay for the truck because it was his jeep that passed at the check point followed by
the truck. He declared that when he replied that others used his jeep, Aquino summoned soldiers who took him outside
and "boxed" him "until I was forced to tell what they wanted me to tell." He said he did not know those two soldiers and
that Aquino remained inside the barracks when he was taken outside; that he related to Aquino afterwards what the two
6

soldiers had done to him but Aquino replied that if he did not confess he would suffer. He said that Captain Arcales
scolded the men who had maltreated him, after which the Captain invited him to pass the night in his house.
Referring to Exhibit "A", his written confession, he declared that he signed the paper because "I was already afraid of
them." He said he put his name on it in the Provost Marshal's office in Cabanatuan, in the presence of Agent Aquino,
Agent Cruz and Captain Arcales. And as to his reconstruction of the crime he said that he "was just taken out of the
provincial jail" without being told that he was to be taken to Putlan. He stated that Agents Aquino, Cruz and Rueda and
many other persons came along besides Captain Arcales, in two automobiles and one freight truck. It was only in San
Jose, he swore, that he learned from the first time their destination, from Captain Arcales and "their conversation."
Arriving at Putlan, he said, a lieutenant from San Jose "told the other companions that was the place where he saw the
cadavers." He said that he posed to be photographed because he was warned that if he refused he would be left behind,
and because he was afraid to die. He added that his various postures in the pictures, including that in which he was
holding two skull, were arranged from him by Agents Rueda and Aquino. Those skulls, he said, he saw for the first time
near one of the MPC jeeps in Putlan.
As to his connection with the military police, the appellant said that he had been a special agent of the Provost Marshal of
Nueva Ecija; that besides being an agent and informer, he had been barrio chief of police of Sangitan Subdivision and
allowed to carry firearm; that he was instrumental in the surrender of many dissidents from Licab.
The only other witness presented by the defense to established alibi was the defendant's mother, Maria Lopez, 70 years
old. This woman's testimony is very brief. It is to the effect that on March 1, Paciano Madrid was in his home and slept
there that night. She said she remembered the date because at noon of that day she dropped in at her son's house to tell
him "not to sleep or to wake up because his birthday was very near." She swore that on the night of March 1, she slept in
Paciano's house and did not leave until his comrade came.
Lieutenant Nicanor Estrada was called to testify that Madrid was an acting special agent of his office; that Madrid's duties
were to gather information about crimes and the whereabouts of dissident elements; that Madrid was active in the
collection of firearms from Huks; that the appellant was honest. He said he was at a loss to know why "this thing
happened."
The important issue That which concerns the part attributed to the appellant in the perpetration of the crime at bar
boils down to credibility of witnesses.
Although neither the purchaser of the truck tires nor the purchaser of the bulk of the palay was introduced, and although
none of the parts of the broken-up truck were found in the possession of the appellant, as far as the record would show,
yet the case against the said appellant is very strong, strong to point of satisfying any hypercritical mind, thanks largely
to the defendant's omission to take the most elementary precaution to conceal the crime and the reckless manners in
which he disposed of or kept the loot.
The defendant's confession fully tallies with the government witnesses' testimony. Confirmed by the finding of the tires
and the palay in the possession of the men named by the accused and Valentine Magno, and natural and plausible in
every sense, the confession and the state witnesses' oaths have the ring of truth and are convincing. The defendant's I
dont-know-anything-about-that response to very damaging imputations, imputations which if false should have evoke
indignation and vehement denials from any innocent person, only strengthens this conviction.
The defendant's repudiation of his confession was lukewarm and his account of the alleged torture is vague, confused and
clumsy. Quite aside from all this, the defendant himself admitted that Captain Arcales was friendly and kind to him,
offering him a meal in a restaurant and a bed in the captain's home in Manila. In fact he declared that he complained to
Captain Arcales against the abuses he claims to have suffered at the hands of the captain's men and that at one time
Captain Arcales reprimanded his subordinates for their misbehavior.
This is not saying that the appellant was maltreated; all indications are that he was not. But his testimony does go to
show that he had no reason to be afraid, and he was not afraid, of Captain Arcales; and, let it be remembered, it was this
officer alone who interrogated him and to whom he made a clean breast of his role in the macabre enterprise. Much less
reason could he have to own before the justice of the peace a directing role in the commission of a capital offense with
which he had nothing to do. A "valued member" of a law-enforcement agency and fairly cognizant of the ways of courts
and of his rights and the consequences of what he has about to do, he swore to his confession freely and without a
murmur, so the justice of the peace affirmed.
The defendant's supposed good character and the valuable services he had rendered as a law agent is unavailing in the
face of overwhelming evidence, direct and circumstantial, of his participation. Furthermore Lieutenant Estrada, the lone
defense character witness, did not express any opinion that the appellant had not committed, or could not have
committed, the crime in question. His reaction seemed to be rather one of astonishment that the man whom he had
appointed to help in the maintenance of peace and order and in whose uprightness and honestly he had reposed implicit
faith, had turned the moving spirit in a shocking highway banditry and cold-blooded murders. He had little realized that
appearances deceive, that as the saying goes and common experience and common observation demonstrate,
confidence kills.
Corpus delicti has been established beyond any shadow of doubt. Whether we take this term to mean the body of the
deceased, which is not exactly correct, or the actual commission of the crime charged, which is what it really signifies, in
either case the required proof is there in great abundance. Mortal remains and one grave were discovered, and their
identity as remains of three and the grave of one of the murdered men was attested by the appellant himself and
coincides with the testimony of eye-witnesses as to the places where the offended parties were shot down and with the
state of the bones and the presence of ropes. As to the actual commission of the crime and the leading part played by the
accused therein, these are the main subject of the prosecution witnesses' testimony and of the defendant's confession
hereinbefore recited at length.
The appealed decision is assailed on the assumption that it does not set forth the facts on which the appellant was
convicted. The decision, it would seem, has been misread. The facts testified to by the prosecution witnesses were recited
7

by the court as its findings and it is quite plain from the decision that it was on the basis of these facts that the appellant
was pronounced guilty. At any rate, the defendant could not in any manner be prejudiced by the alleged defect in the
form of the decision. This Court's and the appellant's tasks on this appeal are not limited to an examination of trial court's
"specific findings." The whole record is open for review and it is on what we believe the record shows that the appellant's
guilt or innocence has to be determined, independently of how the lower court reached its conclusions or which particular
bits of evidence it gave weight to or rejected.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. The appellant's acts
constitute a complex crime of robbery with quadruple homicide and not, as the trial court held, four separate crimes. The
juridical concept of robbery with homicide does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying
of human beings in excess of that number punishable as separate, independent offense or offenses. All the homicides or
murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as all the killings were
perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Here all the four assassination were perpetrated with the sole
end in view of removing opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, or both. There was no other
conceivable motive for the elimination of Young and his employees.
The commission of the crime at bar was attended by at least one aggravating circumstance, that of treachery. At least the
two laborers, Demetrio Sinio or Dina and Feliciano Guyapo, were killed while bound in such a way as to be deprived of
opportunity to repel the attack or escape with any possibility of success.
While the presence of treachery alone is sufficient warrant for the imposition of the extreme penalty, and without
considering the fact of the appellant being a law officer as an aggravating circumstance in law, we can not, nevertheless,
overlook this factor as additional ground for dealing with the appellant with utmost severity. He committed the crime with
the aid of a gun which he had been authorized to carry as a peace officer; and he succeeded in going through the check
point with the stolen truck and its cargo unmolested and unsuspected of misdeed, thanks to his official position. At the
very least, he deliberately broke the law which it was his sworn duty to uphold, and robbed peaceful citizens whom he
was sworn to protect, with malevolence surpassing any displayed by ordinary malefactors. By this token his crime is
graver and his responsibility greater.
It is the unanimous opinion of the court that Paciano Madrid is guilty beyond doubt of the crime of robbery with quadruple
homicide and should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to death to be carried out in the manner prescribed by law, with
costs.
The civil aspects of the judgment must be modified also. The defendant shall pay to the owners the value of the
unrecovered 80 cavanes of palay at the rate of P13 a cavan; P6,000 for the truck less the value of the tires and other
parts which have been recovered, to be appraised when and if the civil judgment is executed; and P6,000 to each set of
heirs of the four deceased.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALLAN RUBIO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate
court.Furthermore, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court are given weight
and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence in view of the fact that
the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court. It can weigh
the testimony of witnesses in the light of the latters demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. This rule of course
admits of certain exceptions, which we find absent in this case, to wit: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses
and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn.We concede that for a man who witnessed an
ongoing crime, an outcry for assistance would have been sufficient if only to arouse the attention of sympathetic
neighbors. We do not agree, however, with the appellants contention that the act of Anastacio Garbo in this case in
directly going to his neighbors houses to seek for assistance is less normal under the circumstances. Witnessing a crime
is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of
behavior can be drawn.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting
involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial noticeand this is
especially true in a case where the parties involved are not just townmates but immediate neighbors.Finally, in a
desperate attempt to destroy the credibility of Anastacio Garbo, appellant questions his alleged failure to reveal
appellants identity to the police officers who investigated the incident on that same night. This argument is specious as it
erroneously assumed that Anastacio Garbo was questioned by the police officers on that night, a fact not duly supported
by the records. But even if it were true, his non-disclosure of the identity of the appellant to the police officers
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. It is not uncommon for a witness
to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved is of judicial notice. This is especially true in this case where the parties involved are not just
townmates but immediate neighbors.
Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself.We agree, however, with the appellant that he should have been convicted only of the
crime of homicide, and not of robbery with homicide. Our settled rule is that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery
8

with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself, otherwise, the crime would only be homicide
or murder as the case may be. A perusal of the entire records of this case convinces us that robbery was not duly
established.
Same; Aggravating Circumstance; Disrespect Due the Offended Party on Acccount of Age; Where the victim was sixty (60)
years old at the time she was killed by an accused who was then only twenty-three (23), the aggravating circumstance of
disrespect due the offended party on account of her age must be appreciated.Considering the fact that Silvina Cuyos
was already sixty (60) years old at the time she was killed by the appellant, who was then only twenty-three (23), the
aggravating circumstance of disrespect due the offended party on account of her age must be appreciated. [People vs.
Rubio, 257 SCRA 528(1996)]
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Appellant ALLAN RUBIO, charged 1 with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, was sentenced "to suffer
reclusion perpetua" and to "indemnify the heirs of Silvina Cuyos in the amount of P50,000,00 without any subsidiary
penalty in case of incapacity to pay." 2 He is now before us on appeal.
The facts of this case as found by the trial court and duly substantiated by the evidence on record are as follows:
. . . On May 17, 1992, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, witness Anastacio Garbo, whose house is located in Bagay,
Daanbantayan, Cebu, heard shouts for help coming from the house of the victim, Silvina Cuyos. The victim and witness
Garbo are neighbors, their houses being about 25 to 30 meters from each other. Upon hearing the shouts for help,
witness Garbo went out of his house and approached the house of the victim. When he was about seven (7) meters away
from the house of the victim, he saw the accused wrestle with the victim. His impression is that the victim and the
accused are quarelling or fighting each other. Upon seeing this, he heard his parents and sisters shouting at him telling
him not to approach any closer to the house of the victim because it may be a robbery and the perpetrator or
perpetrators may have firearms. So witness Garbo went to the neighboring houses to seek for assistance. Shortly
thereafter, witness Garbo, together with four companions, namely Paulino Ygot, Alfonso Rosello, Bimbo Colina and Randy
Ygot, proceeded to the house of the victim. Garbo walked ahead of his companions. When he reached the back portion of
the house, he saw the accused wearing a black tee-shirt walking away from the house of the victim. Witness Garbo was
about five (5) meters away when he saw accused. Witness Garbo did not make any sound and instead, together with his
companions, they proceeded to the kitchen of the house of the victim where they saw the victim lying on the ground. He
noticed that the victim sustained injuries at the neck just below the jaw about three (3) inches from the right ear. The
cheek of the victim was bleeding. An old water jar (banga) was broken. The victim was still alive although not conscious.
Witness Garbo did not go up the house of the victim anymore instead he proceeded to the town to secure transportation.
He came back in a fire truck together with some policemen. Thereupon, the victim was brought to the Daanbantayan
Community Hospital. The victim was later transferred to Verallo Memorial Hospital at Bogo, Cebu. Upon the advice of the
doctor in said hospital, the victim was transferred to Cebu City, first, at the Southern Islands Hospital and then to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital where the victim died in the afternoon of the next day. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, to wit (1) Anastacio Garbo, the lone witness who testified to
have actually seen Allan Rubio wrestle with Silvina Cuyos in the kitchen of the latter's house in the evening of May 17,
1992; 4 (2) Paulino Ygot, one of the persons from whom Anastacio Garbo sought assistance after witnessing the incident in
the evening of May 17, 1992 and whose testimony corroborated that of Anastacio Garbo in all material aspects; 5 (3)
Maximo Cuyos, the nephew of Silvina Cuyos who testified to have discovered that her pillows were ripped open and her
jewelries were all gone, when he made a check on her house in the evening immediately following the happening of the
incident; 6 and (4) Dr. Benigno Aldana, the attending physician of Silvina Cuyos who testified on the cause of the latter's
death. 7 On the other hand, the defense presented the accused himself who admitted his presence outside the house of
Silvina Cuyos on that fateful night but named one Lucio Arsenal as the person who wrestled with the victim. 8
Finding the prosecution's version to be more credible, the trial court, thus, convicted the appellant of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
In this appeal, appellant faults the trial court for giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He
likewise assails their testimonies for being incredible, unreliable and unable to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 9
As in most criminal cases, the principal issue raised herein pertains to the matter of credibility of witnesses. We shall now
discuss appellant s contentions in seriatim.
First, appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness
Anastacio Garbo which testimony, according to the appellant, is fraught with inconsistencies. Except for this general
averment, however, appellant did not cite which parts of Anastacio Garbo's testimony are inconsistent with each other. At
any rate, our careful review of Garbo's testimony reveals no such inconsistencies claimed. Furthermore. the consistent
teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by
the appellate court 10 This is the established rule of evidence in view of the fact that the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court. It can weigh the testimony of witnesses in the light
of the latter's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. 11 This rule of course admits of certain exceptions, which we
find absent in this case, to wit: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence. 12
Next, appellant contends that if indeed Anastacio Garbo saw him assaulting Silvina Cuyos, it would have been more in
accord with human experience for Garbo to immediately shout at the appellant to desist from further hurting the victim or
to alert his neighbors by a cry of alarm. Instead, Garbo went directly to his neighbors' houses, an act which appellant
decries as unlikely if not unbelievable. We are not persuaded.
9

We concede that for a man who witnessed an ongoing crime, an outcry for assistance would have been sufficient if only
to arouse the attention of sympathetic neighbors. We do not agree, however, with the appellant's contention that the act
of Anastacio Garbo in this case in directly going to his neighbors' houses to seek for assistance is less normal under the
circumstances. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for
which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn. 13 Thus, as correctly averred by the Solicitor General,
Anastacio Garbo cannot be faulted for reacting the way he did, especially in the midst of a startling and unusual
circumstance. 14
Finally, in a desperate attempt to destroy the credibility of Anastacio Garbo, appellant questions his alleged failure to
reveal appellant's identity to the police officers who investigated the incident on that same night. This argument is
specious as it erroneously assumed that Anastacio Garbo was questioned by the police officers on that night a fact not
duly supported by the records. But even if it were true his non-disclosure of the identity of the appellant to the police
officers immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. 15 It is not uncommon for
a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural reticence of
most people to get involved is of judicial notice. 16 This is especially true in this case where the parties involved are not
just townmates but immediate neighbors. 17
We hold therefore, that Anastacio Garbo's categorical identification of the appellant as the person he saw wrestling with
Silvina Guyos in the evening of May 17, 1992, leaves nothing more to be desired. He could not have been mistaken as to
the identity of the appellant, his long time neighbor. Moreover, the kitchen of Silvina Cuyos' house, the area where the
incident happened, was then illuminated by a kerosene lamp 18 and by a flourescent lamp located ten (10) meters away
from the scene of the crime. 19 On top of that, appellant was then just seven (7) meters away from the house of the victim
when he saw the incident. 20 These facts, in addition to the failure of the defense to prove that Anastacio Garbo was
prompted by any improper motive in testifying against the appellant, bespeak of his credibility.
On the other hand, the defense offered by the appellant merits scant considerations. We qoute with approval the
following observations of the trial court in this regard:
. . . The claim by (sic) accused that he was forced to walk with the brother's Arsenal from 5:30 in the afternoon up to 7:30
in the evening is rather incredible. The actuations of the accused after the incident is likewise seriously open to question
and lend doubt as to the truthfulness of his testimony. For instance, he said that soon after hearing the shouts for help by
the victim he ran away towards his sister's house which was about 100 to 150 meters from the house of the victim. The
reason is that he was afraid that somebody might hear the shouts of the victim and that he was afraid of being
discovered. This statement is pregnant with incriminating evidence.
We agree, however, with the appellant that he should have been convicted only of the crime of homicide, and not of
robbery with homicide. Our settled rule is that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be
proven as conclusively as the killing itself, 21 otherwise, the crime would only be homicide or murder as the case may be.
A perusal of the entire records of this case convinces us that robbery was not duly established. The information
mentioned of gold earrings, gold ring and cash money being taken by the appellant from Silvina Cuyos. Yet no conclusive
evidence proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the appellant has been presented by the prosecution.
Anastacio Garbo himself, the principal witness for the prosecution, never claimed to have seen any of these items being
taken from Silvina Cuyos. Neither did he affirm that appellant was carrying anything when the latter left the house of the
victim on that night. We quote hereunder excerpts of his testimony on cross-examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Were you able to see any item being taken from the alleged victim?
A I did not notice.
Q When you came back and you made mention that you allegedly saw a man immediately leaving, did you see that man
bringing anything?
A I did not notice him bringing anything.
Q After that man walked briskly, did you or any of your companions went (sic) inside the house of the victim?
A None of us went inside. 22
The trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Maximo Cuyos who testified to have discovered the loss of these items
when he made a check on the victim's house. 23 He admitted, 24 however, that such discovery was made only at about
eleven o'clock in the evening of the following day and not on the same night the incident happened. There is a probability
therefore, that during the interim other persons could have surreptitiously entered into the victim's house, now
uninhabited, and could have taken therefrom these valuable items. As such, the trial court was in grave error when it
conveniently ascribed to the appellant the commission of robbery in this case. Thus, while we are not disputing that
robbery has in fact taken place, we are not convinced that it was appellant who committed the same. Neither will our
finding of Allan Rubio's guilt with respect to the killing of Silvina Cuyos necessarily raises an inference of his guilt with
respect to the element of robbery in the indictment For to convict the appellant of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, 25 there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of both robbery and homicide.
Considering the fact that Silvina Cuyos was already sixty (60) years old at the time she was killed by the appellant, who
was then only twenty three (23), the aggravating circumstance of disrespect due the offended party on account of her
age must be appreciated.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. We find accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of HOMICIDE only. In view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect to the victim on
account of her age and applying in his favor the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Silvina Cuyos is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
10

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO BENITO y RESTUBOG. accused-appellant.
Criminal law.No mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated where a 6-hour interval
transpired between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo (the murdered victim allegedly remarked on seeing
the accused in the premises of the Civil Service Commission that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Commission
which, it is contended, was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound as the
accused was dismissed for an alleged then, of money orders) against Benito and the assassination was more than
sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved the
plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had
left the office. He acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
Same; Same.The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not
the latters alleged defamatory remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for
thieves but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an
alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed the alleged anomalies or
defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his report.
Same; Disregard of rank; The killing of the victim who is the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transaction Division and
Acting Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission, by a clerk in the Cashiers Office of the said
Commission its aggravated by disregard of rank.Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be considered
against him because there was no evidence that he deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank of Moncayo. That
contention has no merit. It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission
and that the killer, was a clerk in the same office who presented the victims condemnatory report against him. In that
situation, the existence of the aggravating circumstance of desprecio del respeto que por la dignidad mereciere el
ofendido is manifest. [People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271(1976)]
AQUINO, J.:
Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to the charge of
murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.
After a mandatory review of the death sentence, this Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of
conviction. It appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty was reduced
to reclusion perpetua. (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351).
Benito filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should not be appreciated
against him.
Benito, 26, a native of Naga City, in his sworn statement , which was taken, about five hours after the shooting, by
Corporal
E.
Cortez
and
Patrolmen
J.
de
la
Cruz,
Jr.,
and
H. Roxas of the Manila Police, recounted the background and circumstances of the tragic incident in this manner (Exh. A):
... alam ninyo ho, ako ay dating empleyado ng Civil Service Commission sa kalye P. Paredes, Sampaloc, Maynila, at ako ay
Clerk 2 sa Administrative Division at ako ay nagumpisa ng pagtratrabaho sa Civil Service magmula pa noong November,
1965 ng ako ay nasuspende sa aking trabaho dahil kinargohan nila ako ng "DISHONESTY" at nasuspende ako ng 60 days
at nabalik ako sa trabaho noong January 1966 pero kinarguhan uli nila ako ng "MALVERSARTION OF PUBLIC FUNDS,
QUALIFIED THEFT, ESTAFA at FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT at dinimanda din ako ng Civil Service ng
Administrative case ng "DISHONESTY" at dinismiss na ako sa trabaho ni Commissioner Subido noong February 16, 1966.
At magmula noon ay nawalan na ako ng trabaho pero lahat ho noong kinargo nila sa akin na sinabi ko sa inyo ay
"fabricated" lang ang mga evidensiya at ang gumawa ho noong ay ang binaril ko kanina na si PEDRO MONCAYO JR. Y
RAMOS at naka pending pa ngayon sa City Fiscal ng Maynila kay Asst. Fiscal Magat at iyon namang "dismissal order" ni
Commissioner Subido ay inapela ko sa Civil Service Board of Appeals.
Magmula noong Idinismiss nila ako sa aking trabaho dahil sa "fabricated" charges ay naghirap na ko sa aking buhay at
nahihiya ako sa mga kaibigan ko. Ako ay assign(ed) sa collecting department noon at nagagalit sa akin ang mga
empleyado ng Civil Service dahil mahigpit ako sa kanila.
Noong bandang alas 7:00 ng gabi noong Dec. 11, 1969, ako ay nagpunta sa Civil Service sa kalye Paredes at nakita ko si
PEDRO MONCAYO, Jr. at kinausap ko siya at tinanong ko siya na iyong kaso ko ay matagal na at hindi pa natatapos at
baka matulungan niya ako at ang sagot niya ay "UMALIS KA NA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA
IPAYARI KITA DITO" at umalis na ko.
Kaninang bandang alas 11:00 ng umaga ay nagkita kami ni PEDRO MONCAYO Jr. sa loob ng compound ng Civil Service at
sa harapan ng maraming tao sinabi niya na "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW" kaya ang ginawa ko ay
umalis na ako.
Kaninang bandang alas 5:25 ng hapon, nitong araw na ito, Desiyembre 12, 1969, nakita ko si PEDRO MONCAYO Jr. na
nagmamanejo noong kotse niya sa kalye P. Paredes sa tapat ng Civil Service, sinundan ko siya at pagliko ng kotse niya sa
kanto ng P. Paredes at Lepanto, Sampaloc, Maynila, ay binaril ko siya ng walong beses at tinamaan siya at napatumba
siya sa kaniyang upuan sa kotse.
Pagkatapos ay tumawag ako sa telepono sa MPD Headquarters para sumurender at kayo nga ang dumating kasama ninyo
iyong mga kasama ninyo.
11

Benito surrendered to the police the revolver (Exh. C) used in the shooting with the eight empty shells of the bullets which
he had fired at Moncayo.
The Police report contains the following background and description of the killing (Exh. B):
According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office located at P.
Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to
Nov. 1965 when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY".
After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS,
ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating in his
dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.
The aforecited criminal charges against the suspect was allegedly investigated by Asst. Fiscal MAGAT. Records from the
CRID, MPD, reveals that on Dec. 6, 1966, Hon. Judge ROAN of the City Court of Mla. issued a Warrant No. E-316758 for the
arrest of the suspect for the crime of ESTAFA.
On May 24, 1969, Hon. Judge JUAN O. REYES of the CFI of Mla. issued an order No. OA-87409 for the arrest of the suspect
for the crime of MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS. According to the suspect, the aforecited criminal and administrative
charges filed him were allegedly instigated and contrived by the victim and since the time of his dismissal, he was
allegedly jobless.
On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested the victim to help him in his cases
but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI
KITA DITO".
The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969, and when they met again, the victim
allegedly remarked in the presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW". The suspect who
was humiliated and incensed, left.
At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22 black revolver
(w/ SN - P-5317, Trademarked "SENTINEL", SQUIRES BINGHAM MFG. CO. INC. MLA. P.I.) loaded with nine (9) live Cal. 22
bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st. Sampaloc, Mla.
The
victim
showed
up
and
drove
his
green
Chevrolet
2
door
car
(w/
Plate
No.
L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes st. The suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and
when the latter's car was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor vehicles,
the suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot the victim eight (8) times on the head
and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car.
The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car (w/ Plate No. L-55117) by his coemployees (composed of VICTOR VILLAR, ELEUTERIO MENDOZA & FORTUNATO JOSE Jr.) to the FEU Hospital.
Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P. PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40 p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.
The thirty-six year old victim, a certified public accountant, was the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transactions Division
and Acting Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission (Exh. E to E-2). The accused was a clerk in the
cash section, Administrative Division of the Commission, receiving P1,884 per annum (Exh. D). He started working in the
Commission on November 7, 1963.
On October 21, 1965 Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito
admitted having malversed an amount between P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps. Moncayo's
report reads as follows (Exh. F):
MEMORANDUM
for
The
Commissioner
Through Proper Channels
This refers to the case of Mr. ALBERTO R. BENITO, Clerk II in the Administrative Division of this Commission, who, as had
previously been reported, malversed public funds in the amount of approximately P5,000.00 out of his collections from
the sale of examination fee stamps.
I wish to state that this matter came to my attention on the evening of March 1, 1965 when Mr. Teodoro Abarquez, Acting
Cashier I, reported to me that fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each with a total vlaue of P100.00 were missing from a
bundle of money orders received from the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato, which were kept by him in one of the cabinets
inside the Cashier's Cashier' room.
At the same time he also informed me that he suspected that Mr. Benito stole the missing money orders. His suspicion
arose from the fact that he found several money orders marked "Cotabato" as their place of issue among the cash
receipts turned over to him by Mr. Benito that afternoon as his collection from the sale of examination fee stamps. Mr.
Abarquez showed to me the said money orders issued in Cotabato which were turned over to him by Mr. Benito and after
checking their serial numbers with the records of list of remittances on file, we were able to establish definitely the fact
that the said money orders were those missing.
It may be stated that at that time, Mr. Benito was assigned to work in the Cash Section and one of his duties was to sell
examination fee stamps to applicants for examinations. It was then the practice of the cashier to issue to Mr. Benito in the
morning examination fee stamps to be sold during the day and in the afternoon he turned over to the Cashier the
proceeds from the sale of stamps including the unsold stamps issued to him. After considering the work performed by Mr.
Benito, it became evident that he succeeded in malversing the amount of P100.00 by substituting equivalent amount of
money orders in the place of the cash extracted by him from his daily collections from the sale of examination fee stamps
when he clears his accountability with the Cashier.
The following day, I confronted Mr. Benito in the presence of Mr. Abarquez and ask him whether he had something to do
with the loss of the fifty (50) money orders at P2.00 each. At first he denied, but when I asked him where he obtained the
money orders issued in Cotabato which were included in his collections the day preceding, he admitted having stolen the
missing money orders.
12

Having confessed his guiltk, I then asked Mr. Benito when he started committing the said irregularity and how much in all
did he actually malversed out of his daily collections from the time that he started the anomaly. He stated in the presence
of Mr. Abarquez that he started in January, 1965 and that although he did not know exactly the total amount malversed
by him, he believed the amount to be between P4,000.00 to P5,000.00. He also confessed that he used the money orders
remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental in the amount of P3,436.00 in substituting various amounts
extracted by him from his daily cash collections and used by him for personal purposes.
It appears from the records that the List of Remittances covering the money orders received from the Provincial Treasurer
of Negros Occidental was duly receipted by Mr. Benito. He was supposed to issue an Official Receipt therefor in favor of
the said Provincial Treasurer and then turn over to the Cashier the amount involved for deposit to the National Treasurer.
The said List of Remittances, duly signed by Mr. Benito, is enclosed for use as evidence in this case.
I told Mr. Benito that I cannot do anything but report the matter to the Commissioner. However, he pleaded that he be
given first an opportunity to restore the amount before I make my report in order that the penalty that may be imposed
upon him may be lessened to a certain degree. As I thought it wise in the interest of the service to recover the amount
involved, I allowed him to go and see his parents in Naga City to raise the amount in question.
After two weeks, Mr. Benito informed me that his parents filed an application for a loan with the Government Service
Insurance System and that the proceeds of the said loan which he intended to use in restoring the amount malversed by
him were expected to be released during the last week of May, 1965. However, when the month of May, 1965 elapsed
without the amount involved having been restored, I conferred with Mr. del Prado, my immediate superior and asked him
whether we should wait further for the release of the said loan in order that the amount involved may be recovered. Mr.
Prado consented to giving him a little more time.
When Mr. Benito still failed to restore the amount in question by the end of June, 1965, I got hold of him on July 5, 1965
and together with Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez and Gatchalian, also of this Commission, brought him before Deputy
Commissioner A. L. Buenaventura and reported the entire matter to the Deputy Commissioner. In the presence of Messrs.
del Prado, Abarquez, Gatchalian and myself, Mr. Benito admitted readily and voluntarily before the Deputy Commissioner
the commission of the offense of malversation of public funds as stated above.
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Mr. Benito be charged formally and that he be suspended from office
immediately considering the gravity of the offense committed by him.
(Sgd.) PEDRO R. MONCAYO Administrative Officer II
Benito was charged with dishonesty. He had admitted to Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura that he had
misappropriated his collections and spent the amount in nightclubs and pleasure spots and for personal purposes. The
decision dismissing him from the service reads as follows (Exh. G):
This is an administrative case against Mr. Alberto R. Benito, Clerk I, Cash Section, Administrative Division of this Office, for
dishonesty.
The following excerpts from the letter dated October 22, 1965 of the Commissioner of Civil Service connect respondent
with the alleged misappropriation of public funds representing his collection from the sale of examination fee stamps and
constitute the basis of the instant case against him:
An investigation made by this Commission shows that you malversed public funds in the amount of P3,536.00 out of your
collections from the sale of examination fee stamps while in the performance of your official duties as Clerk II in the Cash
Section, Administrative Division of this Office. It appears that you succeeded in malversing the above-stated amount from
your cash collections by substituting in lieu thereof money orders worth P3,436.00 remitted to this Commission by the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental which were duly receipted for by you. It also appears that you extracted from a
bundle of money orders remitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato the amount of P100.00 in money orders which
were kept in one of the cabinets in the Cashier's room.
Respondent denied the charge. He explained, among others, that money orders were always kept in the Cashier's safe
and he had no access to them. Although he admitted having received money orders amounting to P3,436.00 remitted by
the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental and another remittance of the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato he, however,
disclaimed having substituted the same for cash collections in his sale of examination fee stamps. He reasoned out
further that he could not be charged with malversation of public funds inasmuch as he was not then an accountable
officer.
It appears that respondent, as Clerk in the Cash Section, performs, among other duties, the selling of examination fee
stamps, receiving payments therefor, and receiving remittances in form of cash and/or money orders from provincial
treasurers in connection with examinations held in the provinces. It was also his duty to issue official receipts for said
remittances. In the course of the performance of his duties, he received said remittances from the Provincial Treasurers of
Negros Occidental and Cotabato, but no official receipts were issued by him, as shown by the reply telegrams pertaining
thereto. While records disclose that remittances from the province of Cotabato were submitted to the Cashier of the Civil
Service Commission, there is no evidence showing that remittances from Negros Occidental were likewise submitted.
Investigation further reveals that 50 money orders were discovered missing from the remittances of Cotabato Provincial
Treasurer which were kept in the cabinet of the Cashier. On or about March 2, 1965, the Cashier of the Commission
noticed that 15 money orders turned over by respondent as part of his collections in the sale of examination fee stamps
were among the missing money orders. This triggered off the filing of this case against the respondent.
On July 5, 1965, respondent admitted before the then Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura having misappropriated
an aggregate amount ranging from P3,000 to P7,000, which he spent in night clubs, pleasure spots and other personal
benefits. Despite the testimonies of several witnesses regarding his confession, including that of the then Deputy
Commissioner himself, respondent, when asked to take the stand, denied his previous admission.
Instead, he argued that the cash and accounts of the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, when examined by
representatives of the Auditor's Office, did not indicate any shortage and therefore there was no irregularity involved. This
argument is not well taken. Inasmuch as the remittances received by respondent from said Provincial Treasurers of Negros
13

Occidental and Cotabato were not in turn given corresponding official receipts, naturally, the same were not reflected on
the Cashier's cash book.
The weakness of respondent's defense lies not so much on its failure to establish convincingly his innocence as its
irreconciliability with established facts. Obviously, none of the circumstances in this case is consistent with his claim of
innocence. On the contrary, all of them put together produce reasonable assurance of respondent's guilt.
In view of the foregoing, this Office finds respondent Alberto R. Benito guilty as charged. Wherefore, he is dismissed from
the service effective upon his receipt of this decision.
In the interest of the service this decision is executed also on the date of his receipt of this decision.
Benito appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from the Commissioner's decision dismissing him. The appeal was
pending at the time when he assassinated Moncayo (Exh. I).
The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim, Moncayo, allegedly made upon
seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen at eleven o'clock in the morning of
December 12, 1969 (about six hours before the shooting): "Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." (Exh. A or 1); or,
as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw." (27 tsn
December 26, 1969).
Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Benito contends that Moncayo insulted him when
he (Moncayo) remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that that
remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made
publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his officemates.
Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January 16, 1975, acquitting him of
the charge of malversation in connection with his alleged misappropriation of the fees collected from the examinees of
the 1974 patrolman examination. That same decision makes reference to Benito's exoneration from the administrative
charge. The court's decision reads as follows:
The accused is charged with malversation under the following information:
That on or about and during the period comprised between October 17, 1964, to February, 1965, inclusive, in the City of
Manila Philippines, the said accused being then employed as Clerk I of the Civil Service Commission, a branch of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, among whose duties were to accept payments of fees collected from the
examinees of the 1964 Patrolman examination, and by reason of his said position received the total amount of P3,536.00,
with the duty to turn over and/or account for his collections to the cashier of the Civil Service Commission immediately or
upon demand but the said accused once in possession of the said amount of P3,536.00, with intent to defraud, despite
repeated demands made upon him to turn over and to account for the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert and malverse the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to
the detriment of public interest and to the damage and prejudice of the said Civil Service Commission in the said amount
of P3,536.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
The evidence shows that the accused had an appointment as clerk in the Civil Service Commission from May 27, 1964, as
clerk I, range 23 from June 1, 1965 and as clerk I, range 26 from July 23, 1965 (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2). He had the duty,
among others, of selling Civil Service examination- fee stamps and to receive payment therefor, as well as to receive
remittances of money orders and checks from the provincial treasurers for payments of examination fee stamps (Exhibit
B).
Teodoro Abarquez, a cashier of the Civil Service Commission during the period alleged in the information, testified in his
direct examination that Benito was working in his office; that one of the duties that he assigned to him was to sell
examination fee stamps; that it was customary for him to give stamps to Benito at the start of office hours in the morning
and that Benito turned over to him the proceeds of the sale, as well as the unsold stamps, at the close of office hours in
the afternoon; that one afternoon he noticed that Benito turned over to him 50 money orders from Cotabato, together
with some cash, as proceeds of the sale of stamps for that day; that he remembered that he was missing money orders
from one of his cabinets where he kept them; that when he discovered that the 50 money orders were those which were
missing, he reported the matter to Pedro Moncayo, the chief administrative officer; on March 1, 1965; that the money
orders were for P2.00 each, and were payments of the examination fees from Cotabato (Exhibit F); that he discovered the
loss of the 50 money orders on February 28, 1965 and reported it to Moncayo on March 1, 1965, together with the list of
missing orders (Exhibit M); that after receiving the report, Moncayo called Benito to the office of Abarquez where he
admitted taking the missing money orders; that Moncayo submitted a memorandum to the Commissioner, dated October
21, 1965, after giving Benito a chance to refund the value of the money orders (Exhibit O). Alipio Buenaventura, acting
Deputy Commissioner at the time, and Eliseo S. Gatchalian, budget officer, testified that when Benito was confronted with
the report of Moncayo and Abarquez, he admitted that he misappropriated about P3,000.00 because of bad company and
that he asked for a chance to refund the money.
Under cross-examination, Abarquez elucidated his testimony in his direct examination and explained that when Benito
turned over the proceeds of the sale of stamps for that particular day, he kept the sum of P100.00 and replaced it with
the 50 money orders that he had taken from the cashier's office to cover up the money that he had pocketed. When he
was asked when he discovered that Benito substituted the 50 money orders from Cotabato, he answered that he checked
them the following night (March 2, 1965) with the list of money orders remitted by the Provincial treasurer (Exhibits F, F1); but when he was confronted with his affidavit which he executed on April 18, 1966 (Exhibit R), he reluctantly admitted
that he had only verified 15 money orders missing as of April 18, 1966 and that he did not keep any record of the money
and the money orders given to him by Benito on March 1, 1965.
He also admitted that the room where he kept the money orders in an unlocked drawer was also occupied by two other
persons, and that this was the first time that he had not followed the usual procedure of keeping them in the safe. He
further admitted that, although regular examinations were conducted during the period of October 1, 1964 to February
14

28, 1965 by the examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing Office, they did not
find any shortage in the accounts of Benito.
Finally, when the Court asked him what happened to the 50 money orders, at first he hinted that they were not deposited
with the Bureau of Treasury because they were reported missing; but when pressed further, he said that he deposited
them, but did not issue any official receipt for them. When asked if he had any evidence to show that they were actually
deposited, he admitted that he could not even remember when he deposited them.
The testimony of Teodoro Abarquez upon which the prosecution has built its case, is too weak and shaky to sustain a
finding of guilt because of his glaring inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps in memory. The prosecution has failed to
present convincing evidence that the 50 money orders were even lost: According to Abarquez he had only verified the
loss of 15 on April 18, 1966, although he testified earlier that he determined the loss of 50 the night after March 1, 1965.
The examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing Office did not find any irregularity
in the cash accountability of Benito, according to Abarquez. This was corroborated by Romeo Jarabelo, auditor of the
Commission on Audit and Miguel Games, auditing examiner assigned to the Civil Service Commission, who testified for
the accused. Benito was in fact exonorated the administrative charge filed against him for the time same transaction
(Exhibit E).
In fact, the testimony of Abarquez under cross-examination that he has not issued any official receipt for the 50 money
orders and his inability to prove that he deposited them with the bureau of Treasury gives rise to the suspicion that other
persons, not the accused, may have stolen the 50 missing money orders. Even without taking into account the testimony
of the accused, who denied the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, the court believes that the prosecution
has failed to prove the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting the accused, with costs de oficio.
The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise to the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically directed at Benito. The prosecution notes
that the remark was uttered by Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning. According to Benito's testimony (not consistent
with his confession), he saw Moncayo three hours later or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his
case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case
(26 tan). As already stated, the assassination was perpetrated at around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the circumstances recited above
for changing our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of "haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de
una ofensa grave, causada al autor del delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente,
Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."
"La apreciacion de la proximidad queda al arbitrio del tribunal; el Tribunal Supremo (de Espaa) no ha apreciado la
proximidad ... cuando la ofensa se realizo por la maana y el delito tuvo lugar por la tarde (Sentencia de 11 noviembre
1921); por regla general no es proxima cuando transcurre tiempo suficiente para la razon recobre su imperio
sobreponiendose a la pasion (Sentencias de 28 mayo 1882, 4 noviembre 1893, 24 junio 1908, etc.) ... Si falta el requisito
de la proximidad debe desestimarse (Sentencia de 3 julio 1950). Exige gravedad en la ofensa y proximada en la
reaccion." (Note 9, 1 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal. 1975 Ed., p. 564).
The Spanish Supreme Court also held that "no puede apreciarse esta circunstancia atenuante en favor del autor de un
homicidio cometido 'algunas horas despues de haberle invitado el interfecto a renir y golpeado en el pecho con las
manos', porque el tiempo transcurrido entre los golpes y la muerte fue suficiente para que el animo del reo se serenase
(Sentencia de 24 Junio 1908, Gaceta 28 Agosto 1909, IV-V Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola 1182).
The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination was
more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he
evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the
victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's
alleged defamatory remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for thieves but the
refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave
offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed
by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his report.
Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank. Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be considered against
him because there was no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank" of Moncayo. That
contention has no merit.
It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission and that the killer was a
clerk in the same office who resented the victim's condemnatory report against him. In that situation, the existence of the
aggravating circumstance of "desprecio del respeto que por la dignidad mereciere el ofendido" is manifest.
The instant case is similar to a case where the chief of the secret service division killed his superior, the chief of police
(People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167) and to the killing of the acting Spanish consul by his subordinate, the chancellor of the
consulate, who had misappropriated the funds of the consulate, which misappropriation was discovered by the victim
(People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil, 597, 606). In these two cases the murder was aggravated by disregard of rank.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISTOTO LAPAZ alias TOTONG, JOHNSON BARLESO and
PAULINO LAPAZ, JR., defendants. CRISTOTO LAPAZ alias TOTONG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 70445. March 31, 1989.*
15

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISTOTO LAPAZ alias TOTONG, JOHNSON BARLESO and PAULINO
LAPAZ, JR., defendants, JOHNSON BARLESO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Testimony of Cristoto Lapaz tending to exculpate appellant Barleso is not worthy of any
credence.The testimony of Cristoto Lapaz tending to exculpate appellant Barleso is not worthy of any credence. Barleso
does not deny that he had a standing grudge against the victim for calling him a thief in the presence of many persons.
He felt so disgraced that he and his wife moved out of the house of the victim. It must be because of such hatred that he
persuaded Cristoto to join him in killing the victim.
Same; Same; Same; The discharge of Paulino as state witness cannot be faulted as long as he is not the most guilty.
Barleso assailed the discharge of Paulino as a state witness on the ground that such discharge is improvident. Barleso
alleges that Paulino was more guilty than himself. The evidence does not support the stance of appellant. Be that as it
may, the discharge of Paulino as state witness cannot be faulted as long as he is not the most guilty.
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating circumstances; The commission of the offense with treachery and evident premeditation
has been established by the prosecution.Contrary to the allegation of the appellant Barleso, the commision of the
offense with treachery and evident premeditation has been established by the prosecution. The appellant nurtured a
grudge and planned the killing of the victim. He invited his two companions to help him execute his plan to beat the
victim to death with pieces of wood in the middle of the night insuring the killing of the victim without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The presence of treachery is clear.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.It was also established that
previous to the incident, the victim called appellant Barleso a thief in the presence of other people, and that appellant
and his family transferred to another house inasmuch as he could no longer bear the insults hurled at him by the victim.
The appellants resentment culminated in the evening of April 14, 1984 when as above-related he persuaded his two
coaccused to join him in killing the victim, which they accomplished. Sufficient time, therefore, had elapsed from the time
the appellant conceived the commission of the crime until the execution thereof. Obviously, evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The aggravating circumstances of disregard of sex and age cannot be absorbed in treachery.
By the same token, the assigned error as to the two aggravating circumstances is not well taken. While it may be true
that nighttime is absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
sex and age cannot be similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to the manner of the commission of the crime. Disregard of
sex and age pertains to the relationship of the victim, who is a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is young man,
27 years old, at the time of the commission of the offense.
Same; Same; Same; Mitigating circumstances; Illiteracy of appellant cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
The mere lack of instruction or illiteracy of the appellant cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance. One does
not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person even if it is
to redress a wrong committed against him.
Same; Same; Same; Court not persuaded that the arraignment of appellant Cristoto Lapaz on a plea of guilty was
improvidently undertaken.However, considering that in the same proceedings the trial continued as against the two
other accused, where one was discharged as a state witness and the other remained for trial, and in the process the
accused-appellant Cristoto even testified as a witness for his co-appellant Johnson Barleso, the Court is not persuaded
that the arraignment of said appellant on a plea of guilty was improvidently undertaken. Appellant Cristoto Lapaz testified
in court and categorically admitted that he was the one who beat the victim to death. He asserted that his two other coaccused did not participate in the killing. He admitted that he drank kulafu wine in order to embolden himself to commit
the offense. His admissions were made freely and voluntarily even after he had been sentenced to death by the trial
court. He related having committed the offense at the dwelling of the offended party at night attended by treachery and
qualified by evident premeditation without regard to the sex and age of the offended party. The Court can take judicial
notice of this testimony of the appellant in court and of the other evidence adduced during the trial in the resolution of his
appeal. [People vs. Lapaz, 171 SCRA 539(1989)]
GANCAYCO, J.:
In the evening of April 14, 1984, Eulalia Cabunag, a 70-year old woman who was living alone, was beaten to death by
three men at Barangay Katipunan, Carmen, Bohol. One of them was discharged as a state witness; the second pleaded
guilty and the third pleaded not guilty so he underwent a trial. Thereafter, both were found guilty and sentenced to death.
Said verdict is now before this Court on appeal.
Appellant Johnson Barleso used to stay in the house of said victim, Eulalia Cabunag, as his common-law wife was the
niece of the latter. They transferred to the house of Aurelio Gaudicos, son-in-law of Eulalia, when Eulalia called Barleso a
thief in the presence of many people. Apparently, Barleso resented the remark.
Paulino Lapaz, Jr. was then in his parent's house in the same barangay when he was fetched by his uncle, herein appellant
Cristoto Lapaz, to go to the house of Barleso. Thereat, Barleso proposed to Cristoto in the presence of Paulino that they
kill Eulalia. Cristoto agreed. He asked Paulino to buy a bottle of "kulafu" wine which be drank to embolden himself.
Thereafter the three proceeded to the house of the victim who was living alone. Cristoto carried a rounded piece of wood
1 which was given to him by Barleso, while Barleso also carried another piece of wood 2 and a bolo.
16

Upon their arrival in the house of the victim, Barleso left the bolo behind a post beneath the house. He then removed a
plywood covering an opening on the wall beneath the victim's stove. The three then entered the house, one after the
other through said opening. Paulino stayed in the kitchen, while Barleso and Cristoto proceeded to the sala where they
helped one another in beating the victim with the pieces of wood they brought with them until the latter slumped on the
floor.
Barleso ordered Paulino to get the bolo which he left beneath the house. When Paulino handed the bolo to Barleso, the
victim suddenly shouted for helPeven as she was already lying on the floor. Frightened, the three panicked and jumped
one after the other through the same opening through which they entered the house, leaving behind the two pieces of
wood which Barleso and Cristoto used. Paulino and Barleso proceeded to the latter's house while Cristoto proceeded to
the house of Paulino's parents.
As Aurelio Gaudicos heard a thudding sound and a shout for helPcoming from the direction of the victim's house, he ran
towards said house and hid behind the coconut tree near the kitchen. From there he saw the three men, Paulino, Barleso,
and Cristoto hurriedly leaving the house of the victim. Gaudicos immediately returned home and ordered someone to
fetch the police.
When the policemen led by the Integrated National Police station commander of Carmen, Bohol arrived, they were met by
Gaudicos who led them to the house of the victim. There they saw the victim bathed in her own blood at the sala still
alive but she could no longer talk. She was brought to the Simeon Toribio Memorial Hospital at the poblacion. Guadicos
confided to the police investigating team the Identity of the three persons he saw leaving the victim's house immediately
after the incident.
Paulino was spotted by the policeman mixing with the crowd in the vicinity of the victim's house so he was invited for
questioning in the house of his father where Cristoto Lapaz was found. In the course of the questioning, the station
commander noticed the blood stains on the t-shirt of Cristoto. The two suspects were brought to the police station where
the station commander also noticed bloodstains on the pants of Paulino. 3 Upon initial inquiry, Paulino readily admitted
his participation in the commission of the crime. Cristoto also admitted his complicity but he pointed to Barleso as the one
who struck the victim with the piece of wood. Barleso was picked uPat dawn the following day at the hospital where he
accompanied the victim. At the initial stage of the investigation, he denied any participation. However, he eventually
admitted his guilt.
On April 14, 1984, the police conducted a thorough investigation. Barleso executed a sworn statement admitting his
participation in the commission of the crime. 4 During the preliminary examination conducted by Judge Francisco Escano
of the Municipal Circuit Court of Carmen, Butuan on April 27, 1984, he admitted having inflicted the injuries on the victim.
5
The victim died of the injuries the following day in the hospital. Aside from the certificate of death that was issued, 6 a
post mortem certificate was also issued by Dr. Elizabeth Cabagnot. The said physician stated her findings in connection
with the autopsy conducted of the victim, as follows:
... Cardio-respiratory arrest sec. to multiple lacerated wounds, Face, Frontal, Parietal and occipital areas Multiple
contusions, Face, lateral side of neck (left) and shoulder area (left). 7
Thus, an information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal of Bohol against said three suspects in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol.
Upon arraignment of the three accused on July 3, 1984, they entered a plea of not guilty. They were assisted by their
respective counsels. When the case was set for trial on the merits on July 25, 1984, counsel for the accused Cristoto
Lapaz informed the trial court that he would like to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty. The trial court inquired
from the accused if he confirms the manifestation of his counsel and he answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, said
accused was rearraigned whereupon he pleaded guilty to the crime charged against him. The trial court again asked the
accused whether he confirms the manifestation of his lawyer that he was changing his previous plea of not guilty to that
of guilty considering that the crime charged is a capital offense and the answer of the accused was still in the affirmative.
The trial court also asked him whether he understood fully well the explanation of his lawyer as to the nature of the
charges against him and the consequences of his plea of guilty to the crime charged. The answer of the accused was also
in the affirmative. At this juncture, his counsel invoked two mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, to wit: (1)
voluntary plea of guilty; and (2) voluntary surrender. The fiscal did not offer any objection to the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty but he submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court the
appreciation of the second mitigating Circumstance of voluntary surrender. He informed the trial court that the accused
was apprehended a few minutes after the commission of the offense and was in the custody of the police before the filing
of the complaint.
The trial court required the prosecution to present Dr. Elizabeth Cabagnot in order to determine the extent of injuries
suffered by the victim. On August 17, 1984 a decision was promulgated by the trial court convicting the accused Cristoto
Lapaz alias "Toto" of the crime of murder. Considering the two aggravating circumstances charged in the information,
namely: (1) disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her age and sex and (2) the crime having
been committed in the dwelling place of the offended party without the latter having given provocation, and which is
offset by one mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, the accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of Eulalia Cabunag in the amount of P12,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Meanwhile, the trial proceeded as against appellant Barleso and Paulino Lapaz, Jr. The fiscal filed a motion to discharge
the accused Paulino as a state witness with the conformity of the said accused. This was granted by the trial court. After
the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court of February 28, 1985 finding the accused Barleso guilty
of the crime of murder, with three aggravating circumstances, namely: (a) disregard of sex and age of the victim; (b)
committed at the dwelling place of the victim; and (c) committed at nighttime and by gaining access to the victim's
dwelling through an opening not intended for egress; i.e., through a hole made by the accused, without any mitigating
17

circumstance to offset the same. The trial court imposed on him the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P12,000.00, and required him to pay the heirs of the victim the actual damage of P10,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Both cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
The accused Johnson Barleso with the assistance of counsel de oficio asked for a reversal or modification of the judgment
based on the following assignments of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT CRISTOTO LAPAZ WAS ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF
EULALIA CABUNAG.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANT JOHNSON BARLESO WAS, IF AT ALL, MERELY AN ACCOMPLICE
OF CRISTOTO LAPAZ.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISREGARDING THE SELF- EXCULPATORY TESTIMONY OF PAULINO LAPAZ, JR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE RESPECTIVE SWORN STATEMENT'S OF
APPELLANT JOHNSON BARLESO EXECUTED AT THE POLICE STATION AND DURING HIS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
EXHIBITS "B" AND -F-), FOR VIOLATION OF THIS APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
ATTENDED THE KILLING OF EULALIA CABUNAG.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE KILLING OF EULALIA CABUNAG WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF- (A) DISREGARD OF SEX AND AGE, AND (B) NIGHTTIME.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING APPELLANT JOHNSON BARLESO WITH THE ALTERNATIVE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INSTRUCTION.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT BARLESO. 8
Likewise, with the assistance of his counsel, the accused Cristoto Lapaz filed a brief assailing his conviction on the
following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE DEGREE OF CARE WHICH THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT HAS
PRESCRIBED FOR A VALID ADMISSION OF A PLEA OF GUILTY BY AN ACCUSED, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE COMMISSION OF A
CAPITAL OFFENSE IS CHARGED AS IN THE PRESENT CASE AND IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT TAKING
EVIDENCE INDEPENDENT OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, TREACHERY
AND SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND THE RECORDS ALSO DO NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO WIT: (1) DISREGARD
RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HER SEX AND AGE: AND (2) THE CRIME HAVING BEEN COMMITTED
IN THE DWELLING PLACE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY WITHOUT THE LATTER HAVING GIVEN PROVOCATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INSTRUCTION.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CRISTOTO LAPAZ. 9
With the abolition of the death penalty under the present Constitution,10 there is no more automatic review of cases of
this nature. These cases are thus treated as on ordinary appeal.
First, the Court takes into account the appeal of appellant Johnson Barleso. Barleso stresses the fact that his co-accused
Cristoto Lapaz, who took the witness stand as his witness, admitted having killed the victim Eulalia Cabunag on the
evening of April 14, 1984 and that although Barleso and Paulino Lapaz Jr. were with him then, he did not see Barleso
participate in the beating of the victim. Barleso testified that at that critical moment, he was at the kitchen of the victim's
house and that he went with Cristoto and Paulino because Cristoto threatened him with a hunting knife. While Barleso
admitted that his relationshiPwith the victim was not cordial, he alleges that his anger never developed into such hatred
as to inspire him to kill the victim. He contends that his mere presence on the occasion of the killing does not prove
conspiracy inasmuch as he did not take a direct part in the beating of the victim and that he did not directly force or
induce Cristoto to commit the same. He argues that if at all, his participation was merely that of an accomplice in that
knowing of the criminal design of Cristoto he still accompanied said assailant to the place of the victim, and that his
presence at the scene of the crime was not indispensable to the commission of the same. 11
The Court is not persuaded. Paulino Lapaz, Jr., who was discharged as a state witness, categorically testified that he was
present when Barleso and Cristoto Lapaz agreed on that evening to kill the victim; that he was asked by Cristoto to buy
"kulafu" wine which Cristoto drank; that Cristoto brought a piece of wood, while Barleso brought a piece of wood and a
bolo with him; that Barleso left his bolo underneath the house of the victim; that Cristoto entered through an opening in
the house followed by Barleso and himself-, that Cristoto and Barleso beat the victim, who was then alone, by using the
pieces of wood they had brought along; that after the victim slumped down to the floor, Barleso commanded him to get
18

his bolo, and so he got it and handed it to Barleso; that the victim shouted for help; that they were frightened; and that
they all got out of the house and fled.
The testimony of Cristoto Lapaz tending to exculpate appellant Barleso is not worthy of any credence. Barleso does not
deny that he had a standing grudge against the victim for calling him a thief in the presence of many persons. He felt so
disgraced that he and his wife moved out of the house of the victim. It must be because of such hatred that he persuaded
Cristoto to join him in killing the victim.
Barleso assailed the discharge of Paulino as a state witness on the ground that such discharge is improvident. Barleso
alleges that Paulino was more guilty than himself. The evidence does not support the stance of appellant. Be that as it
may, the discharge of Paulino as state witness cannot be faulted as long as he is not the most guilty. 12
The admission in evidence of the sworn statements of appellant Barleso executed at the police station and during the
preliminary examination is also questioned by appellant. The Court finds it unnecessary to dwell on the issue considering
that the evidence on record is more than adequate to generate appellant's conviction of the offense charged against him
without considering the said sworn statements. 13
Contrary to the allegation of the appellant Barleso, the commission of the offense with treachery and evident
premeditation has been established by the prosecution. The appellant nurtured a grudge and planned the killing of the
victim. He invited his two companions to helPhim execute his plan to beat the victim to death with pieces of wood in the
middle of the night insuring the killing of the victim without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The presence of treachery is clear. 14
It was also established that previous to the incident, the victim called appellant Barleso a thief in the presence of other
people, and that appellant and his family transferred to another house inasmuch as he could no longer bear the insults
hurled at him by the victim. The appellant's resentment culminated in the evening of April 14, 1984 when as aboverelated he persuaded his two co-accused to join him in killing the victim, which they accomplished. Sufficient time,
therefore, had elapsed from the time the appellant conceived the commission of the crime until the execution thereof.
Obviously, evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. 15
By the same token, the assigned error as to the two aggravating circumstances is not well taken. While it may be true
that nighttime is absorbed in the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
sex and age cannot be similarly absorbed. Treachery refers to the manner of the commission of the crime. Disregard of
sex and age pertains to the relationshiPof the victim, who is a 70-year old woman, and the appellant who is young man,
27 years old, at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Court also takes note of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and that the crime war, committed
after an unlawful entry.
The mere lack of instruction or illiteracy of the appellant cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance. One does
not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person even if it is
to redress a wrong committed against him
The conviction of appellant Barleso by the trial court must be upheld.
Now to the appeal of Cristoto Lapaz. The main thrust of his appeal is that the trial court failed to observe the degree of
care prescribed in imposing the death penalty upon a plea of guilty by an accused charged with the commission of a
capital offense, citing People vs. Badilla. 16 The appellant contends that the trial court failed to explain to him the nature
of the charge against him, especially the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the offense and that the
trial court did not propound any question to him regarding said circumstances so as to leave no room for doubt as to the
possibility of his misunderstanding the nature and gravity of the charge to which he was pleading guilty. He argues that
he was not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language in the information in qualifying the acts
constituting the offense. 17
The appellant also cites People vs. Formentera 18 where this Court observed that the casual remark of the trial judge that
the penalty to be imposed is "reclusion perpetua to death" without specifically and categorically informing the accused of
the imposable penalty, and the averment of several aggravating circumstances in the information, thus provide cogent
reason to conclude that the accused did not fully comprehend the consequences of his plea. He asserts that the trial court
could have called witnesses for the purpose of establishing his guilt and culpability not only to satisfy the trial judge, but
also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the
meaning and the full consequences of his plea. 19
The record of the proceedings relevant to this issue is as follows:
ATTY. BAGAIPO, JR.:
Your Honor, please, one of the accused in this case Cristoto Lapaz alias Toto intimated to me that he is changing his plea
of not guilty, your Honor. We therefore request that he be re-arraigned on the Information, your Honor.
COURT (to accused Cristoto Lapaz):
Q Your lawyer, Cristoto Lapaz, Atty. Fortunate Bagaipo Jr. manifested to the Court that you are going to change your plea
from your previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Do you confirm to this fact as manifested by your lawyer?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
Yes, your Honor, that is correct.
COURT (to Court Interpreter):
All
right,
re-arraign
accused
Cristoto
Lapaz
alias
Totong.
(At this juncture, the court interpreter is reading the in formation to accused Cristoto Lapaz)
COURT:
Q Cristoto Lapaz, this is your correct name?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
19

Q Do you understand the Information read to you and translated to you in the Cebu Visayan dialect?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT.
Q What plea do you enter?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A Guilty, your Honor.
COURT:
Q You are charged of a capital offense. Did your lawyer explain to you the nature of the offense which is punishable from
life to death?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What is your highest educational attainment?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A I am an illiterate, your Honor.
COURT:
Q And you understood the explanation of your lawyer very well about you change of plea ?
ACCUSED CRISTOTO LAPAZ:
A Yes, your Honor, I was made to understand by my lawyer.
COURT:
Order.
When this case was called for trial this morning, Asst. Prov. Fiscal Pablo R. Magdoza appeared for the prosecution, accused
Cristoto Lapaz alias Totong and Paulino Lapaz Junior appeared assisted by their counsel, Atty. Fortunate Bagaipo Jr. while
accused Johnson Barleso appeared assisted by his counsel, Atty. Alexander H. Lim.
Atty. Bagaipo Jr. manifested to the Court that his client Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong would like to change his previous plea
of not guilty to that of guilty and that is why accused Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong was called by the Court whether he
would confirm the manifestation of his counsel and the answer of accused Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong as (sic) in the
affirmative. Thereafter, accused Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong pleaded guilty to the crime charged. The Court asked again
said whether he would confirm the manifestation of his lawyer that he has to change his previous plea of not guilty to that
of guilty considering that the crime charged is a capital offense and the answer was still in the affirmative. The Court
further asked said accused whether he understood very well the explanation of his lawyer as to the consequences of his
plea of guilty to the crime charged and the answer of the accused was in the affirmative.
At this juncture, Atty. Bagaipo Jr. invoked two (2) mitigating circumstances to be appreciated in favor of his client accused
Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong, namely; (a) voluntary plea of guilty and (b) voluntary surrender. Fiscal Magdoza, on other
hand, did not offer any objection to the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of
accused Cristoto Lapaz (alias) Totong (inasmuch as he) was apprehended (a) few minutes after he committed the crime
and he was in the (sic) police custody before the filing of the complaint.
Promulgation of sentence upon accused Cristoto Lapaz alias Totong is held in abeyance until all prosecution witnesses
shall have testified against the rest of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court, Tagbilaran City, July 25, 1984.
(SGD.)
ANDRES
S.
NAMOCCATCAT
Judge 20
The first witness who testified for the prosecution was Dr. Elizabeth Cabagnot, resident physician of Simeon Toribio
Memorial Hospital. After her testimony, the trial court ruled that it was satisfied with the testimony of the doctor. The trial
court also considered the evidence against appellant sufficient. The proceedings were to continue only insofar as the two
other accused were concerned. On August 17, 1984, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant Cristoto Lapaz
guilty of the crime of murder.
In disputing the argument of the appellant, the Solicitor General states that the trial court did its duty of assuring that the
appellant understood his act, the nature of the charges filed against him and the character of the punishment provided
for by law before it it imposed, 21 and that the information was read to him translated into the Visayan dialect which the
appellant understood.
The record shows that appellant was informed by the trial court that upon a plea of guilty he could be imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment to death. It is likewise true that the trial court was informed that the appellant was illiterate.
The presiding judge verified anew if he understood the charges against him and if his lawyer explained the consequences
of the plea to him. The accused confirmed his plea of guilty. Thereafter, the trial court required the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution but after the doctor testified as to the multiple injuries inflicted on the deceased with the use
of a blunt instrument, the trial court considered the case against appellant submitted and rendered its decision.
The Court agrees with the protestations of the appellant that the trial court did not take pains in explaining to him the
nature and character of the offense charged against him, the consequences of the plea of guilty and the meaning and
effect of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances so as to in sure that the appellant fully understood the
consequences of his plea of guilty.
However, considering that in the same proceedings the trial continued as against the two other accused, where one was
discharged as a state witness and the other remained for trial, and in the process the accused-appellant Cristoto even
testified as a witness for his co-appellant Johnson Barleso, the Court is not persuaded that the arraignment of said
appellant on a plea of guilty was improvidently undertaken. Appellant Cristoto Lapaz testified in court and categorically
20

admitted that he was the one who beat the victim to death. He asserted that his two other co-accused did not participate
in the killing. He admitted that he drank "kulafu" wine in order to embolden himself to commit the offense. His admissions
were made freely and voluntarily even after he had been sentenced to death by the trial court. He related having
committed the offense at the dwelling of the offended party at night attended by treachery and qualified by evident
premeditation without regard to the sex and age of the offended party. The Court can take judicial notice of this testimony
of the appellant in court and of the other evidence adduced during the trial in the resolution of his appeal. It appears that
the trial court committed no error in accepting the voluntary plea of guilty of appellant in this case and in imposing the
corresponding penalty thereafter. Appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea.
The guilt of both appellants Johnson Barleso and Cristoto Lapaz is sufficiently established. Accordingly, this Court affirms
the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. However, considering that the 1987 Constitution does not allow
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty which should be and is hereby imposed on the appellants is reclusion
perpetua, and the indemnity that each of them should be required to pay to the heirs of the deceased is set at
P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and indemnity, the judgment appealed from in these cases is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO DANIEL alias AMADO ATO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; A 13-year old girl cannot possibly have an ulterior motive to charge appellant with rape.Appellant
assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in
her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make
her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a
public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a
physical examination of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she
has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to
others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple
and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
Same; Same; The claim that the victim of rape filed the complaint below because the accused failed to fulfill his promise
to marry her is preposterous where the raped victim was then only 12 years old.The insinuation that this complaint was
filed because appellant had not married the girl although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20,
1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal
impossibility. And as regards, appellants testimony that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who
was Margaritas uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Same; Same; Fact that while being molested, but not yet raped, inside a bus in a public place the offended girl did not cry
out for help does not mean her testimony may not be given credence.Appellants contention presupposes that
Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she saw the appellant inside the bus that the latter had intentions
of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she called the attention of the
driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything about it. And when Margarita
walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he
was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that appellant was following her,
Margarita answered: No sir, I did not suspect. All along Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street
or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when
Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around and in fact she went straight to her room and it was
at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the door. In short, the poor girl was
simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said If
you will talk I will kill you.
Same; Same; In a crime of rape force need not be irresistible.The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and
destroy the veracity of Margaritas straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in
the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs., and five feet and six inches tall, overpowered her and succeeded in
accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4 8 in height, and
weighed around 95 lbs. In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings
about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. All that is
necessary is that the force used by accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose.
Same; Same; Rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim.Rape is likewise, committed when intimidation
is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this
case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or
scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result
appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim.
Same; Same; Evidence; Results of lie detector test not necessarily credible.One last point raised by the able counsel of
appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that
appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie
21

detector examiner is in appellants favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one
of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was No. On this
matter We find the trial Judges observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is well known that the same
is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject.
If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test
will fail. x x x
Same; Same; Where girl was raped in the boarding house being rented by her, dwelling should be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon
with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita
was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a dwelling as
the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place
where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law
seeks to protect and uphold.
MUOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita
Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in
her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, the latter not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May 30, 1966, finding
the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
and he should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, providing that

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as amended)
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a Resolution of
March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root of a long standing practice
and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of
the Rules of Court? 5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court to acquire jurisdiction
over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or
death as the facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that the dispositive
portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction
on the Court to act on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals without
findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case
is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower
court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this
Court under Section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of
death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
22

forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say, strong reactions from the
Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court
of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the
appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the following pertinent
portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted
provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in the law
precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And
in order that this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound to make in its order f certification
such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be
imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides th where a court to which an appeal has been
taken has no appellate jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a specific
and clear statement of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent
erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in the provision above quoted, are
sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the
evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established by proof that the
penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to
the Supreme Court for final determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it
must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for
they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First Instance wherein either life
imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears
to be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering
judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more
practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining the
evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the
Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the
case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both
the Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion,
come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court,
must state its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life
imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal
conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds
them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial compliance with the law as the
order of certification made reference to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained
sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of Appeals is bound to make its
findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that
portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to
the Court of Appeals. 7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it was necessary for
the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment
should be imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice
Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither
essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice
of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla. 8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos that is, for the Court of Appeals
not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or
death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which confers on the Supreme
Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
23

Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." 9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not
be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court
11
more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death
or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith
certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from rendering
judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed.
This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the
penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is
understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment"
presupposes a final judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate
court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. 12 It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or
recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of Appeals from
entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the decision being
certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a
complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final
determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of
facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of
the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense
committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment " there would be no cause
for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised
Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation
under the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in
harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of the offended
party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on
the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the
People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a
native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in question on September 20,
1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year
high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa
bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station, she
waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting her
by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.).
She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the
former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused
closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.).
The accused also alighted and again he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag,
her was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the accused dashed in and closed the
door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight
inches long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of
her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He
also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger and her neck with
his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of
24

his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself from the
accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the
accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.),
used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He
nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part of her panty
covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.).
Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10,
Id.). She was immediately brought to the Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they
proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again
examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.).
Margarita and her father gave their respective statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.).
She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at
p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he testified on the physical
examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the
report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a
clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI
record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the hymen revealed that
Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the
base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other since 1963, and there were
occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was
with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having
occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant
complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial court which
were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the
case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-year old girl
barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation
and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be
denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of
submitting to a physical examination of her body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the
hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave it
unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to
her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he promised to marry
her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of
marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was
instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a
declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract the
attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were
people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a
jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but
no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she saw the appellate
inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold
her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not
do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant
walking behind her she did not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she
suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could
not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant
was not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19 and
in fact she went straight to her room and it was at that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before
she could close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who
immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an aggressive or violent attitude of
confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful
attitude.
25

Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at the time the latter
was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on
the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward and positive
declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and
six inches tall, 20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was
less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result,
all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v.
Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior
physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of rape it is not
necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only
necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil.
434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has been followed in numerous
cases involving the crime of rape and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA
665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a
relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will because
of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it
threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita
could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965 was
the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of
Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on
the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse
with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision the
following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is well known that the same
is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject.
If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test
will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other
persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected
and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a
bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article
14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be
he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as charged, and We
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral
damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL RIOS, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect,
for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness.No cogent reason
exists to overturn the trial courts assessment that Anacita Benedicto positively and unequivocally identified appellant as
the felon who stabbed her husband. It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a
witness and thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. Anacitas testimony on the matter clearly supports
the trial courts finding on the matter.
Same; Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is the best way to identify a person;
Relationship with the victim per se is not proof of prejudice.There is no doubt, therefore, that Anacita had a good look at
her husbands assailant and that she actually saw appellant stab Ambrocio as she was only a meter away from them,
behind her husband who was facing appellant. She could not have mistaken another man for appellant because being
neighbors, he was familiar to her. Aside from being her neighbor, appellant even admitted that he used to be a customer
in the Benedictos sari-sari store where he would buy cooking needs. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly
those of the face, is the best way to identify a person. Thus, in the absence of an established ill motive on the part of
26

Anacita, her identification of appellant as her husbands killer should be given full faith and credit, her relationship with
the victim notwithstanding. Relationship with the victim per se is not proof of prejudice.
Same; Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.Anacitas
failure to name the weapon used by appellant and to recall his position as he stabbed Ambrocio cannot diminish her
credibility. Her relative position to the two accounts for Anacitas failure to see the details surrounding the incident.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. Nevertheless,
Anacitas one-meter distance from the two enabled her to observe the manner by which appellant stabbed Ambrociohe
did so in a manner described in the dialect as pakadyot, meaning the bladed instrument came from underneath.
Same; It is entrenched in jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial
court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Appellants positive identification of appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime was thus proven beyond reasonable doubt by the consistent and firm testimony of Anacita
Benedicto. Consequently, such positive identification effectively effaced appellants alibi. That she was the only
eyewitness to the killing presented by the prosecution did not in any way dilute the evidentiary value of her credible
testimony. It is entrenched in jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; To constitute treachery, these two conditions must be
present: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.In this case, the prosecution failed to
discharge its duty under the law as regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
may make. To constitute treachery, these two conditions must be present: (1) employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Treachery may not be appreciated where the attack against the victim cannot be categorized
as unexpected and unforeseen so as to deprive him the opportunity to defend himselfthere is no treachery when the
victim was standing face to face with his assailant.Treachery may not be appreciated where, as in this case, the attack
against the victim cannot be categorized as unexpected and unforeseen so as to deprive him the opportunity to defend
himself. By the facts of the case, where the incident of the victim berating the accused for throwing stones at his
residence preceded the fatal assault, a possible retaliation by the accused was not remote. As this Court has repeatedly
held, there is no treachery when the victim is placed on guard, as when a heated argument preceded the attack,
especially when the victim was standing face to face with his assailant. In that instance, the initial assault could not have
been unforeseen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.Where treachery is
alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. It cannot
be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime. In the case at bar, the prosecution presented
Anacitas ambiguous testimony on how the attack began to support its claim that treachery attended the commission of
the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Dwelling; Words and Phrases; The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms
an integral part thereof and therefore it includes the staircase of the house, and much more, its terrace; Provocation in
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to
the commission of the crime.The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada
in this case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof and therefore
it includes the staircase of the house, and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c)
immediate to the commission of the crime.
Same; Damages; Dwelling; The presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against the accused; Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence on record.
The presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against the
appellant. Such damages, the award of which depends upon the Courts discretion, shall be a part of the civil liability that
may be imposed upon the appellant. However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court overlooked certain
evidentiary requirements in the award of actual damages. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by
evidence on record. The trial court mainly based its award of P32,892.00 on the photocopy of the receipt issued by the
funeral parlor and on a receipt issued by a livestock agricultural corporation. The prosecution reserved its right to present
the original copy of the receipt of the funeral parlor evidencing payment of the amount of P27,000.00 but it does not
appear on record that it indeed presented that original copy. On the other hand, the receipt issued by the Broadway
Livestock Agricultural Corporation in favor of one Sotero Espiritu was in full payment of the amount of P5,092.00 for an
undecipherable purpose which the prosecution claimed was for expenses. However, considering that these expenses
27

were not explained and the absence of a duly established connection between the death of the victim and the expenses
paid to a livestock agricultural corporation, the receipt can not be given evidentiary weight.
Same; Same; It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable to justify such award.It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those
that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized
in courts. The courts will not rely merely on suppositions or conjectures. Hence, only the amount of eight hundred pesos
(P800.00) spent for the niche and funeral mass that is evidenced by an original receipt shall be awarded to the victims
heirs. [People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823(2000)]
PUNO, J.:
If capital punishment is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment. 1 This truism
underscores the wisdom of the admonition that any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. 2 At stake in the case at bar is life itself, hence, we shall strictly adhere to our bounden duty to exercise extreme
caution in the review of the parties evidence.
For the death of Ambrocio Benedicto due to a fatal stab wound, appellant Angel Rios was charged with the crime of
murder in an information that reads:
That on or about the 7th day of February 1996, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with bladed instrument and with
intent to kill one Ambrocio Benedicto, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said bladed instrument the said Ambrocio
Benedicto, hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Appellant Rios, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge against him. 3 Thereupon, trial
on the merits of the case ensued.
Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto owned a sari-sari store in their house in Marigold Subdivision, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. According to Anacita, at around 6:30 in the evening of February 7, 1996, appellant Angel Rios, a neighbor, hurled
stones at their house. A few minutes later, and while the Benedicto spouses were tending their store, appellant bought
cigarettes. Ambrocio confronted appellant about the stoning incident and an altercation ensued between them. 4
As the two engaged in a verbal tussle, Joselino Mesa and his fellow barangay tanods named Amorsolo Dayao, Rivera and
Espino who were roving the vicinity, chanced upon the disputants. Having heard the appellant shout at Ambrocio, Mesa
intervened and requested the two to part ways. He even escorted them to their respective residences. 5
A few minutes later, appellant went back to the store. 6 Just then, Anacita saw her husband go to the terrace of their
house. Appellant suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right stomach. Anacita was only a meter away from the
antagonists; she was facing her husband's back while appellant was standing in front of Ambrocio. As Anacita started
shouting, appellant fled. 7
Mesa and his group saw Anacita weeping while Ambrocio was lying lifeless in the terrace of their house. Anacita told the
tanods that appellant had stabbed her husband. One of the tanods assisted Ambrocio but the latter succumbed to death
even before they could reach the hospital. The postmortem certificate of death shows that Ambrocio died of "shock due
to a stab wound at the chest around 3 cm. penetrating the right auricle (heart)." 8
Mesa and his companions arrested appellant in his brother's house thirty (30) minutes after the crime happened. 9 The
following day, Anacita and Mesa executed sworn statements before the police. 10
With only appellant testifying, the defense interposed alibi. Appellant, a 39-year-old laborer from San Fernando, Romblon
who had been staying for two decades with his brother in Graceville, Marilao, Bulacan, had reported to his job in San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan at 7:00 a.m. of February 7, 1996. He stopped working at 5:00 p.m. and returned to his brother's
house, reaching it at around 8:00 p.m. Moments later, Joselino Mesa, accompanied by some barangays tanods, arrived
and brought him to the municipal hall of San Jose del Monte. They did not inform him that he was a suspect in the killing
of Ambrocio Benedicto. 11 Appellant knew Ambrocio because they had built a house near the Benedictos' residence and it
was from the latter's store that they would buy their cooking needs. He denied having seen Amborcio on that fateful day
of February 7, 1996. 12
On December 3, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 22, 1 rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Ambrocio Benedicto. It found that the killing of Ambrocio was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery but that abuse of superior strength is "comprehended" by said circumstance. It ruled
out the presence of evident premeditation. However, it considered dwelling as aggravating to the effect that even if the
accused did not enter the victim's house, such as when he shot the victim from under the house or when he fired the shot
that fell the victim who was inside his house, said circumstance is aggravating. The trial court thus disposed of Criminal
Case No. 572-M-96 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. finding the accused, ANGEL RIOS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as penalized under Art. 248,
of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the death penalty;
2. accused is ordered to pay the following amounts to the heirs of Ambrocio Benedicto:
P50,000.00 for the life of the victim (Ambrocio Benedicto)
P32,892.00 actual damages (supported by Exhibits C, D, E and E-1 and based on Table I) P82,892.00
With 6% interest on all amounts due from the filling of the information on April 24, 1996 until said amounts have been
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant is now before this Court on automatic review of said Decision, with the following assignments of error:
28

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXISTENCE OF TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING DWELLING AS A GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING P32,892.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The appeal is partly meritorious. While there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant dealt the fatal stab wound
upon Ambrocio Benedicto, the trial court erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Hence,
appellant cannot be held liable for the crime of murder but for the lesser crime of homicide.
No cogent reason exists to overturn the trial court's assessment that Anacita Benedicto positively and unequivocally
identified appellant as the felon who stabbed her husband. It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility
of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
demeanor of a witness and thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. 14 Anacita's testimony on the matter
clearly supports the trial court's finding on the matter. Thus:
Fiscal:
q Where is this Ambrocio Benedicto, your husband now?
a He's already dead.
q Tell us, what is the cause of death of your husband?
a He was stabbed.
q By whom madam witness?
a By Angel Rios.
Fiscal:
q Madam witness, if Angel Rios, is around in this courtroom will you be able to identify him?
Witness:
a Yes, sir.
Fiscal:
Will you please stand up and look around and point him to us.
(Witness pointed to man in yellow shirt who gave the name of Angel Rios.)
Court:
q Why do you say that it was Angel Rios who stabbed your husband?
a Because I saw him.
Fiscal:
q When was your husband stabbed by Angel Rios?
a He was stabbed on February 7, 1996.
Court:
q At what time?
a More or less 8:00 in the evening.
Fiscal:
q Where?
a In the terrace of our house.
q Where is your house located?
a In Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. (Emphasis supplied.) 15
There is no doubt therefore, that Anacita had a good look at her husband's assailant and that she actually saw appellant
stab Ambrocio as she was only a meter away from them, behind her husband who was facing appellant. She could not
have mistaken another man for appellant because being neighbors, he was familiar to her. 16 Aside from being her
neighbor, appellant even admitted that he used to be a customer in the Benedictos' sari-sari store where he would buy
cooking needs. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is the best way to identify a person. 17
Thus, in the absence of an established ill motive on the part of Anacita, her identification of appellant as her husband's
killer should be given full faith and credit, her relationship with the victim notwithstanding. Relationship with the victim
per se is not proof of prejudice. 18
Anacita's failure to name the weapon used by appellant and to recall his position as he stabbed Ambrocio cannot diminish
her credibility. Her relative position to the two accounts for Anacita's failure to see the details surrounding the incident.
Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. 19 Nevertheless,
Anacita's one-meter distance from the two enabled her to observe the manner by which appellant stabbed Ambrocio
he did so in a manner described in the dialect as "pakadyot," 20 meaning the bladed instrument came from underneath.
Appellant's positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime was thus proven beyond reasonable doubt
by the consistent and firm testimony of Anacita Benedicto. Consequently, such positive identification effectively effaced
appellant's alibi. 21 That she was the only eyewitness to the killing presented by the prosecution did not in any way dilute
the evidentiary value of her credible testimony. It is entrenched in jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if
found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 22
However, appellant is correct in arguing that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. Its presence was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. As this Court said in People v. Derilo:
It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration
for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness
29

as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as a criminal offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing
that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying and aggravating circumstance alleged to have been
present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof. 2
In this case, the prosecution failed to discharge its duty under the law as regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party may make. To constitute treachery, these two conditions must be present: (1)
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 24
Treachery may not be appreciated where, as in this case, the attack against the victim cannot be categorized as
unexpected and unforeseen so as to deprive him the opportunity to defend himself. By the facts of the case, where the
incident of the victim berating the accused for throwing stones at his residence preceded the fatal assault, a possible
retaliation by the accused was not remote. As this Court has repeatedly held, there is no treachery when the victim is
placed on guard, as when a heated argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was standing face to face
with his assailant. In that instance, the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. 25
Moreover, where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Absent any particulars as to the manner in
which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated. 26 It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime. 27 In the case at bar, the
prosecution presented Anacita's ambiguous testimony on how the attack began to support its claim that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. Thus:
q Before the stabbing was there conversation between them?
a My husband went outside our terrace.
q Then what happened?
a Then I saw him stabbed.
q By whom?
a By Angel.
q What weapon?
a I did not see the weapon used.
Court:
q How many times?
a Only once.
q What did you do?
a I shouted.
q How far were you from the stabbing?
a More or less one (1) meter.
Fiscal:
q Madam witness, when your husband was stabbed by Angel Rios, what was his position at that time?
a My husband was standing at that time.
q Where was your husband hit by the stab of Angel Rios?
a In his right stomach.
q What is the position of the accused when he stabbed your husband?
a I did not see.
q You did not see who stabbed your husband? What I mean to say is was the accused also fronting your husband?
a What I only saw, Your Honor, was my husband was stabbed." (Emphasis supplied) 28
On cross-examination, Anacita testified as follows:
q Madam witness, I will be showing to you transcript of stenographic notes taken down on May 31, 1996. . .
Court:
What is the defense?
Atty. Tolentino:
He did not do it, Your Honor.
q . . . by the question of the court, "What was the position of the accused when he stabbed your husband"?
Witness:
a "I did not see." It was "pakadyot" ma'am.
q You said that the accused stabbed your husband in the manner that you said "pakadyot." Will you tell the court when
your husband was stabbed by the accused how was he positioned in relation to your husband?
a He was facing my husband.
Court:
q Sitting down or standing up?
a They were standing up.
q What about you, what was the position of the accused in relation to you when you said you saw the incident?
a I cannot understand where I was.
q What about your position in relation to your husband when the incident was happening?
a I only saw it when I went out.
xxx
xxx
xxx
q Will you tell the honorable court the position of your husband in relation to you? Was your husband's back towards
you or was your husband facing you?
a My husband's back was in front of me.
30

q What about the accused? How was he positioned in relation to you?

a The accused was facing me frontally.
Atty. Tolentino:
q And you said you were just one meter away from them?
a I cannot remember because I did not see how he was stabbed. 29
From this testimony, it is indubitable that Anacita saw the stabbing incident but she could not describe exactly how it was
commenced notwithstanding what appears to be her conclusion that the stabbing was done in a "pakadyot" manner. This
may perhaps be blamed on the frailty of human memory but it does not obliterate the fact the she actually saw the
stabbing incident. The doubt as to its manner or mode of execution should therefore be resolved in favor of the appellant.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this case. The word dwelling
includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof 30 and therefore it includes the staircase of
the house 31 and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter
has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 32 Provocation in the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the
commission of the crime. 3
We hold that the altercation between appellant and Ambrocio that immediately preceded the latter's fatal stabbing is not
within the purview of the concept of provocation under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The unrebutted facts
established by the prosecution show that it was the appellant who started the events that led to his unfortunate killing of
Ambrocio, by stoning the latter's house. In an apparent show of unmitigated braggadocio, appellant even went to the
victim's house on the pretext of buying cigarettes after the stone-throwing incident. The victim naturally confronted
appellant about that incident. As the two engaged in heated argument, the roving tanods interved and two parted ways.
However, a few minutes later, appellant returned to the victim's house and right at the latter's terrace, dealt him the fatal
stab wound. Under these circumstances, to cater to appellant's claim that the victim provoked him would amount to
erasing the duly established fact that by stoning the victim's house, appellant himself instigated the heated argument
that resulted in his physical assault upon the victim.
The presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against the
appellant. 34 Such damages, the award of which depends upon the Court's discretion, shall be a part of the civil liability
that may be imposed upon the appellant. 35 However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court overlooked
certain evidentiary requirements in the award of actual damages. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by
evidence on record. 36 The trial court mainly based its award of P32,892.00 on the photocopy of the receipt issued by the
funeral parlor 37 and on a receipt issued by a livestock agricultural corporation. 38 The prosecution reserved its right to
present the original copy of the receipt of the funeral parlor evidencing payment of the amount of P27,000.00 39 but it
does not appear on record that it indeed presented that original copy. On the other hand, the receipt issued by the
Broadway Livestock Agricultural Corporation in favor of one Sotero Espiritu was in full payment of the amount of
P5,092.00 for an undecipherable purpose which the prosecution claimed was for "expenses." 40 However, considering that
these "expenses" were not explained and the absence of a duly established connection between the death of the victim
and the "expenses" paid to a livestock agricultural corporation, the receipt can not be given evidentiary weight.
It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized in courts. The courts will not rely
merely on suppositions or conjectures. 41 Hence, only the amount of eight hundred pesos (P800.00) spent for the niche
and funeral mass that is evidenced by an original receipt 42 shall be awarded to the victim's heirs.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. 4
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be twelve (12) years of prision mayor, maximum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and is meted
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years prision mayor maximum to twenty (20) years reclusion temporal
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Ambrocio Benedicto in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay exemplary damages of
P20,000.00, and actual damages of P800.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT and BOY FERNANDEZ (at
large), accused. PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the assailants.We agree with the court a quo that the discrepancy as to the distance between
the electric post and the victims house is a minor inconsistency that cannot affect the credibility of the witness
testimony. As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen
the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.
Same; Evidence; It is a hornbook doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons; No amount of textual description, recitation of
31

measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime scene to the trial judges acute
senses.It is a hornbook doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should
not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because of the trial courts unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. In the same vein,
questions regarding the locus criminis, the distances and positions of the landmarks, and the credibility of the witnesses
relative thereto, are best left to the trial court, especially when it had conducted an ocular inspection. No amount of
textual description, recitation of measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime
scene to the trial judges acute senses.
Same; Same; Positive identification, if categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence not worthy of weight in law.In the face of the prosecutions mounting
evidence, accused-appellant invokes alibi for his defense. But positive identification, if categorical and consistent, without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence not worthy of weight in law. For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that accused-appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed but
it must likewise be demonstrated that he was far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The lower court took judicial notice of the fact that a trip
from Isabela to Dagupan City takes a mere eight (8) to nine (9) hours and therefore it was not impossible for accusedappellant to have been in Dagupan City on the night in question and returned to Isabela immediately after. For this
reason, the defense of alibi must fall.
Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Elements; There was treachery where the victim was in the
comforts of his own home, enjoying a televised basketball game, when he was shot in the head from the back.There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment
of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the victim was in the comforts of his own home, enjoying
a televised basketball game. He was shot in the head from the back, with the gunman even having all the time in the
world to roll up his sleeves and take careful aim. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life, and was not in the
position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
Same; Same; Same; Dwelling; He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere; For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should
have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offenseit is enough that the victim was attacked inside
his own house, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside.Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not given
provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Although accused-appellant was outside of the house when he fired, the victim
was inside his house. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have
actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own
house, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated.However, the
death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in light of our recent rulings in People v. Arrojado and People v.
Gano where Secs. 8 and 9 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure were given retroactive application where favorable
to the accused. The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not alleged in the
Information, it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death. Consequently, there being no more modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for this murder is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 in relation to Art.
248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. [People vs. Perreras, 362 SCRA 202(2001)]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ACCUSED-APPELLANT PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" was found guilty by the court a quo of murder for the killing of
Estanislao Salo and sentenced to death. He was ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 for civil indemnity,
P91,803.59 for actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 for lost earnings and P100,000.00 for moral damages.
His conviction is now the subject of this automatic review. 1
Meanwhile, his co-accused BOY FERNANDEZ has remained at large, hence is not included in this Decision.
On the night of 21 July 1998 in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, accused-appellant Pedro Perreras, a former resident of the
barangay, and Boy Fernandez, his nephew, approached Leonardo Salazar who was engaged in idle banter with some
barriomates at the neighborhood waiting shed. Pedro asked Leonardo if Manoling Pastoral was home. When Leonardo
nodded, Pedro asked for directions to go to Manoling's house. Feeling almost suffocated in the crowded waiting shed,
Leonardo excused himself and walked towards the house of Estanislao Salo ten (10) meters away for some refreshing air. 2
32

Soon after Pedro and Boy followed, each holding a bottle of beer. The two (2) approached the son of Estanislao by the
name of Joel and asked him also for Manoling's house.
Accused-appellant then stopped by the window of the Estanislao's house which was just adjacent to the house of
Manoling. The place was lighted by a mercury lamp about twelve (12) meters from the house of Estanislao. As soon as
accused-appellant saw Estanislao, he rolled up his sleeves, drew a gun from his waist, and fired at Estanislao, hitting him
on the head.3 Leonardo had a clear view of Estanislao sitting on a chair and watching TV when fired upon as he was only
about ten (10) meters away from the shooter and the victim. Fearing for his life, Leonardo hid behind a chair.
Leonora Salo, Estanislao's wife, was washing dishes in the kitchen when she heard the gunshot. She rushed to the living
room and saw her husband slumped on the floor. She looked out the window and saw accused-appellant Pedro Perreras
alias "Pepot" holding a gun staring at her husband's body. 4 Upon seeing Leonora, Pedro fled with Boy trailing him some
twenty (20) meters behind. Shocked and senseless, Leonora cradled her dying husband in her arms and shouted his
name as if to will him back into consciousness. After Pedro and Boy left, Leonardo Salazar ran to the house of Saturnino
Maramba, a barangay councilor, and reported to him, in between gasps, the shooting and narrated the details of what he
had witnessed. Both then went to the house of SPO2 Dacanay for assistance.
Estanislao was rushed to the Villaflor Hospital for treatment but it was too late. He died at 5:30 the following morning, 22
July 1998.
Dr. Benjamin Bautista, Rural Health Physician of Dagupan City, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Estanislao. It was
in a state of rigor mortis, with "gunshot wound, POE, 2 cm., left, Parietal area, penetrating, perforating, gunpowder
tattooing marking, less dense, collar abrasion, depress fracture skull." Internal findings showed "intercranial hemorrhage,
moderate; skull depress fracture; penetrating and perforating brain tissue damage." Cause of death was "Hypovolemic
shock, Hemorrhage, moderate, due to gunshot wound POE (L) parietal area, brain tissue damage." 5 Dr. Bautista explained
in court that the victim was shot in the left side of the top portion of the head but there was no exit wound; the shot was
fired at close range, from four (4) to six (6) feet, and from a low caliber pistol; and, from the position of the bullet wound,
the victim could have been shot while seated.6
On 22 August 1998 accused-appellant was arrested while in hiding in Echague, Isabela. According to SPO4 Alfredo Flores,
accused-appellant admitted to him that he killed Estanislao Salo and voluntarily signed the warrant of arrest 7 on the left
margin thereof.8 But, Boy Fernandez was nowhere to be found.
Accused-appellant however subsequently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he had been in Isabela since
11 July 1998 and returned to Dagupan only upon his arrest. He also denied that he admitted to SPO4 Flores that he
murdered Estanislao Salo, claiming that did not know how to write and his captors forced him to affix his signature on the
warrant. He also testified that he was mauled by Estanislao Salo's two (2) sons and nephew while he was detained in the
Dagupan police station. Furthermore, he asserted that Boy Fernandez, his alleged companion during the murder, had
been dead for three (3) years, and even presented a Death Certificate 9 of one Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who died on
23 May 1994.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two (2) other witnesses, Orlando and Pepito Capua, both residents of Bacayao
Norte, to testify that they knew Boy Fernandez and that he was still alive. They further testified that the Rodolfo
Geminiano Fernandez who died in 1994 was the father of Boy Fernandez.
Accused-appellant now maintains that the lower court committed a grievous error in lending weight to the testimony of
prosecution witness Leonardo Salazar. He pointed out supposed "inconsistencies" in Salazar's testimony in an attempt to
impugn his credibility. First, the ocular inspection of the area which revealed that the victim's house was east of the shed
was inconsistent with Salazar's testimony that he was facing west when the incident transpired. Second, the location of
the electric post which illuminated the vicinity was not twenty (20) meters in front of the house, as Salazar claimed, but
on its southern direction 100 meters away. Third, it was impossible for him to have asked directions to the house of
Manoling Pastoral because he personally knew Pastoral as well as the location of his house.
As regards the first perceived "inconsistency," accused-appellant argues
From the testimony of the said witness itself it was well established that he was at that shed near the electric post where
the improvised basketball court was located, and the said shed was facing the three (3) meters concrete road. On this
point alone it was already very clear that witness Leonardo Salazar, assuming arguendo to be present, could never see
the house of the victim because he was then at the time facing the three (3) meters concrete road, hence, facing west
but the house of the victim during the ocular inspection was found to be located in the eastern direction in relation to the
said shed or electric post and improvised basketball court was located.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that nowhere in Leonardo's testimony did he ever state that he was facing west
when the shooting occurred. He only said that the waiting shed where he was standing before he went to breath some
fresh air was facing the newly constructed concrete road. The map of the area drawn by the court researcher 10 reveals
that this road was indeed to the west of the shed. However, Leonardo did not claim to have witnessed the shooting from
there. He left that shed to go to the front of the victim's house for some fresh air. It was from there, and not from the
shed, that he saw the killing. As the lower court correctly pointed out
It was counsel for the defense who was apparently confused when he predicated almost all his questions during the crossexamination of Leonardo Salazar on the place where the witness was refreshing himself when actually counsel for the
defense wanted to refer to the waiting shed where the witness was conversing with the people around and where the
accused asked him where the house of Manoling Pastoral is and if the latter was in his house. The place where the waiting
shed is located is actually different from the place where the witness went to refresh himself near the house of the victim
as borne out by the transcript of the testimony of the witness. 11
We agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that considering that accused-appellant had been in Isabela from
1975 to 1997, it would not be far-fetched that he lost his familiarity with the barangay so that it was not unlikely that he
had to ask for directions to the house of Manoling Pastoral, or at least verify his recollection with someone more familiar
with the place.
33

Also, we agree with the court a quo that the discrepancy as to the distance between the electric post and the victim's
house is a minor inconsistency that cannot affect the credibility of the witness' testimony. As it is oft-repeated,
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and
prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual for there
is no person with perfect faculties or senses.12
At any rate, all doubts regarding the relative positions of the houses, electric lights and basketball court have been
soundly put to rest, and aptly so, by the trial court
During the ocular inspection it was learned that there was a vacant space in front of the house of Salo as the area was not
yet fenced at the time of the incident with a hollow block wall on the southwestern side of the vacant lot was a mercury
lamp . . . which could very well light the house of Estanislao Salo, including that portion where a window existed through
which Estanislao Salo was shot . . . Although the electric post was not located immediately on the side of the road as it
was inside the kitchen wall of a house under it, same was of a height sufficient enough to make the electric bulb attached
to it to light the front of the house of Estanislao Salo without any obstruction and when the witness said that he went in
front of the house of Salo he was within the vicinity of the said electric post, not on the waiting shed near which another
electric post was located where the defense argued the witness was at the time of the incident. From any place in front of
the house of Salo, anyone could see the place where the accused was supposed to be standing when Estanislao Salo was
shot.13
It is a hornbook doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because of the trial court's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. 14 In the same vein, questions
regarding the locus criminis, the distances and positions of the landmarks, and the credibility of the witnesses relative
thereto, are best left to the trial court, especially when it had conducted an ocular inspection. No amount of textual
description, recitation of measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime scene
to the trial judge's acute senses.
Moreover, Leonardo Salazar's testimony was corroborated by Leonora Salo, the wife of the victim, and Dr. Benjamin
Bautista, the examining physician. Leonora's testimony that she saw accused-appellant holding a gun and staring at her
unconscious husband through the window confirms the gunman's identity. Dr. Bautista's findings that the victim was shot
at close range with a small firearm while sitting down15 are also consistent with Leonardo's account.
In the face of the prosecution's mounting evidence, accused-appellant invokes alibi for his defense. But positive
identification, if categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence not worthy of weight in law. 16 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that accused-appellant
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 17
The lower court took judicial notice of the fact that a trip from Isabela to Dagupan City takes a mere eight (8) to nine (9)
hours and therefore it was not impossible for accused-appellant to have been in Dagupan City on the night in question
and returned to Isabela immediately after. For this reason, the defense of alibi must fall.
In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 18 For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 19 In this case, the victim was in the comforts of his own
home, enjoying a televised basketball game. He was shot in the head from the back, with the gunman even having all the
time in the world to roll up his sleeves and take careful aim. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life, and was
not in the position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ruled that the murder was aggravated by dwelling. We agree, but not to the
imposition of the supreme penalty as shown hereunder.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not
given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. 20 Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of
the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 21 Although accused-appellant was outside of the house when he fired,
the victim was inside his house. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked
inside his own house, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside. 22
However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in light of our recent rulings in People v. Arrojado23
and People v. Gano24 where Secs. 8 and 9 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 were given retroactive application
where favorable to the accused. The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying
but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not
alleged in the Information, it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death. Consequently, there being no more
modifying circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for this murder is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 in
relation to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
Of the amount of P91,803.59 awarded for actual damages, only P61,813.15 may be granted as only so much for medical
and burial expenses are supported by the evidence on record. 26 Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary
evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim. 27
34

The heirs of the deceased may recover damages for loss of earning capacity. Although the prosecution did not present
documentary evidence to support this claim, testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can
make a fair and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity, 28 and the unrebutted testimony of Leonora
Salo is sufficient basis for the award. She testified that the victim was fifty (50) years old at the time of his death and
earned a basic salary of P130.00 a day but including tips as waiter in a restaurant he was earning a total average of
P9,000.00 per month. Under the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases, 29 loss of
earning capacity is computed according to the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity (X)
Life
Expectancy
x
Gross
Annual
IncomeLiving
Expenses
(50% of Gross Annual Income)
where life expectancy

2/3 x (80 - [age of deceased]);

and
Gross Annual Income

Monthly Earnings x number of months (12)

Therefore,
X

2/3 (80-50) x [(P9,000.00 x 12) -[P9,000.00 x 12)

50%]

2/3 (30) x [P108,000.00 - P54,000.00]

20 x P54,000.00

X
P1,080,000.00
The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 since murder was not qualified by any circumstance
under which the death penalty is authorized. The testimony of Leonora that she suffered sleepless nights and mental
anxiety as a result of her husband's murder sufficiently justifies moral damages, 30 although the award of P100,000.00
may be considered excessive hence must be lowered to P50,000.00 to conform with current jurisprudence. 31
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 98-02303-D finding accused-appellant PEDRO
PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of murder, imposing on him the death penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of
ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 in lost
earnings, and P100,000.00 in moral damages is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS is found guilty of murder
and sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P61,813.15 as actual damages, P1,080,000.00 in lost earnings and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR LACANIETA alias Boy Alog, JERRY
BALLENAS alias Marlon Marquez and Carlito Gamad, accused. JERRY BALLENAS, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been
sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime because alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.This Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in
concluding that BALLENAS is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the forcible abduction and rape of WILMA. In asserting his
innocence, BALLENAS foists the defense of alibi, a defense that has long been considered as intrinsically the weakest of
all defenses. Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been
sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime because alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.
Same; Denial; Witnesses; Well-settled is the rule that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence on non-culpability to merit credence; An affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony,
especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.A telling detail in this case is the fact that the mother
of the victim witnessed first hand the abduction of her daughter at gunpoint. Consorcia has no reason to wrongfully
implicate BALLENAS. As the mother of the deceased victim, Consorcia would want nothing short of justice for her dead
daughter. BALLENAS does not deny the fact that he went to see WILMA to fetch her that evening of March 20, 1987. In
professing his innocence, BALLENAS merely denies the allegations of Consorcia that he took away WILMA at gunpoint and
offers the defense that he merely talked to WILMA to convince her to meet with LACANIETA. Well-settled is the rule that
denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence.
An affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a
credible witness. The fact that BALLENAS exposed himself to Consorcia all the more indicates his brazenness in abducting
WILMA. The return of BALLENAS to Catmon after the death of WILMA cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence. It
is the credible and unwavering testimony of Consorcia that stands as solid proof of the guilt of BALLENAS.
Witnesses; Alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness when not clearly established will not discredit said
witness; Settled is the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony
deserves full faith and credit.BALLENAS assails the testimony of Florencio on the ground that it abounds in
inconsistencies and is not credible. The alleged inconsistencies are however not clearly established. Notably, Florencio
unequivocally said that he saw LACANIETA, BALLENAS, SALVADOR and GAMAD rape and stab WILMA. We have no reason
35

to doubt the credibility of Florencio in light of the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious
offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit. The initial reluctance of Florencio to get involved in this case is
understandable and does not cast doubt on his credibility as a witness. Whenever the issue boils down to credibility, we
have always maintained that the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.
Criminal Law; Forcible Abduction with Rape; Aggravating Circumstances; Nighttime; Nocturnity cannot be appreciated if it
can be shown that the place was adequately lighted.Based on the records, BALLENAS abducted WILMA around 7 oclock
in the evening of March 20, 1987 and that BALLENAS blew off the lighted kerosene lamp offered by WILMA to BALLENAS
to light his cigarette. However, Consorcia testified that there was some light coming from another kerosene lamp upstairs
that reflected (sic) the door and that Consorcia also had a kerosene lamp with her that BALLENAS also put off. In the
case of People vs. Pallarco, the scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp, hence we ruled in that
case that nocturnity cannot be appreciated if it can be shown that the place was adequately lighted. The prosecution also
failed to prove that nighttime was specially sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him or that nighttime
facilitated the commission of the crime, circumstances which must be present before the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime can be appreciated.
Same; Same; Same; Cruelty; There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act; The mere fact that the victim
sustained ten (10) stab wounds does not prove that the accused deliberately inflicted the injuries to prolong
unnecessarily her physical suffering.We also do not agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty attended the commission of the crime charged. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty is present when the
wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. In People vs. Ferrer, the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty was not appreciated in the absence of positive proof that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13)
wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the blows which snuffed
out his life. In this case, WILMA sustained ten (10) stab wounds, but these multiple wounds-alone do not prove that the
accused deliberately inflicted the injuries to prolong unnecessarily her physical suffering. Thus, the trial court improperly
considered the aggravating circumstance of cruelty in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Dwelling; Dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where the victim was
abducted while she was still in her house.What is present in this case is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
Consorcia testified that her house has a ladder that leads to the main door; that BALLENAS was at the main door when he
called WILMA; and that when WILMA refused to go with BALLENAS, it was there that BALLENAS forced WILMA to go with
him. Without a doubt, WILMA was abducted while she was still in her house. Thus, dwelling may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance considering that it is not necessary that the accused should have entered the dwelling of the
victim.
Same; Same; Elements.BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape punished under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and 48 of the same Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1)
the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex
crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by
using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman
is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Same; Same; Damages; The increase of civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is justified if the crime was committed under
circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty.The P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court
must be modified. Instead of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity considering
that the crime was committed with the use of a weapon as alleged in the information and proven in court. In consonance
with jurisprudence, the increase of the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is justified if the crime was committed under
circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Baago, the accused committed the crime of
rape with the use of a gun on October 15, 1993, before the passage of RA 7659. This Court was thus precluded from
meting out the death penalty, but nevertheless the accused was ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the victim died, the Court cannot award the higher amount of P100,000.00, the civil
indemnity awarded in cases of rape with homicide, where the information is merely for forcible abduction with rape, not
rape with homicide.In spite of the death of the victim in this case, we cannot award the higher amount of P100,000.00,
the civil indemnity awarded in cases of rape with homicide. The information in the case at bar is merely for forcible
abduction with rape and not for rape with homicide.
Same; Same; Same; The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereofthe fact that they sustained the trauma of mental or physical
36

and psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still
require recital thereof at trial.Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are also hereby granted to the heirs of the
victim. The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental or physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof
at trial. Here, Consorcia testified as to the inconsolable loss that she felt when her only daughter was abducted, ravished
and killed. [People vs. Ballenas, 330 SCRA 519(2000)]
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Consorcia Tayo (Consorcia) claims that her daughter, 19-year-old WILMA TAYO (WILMA) was abducted at gunpoint on
March 20, 1987. WILMA was found dead the next day, her body bore signs that she was first raped then brutally stabbed
ten times. Four persons were suspected as perpetrators of the crime: JERRY BALLENAS (BALLENAS) alias MARLON
MARQUEZ, CESAR LACANIETA (LACANIETA) alias BOY ALOG, ALBERTO SALVADOR (SALVADOR) and CARLITO GAMAD
(GAMAD). SALVADOR was shot dead during the police investigation and GAMAD was also shot dead after the reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of San Jose, Antique.
Based on the records of this case, LACANIETA and BALLENAS were already charged with murder at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique. Since BALLENAS had already been arraigned for murder, an Information for Forcible
Abduction with Rape was filed on October 12, 1987 against BALLENAS and LACANIETA before the same court. LACANIETA
thereafter posted bail, but he eventually absconded. The Information was then amended on June 19, 1989 to read as
follows:
At the instance of the mother of the deceased offended party, Wilma Tayo, who has subscribed and sworn to a complaint
attached to the records of the above-entitled cases, the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses JERRY
BALLENAS alias "MARLON MARQUEZ" of the crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with Cesar Lacanieta
who is still at large and Alberto Salvador and Carlito Gamad, both deceased, being then armed with gun and knife and by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct and carry away Wilma Tayo at a gun point ( sic) to
an uninhabited place and while there, by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the said Wilma Tayo
against the latter's will.
Contrary to the provisions of article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 of the same Code. 1
Trial fiscal Juan C. Mission, Jr. was of the opinion that the proper charge against BALLENAS is forcible abduction with rape
"because an independent act of forcible abduction preceded the rape and murder of the deceased Wilma Tayo," and not
the special complex crime of rape with homicide. 2
The arraignment of BALLENAS for forcible abduction with rape came belatedly because it was only after the case was
already submitted for decision when the trial court discovered that BALLENAS had not yet been arraigned. Both the
prosecution and defense then agreed to arraign BALLENAS and to consider all the evidence earlier presented as
reproduced. BALLENAS was accordingly arraigned on the Amended Information on February 18, 1992; he pleaded not
guilty. The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Consorcia and Florencio Millones (Florencio) and
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" as documentary evidence, while the defense presented BALLENAS as its lone witness.
The version of the prosecution as summarized by the trial court is as follows:
On March 20, 1987 about 7 o'clock in the evening, the Wilma Tayo (sic) and her mother Mrs. Consorcia Tayo were in their
house at Sitio Bulho, Cubay-Sermon, Sibalom, Antique. They were about to eat supper when someone called to them
asking to light a cigarette. Wilma Tayo asked who was calling and the answer was "I am Junior, let me light my cigarette".
Wiima Tayo opened the door slightly and there stood accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez. Accused did not light
his cigarette but instead blew the gas lamp and put out the light. He held Wilma Tayo by the wrist.
Accused Jerry Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma Tayo and Consorcia Tayo. Accused told Wilma Tayo to accompany
him to Maria Leong-on, his girlfriend. Wilma Tayo refused as they were about to eat supper. Consorcia Tayo also told her
daughter, Wilma Tayo not go out (sic) because it was already dark. Accused Jerry Ballenas forced Wilma Tayo to go out
with him and struck the hand of Consorcia Tayo and pointed the handgun at her. Accused held Wilma Tayo tightly and
took her away.
Because of the abduction, Consorcia Tayo sought the help of a neighbor, Andres Mallorca, whose house is about 20
meters away from her house but to no avail, Andres Mallorca shut the door on her for fear of Jerry Ballenas as the letter is
known as a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the New People's Army.
The following morning, Consorcia Tayo reported the abduction of Wilma Tayo to her son-in-law who is a member of the
Integrated National Police. She learned from Aurelio Gamad that her daughter Wilma Tayo was already dead. The police
then proceeded to the scene of the incident.
At the time Wilma Tayo was abducted, she was 19 years old. She was single and a third year student in the Polytechnic
State College of Antique, Sibalom, Antique.
Consorcia Tayo spent P30,000.00 for the funeral of Wilma Tayo. Consorcia was shocked and she felt pain with the death of
her only daughter Wilma Tayo. To Consorcia Tayo no amount of money could compensate the death of her daughter Wilma
Tayo whom they loved so much.
BALLENAS disavows any participation in the abduction, rape and killing of WILMA and offered this version, viz:
In the afternoon of March 20, 1987, at about past 4:00 p.m., he was in the house of CARLITO GAMAD. When darkness
came, CARLITO asked him to accompany CEZAR LACANIETA (a boarder of the GAMAD's), to the house of victim WILMA
TAYO. Victim was the girlfriend of LACANIETA. On the way, LACANIETA told him of his plan to elope with victim, and asked
him to talk to her. He proceeded to the house of victim, while LACANIETA was left behind near the irrigation canal. Upon
37

reaching the house of victim, he called out and the mother answered his call and then victim came out of the house. He
told victim that LACANIETA had something to tell her and that he was waiting for her at the irrigation canal. Both of them
proceeded to where LACANIETA was waiting and after he led victim to LACANIETA, he went home (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, August
9, 1990).3
On May 29, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique rendered its Decision 4 finding BALLENAS guilty
of forcible abduction with rape, the judgment declares:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon
Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape punished under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and Article 48 of the same Code with reclusion perpetua to death by reason
of the use of a firearm by accused Jerry Ballenas in the abduction of Wilma Tayo. And applying Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed should be the greater penalty of death there being two aggravating
circumstances but because the present Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty accused Jerry Ballenas
is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and to suffer the accessory penalty
provided for by law and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Wilma Tayo the sum of P50,000.00 and to
pay Consorcia Tayo, the sum of P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses incurred by her for the funeral of the deceased Wilma
Tayo and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.5
In this appeal, BALLENAS questions the quoted decision on these grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00, THE SUM OF P30,000.00 FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES AND TO PAY THE COSTS. 6
This Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in concluding that BALLENAS is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the forcible abduction and rape of WILMA. In asserting his innocence, BALLENAS foists the defense of alibi, a defense that
has long been considered as intrinsically the weakest of all defenses. 7 Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be
rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime
because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. 8
In this case, Consorcia, the mother of WILMA, positively identified BALLENAS as the person who went to her house and
abducted her daughter at gunpoint that fateful night. Moreover, the testimony of Florencio fortifies the theory of the
prosecution that after the abduction of WILMA, BALLENAS together with LACANIETA, SALVADOR and GAMAD raped and
stabbed WILMA. According to Florencio, he was passing through the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, antique when
he saw "Boy Alog" (LACANIETA) lying on top of WILMA. 9 The hands of WILMA were then held down by BALLENAS and
SALVADOR. 10 Surprised by the presence of Florencio, LACANIETA stood up and told the former that they were just having
a "happy-happy". 11 Florencio then left and after reaching three brazas, he hid to see what the group was up to. 12
Florencio testified that he thereafter saw four men take turns in ravishing and stabbing WILMA. 13 The following testimony
of Florencio establishes the participation of BALLENAS in the crime charged:
Q: Mr. Millones, you said that you are a resident of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique, how long have you been a
resident of that plade?
A: I was born there.
Q: Are you still a resident in that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On March 20, 1987, were you still a resident of that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On that day, about 7:00 o'clock in the evening can you recall where you were?
A: Yes, sir, I was walking on the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique and it was already past 7:00 o'clock in the
evening.
Q: Where did you come from?
A: I came from Durog leading to Catmon.
Q: Where were you going then?
A: I was intending to go to the house of my deceased mother whose wake falls on that night.
Q: While walking from Durog towards your house, can you recall if you were able to observe any unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that about?
A: While I was in the street of Brgy. Catmon, Sibalom Antique, I saw four persons, three are squatting, while the other one
is lying flat on his stomach and I thought there (sic) were all drinking.
Q: As you pass by these four persons, did you start any conversation with them?
A: While I was approaching them and when I reach that place, the fellow who was lying flat on his stomach, stood up and
told me that they were just having a happy happy so I will just pass by my way.
Q: What else did you see when he stood up?
A: When he stood up, he told me I will proceed on my way and I saw that the three persons were holding a girl.
Q: You said they were holding a girl, do you know that girl?
A: Yes, sir, Wilma Tayo, daughter of Consorcia Tayo.
Q: Aside from Marlon, do you know that three other persons?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were they?
38

A: They were Alberto Salvador, Carlito Gamad, Marlon and Boy Alog.
Q: And who was that person who was lying flat on his stomach?
A: Boy Alog.
Q: If these three persons are inside the courtroom, could you please point to them?
A: Only one is here inside the courtroom.
Q: And who was that?
A: Jerry Ballenas.
INTERPRETER:
At this juncture, the witness pointed to a man seated inside the courtroom and when asked by the Interpreter what his
name is, identified himself as Jerry Ballenas.
Q You said that three persons were holding on to Wilma Tayo, will you please tell us who among these three persons were
holding Wilma Tayo and on what part of the body?
A: Carlito Gamad was holding the hands of Wilma Tayo and the hands of the girl are both stretched above his head.
Q: How about the two other persons?
A: While Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, Jr. were holding on each of the leg of the girl.
Q: How did these Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, how were they holding the legs of Wilma Tayo.
A: Wilma was lying flat on his (sic) back on the street and each of these persons were holding on each of the leg of Wilma
Tayo.
Q: Are the legs of Wilma Tayo held fell (sic) to the ground or raised up?
A: The legs are joined to the ground in V-position.
Q: Do you know if Wilma Tayo saw you pass by?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Incompetent, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
FISCAL MISSION:
After you were told that they were just there for a happy happy, what did you do?
A: I told them I will pass my way.
Q: After that, what did you do?
A: I walk farther and observe.
Q: How far did you walk and observe these persons?
A: I walk from the place about three brazas so that I could observe what they were doing.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to the court by pointing inside the courtroom how far more or less is three brazas?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to the wall of the other courtroom of Branch 11 which is more or less 8 to 9 brazas.
FISCAL MISSION:
Q: Now, upon reaching that place about 8 brazas to make some observation, what did you do?
A: I hid and observe what they were doing.
Q: Did you observe anything else?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you observe?
A: I saw them. These four took turns in raping the girl.
Q: Then what else did you see?
A: After raping Wilma Tayo, they also took turns in stabbing her.
Q: How long did you observe the group?
A: I could not determine the length of time I stayed in that place because I do not have a watch.
Q: After making such observation, what did you do?
A: After I have witnessed that horrifying incident, I just proceed to the house of my deceased mother. 14
The autopsy report made by Dr. Julito V. Osunero, Chief of the Ramon Maza Memorial District Hospital, Sibalom, Antique
confirms the testimony of Florencio. The report contains these findings:
1. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
2. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
3. Stab wound, 1 inch long Left side neck and point of exit Right side Neck thru and thru, cutting carotid and jugular
vessels.
4. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Epigastric Area perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Liver.
5. Stab wound, 1 inch diameter perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Stomach.
6. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right anterior Chest perforating thoracic Cavity penetrating Right Lung.
7. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right Lumber Area perforating Abdominal Cavity penetrating Kidney.
8. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Lumbar Area Right, perforating Abdominal Cavity.
9. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
10. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
11. Contusion both thigh, 2 inches diameter, left and 3 inches diameter, right.
12. Hymen Lacerations 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock, Fresh. 15
The cause of the death of WILMA is reported as due to hemorrhage secondary to wounds on the neck, chest, abdomen
and back. 16
The trial court opined that the contusions on the thighs of WILMA show that her legs were forcibly set apart to facilitate
the rape of WILMA. That WILMA was raped is evidenced by hymenal lacerations, still found fresh on March 21, 1987, the
39

day the autopsy was conducted. We agree with the trial court that based on the evidence, it could readily be concluded
that the perpetrators stabbed WILMA several times after the commission of the rape. 17
In a desperate attempt to reverse the decision of the trial court, BALLENAS impresses upon this Court his theory that if he
indeed committed the crime charged, he would not have exposed himself to Consorcia at the time that WILMA was
abducted. 18 BALLENAS also points out that his return to Catmon the following Monday after the death of WILMA and on
which date he was arrested, belies his participation in the despicable crime. 19 BALLENAS argues that if he was guilty of
the crime, he would not have returned to Catmon to face the possibility of being arrested since the victim was with him
on the night of March 20, 1987. 20
We are not persuaded. A telling detail in this case is the fact that the mother of the victim witnessed first hand the
abduction of her daughter at gunpoint. Consorcia has no reason to wrongfully implicate BALLENAS. As the mother of the
deceased victim, Consorcia would want nothing short of justice for her dead daughter. BALLENAS does not deny the fact
that he went to see WILMA to fetch her that evening of March 20, 1987. In professing his innocence, BALLENAS merely
denies the allegations of Consorcia that he took away WILMA at gunpoint and offers the defense that he merely talked to
WILMA to convince her to meet with LACANIETA. Well-settled is the rule that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence. 21 An affirmative testimony is far stronger
than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 22 The fact that BALLENAS
exposed himself to Consorcia all the more indicates his brazenness in abducting WILMA. The return of BALLENAS to
Catmon after the death of WILMA cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence. It is the credible and unwavering
testimony of Consorcia that stands as solid proof of the guilt of BALLENAS.1wphi1.nt
BALLENAS assails the testimony of Florencio on the ground that it "abounds in inconsistencies" 23 and is not credible. The
alleged inconsistencies are however not clearly established. Notably, Florencio unequivocally said that he saw LACANIETA,
BALLENAS, SALVADOR and GAMAD rape and stab WILMA. We have no reason to doubt the credibility of Florencio in light
of the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith
and credit. 24 The initial reluctance of Florencio to get involved in this case is understandable and does not cast doubt on
his credibility as a witness. Whenever the issue boils down to credibility, we have always maintained that the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 25 Findings of the trial court on such
matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 26
We therefore see no cogent reason to reverse the judgment of the trial court convicting BALLENAS of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The trial court ruled that there are two aggravating circumstances in this case, nighttime 27 and that
the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission 28 . We however digress from the finding of the trial court that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for its commission are present in the case at bar.
Based on the records, BALLENAS abducted WILMA around 7 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1987 and that BALLENAS
blew off the lighted kerosene lamp offered by WILMA to BALLENAS to light his cigarette. 29 However, Consorcia testified
that there was some light coming from another kerosene lamp upstairs that "reflected ( sic) the door" and that Consorcia
also had a kerosene lamp with her that BALLENAS also put off. 30 In the case of People vs. Pallarco, 31 the scene of the
crime was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp, hence we ruled in that case that nocturnity cannot be appreciated
if it can be shown that the place was adequately lighted. 32 The prosecution also failed to prove that nighttime was
specially sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime,
circumstances which must be present before the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be appreciated. We also do
not agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty attended the commission of the crime charged.
The aggravating circumstance of cruelty is present when "the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission". 33 There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and
delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of
the criminal act. 34 In People vs. Ferrer 35 , the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was not appreciated in the absence of
positive proof that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13) wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to
agonize before they rendered any of the blows which snuffed out his life. In this case, WILMA sustained ten (10) stab
wounds, but these multiple wounds alone do not prove that the accused deliberately inflicted the injuries to prolong
unnecessarily her physical suffering. Thus, the trial court improperly considered the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
in the case at bar.
What is present in this case is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Consorcia testified that her house has a ladder
that leads to the main door; that BALLENAS was at the main door when he called WILMA; and that when WILMA refused to
go with BALLENAS, it was there that BALLENAS forced WILMA to go with him. 36 Without a doubt, WILMA was abducted
while she was still in her house. Thus, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering that it is
not necessary that the accused should have entered the dwelling of the victim. 37
BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 342 and 48 of the same Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1) the taking of a woman
against her will and (2) with lewd designs 38 . The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs
when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented. 39 BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987,
before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that took effect on December 31, 1993. At the time
that BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion perpetua
40

to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven in
court, should have warranted the imposition of the death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the
implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctfully ruled that the penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS is
reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of
reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of a
crime. 40
This Court is however constrained to disallow the amount of P30,000.00 for the burial expenses incurred by Consorcia. We
can only give credit for actual damages such as burial expenses if there are receipts that can support the claim. 41 The
records in the case at bench do not substantiate the P30,000.00 burial expenses sought by Consorcia, except for her lone
assertion.
The P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court must be modified. Instead of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity,
we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity considering that the crime was committed with the use of a weapon as alleged in
the information and proven in court. In consonance with jurisprudence, the increase of the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is
justified if the crime was committed under circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. 42 In People vs.
Baago 43 , the accused committed the crime of rape with the use of a gun on October 15, 1993, before the passage of RA
7659. This Court was thus precluded from meting out the death penalty, but nevertheless the accused was ordered to pay
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. 44
In spite of the death of the victim in this case, we cannot award the higher amount of P100,000.00, the civil indemnity
awarded in cases of rape with homicide. 45 The information in the case at bar is merely for forcible abduction with rape
and not for rape with homicide.
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are also hereby granted to the heirs of the victim. The award of moral
damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings which constitute
the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at trial. 46 Here, Consorcia
testified as to the inconsolable loss that she felt when her only daughter was abducted, ravished and killed. 47
Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. 48 Since dwelling is appreciated in this case as an aggravating circumstance under
Article 14 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is therefore in order.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, antique is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellant Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual
damages of P30,000.00 is deleted.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO BALANSI alias BAN-OS, defendantappellant.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused
was guilty of shooting the victim Elpidio Dalsen to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982.While there was no
eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused was guilty of
shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen, to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1)
He was seen standing by the entrance of the house where the victim had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes
before gunshots were heard. Three witnesses saw him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen, (2) Moments
later, two shots rang out, one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen, and Nicolas Balais. (3)
Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw him there, whom he wrestled for the
possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
Same; Same; Defense that accused-appellant was there to investigate the matter rejected; Flight is a silent admission of
guilt.The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to investigate the matter,
and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too must reject this
defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he, Asbok, should testify
falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled immediately thereafter. If he were truly innocent, he would not have
done so. We have held time and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. As aptly put: The righteous is brave as
lion, but the wicked man fleeth.
Same; Same; Credibility of witnesses; Claim of inconsistency on the part of the prosecutions witnesses likewise rejected.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecutions witnesses, notably Asbok, who stated that he
was the first to be in the victims house after the shooting (aside from the accused), in the face of Canaos testimony that
she also had been there. The Court is not convinced that an inconsistency exists. For obviously, Asbok had been
mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
Same; Same; Motive; Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the
accused-appellant.The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to
the accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any successful showing of a motive, the
circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
41

Same; Same; Aggravating circumstances; Court not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising
from treachery, evident premeditation and means employed to weaken the defense of the victim.The Court, however, is
not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from treachery, evident premeditation, and
means employed to weaken the defense of the victim. As to treachery, jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack
must be shown. While there are testimonies to the effect that the victim was fast asleep, we can not safely presume
that he was still in that condition when the accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can
not justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time.
Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation not a qualifying circumstance; Elements to fully appreciate evident
premeditation.Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is
necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and
execution. The prior determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not been sufficiently demonstrated by
the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Fact that accused also employed means to weaken the victims defenses is likewise missing in this
case.That the accused also employed means to weaken the victims defenses is likewise missing in this case. As we
said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us,
that the appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Dwelling; Court affirmed the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling; The dwelling place need
not be owned by the victim.We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim
was not shot in his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of
privacy the law accords to human abode.Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. According to one commentator, ones dwelling place is a sanctuary
worthy of respect and that one who slanders another in the latters house is more guilty than if he who offends him
elsewhere. However, one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of another because as his
invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may
not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment, home to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short moment.
[People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566(1990)]
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30, 1982 at Balinciagao, Pasil,
Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he, armed with a Garand rifle, went inside the house of the victim, then
allegedly fast asleep, where he shot him twice and killed him. Treachery was held to be present, and so were evident
premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense of the victim. 1
The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, and a member of the
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the victim was the Provincial Development Officer of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The
incident took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur, Pasil, at or about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The defense placed two on the stand.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to pay a total of P590,000.00 in actual
(P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning capacity) and moral damages, plus costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house of his parents located opposite the
house where the wedding celebration was being held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Beatrice Canao, a
Balinciagao resident, saw the accused, her uncle, standing at the door of the house of the victim's parents, also her
relatives, armed with a gun. She inquired what he was doing there and he allegedly replied that he was waiting for the
victim. She then entered the premises to locate an old newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the
victim asleep. When she left, she saw the accused at the doorway. After disposing of her rice cake (which she gave to a
certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired at an interval of two or three seconds, emanating apparently from the
house, to which she shortly rushed. She allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the second floor, brandishing
his rifle. 4
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported the matter to the police.
Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao resident, also heard two gunshots ring that
afternoon. He said that he was three meters from the house where the gunshot sounds seemed to have originated. He
allegedly proceeded there but was met by the accused at the steps. They allegedly grappled for possession of the rifle,
which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of gunpowder. He was able to wrest possession, after which, the accused
allegedly ran away and fled to Pogon, also in Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been shot and that he died
at Lubuagan Hospital. 6
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots. She made
inquiries subsequently and was informed that the victim was her husband. She claimed that she saw the accused
standing at the entrance of her parents- in-law's house prior thereto. 7
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the shots. He then went to the
victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out from. He did not allegedly have in mind that somebody had
actually been fired upon but thought that may be there had been a burglary. He ascended the steps of the house where
42

the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered the second floor. He saw the victim lying in his
room, whom he initially believed to be merely sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead. 8
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and Artemio Dalsen the victim's brother,
who sought to establish a motive for the killing of the victim, a motive they imputed to the accused. Valera testified that
revenge was supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the accused and victim were members), which,
however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently, intervention and mediation by community elders. 9
Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the accused had nursed along- standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of
delaying on alleged award for the construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two witnesses, the accused himself and
Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful afternoon when he too heard two
gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to investigate the matter. He said
that he went to the direction where the shots came from and was on his way to the entrance of the house when Yulo
Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed the firearm he was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that
time that the victim had been shot and allegedly learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran away but
allegedly because he had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose
corroborated his statement. 11
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness who testified to having seen the
accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the circumstances pointed to him as the perpetrator of the crime." 12
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and Beatrice Candao as well as the
accused himself, who admitted having been at the scene of the crime. Obviously, the judge did not lend credence to the
accused's defense.
The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating circumstantial evidence, second, in
appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his defense of alibi.
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion than that the
accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982. These
circumstances are as follows: (1) He was seen standing by the entrance of the house where the victim had sojourned,
armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were heard. Three witnesses saw him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and
Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments later, two shots rang out, one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok,
Dalsen and Nicolas Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw him
there, whom he wrestled for the possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant, who could have perpetrated the
offense.
The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to investigate the matter, and
armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too must reject this
defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he, Asbok should testify
falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled immediately thereafter. If he were truly innocent, he would not have
done so. We have held time and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14 As aptly put "The righteous is brave as a
lion, but the wicked man fleeth." 15
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to do with the killing and who had
meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an inquiry, it would have been he, the accused, to be the first to make a
report to the authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of justice. If the latter did try to prevent him from
performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have gone to lengths to implicate Asbok because that too was his duty.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, notably Asbok who stated that he
was the first to be in the victim's house after the shooting (aside from the accused), in the face of Canao's testimony that
she also had been there. The Court is not convinced that an inconsistency exists. For obviously, Asbok had been
mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the accusedappellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any successful showing of a motive, the circumstantial
evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from treachery, evident
premeditation, and means employed to weaken the defense of the victim. As to treachery, jurisprudence is ample that
the manner of attack must be shown. While there are testimonies to the effect that the victim was "fast asleep", we can
not safely presume that he was still in that condition when the accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the
actual shooting, we can not justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is necessary to show:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution. 18 The prior
determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.

43

That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise missing in this case. As we said, there
was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us, that the
appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.
We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim was not shot in his house (his
parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the victim. 19 In that case, it was held:
La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia de los occisos, debe estimarse porque segun el
Tribunal Supremo de Espaa " no solo por el respeto que el domicilio ajeno merece, como especie de complements de
la personalidad, y por el que es debido al hogar de la familia, sino por el no menor de que es digna la residencia privada
de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de malicia que revela quien busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra
con la confianza y abandono propios del lugar elegido para el descanso y las intimidades de la vida: razon por la cual
habla el Codigo penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de morada en su acepcion real, que no es otra
que la del paraje en donde una persona hace estancia de asiento. ... a titulo de nuesped, o por otro cualquiera.itc-asl
(S. de 25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of another. Dwelling there was held to be
aggravating.
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling place must be owned by the
offended party. In another decision, People v. Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in the absence of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where he was killed. In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was
not likewise considered for the same reasons.
However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v. Galapia 24 and People v. Sto. Tomas.
25

"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to
human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect" 26 and that one who
slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends him elsewhere. However, one does not lose his
right of privacy where he is offended in the house of another because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered
by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief
moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short moment.
It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very parents. who raised him until he
could be on his own.
Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the accused-appellant responsible for
taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for simple homicide aggravated by dwelling. Under the Revised Penal
Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there being no mitigating circumstances and one
aggravating circumstance. 27
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The
grant of damages is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO PAREJA, JOSE TOLEDO and JOHN DOE, accused,
JOSE TOLEDO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It would be unnatural for the relatives of the victim who seek justice to commit an
injustice by imputing the crime to innocent persons and not those who were actually responsible therefor.Very telling is
the fact that appellant does not even discuss Emelita's testimony establishing his presence at the crime scene,
notwithstanding that it was Emelita whom he confronted and threatened and who pulled off his mask inside the
welllighted bedroom. Appellant was no stranger to the Jacob family; in fact, they were familiar with his build and his voice,
since he frequented their home when peddling fruit juices and homemade chocolates in Pawa. Considering these
circumstances, in the absence of proof that she had any bias or ill-motive against appellant, Emelita's sole identification
of appellant as one of the three intruders in the Jacob residence stands completely unscathed. Consequently, such
identification suffices to obtain conviction even in the absence of corroboration. Besides, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victim who seek justice to commit an injustice by imputing the crime to innocent persons and not those
who were actually responsi-ble therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Alleged inconsistency on a minor detail is insignificantrather than eroding the credibility of the
testimonies of witnesses, such difference in fact constitutes a sign of veracity.As regards the variance in the testimonies
of Emelita and her mother Amada concerning the type of weapon used by appellant in threatening the former, such
alleged inconsistency is insignificant as it refers only to a minor detail. Rather than eroding the credibility of their
testimonies, such difference in fact constitutes a sign of veracity. It is a well-recognized fact that witnesses testifying
about the same nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected to be correct in every detail nor consistent with other
witnesses in every aspect, considering the inevitability of differences in their perception, recollection, viewpoint or
impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional and psychological states at the time of reception and recall of
such impressions. After all, to begin with, no two individuals are alike in term of powers of observation and of recall. Total
recall or perfect symmetry is not required as long as witnesses concur on material points.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that people faced with danger usually become passive and submissive, it is equally
true that there are some people who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a frightening experience
different persons have different reactions to similar situations and man's behavior and reactions can never be
44

stereotyped.We are also unpersuaded by appellant's contention that it would have been well nigh impossible for
Emelita to have the courage to snatch the mask off his face when she was being held at gunpoint, and considering that
her husband did not even dare lift a finger. While it is true that people faced with danger usually become passive and
submissive, it is equally true that there are some people who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a
frightening experience. Different persons have different reactions to similar situations. Man's behavior and reactions can
never be stereotyped. In the same vein, it is not improbable or unusual for victims of or witnesses to crimes or startling
events to strive to recognize the culprits and observe the manner of commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Alibi; The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of defenses because it is easy to
fabricate but difficult to prove.As regards appellant's alibi, the Court has time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest
of defenses because it is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by witnesses. For the defense to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be strictly met:
It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime during its commission.
Same; Flight; There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of innocence.Moreover,
the mere fact that, according to his companions at the wake, appellant did not flee the crime scene, may not be deemed
as indicative of his innocence. There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of
innocence.
Same; Same; Witnesses; The task of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of the declarant's
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between
the true and the false.On the whole therefore, appellant's guilt hinges on the issue of credibility. This Court has
repeatedly said that the task of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of the declarant's
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between
the true and the false. The rule holds firmly especially where, as in this case, the appellant failed to show any fact of
substance which the trial court might have overlooked that, when considered, may affect the result of the case. No such
fact obtains in this case.
Same; Attempted Robbery with Homicide; The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something the culprits
had not taken into account) may not be considered as voluntary desistance from the commission of the crime so as to
remove the element of asportation from the complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide.It is beyond dispute
that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Robbery was the intended purpose of the intruders' trespass
into the residence of the Jacobs. Generoso Jacob's killing was on the occasion of a robbery which, however, was not
consummated. The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something the culprits had not taken into account)
may not be considered as voluntary desistance from the commission of the crime so as to remove the element of
asportation from the complex crime charged. Such failure to consummate the robbery was not caused solely by their own
volition and inabilities. It was likewise brought about by factors such as their unmasking and the arrival of neighbors who
responded to Emelita's shouts for help. These circumstances forced them to flee, leaving behind the objects.
Same; Same; Whenever homicide is committed on the occasion or as a consequence of robbery, all those who took part
as principals in the robbery shall be held guilty of the special complex crime of rob-bery with homicide although they did
not actually take part in the homicide, and the same principle applies even if the crime committed is attempted robbery
with homicide.Appellant is liable for attempted robbery with homicide even if he was not himself the author of the
killing of Generoso Jacob, for lack of evidence showing that he endeavored to prevent such slaying. Thus, the general rule
applies that whenever homicide is committed on the occasion or as a consequence of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery shall be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the homicide. The same principle applies even if the crime committed is attempted robbery with
homicide.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Nighttime; For noc-turnity to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it
must have been particularly sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the
crime or to ensure his immunity from capture, or otherwise to facilitate his getaway.The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime alleged in the Information was not conclusively proven. For nocturnity to be considered as such circumstance, it
must have been particularly sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the
crime or to ensure his immunity from capture, or otherwise to facilitate his getaway.
Same; Same; Same; Dwelling; Although dwelling (morada) is considered as inherent in crimes which can only be
committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as
aggravating in robbery with homicide because the author thereof could have accomplished the heinous deed of snuffing
out the victim's life without having to violate his domicile.Nonetheless, we find that the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling had been duly proven. Although dwelling (morada) is considered as inherent in crimes which can only be
committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as
45

aggravating in robbery with homicide because the author thereof could have accomplished the heinous deed of snuffing
out the victim's life without having to violate his domicile. Hence, in view of this aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposable upon appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. la conformity with prevailing jurisprudential law, indemnity for the
death of Generoso Jacob shall be increased to P50,000.00. [People vs. Pareja, 265 SCRA 429(1996)]
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
Senseless killing takes on an almost blase signification in the instant case, where the accused tried but failed to asport a
TV set and 'betamax' machine, and instead ended up killing a defenseless person. Attempted robbery with homicide,
committed in the name of a few mundane material goods. Unfortunately, this is no longer unusual or shocking nowadays,
as it seems that life has become cheap. And that's precisely what is so painfully tragic for all of us.
Together with Antonio Pareja and one John Doe, herein accused-appellant Jose Toledo was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, with the crime of attempted robbery with homicide in an Information 1 which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1986, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, being
then armed with a knife and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the house of HENEROSO (should be "Generoso") JACOB, by forcibly detaching the bamboo wall of the kitchen and
once inside, threatened the occupants thereof and demanded for the video machine trade mark "betacord", however
Sabina Jacob grabbed the cloth covering the face of accused Antonio Pareja which caused the latter to scamper away
together with the two other accused and on the occasion of said attempted robbery the accused Antonio Pareja, with
intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab (sic) said HENEROSO JACOB several times consequently inflicting
injuries which directly caused his death; thus said accused commencing the commission of the crime of Robbery directly
by overt acts and was (sic) not able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance. That there is present in the commission of the
offense the aggravating circumstance of night time.
CONTRARY TO LAW
At his arraignment on June 23, 1987, appellant Toledo pleaded not guilty to the charge. 2 His two co-accused have
remained at large.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The family of 54-year-old Generoso Jacob 3 resided in a one-bed-room house in Pawa, Legazpi City. At around 2:00 o'clock
in the morning of November 22, 1986, Generoso was asleep on a folding bed in the kitchen, three steps below the living
room where his wife Amada, and their children Shirley, Alberto, Marlene and Sabina were sleeping.
A
six-and-a-half
feet
high
partition
separated
the
living
room
from
the
2 x 3 meters bedroom which was lighted by a 50-watt bulb. Asleep in the bedroom, about four meters away from the
kitchen, were Generoso's daughter Emelita, her husband Romeo Ramirez, and their baby Marlon.
Kept in the said bedroom was a 14" Sanyo color TV which had been brought from Saudi Arabia by Generoso's son, Rafael.
In the living room was a 'betamax' with three components.
The family was roused from sleep by shouts of "Gising kayo, huwag sumigaw!" Three masked intruders had gained entry
into the house. Amada saw one of them asking Sabina for the betamax. The same fellow tried to lift and carry off the
machine but it proved to be too heavy for him. Almost without thought, Sabina snatched off his mask and recognized him
to be Antonio Pareja, who used to frequent their house and take lunch at Emelita's store, as he was even one of Emelita's
gangmates. 4 The latter tried to stab Sabina but she evaded the thrust and swiftly jumped out the window. 5
Emelita was awakened by her father's cries of "tabangi ako nindo" ('please help me'). Instinctively, Emelita also screamed
for help from their neighbors, but one of the robbers poked a white-and-gold colored gun at her "sentido" (temple), and
neither she nor her husband could lift a finger. The gunwielder's face was covered by a t-shirt, except for his nose.
Incidentally, Emelita recognized the T-shirt to be hers, which she had left hanging on the clothesline outside the house.
The man uttered, "Huwag kayong sisigaw kung ayaw ninyong mamatay, nasaan yung TV?" When she answered, "diyan,"
the man tried to lift the television set. Failing to do so, he called out, " Ger, tulungan mo ako." But no one responded to his
call. While he was thus distracted, Emelita grabbed at the T-shirt and unmasked him, thus recognizing him to be herein
appellant Toledo. She thus confirmed her earlier suspicion about his identity based on his body build and voice. 6 As the
neighbors were starting to respond to her cries for help, the trio fled empty-handed.
Hearing her husband's moans, Amada went to the kitchen, where she saw Generoso lying in a pool of blood on the
cemented floor. She embraced him but be merely looked at her, tried to open his mouth and expired. 7 He had bled
profusely from the wound on his chest.
Generoso was autopsied at the Funeraria Oro by Dr. Cesar Chua of the Albay Provincial Hospital, who found that the
victim sustained a 2-cm. penetrating stab wound at the level of the nipple, left parasternal line; a 2-cm. incised wound at
the pulmonary arterial trunk; another 1 cm. incised wound at the outlet of the right ventricle, and hemoperitoneum. 8 Dr.
Chua opined that Generoso's wounds could have been caused by only one sharp, pointed and long instrument. 9
A police photographer took pictures of the damaged bamboo portion of the kitchen used for drying dishes, 10 which the
robbers detached in order to gain entry into the house.
The Defense's Version
In his own defense, appellant interposed alibi. He swore that in the "evening of November 22, 1986," he attended the
wake of Nerry Armario in Bogtong, Legazpi City, and he stayed there until "past 3:00 o'clock early morning of the
following day." 11 Santos Armario testified that his wife Nerry died on November 22, 1986 and that at around 9:00 o'clock
that evening, appellant arrived at his house where he stayed until "early morning of November 23, 1986." 12 Armando
46

Armario and Eduardo Armario both testified that appellant arrived for the wake "more or less nine in the evening of the
same day." 13
The defense also presented the victim's daughter Sabina as their witness. She swore that of the three robbers, she was
able to recognize only Antonio Pareja. She failed to see the other two culprits because one was in the bedroom and the
other was in the kitchen while she was in the sala being held at knifepoint by Antonio Pareja. She affirmed that Pareja
indeed had two companions during that incident.
The Trial Court's Ruling
On March 6, 1989, the trial court 14 rendered its Decision 15 holding that appellant's denial and alibi could not prevail over
the positive identification by Emelita of appellant himself and Antonio Pareja as the malefactors, adding that there was no
reason at all for Emelita to unjustly and falsely finger appellant as one of the culprits. The court a quo opined that,
although it may have been true that appellant did attend the wake in Bogtong, it was however not impossible for him to
have left the wake with two companions to commit the crime in nearby Pawa. While pointing out that it was Antonio
Pareja "who was responsible for inflicting the fatal injuries" upon the victim, the trial court ruled that appellant "should
likewise be held equally liable" for the death. It thus disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, accused Jose Toledo is hereby
convicted of the offense charged, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law
and to pay the costs. Accused Jose Toledo is moreover ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Heneroso Jacob in the
amount of P30,000.00.
Accused Jose Toledo, who has been under detention since April 29, 1987, is given full credit for his preventive
imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Errors Assigned
In this appeal, appellant assigned the following errors:
The trial court erred in holding that there was a clear and positive identification of Jose Toledo by the prosecution
witnesses as one of the authors of the crime.
The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant Jose Taledo reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that prosecution witness Amada Jacob failed to place him at the scene of the crime on account of her
admission to the police that she could not identify the two companions of Antonio Pareja. Neither could she have seen
appellant inside the bedroom where he was supposed to have threatened Emelita, because of the partition between the
bedroom and the living room. Moreover, appellant highlights that variance in the testimonies of Emelita and her mother
regarding the weapon used by appellant in threatening the former, with Emelita swearing that it was a knife and Amada
affirming that it was a gun. Appellant also claims that it was highly unlikely that Emelita would have the courage to
suddenly remove the mask from his face, on account of the gun pointed at her head, and considering that her husband
could not even do anything under the circumstances. Lastly, appellant emphasizes the fact that Sabina, one of the
victim's daughters, failed to identify the other assailants apart from Antonio Pareja.
The Court's Ruling
Positive Identification
Very telling is the fact that appellant does not even discuss Emelita's testimony establishing his presence at the crime
scene, notwithstanding that it was Emelita whom he confronted and threatened and who pulled off his mask inside the
well-lighted bedroom. Appellant was no stranger to the Jacob family; in fact, they were familiar with his build and his
voice, since he frequented their home when peddling fruit juices and homemade chocolates in Pawa. 16 Considering these
circumstances, in the absence of proof that she had any bias or ill-motive against appellant, Emelita's sole identification
of appellant as one of the three intruders in the Jacob residence stands completely unscathed. Consequently, such
identification suffices to obtain conviction even in the absence of corroboration. 17 Besides, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victim who seek justice to commit an injustice by imputing the crime to innocent persons and not those
who were actually responsible therefor. 18
As regards the variance in the testimonies of Emelita and her mother Amada concerning the type of weapon used by
appellant in threatening the former, such alleged inconsistency is insignificant as it refers only to a minor detail. Rather
than eroding the credibility of their testimonies, such difference in fact constitutes a sign of veracity. 19 It is a wellrecognized fact that witnesses testifying about the same nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected to be correct in
every detail nor consistent with other witnesses in every aspect, considering the inevitability of differences in their
perception, recollection, viewpoint or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional and psychological states
at the time of reception and recall of such impressions. After all, to begin with, no two individuals are alike in term of
powers of observation and of recall. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required as long as witnesses concur on
material points. 20
We are also unpersuaded by appellant's contention that it would have been well nigh impossible for Emelita to have the
courage to snatch the mask off his face when she was being held at gunpoint, and considering that her husband did not
even dare lift a finger. While it is true that people faced with danger usually become passive and submissive, it is equally
true that there are some people who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a frightening experience.
Different persons have different reactions to similar situations. Man's behavior and reactions can never be stereotyped. 21
In the same vein, it is not improbable or unusual for victims of or witnesses to crimes or startling events to strive to
recognize the culprits and observe the manner of commission of the crime. 22
Appellant also relies on the testimony of Sabina Jacob that she could not identify the two associates of Antonio Pareja.
This contention cannot be taken seriously. A careful reading of Sabina's testimony shows why she was able to identify
only Antonio Pareja she focused her full attention on him as he was the one with her in the living room. 23 Moreover, her
statement that she was not able to identify the other two intruders one of whom was in the bedroom and the other in
the kitchen in no way implied that he (Jose Toledo) was not among the three malefactors.
47

Alibi
As regards appellant's alibi, the Court has time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of defenses because it is easy to
fabricate but difficult to prove. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses. For the
defense to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be strictly met: It is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission. 24
In the case before us, such physical impossibility had not been proven, and in fact, quite the opposite was shown.
According to Fiscal Fidel Sarmiento, the distance between Pawa and Botong, which are adjacent barangays, could be
negotiated in ten to twenty minutes by crossing the river; and appellant admitted that in travelling between Bogtong and
Pawa to peddle his wares, he would usually cross the river instead of passing through San Joaquin. 25 Even the
corroborative testimonies of appellant's drinking partners at the wake 26 are rendered valueless on account of the ease of
going back and forth between the two barangays, as well as in light of appellant's positive identification by prosecution
witnesses as one of the interlopers in the Jacob abode.
Non-Flight?
Moreover, the mere fact that, according to his companions at the wake, appellant did not flee the crime scene, may not
be deemed as indicative of his innocence. 27 There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive
proof of innocence. 28
Credibility of Witnesses
On the whole therefore, appellant's guilt hinges on the issue of credibility. This Court has repeatedly said that the task of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who,
unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. The rule holds
firmly especially where, as in this case, the appellant failed to show any fact of substance which the trial court might have
overlooked that, when considered, may affect the result of the case. 29 No such fact obtains in this case.
It is beyond dispute that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Robbery was the intended purpose of
the intruders' trespass into the residence of the Jacobs. Generoso Jacob's killing was on the occasion of a robbery which,
however, was not consummated.
The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something the culprits had not taken into account) may not be
considered as voluntary desistance from the commission of the crime so as to remove the element of asportation from
the complex crime charged. Such failure to consummate the robbery was not caused solely by their own volition and
inabilities. It was likewise brought about by factors such as their unmasking and the arrival of neighbors who responded
to Emelita's shouts for help. These circumstances forced them to flee, leaving behind the objects.
Appellant is liable for attempted robbery with homicide even if he was not himself the author of the killing of Generoso
Jacob, for lack of evidence showing that he endeavored to prevent such slaying. Thus, the general rule applies that
whenever homicide is committed on the occasion or as a consequence of robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery shall be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take
part in the homicide. 30 The same principle applies even if the crime committed is attempted robbery with homicide. 31
Pursuant to Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime charged and proven in this case carries the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty."
Said penalty is imposable in this case, there being no ground to apply the exception mentioned in the article.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime alleged in the Information was not conclusively proven. For nocturnity to be
considered as such circumstance, it must have been particularly sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him to
facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from capture, 32 or otherwise to facilitate his getaway.
Nonetheless, we find that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling had been duly proven. Although dwelling ( morada) is
considered as inherent in crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as tresspass to dwelling
and robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as aggravating in robbery with homicide because the author thereof
could have accomplished the heinous deed of snuffing out the victim's life without having to violate his domicile. 33 Hence,
in view of this aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposable upon appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. 34 In
conformity with prevailing jurisprudential law, 35 indemnity for the death of Generoso Jacob shall be increased to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision finding appellant Jose Toledo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that he shall indemnify the heirs of
Generoso Jacob in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation which are
herewith instructed to effect with dispatch the arrest of Antonio Pareja in order that he too may stand trial for the crime
charged and duly proven here.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROQUE CABRESOS, accused-appellant. [People vs.
Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362(1995)]
Roque Cabresos was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 26 of Medina, Misamis
Oriental, in an information which alleged:
That on or about 29th day of June 1988 at about 2:00 early dawn, more or less, at Sitio Upper Anoling, Barangay
Kabulakan, Municipality of Balingoan, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
48

force and intimidation and with the use of a knife, have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Editha Pesidas,
against her will and without her consent.
The crime was committed with the attendance of aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness as accused was accommodated to live with the complainant's family.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 14, paragraph 4, all of the Revised Penal
Code. 1
At arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced in a decision rendered in
November 19, 1992. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Roque Cabresos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with the use of deadly weapon as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with aggravating
circumstances of abuse of confidence, obvious ungratefulness, blood relationship and with the use of deadly weapon;
and, thereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment under reclusion perpetua or thirty (30) years imprisonment, with
full credit of the entire period of his detention from February 17, 1989 to the present or finality of this judgment. Accused
Roque C. Cabresos is hereby declared as the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas and he is ordered to recognize and
support said child in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code.
Accused Roque Cabresos is likewise ordered to pay Editha Pesidas the sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and
P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs. 2
Roque Cabresos appeals from his conviction assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness which is highly incredible,
inconsistent and unreliable.
II
The trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the defense interposed by accused-appellant.
III
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. 3
The trial court found that the evidence of the prosecution showed the relevant facts to be the following:
Complainant Editha Pesidas testified that she is 18 years old (at the time she testified), but she was 16 years old when
she was raped by accused. She is single, housekeeper and a resident of Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental and has
studied up to second year high school. She personally knows the accused Roque Cabresos whom she considers as her
uncle because he is a cousin of her mother. She identified the accused in the courtroom by touching his shoulder.
Editha Pesidas declared that last June 28, and June 29, 1988, her mother and father were in Talisayan District Hospital.
She was left in the house together with her brother and sister, who are 12 and 10 years old respectively. She slept alone
in her room, while her brother and sister slept in the adjoining room. Roque Cabresos lived with them and in that
particular night of June 29, 1988, Roque Cabresos slept in the sala. Then, at dawn, which was 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
more or less, already June 29, 1988, she was awakened by accused Roque Cabresos who pointed a sharp pointed knife to
her neck, squeezed her mouth and boxed her abdomen that she lost her strength.
There and then, Roque Cabresos took off her panty by tearing it. Then, accused placed himself on top of her and made a
push and pull movement (kiyo-kiyo). Accused inserted his penis to her vagina that she felt severe pain which lasted about
half an hour. The left hand of accused was holding the knife and was always pointing to her neck. She struggled, but
accused is bigger and stronger that she lost her strength. Ultimately, accused succeeded in raping her. Something sticky
came out from his penis; thereafter, Roque Cabresos threatened her; that, she would be killed if she would tell her
parents. He uttered this threat about five (5) times. Then, Roque Cabresos left her room and returned to sleep in the sala.
After three days from the commission of the crime, her parents returned home from the hospital. She did not tell them
about what happened because Roque Cabresos threatened to kill her.
Complainant testified that at the time accused raped her, she was fertile. In the succeeding months, she did not have
monthly menstruation. When her pregnancy was noticeable, her parents inquired about it, and she told them the truth.
She told also her grandfather Eufrocino Quejada some time last February 1989. She was accompanied to the house of a
midwife for examination. Thereafter, accompanied by her parents and grandfather, they went to the police station of
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, and there, her affidavit was taken on February 14, 1989 which she subscribed on the
following day before the prosecutor. 4
Appellant Cabresos' version of the facts was summarized by the trial court as follows:
On June 28, 1988 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused appellant was at the house of Mr. Trapal in Upper Lapinig,
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental together with his companions, namely: Anastacio Cabresos alias "Baloloy", Eddie Aragon,
Rene Magallon, Dobby Magallon and Oloy Cabresos drinking one pocket size of Tanduay rhum. While they were drinking,
they were conversing about their works, especially the gathering of coconuts. After staying there for an hour, they
proceeded to the municipal building of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. In the said store, they again drank one pocket size of
Tanduay rhum. From the store of Beboy Pebular, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, they went to the
house of Alding Itom. At Alding Itom's house, they butchered a dog, cooked the meat and ate the same as their
sumsuman. After eating, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day they proceeded to the house of his uncle
Anastacio Cabresos. When they were already at the house of his uncle, they once more drank another one pocket size of
Tanduay rhum. The accused went to sleep at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of the same date at the latter's house
and woke up at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. That was June 29, 1988. 5
We are once again faced with the task of deciding who as between two (2) persons is worthy of belief and who is not.
Private complainant Editha Pesidas claims that she was raped by the accused. The accused denies the accusation and
interposes the defense of alibi contending that he could not have committed the rape because he was somewhere else at
49

the time the alleged rape occurred. In support of his claim, Cabresos presented witnesses who vouched that he was with
them on the night and hour in question, carousing on cheap rum and on dog-meat with great abandon.
After much consideration and upon careful examination of the record, we find no reason to overturn the findings of the
trial court.
The issue to be resolved is, of course, whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of the
complainant the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
We answer in the affirmative.
The question is essentially one of credibility and it is a well-settled rule reiterated in a long and still growing line of cases,
that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter are in a better position
to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless it is convincingly shown that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 6
In his appeal, appellant highlights certain points in complainant's testimony which he contends constitute inconsistencies
or improbabilities which weaken the force of her accusation. However, going over those same points we come to a
different conclusion.
On the night of the rape, the victim's parents were not at home. They were at a hospital in Talisayan where the victim's
mother had to be brought 7 and they returned from the hospital only three (3) days later. 8 Complainant positively
identified the accused as her assailant. There was a kerosene vigil lamp in the altar which illuminated her bedroom. 9
Moreover, as found by the trial court, she was familiar (with) the persona of the accused being a relative who resided in
their house. 10
Complainant was only able to cry out for help once because the accused threatened her with a knife which he pointed at
her neck; 11 he also squeezed her mouth and boxed her stomach, as a result of which her strength and vitality fled her. 12
The fact that her young brother (12 years of age) and sister (10 years old) who were sleeping in an adjoining room did not
hear her outcry does not necessarily mean that the rape never occurred.
Appellant stresses the fact that after the alleged rape, the complainant testified that she continued going to school and
not once did she report the incident to her parents or the police although she passed by the police station everyday on
her way to school. 13 Furthermore, the complainant did not report the outrage on her person to a relative of hers who is a
policewoman. 14
We have previously held in earlier cases that delay in prosecuting the rape is not an indication of fabricated charges. 15 In
at least one case, we observed that "if the complainant did not become pregnant, she probably would never have
revealed that she was raped by her uncle. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against their
rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the rapists' making
good their threats to kill or hurt their victims." 16 This in fact was what happened here where the victim reported the
incident to her parents only eight (8) months after she had been raped when her pregnancy became noticeable. Similarly,
in the case of People v. Soterol, 17 where the appellant had contended that complainant's 6-month delay in filing the
complaint and her silence after the alleged rape render her charge incredible, we ruled that the complainant's failure to
report the rape incident earlier had been fully and satisfactorily explained. There, the complainant testified that she did
not report the incident immediately because she believed her uncle's threat to kill her.
Editha's inaction for eight (8) months was sufficiently explained by her in open court. Thus:
(Direct Examination of Editha Pesidas)
Q: And when your father arrived in your house, did he know about the incident?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: I did not say anything because I was afraid of the warning of Roque Cabresos.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was the warning or threat of the accused during the incident?
A: He said that if I tell my parents he would kill me.
Q: How many times did he utter these words?
A: Five times. 18
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of Editha Pesidas)
Q: When Roque Cabresos left your house, and your parents (were) already there, of course, your fear no longer existed
because your parents were already there?
A: I was still afraid of him.
xxx xxx xxx
A: I was still afraid for he might come back. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did it not occur to your mind to tell your parents that you were already pregnant?
A: No, because of fear and shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your parents would eventually discover you were pregnant and it was better to tell
them earlier so that if there is a person answerable for that they would run after him?
A: No, because of my fear.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your fear of being discovered will be useless because eventually your parents will
discover it?
A: No, because of my fear and shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your mind your shame will be useless because eventually your parents will know of your pregnancy?
A: No.
50

Q: Why?
A: Because of my fear. 20
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
While a mature woman would probably have acted differently, we are unable to conclude that Editha's continued fear of
her violator and her failure to inform her parents of the rape meant that it had not occurred at all.
Appellant Cabresos also assails the findings of the trial court concerning the delayed delivery of the child as not
supported by evidence. The trial court found that the complainant Editha Pesidas "gave birth within 300 days or 10
months allowable in medical science from conception or fertilization, implantation, gestation and to birth of the child," 21
as a result of the sexual assault inflicted upon her by appellant. The trial court said on this point:
. . . this court has taken note of the testimony of Editha Pesidas; that the onset of her monthly menstruation was June 9,
1988 and ended after five days. So, it must be June 14, 1988. Medical science has shown that from the first day of
menstruation, the first ten days thereafter is considered a safe period, meaning the woman is not fertile. This corresponds
to June 10 to 19, 1988. Then, the period from the 11th day to 20th day from the first day of menstruation is fertility period
where the ovum in matured and any time may be fertilized by a sperm. In the case of Editha Pesidas, [the] fertility period
corresponds from June 20 to June 29, 1988, that is why, Editha Pesidas said that from the day she was raped, she did not
have any monthly menstruation thereafter, except a little blood spotting on July 20, 1988.
Medical science has taught us the basics of fertilization, conception, gestation and delivery of a child. First, the basics: a
baby is formed when the sperm cell from the man meets (or fertilizes) the woman's egg or ovum. An ovum, which is
released by the woman's ovary only once in about 28 days, has a maximum life of 24 to 72 hours (3 days only). The
sperm cell, on the other hand, may live for up to 6 days under very hospitable conditions, but usually lives for only about
24 hours. When the ovum is not fertilized, it dies, and the absence of fertilization is normally indicated by the arrival of
menstruation. On the other hand when the ovum is fertilized, it attaches itself on the inner wall of the womb. This is
sometimes known as implantation of fertilized ovum. The inner wall does not shed off, so menstruation does not occur
during the entire period of pregnancy.
Somewhere in July 20, 1988 is the attachment of the fertilized ovum in the womb of Editha Pesidas. It is the date of the
implantation of said fertilized ovum. That is why on said date, she had little blood spotting which is not considered as
menstruation. Counting therefrom, the birth of Anthea Q. Pesidas on May 1, 1988, the child's coming to this world was
within the 300 days or ten months, allowable in medical science from conception or fertilization, plantation, gestation,
and to birth of the child. 22
In computing the duration of pregnancy, "we should note that time is computed from the date of three different
occurrences in the life of the mother: one is the first day of the last menstrual period, one is the time of intercourse, and
one is the time of the fertilization of the ovum . . . . . " 23 We find that the trial judge's computation in this case of the
duration of complainant's pregnancy counted from the time of the fertilization of the ovum, is medically accepted and
recognized.
Moreover, from complainant's testimony, the uncontroverted fact is that the complainant gave birth to a baby girl 307
days or 10 months after the date of her alleged rape. While the ordinary period of gestation is approximately 9 calendar
months or 280 days, calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period, 24 there is nevertheless an abundance of
medical authorities recording exceptions to this general rule. 25 In fact, it has been held that length of pregnancy varies
from 220 to 330 days from date of fruitful coitus. 26 Thus, the 280-day rule is not a hard and fast one. 27
On the other hand, as against the complainant's positive identification, the accused-appellant offers the defense of alibi.
However, we have many times held that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the complainant's positive and
clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 28 Moreover, the defense of alibi in this case must be
rejected because aside from a clear and positive identification made by the complainant, the possibility of the accused
having gone to the scene of the crime at the time of its commission was not at all remote. Note the following statements
of defense witnesses:
(Cross-examination of Rene Magallon)
Q: And this place of Balodoy to Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental is how many kilometers, according to your own
estimate?
A: Three kilometers.
Q: And ordinarily hiking we can negotiate three kilometers in less than one hour?
A: Yes, sir. 29
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
Q: A healthy person like the accused can reach Barangay Kabulakan which is three kilometers only one hour because he
is healthy?
A: Of course, if he is healthy.
Q: Or maybe less than an hour?
A: Depending upon his speed in walking. 30
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of accused Roque Cabresos)
Q: Anastacio Cabresos alias Baludo is living in what place?
A: At Upper Lapinig.
Q: What is the distance from Upper Lapinig to Kabulakan, particularly the place of Pesidas?
A: Three kilometer, more or less.
Q: By ordinary hiking you can negotiate three kilometers with an hour hike?
A: It depends how you walk.
51

Q: But natural walking?

A: More than an hour, more or less. 31
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mean, by ordinary hike, you can negotiate one kilometer by one hour?
A: Less than (an) hour.
Q: Even in thirty minutes?
A: Yes sir. 32
xxx xxx xxx
The settled rule is that, for alibi to be given credence, "an accused must not only prove satisfactorily that he was at
another place at the time the crime happened; but more importantly, that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." 33
Of equal significance is the fact that the accused had the opportunity to commit the crime considering that none of his
witnesses actually saw him at the hour in question because they were all already asleep at that time.
(Direct Examination of Rene Magallon)
Q: What time did Roque Cabresos go to sleep on June 29, 1988?
A: 1:20 in the morning
Q: About you, what time did you go to sleep?
A: 2:00 o'clock. 34
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
Q: So that at 9:00 o'clock you were already lying down and at 10:00 o'clock you were already sound asleep?
A: About that hour.
Q: And you woke up the next morning at about 4:40?
A: 4:30 dawn.
Q: And the accused who was sleeping in your house was not sleeping with you in the same room that night?
A: He slept in another room.
Q: So that you cannot determine if Roque Cabresos was still in his room because you could not see him?
A: My house has three rooms and the room where they were sleeping I could pass by it.
Q: But you had no time to pass by the room where they were sleeping because you were sleeping at that time?
A: I woke up at 4:30.
Q: It was only at 4:30 when you passed by the room where the accused (was) sleeping?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At 12:00 midnight you did not wake up?
A: No, sir
Q: You did not wake up at 1:00 o'clock?
A: I woke up to urinate in my bedpan.
Q: At 2:00 o'clock did you wake up?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was only 4:30 when you woke up again?
A: Yes, sir. 35
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Although we affirm the findings of the lower court with regard to the guilt of the accused and its appreciation of the
aggravating circumstances of use of a deadly weapon, 36 abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, 37 we must
take exception to its appreciation of blood relationship as an aggravating circumstance in this case. We have held in
earlier cases 38 that the relationship between uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned in
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, the penalty imposed by the trial court need not be disturbed
considering the presence of other aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Roque Cabresos guilty of rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and declaring him as the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas, ordering him to recognize and support
said child, is hereby AFFIRMED. The award to the complainant of civil indemnity in the total amount of P50,000.00
(P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) is likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMNINO G. GREFIEL, accused-appellant.
Same; Same; Same; Under the circumstances, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary
complainants submission to the criminal acts of the accused-appellant.It is therefore clear that there existed a
continuing intimidation which produced reasonable fear on the latters part. Under such circumstances, the failure to
shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary complainants submission to the criminal acts of the accusedappellant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When force is an element of rape, it need not be irresistible.It is a well established doctrine
that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view. Otherwise stated, when force is an element of rape, it need not be
irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was
52

more or less irresistible is beside the point. So it must likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the
victim and is therefore subjective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore
enough that it produces fearfear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something
would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol. And where such
intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it
would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If
resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean
consent to the assault as to make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary. [People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA
596(1992)]
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused appeals from the Decision 1 of Branch 3 (Guiuan) of the Regional Trial Court of Eastern Samar in Criminal Case
No. 801, promulgated on 31 October 1985, finding him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and
sentencing him to suffer:
. . . the undivisible (sic) penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the offended party, Marcela R. Torlao, the sum of
P20,000.00 with the accessories of the law and to pay the costs.
The conviction is based on the evidence adduced by the prosecution through its witnesses the complainant Marcela
Torlao, Patrolman Estanislao Gamalo, Barangay Captain Pamfilo Inciso, Station Commander Francisco Gavan, Dr. Catalina
Camenforte, Judge Enrique Garado which is faithfully summarized in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
It was about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of September 19, 1982. Victim Marcela Torlao, her husband and their four
children were sound asleep in their house located at Sitio Bagacay, Lawa-an, Eastern Samar when they were awakened
by the sound of their front door breaking. An intruder, later identified as accused-appellant Domino Grefiel, suddenly
entered the family's bedroom and beamed a flashlight on their faces shouting, "Walang kikilos ng masama, sapagkat
ako'y mayor ng sundalo."
Accused-appellant then grabbed Marcela Torlao's right hand and pulled her up. Seeing this, Marcela's husband made a
move to stand up but was prevented by accused-appellant who stepped on his shoulder. The Torlao children, who were
awakened by the commotion, cried in fear.
Accused-appellant dragged Marcela outside the house saying, "Walang titingin-tingin". Adding, (sic) "mga kasama pag
mayroon bumaba, barilin ninyo at paikutin ninyo ang bahay".
Marcela asked accused-appellant where he was taking her and what he planned to do with her. Accused-appellant
answered, "Wag ka nang maingay dahil sandali lang, babalik kaagad sa inyo".
While dragging Marcela towards the direction of the Lawa-an Elementary School, accused-appellant inserted his hand
inside the former's blouse and fondled her breast. When they reached the school, accused-appellant brought Marcela to
the farthest room of the Marcos-type building on the right nearest the stage.
There, Marcela was ordered by accused-appellant to sit on a table. He then proceeded to undress Marcela who stood
unmoving rooted by fear. Accused-appellant first took off Marcela's blouse then her skirt which had a garter top and her
shorts.
When the victim was naked, accused-appellant quickly removed his own clothes. He then spread out a table cover on the
floor before taking hold of Marcela's waist and pulling her down to lie face up on the cemented floor.
Marcela, who was then four months pregnant, pleaded to (sic) accused-appellant, "Please don't do it, I am pregnant,
please be merciful". To which accused-appellant answered, "Putang ina, if you do not allow me to have intercourse with
you, I will kill you."
Unmoved by the pleas of the crying victim, accused-appellant continued kissing Marcela's face and sucking on her nipples
while he performed coitus with her.
Not satisfied with his bestial act, accused-appellant then ordered Marcela to lie face down on the floor pushed her knees
to the floor, raised her buttocks and performed anal intercourse with the victim. Marcela, who was at that point already
weak with fear and extreme pain, could not do anything but follow accused-appellant's orders.
Still unsatisfied, accused-appellant lay down on the floor face up and ordered Marcela to suck his penis. Mercifully, sleep
overtook the drunken perpetrator before he could force the victim to perform fellatio on him.
Gathering her strength, Marcela put on her clothes and crept out of the room. She went straight to the residence of
Barangay Chairman Pamfilo Inciso where she reported the incident. Inciso left the victim with his wife to let her sleep. He,
in turn, reported the incident to the local Station Commander of the Integrated National Police, Corporal Francisco Gavan.
At daybreak, Inciso, Cpl. Gavan and Pfc. Estanislao Gamalo, together with the victim, went to the Lawa-an Elementary
School. There, Inciso and Gavan found accused-appellant stark naked still asleep with the table cloth partially covering his
body. Beside him were his clothes and a pisaw (small sharp pointed bolo).
Inciso and Gavan roused accused-appellant and brought him to the municipal building for investigation. Incidentally, Cpl.
Gavan prepared a sketch of both the schoolroom and the Torlao's residence with its broken front door.
About 10:00 o'clock of the same day, victim Marcela Torlao submitted herself to a medical examination conducted by Dra.
Catalina Monasterio-Camenforte, a resident physician of the Balangiga Emergency Hospital, who subsequently, prepared
a "Living Case Report". (Exhibit "D" and series).
Barely a month later, Marcela Torlao suffered a miscarriage. 2
In her Living Case Report, 3 Dr. Camenforte made the following entries:
53

INTERNAL EXAMINATION FINDINGS:

Public (sic) hair fairly grown and scanty. Labia Majora & Minora are no longer well coapted. Hymenal opening originally
linear in shape is with an (sic) old complete lacerations at 7:00 o'clock & 3:00 o'clock in the face of the clock. Hymenal
opening admits 2 fingers easily with no resistance. Vaginal rugosities are not appreciated. Vaginal canal is lax.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No signs of traumas has (sic) been noted on external & internal examination.
2. Findings in microscopic Seminal Examination = three (3) Immobile sperms were seen, (probably dead).
3. Physical virginity already lost.
In the morning of the following day, 20 September 1982, the sworn statements of Marcela and her husband, Bienvenido
Torlao, 4 were taken by Pfc. Patricio Abe, Jr. at the office of the sub-station commander of the INP of
Lawa-an, Eastern Samar. The same were, however, sworn to before Municipal Circuit Judge Enrique Garado on 29
September 1982.
Also on 20 September 1982, a criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape against the accused-appellant was
signed by Marcela; this was sworn to before Judge Garado only on 29 September 1982 upon its filing with the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of Balangiga-Lawa-an, Eastern Samar. The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 580. 5
Judge Garado immediately conducted a preliminary examination and then issued a warrant for the arrest of accusedappellant. 6 The latter was arrested on the same date. 7 On 9 October 1982, the accused files a Waiver of the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. 8 The Circuit Court thereupon elevated the case to the then Court of First Instance
of Guiuan, Eastern Samar.
On 12 November 1982, Acting 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Roberto A. Navidad filed with the Court of First Instance at
Guiuan, Eastern Samar, an Information charging the accused-appellant with the crime of forcible abduction with rape. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 801. On 6 December 1982, Fiscal Navidad filed an Amended Information with the
following accusatory portion:
That on or about the 19th day of September, 1982 at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Lawa-an, Province
of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a
deadly weapon and pretending to be a soldier and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats did, then and
there, with lewd and unchaste designs, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away Marcela R. Torlao, from her
house to the school building of Lawa-an Central School, Lawa-an, Eastern Samar, against her will and once said accused
was in possession of the said Marcela R. Torlao by means of force violence, intimidation and threats, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had (sic) carnal knowledge with said Marcela R. Torlao against her will and without her
consent.
Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and craft. 9
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged at his arraignment on 7 December 1982. 10 Trial
subsequently ensued. After the prosecution presented its witnesses, counsel for the accused-appellant orally moved to be
allowed to file a demurrer to evidence. In its Order of 29 January 1985, the trial court granted the defense forty (40) days
from receipt thereof within which to file the demurrer. 11 On 12 April 1985, accused-appellant filed his "Memorandum on
Demurer (sic) to Evidence" 12 contending therein that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the crime of
rape by the quantum of evidence required by law considering that (a) there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, (b)
there was even a token resistance offered by the complainant and (c) the findings of Dr. Camenforte do not support a
conclusion that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the demurrer to evidence. 13 Subsequently, on 30 July 1985, the new counsel for
accused-appellant filed a motion to withdraw the demurrer to evidence 14 which the trial court granted on the same date.
15

Accused-appellant testified on his own behalf and presented no other witnesses. In his Appellant's Brief, he summarizes
his testimony in this wise:
The accused-appellant as the sole witness for the defense testified that he and Marcela Torlao had several sexual liaisons
by mutual consent for the past three months, even thought they were not sweethearts; that on the evening of September
18, 1982, while in attendance at the dance that was being held at the town plaza, Marcela Torlao extended an invitation
to the accused-appellant, through a child, to meet her at their usual rendezvous, at the Lawa-an Elementary School where
they proceeded to satisfy their animal passions.
Having left ahead of him, Marcela Torlao returned home only to discover that her husband had noticed her unusual arrival
at such a late hour. The husband, out of spite and in anger over their illicit liaison, insisted that Marcela Torlao lodge a
complaint against the accused-appellant for forcible abduction with rape. It was in light of the foregoing that Domnino
Grefiel, sound asleep from the liquor he consumed from the previous night and the sexual exertions, was roused by
officers of the law and detained at the municipal jail. 16
which We find to be supported by the transcripts of stenographic notes of his testimony.
The trial court refused to believe the accused-appellant's story which it describes as a fantastic fallacy. 17 It gave full
credit to the version of the complainant whom it described as being "undoubtedly virtuous and with a moral excellence
which cannot be trampled upon by a mere verbal intrusion of an unfounded and uncorroborated (sic) declarations (sic) of
the swain in the scene of the bench." 18
Finding the elements of the complex crime of forcible abduction 19 with rape 20 to exist, the trial court sentenced the
accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P20,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
The court a quo did not take into account the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and craft which are alleged in the
amended information because as to the first, "it was not especially sought for by the offender to facilitate" the
commission of the crime, and to the second, the pretense that the accused is a soldier "was not employed to give
entrance to the dwelling." 21
54

In this appeal, accused-appellant does not plead for his acquittal but merely asks this Court to modify the challenged
decision by finding him guilty only of forcible abduction. He thus submits this single assignment of error:
I
The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with rape when only
the crime of Forcible Abduction was established by the evidence. 22
and prays as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the decision of the court
a quo be modified finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of forcible abduction only and reducing his penalty
proportionately. 23
Having finally admitted committing the crime of forcible abduction, which he earlier vigorously denied up to the last
minute while in the witness box for according to him it was the complainant through a child-courier who arranged
their illicit tryst, accused-appellant reduced the difficult task of this Court to merely determining the merits of his
contention that he did not commit the crime of rape. As to this, he no less transilient. After dishing out his concocted
story of the alleged tryst and both his and the victim's mutual satisfaction of their sexual urges, he filed his Memorandum
24
which states, inter alia, that "there is a strong possibility that the complaining witness has no sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge of the accused on the date and time of the incident in question" 25 because the Living Case Report of Dr.
Camenforte discloses that only three (3) immobile sperms, which were probably dead, were seen during the microscopic
seminal examination moreover, on cross-examination, Dr. Camenforte admitted that it is possible that the sperms could
have belonged to the complainant's husband who had coitus with complainant days before the rape. In the face of the
accused's admission of sexual intercourse at the time and place proven by the prosecution, the suggested possibility and
malicious insinuation that the examined semen belonged to the complainant's husband is clearly preposterous. This, of
course, should not be taken against the accused-appellant for even if he had lied a thousand times, the weakness of his
defense or even the lack of it would not necessarily bring about his conviction. The fundamental law presumes him
innocent; 26 to overthrow this presumption, the prosecution must establish his guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 27
Thus, the crucial issue that crops up is whether or not the evidence for the prosecution has shown beyond reasonable
doubt that rape was committed by the accused-appellant. The latter's final stand is that per his version, complainant
submitted herself voluntarily to the sexual act; and even assuming that this theory is to be rejected, accused-appellant
claims that it is still clear that complainant failed to make manifest her vehement objection and tenacious resistance to
the intrusion against her honor and privacy, thereby negating the charge of the rape. He capitalizes on the failure of the
complainant to shout or put up a fight to defend her honor.
His arguments neither impress nor convince Us. The appeal must therefore fail.
By his admission that he forcibly abducted the victim which, by the way, was independently established by the evidence
for the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant unqualifiedly affirms the existence of the elements of
the crime of forcible abduction under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: the taking of a woman against her
will and with lewd designs. Indeed, the taking was against complainant's will because she was dragged out of her house
by means of force and intimidation. The abduction was not for any lawful or noble purpose; as he now frankly admits, it
was with lewd designs. The word "lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It signifies that
form of immorality which has a relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. 28 To carry out
his lewd designs, accused-appellant pretended to be a "mayor ng sundalo," thereby suggesting his possession of military
power and its concomitant instrument of violence a firearm. He suddenly grabbed complainant's right hand and pulled
her up; when her husband made a move to stand up, accused-appellant prevented the latter from doing so by stepping
on his shoulder. As the accused-appellant dragged his unwilling victim outside the house, he shouted the following
instructions: "mga kasama pag mayron bumaba, barilin ninyo at paikutin ninyo ang bahay," thereby impressing upon the
victim, her husband and anyone who may come to the rescue that he, a "mayor ng sundalo," had armed companions.
When the complainant pleaded that she be spared from the impending sexual assault because she was four (4) months
pregnant, he threatened to kill her. It is therefore clear that there existed a continuing intimidation which produced
reasonable fear on the latter's part. Under such circumstances, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not
make voluntary complainant's submission to the criminal acts of the accused-appellant. This Court further notes that the
intimidation was further compounded by the latter's deliberate choice of time and place the crime was committed at
the unholy hour of 2:00 o'clock in the morning and in an isolated place. This circumstances, taken together with the fact
that she had seen her husband stepped upon by accused-appellant, was still gripped by a well-founded fear that the
accused-appellant had armed companions and had just been threatened with death if she would not yield to his bestial
desires, certainly made her realize that a shout for help or a tenacious resistance would prove to be futile. It would be
demanding too much from an ordinary mortal placed under such a stressful psychological and emotional situation to
require that she shout or ward off the impending evil. We have said before that the workings of a human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout;
some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 29
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman through, inter
alia, the use of force and intimidation. It is well established doctrine that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary
that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary
that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view. 30 Otherwise
stated, when force is an element of rape, it need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about
the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. 31 So it must likewise be
for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
55

accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she
reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
32
And where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and
strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would
not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.
Such voluntariness on the part of the complainant could hardly be imagined given the circumstances obtaining in this
case. She was not only forcibly abducted from her humble home in the presence of her husband and children, she was
also forced to perform a perverse sexual act anal coitus. And had her assailant not fallen asleep, she would have also
been forced to perform fellatio on him. Despite the outrage and shame, she lost no time in reporting the incident to the
barangay captain. In less than twelve (12) hours from the commission of the crime, she narrated the sordid details of her
horrifying and harrowing experience in a statement given to the police authorities, submitted to a medical examination
and signed a criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape against the accused-appellant. Not only did these acts
demonstrate courage of the highest order, they also enhance the complainant's credibility. It has been repeatedly said by
this Court that when a woman admits that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed; if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 33
We have likewise ruled that a complainant would not make public the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of
public trial 34 and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she had not in fact been raped, 35 for no decent
Filipina would publicly admit that she had been raped unless it is the truth. 36 Considering the inbred modesty and
antipathy of a Filipina to the airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would
assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. 37
There is no doubt in Our minds that it is only the desire to bring the accused-appellant to justice and for him to answer for
his evil deeds which impelled the complainant to immediately report the crime, subject herself to a medical examination,
file the necessary complaint and undergo the troubles, inconvenience, scandal, embarrassment and humiliation of a
public trial. 38
There is, however, no evidence to show that the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon. A finding on this
point would ordinarily be crucial because a higher penalty reclusion perpetua to death is imposed under the third
paragraph of Article 335 if rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Of course, in view of Section 19(1), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. The trial court based its affirmative conclusion
as to the existence of a deadly weapon on the discovery of the "pisaw" near the accused-appellant who was sleeping at
the scene of the crime. The trial court thus stated:
The bolo, commonly known as the "Pisaw", (Exhibit "D"), as physical evidence and coming from the reliable source having
(sic) found by the Chief of Police at the side of the sleeping naked accused, undenied by him, surely was the deadly
instrument referred to by the complainant whom (sic) she had mistakenly believed to be a gun used during her forcible
abduction. 39
We have carefully and meticulously read the transcript of the stenographic notes of the complainant's testimony and note
that she never stated that she saw a pistol in the possession of the accused-appellant. She merely concluded that being
"the head of the soldier (sic)," he had a pistol. Thus:
FISCAL:
Q Now, on the way from your house to the School building, what was he doing to you aside from dragging you?
A I was being frightened, which (sic) I was made to understand that since he was the head of the soldier (sic), he has a
pistol. 40
The prosecution did not exert further efforts to elicit from her a statement that she did in fact see a pistol or any other
firearm in the accused-appellant's possession or at the place where the "pisaw" was actually recovered. In short, there is
absolutely no proof that accused-appellant used the "pisaw" to commit the crime of rape of facilitate its commission.
Verily then, the accused-appellant committed the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. 41 Forcible abduction was
the necessary means used to commit the rape. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the more
serious crime shall be imposed. Article 342 of the said Code penalizes forcible abduction with the penalty of reclusion
temporal while Article 335 penalizes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The latter then is the more serious crime.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the trial court reclusion perpetua is correct. We do not, however, agree with its
conclusion that the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime, which is alleged in the Information, should not be
appreciated against the accused-appellant. It is obvious that nighttime was deliberately and especially sought or taken
advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime. 42 He deliberately waited until the unholy hour of 2:00
o'clock in the morning, thereby being assured of the cover of darkness and the stillness of the sleeping world, before
unleashing his criminal fury to accomplish his evil deed.
Although not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling should have also been
appreciated against the accused-appellant considering that it was fully established without any objection on the part of
the defense. This Court has held that in the crimes of abduction 43 and illegal detention 44 where the offended party is
taken from his house, dwelling may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance.
However, the presence of the foregoing aggravating circumstances would not affect the imposable penalty considering
that the same is indivisible. 45
Taking into account the nature of the crime committed and the following facts: that the victim is a married woman who
was on the fourth month of pregnancy for her fifth child at the time the crime was committed; she was forcibly abducted
in the presence of her husband and children; and she suffered a miscarriage barely a month thereafter, thus necessarily
causing her untold mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, fear, moral shock, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation, the indemnity, in the concept of moral damages, 46 is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
56

Considering, further, the moral corruption, perversity, viciousness and wickedness of the accused-appellant who cruelly
ravaged the complainant, savaged the sanctity of her home and grievously wronged the institution of marriage by raping
a married woman after forcibly abducting her in the presence of her husband, the imposition of exemplary damages by
way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or correction for the public good 47 is in order. Accordingly,
he should be ordered to pay P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision of Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Eastern Samar in
Criminal Case No. 801 is AFFIRMED. As modified, the indemnity awarded by the trial court is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the accused-appellant DOMNINO G. GREFIEL is further ordered to pay the offended party,
Marcela R. Torlao, the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY CABANGCALA y ABRASIA, RENATO CABANGCALA
y ABRASIA alias RENE, and DANILO CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias DANNY, accused-appellants. [People
vs. Cabangcala, 362 SCRA 361(2001)]
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstance; Abuse of superior strength; In abuse of superior strength, what should be
considered is not that there were three, four or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense.Regarding abuse of superior strength as
aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there were three, four or more assailants as against one
victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense
(People vs. Platilla, 304 SCRA 339 [1999]). In the present case, accused-appellants were priorly unarmed, and it was only
when they were about to commit the crime, while waiting for the victim to pass by the bamboo groove that they thought
of getting some implement, a crude bamboo pole which they cut right there and then. We further note that only Benny
approached the victim, striking him with the said piece of bamboo. Only after the victim fell, having been struck twice by
Benny, did the two brothers joined in mauling the victim to death. Obviously, the three accused-appellants did not
purposely take advantage of their superior strength.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nighttime; For nighttime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the court must be
convinced the cover of darkness was purposely sought for the purpose of ensuring the consummation of the crime.Now,
as regards the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, it may also be noted that indeed, the plan to kill the victim was
hatched as early as 5 oclock in the afternoon, but accused-appellants did not execute the plan until 10 oclock that
evening. It may be stressed, however, that for nighttime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the court
must be convinced that the cover of darkness was purposely sought for the purpose of ensuring the consummation of the
crime. [People vs. Cabangcala, 362 SCRA 361(2001)]
MELO, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the judgment rendered by Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of the First
Judicial Region stationed in Tayug, Pangasinan, sentencing to death two of herein accused-appellants, as well as the
appeal of the third accused-appellant who was still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime of murder.
The Information charged as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1997, in the evening, at Brgy. Pangangaan, municipality of Umingan, province
of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, armed with a bamboo, and with the use of superior strength and evident premeditation, and taking advantage of
nighttime, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
strike, maul, box and hit one DIONISIO PASCUAL, inflicting upon the latter mortal wound on his head and different parts of
his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of DIONISIO PASCUAL.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Record, p. 1.)
The antecedent facts are summarized as Counterstatement of the Facts in the People's Brief in this wise:
On February 7, 1997, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Rovellano Abrasia, fifteen years old, testified that he and his
first degree cousins, the Cabangcala brothers, Benny, Rene and Danny (appellants herein), had just finished cutting cogon
in the mountains of Barangay Ricos, Umingan, Pangasinan. He [Rovellano] accompanied Danny to the barber shop of
Merced Abrasia in Barangay Pangangaan of the same municipality (pp. 2-6 & 8, tsn., Aug. 14, 1997; pp. 2-3, tsn., Sept. 5,
1997)
While having his haircut, Danny saw the victim Dionisio "Isio" Pascual drinking gin with Anciong Abrasia and Quisot
Camacho in front of the house of Corazon Morante (pp. 4-6, tsn., Aug. 14, 1997). Thereupon, Danny pointed to the victim
and told Rovellano "that man is Isio Pascual" (pp. 7-8, Ibid.).
Later, Rovellano and Danny went to the latter's house, some 100 meters from Morante's place, where they drank gin
together with Benny and Rene (pp. 13-14, tsn., Sept. 1, 1997; pp. 5 to 5-A, tsn., Sept. 3, 1997). There, Rovellano
overheard the Cabangcala brothers talking about the victim (p. 14, tsn., Sept. 1, 1997). Rovellano recalled that a week
before, Mario Cabangcala, appellant's younger brother, told him that he had a quarrel with the victim's son (p. 13, tsn.,
Sept. 2, 1997). At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, that same day, Benny announced a plan to kill the victim (p. 20,
ibid.) The four continued drinking until 10:00 o'clock in the evening during which period Danny would occasionally go out
to verify if the victim was still at Morante's place (pp. 2, 6 to 8, tsn., Sept. 3, 1997). Danny reported to the group that the
victim was still there lying down while his drinking buddies Anciong and Quisot had already gone home (pp. 5 to 7, ibid.).
57

The Cabangcala brothers then proceeded to execute their plan and, together with Rovellano, waited for the victim at a
place halfway within the 100 meter distance between the house of Morante and the Cabangcalas, along a footpath where
the expected victim would use in going home (p. 8, id.). When the group spotted the victim, the latter was bidding
goodbye to Morante saying, "Mare, I will go home now" (p. 7, id..) Immediately, Benny and Danny went downhill to cut a
piece of bamboo about one (1) meter long (p. 9, id.).
As the victim was approaching, Rovellano ran and hid behind a "buri palm" (p. 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997). The Cabangcala
brothers positioned themselves under a bamboo groove around five (5) meters away from Rovellano (p. 10, tsn. Sept. 3,
1997; p. 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997.)
The victim stopped on the rice paddy about four [4] meters from Rovellano (pp. 13 to 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997). Rovellano.
noticed that the victim had a companion whom he did not recognize but who immediately fled perhaps sensing danger
from the encounter (pp. 9 to 10, & 14, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997). Benny approached the victim and struck him twice with the
bamboo hitting the latter on the left cheek and the neck (p. 15, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). The victim fell, after which Danny and
Rene joined Benny in mauling the victim (pp. 15 to 16, ibid.).
The victim pleaded for his life saying "Please have mercy on me. Don't kill me" (p. 17, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). But the
mauling continued. At one point Danny uttered "Nagado nga ammomon. No saan nga diay anak mo nga pinangpakpak na
kaniak saanak nga agibales"; meaning "Nonsense, had not your son clubbed me I would not avenge" (ibid.).
When the victim was rendered unconscious, Rene carried him towards the field east of Danny's house (pp. 17 & 19, tsn.
id.). There, the victim was mauled further with the piece of bamboo carried by Benny (p. 5, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997).
Thereafter, Rovellano accompanied Danny in getting a sled where they loaded the victim and brought him to the
mountain of Barangay Ricos (p. 19, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). Using shovels, the Cabangcala brothers dug a pit where they
dumped the victim and covered it with soil (pp. 20 to 21, ibid.). Thereafter, they all went home (p. 21, id.).
On March 14, 1997, the victim's brother, Fulgencio, and daughter Jennifer, went to the Umingan Police Station and
reported to the police that the victim had been missing since February 7, 1997 (p. 3-4, tsn. Oct. 6, 1997). SPO1 Jeremias
Fernandez conducted an investigation in Luna Este but failed to obtain favorable results (p. 5, id.).
However, ten (10) days thereafter, on March 24, 1997 Fulgencio returned to the station with a certain Danilo Abrasia who
disclosed that he saw the victim sometime in February 1997 in Barangay Pangangaan being mauled by the Cabangcala
brothers (id.). Hence, SPO1 Fernandez went to Barangay Pangangaan where a secret informant told him that a certain
Rovellano Abrasia had knowledge about the missing person (p. 6, id.). SPO1 Fernandez found Rovellano that night at a
certain bakery in the poblacion of Tayug, Pangasinan (id.). When confronted by the police, Rovellano admitted that he was
with the Cabangcala brothers when the latter killed the victim in Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 6-7, id.). The police,
thereafter, invited Rovellano to the police station where he executed his statement at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning
the following day, March 25, 1997 (pp. 7 to 8, id.; Exh. A., pp. 11-12, Record).
On March 25, 1997, upon being told by Rovellano of the exact place where the victim was buried, SPO1 Fernandez
proceeded there together with Rovellano, Fulgencio Pascual, some members of the Umingan Police, and Barangay officials
of the mountainous area of Barangay Ricos and reached the place at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning (pp. 8-9, tsn.
Oct. 6, 1997). A cadaver was exhumed with the face still complete which Fulgencio identified as that of his brother
Dionisio (p. 9, id., see also pictures in pp. 41, 42 & 43, Record). The cadaver was thereafter brought to the municipal hall
and thereafter to the cemetery for autopsy (p. 10, id.).
Immediately, SPO1 Fernandez went to the house of Benny Cabangcala with the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Pangangaan (pp. 20 & 21, id.) SPO1 Fernandez saw the three (3) appellants in the house of Benny about to leave because
there were (3) traveling bags and said appellants were selling a carabao to a buyer from Barangay Prado (p. 22, id.). With
the coordination of the said barangay captain, SPO1 Fernandez was able to invite the Cabangcala brothers to the police
station to shed light on the killing of Dionisio Pascual (p. 20, id.).
The next day, on March 26, 1997, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Special Report on his investigation (Exh. E, p. 14, Record).
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, Dr. Thelma Busto, Rural Health Physician of Umingan,
Pangasinan, examined the cadaver and prepared the following post-mortem findings:
Post-Mortem Findings:
1. Head multiple fracture of the skull
2. Other parts of the body was in state of decomposition.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cerebral Hemorrhage sec. to fracture of the skull.
(Exhibit C, p. 16, Record)
Dr. Busto noted that when the cadaver was bought to her the skin was still intact although it was soft, tearing and moist.
However, the face was still recognizable (p. 5, tsn. Oct 1, 1997). She prepared a schematic diagram showing multiple
fractures with skull, 10 at the back, 4 to 5 at the frontal crown, and 2 on each parietal area (pp. 5-7, id.; Exh. D, p. 15,
Record).
The victim's family thereafter took care of his funeral and burial (pp. 3 to 6, tsn. Sept. 26, 1997; p. 26, tsn. Sept. 16,
1997).
Jennifer Pascual Espiritu, one of the victim's daughters, recalled that the last time she saw her father alive was on
February 7, 1997. The day before it, on February 6, 1997, the victim came to her house in Barangay Luna Este and went
fishing with her neighbor. At night, the victim slept in her house (p. 25, tsn. Sept. 16, 1997). In the morning of February 7,
she saw the victim going home to Barangay L Paz taking the route of Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 25 to 26, id.). When she
saw her father again was on March 26, 1997, his remains were already in a coffin (p. 26, id)
Dionisio Pascual, Jr. never saw his father again after he left their place on January 8, 1997 (p. 12 to 13, tsn. Oct. 10, 1997).
He had to leave for Manila and stay there for about four (4) months because he knew that the Cabangcala brothers
planned to kill him (p. 12, id.) on account of his violent encounters with them on December 25, 1996 during the wedding
party of a certain Josephine Cabanting in Barangay Luna Este where Dionisio, Jr. had boxed Mario Cabangcala, appellants'
58

younger brother because the latter tried to hit him with a bottle of "beer grande" when he refused to buy beer for them
(pp. 4 to 6, id.). Dionisio, Jr. felt very strongly that the he was the reason why the Cabangcala brothers killed his father.
(Rollo, pp. 149-157.)
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, guilt having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the herein accused of the
crime of evidently premeditated MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, with the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime aggravating the offense.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Article 63 of the same code, the Court hereby sentences the accused BENNY CABANGCALA
and RENATO CABANGCALA to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
In regard to the accused DANILO CABANGCALA alias "Danny," the Court applies section 22 of Republic Act 7659 and
Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MINIMUM to 17 years and one day of reclusion
temporal maximum as MAXIMUM.
The subject accused are further hereby ordered to SOLIDARILY indemnify the heirs of deceased DIONISIO PASCUAL for
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for his death, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Record, pp. 225.)
In the automatic review of this case, appellants assign the following errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PERSON EXHUMED ON MARCH 26, 1997 (sic), IS THAT
OF DIONISIO PASCUAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE BELATED TESTIMONY OF DANILO ABRASIA THAT WITNESS SAW
THE INCIDENT.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROVELLANO ABRASIA.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI ADVANCED BY THE ACCUSED.
The Court affirms the conviction of all three accused-appellants.
Firstly, accused-appellants heavily bank on the possibility that the body exhumed by the police authorities upon
information disclosed by Rovellano Abrasia on March 25, 1997, is not that of Dionisio Pascual, whereby in the absence of
the corpus delicti they cannot be convicted of the crime charged. To cast reasonable doubt, accused-appellants quote
prosecution witness Dr. Busto's statement that "when a person was buried on February 7 and exhumed on March 25, the
body would be so decomposed that it would be hard to identify the person" (Appellants' Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 91).
We are not persuaded for the foregoing statement was obviously taken out of context. Dr. Busto was stating a general
proposition that if a cadaver had been buried for 45 days, it would normally be in such a state of decomposition making
identification difficult. More so, according to Dr. Busto, if the ground on which the cadaver is buried is wet. The specific
finding for this particular cadaver, however, is that although the cadaver when brought to her was in an advanced state of
decomposition, its face was still "recognizable" because the "skin was still intact" (p. 5, tsn. Oct. 1, 1997). One day before
Dr. Busto saw the cadaver, right at the site where the remains of Dionisio Pascual were exhumed, Fulgencio Pascual
(brother of Dionisio), and Victoria Abrasia (a cousin of Dionisio) positively identified it to be that of Dionisio Pascual.
TESTIMONY OF FULGENCIO PASCUAL:
Q.
And then after digging what was discovered, if there was any?
A.
I saw the cadaver of my brother first the face, sir.
Q.
How do you know that was the cadaver of your brother?
A:
I know him sir because the face was not yet to decomposed. I could still recognize his face.
Q.
What were the physical features you observed wherein you are now concluding that he was your brother?
A.
We have a resemblance with my brother the only difference is he was taller and thinner than me, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q
Aside from you who else, if any, identified the body right at the place of the exhumation?
A.
My cousin, sir
Q.
Who?
A.
Victoria Abrasia, sir.
Q.
He (sic) was with you?
A.
Yes, sir, were only two at that time.
(pp. 11 & 12, tsn. Sept. 23, 1997)
Moreover, the body exhumed on March 25, 1997 was given due funeral services. As Dionisio's daughter, Jennifer, averred,
she saw her father already in a coffin on March 26, 1997. We agree with the trial court's observation that "nobody mourns
the death of a stranger." It is hard for this Court to conceive of the possibility that the family of Dionisio would grieve
before the remains of a stranger, much less spend money for funeral services and burial of somebody other than their
own deceased. This, coupled with the fact that the location of the exhumation site was pointed to by no less than an
eyewitness to the crime and the burial, the Court is convinced that the body recovered on March 25, 1997 is truly that of
Dionisio Pascual.
Secondly, accused-appellants find fault in witness Danilo Abrasia's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities. This,
according to them, should have been enough basis for the court to disregard his testimony. Besides, they claim, Danilo
did not actually witness the commission of the crime but only learned about it through Rovellano Abrasia.
We find this contention lacking in merit, as well.
Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he knows about a crime does not render his testimony false, for the
delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case.
But more than this, there is always the inherent fear of reprisal (People vs. Basilan, 174 SCRA 115 [1989]). We have ruled
59

on several occasions that "the delay of several months in reporting the incident to the police does not affect the witness'
credibility, the reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information in a criminal case being of common knowledge (People
vs. Sampaga, 202 SCRA 157 [1991]).
Accused-appellants also imply there is no basis for Danilo to be fearful of reprisal because accused-appellants allegedly
did not see him during the commission of the crime. In People vs. Dulay (217 SCRA 103 [1993]) we ruled:
We cannot sustain this contention because whether or not the witnesses feared him only the witnesses can tell. Fear
arises in the subject not in the object of the fear. It is defined as an unpleasant emotional state characterized by
anticipation of pain or great distress. It is a reaction to an external danger, which is perceived to cause him harm.
We cannot discount the possibility that fear develops in the mind of the witness despite the absence of threat from the
accused. Besides, reprisal from the accused may come about not only before the witness reports the crime, but it may
also develop after the crime is reported. This is the reason for enactment of the law on witness protection. In this light
therefore, the fact that accused-appellants did not see Danilo Abrasia witness the crime has no real significance insofar as
the said eyewitness' fear is concerned.
Thirdly, accused-appellants contend that the testimony of Rovellano Abrasia is contrary to natural experience because
even as he appeared to be a participant in the crime, having been present from the planning stage up to the
consummation of the crime, although his cooperation and assistance were not required by the three accused-appellants
who were all brothers. They also cite the fact that Rovellano left Barangay Pangangaan immediately after the alleged
commission of the crime, an indication, according to them, that he was himself guilty.
We find these circumstances insufficient to discredit Rovellano's testimony. These were all aptly explained by the fact that
Rovellano was himself related to the Cabangcala brothers, accused-appellants in this case. We do not find it odd that he
could have actually tagged along with them during all that time that accused-appellants were plotting the crime up to the
time of the actual commission of the murder. It is also in accord with natural experience for Rovellano to distance himself
from his cousins right after the commission of the crime for fear of being implicated. This will not be taken as flight similar
to that of an accused avoiding appropriate charges and possibly, a conviction.
It must likewise be noted that his testimony is not the sole basis for the conviction of the three accused-appellants. The
major points in his narration were corroborated by other evidence tending to bolster his credibility.
Besides
As to the credibility of witnesses it is well established that the findings of fact of the trial court thereon should not be
disturbed on appeal said court being in a better position to decide the question, from having itself heard and observed
the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which,
if considered, could affect the result of the case.
(People vs. Perez, 265 SCRA 506, 516 [1996])
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to depart from this settled rule.
Finally, we find unpersuasive accused-appellants' insistence that the trial court erred in not giving credence to their
defense of alibi.
Two eyewitnesses have positively identified the three accused appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. (People vs. Gabatin, 203 SCRA 225
[1991]; People vs. Tinampay, 207 SCRA 425 [1992]). No jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, for which reason it should be rejected when the accused is sufficiently and positively
identified by credible eyewitnesses to the crime (People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). As we have already ruled,
no circumstances are present in the case at hand, which would render Danilo's and Rovellano Abrasia's eyewitness
accounts incredible.
Additionally, the distance between accused-appellants' houses where they claim to have stayed when the crime was
being perpetrated, does not preclude the possibility that they could also have been at the scene of the crime. They were
actually only within fifty meters from the scene of the crime. It is equally settled that:
The requisite elements for alibi to be appreciated are: (a) to prove his presence in another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense; and (b) to demonstrate that it would thus be physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime (People vs. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96 [1998]).
We, however, cannot affirm the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and nighttime.
Regarding abuse of superior strength as aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there were
three, four or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the offense (People vs. Platilla, 304 SCRA 339 [1999]). In the present case, accusedappellants were priorly unarmed, and it was only when they were about to commit the crime, while waiting for the victim
to pass by the bamboo groove that they thought of getting some implement, a crude bamboo pole which they cut right
there and then. We further note that only Benny approached the victim, striking him with the said piece of bamboo. Only
after the victim fell, having been struck twice by Benny, did the two brothers joined in mauling the victim to death.
Obviously, the three accused-appellants did not purposely take advantage of their superior strength.
Now, as regards the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, it may also be noted that indeed, the plan to kill the victim
was hatched as early as 5 o'clock in the afternoon, but accused-appellants did not execute the plan until 10 o'clock that
evening. It may be stressed, however, that for nighttime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the court
must be convinced that the cover of darkness was purposely sought for the purpose of ensuring the consummation of the
crime. In People vs. Bitoon (309 SCRA 209 [1999]), we ruled:

60

Nighttime could not be appreciated where, as in this case, no evidence was presented showing that nocturnity was
specially sought by accused or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his
immunity from capture.
There is no evidence in the present case that accused-appellants intentionally sought the advantage of nocturnity to
facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure immunity from capture. They simply waited for the victim to finish his
drinking spree with his companions, which happened to be at around 10 o'clock in the evening, and it was when the
victim was on his way home, that the accused-appellants attacked him.
There being no aggravating circumstances to be appreciated against accused-appellants, the death penalty imposed by
the trial court upon accused-appellants Benny and Renato Cabangcala for the crime of murder cannot be affirmed.
Accused-appellants Benny and Renato Cabangcala are, therefore, sentenced to the prison term of reclusion perpetua.
As for Danilo Cabangcala, who was a minor when the crime was committed, the correct penalty should be one degree
lower which is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period (10 years and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months). Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the imposable penalty for the crime of murder in his case
where there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, should be 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as minimum up to 14 years and 3 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
With regard to civil damages, Dionisio Pascual's heirs should be awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ( People vs. Basco,
318 SCRA 615 [1999]). Moral damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish may be recovered in criminal
cases resulting in physical injuries or victim's death, as in this case (People vs. Bromo, 318 SCRA 760 [1999]), which,
under prevailing jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00 (People vs. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 [1999]).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellants' conviction of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED but with
MODIFICATION as to the imposable penalty, as above indicated. Accused-appellants are further ordered to solidarily pay
the heirs of Dionisio Pascual the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs in
all instances.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. M/SGT. REYNALDO LANDICHO, PAT. JOHNNY BUNYI, C1C
ERIC MANLUSOC, and C2C LEOVINO CANUEL, accused. C1C ERIC MANLUSOC, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Judges; Judgment; The challenged decision substantially complied with the requirements of both
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.The first assigned error is
patently without merit. The challenged decision substantially complied with the requirements of both Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The pertinent disquisitions therein, as well as its
dispositive portion earlier quoted, readily show such compliance. It sets out the facts which it believed were proved and
the law upon which the judgment was based, and states the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts
proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Treachery; Two conditions must concur for treachery to be present.For treachery to be present,
two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed giving the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or form of exe-cution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery may still be appreciated for even when the victim was warned of danger to his person,
what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.In
the case at bench, the victim seemed to have expected trouble, considering that upon seeing Manlusoc and Bunyi
approaching him, he told his companion, Mejico, to move away. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated for even
when the victim was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The evidence clearly bears this out. The victim was unarmed
and the accused gave no warning. The victim was then totally unprepared to even guess that the appellant and his coaccused Canuelwho were the first two who appearedwould pepper him with bullets.
Same; Same; Same; Sudden attack against an unarmed victim shows treachery.A sudden attack against an unarmed
victim shows treachery. Furthermore, it was shown that the first shot, towards the victims head, came from behind the
victim. While it has been said that a dorsal attack alone does not indicate treachery, the assault in this case was also
sudden, unexpected, and without warning, thus suggesting treachery.
Same; Same; Same; The number and location of the gunshot wounds are enough to banish any motive of an accidental
shooting.We disagree with the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that treachery was absent because of
lack of evidence that prior to the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and
consciously adopted the mode of attack. The number and location of the gunshot wounds, two in the head, and at both
the anterior and posterior portions of the body as shown in Exhibit C, are enough to banish any motive of an accidental
shooting.
The severity of the accuseds acts indicate a calculated pursuit of a decision to kill.
61

Same; Same; Same; Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.Treachery being present, it was then error for the trial
court to consider the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength as an independent aggravating
circumstance. It is settled that treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. [People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1(1996)]
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
As Juvenal once asked, "But who is to guard the guards themselves?" 1 This case deals not with a mere appeal from a
conviction in a murder case. It is a tale, rather, an expose, of the warped sense of camaraderie which binds certain
members of the law enforcement and penal systems in our country. This account of betrayal of the public trust stands as
yet another stain on the honor of the Philippine National Police (PNP), at a time when its reputation and integrity are
already in serious question.
On 8 January 1991, at 9:30 p.m., in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, four members of the PNP gunned down Isagani Mazon in
cold blood. Mazon died instantly, having suffered twenty-one (21) gunshot wounds, a number of which were at his back.
As a result, the accused were charged with murder, 2 but in the interim, the trial court endowed them the privilege of
being detained by their superiors, instead of customary incarceration at the provincial jail. And if only to exacerbate
matters, the accused then escaped through the connivance or inexcusable negligence of their guardians. Of the accused,
only the appellant was subsequently arrested.
On 30 August 1991, the accused were charged with murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 39, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-3496, the accusatory portion reading:
That on or about January 8, 1991, at the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), conspiring with each other, with deliberate intent to kill and with the use of firearms, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack and shoot Isagani Mazon, a private person, hitting him at
the vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him mortal wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
No bail was recommended for their temporary liberty.
On 17 October 1991, the trial court, through Judge Marciano T. Virola, issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 4 On
24 October 1991, the accused allegedly surrendered at the PNP office in Oriental Mindoro. Then, in a first indorsement
dated 25 October 1991, Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar, PNP Provincial Director of Oriental Mindoro, committed the
accused to the trial court, but requested that they be detained at the PNP Stockade as they were members of the PNP
Mindoro Oriental Command. 5
On 29 October 1991, the accused filed a petition for bail and motion to transfer their detention from the Provincial Jail to
the PNP Headquarters pending hearing of their petition. 6 Judge Virola immediately granted the motion for transfer to the
PNP Stockade at the PNP Mindoro Oriental Command Headquarters, on the condition that the accused would not be
allowed to leave the stockade or "be placed in the custody of any person without order from [the] Court." 7 The trial court,
however, denied the application for bail as the motion did not set the application for hearing. Branch Clerk of Court
Rolando Caguete then committed the accused to Supt. Lasar for detention at the PNP Stockade. 8 Meanwhile, First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel S. Panaligan opposed the petition for bail and prayed that it be denied for lack
of merit. 9 On 30 October 1991, the accused filed a notice to set for hearing the petition for bail. 10
Upon arraignment on 5 November 1991, each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty. 11 The trial court then set the
hearing on the petition for bail on 11, 18, and 19 November 1991, and the pre-trial on 18 November 1991. 12 On even
date, the private prosecutor, Atty. Alvin T. Sarita, moved to suspend the accused from the service pursuant to Section 47
13
Of R.A. No. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act), which the trial court granted on 6 November
1991. 14
The 11 November 1991 hearing on the petition for bail was cancelled but reset to 18, 19, and 20 November 1991.
In a letter dated 13 November 1991, Pedro Mazon, father of the victim, sought Judge Virola's assistance regarding
information that all the accused were seen aboard the boat M.B. San Miguel bound for Batangas. 15 Judge Virola ordered
the Calapan RTC Clerk of Court as ex-officio sheriff and his Branch Clerk of Court to investigate the matter 16 and directed
Supt. Lasar to comment on Pedro Mazon's letter. 17
In their report, 18 the aforementioned Clerks of Court informed Judge Virola that they went to the Oriental Mindoro PNP
Command on 13 November 1991 at around 12:00 p.m., only to discover that accused Landicho and Bunyi were not there.
According to the guard on duty, SPO3 Fortunato Mendoza, the said accused, escorted by SPO3 Julian Bilog, left the
Mindoro Oriental PNP Command at about 11:50 a.m. and ate lunch outside the PNP Command. Later, at around 1:10 p.m.,
Landicho and Bunyi returned with their escort SPO3 Bilog. Bilog then informed the Clerks of Court that on 12 November
1991, at around 11:30 a.m., while he was the guard on duty, the four accused left the stockade for lunch and talked to
someone about their case, with Landicho and Bunyi escorted by PO2 Edilberto Santos, and accused Manlusoc and Canuel
by SPO2 Ernesto Javier. An hour later, only Bunyi returned; further, when the Clerks of Court left at about 2:00 p.m.,
Manlusoc and Canuel had not yet returned.
In his comment, Supt. Lasar confirmed that the four accused "were present at the place as they were seen [but] were
guarded by escort." 19
In his report 20 to the trial court, Senior Inspector Jesus T. Gatchalian, Commanding Officer of the 269th PNP Mobile Force
Company, declared that at 11:20 a.m. of 12 November 1991, all the accused left for lunch with escorts. While Landicho
and Bunyi returned to the PNP Stockade at 1:00 p.m. that day, Manlusoc and Canuel proceeded to Batangas, with escorts,
to get financial support for their case. However, they returned to the PNP Stockade at 3:00 p.m. on 14 November 1991.
At the scheduled pre-trial on 18 November 1991, the trial court granted the motion of the accused to terminate the pretrial and reset the hearing of the petition for bail on 23, 24, 27, and 30 January 1992. 21
In his letter of 16 December 1991, Pedro Mazon informed Judge Virola that on 13 December 1991, he saw the four
accused watching a cockfight in Barangay Sta. Isabel, Calapan. 22 Judge Virola referred the matter to Supt. Lasar, 23 who
62

replied that on 13 December 1991, the accused were at the PNP Stockade, as evidenced by the certification issued by the
Sgt of the Guard and Guards on Duty at the time." 24
The petition for bail was initially heard on 23 January 1992, with the prosecution presenting eyewitness Lilian Francisco.
The hearing continued the following day with the prosecution ready to present Dr. Arturo Alberto; however, the defense
and the prosecution agreed to dispense with Dr. Alberto's testimony and mark the following exhibits:
Exhs. "B" Necropsy Report "B-2"
Dorsal Side of Exh. "B"
"B-2" Signature of Dr. Alberto
On Exh. "B-1"
"C" Rough Illustration report
"C-1" Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "C"
"D" Certificate of Death
"D-1" Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "D". 25
Consequently, the trial court issued an order, the pertinent portions providing:
After the prosecutor announced that the next witness that he is presenting is Dr. Arturo Alberto as medico legal expert,
whose qualification as such was admitted by counsel for the accused, for the purposes to wit:
(a) to identify the Necropsy Report issued by him in connection with the Post Mortem examination conducted on the body
of Isagani Mason;
(b) to testify on the character and nature of the wounds sustained by Isagani Mason as well as the cause of the wounds
sustained by the victim which according to his opinion as stated in the Necropsy Report were all sustained by gunshot
wound;
(c) to testify as to the number of wounds sustained which is 21 gunshot wounds;
(d) to testify to the effect that the victim sustained 7 gunshot wounds at the back;
(e) to testify that the victim sustained 14 gunshot wounds in front of his body, two of which were inflicted on the head;
(f) to identify the rough sketch showing the anterior and posterior position of a human body and to testify that the
wounds sustained by the deceased as indicated were in front and at the back of the body;
(g) to identify the certificate of death of Isagani Mason;
(h) to testify as to the cause of death which is multiple internal injuries, secondary to gunshot wounds;
Counsel for the accused manifested that he is admitting that if presented on the witness stand said witness will testify
according to the tenor and for the purposes as stated by the prosecutor in open court.
Forthwith, the prosecutor caused the marking of the Necropsy Report as Exhibits "B", "B-1", and "B-2", the Sketch
showing the anterior view and posterior view and the location of the wounds indicated therein as Exhibits "C" and "C-1",
the Certificate of Death of Isagani Mason as Exhibits "D" and "D-1" and thereafter dispensed with the presentation of Dr.
Arturo Alberto in view of the stipulation between the parties. 26
On 16 March 1992, the prosecution presented Herman Mejico, Jr. as its third witness on the petition for bail and,
thereafter, rested its case for the purpose. 27
At the hearing on 17 March 1992, as their evidence in connection with the petition for bail, the accused only caused to be
marked some documents and then rested their case. The documents marked were:
Exh.
"1"

Alias
Warrant
of
Arrest
for
Isagani
Mazon
in
Criminal
Case
No.
3201,
for
violation
of
RA
6539

Anti-Carnapping
Act
of
1972

dated 2 January 1990;

Exh.
"2"

Warrant
of
Arrest
for
Herman
Mejico
in
Crim.
Case
No.
C-2675
for
attempted
murder
dated 28 January 1988;
Exh.
"3"

Order
of
28
August
1988
in
Crim.
Case
No.
C-2675
archiving
the
case
since
Mejico
has
not been arrested;
Exh.
"4"

Warrant
of
Arrest
for
Isagani
Mazon
dated
27 August 1990 in Crim. Case No. C-3201;
Exh.
"5"

Order
of
18
December
1990
in
Crim.
Case
No. C-3201 archiving the case. 28
The trial court then considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution and set the reception of the prosecution's
evidence on the merits of the case on 23 April and 24 April 1992. 29
On the same date, 17 March 1992, the court granted Atty. Edgardo Aceron's withdrawal as defense counsel on the ground
that he would seek election as Governor of Mindoro Oriental. 30 Likewise, the private prosecutor moved to transfer the
detention of the accused to the Provincial Jail and cite the accused and the PNP Provincial Director in contempt of court
because of persistent violations of the court's order not to allow the accused to leave the PNP Stockade nor to place them
in the custody of any person without a court order. 31 The court deferred action on the motion for transfer until the petition
for bail was resolved and required Supt. Lasar to comment on the motion to cite him in contempt. 32 Supt. Lasar
responded that he had not received any information that the accused left the stockade without escorts and the accused
were never moved to any detention cell other than the PNP Stockade. 33
On 24 March 1992, the trial court issued an order 34 denying the petition for bail on the ground that evidence of guilt was
strong, directing the transfer of the accused from the PNP Stockade to the Calapan Jail Center, and reiterating its previous
order that the accused would not be allowed to leave the jail nor be placed in the custody of any person, unless otherwise
ordered by the court.
63

On 27 March 1992, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion to cite the accused and the PNP Provincial Director in
contempt of court due to "humanitarian reasons"; moreover, the prosecution failed to substantiate its allegations in the
said motion. 35
The hearing on the merits of 23 April and 24 April 1992 were reset to 20 May and 21 May 1992. 36
In a letter dated 5 May 1992, Pedro Mazon complained once more to Judge Virola that he saw the four accused roaming
the town of San Vicente, Calapan, and often staying in a house in Libis, another town in Calapan. 37 Judge Virola asked
the Provincial Jail Warden to comment 38 and the latter replied that the accused "are at present inside the jail," although
at one time "they requested to be escorted by Mr. Saure, Prison Guard, to consult their legal counsel, hence it may have
been possible that they were seen outside." 39
On 10 May 1992, the prosecution moved for the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the accused who had been
roaming around Calapan without police escorts. 40 Thus the trial court ordered the PNP Provincial Director to cause the
immediate arrest of all the accused and place them inside the Provincial Jail, and the Provincial Jail Warden to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt of court for allowing the accused to roam around. 41
On oral order of Judge Virola, Clerk of Court Armando E. Fortus went to the Provincial Jail on 12 May and 13 May 1992 to
verify the private prosecutor's allegations that all the accused were seen "roaming around without any escorts and
carrying firearms." Fortus reported that on the said dates Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel "were all out of the Provincial Jail
Center for the reasons that they were in the custody of the Provincial Governor, however, M/Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho was
there . . ." 42
Since Supt. Lasar did not comply with the above order, the court issued on 14 May 1992 another bench warrant for the
arrest of all the accused, except Landicho, and redirected the Provincial Jail Warden not to allow the accused to be placed
in the custody of any person, including the Governor. 43
Then, on 15 May 1992, the trial court received information from Provincial Jail Warden Menandro S. Abac that:
[T]he four (4) . . . accused were reported in the Logbook as escaped prisoners as of May 9, 1992 while Guard-on-Duty was
busy attending in serving meals for lunch to our inmates. The four accused left unnoticed and might have used the exit
way going to the Provincial Capitol Compound. 44
At the scheduled hearing on 20 May 1992, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Upon request of Atty. Ligorio
Turiano of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), who was appointed by the court as de oficio counsel for the accused, the
hearing on that day was adjourned until the following day, as scheduled.
The accused did not appear on 21 May 1992. The prosecution rested its case by adopting as its evidence on the merits
the evidence it had presented on the petition for bail. The trial court then set the reception of the evidence for the
defense on 1, 4, 8, 9, and 10 June 1992. 45
At the scheduled hearing on 1 June 1992, counsel for the accused asked for a postponement on the ground that he had
not been able to contact the accused who, according to the Provincial Jail Warden, had escaped. The court granted the
motion but directed the hearing to proceed on the succeeding scheduled dates of 4, 8, 9, and 10 June 1992. 46
The hearing on 4 June 1992 was also postponed on motion of counsel for the accused. 47 At the hearing on 8 June 1992,
the
defense
presented
Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio 48 who merely identified photocopies of certain documents. 49 The defense then moved to reset the
next scheduled hearings because the wife of accused Landicho was still trying to convince the latter to return to the folds
of the law. 50 The trial court, for humanitarian reasons, but over the vehement objections of the prosecution, granted the
motion and reset the trial on 16 June and 17 June 1992. 51
On 16 June 1992, the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Renato G. dela Cruz, moved to quash the information on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. They claimed that under P.D. No.
1486, crimes committed by public officers were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and
although Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 provided that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts," the term "courts" referred to the Sandiganbayan. 52 The trial court denied the motion to quash 53
and considered Atty. dela Cruz' verbal motion for a grant of five days within which to file a motion for reconsideration as
dilatory. 54
Since Atty. dela Cruz manifested that he was not ready to present evidence, the trial court issued on 16 June 1992 an
order declaring the accused as having waived the presentation of evidence since they had not been re-arrested and
repeatedly failed to present evidence despite the several occasions afforded them. Thus, the trial court set the
promulgation of judgment on 1 July 1992. 55
On 29 June 1992, however, Atty. dela Cruz filed a motion praying that the scheduled promulgation be cancelled and
further proceedings suspended, citing Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals, 56 because the accused had
filed a "25-page Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition With Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order" before the Cour0t of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 28210. On 1 July 1992, the trial court denied the
motion and promulgated its decision 57 as scheduled. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of Murder,
defined under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized therein by reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to
death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of the crime having
been committed by a band and advantage having been taken of superior strength. Considering that there are two
ordinary aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty that accused must suffer should
be the maximum period of the penalty provided by law. Considering, however, the abolition of the death penalty under
the Constitution of 1987, the hands of the Court are tied in imposing the supreme penalty of death.
Consequently, all the accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
Accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the legal heirs of the victim Isagani Mazon the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of actual and compensatory damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
64

Let warrants of arrest be issued for the arrest of the accused and the different police agencies be furnished with copies
thereof to effect the recapture of all the accused who had escaped from confinement during the progress of the trial. 58
The following disquisitions of the trial court support its judgment:
To substantiate the allegation of the Information, the prosecution presented Lilian Francisco and German Mejico, Jr. The
presentation of Dr. Arturo Alberto whose qualification as medico legal expert was admitted by counsel for the accused,
was dispensed with in view of the stipulation that, should said witness be presented on the witness stand, he would
testify, among others, that he was the one who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of deceased Isagani
Mazon; that the victim sustained 21 gunshot wounds, 7 of which were sustained at the back, 14 of which were in front,
and 2 of which were on the head; and that the cause of the death of the victim is multiple internal injuries secondary to
gunshot wounds.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it has been sufficiently established that sometime on January 8, 1991, at
around 9:30 in the evening, while the victim Isagani Mazon was walking together with German Mejico, Jr. on J.P. Rizal St.,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro near the Main Deck which is opposite the building where the Pizza Galera Restaurant and Hotel
Domini are housed, accused Johnny Bunyi and Eric Manlusoc approached them. Isagani Mazon told German Mejico, Jr. to
go away and after German Mejico, Jr. had moved away around 10 arms length from Isagani Mazon, accused Johnny Bunyi
and Eric Manlusoc fired their short firearms at Isagani Mazon while accused Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho and Leovino Canuel
rushed towards Isagani Mazon and likewise fired their guns at Isagani Mazon. The shooting incident was also witnessed by
Lilian Francisco who was then ascending the stairs of the building where the Domini Hotel and Pizza Galera Restaurant are
housed. Lilian Francisco recognized all the accused because she knew all of them prior to the incident in question. She
knew Johnny Bunyi for around one month prior to the incident in question; Eric Manlusoc around a year prior to the
incident in question; Leovino Canuel also around a year prior to the incioent in question; and Reynaldo Landicho even
before the COSAC organized by the military was disbanded. She recalled that accused Reynaldo Landicho formerly
resided at the back of the Mindoro College and accused Johnny Bunyi, Eric Manlusoc and Leovino Canuel used to visit and
drink in the Mariwasa Restaurant where she formerly worked as floor manager of the ladies working thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
After the cancellation of the scheduled dates of trial on June 1 and 4 at the instance of counsel for the accused, counsel
for the accused presented SPO3 Rogelio Rogelio on June 8, 1992 who identified certain documents namely, xerox copy of
the statement of M/Sgt. Landicho, xerox copy of the statement of Johnny Bunyi, xerox copies of the joint statements of
Leovino Canuel and Eric Manlusoc, xerox copy of the Investigation Report of SPO3 Rogelio, xerox copy of alias warrant of
arrest against Isagani Mazon in Criminal Case No. C-3201 of this Court. Thereafter, counsel for the accused asked for
continuance and for the cancellation of the trial on June 9 and 10 and prayed that accused be given another opportunity
to present further evidence on June 16 and 17, 1992, all starting at 8:30 in the morning and the same was granted by the
Court in view of the manifestation of the counsel for the accused that the wife of one of the accused is trying her best to
convince the accused to return to the fold of the law in order to testify in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
For repeated failure of the accused to present their evidence despite the fact that they were given several opportunities
to do so although they had escaped from the Provincial Jail, the Court considered the accused to have waived the
presentation of their evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision.
Even admitting that there was a warrant issued by the Court for the arrest of Isagani Mazon in Crim. Case No. 3201 the
accused were ordered by their Commanding Officer to serve the same, the accused were not by that fact alone justified
to shoot and kill Isagani Mazon. They have to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were justified in killing
Isagani Mazon. Instead of testifying in their favor to prove justifying or exempting circumstance accused escaped from the
provincial jail after the prosecution has rested its case.
The act of the accused in escaping from the custody of the law during the progress of the trial of the case against them is
indicative of their guilt (citations omitted).
Considering that in killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which
tended directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which said
Isagani Mazon might make, the commission of the crime is attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The
commission of the crime is likewise attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of the crime having been
committed by a band considering that all the four accused were all armed with firearms and acted together in the
commission of the offense. The commission of the offense is also attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of
advantage having been taken of superior strength considering that the victim Isagani Mazon was unarmed while the four
accused were armed with firearms. 59
At the promulgation of judgment, the trial court was informed by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command (PNPCISC), Fourth Regional Office, that accused Manlusoc was arrested on 26 June 1992 at Barangay Mendez Crossing,
Tagaytay City. 60 With this information, the trial court, pursuant to its judgment, caused warrants of arrest to issue against
Landicho, Canuel, and Bunyi. 61
On 3 July 1992, accused Manlusoc was surrendered to the court pursuant to its order for the purpose of committing him to
the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. 62 Manlusoc was then turned over to the custody of the Provincial Jail Warden of
Calapan. 63
On 8 July 1992, accused Landicho, Bunyi, and Canuel, who remained at large, through Atty. dela Cruz, filed a motion to
quash the warrant of arrest issued against them on the ground that the Court of Appeals had given due course to their
petition questioning the trial court's jurisdiction. 64 In a supplemental manifestation filed the following day, Atty. dela Cruz
called the attention of the trial court to the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210 directing the trial
court to answer the petition and to show cause why injunction should not issue. 65 Agreeing with the prosecutor's
opposition that the motion to quash was premature as giving due course to the accused's petition did not automatically
render void the proceedings before it, 66 the trial court denied the motion. 67
65

On 15 July 1992, the trial court denied the Provincial Jail Warden's request to allow him to escort Manlusoc to Tagaytay
City for a hearing in a case of illegal possession of firearms filed against Manlusoc. Further, the trial court directed the
Provincial Jail Warden to commit Manlusoc to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa "under tight security." 68
On
16
July
1992,
Atty.
dela
Cruz
filed
a
Notice
of
Appeal
Ad
Cautelam 69 which the trial court denied due course to as it was remotely contingent upon the Court of Appeals finding
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. 70
Later, on 30 September 1992, the four accused filed a Supplemental Petition before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28210 asking the said court to declare the trial court to be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. C-3496 and as
null and void the subsequent orders of the trial court, including its denial of their notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam. 71 This
supplemental petition was verified by the four accused who subscribed and swore to such verification before their
counsel, Atty. dela Cruz, in his capacity as a notary public and who entered such fact in his notarial register as Proc. No.
320; Page No. 65; Book No. III, Series of 1992. 72
In its decision of 22 September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, the Court of Appeals dismissed the accused's petition for
certiorari and prohibition, but partially granted the supplemental petition in favor of Eric Manlusoc, by ordering the trial
court to give due course to Manlusoc's appeal to this Court. 73
Unsatisfied, the accused filed in this Court a petition for review, G.R. No. 110792, which we denied in our resolution of 22
November 1993 as the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. We also denied the motion to reconsider the
resolution. 74 Meanwhile, the trial court gave due course to the appeal of Manlusoc as directed by the Court of Appeals. 75
The only valid appeal then is that of accused C1C Eric Manlusoc who was re-arrested five days before the promulgation. 76
On 29 May 1995, this Court accepted Manlusoc's appeal. 77
In his Appellant's Brief, Manlusoc imputes to the trial court seventeen "errors." He contends that:
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS A NULLITY IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONTAIN SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO
PRONOUNCE A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AS MANDATED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION;
and that the trial court erred:
II. . . . IN HAVING CONVICTED APPELLANT WITH MURDER DESPITE THE LACK OF PROOF OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION;
III. . . . IN HAVING FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER TO
TESTIFY ON THE FACT OF DEATH OF THE VICTIM; THE NATURE OF THE INJURIES SUSTAINED AND THE CAUSE OF DEATH;
IV. . . . IN HAVING FOUND THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS PRESENT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
NO LESS THAN PROSECUTION'S OWN EVIDENCE HAD ESTABLISHED ITS ABSENCE;
V. . . . IN NOT WAVING MADE ANY FINDING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE BULLET WHICH CAME FROM THE GUN OF
APPELLANT HIT THE VICTIM;
VI. . . . IN HAVING MADE [THE] ASSUMPTION AND CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO- ACCUSED
FIRED THEIR GUNS, THE VICTIM'S DEATH RESULTED THEREFROM;
VII. . . . IN HAVING MADE A GENERALIZED CONCLUSION OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM SIMPLY BECAUSE HE WAS SHOT BY
THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
VIII. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE LACK OF PROOF THAT THE GUNSHOT COMING FROM
APPELLANT'S FIREARM HIT THE VICTIM;
IX. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS TO WHO'S GUNSHOT WOUND
WAS FATAL;
X. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND
AMONG THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
XI. . . . IN HAVING FOUND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF BAND TO BE ATTENDANT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF MURDER;
XII. . . . IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO- ACCUSED IN FACT ESCAPED;
XIII. . . . IN HAVING RULED THAT THE ALLEGED ESCAPE OF THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL
INDICATED AN ADMISSION OF GUILT;
XIV. . . . IN NOT HAVING MADE A FINDING IN ITS DECISION AS TO THAT PART OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
WHICH IT CONSIDERED BELIEVABLE;
XV. . . . IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF BOTH PROSECUTION WITNESSES LILIAN FRANCISCO AND
HERMAN MEJICO, JR. WAS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCY AFFECTING THEIR CREDIBILITY;
XVI. . . . IN HAVING GIVEN CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF LILIAN FRANCISCO AND HERMAN MEJICO, JR.
NOTWITHSTANDING PRESENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES INDUBITABLY SHOWING THAT THEIR TALE OF THE ALLEGED
SHOOTING WAS UNBELIEVABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE; and
XVII. . . . IN NOT HAVING ACQUITTED APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD FAILED TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 78
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General refutes all errors assigned by the appellant, but
recommends, however, that the appellant should only be convicted of the crime of homicide because:
[I]t cannot be said that the killing of Mazon was attended by treachery. No evidence was presented to show that prior to
the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and consciously adopted the mode of
attack. 79
xxx xxx xxx
[W]here there is no evidence that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the crime or
there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection, treachery cannot be
considered. 80
If the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was
not deliberately sought by the accused, but was purely accidental. 81
66

It asserts, further, that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was duly proven by the prosecution;
nevertheless, since it was not alleged in the Information, it may only be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
We cannot proceed to resolve the assigned errors without first commenting on certain lapses of the trial court, which only
heighten a suspicion that the accused initially obtained generous concessions from it. It immediately granted, ex-parte,
their request to be detained at the PNP stockade but, at the same time, denied the accompanying motion for bail solely
on the ground that it did not set it for hearing, although both motions were contained in one petition. It took no positive
action against the accused, the PNP Provincial Director, and the Provincial Jail Warden, despite admissions that the
accused had been allowed to roam around unescorted and even go to Batangas without leave of court in all instances.
Then strangely, it rejected the motion for contempt on the flimsy ground of "humanitarian" considerations. Worse, it did
not pursue any disciplinary action against the Provincial Jail Warden despite the latter's failure to comply with the "show
cause" order of 10 May 1992.
Compounding the matter, although the trial court had been belatedly informed by the Provincial Jail Warden on 15 May
1992 that the accused had escaped from the Provincial Jail on 9 May 1992, and by Clerk of Court Fortus that on 12 May
and 13 May 1992 accused Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel were in the custody of the Provincial Governor, the trial court did
not either order the Provincial Jail Warden to formally investigate the escape nor direct the Provincial Governor to show
cause why he kept the "escaped" prisoners.
What is more appalling is that although it validly tried the accused in absentia 82 because they escaped, it conveniently
forgot that by their escape, the accused waived their right to present evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against
them. 83 Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio on 8 June 1992 and all documents identified by him
(Exhibits "1" to "5-A", inclusive) must be rejected.
Needless to say, the conduct of the trial court leaves much to be desired.
We now turn to the assigned errors.
The first assigned error is patently without merit. The challenged decision substantially complied with the requirements of
both Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution 84 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. 85 The pertinent
disquisitions therein, as well as its dispositive portion earlier quoted, readily show such compliance. It sets out the facts
which it believed were proved and the law upon which the judgment was based, and states the legal qualifications of the
offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
imposed, and the civil liability.
The remaining assigned errors are interrelated and may be classified as follows:
That the trial court erred:
I. In holding that the crime of murder was committed despite absence of proof of its essential elements (First and Fourth
assigned errors);
II. In holding the appellant guilty despite lack of evidence against him (Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth assigned errors);
III. In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of band (Eleventh assigned error);
IV. In holding that the appellant and his co-accused had escaped and such escape indicated an admission of guilt (Twelfth
and Thirteenth assigned errors);
V. In not making a finding as to what part of the testimony of the witnesses it considered believable (Fourteenth assigned
error);
We resolve them in seriatim.
I. The qualifying circumstance alleged in the Information was treachery and the trial court appreciated it as:
[I]n killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tended directly
and especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which said Mazon might
make . . . 86
While the above was a mere conclusion without an accompanying explanation, such a lamentable inadequacy does not,
per se, justify a reversal of the decision. Since the appellant's appeal opens the whole case for review, 87 we shall, on the
basis of the evidence, determine for ourselves if the killing of Isagani Mazon was attended with treachery.
For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed giving
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or form of
execution
were
deliberately
and
consciously
adopted
by
the
accused. 88
In the case at bench, the victim seemed to have expected trouble, considering that upon seeing Manlusoc and Bunyi
approaching him, he told his companion, Mejico, to move away. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated for even
when the victim was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. 89 The evidence clearly bears this out. The victim was unarmed
and the accused gave no warning. The victim was then totally unprepared to even guess that the appellant and his coaccused Canuel who were the first two who appeared would pepper him with bullets. It was for this reason that the
appellant asserted in his Brief:
[I]nstead of running away when he had the opportunity to do so, the victim went straight, continued to walk towards the
appellant and Canuel and faced them. 90
This reaction only showed that the victim had no inkling whatever that he would be fired upon. The assault was
indisputably sudden and the victim's premonition of peril did not negate the treacherous nature of the attack.
That it was impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate is obvious from other circumstances of this case. While
the accused each had a gun, there is no proof that the victim was armed. The appellant's allegation that "[t]ruly, after the
shootout, the victim yielded a gun and a dagger," 91 does not even point to the source of such a conclusion. If it were the
67

testimony or report of defense witness Rogelio, the same, as already noted above, must be rejected. If, indeed, the victim
had a gun and dagger, the accused should have presented them at the hearing on the application for bail.
A sudden attack against an unarmed victim shows treachery. 92 Furthermore, it was shown that the first shot, towards the
victim's head, came from behind the victim. 93 While it has been said that a dorsal attack alone does not indicate
treachery, 94 the assault in this case was also sudden, unexpected, and without warning, thus suggesting treachery. 95
As to the method of execution, we find that the accused, including the appellant, adopted it deliberately. We disagree with
the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that treachery was absent because of lack of evidence that "prior to
the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and consciously adopted the mode of
attack." 96 The number and location of the gunshot wounds, two in the head, and at both the anterior and posterior
portions of the body as shown in Exhibit "C," are enough to banish any motive of an accidental shooting. 97 The severity
of the accused's acts indicate a calculated pursuit of a decision to kill.
Treachery being present, it was then error for the trial court to consider the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength as an independent aggravating circumstance. It is settled that treachery absorbs abuse of superior
strength. 98
II. Under the second classification of his assigned errors, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding him
guilty of murder: (a) despite the failures of the medico-legal officer to testify to the fact of death of the victim (Third
assigned error) and of the trial court to make a finding that the bullet which came from his (appellant's) gun hit the victim
(Fifth assigned error); (b) despite absence of proof that the gunshot coming from his (appellant's) firearm hit the victim
(Eight assigned error) and as to who caused the fatal gunshot wound (Ninth assigned error) and of conspiracy (Tenth
assigned error); (c) in having assumed that because he and his co-accused fired their guns, the victim's death resulted
therefrom (Sixth assigned error) and made a generalized conclusion of the death of the victim simply because he was
shot by him (appellant) and his co-accused (Seventh assigned error); and (d) in giving credit to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Lilian Francisco and Herman Mejico although the same was replete with material inconsistencies
affecting their credibility (Fifteenth assigned error) and notwithstanding the presence of circumstances indubitably
showing that their tale of the alleged shooting was unbelievable and contrary to human experience (Sixteenth assigned
error).
These errors fail to impress.
It is untrue that the medico-legal officer failed to testify to the fact of death of the victim. As earlier shown, the said
officer, Dr. Arturo Alberto, was ready to testify on 24 January 1992 in connection with the petition for bail, but the defense
and the prosecution dispensed with his testimony on the basis of the stipulation as to the nature, tenor, and extent of his
testimony and admission by the former of the qualifications of Dr. Alberto. Further, the defense chose not to crossexamine him. It probably intended to subject him to more searching questions during trial on the merits. But they
escaped before such time. Thus, when the prosecution rested its case for the trial on the merits by adopting the evidence
it introduced at the hearing of the petition for bail, which included that of Dr. Alberto and the documents prepared by him,
the appellant lost his opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Alberto, through no fault of the prosecution or any other, but solely
his own. The appellant cannot now be heard to complain.
There is equally no basis for the sixth and seventh assigned errors. The appellant admitted in his Brief that he, Canuel,
and Bunyi shot Isagani Mazon.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
EMMANUEL DESALISA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Roberto R. Barrales for accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

NOCON, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has adequately established the identity of the killer in this case, destroyed the presumption of
innocence in his favor and fulfilled the test of moral certainty sufficient to convict. Hanged by means of a rope, the victim,
accused-appellant's legal wife, and the approximately five month old fetus in her womb died as a consequence.
Unfounded infidelity of the victim moved accused-appellant to perpetrate the highly condemnable deed. As one proverb
goes, "A tranquil mind gives life to the body but jealousy rots the bones."
Accused-appellant Emmanuel Desalisa, a twenty four year old farmer, was charged with the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion in Criminal Case No. 1017 before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Fifth Judicial Region,
Branch 52. The information filed in said case reads, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October, 1983, in the (sic) sitio Pinaductan, barangay San Juan, municipality of Bacon,
province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused moved by hatred
and jealousy with evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill armed
with a sharp pointed instrument, assault, attack, and inflict physical injuries on the vagina of one Norma Desalisa y
Dioneda with whom he was united in lawful wedlock and who was pregnant for about five (5) months, and thereafter with
the use of rope hang her to a jackfruit tree causing her death and that of her fetus, to the damage and prejudice of her
legal heirs.
That in the commission of the offense there exist the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place
which facilitated the commission of the offense, and evident premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On July 10,
1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
68

WHEREFORE, with the circumstancial (sic) evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused, the Court finds accused
Emmanuel Desalisa guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Norma Desalisa y Dioneda, the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as burial expenses and Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as damages.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, the present appeal.
The antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the records are, as follows:
Accused-appellant lived with his eighteen year old legal wife, Norma Desalisa, and two year old daughter in a small nipa
house on a hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. There are two other houses in the neighborhood which are 150
meters away: the house of his parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso. These cannot, however, be seen from the
couple's house because of the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
According to Paulina Dioneda, mother of Norma, on October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she was
informed by the mother of accused-appellant that accused-appellant and Norma had an altercation. He slapped and
boxed her on the stomach. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Norma complained to her that
accused-appellant manhandled her by slapping and boxing her on the stomach when she told him not to go out of the
house and get drunk because during that time their child was sick; also, accused-appellant was jealous of a man. Even
before October 9, 1983, Norma used to tell her that she was being manhandled by accused-appellant. 3
Vicente Dioneda, father of Norma, testified that on October 9, 1983, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
accused-appellant went to their house and left his child. On the following morning, between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock, he
went to the house of accused-appellant and Norma. When he arrived there, he noticed that the plates were scattered on
the floor; the kettle with rice that was not eaten was also on the floor; and the rope which was used to tie the other end of
their hammock was missing. He went out of the house. He saw the couple's pig and observed that it was hungry. He
thought of feeding it with coconut meat so he climbed a coconut tree which was nearby. While on the third step of the
trunk, he saw the back of the body of Norma. He went down the tree and called her. Inasmuch as she did not answer him,
he approached her and touched her back. However, her body swayed. It was only then when he realized that she was
hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was tied with the missing rope of their hammock. Her bloody feet
were approximately four inches above the ground. Her dress was wet. He informed his wife immediately about the matter.
He and his wife proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso and requested the latter to fetch the authorities. Accusedappellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her of having a paramour and that the baby in her womb
was not his. The last time he saw Norma alive was on October 9, 1983, at around 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
when she went to their house. He corroborated the previous narration of Paulina Dioneda on this aspect. He saw accusedappellant at the municipal building of Bacon on October 10, 1983. He asked accused-appellant why he killed Norma.
Accused-appellant did not answer him but just stooped down. 4
Carlito Dichoso, neighbor of accused-appellant, testified that at about 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 9,
1983, accused-appellant went to his house. It was raining during that time. Accused-appellant borrowed a flashlight
because he will be looking for his wife. After two and a half hours, accused-appellant returned to Carlito's house. He sat
on a bench. Carlito asked him whether or not he found his wife but he did not answer. Carlito told him to look for his wife
in the house of his in-laws because she might be there. Again, he did not answer. Carlito also told him to look for his wife
in the nearby hut because perhaps the heavy downpour prevented her from proceeding home. Accused-appellant
remained sitting on the bench, leaning on the post. He uttered the following words: "My wife is continuously possessed by
devils." Carlito's wife then advised accused-appellant: "You must be patient with your wife because she is pregnant."
Accused-appellant did not answer her. She then prepared a mat and a pillow for accused-appellant but the latter preferred
to remain sitting on the bench. During the time that it was raining hard, or about 3:30 o'clock in the morning of the
following day, accused-appellant was frightened because he fell down from the bench. He sat again on the bench and
Carlito noticed that he did not sleep anymore. At around 5:00 o'clock of the same morning, accused-appellant opened the
door and said: "If there is something that happened, Manoy Carlito, what would I do?" Carlito was not able to ask him
where he was going because he already went down. At around 7:30 o'clock of the same morning, Carlito was informed by
Vicente and Paulina Dioneda that Norma is dead. Accused-appellant and his wife used to quarrel because of jealousy. 5
Corporal Crisonogo Gillego, chief investigator and government prosecutor of the Bacon Integrated National Police,
testified that he was ordered by their station commander to investigate the case of a woman who was hanged at San
Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. He was accompanied by two members of the Bacon INP and some barangay officials of San Juan.
He saw the woman hanging from a jackfruit tree branch, whom he later came to know as Norma Desalisa. A rope was tied
around her neck. Her feet were twelve inches above the ground. There were blood stains on the back of her dress and on
her panty. He suspected that it was not a suicide case because he noticed that the hair of Norma was entangled with the
knot of the rope. He opined that if a person is about to commit suicide, he has to prepare the knot first in order to place it
around his neck and then jump. Before Norma was untied, pictures were taken of her. He also investigated the house of
the couple and found that the rope that was used in hanging Norma was the same as the rope tied to one end of their
hammock. Some things inside the house were not in proper places. He saw accused-appellant at the house of the
barangay captain. He asked him how the incident happened but he did not answer. He asked him if he suspected
somebody as the paramour of his wife. Accused-appellant answered that a person whose surname is Ariate is courting his
wife. He asked accused-appellant whether or not they always quarrel. Accused-appellant answered that they quarrel
sometimes. He noticed that accused-appellant was trembling while he was asking those questions. He asked him why he
was not in his house. He answered that he was afraid the relatives of his wife might retaliate. Accused-appellant was
informed by his mother about the death of his wife. 6
Dr. Amelia Escarcha, resident physician of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the body of Norma
and submitted the following report:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
69

External Findings:
Head & Neck:
1. Rope embedded around the neck with knot directing to the right lateral of the neck;
2. Contusion, 3 cm., post-auricular area; right;
3. Ligature mark on the anterior neck extending to the submandibular area & infra-auricular area;
4. Tongue bitten right.
Abdomen:
5. Abdomen enlarged, at about 5 months size with fetal parts on abdominal palpation.
Genitalia:
6. Scanty pubic hair
7. Parous vagina
8. Hematoma with contusion both labia
9. Punctured wound 1 cm. long & 2 cm. depth, perineum with slight blood clot, non-perforating.
Internal Examination:
1. Cervix soft, closed, no vaginal discharge
2. Uterus pregnant to about 4-5 months in size.
Internal findings:
1. Lung both lungs collapsed colored grayish.
2. Heart - normal in size.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxation secondary to hanging. 7
On the other hand, accused-appellant professes his innocence of the crime charged against him. He speculates that his
parents-in-law are harboring ill-feelings against him since his wife died. His relationship with his wife has deteriorated as
early as June 24, 1983, when she told him upon coming home: "You nearly came upon the man." From that time on, they
had no peace at home and often quarrelled. He did not consider her anymore as his wife. But he suspects nobody of
having killed his wife, for he was of the impression that she probably committed suicide by hanging herself as previously,
she wanted to hang herself but was stopped by her uncle, "Tio Awe." His version of the incident is, as follows: In the
afternoon of October 9, 1983, his wife was in their house. When he arrived in the evening of that day, he and his wife had
an altercation because she suspected him of having an affair with the daughter of Manoy Carlito. She told him to leave
otherwise, she will leave. So, he left and visited his farm. Upon returning at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening he found
his wife gone and their daughter crying alone. He carried her and proceeded to the house of his parents-in-law to inquire
whether or not his wife is there. Not finding her, he left the child in their care and proceeded to the house of Carlito. He
likewise did not find her there. He then borrowed Carlito's flashlight to look for her. At that time, he was armed with a
sharp bladed instrument. He looked for her in the huts near their farm but she was not there. When it started to rain, he
returned to the house of Carlito to check whether or not his wife is already there, only to find out that it was not so. Since
it was raining hard, he stayed in the house of Carlito up to around 5:30 o'clock in the morning of the following day, when
he went home hoping to find his wife there. Still, there was no trace of his wife. Searching around the premises, he saw
his wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. He was shocked and taken aback because he did not think that his
wife would do such a thing. He knew that she was dead because she was not moving. But the first thing he did was to go
to the house of his parents and informed them about the incident instead of running to her and cutting her down. His
mother went immediately to the police station, while he went to Dominador Baluyot, one of the peace and order officers
to inform him about the incident. 8
Juan Don, a councilor, and Dominador Baluyot, a laborer, testified that there was no eyewitness to the incident, They
opined, however, that accused-appellant did not kill Norma.
In this appeal, accused-appellant imputes error on the part of the trial court for finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt despite evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant asseverates that the trial court erred in arriving at the conclusion that he was motivated by jealousy in
killing his wife. Not only is this not true but on the contrary, it was the victim who was jealous. She previously tried to
commit suicide but was fortunately prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of her "Tio Awe". In fact, he spent
the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso which he would not have done if he were guilty. His first impulse, if he had killed
his wife, is to go into hiding to avoid arrest.
The Office of the Solicitor General supports the conviction of accused-appellant. The injuries sustained by his wife belie
his assertion that she committed suicide by hanging herself. His defense of denial is one of the weakest defenses. The
presence of motive and the attendant circumstances, correctly led the trial court to believe that he killed his wife.
We uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
The quantum of proof necessary to establish accused-appellant's guilt, albeit based on circumstantial evidence, is
sufficient. There is more than one circumstance. The facts from which the inference are derived are proven. The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 9 Thus, we quote as our
own the ratiocination of the trial court:
MOTIVE:
There is not (sic) question (that) there was a serious quarrel between accused Emmanuel Desalisa and his young wife
deceased Norma Desalisa. The accused admitted the existence of the quarrel to P/Cpl. Gillego, as was testified to by the
mother-in-law of the accused Paulina Dioneda and admitted by the accused when he testified for and in his own
behalf. . . . Likewise, accused admitted (that) one Aryate was courting Norma and that when the matter was brought out
to him, the accused was trembling and very pale.
Paulina Dioneda testified, which was unrebutted nor denied by the accused, that on October 9, 1983, at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning, her daughter (deceased) Norma accompanied by her mother-in-law (mother of the accused) told
70

her she had an altercation with her husband accused Emmanuel. Norma was, according to her, slapped, boxed and
manhandled by the accused. . . .
When the accused testified for and in his own behalf, he admitted that on October 9, 1983, or immediately prior to
Norma's hideous hanging, Norma refused to allow him to enter the house or she will be the one to leave the house. A
statement coming from a wife when told to a husband cannot be mistaken to anything less than a very serious quarrel.
The quarrel between accused Emmanuel and deceased Norma prior to and immediately before the fatal hanging when
considered with the kind of quarrel the couple were having, an affair with another man, culminating to his doubt having
fathered the child Norma was carrying at the time was doubtful (sic). Jealousy (sic) is a motive as old as time.
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE CRIME:
The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The house where accused Emmanuel and Norma live as pictured
by both the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense is up a hill and isolated. The whole neighborhood consists of
only three (3) houses. While it is true (that) from any of the three (3) houses, one cannot see the other because of the
fruit trees and shrubs that abound, their distance from each other is only 150 meters. No one, definitely no one can go up
the hill to visit or whatever without being known to the neighbor. With such an arrangement, no one can go up the hill to
the house of the accused Emmanuel and Norma without their neighbors, who are related to them, being aware of.
Nowhere in the whole evidence, where neither Norma's family nor accused Emmanuel Desalisa's family, directly or
indirectly, even suspected any stranger for having committed the crime. The accused himself blamed that (sic) his wife
Norma for having taken her own life. He never pointed his accusing finger to anybody.
As early as 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 9, 1983, accused Emmanuel was with Norma and their child in their
house up the hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon. They were all alone in that isolated house when he was not allowed,
with threatening voice, entry in his own house, or his wife will leave the house. What can be more humiliating to a man
aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to one's very home? A man maybe able to swallow defeat to a
woman's affection, even lose the love of a wife, but to be scorned and refused entry to one's house by the very woman
who was unfaithful to his love, is something a man cannot take sitting down, as the accused did take with his own hand
the life of his young wife Norma.
The intensity of the hatred of the man who committed the dastardly act of hanging Norma by the neck tied to the branch
of a jackfruit tree is shown by the injury suffered by the deceased. The injury on the head, the entangled hair of the
deceased to the noose of the rope, the proximity (six inches) of the noose that holds and encircles the neck of the
deceased to that of the branch of the jackfruit tree, the contusion in the labia minora and punctured wound suffered by
the deceased in her genital area, could have only be done by a man whose manhood was trampled upon, as accused
Emmanuel Desalisa in his jealousy was prone to believe, and in his blind jealousy not only snuffed the life of his wife by
hanging but also tortured and humiliated the deceased by abusing and inflicting injury to her private parts as a last act of
insult to humiliate her womanhood, as he was insulted and humiliated to (sic) what he believe (sic) his unfaithful wife has
committed against his honor.
Another point that is pointed, is, when the accused was at the house of his neighbor, his Manoy Carlito Dichoso, after
having left said house to look for his wife, he was asked by Carlito if he found his wife. The accused did not answer the
query. He just sat on the bench and said, "his wife Norma is possessed by devils." When Carlito's wife who was then
present told him to be patient with his wife because she is pregnant, again, the accused, did not answer. When the
accused was at the police headquarters of Bacon, and in the presence of many, was accused (sic) by his father-in-law
Vicente Dioneda, why he killed his daughter Norma. Again, the accused did not answer. That when P/Cpl. Gillego was able
to extract from him the information that one Ariate was courting Norma, the accused was trembling and very pale. These
are actuations and circumstances pointing to a man bothered by a guilty conscience. 10
The uncorroborated assertions of accused-appellant that it was the victim who was jealous of him and that she has tried
to commit suicide previously are nothing but self-serving statements which cannot outweigh the prosecution's
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 11
There is ample evidence to support the finding that the hanging of the victim was homicidal 12 and not suicidal, as
claimed by accused-appellant. A day after the incident, Vicente Dioneda found scattered plates and kettle with untouched
rice on the floor of the house of accused-appellant 13 while Cpl. Gillego found that some things in the house were not in
proper places. 14 These are indicia or previous struggle. There were blood stains on the victim's dress, 15 panty, 16 and
feet. 17 On her genitalia, the doctor found a punctured wound, 1 cm. long and 2 cm. deep, with slight blood clot which
could have been caused by any pointed object, sharp bolo or sharp pointed instrument. 18 Accused-appellant admitted
during the cross-examination that he was armed with a sharp bladed instrument while he was looking for his wife. 19 The
doctor also found hematoma with contusion on both labia of her genitalia, which could have been caused by a fist blow. 20
According to the doctor, these injuries could not have been self-inflicted. 21
Although accused-appellant spent the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso and did not flee, this circumstance standing
alone is no brief on his innocence. There is no case law holding that non-flight is conclusive proof of innocence. 22
What strikes the attention of this Court further is the testimony of accused-appellant that when he saw his wife hanging
from a branch of the jackfruit tree, he went to the house of his parents and informed them about the incident, 23 instead
of bringing her down and determining if she was still alive, and if so, to rush her to any doctor, clinic or hospital. He didn't
even bother to let his parents-in-law know of what happened to their daughter because according to him, he was
confused. 24
We find it hard to believe in his excuse, considering that the house of his parents-in-law, is only 150 meters away from his
house. 25 Furthermore, it goes without saying that his parents-in-law are the more concerned persons than his parents
with respect to the misfortune that befell their daughter. Or, he could have proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso,
which is likewise only 150 meters away from his house. We view the course of action that he took as akin to seeking
sanctuary in the protective arms of his parents.
71

The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated against accused-appellant absent any
proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. 26 Neither may be
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated against him because there is no proof that it was purposely
sought or taken advantage of, or that it facilitated the commission of the crime. 27
However, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not
by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was
reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and many
fruit trees and shrubs obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to
receive any assistance. 28 At any rate, in the imposition of the proper penalty we shall disregard the presence of this
aggravating circumstance, which we shall explain later.
We note that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of parricide only. This is an error. The evidence on
record has shown beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant has committed the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the victim. It is
unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion. 29
In case of complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. 30 The
maximum period of the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, is death. 31 However, by reason of Sec. 19 (1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. 32 Being a single indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. 33
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The civil indemnity for the death of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ ET AL., defendants and appellants.
1. MURDER; SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.Facts examined and held sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of
murder.
2. ID.; PREMEDITATION; DETERMINATION TO KILL UNKNOWN PERSONS.In order that premeditacin conocida may
exist, it is not necessary that the accused premeditate the killing of a particular individual. A general attack with deadly
weapons upon a given village having been premeditated and planned, the killing of any individual during the excitement
of that attack is murder.
3. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.The nature and characteristics of the aggravating circumstances defined in
paragraphs 8 to 16, inclusive, of the findings, discussed and presented, and such circumstances found not present under
the facts. [United States vs. Rodriguez., 19 Phil. 150(1911)]
THE
UNITED
STATES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
W.L.
Wright
for
appellants.
Acting Attorney Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Dorotea Rojas, Feliciano Pantanilla, Roman
Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante,
Victoriano Calipusan and Valentin Multialto from a judgment o the Court of First Instance of the Moro Province, Hon
Herbert D. Gale presiding, convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them each to death.
From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears that the appellants, with nine other, being members of the
second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during the
course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately after such revolt the
mutinees, having taken arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched toward the
mountains of Lipada; that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the
town; that the inhabitants thereof, having received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to meet
it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been detailed by those
commanding the defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to, advanced to the cemetery within the limits
of the town, forming an outpost for the purpose of awaiting the coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they
sighted the mutineers; that immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, which came from near the
cemetery, where the mutineers had halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had been exchanged Roy Libby was
struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to the convent and took refuge therein; that the mutineers
advanced against the town, attacking it at various points and especially the convent, where a portion of the residents of
the town had gathered, including the women and children, or the purpose of defending themselves; that no other person
except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or less severely wounded.
What with the confession of some of the accused, the testimony of others, and the evidence presented by the witnesses
for the prosecution, there remains so little a question of fact in this case that it is substantially unworthy of discussion.
That the appellants with others revolted against their superior officers on the 6th of June; that they returned to Davao on
72

the 8th and attacked it viciously and persistently, killing one of its defenders and wounding several others; and that they
all took a direct and active part therein, is not only absolutely undoubted from the testimony of the prosecution but is
substantially admitted by all of the defendants in the case. Some of the appellants sought to defend themselves upon the
ground that they had been forced, by threats and intimidation, to take part in the mutiny and the attack upon Davao by
other members o the mutineer band. The evidence in no way justifies this defense and it is utterly impossible under any
construction of the evidence to sustain it. All of the appellants, however, agree in presenting the defense that they
entered the town of Davao on the 8th of June, not for the purpose of attacking it for the purpose of surrendering to their
superior officers and the governor of the district. Not only it is impossible from the testimony of the prosecution to arrive
at such a conclusion o fact, but it is almost as nearly impossible to arrive at such a conclusion from the evidence
presented by the appellants themselves. No defense upon the facts worthy of the name has been presented.
As to whether or not there was present premeditacion conocida, qualifying the crime as murder, a simple reading of the
proofs presented by the Government is sufficient to demonstrate that beyond question or doubt. It appears that all of the
appellants, on or about the 8th day of June, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, went to the house of Cenon Rasay, some
distance from Davao, in order to obtain information as to whether or not reinforcements had been landed at Davao. On
being informed that, to the knowledge of the persons questioned, none had been landed, they asked the elder Rasay to
permit them to leave at his house the three woman that accompanied them, as they were going to march on Davao and
attack it. The appellant Rodriguez also requested that, in case he should be killed in the attack, he, Rasay, should treat
one of the women, who was the wife of Rodriguez, as his servant. Having left the women in the house of Cenon, they took
up the march to Davao. On arriving near the river Bagoo, they were overtaken by Ignacio Rasay, a kinsman of Cenon
Rasay, and suspecting that he was going to Davao for the purpose of warning the town against the meditated attack,
they halted him and told him that, if he should give any warning of their approach, they would cause damage to his
family. He having assured them that such was not his purpose, they permitted him to proceed. The appellants continued
on their way and arriving at the cemetery near Davao heard a shot, which they claim came from those who had seen sent
out to watch for their approach. On seeing this advance guard, the accused dismounted from their horses and began to
fire forming in a skirmish line and advancing steadily. Overwhelmed by the number of the attacking party, the outpost
retreated toward the village, pursued by the appellant. There followed an attack upon the town, more or less general, of
the kind and character generally to be expected from such a body of men. The attacks was, in a large measure,
unsuccessful and the mutineers withdrew when they saw the futility of further fighting.
The learned trial court found premeditacion conocida as the element qualifying the crime as murder. The learned counsel
for the appellants excepts to this finding and asserts that, inasmuch as the appellants did not know even of the existence
of the deceased, Roy Libby, at the time of his death, much less that he was at the time in the village they attacked and
one of the outpost of four, his death could not possibly have been premeditated. He argues that, in order that the killing
be premeditated, the accused must have resolved to kill the premeditated person. We do not stop to discuss this question
at length for the reason that it has already been determined by this court adversely to the learned counsel's contention.
In the case of the United States vs. The Moro Manalinde, "the accused made up his mind to kill two undetermined
persons, the first whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the inducement of a third person." In its decision
the court said:
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused upon accepting the order and undertaking the
journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature
and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said Datto, he was about to carry out, and to
that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night
for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never
had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that
the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered,
does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature of the circumstances which characterize
the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was
not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds
executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one, as the firm and persistent intention of the
accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed upon the offer of
money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there
existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because
an offer money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being
independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a
promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistently and firm intent in his plan to carry out
the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the
crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it. (U.S. vs The Moro Manalinde, 14 Phil. Rep.,
77.)
The trial court found that the crime charged was committed with the aggravating circumstances following:
8. When craft, fraud or disguise is employed.
9. When advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense.
10. When the act is committed with abuse of confidence.
11. When advantage is taken is taken by the culprit of his public position.
13. When the crime is committed on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck or other calamity or misfortune.
15. When it is committed at night, or in an uninhabited place, or by a gang.
16. When the crime is committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities.
As to number 8:
We do not believe that this circumstance was present.
73

This circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the criminal
resorts to carry out his design. This paragraph was intended to cover, for example, the case where a thief falsely
represents that he is the lover of the servant of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the owner (astucia); or where
(fraude) A simulates the handwriting of B, who is a friend of C, inviting the latter, without the knowledge of B, by means
of a note written in such simulated hand, to meet B at a designated place, in order to give A, who lies in wait at the place
appointed, an opportunity to kill C; or where (disfraz) one uses a disguise to prevent being recognized; and cases of that
class and nature.
We are unable to find from the facts proved any element which warrants the conclusions of the learned trial court as to
the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the appellants were found guilty. They boldly
marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the daytime, with the purpose of attacking the town,
which purpose they communicated to at least three person, one of whom was permitted to precede them to the town.
they advanced against the town at about 4.15 in the afternoon without any effort at concealment. They were in no way
disguised, but, on the contrary, each wore the greater portion of the Constabulary uniform in which he was clad at the
time of the mutiny. While it appears that some of them had cloths wrapped about their heads, it does not appear that this
was done as a disguise, but was following rather the custom of the country in which they had been reared. We find in all
the case nothing of craft, fraud or disguise.
As to number 9:
The circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can hardly be said
that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense when twenty-three men, in
the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a town of the size of Davao. the results of the attack
clearly show that the strength of the attacking party was not sufficient to accomplish the purpose in view. They
demonstrate, under the circumstance, that no means were employed to weaken the defense, outside of such as are
inherent in the situation when one body of men attacks another with deadly weapons.
As to number 10:
For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence between the person
committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the former make use of such relation to commit
the crime. For example, where one commits a robbery in a house in which, as a friend of the owner, he is at the time a
guest. No relation of this nature existed between the appellants and the citizens of Davao or the deceased. The evidence
fails to disclose a single fact upon which the existence of this relation can be based.
As to number 11:
In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be a public official
and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the means by which he realizes his
purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry, "Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the
crime?" We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant the finding of the trial court in this particular. (Supreme court
of Spain, decisions of 4th March, 1872; 18th December, 1871.)
As to number 13:
The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst
of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune
to despoil them.
As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the occasion of
the attack.
As to number 15:
The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:
The court shall take this circumstance into consideration according to the nature and characteristics of the crime.
In this case, under all the circumstances, including those presented in the discussion relating to paragraph 9, the fact that
there were more than three armed persons in the attacking party is not sufficient to call for the application of the
provisions of this paragraph.
As to number 16:
The supreme court of Spain has held "that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority, provided for in
paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in the exercise of its functions and he who
is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person against whom the crime is committed in which that
circumstance appears;" the court further saying that such aggravating circumstance was not present in the case before it
"because D. Jose Torres, although he was municipal judge, was the object of the murder involved in that case."
In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities, those authorities
must have been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were the very persons against
whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed.
After diligent investigation and extended consideration, we have been unable to find that any aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of this crime.
There being present no aggravating circumstances and there existing no extenuating circumstances, the penalty imposed
must be in its medium degree.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified and the appellants are each sentenced to cadena perpetua, to the
accessories provided by law, to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the deceased Roy Libby the sun of P1,000 and to
pay the costs of the trial.
So modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

74

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES alias PIDO,
JIMMY AGLUBA and LEON CERIA, accused, MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES @ Pido, and JIMMY
AGLUBA, accused-appellants. [People vs. Umbrero, 196 SCRA 821(1991)]
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Branch 8, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Mariano Umbrero, Jaime (Jimmy) Agluba
and Alfredo Costales alias Pido, guilty of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and therefore sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay jointly and
severally an indemnity of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS to the heirs of Alfonso Urbi; and each of them to pay
1/7 of the costs. (Rollo, p. 31)
The information filed against the accused reads:
That on or about November 29, 1980, in the Municipality of Lallo, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales alias Pido, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria, together
with Eugenio Rigon alias Inyong, Bartolome Tangonan and Danny Costales who are still at-large and not yet arrested,
armed with guns, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one, Alfonso Urbi, inflicting
upon the latter wounds on his body which caused his death.
That the offense was committed with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit: (a) that it was committed with
abuse of superior strength, and (b) that it was committed by a band. (Records, p. 33)
The accused Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The
other accused, Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome Tangonan, and Danny Costales were not arraigned as they were still at large.
The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Angelina Urbi Ragsac, daughter of the victim Alfonso Urbi testified: She was at home in Sta. Teresa at about 2:00 in
the afternoon of November 29, 1980 when several armed men came, two (2) of whom shot her father under the house,
accused Alfredo Costales and Danny Costales. She was not able to recognize the other armed men. She was two (2)
meters from her father when he was shot. Of the two accused mentioned, she only identified in Court accused Alfredo
Costales. Danny Costales was not present. He was the one who shot her father. He followed her father when he ran
outside the house but the companions of Alfredo Costales followed and killed him. Alfredo Costales and Danny Costales
shot her father with short firearms. Their companions had long firearms. All the accused ran after killing her father. She
and her mother did not do anything because they were afraid; however, they went to get the body of her father later on.
He sustained five (5) gunshot wounds on his breast and stomach. She reported the killing of her father to barangay
captain Felix Villamin. Thereafter she executed an affidavit marked as Exhibits "E" and "E-1" which were admitted by the
defense as part of the record. Mariano Umbrero was among the armed men who came to their house in the afternoon of
November 29, 1980. She knows him personally.
On cross-examination defense counsel Atty. Alfredo J. Donato made reference to question No. 5 and the corresponding
answer, in the affidavit of the witness (Exhibits "E" & "E-1 ") to be marked as Exhibit "I " for the defense. She admitted
that the first one to shoot her father was Danny Costales of Jurisdiccion, Camalaniugan known and called Dominador who
executed an affidavit. She knew that Alfredo Costales was apprehended. As to Danny Costales, she does not know
whether or not he was apprehended. In 1980 their place was infested with NPA and she believed that Danny Costales and
his companions were members of the NPA. She does not know of any motive of the armed men in killing her father. She,
her father and mother and her children were then eating on the ground floor of their house when the armed men arrived.
Her father stood up when Danny Costales asked for water to drink. Her father went to the door to see him and his
companions. It was there where Danny Costales shot him.
On August 5, 1985 the prosecution presented Eugenia Urbi, surviving spouse of the victim Alfonso Urbi. Her testimony is
hereby reproduced substantially: In the afternoon of November 29, 1980, at about 2:00 o'clock, she and her deceased
husband were in the house of their daughter Angelina Urbi Ragsac in Sta. Teresa, Lallo. To their surprise, armed men
came to ask for water. When her husband went to them to give water he was shot by Johnny Costales. Mariano Umbrero,
Jimmy Agluba and Pido Costales were his companions. She identified in Court Pido Costales who gave his name as Alfredo
Costales, Mariano Umbrero and Jaime Agluba. Johnny Costales was not in Court. She knows Leon Ceria he being her
barriomate. She saw him the following day after the killing of her husband when he passed by their house. She did not
see Leon Ceria with the group of armed men who went to their house. She was about a meter from her husband when he
was shot by Johnny Costales in the presence of his companions. Johnny and Danny Costales was admitted as one and the
same person. At the time Danny Costales shot her husband, some of his companions were near him and some were a
little bit far. Those who were near him were the accused Pido Costales, Mariano Umbrero and Jimmy Agluba. They were all
armed. Danny Costales and his companions left after shooting her husband. Thereafter the killing of her husband was
reported to barangay captain Felix Villamin who instructed Juan Urbi to get the body of her husband. She could not be
compensated for the killing of her husband. She was investigated, and in connection therewith she executed an affidavit
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1").
On cross-examination, she testified that Danny Costales shot her husband three (3) times. She clarified that when they
were eating, Danny Costales and his companions suddenly arrived. They asked for water. Her husband stood up and went
to see them. That was the time when Danny Costales shot her husband for the first time. Her husband ran outside,
followed by Danny Costales and shot him again. Danny Costales and his companions then left. She did not go
immediately to the place of her husband because she was afraid. At the time Danny Costales shot her husband, accused
Alfredo Costales, Jaime Agluba and Mariano Umbrero were holding their firearms at their sides. They drew their guns
75

when her husband ran outside the house; however, they did not prevent her husband from running outside the house.
She could not tell as to whether or not Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo Costales fired their guns.
Exhibit "B", sworn statement of Eugenia Urbi, was also adopted as Exhibit "4" for the defense, to show that the victim
sustained five (5) gunshot wounds, the entrance of which were 0.5 cm. showing that the fatal weapon was fired by one
person.
On August 28, 1985 the prosecution presented Martin Pagaduan, also a resident of Sta. Teresa, Lallo, Cagayan. He was in
his ricefield north of the house of Alfonso Urbi on the day he was shot to death. He saw more than ten (10) armed men
passed by going westward. Not long thereafter, he heard gun reports from the house of Alfonso Urbi which is less than
fifty (50) meters from his ricefield. The armed men returned and proceeded eastward. They took his brother Juan
Pagaduan. He was able to identify Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba, Pido Costales, Inyong Rigon, Florante Tabunal and
Romy Arellano who were with the group of armed men he saw. When he heard gun reports he saw the armed men
surrounding the house of Alfonso Urbi. The persons in the house cried loudly. He went to hide because he was afraid.
When the armed men were already gone, he went to the house of Alfonso Urbi. He saw him already dead in his yard. He
sustained gunshot wounds. He identified in Court accused Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo Costales. They
were all holding firearms when they passed by. He was confronted with his affidavit taken during the investigation
conducted by the Integrated National Police of Lallo which was marked as Exhibits "G" and "G-1 ".
On cross-examination he admitted that he was examined during the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal
Trial Court of Lallo. His signature appearing therein was marked as Exhibit "2" and the signature of Judge Pascual as
Exhibit "2-B". The question of the Court: "How did you know that there were ten (10) heavily armed men who were
present in the house of Alfonso Urbi on November 29, 1980 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he was gunned
down by these heavily armed persons? Ans. I was around forty (40) meters away from these heavily armed persons
preparing my harrow when I was attracted by the presence of those armed persons when one of them by the name of
Doming Arellano shot the late Alfonso Urbi with an armalite was marked as Exhibit "2-D". (Rollo, p. 22-24)
The case as against Leon Ceria was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
As for Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales and Jimmy Agluba, their version is summarized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mariano Umbrero corroborated his witness Alejandrino Umangay, that they they left Sta. Teresa and Rosario,
respectively because the soldiers ordered them to evacuate; they and other residents of the barangay were suspected as
members of the NPA. On November 29, 1980, Alejandrino Umangay went to collect from Mariano Umbrero an
indebtedness of P200.00. To pay the same Mariano Umbrero sought to mill his palay in Bical, Lallo, a distance of three
kilometers in the ricemill of Gregorio Cabulay. As they were putting in a sack the palay, two men arrived Ka Al the leader
of the NPA and Danny Costales. They invited Mariano Umbrero to the house of Alfonso Urbi. Mariano Umbrero excused
himself for they were going to mill his palay, and they told him to follow. At 4:00 o'clock their palay was milled and
Mariano Umbrero started for his house at 5:00 o'clock. Mariano Umbrero denied having been with Danny Costales, when
he shot to death Alfonso Urbi.
The accused Alfredo Costales corroborated the testimony of his wife Maria Umoso, that on November 29, 1980 when
Alfonso Urbi was killed he was not in Sta. Teresa, Lallo, for he was in Aparri, Cagayan on the burial of Benilda Espino, their
granddaughter who died on November 23, 1980 (Exh. 4, Death Certificate) who was buried on November 28, 1980 in the
afternoon, and went back to Sta. Teresa at 5:00 o'clock and arrived at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. In 1980, the soldiers
ordered them to evacuate Sta. Teresa due to the presence of the NPA. Alfredo Costales denied having been with Danny
Costales (no relation) when he killed Alfonso Urbi on November 29, 1980, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (pp. 7, 8
Decision)
The accused Jaime Agluba, corroborated the testimony of his wife Laureta Agluba, who testified that in 1980 soldiers
ordered residents of Sta. Teresa to evacuate due to the presence of NPA. On November 29, 1980, were not in Sta. Teresa
but they were in Newagac, Gattaran, a distance of about 50 kilometers. (should be 15 kilometers, TSN, January 17, 1989,
pp. 10-11) As is their usual work the accused Jaime Agluba, during farming time always went to help his sister Estrella
Villamin, married to Rufino Villamin. They left Sta. Teresa on November 23, 1980 and continued living in Newagac, until
their return to Sta. Teresa, Lallo, on December 2, 1980. Jaime Agluba denied having been with Danny Costales when he
killed Alfonso Urbi on November 29,1980." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4)
xxx xxx xxx
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THAT THE HON. LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AS AGAINST THE ACCUSED MARIANO
UMBRERO, THERE BEING NO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OR WAS
THERE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, THUS DENYING HIM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA AND THE PAYMENT
OF P30,000.00 INDEMNITY. (Rollo, p. 50)
In the first assigned, error, Mariano Umbrero alleges that he was denied his right to due process. He states that there was
no preliminary investigation conducted as his name not included in the criminal complaint filed with the municipal court
which conducted the preliminary investigation.
The allegation is unmeritorious.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [A]lthough appellant Umbrero was not named in the complaint filed by the police with the municipal trial court for the
purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, the municipal judge upon being informed that Mariano Umbrero was
76

one of the perpetrators of the killing of Alfonso Urbi, issued a warrant of arrest and later ordered suspect Umbrero to file
his counter-affidavit. The record shows that appellant Umbrero was given the opportunity to answer the charges against
him during the preliminary investigation. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 6-7)
Moreover, it has been held in Parades v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991), reiterating this Court's ruling
in People v. Casiano (1 SCRA 478, [1961]), that:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there was no preliminary investigation and the defendant,
before entering his plea, calls the attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. (pp. 7-8)
The appellant never asked for or called the attention of the court before entering his plea, as to the absence of a
preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary investigation, then is deemed waived as he failed to invoke such right
prior to or, at least, at the time of the entry of his plea in the court of first instance. (People v. Casiano, p. 483, supra) The
entry of their plea constituted a waiver of their right to preliminary investigation and any irregularity that attended it.
(See People v. La Caste, 37 SCRA 767, 773 [1971])
Jurisdiction was acquired by the Court over the person of Mariano Umbrero as the accused appeared at the arraignment
and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. (See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, 5 [1988])
In the second assigned error, the appellants contend that there was no conspiracy, thus, they should all be adjudged as
innocent. They asserted that mere presence at the scene of the crime does not by itself indicate the existence of
conspiracy. There must be proof of their participation in the crime.
This contention must fail.
It is well-settled rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the
accused. (People v. Alitao, G.R. No. 74736, February 18, 1991) The appellants' actuations immediately prior to, during,
and right after the shooting of Alfonso Urbi indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The appellants were not
merely present at the scene of the crime. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellants as among the
armed men who arrived at the scene of the crime, shot Alfonso Urbi, and left together after apparently accomplishing
their purpose. (TSN, April 10, 1985, pp. 2, 7; TSN, August 5, 1985, pp. 2, 6; TSN, August 28,1985, pp. 2-3)
The trial court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
It will be recalled that accused Mariano Umbrero, Jaime Agluba and Alfredo Costales, alias Pido and others were all armed
when they went together to the house of the victim Alfonso Urbi. They were close to Danny Costales when he (Danny)
asked for water which was not their common purpose. Alfonso Urbi got near to see them. Suddenly he was shot by Danny
Costales. He ran outside the house but was overtaken by Danny Costales who pumped more shots on him all located on
the vital parts of the body, causing his instantaneous death. They all left together upon accomplishing their purpose. The
accused were all holding their firearms on their sides, while others stood guard and surrounded the house. The acts
performed by all the accused before, during and after the perpetration of the crime are indicative of a previous criminal
design and unity of common purpose. (Rollo, p. 30)
The appellants although not active participants in the killing itself, made no effort to prevent it. In fact, the appellants
even drew the guns that were tucked on their waists when Alfonso Urbi, after being shot for the first time, tried to run
outside of his house. (TSN, August 5,1985, pp. 18-19)
Conspiracy having been established, the appellants as co-conspirators are all guilty on the principle that the act of one is
the act of all. (People v. de Guzman, 162 SCRA 145,153 [1988])
The defense of alibi of the appellants is without merit. The appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the witnesses were only a few meters away from the crime scene. (TSN, April 10, 1985, p. 3; TSN August 5,
1985, p. 5).
The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the appellants (People
v. Kyamko, G.R. No. 95263, December 18, 1990). There is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on
the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused. Identification, then, should be given full credit. As there is no
showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved, their testimony therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. (People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. L-34386, February
7,1991)
In the instant case, the appellants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were at some other place
and for such a period of time as to negate their presence at the time when and the place where the crime was
committed. (See People v. Solis, G.R. No. 93629, March 18, 1991 citing People v. Riego, G.R. No. 90256, September 12,
1990)
The persons that the appellants presented to corroborate their alibis were their relatives.
Alfredo Costales and Jaime Agluba could have presented other people, aside from their wives, to corroborate their
testimony that they were at some place other than the scene of the crime. But even the testimony of Jaime Agluba's wife
did not clearly show that Jaime Agluba was not in Sta. Teresa as she stated that during their stay in Newagac her husband
would go to the field and it was only the wife's belief that her husband was in the field in the afternoon of November 29,
1980. (TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 16-17) As regards Mariano Umbrero, he could have presented Gregorio Cabulay (TSN,
April 21, 1986, p. 27) aside from Alejandrino Umangay to support his statement. Umangay's corroboration is not that
credible as Umbrero and Umangay had known each other ever since they were still little boys (TSN, April 21, 1986, p. 31)
and Umbrero's relative is Umangay's niece. (TSN, April 21, 1986, p. 32) It has been ruled that the defense of alibi is weak
if it is established mainly by the accused themselves and their relatives and not by credible persons ( See People v. Flores,
G. R. No. 71980, March 18, 1991).
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the case at bar.
77

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. (People v. Cempron, G.R. No. 66324, July 6, 1990; People v. Manzanares,
177 SCRA 427, 434, [1989])
The shooting of Alfonso Urbi was sudden and unexpected. The victim was unarmed, unable to defend himself. He was an
unsuspecting victim as the assailants just asked for a drink of water. (TSN, April 10, 1985, p. 20; TSN, August 5,1985, p. 2)
He was totally unprepared to be able to defend himself.
On the other hand, evident premeditation was not clearly established, contrary to the findings of the trial court. Although
conspiracy existed, it was merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime, the requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have not been met in this case. (See People v. Repe, 175 SCRA 422, 435
[1989]) The prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the
lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. (People v. Iligan, G. R. No. 75369, November 26, 1990; People v. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506, 513 [1988])
Aid of armed men should also not be appreciated in this case, considering that the assailant as well as the appellants
were in conspiracy. (See People v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508, 524 [1978]; People v. Piring, 63 Phil. 546, 553 [1936])
The fact that Judge Tumacder did not preside at the trial of this case in its entirety, having taken over only when the
second defense witness was to be presented, did not detract from his appreciation of the prosecution evidence. The full
record was available to him. (See People v. Abaya, 185 SCRA 419, 424 [1990])
In view of the foregoing, the appellants were correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, but without the
attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and aid of armed men. The penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is raised to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the aforesaid MODIFICATION.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Judicial Confessions; A plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a
judicial confession of guilt, an admission of all material facts alleged in the information.It is well-established rule that a
plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of guiltan admission of all the material
facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Ariola, 100 SCRA 523) To be
considered a true plea of guilty, it must be made by the accused freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of his act. It must be made unconditionally. (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155).
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilt; When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory
for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the
accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances.Section 5, Rule 118 of
the old Rules of Court provides that Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court
accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what
punishment shall be imposed. (italics supplied). The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads
guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking testimony. (US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541).
Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability
of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to
prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Recidivism; For purposes of determining whether, accused is a recidivist, the phrase at the time of his trial
for an offense used in the definition of recidivism, must be interpreted to include everything done in the course of trial
i.e. from arraignment until after promulgation of decision.We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a
recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had been convicted of
the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No. 1566. The former
counsel de oficio of herein accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15,
1983, hence when the accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that the time of trial is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment.
The phrase at the time of his trial should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment. We
declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase at the time of his trial for an offense is employed in its
general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase at the
trial is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is
announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No.
1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist:
the accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.

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Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; To show evident premeditation, it is required that criminal intent be evidenced by
notorious acts evincing the determination to commit the same, mere admission of accused that he had long planned to
kill the victim is not enough.Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites; (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c)
a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA
704; People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506). The statement of the accused, that he had long planned to kill Reynaldo Aducal
in retaliation for the act of Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, does not adequately prove the existence of evident
pre-meditation. It is necessary to establish that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was
conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendants proposition was nothing but an expression of his
own determination to commit the crime which is entirely different from premeditation. (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). In
People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224, We rule that there is no evident premeditation where the only evidence to support it is the
statement of the accused that he planned to kill the victim in 1964 when actual stabbing was 1969. To show
premeditation, it is required that the criminal intent be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the determination to commit
the same. (People vs. Guiyab, 139 SCRA 446). It must be evident and not merely suspected (People vs. Iturriaga, 88 Phil.
534) or merely thought of or contemplated mentally, without externalized acts. The findings of the trial court, that the
accused had clandestinely concealed the knife in his body away from the searching eye of the prison guards which
showed the deliberate intent of the accused, is not borne out by the records. Perusal of the records does not show that
the accused deliberately planned the killing through external acts. The finding of facts by the trial court should not be
based on mere assumptions; there must be proof that such facts exist.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Laoang, Northern Samar, Br. 21. [People vs. Lagarto,
196 SCRA 611(1991)]
PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the judgment * of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch XXII, Laoang,
Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. 1566, finding the accused EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
In the early evening of May 25, 1983, Reynaldo Aducal, who was buying fish in the public market, Poblacion Laoang,
Northern Samar, was fatally stabbed. Right after the stabbing, the assailant was apprehended by Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan
whose commendable act thwarted the assailant's escape.
For the killing of Reynaldo Aducal, accused Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. was charged in an amended information with
the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1983, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, inside the public market
Bgy. Little Venice, Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused with deliberate intent to kill with the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one REYNALDO
ADUCAL y LURA with the use of a Batangas fan knife or Balisong which the above-named accused had provided himself
for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said victim fatal wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the instantaneous
death of the victim.
Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of another came embraced IN THE SAME TITLE
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THAT OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1473.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Record, "Amended Information", p. 35)
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.
The records disclose that the trial court had asked appellant whether or not he understood the consequences of his plea.
Following the rulings of this Court, however, the trial court still directed the prosecution to present its evidence for the
purpose of establishing with certainty the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused.
Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution: they were Zosimo Aducal, father of the victim, and Pfc. Wenefredo
Laguitan.
1. Zasimo Aducal testified that in the evening of May 25, 1983 while he was attending to his farm, three (3) kilometers
away from the poblacion of Little Venice, Laoang, Northern Samar, his grandson Artemio Aducal, son of Reynaldo,
informed him that Reynaldo Aducal had been stabbed dead; he was not able to see his deceased son that night because
he could not see his way during night time; it was only in the following morning when he saw his deceased son with two
stab wounds on the right and left breast. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 14-20).
2. Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan testified that on May 25, 1983, around 6:00 in the evening, while he and Pat. Manuel Sevillana
were passing the market place, his attention was called by a certain Armando Baluyot to a commotion; he observed that
the people were scampering for safety and a man was escaping; when somebody shouted that the man was the
assailant, he immediately followed the man and apprehended him right then and there; at the police headquarters the
man admitted to him that he had long planned to kill the victim and that, the plotter was Eugenio Lagarto, Jr., herein
appellant. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 22-28,).
The prosecution likewise presented the following evidence:
(a) Case Record of Criminal Case No. 1473 entitled "People vs. Eugenio Lagarto, Jr." showing that appellant had been
convicted by final judgment of homicide. (Exhibit "A" to "A-1 a");
(b) Death Certificate of deceased Reynaldo Aducal (Exhibit "B");
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(c) Fan knife (Exhibit "D");

(d) Extra-judicial confession of appellant (Exhibit "C" to "C-4"), which discloses the following:
07. Question: Do you know Reynaldo Aducal personally?
Answer: Not so much, sir, but he was the one who stabbed my brother Pablito last 1980.
08. Question: What was the result when Reynaldo Aducal stabbed your brother Pablito?
Answer: As a result, my brother Pablito was hospitalized.
09. Question: Why did you stab to death Reynaldo Aducal?
Answer: I stabbed him to death sir, as a revenge or retaliation for his stabbing of my brother Pablito.
10. Question: According to what you have said Reynaldo Aducal had stabbed your brother Pablito in 1980. Do you mean
to say that since 1980 up to May 25, 1983 you had been planning to avenge your brother by killing Reynaldo?
Answer: Yes, sir.
(p. 2, Exhibit "C")
Based on the appellant's plea of guilty and the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in
the information, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer the extreme
penalty of DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)
The imposition of the supreme penalty of death warrants an automatic review by this Court. However, the penalty of
Death had been changed to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the provision of Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
The counsel de oficio recommends that the sentence be modified, contending that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AGAINST
THE ACCUSED.
II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AGAINST
THE ACCUSED; AND
III. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE EXTREME PENALTY OF
DEATH."
(Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 4; Rollo, p. 1 1 8)
It is a well-established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of guilt
an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. (People vs.
Ariola, 100 SCRA, 523) To be considered a true plea of guilty, it must be made by the accused freely, voluntarily and with
full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. It must be made unconditionally. (People vs. Comendador,
100 SCRA 155).
In the case at bar, the trial court exerted its utmost effort to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that the accused
understood, the meaning and importance of his plea. Thus,
Q Do you realize the import and consequences of your having entered the plea of guilty?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, the Court would repeat to you that you have entered the plea of guilty to a most grievous offense?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q For having entered a plea of guilty to the present crime of murder for the killing of Reynaldo Aducal you are therefore
submitting the case without presenting your own evidence, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And despite this advise and admonition to you by the court, do you still insist on entering a plea of guilty to the crime
as charged?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q The Court will advise you that in this kind of offense which is a crime of murder there is only one possible penalty and
the court has no other recourse but to impose it, that of death, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.
(Translated in the dialect known to the accused)
(TSN, October 11, 1983, pp. 2-4).
The trial court was not remiss in its obligation to warn the accused of the important consequences of his plea. The
possibility that death might be imposed should have warned the accused to protect his interest: even an ordinary
unlettered man fears death. And despite the thought of losing his life, the accused pleaded guilty. We are convinced that
the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the light of overwhelming evidence presented by
the prosecution, fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of guilty of the accused.
The only issue before Us is whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or
information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear
witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed." (emphasis supplied). The trial court in a criminal case may
80

sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without the necessity of taking
testimony. (US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised
Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the
court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused
being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152
SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).
In the case at bar, the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt
and degree of culpability of the defendant.
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code. Herein accused had been convicted of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the
present Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for
Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment.
The phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment.
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its
general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase "at the
trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is
announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No.
1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist:
the accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.
We find no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident premeditation and treachery existed in the commission of the
crime. It is a rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence
adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances (People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA
123).
Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between
the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704; People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506).
The statement of the accused, that he had long planned to kill Reynaldo Aducal in retaliation for the act of Reynaldo
Aducal in stabbing his brother, does not adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation. It is necessary to
establish that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was
actually perpetrated. Defendant's proposition was nothing but an expression of his own determination to commit the
crime which is entirely different from premeditation. (People vs. Carillo 77 Phil. 572). In People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224, We
ruled that there is no evident premeditation where the only evidence to support it is the statement of the accused that he
planned to kill the victim in 1964 when actual stabbing was 1969.
To show premeditation, it is required that the criminal intent be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the determination to
commit the same. (People vs. Guiyab, 139 SCRA 446). It must be evident and not merely suspected (People vs. Iturriaga,
88 Phil. 534) or merely thought of or contemplated mentally, without externalized acts. The finding of the trial court, that
the accused had clandestinely concealed the knife in his body away from the searching eye of the prison guards which
showed the deliberate intent of the accused, is not borne out by the records. Perusal of the records does not show that
the accused deliberately planned the killing through external acts. The finding of facts by the trial court should not be
based on mere assumptions; there must be proof that such facts exist.
In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was attacked.
Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was
sudden and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, the circumstance of treachery can not be taken into
account. (People vs. Ariola, supra)
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the
perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that the victim might put up. There is an absence of evidence to
show the means employed by assailant and the mode of attack. Treachery may not be simply deduced from assumptions;
it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the crime into murder.
WHEREFORE, the that court's judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO is hereby
CONVICTED of homicide; appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is
offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the Court hereby sentences said accused to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

81