Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Intelligence Agency
5 May2015
Jason Leopold
request for the following information for disclosure of the following UNCLASSIFIED reports
from the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General:
I. Former Agency Officer Alleges Retaliation for Protected Disclosures- ISSUE DATE
MARCH 2013
2. Alleged Violation of CIA-Unique Post Employment Restrictions- ISSUE DATE
FEBRUARY 2013
3. Misuse of Government Systems for Database Searches- ISSUE DATE FEBRUARY
2013
4. Agency Contractor Alleged Reprisal for Whistleblowing- ISSUE DATE FEBRUARY
2013
5. Review of[redacted] Allegations from DOD- ISSUE DATE MAY 2013
6. Alleged Retribution Against Alleged Whistleblower- ISSUE DATE JUNE 2013
7. Alleged Classified Information Leaked to Foreign Army Officials- ISSUE DATE JULY
2013
8. Misuse of Agency Credential by Former (b3) Staff Officer- ISSUE DATE AUGUST
2013
9. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information- ISSUE DATE AUGUST 2013
10. Request for Whistleblower Protection by Former Interrogator- ISSUE DATE AUGUST
2013
lfcLl}~~
Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Enclosures
co 6299587 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
.
I
.
11 February 2013
(b)(3) CIAAct
David B. Buckley
Inspector General
J Special Agent
c____
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
[
_
_______j
~---
1lCRH(
INOFORN
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05
-----------~~~
co 6299587
CU6L'99587
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF CIA-UNIQUE
POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
(U//Ffit1fi)
[ (b)(3) CIAAct
-------------------
---
------
--
11 February 2013
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SECRET
C062.99587
(b)(3) CIAAct
(5) Special Rules With Respect to Cenain Relationships with Foreign Governments or Political
Parties Follcwing Separaticlifrom CIA.
(a) (U) Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) to issue regulations requiring
designated Agency employees to sign written agreements committing not to represent or
advise, for a petiod of three. years after that employee leaves CIA employment, any
foreign govet:nment or foreign political party. Pursuant to starutory authorities, the
D/CIA has delegated to the Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(ADD/CIA) responsibility for administering the post-employment restrictions required by
section 402. The ADD/CIA shall report to the D/CIA all actions taken pursuant to
subparagraphs m(5)(e), (k). and (m) below.
(c) (U) Within 30 days after the promulgation of this subparagraph m(5), and by
31 January of each subsequent year, each directorate (including the D/CIA Area) shall
identify those positions within that directorate which are occupied by members of the
Senior Intelligence Service, whose responsibilities require them to maintain "significant
contact... with foreign government officials and it is expected that the contacts will
involve regular or recuning interaction.
(j) (U) Where it appears that a fonner employee may have violated the terms of .his or
her Post-Employment Agreement, the Inspector General will have jurisdiction to
investigate the matter, report his or her findings of fact to the D/CIA, and provide a copy
of that report to the ADD/CIA. In such cases, the ADD/CIA shall review the Inspector
2
.SBeltBI
C06299587
(o) (U) The ADD/CIA shall provide !he Director, Office of Security information about
any final decisions made pursuant to subparagraphs m(5)(e), G), (k), or (m) above. The
Director, Office of Security shall maintain a database containing !hat information.
(U) Title 18 USC 207, Restrictions on former officers, employees, and elected officials of the
executive and legislative braches, provides in pertinent part:
(f) Restrictions relating to foreign entities, (I) Any person who is subject to the restrictions in subsections (c), (d), or (e) [applicable to
certain former senior employees of !he executive branch] and who knowingly, wilhin one year
after leaving the position, office, or employment referred to in such subsection(A) represents a foreign entity before any officer or employee of any department or agency
ofe United States wilh !he intent to influence a decision of such officer or employee
in carrying out his or her official duties, or
{B) aids or advises a foreign entity wilh !he intent to influence a decision of any officer or
employee of any department or agency of !he United States, in carrying out his or her
official duties,
(b )(7)( c)
(C) shall be punished as provided in section 216 of this title.
(b )(7)( c)
3. (U/@JOO) InC] !he year ofC}ermination of CIA employment, !he foreign
entity restrictions in 18 U.S.C. 207(f) applied to senior employees whose base pay, including
3
SECR'f
C06299587
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( c)
4. (Uifi'Otl'O) OIG made a preliminary presentation of lhe facts concerning c:.Jto lhe
Department of Justice Public Integrity Section (DOJ/PIS) as a possible violation of 18 U.S.C.
207(f). DOJ/PIS consulted with lhe Offlce of Legal Counsel and the Office of Government
Ethicsaboutthematter. On _(b)(7)(c)
DOJ/PISdeclinedtoo nacriminalcasea ainst
L__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
SBCRHT
C06299587
(b )(7)( c)
A former employee subject to this restriction would be prohibited from working for a
foreign government in any"capacity, including as an employee or contractor. Further,
regardless of whether the former employee worked directly for the foreign government,
he would be barred from "representing" a foreign government on any matter. The former-'
employee could, however, work for a consultant that advises a foreign government, and
even interact directly with the foreign government so long as the subject of the
consultation was not related to any ~r within the scope of his government
employment. The former employee also could sell goods for his new employer directly
to a foreign government, and provide advice on how to use a product, so long as the "
advice was not related to any matter within the ~ of his government employment.
The Feb!Wli)' letter continued:
(b)(7)(c)
"As you discussed with [CIA Senior Deputy Counsel] Joho Rizzo during our '----c-~
meeting, a "matter" means any particular matter with specific parties, such as a contract.
Therefore, you will not be considered to be in violation of this restriction if you are
rendering advice to a foreign government in connection with a sale of goods and services
and that advice does not intersect with any matter, including any contract, with which you
were involved as a government employee.
(b)(7)(c)
C06299587
ENTITIES
(U) Overview
(b)(?)(c)
(b)(?)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b)(?)(c)
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(b )(7)( c)
(b)(7)(c), _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __i
(b )(7)( d)
(U)I
16.
!said tha!nmade an effort to understand the applicable rules and
regulations, and to the best oflJknowi~.Owas in compliance with all oC}ost(b )(7)( c)
employment restrictions.
added thatUnever had any intention of violating or circumventing
the restrictions.
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
SECRET
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299587
C06299587
----------~-----------------
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
SECI&f
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(b)(3) CIAAct
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SECRE'f
' Copy
CWOIG Loan
Do Not Copy
(U) SECTION 6- EXIDBITS
A. Post-Employment Agreement dated L(b)(?)(c1
B. Letter dated L(b)(7)(c)=from CIA OGC to~garding post-employment
restrictions
(b)(7)(c)
c.
D.l (b)(?)( c) Iemail exchange between OGC attorneys regarding oral infonnation provided
toj
(b)(7)(c)
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POST-EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
An Agreament
BetW1Ktn
the United
states.
1. Intending to be legally bound, and in consideration
of my continued service in the position that I now occupy
("llllr position") for the Central Intelligence Agency. ("CIA"),
I accept the obligations contained in this Ag~t. I
understand and accept th&t service in my position imposes
upon ma certain obligations, including the obligation not to
per.mit an'actual or potential conflict of interest or the
appearance of any actual or potential conflict of interest
to arise between the responsibilities of my poaition and llllr
relationships with certain foreign entities following my
separation from CIA.
2. I understand and agree that for the three-year
calendar periOd illlll8diately following my separation from CIA
employment I will not represent or advise the governmant or
any political party of any foreign country, as defined in
18 u.s.c. 207(f)(3). I further understand that I will not
be subject to this restriction on my post~loymant
activities if I occupy a position that has not bean
designated as being subject to these post-employment
restrictions for a period of three years or more prior to my
separation from CIA employment.
3.
Ag~nt;
C06299587
severab~e,
and
that
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WAIHINQTON. D.C. JOIJOt
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(b)(7)(c)
the restrictiOIIS of 18
u:s.c.
207 (b).
'
If II understellding of your employment history is incorrect and
one of the above tatements is nOt true# the advice provided in
this lett:er may:not be acct.irate and cannot be relied upon.
Should mY Unae~:atimditig of the facts be in error~ please contact
oata!!lplor--t Reatriatiou
C06299587
(b)(7)(c)~
2. You ...-. barred for t1oo yearo from repreoontiDg anycma
(other than tb 08 Gove~t) befor any official or agency _of
the . tJS OovrDJ~eD.t cumcendng any partioular matter that were
actually pen41Dg. UDder your official reeponoibility duriDg ycur
To
C06299587
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contract .
otficia~
reaponsibilityfor a matter
C06299587
-----------------------(b)(7)(c)~
UDder consideration by peraona within the emplQYee'e area of
reaponoi~ility.
Tbio rootrictioa doeo not apply unleoo at the
time of the. proposed representation of another he knows or
reasonably should know that th~ matter had been under hia
reponaibility during the lat year_of Agency service.
reeponaibility.
To the extant that you were not personally and
substantially involved in a particular matter, but that =atter
tell under your official responsibility during your last year of
gov.ernmene service, you will be- subject to this- two-year ban on
that matter.
OU. Year CooliDgOff Period. 18 U.S.C. 5 207(c) imposea
additional.reatrictiona on senior intelligence officers earning
over $136,757 in b&ae pay (which after 11 July-2004 includeo
lOcality pay), and, u your b&se pay will exceed the threshold
when you separate 1 you will be subject to this one-year
restriction following your separation from the Agency. Former
senior employees subject. to Section 207 (c) are prohibited for
one year after separation frgm making !EX communication or
appearance on behalf of a third party before the Central
Intelligence Agency or any federal agency in which the former
employee served in any capacity during his last year of
government service seeking official action. Like the permanent
and two-year restrictions discussed aboVe, this provision does
not prohibit behind-the acenea assistance to a third party.
The restriction, however, doee not require the former senior
employee to have ever been officially involved in the matt~r
that ia tho aubjoct of the COimllWlicat.ion or appearance.
(b )(7)( c) _ _-"
C06299587
[(b)(7)(c)
C06299587
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C06299587-----------~
(b)(?)(c)
C06299587
-----------------c(b)(7)(c)
provide advice on
~ow ~o
was nOt related to any matter .within the scope of his government
eraployment:.
2836.
C06299587
----------~------------
-(b)(7)(c)-
(b)(3) CIAAct
Sincerely,
(b)(3) CIAAct
Bthioa Counsel
C06299587
------- ----Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299587-------------.
C06299587
------------------------CENTRALINTaUGENCE AGENCY
WAll !IemaN, D.C. 10101
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
are trues
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(b)(?)(c)
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t
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Agency.
negotiati~
as an
207 {b).
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laa~
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after your
~ropoaal
for a contract.
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C06299587
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that a specific party or partiea be involved at the time of
employee' a invo;Lvement.
participate
~-
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18 tJ,S.c ..
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. .This
ban
C06299587
responsibility.
To the extent that you ware not personally and
substantially involved in a particular matter, but that matter
fell under your official responsibility during your last year of
govertlJAeDt ervice, you Will be ubj ect to this two-year ban on
that matter.
One Year Cooli.Ds-o!f Period. 18 o.s .c. ! 207 (e) imposes
additional restriction& on senior intelligence officers earning
over $140,216.50 in base pay (which after 11 July 200 includeo
locality pay) , and, aa your baae pay will 8lCCeed the threshold
wnen you separate, you will be subject to this one-year
restriction following your aeparation from the Agency. Former
senior employees subject to Section 207(c) are prohibited for
one year after aeparation from making !nl communication or
appearance on behalf of a third party before the Central
Intelligence Agency or any federal agency in which the former
C06299587
(b )(7)( c)
unlike the permanent and two-year restrictions, the prohibition
appliel only to. the federal agency or ageDciea in w~eh the
tormer employeoaerved in any capacity during hie laet year ot
govertUt~.tmt service. In your c&1e, ~u will be barred !rom
repreaenting any tbird party beforo[
(b)(7)(c)
the Central Intelltgance Agency. L----------------~~~~~
diacuased .and you offer your opinion on the matter, you would be
conaid,red to bB representing-: your employer. Tbia would be a
violation of the criminslatatute.
w
None of these representational hsna prohibit behind-thescenes involvement in a particular mat tel:'. This aafe harbor
allows you to use ;your expertise and knotfledge, bu.t not yOur
influence. Aa notect.al)ove,.. however, conduc:t falls outside the.
scope ot. permissible behind-tlle-acenea" involvement it, for
inatanc:e, a former government official intends that information
conveyed to the .federal government by a third party be
attributed to :him. In: other words, you cannot shield yourself
C06299587
=(b)(7)(c)
~07(f)
Section '02
'nlr-
-~~w,=t
for1118r position, ao
Your
I is .a
designated poaition s
(b)(?)(c)
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=(b)(7)(c)
Agency on
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(b )(7)( c)
C06299587
(b )(7)( c)
L(b)(3) CIAAct'
Sincerely,
crb)~3)~1AAct _ _]
-l!tliica Counsel
C06299587
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
(CASE CLOSING MEMORANDUM)
I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
(b)(3) CIAAct
Case N o1
.
i(b)(3) CIAActl
Investigator:L
Supervisor: I
(b)(3)
Case Type: SR
CIAAc~
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
This docwnent contains neither recommendations nOr conclusions of the Central rntelli"gence Agency, Office of Inspector
General. It is the propertY of the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG
authorization.
~~
(b)(3) NISooAct
6:gCRIH'/fW0l'ORN
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Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299588
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(b)( 1)
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(b )(7)( e)
fS/INF) On 16
----
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(b)(7)(c)
III. FINDINGS
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)( e)
Page 2 of3
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
b )(7)( e)
IV. REVIEW M
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Case Investigato
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Approved by Supervis<
2/19/2013
(b)(3) CIAAct
2/19/2013
Page3 of3
SECRET/ /~JOf0R:1q
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 CD6299588
col3299592
C06299592-----~-------,
SECRE'f'/;'N6Ft5ftt4
Administrative Data
I.
Case No.:
Investigator:
[(b)(3) CIAAct1
_
Case Title:
-~(b)(3) CIAAcL_
Supervisor:
Date Received:
3 September 2012
Date Assigned:
J September _,_20,_,_,12,____
Case Type:
ll.
Preliminary Investigation
I. Department of Justice (DoJ) Civil Litigation Division forwards to CIA Office of the Inspector
General- Investigations Staff(OIG INV) '"courtesy copies' of qui tam allegations against contractors
with the Department of Defense (DoD). As many contractors with the DoD can also be contractors with
the CIA, each allegation is evaluated for potential nexus with the CIA.
If~
III.
Fiodiogs
--~)(3)
[_
(b )(7)( a)
NtS,cAd
L_ _ .. _ _ _ _
_(Ofthose contractors detennined to have contracts with the CIA, no information had
be-en- uncoVered th3-i CIA is affected by the allegations in the corresponding qui tam.
(b )(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
4. This matter is being closed in favor of other more appropriate means of documenting the
proactive activities from this initiative. Future review and research will be documented via MOIA.
Should additional information be developed, INV may consider-reopening the matter or separate
INV-201
Pagt: ! or2
This document is controlled by the CIA/OIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
disseminated without prior IG authorization.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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investigation if future qui tam allegations under this proactive initiative with a potential CIA nexus are
determined.
IV.
---~~_,_,~---
(Sign I Date)
INV-201
Page 2 of2
_SECRS'P//NOfOFffi"
I
Approved for Release: 20 15/05/':J05"-.':C:."O':J62~9"'9"'5'-'9'!'2'-------------'----
C06299595
L___ _ _ _ _ _ ______..J
(b )(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) CIAAct
Case No.:
CaseTitle:
Investigator:
Supervisor:
Date Received:
(b)(3) CIAAct
!OJuly 2013
II.
Case Type:
Preliminary Investigation
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(7)( d)-- - - - - - - - - - ,
. __
sent LOtus Note nottfymg tliis office of a possible leak of
classified information. The Lotus Note references aCintelligence report[
I
J
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3
(b)( )CIAAct
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(3) CIAAct
2. (U//F91:te10nliJuly2013,atthedirectionofSAci - -]SA
(b)(3)
and ASAC I
\met with c=]who was unable to provide additional information.L
I
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does not work on any matter related to the information provided in thec:::Jreport, nor is any of the
(b )(3)(b )(7)( d)!\ct
1
reported subject matter inOarea of expertiseOstatedD jas sil!!JJJ concerned by the implication of
a highly placed US official leaking classified information to the
Army and wanted to make sure
(b )(7)(d)
the report was forwarded to the appropriate investigative authority.
(b )(3)
J
(b)(1) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
-----o----!\found the identical report referenced in\L _ __,ji.<ltus Note. The (b )(3) NatSecAct
distribution list for the report includes the Justice Department.
(b)(7)(e)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(7)( d)
IIL Findings
=-=_j-
(b)(1)
4
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_{Fiirther, the Justice Department, which would be the
(b )(7)( e)
appropriate investigative authority in this matter, was included on the report's distribution list. Therefore,
this matter is being closed. Should additional information be developed, INV may consider reopening the
investigation.
INV-201
Pagel of2
This document is controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
disseminated without prior IG authorization.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
'-----------...L:-;;--r=='-----(b)(1)
'
T~CRET/ L___ _ _(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299595
C06299595-------------~
T~CRET/
Case ClosingMemorm..tum
IV.
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TOP~RET/
(Sign! Date)
INV-201
Page2of2
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C06299596
S~ORN
I.
Administrative Data
Case No.:
Case Title:
Investigator:
Supervisor:
(b)(3) C 1AAct
1
Date Received:
18 March 2013
Date Opened:
18 March 2013
Date Assigned:
18 March 2013
Case Type:
Preliminary Investigation
<
II.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b) ( 3) C
!Met] notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG), via Lotus Note, that the'-;U~0S;-;Doo-e-partm---:--en--ct-of--~~
Homeland Security, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations (HSJ;),
located in Indianapolis, Indiana, intercepted $185,070 in cash that was being sent via FedEx from South
Carolina to California.' Therecipientofthecash W\ISL_m m m_]afonner[u . . .
~
(b )(3) CIAActr---loffi=. HSI is seeking to determine if the cash is connected to an illegal activity. --HSI reported
(b)(7)(c)
~told HSI[]was receiving the cash from
for al
.
!company.
!attorney sent
HSI further reported that, in an attempt to reclaim the cash that HSI confiscatedl
HSI scanned copies ofj
~IC::]Special Agent (SA) badge and credential, and a CIA Earnings
( b )(3) CIAAct and Leave (E&L) statement. HSI reported that it considered this to be an administrative matter.
(b )(7)( c)
Clct::=Jadvised OIG thac=Jwas a person of interest regarding the source of the cash and that
(b )(3) CIAAct ~~~was jkin, any background inf~nnation onc=Jthat OIG could provide regarding a separate
mvesuganon of
thatOIG completed m 2012. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3)
CIAAct
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
Page I of3
This document is controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
~-.;-,.;oc~b)(3)
NtSoAct
SEC~OFORN
C06299596
SE~ORN
Case Closing Memorandum
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)( ) CIAA t
3
C
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
3. (UJI.IdtlO) On 10 April 2013, OIG met with HSI in Indianapolis to discuss HSI's
investigation. HSI advised that it intercepted, and confiscated, the shipment of cash totaling $185,070 at
the Indianapolis International Airport, where HSI operates a counterdrug operation, after a specially
(b)(7)(c)
trained ,jog sniffed the odor of narcotics on the pac.kag.e containing. the cash. HSI was ~uendy_
contacted bL:.:Jwho identified
as the shipper of the package. HSI advised L___jthaB
I
would
have
to
provide
documentation
regarding
the source of the $185,070 because the method
(b)(3) CIAAct
used
to
ship
the
cash
made
it
appear
that
the
cash
had been illegally generated. Soon thereafter, an
(b /(7)( c)
attorney, obtained by
to assist in retrieving the cash, contacted HS! and emailed scanned black and
(b)(3) CIAAct white copies ofc=::JC~SA badge and credential, as well as dnee CIA E&L statements, to HSI
for the purpose of substantiating
earlier asSertion to HSI that~s a former employee of the
(b )(7)( c)
CIA. HSI advisedc=:Jthat, in accordance with HSI policy, unlessl__jpetitioned the relevant court
I
(b)(3) CIAAct for return of the cash, the cash would be forfeited. HSI said it would not interview relevant individuals
unlessc::==lpetitioned the court. HSI provided OIG with a copy of its investigative file, which DIG
(b)(7)(c)
I
received
on 19 April2013.
!
fl
(b)(3) CIAAct
(~)(7)(c)
4. (UIH!:ffi9) On 7 May 2013, HSI advised DIG thatc=:Jsubsequendy filed a Seized Asset
Claim Form requesting that the case be referred for federal court action. HSI advised that it will
commence interviewing relevant individuals. HSI still considers the matter to be administrative and not a
criminal proceeding.
Ul.
Findings
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)J
\U}\1 )\<C
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)c)
\" I\- I)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
- - - - - . - - - - ( b ) ( 7 ) ( c ) - - - - - . - .- - - - -
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b )(7)( c)
20 November 2012 for nususe of a govemmcnLvemcie, voucher fraud, and accepting gtfts from a contractor. The
(b)(3) CIAAct
De
On 2 May 2013,
OS, advised OIG thatc=J
by the applicable Intelligence Community (!C) Policy Guidance. In addition,! ______ ~dvised that Scattered
Castles, the IC database containing the clearance and access status of individuals throughout the IC, reflects c=:J
(b )(7)( c)
as being debriefed ofDlearance and accesses, but not thatc::::J was terminated from CIA. Furthennore, the
database does not reflect an alert, referred to as "red flagged," that CIA should be contacted before any clearance
and access action is undertaken by another IC agen,0'~
(b)(3) CIAAct 3 (U//AW87 c:=:Jwas issued two identical CIAL_jSA badges and one credential with the same identification
(b )(7)( c)
. number. One badge was affixed to the credential holder and the other badge was affixed to a belt holder.
INV-201
Page 2of3
(b )(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
\DJ\0)
CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
co'15299679
CO~ENTIAL
Office of Inspector General
Investigations Staff
Case Closing Memorandum
I.
Admlnis1rative Data
Case No.:
Investigator:
Date Received:
Date Assigned:
n.
~) CIAAct
~
31
ca..,Title:
)b)(3) CIAAct
Ma~2013
3 June 2013
:;uperv1sor:
SAc[
Date Opened:
3 June 2013
C~Type:
Full Investi~on
(b )(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
3
(b)(3) CIAAct ~On 31 May 2013, the Chief, Counterintellgence CenteE
(b)( ) CIAAct
(Ciq___j10tified the Office of Inspector Genernl (OIG) of the NCIS activity pertaining to
(b )(6)
OIG opened an investigation into the matter. OIG evaluated the authenticity of the CIA
Special Agent badge seized by NCIS and, through coordination with the Office of Security and
the Global Deployment Center (GDC), detennined the CIA badge seized by NCIS was not
authentic. In addition to evaluating the authenticity of the badge, OIG investigated any ties
(b )(6) betweec:::Jand the CIA.
m.
(b) (6)
Findings
I. (U//FOI:JO) The OIG investigation deteqnined that the CIA Special Agent badge
possessed byc::=Jwas not authentic but did represent a similar a~ce to the official CIA
OIG Special Agent badge. The investigation also detennined thatL_jdid not have any
(b )(6)
official ties to the CIA.
INV-201
Page I of2
This document is controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor itS contents should be
disseminated without prior JG authorization.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
-I
(b )(6)
" co6299679
Case ClosingcMemorandum
(b )(6)
(b )(6)
(b)(6)
6
(U//-FOUO) On I July 2013, Special Assistant US Auornev (SAUSA)j
(b)\ )
L--__,~ EDVA, accepted tl>is case for prosecution. On
the criminal infonnation
was tiled citing two misdemeanor counts of violating 18 U.S. C. 701 (False Federal Badge).
On 6 September 2013,= pled guilty to two coums of possession of badges that were of(!
colorabl.e imitation to those of the CIA Office of Inspector General and Naval Criminal
Investigative Service. He was subsequently sentenced to six months of probation, a $300.00
fine, 25 hours of community service and a $20.00 special assessment.
3. (l.l/1~) (U) An Agency Request or Notification Memorandum (Al\NM) will be
prepared for the D/OS for informational purposes.
4.
(Uif~)
Based upon the successfu.l prosecution <if the case by EDV A, OJG
IV.
Superv~sor:
(b )(3) CIAAct
l:========rswrnwzc~_?_..s_c;_. ff:A:Jr)
(b)(3) CIAAct .
j)h." ,
Vr~'?-at...3
rNV-20!
Page 2 of2
C06299683
Ca1;;e No.:
Investigator:
{b){3) CIAAct
sd
(b)(3) CIAAct
Supe-rvisor:
(b){3) CIAAct____ _
--------------,
Dale. Received:
23 August 2013
Date Opened:
2=-:3'-''--'\"-ug"-u=-:s.:.t-=2"-0"'13'--------
Date Assigned:
29 August 2013
Case Type:
Prelill_li_~arv lnvesti_g_~''tb)(
H.
{b)(3) CIAAct
1. - -
Charge (ASAC)
(b)(7)(c)
Case Title:
review ASAC
called Var 10 fro
AnVar 10 from
On
1 )----
discovered that
llogfiles for
During his
(b )(3) CIAAct
!ordered a product
'------------------------------~(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
2. (U/,'!OOUOj On 23 August 2013, the OJG initiated a preliminary investigation (PI) into tht'
martcr. During the course of the PI the reporting agent reviewed the wehsites and the specific items
ordered. The websites identify on the homcpage of each that the- s.ites "are offering this very strong
alternative to the highly toxic drug listed at the top of the page."
identifies Var 10 as
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
{b)(7){c)
associated with the drug oxantrione. A review of the ingredient label for AnVar 10 demonstrated the
ingredients as primarily arginine hydrochloride (HCL), multiple- amino acids, and vitamjn B-6.
III.
(b )(7)( c)
Findings
3.
(b )(3) CIAAct
(U/trOUO) The OIG Investigation determined that the products ordered by IP address
I were not schedule Ill controlled substances. Neither the produeLs nor their ingredients are __
listed in 21 USC 802(41)(A) Definitions for steroid associated controlled substances. The investigation
also notes that the sites identify that these substance,s <.Ire not "drugs'' and arc alternatives to actual
steroids. This matter is considered closed by OIG.
IV.
Supervisor:
{b)(3) CIAAct
------.0?:il8)i I
c___ _ _ _ _ _ _
JAm
(b)(3) CIAAct
INV-201
Page I of l
Thi~ drn:ument is controlled by the ClA/OIG and neither the documem nor i.ts content!-! should
be
{b)(3) NatSecAct
-l
_j
L _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _
5ECRE'7P/ '::;OFORH
L~----------------------------------~
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299683
CO'b299684
Administrative Data
(b)(3) CIAAct
Case No.:
----,----"'~(~b"")(='3)~C_I_AAct:ase Title:
Ll
Investigator:
sAl
Date Received:
16 June 2010
Date Openoo:
Date Assigned:
9 October 2012
Case Type:
Supervisor:
16 June 2010
~~~~-----------
Fl
II.
Summary of Investigative Actions
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I. ~n 14 June 2010 the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) notified (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(d)
the CIA ofal_____
I referral NCIS received, which alleged
;~~~~ei;~~~~:~:':~v~yre~~n~~;~~~r~~L_--_-_----=-- r~_eccfe_rro-cac-J-in~-~-_lu_d~ed_a_J)a~rt-i~al_,
i~
;g;
(b)( )
ITh-oe"'_
_jald
1
(b )(3) NatSecAct
I which alleged misconduct by an Agency officer. OIG initiated an investigation on 16
NatSecAct
(b)(?)(d)
,J_un_e_2_0t_o._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~_ __._(b--i)(7)(d)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
.
INV-.0
Page I of3
This document is controlled by the CIA/OJG and neither the document nor its contents should be
I-''"'m<w<"~";:~:;~~~~=:'""
S~T[_~NO~N
(b )(3) f\JatSecAct
C0'6299684
(b )(3) NatSecAct
S~
N~N
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
4. (UI/ffit10/ On 24 June 2010, OIG referred this matterto the Department of Justice (DOl)
Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section (HRSP). HRSP declined prosecution of this matter on 3
August 2012, and OIG continued an administrative investigation to determine if Agency policies were
violated regarding the alleged incidents.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)( c)
III.
Findings
\
9. {Sflfl The 'investigation by OIG did not uncover any evidence to substantiate thL(b )(7)( d)
allegations tha.
lor any other Agency staff or contractor employee, violated the rules of
engagement or otherwise unlawfully killed anyone during the assault operations examined during the
course of this investigation.
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
{b)(3) NatSecAct:--------------------------:::,N;:-v;-:.2~
01
(b)(7)(c)
Page2of3
~T~
fN~N
~-~
(b )(3) NatSecAct
....
- - - - .. -- ..----~----.. --------~
C0'5299684
(b )(3) NatSecAct
s~ErL_~NO~N
Case Closing Memorandum
10. (UI~) An Action Request or Notification Memorandum (ARNM) will be submitted to
the Executive Director, and the Director of the National Clandestine Service with no response required.
The matter is considered cl~ed by OIG.
IV.
(b)(3) CIAA1t
JL(;JJ\l~J-
~====:::Jc=====--"-"'rlgn I Date)
(b)(3) CIAAol.,
L__jl"cv-~~-.f/~,J'."'""'"ISVTTJQI
"
II(4/~~.)o;
(/)
INV-201
Page 3 of3
(b)(3) NaiSecAci
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299684
, coo299685
S~TJ
J~RN
I.
Administrative Data
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
Case No.:
L'(b~)~(3_:_)~C---ciAAc-'c~t:::-::-_, __
_
(b)(3) CIAAct
Investigator;
- -------------------------------
Case Title:
Supervisor:
Date Received:
16 October 2013
Date Opened:
22 October 2013
Date Assigned:
16 Octobe~r~20~13:___ __
Case Type:
Preliminary Investigation
(b)(1)
II.
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
Summary of Investigative Actions~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(b )(3) NatSecAct
I. (Sm!F) On 15 October2013, thec__~=~--~---c--o-~~---,:--c--:--(b)(7)(c)
]notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) about an alleged physical abuse involving (b )(7)( d)
____
(b)(3) NatSecActdetaineej
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
Pagelof3
1
This document is controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
disseminated without prior IG authorization.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
S~ET[
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. C06299685
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
S~ETI
(b)(3) NatSecAct
f~
INV-201
Page 2 of3
. C08299685 _ __
{b )(3) NatSecAct
S~ET[___ /No_;;N
~~~g~ CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
Findings
10. ~The infonnation obtained during the course of this investigation did not substantiate any
misconduct or ph~al abuse by CIA officers. During an interview with OIG.c=Jclari,fied, cOrrecteQ1.
or recanted all ofL __ _I rior admissions related t
know led e of physical abuse of detainees.
r---
(b )(7){ c)
(b )(7){ d)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
{b )(3) NatSecAct
L_-------------------(b)(7)(c)
12. (U//.A.II:l6) An Action Request or Notification Memorandum (ARNM) will be forwarded to the
Director of National Clandestine Service and to the Director of the Counterterrorism Center for
informational purposes.
13. (U/I'I'ffl::!e) This matter is considered closed by OIG.
IV.
(b)(3) CIAAct
Case Closing Memo approved by Supervisor:
!NV-201
~RETc=-JNo~
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299685
Page 3 of3
C06299687
,(b)(3) CIAActl
DIR/OIG-L_
_
2 5 Apr ill..,-2"0'14,------
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
(3//!IF)
Alleged Abuse and Misconduct by CIA
Offic_E!l' Invo)yJng Domestic Help I
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(d)
1.
(5
'/111
On 25
MarcJ1 2013,
':-:.-=ocr~:c=,-;::,--~-(b)(?)(d) (b)(1)
l =~~=--==~,--=""---;cLC"""o=c::"J notified
the Offl;:c.c::.:e:....=o.:cf~~~(b)(1)
Inspector General (OIG) that A enc staff em lo ee
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
officer may be _m;i.streat_ioo
1
domestlc help [
by not paying adequate
(b)(1)
wages, forcing long work. ours, an making threats to have
family members, who reside in I
I kiY:dld Addi.tionall.v..
(b)(3) NatSecAclthe L.::::=J alleged that I
I spouse,
abused illegal drugs and also abused their c l ren. That
investigation is now complete, and this matter is being referred
(b)(1)
to
you for information only.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
2 ''r_:((-ES't/'-f_/:!!lifF:l:_)___:Tl')h}.Eel__(:O)]:I_(;G___iin[l'VI[Eel_!s>Jtji,_gg@a_l;_t~ed;UtUhui~s;__aal_l.:Lle~a:r;a>Jt~i.!:ownLQ_t,
(b)(7)(c)
/ chHsi ab~
1,.
the 0 f f l ce o f'---.,Mc;;e"'dlo:ccoo:a"l,---cS.-;:ec;::r:o;v'i:::Cce;::cs;:;-("'O"'M"'sT)----;::co;::cn"'t"'r"i"b;;;u--;::t~e::<d-ct>e:o~t'>h~e~
investigation with interviews and medical support, and family
assessments.
3.
(8_//U_et_
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b )(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)( 3 )
NatSecAc
(b)(7)(c)
(DJ\<5)
N. atS.e,.c,A,.c,t(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAc
(t(b~'hl
(b )(3)
CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b )(7)( c)
I
(b )(3) NatSecAct
SECR~FORN
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299687
C06299687
SEC~ORN
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct ,
(b )(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT:
{~//!IF)
Alleged Abuse and Misconduct by CIA Ofti<:;_ez;
Involving Domestic Help I
~
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
~I~-=~~~-~--=>~~..,..-,-~=-,-------~~----.--c~-----c,----_j
b)
N S At
. In the absence of additional leads or information,the
( (3) at ec C alleged child abuse investigation is closed.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
4.
15/~
Jeparately, there was an allegation by
the I
(b)(7)(cl
was mistreating [__]by not paying
(b)(1)
adequate wa"""' d.lrc1ng long work ho_y_r_s~---.a
making threats to
(b)(3) NatSecActhave family members, who reside in
During a
1
joint OIG I
I interview of
,
admitted paying
b)( )
the $470 per month instead of the required $1,000 per terms of
( 1
the ,cmu.rfct; however,
denied that I
I made threats to
(b)(3) CIAAct
the ~ family or that
used illegal drugs.
(b)(3) NatSecActSeparatel , a joint OIG
interview was con'ducted of
I
and c::=J admitted qaying only----$-400~ month to th_ _ e_
( b)(7)(c)
Additionally,l
J admitted th<>t L__Juses mari _llana _
and that some marijuana was present in L_] home but that ________]
had no knowledge of the il:J&gal drug use py
J until
recently informed D
thatl~ used marijuana.
On 27
September 2013, the Department of Justice declined prosecution
(b)(1)
pertaining to the alleged human trafficking allegations.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
5.
(U/ /-ffllffi) This Office considers the matter closed
and plans to take no further action. This information is
provided to you for informational purposes. No response is
required. The OIG point of contact is Special Agent L---~~~
(b)(7)(c)
I
_
j. This information is also being provided to
the D1rector of Office of Medical Services for informational
purposes.
6.
(U/ /+effe) This Memorandum contains information
protected by the Privacy Act. You should consult with the
Office of General Counsel prior to further dissemination to
ensure compliance with the Privacy Act.
cSignec!byj
L__---,-
cc:
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(3)
(tNatSecAct
(t(b )(7)(
NatSecAc
(b)( 1)
(b )(3)
NatSecAct
c)j
,,
1\
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b )(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
D/OMS
SEC~OFORN
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299687
coo299687
SUBJECT:
(3//NE)
Alleged Abuse and Misconduct by CIA Officer
Involving Domestic Help 1
I
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SEC~FORN
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299687
C06299688
CONF~OFORN
,--(b)(3) CIAAct
DIR/OIG1____
2 5 AprilL---.,2"0'1"4--------"
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Director of Security
~(b)(3) CIAAct.
L
.
1
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
+C//llf~
Allegation of Misconduct by Poiygraph
Examiner L(b)(3) CIAAct]
(b)(1)
(b )(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
!E, '!iF~ Th 0
,
.
.~
d t
d h
2._
b)(?)( )
, >:
e IG ~ >nves_,_!_o_a_tio.n, e ermlne t at
(
C
polygraph examlner
.
J repeatedly used
techniques that vi
~
]' s policies and
. guidelines.
__ ... . .. .. . admitted to usin'il iJ~rop~r techniques in
an effort to lqn~iaht .
performance w1th
1
supervisors. I
I claimed that two of
supervisors
(b)(1)
were aware of and approved of these techn1ques; however, there
(b)(3) CIAAcl was no e;ridence to. substantiate supervisor approval of the
(b)( 3 ) NatSecActmauthonzed techmques.
(b)(7)(c)
the Department of
declined criminal
by the Agency. This
to take no further
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
Special Agent
_ _j
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299688
C06299688
CONFIDE~OFORN
SUBJECT:
(C//NF)
Allegation of Misconduct by Polygraph
Examiner c=(b)( 3 ) CiAAd
Signed
bvl
(b)(3) CIAAct-
CONFIDE~NOFORN
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299688
C06299688
SUBJECT:
(G//!IP)
Allegation of Misconduct by Polygraph
Examiner L(b)( 3) CIAActJ
(b)(3JCIAAct -----
I (17
April 14)
L_----------------~~----------~
Distribution:
Orig - D/OS
1
AIG/INV
1
DS/OS FO Special Assistants
1
DAIG/INV
1
Counsel to the Inspector General
l
DIR-OIG-RA !NV Review
1
DIR-OIG-INV-SAs
CONFID~OFORN
I
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06299688
C0303044
COUFIBBU':FI:hb
(b)(3) CIAAct
Case No.:
(b)(3) CIAAct Investigator:
Date Received:
21 October 2013
Supervisor:
Date Opened:
Date Assigned:
5 November 2013
Case Type:
U.
Case Title:
~S_A_d'--_--'(c:cb)'-'-(3=-")-'C=-ciAA'-'--'c""t_ _
21 October 2013
Preliminary Investigation
..
(b)( 1 )
~==- _l. -t7 On 21 October 2013, _the Office of Security's Personnel Security Group[Jb)(3 )UCiAAct
b)( ) CIAA _
hotified the Q:c-oflnsnek~eral (OIG) ofall:ed misconduct by polygraph exanu-ner
( 3
c1
IL(b )(3)CIAActalleged thatj
~ad deviated from acceptable
lb )( 1)
(b)(3) Na!Sec~Cllygrapbprocedures,whichresultedinabreachofprofessto responsibility. L(b)(3) CIAActl
(b)( ) CIAAct
3
(b )(7)( c)
discovered the allegations after an applicant challenged a statement from a polygrnph report, which
(b)( )
3
disqualifiedtlle applicant from CIA employment. Upon notification by I
(b) (3) C IAAct
(b )(3) CIAA~t> (3) CIAAct-----1initiated a review of the applicant's jlygraph examination conducted by
Na!SecAct
(b )(3) CIAAct
I_
1-
- -
-~
(b)(1)
____ /
(b )(3) C IAAct
\ Based upon these conclusions, the matter was referrl'd to OIG by the Office of
(b )( 3 ) NatSecA~furity and a Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB) was convened fo~
I
(b )(7)( c)
2.
~- - ---
(b)( 1 )
~ a baste compretlenston of the ~I aspects related to polygrnph exams.\
[also
(b)(3) CIAAct provided OIG with a summary of internal reviews conducted on\
polygra~_ll-""~,
(b )(3) NatSecAct
!>;buttal to the PEB allega?ons. PEB briefing notes, and a review oftheL(b )(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
L(b)(3) CIAActasrelatedtotheallegauons).
3. ~SeniorPolygraphExamin
(b )(3) CIAAct
were interviewed during this investigati011
(b) (7 )(c)
~
~ey had approved[:::Jimproper use of polygraph techniques.
'-----,__
(b)(7)(c)
jlenied claims by
(b)(3) CIAAct
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , ( b ) (7 )(c) INV~20l
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
Page I of2
(b )( 3 ) NatSecA~.~s document is-controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
(b) (7) (C)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
I_
(b )(j)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )( )
3
NatSecAct
(b )(7)( C~)
\ u 1\
C IAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(3)
CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(3)
C IAAct
(b)( 7 )(c)
C06303044
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
4. ~On30_QciQ!x;r_2QU,_aJ'~r.;Qnn_el Evaluatio:1n Bg!l[<l (PEB) c1:1nvened in relation t\1 the
(b )(7)( c)
allegatiqns againstl ______ presenteC(b )(3) CIAAcl' r~ ooard.
The PEB recqmmcnded terminatio:1n qf employment and revocat11:1n qf clearances tor~ The
PEB was co:1nducted independently and separate fmm the OIG investigatio:1n.
::J
III.
(b)(1) .
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
Na!SecAct
(b)(7)(c)
Findings
5. (UIIf9-BO) On 18 February 2014, OIG referred this matter 11:1 the Department of Justice
(b)( 1)
(DOJ), Eastern DistrictqfVirginia, US Attorney's Office (AUS~(b)(G)=:J DOJ declined
(b)(3) CIAAct
pmsecution in lieu of administrative actiqn by the Agency.
,---~~~~~____,(b )(3)
__
6. -fETOn 28 February 2014, OIG co:1nducted im .in.terview with
Na!SecAc!
I }ulmittedtqrepeatedlyusingtechniquesthatviolatedl (b)(3) CIAAct liciesand
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct \
(b 3 Na!SecAct.
.
.
said
useqfthese techmques wntnbuted t
h1gh clo:1sure rate,
)( )
n.l~Cll::Jupervsms v1ewe a' apo:1Sitlve.
sa1dOwanted to recetve p<:1sttlve feedback
(b )(7),{:3)(7)( c) fmnQupervisms and believed that these techniques allowed
stand out fmm the rest of the
pqlygraph examiners.
reiterated many qfthe statements made in0rehuttal memorandum
(b)(1)
tothePEBallegatio:1ns.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
.
(b )(3) Na!SecAct . 7. (U/h"dUG) An Actiqn Request m No:1tification Memmandum (ARNM) will be forwarded to
(b)(?)(c)
mcD~rectorofSecunty.
Ow
IV.
(b )(3) CIAAct
'111'.1!1
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
!
.j() ~- .'/
{/
JNV-201
Page 2 of2
CQNFIBHli'fiA"ti
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAc!
(b )(3)
Na!SecAc!
(b)(7)(c)
' C06303044
Approved for Release: 2015/05/05 C06303044
Case Title:
Alleged Misconduct by
Polygraph Examiner
Activity:
Source Review
Date Prepared:
II April 2014
[(b)(3) CIAAct_ __
Investigator:
. Date of Activity:
Location:
(b)(3) CIAAc,__ _
II April 2014
L(b)(3) CIAAct._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I. Jl!lnttt;S-) On this date, I completed a source review of the case closing memo for OIG Case
(b)(3) CIAAclJ
(b)(3) CIAAdestigator
(b)(3) CIAAct
il
OpJ !t/
INY-100
Page I of I
This document is controlled by the CIA/OIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
disseminated without prior iG authorization.
Administrative Data
Case No.:
~b)(3) CIAAct j
Case Title:
Investigator:
l(b)(3) CIAAct_ _ __
Supervisor:
Date Received:
Date Assigned:
II.
~
, ====~-----------------
(b)(3) C IAAct
_ _ _I
- -- - - - - - - - - - -
09/26/2011
09/26/2011
Case Type:
----~-------------
......::F~1 --------(b)(3)
C IAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
- (b)( 6 )
i
'
(b)(1)
1. ~ On j
- -- ~ former Agency Staffofficer(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct serv~dfro~.
.
.
(b)(7)(c)~ allegedthattheAgencyt~ok (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)( 3 ) NatSecACfpns~ls agamst ~tm for compla~nts he made to the Office of Inspector Generai(OIG) regardmg (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )( )
.. nancml corruptiOn and other mtsconduct
Froml _
ser:ed a{b )(6)
6
I
(b)(3) CIAAct
. j Accordmgto(b)( 7 )(a)
(b),(7)(c)
[==: (b)(6)__j letter, the retaliation against him included: an Agency claim that he owes th'(b)( 7 )( )
==:J
( 3
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
1
(U//~
~~ ~~~ ~( ~)
OIG investigated separately the possible USERRA violation and whether an Agency claim[_
for salary overpayments[==:Jreceived while serving as a mobilized
Reserve officer was tied to the "'-0 - USERRA violation. The results of the investi ation are re orted in case (b)(3) CIAAct_______ ____
INV-201
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
Page l of3
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(U) This document is controlled by the CIA/OIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
(b)(7)(c)
disseminated without prior IG authorization.
.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SE~ORN
C06299586
Approved for
Rel~!i~:~~Jbeffi C06299586_ __
_ _ _ _ __
,
(b)(1)
SECRfl'itt~ePem<: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6).
,
_(b)(6)
.
in \ (b)f )(lc)drelatedpr_imarilyt?claimsthat \
(b)(7)(c)
J ad
7
haras""u \ulu dftd engaged m financaal and otherwrongdOIJ'I~ tn~
~ OIG considered
(b)(3) CIAAct
these issues of possible wrongdoing in other cases? [
ijn hl( b)( 3) C IAAct again accused
(b)( )
6
(b)(3) CIAAc(] ofretaliatory acts against him,[
_ _
(b)(6)1Consequently, OIG
(b)(6)
~nsidered whether - - [might have suffered retaliation froiD[ (b)( 7 )(c)_ _
~ (b)(7)(c)
7
(b)( )(c)l
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
-,
~
(b)(3) CIAAct
3. ~ OIG obtamed and examine<\_ (b)(6)_
e-mail mes~ges and the
1
(b)( 3 ) C IAAct [(b)(3) CIAAct~essages of his supervisor and (b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
during
b)( )
Performance Appraisal Report~ securitv file. and
(b)( 1)
the period\_(b)(3) CIAAct reviewedc =
6
(
Official Personnetl'older. OIG obtained and reyiewe_q
(b )(7)( e)_ _
~essage
(b)(7)(c)
and debt calculations\
(b)(3) CIAAct
_ j In addition, OIG obtained and reviewed
(b)(3) CIAAct
I
(b )(3) CIAAct 1_
!time and attendanCe records from the _eeriods when he was performing his military service. (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
OIGinterviewed ! -- _
(b)( 1)--=:] oiGalsoconsultedwi1(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
a legal expert on ~ower reprisals.
(b)( 3 ) CIAAct .
(b)(7)(c)
_j
c-=
(b)(3) NatSecAct
m.
c
(b)(3) IAAct
(b )(6)
Findings
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
_
!allegations of reprisals.
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Regarding[
J USERRA claim, which OIG considered separately[ (b)(3) CIAAct~OIG did
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( c)
not determine that Agency officers committed USERRA violations against[
_j md found no
1
evidence that an Age~cy claim for [
n salary overpayments t==]received during his
6
(b )( )
service as a mobilize
\Reserve officer was connected to the alleged USERRA violation or
(b)(6)
(b)( 7 )(c)
inappropriately calculated. The lack of substantiation for matters (b)(3) CIAActjrenders of no
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(3) C IAAct practical significance [ _ ~etaliation claims related to .USERRA and Agency debt repayment
(b )(6)
demands. In July 2012:-c=:::Jsettled his[
j claim against the Agency, and so OIG did not, as part
of this matter, consider whether Privacy Act violations occurred againstl
~s reprisals. Regarding
(b )(3) CIAAct
. (b)(7)( c)
' (b )( 3 ) CIAAct other, new allegations c = Jincluded in his
_j letter, OIG did not find that reviewable
(b )(6)
personnel actions, as defmed in Agency guidance or guidance found in Presidential Policy
b)( )
(b)(7)(c)
( 6
Directive/PPD-19, were present to warrant a complete investigation. Specifically, OIG found that the
non-transfer of accurate information regarding life, health, vision, and dental insurance to
(b )(3) C IAAct
' (b )(7)( C)
4. .
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
(b)( 3 ) CIAAct
. .
.
(b)(6)
2
(b)(6)
~ 01Gconsadered(b)(6 ) [prevaouscomplamtsmthefollo\(b)-(3)--CIAA t
(b)(!)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
_
c
lD){d) GIAAct
th\13) CIAActl~!?.}(JHc) _(b)(6) . .Jdealt..witl((b)(6)):1aimsofharassmentby l (b)(6)J
(b)(3) CIAAc!
_
(b)(7)(c)
_
. (b)(7)(c) c=Jhadfiledafornrb)f7)(ct
(b)(6)
. Equal Employment Opportunity (OEEO) harassment claim, OIG deferred to OEEO on the matt'b. \ub
(b)(3)
(b) ( ) (C)
OEEO inquiry rendered a false finding, meaning that harassment did not occur.
7
CIAAct
.
(b)(3) C IAAcU Thiscase, C
(b)( 6 )
elatedto?ultipleallegationstha~[~adein
(b)(6)
a 14-page amended submissaon to Olt(b )(7)( C )gataons related to tssues of harassment~ dascnmmatton, and
false reports/statements by [
.
J
also _(b)((.~)(7)(c)
(b )(3) C IAActted thatj
jwas involved in financial imprQPrieties and other misconduct. OIG handled the case
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
as a grievance, and the case closure,L(b)(6)~reported that:
.
(b)(3)
All elements of Complainant's. subl(b \(7)(c )C f~n_d to have been pre~iously a~dress~d by ~ther
NatSecAct
(b )(7)( c)
means, and no grievance was appropn&,c. vn~ addat10nal concern submitted dunng an mtervaew was
checked and found to be unfounded. The case was completed with that action.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
3
~ The Assistant Inspector General for Investigations detennined [ (b) (6) ~ that this investigation
will focus only on the alleged reprisals
(b )(7)( c)
fand the Agency
cannot implement relative to him OIG recommendations suggesting disciplinary or ameliorative measures.
INV-201
(b)(3) CIAAct
Page 2 of 3
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
5ECRTN~~OF0~(
co6299586
Approved for
Rel~~~:~~}beffi C 0 6 2 9 9 5 8 6 - - - - - - - - . SE~ORN
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Relative to \ _ __\ claim that the Agency retaliated against him by refusing to complete a timely review
(b)(7)(c)
of his wife's resume, OlG also determined that the claim is not a reviewable personnel action, as the
action allegedly occurred against\_ _
\wife, not against him.
(b)(3) CIAAct
5. (U/~ I
- um:stigation and ofrelatedOIG investigation L
(b)( )
6
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
IV.
j
L
l
(b)(3) CIAAct ) jPltJ
"{SlgiifDate)
,/13
---,
(b )(3) C IAAct.--rf.:w~j_f-1-,,;)....3'_ _ _ _ _
(Sigh Tliate)
J;NV-201
Page 3 of3
~ORN
Approved for Rel~i..1(S5J~ C0629958~'--------------
C06299597
Approved for
Rel~~~:~~}o~ffi C06299597------~------.
SDCRB'f//UOPOR:!i
Administrative Data
(b)(3) CIAAct
~-=-
Case No.:
(b)(3) CIAAct
.
mvesugator:
= . _____
_!
Unauthorized Disclosure of
Cla'isified
Case Title:
-=~~~====,====--------
Supervisor:
SAcJ (b)(3,_
) .::_
c ;.:
'IAA
..:::_:_c.::..:t:___ _ _
Date Received:
17 October 20 12
Date Opened:
l9 October 2012
Date Assigned:
19 October 2012
Case Type:
Full Investigation
fl.
--=
1. "'(~//HF)- On 17 October 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) received notification
from the Office of Security (OS) that j
(b)(6)_
~ad found cla<>!'.ified
material on personal hard drive seized from l(b )(7)l c);e of a former Agency contractor. The classitied
data was(b )(6)b>l_~xaminers during tilt.:n analysis of the hard drive a<> part of an unrelated
inv~tig~(b)( 7 )(c)~mo~y. The subject was identified as [_ _
_ _l a contractor
(b )(3) C IAAct
Jwas terminated and his clearances
(b )(6)
~~okeal - (b)( 6 ) _j for misusing government systems related to the sexual exploitation of
(b)(7)(c) children.
(b)( 7 )(c) .
.
---==
--::=_
(b)(3)
CIAAct
- (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c
2. ~.Vfci~ The OIG obtained a copy of the data from OS and rt.:vit.:wed it to confirm the
classification. The OIG confirmed that document'i labeled "Top Secret" were present and contacted the
Federdl Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to obtain a search warrant to review the computer eguioment_i_n__t.M
custody [ _ ~ The OIG seized the equipmentL
~~
~
~~
The OIG referred the findings to the FBI and to the Counterintelligence Center
(CIC), and supported their investigative efforts. The FBI and CIC stopped providing updates t(b )( 1}IG
j
jand have not requested assistance from the OIG since that date.
(b )(3) CIAAct
:=J
L _
111.
'
.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
,
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
3. f~:@l~ 0~ (b )(7)( c)__] the OIG notified the Department of Justice of the t(b )(7)( e)
classified material. On
~ the OIG formally referred the matter to the FBI. On!
I
~- Jthe OIG executed a search warrant for possession of child pornogr.t..l.'.!!Y_!o seize the
(b )(6)
com
(3) CIAAct
6)
)(c)
Findings
C__
j <
b )(7)( c)
m~ ~ r---
(b)(3) C IAAct
t-= 4. ~
(b)(3) NatSecAct
-==----'----"== = -- - '==::...-.:__:===-(b )(7)( c )
(b)(7)(e)
-INV-201
Page I of J
This document is controlled by the CIA/OIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
,dis.eminatcd_withou.Lnrior IG_authorization
(b)(3) NatSecAct
-SECRET I lbJQFOR:N
C06299597
Approved for
Rei~~~:~~J5~f:B C06299597
(b)(3)
(b)(?)( c)
5. ~5/Rlf) Based on the results ofthe initial review, OIG referred the matter to the
C IAAct
Counterintelligence Center's
- (b)(3) CIAAct_
=The CIC5 - (b)(6)
and the FBI began a joint counterintelligence investigation into[
[activitiesl
__
(b )(7)( c)
[--=-
___
- -
___
_j
.
6. 'fflHNfi_ On l(b )(7)(c)_the1r request. I
,he OIG turned over all of the evidence gathered to H(-bco)( )-:tt
1 ~
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
-(b)~ 3 ) N tSecAct
- (b)(3) NatSecAct
7. ~ Th(b)(Cl(C)ntified approximo..~ 1
,..~,~ .......... ~uments present o..!!.l(b)(7)(e)
personal systems, which were confirmed by a subject matter expert
_ (b )(3) C IAAct_ _
I
[
_(b)(3) CIAAct
~dditionally, more than [..=limages allegedly containing child (b)(3) CIAAct
pomogmphy were identified onl _ jcomputers.
~}fZ)__{fl
(b )(6)
r== -
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(e)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
_ __ (b)(7)(c)
9. fS#NfJ On [
~leaded guilnjof possession of child pornography.[
j;as sentenced
b)(3) CIAAct_
and registration as a sex offender.
b)(6)
- (b)(6)---,
b){ 7 ){ )
C
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)_
(b)(7)(c)
[counts
10. ~ On [- (b )(7){ c)the Office of General Counsel notified the OIG that the FBI had
executed a search warrant on1
JfeS'.dence and obtained an 8GB tlash drive[
__
[
~ The OGC advised that the FBI would be completing the
==.J
forensic analysis of the flash drive and closing the case, pending the receipt of additional information.
II. ~lf4f7 The FBI ha<> ao;sumed the investigation a.'i the primary investigative agency and the
OIG has not received any requests for additional support since March 2013. As a result of no further OIG
investigative activity occurring and the FBI jurisdiction over the case, the OJG is closing this
investigation. Should additional information be developed, the OIG may consider reopening the matter.
INV-20 1
Page 2 of 3
SECRET I /NOF9FMf
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
C06299597
--Approved for
Rei~~~:~Jgef:B C0629959l- --
- --
----.
(b)(3) CIAAct
-L_
(b)(3)
ate)
CIAAc~~~~, } a.pJo:f
INV-201
Page 3 of 3
_ru;;CRET/ /N9P8R:l~
Centrallntelligence Agency
6 August 2015
Jason Leopold
3. Misuse of Government Systems for Database Searches- ISSUE DATE FEBRUARY 2013
4. Agency Contractor Alleged Reprisal for Wbistleblowing- ISSUE DATE FEBRUARY 2013
5. Review of[redacted] Allegations from DOD- ISSUE DATEMAY 2013
6. Alleged Retribution Against Alleged Wbistleblower- ISSUE DATE JUNE 2013
7. Alleged Classified Information Leaked to Foreigu Army Officials- ISSUE DATE JULY 2013
8. Misuse of Agency Credential by Former (b3) Staff Officer- ISSUE DATE AUGUST 2013
9. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information- ISSUE DATE AUGUST 2013
10. Request for Whistleblower Protection by Former Interrogator- ISSUE DATE AUGUST 2013
11. Counterfeiting of CIA Credentials- ISSUE DATE SEPTEMBER 2013
12. Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers- ISSUE DATE SEPTEMBER 2013
13. Alleged Use of Government Systems to Order Steroids- ISSUE DATE OCTOBER 2013
14. Alleged War Crimes by Agency Personnel Overseas -ISSUE DATE NOVEMBER 2013
15. Alleged Abuse of Detainees Overseas- ISSUE DATE JANUARY 2014
16. Disclosure of Classified Information by Former D/CIA- ISSUE DATE MARCH 2014
17. Alleged Abuse and Misconduct Overseas- ISSUE DATE MARCH 2014
18. Alleged Misattribution of Detainee Intelligence- ISSUE DATE APRIL 2014
19. Alleged Misconduct by Polygrapher- ISSUE DATE MARCH 2014
20. Theft ofUSG Property: E Bay sale ofNVGs- ISSUE DATEMAY 2014
21. Allegation of Misconduct by Polygrapher- ISSUE DATE MAY 2014
We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and although our prior
responses stated that we located twenty-three (23) responsive documents, further review of one of those
documents indicates that the document is not one of the IG reports listed in the FOIA request and is,
therefore, not responsive. Thus far, we have produced nineteen (19) documents in segregable form and
denied two (2) in their entirety. At this time, one (1) additional document can be released in segregable
form with redactions made on the basis ofFOIA exemptions (b)(l), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), and
(b)(7)(e). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50
U.S.C. 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)ClAAct" on the enclosed document, and/or Section 102A(i)(l)
of the National Security Act of1947, 50 U.S.C 3024(i)(l), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on
the enclosed document.
Because the above-referenced request is a subject of pending litigation in federal court, in
accordance with Agency regulations as set forth at Section 1900.42 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, you are not entitled to appeal this determination administratively.
Sincerely,
;lJM)~~~
Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Enclosure
C06299690
Administrative Data
Case No.:
{b)(3) CIJI.f.~c~t_ __
Case Title:
Investigator:
~b)(3) CIAAct]
Supervisor:
Date Received:
30 November 2012
Date Assigned:
4 December 2012
Case Type:
H.
Full Investigation
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(3) NatSecAc
According
from both
(b)(3)
(b)(3) CIAAct to Agency records, theNVGs arrived at
on 2June 2011, at which time alii? sets ofNVGs were
CIAAct
(b)(6)
inventoriedandaccountedfor. On21June2011,1
lanA~encycontractorl
I
(b)(6)
(b )(7)( c)
received SOJ(b )(3) CIAAc!transported the 17 NVGs to th~
}warehouse, located[
I
(b)(7)( c)
L___
__j ~-~designated the NVGs for disposal by.secure destruction on 28 February 2012. The
NVGs were last inventoried on 15 March 2012 by propertv tnmCin (PTI) personnel '(b)( 1 )_::]in
. (b)(1)
preparationfrirdestruction.
(b)(1)
(b\(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
'
(b )(3) NatSecAct
3. fU'JIIQWl On 10 Decemher2012, OIG contacted the Pentagon point of contilct for the
CIAAct
Ureferral,
(b)( 6)
referred OIG to US Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID),
(b)(6)
SA
On II January 2013, OIG coordinated with the US Army CID Field Investigative Unit (FlU)
(b)(7)(c)
to obtain further ioformation concerning the matter. FlU advised OIG that the NVGs were in the
(b )(6)
possession ofCID office, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
(b)(7)(c)
c=
!NV-20!
Page I of2
This document is controlled by the CWOIG and neither the document nor its contents should be
I
I.
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C06299690
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(b )(1)
6. -ceTThe OIG investigation found that 17 Agency-owned NVGs were received by c=(b )(3) NatSecAct
and destined for destruction; however, by unknown means, at least 7 were transferred to DRMO at
Tobyhanna Anny Depot, PA. The DRMO subsequently released the NVGs for sale to the public without
the requisite demilitarization of the equipment. GILCO LLC, of Muncy, PA, subsequently obtained the
NVGs through a government auction, and later posted the NVGs for sale on eBay.
7. i7" Due to a lack of evidence to suooort the alleoation of theft of US ovemment oronertv,
this matter is being cl~(b)( 1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(e)
(b )(1)
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(b)(7)(e)
IV.
11
(b)(3) CIAAct
1"'"6'"'
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INV-201
Page2of2.
SECRE'3?//NOF9R:Ii