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Disbelief in the metaphysical logically results in misplacing the emphasis on the earthly.
Our century, indeed, lives in the delusion that it is thereby preparing the golden age ...
Carl Du Prel, The Philosophy of Mysticism, London 1889.
Modern man, the world eater, respects no space and no thing green or furred as sacred. The
march of the machines has entered his blood. They are his seed boxes, his potential wings
and guidance systems on the far roads of the universe The ancestral center exists no longer.
Anonymous millions roam the streets.
Loren Eiseley, The Invisible Pyramid, New York 1970.
Here I refer to any attempt to explain the human conditionfor example in relation to the environment
by reference to some absolute purpose, end, goal, or function.
regarded as processes that are developing through, rather than acting upon,
nature (Moore 2015b).
In the first part of their seminal work on Capitalism and Schizophrenia
Deleuze and Guattari promulgate, and we may read this as a genuinely
ontological claim, that all of reality is machinic. Yet, the machinic is not a third
realm between Nature and Society. It is not a third sphere that is neither human
nor natural, as we commonly imagine it to be. The fundamental ontological
notion is that all is one, that there is no fundamental difference between
humans and nature since they are interconnected through the same process of
becoming. In the eyes of Deleuze and Guattari, this process of becoming is
proceeding in a state of technological schizophrenia, a universe of productive
and reproductive desiring-machines driven by the goal of universal primary
production as the essential reality of man and nature (D&G 2004: 5). In this
capitalist technonature, there is no perceived difference between the biological
and the social. All life functions and must be organized along the same lines of
machinic production.
It is hardly surprising that this machinic ontology derives much of its
mythical power from the notion of metallurgy. Corresponding allegories and
metal workers are abound in the theoretical work of Deleuze and Guattari,
exemplified by archetypical figures such as the alchemist and the smith (Cline
2014). In the cyborg, we also find a new interpretation of the mythical figure
of the Golem, the speechless and soulless anthropomorphic being that is created
out of the earths materials to serve the will of the sages.
However, a second ontological dimension of our coexistence within the
environment re-emerges if we think of it in terms of possessing a more-thanhuman agency, an innate capacity to sustain our bodily and spiritual existence,
to communicate, interact and become with us by inscribing an ambiguous
syntax in our minds and on our bodies. Agro-industrial and machinic practices
of capitalist accumulation and territorialization are certainly not the only way
of thinking about nature-making in the Anthropocene. In short, the key
question is whether the decolonialization of the Anthropocene, among other
things, requires us to develop a new sense of enchantment, to discover the
myths we tell us about ourselves and our relationships with the living
environment that may potentially transcend the strictly policed boundaries of
mainstream sustainability debates and replace the schizophrenic ontology of
endless production.
This second aspect of decolonialitywhich I am admittedly only able to
briefly sketch heredoes not imply to nurture new grandiose feelings of
Enlightenment romanticism, or to regard all ontological propositions as equally
valid. Instead, the decolonial alternative is to take a more modest analytical
approach which seeks to avoid the path dependencies of institutionalized
knowledge production by realizing the political and cultural-cognitive
limitations of a machinic ontology, and by avoiding exclusionary empirical
dualisms such as scientific vs. indigenous or natural vs. supernatural.
Yet, as soon as we embark on a decolonial journey within contradiction, we
may often find ourselves walking on thin ice from a professional point of view.
It almost seems as if the pervasive objectification of nature and its empiricist
reduction to biogeochemical processes, which arguably dominate the natural
sciences and much of contemporary ecology, have vigorously slammed the door
shut on any serious attempt to begin a new conversation about the scientific
demystification of life. Such an all-encompassing demystification of the morethan-human dimensions of our existence may even preclude the articulation of
new utopian alternativeseven if they are only contingent alternatives. In her
book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things Jane Bennett (2010: xv;
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emphasis in the original) points out that demystification tends to screen from
view the vitality of matter and to reduce political agency to human agency.
Those are the tendencies I resist.
Thinking and being political in the Anthropocene therefore requires us to
reclaim the right to be irrational, the right to be enchanted, even if this means to
(temporarily) leave the traditional realm of scientific inquiry altogether, and
to engage in a very different type of conversation that is not limited to debating
the advantages or disadvantages of vitalist philosophy and the role of religion
within the liberal state. As long as so-called indigenous ontologies based on
experience, art, language and ritual are marginalized within contemporary
ecological discourses, this seems to be a risk we must be willing to take.
Then, does the idea of enchantment imply that we should refrain from seeing
ourselves as mere scholars and strive to become better poets, artists and
iconoclasts who unearth the salient myths that are connected to the idea of the
Anthropocene? This is certainly one possibilityinasmuch as the latter
suggestion leaves room for the important thought that we are constantly reinterpreting our various mythological traditions in order to make sense of the
past and prepare for a vague future. However, this process of mythologization
that imparts the past with metaphysical qualities is neither a new cultural
phenomenon, nor is it one that is exclusively linked to the Anthropocene.
In the aftermath of the famous battle of Kadesh that took place between the
Egyptian and Hittite empires in 1274 BCone of the first military engagements
for which a detailed contemporary account has been discoveredthe Egyptian
king Ramses II already knew too well how to rely on his scribes and artists to
turn a rather indecisive military engagement abroad into a triumphant
propaganda victory at home. In what could be described as the prototype of a
modern public relations campaign, the king unified the rich faculties of
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the category of science, nor by the category of religion, which turns it into a very
special form of borderthinking.
Beyond the confines of Western (Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian) cultural
traditionsthat are arguably far less Western and much more hybridized than
purist ideas of culture are able to conveywe encounter a rich repertoire of
mythical thought as well. Examples include so-called indigenous traditions of
shamanism and paganism, African art, philosophy and spirituality, as well as the
mythical heritage of ancient China, India, Persia, or Egypt.
In the Humanities, to use such a clumsy term for lack of a better word, where
some postmodern scholars would possibly reject the scientist label altogether,
one does not need to look very hard either to discover that an influential thinker
like Gilles Deleuze readily confessed that he feels like a pure metaphysician
(Villani 2007: 45).3 And who would deny that even a simple computer is quite
an enigmatic machine for many of usa state of affairs that regularly awakens
millennialist visions and a whole range of technological anxieties, some of which
seem to be rather unsubstantiated, while others appear to be more imminent.
Luciano Floridi (2015: 10; emphasis added) comments:
The point is not that our machines are conscious, or intelligent, or able to know
something as we do. They are not. The point is that they are increasingly able to deal
with more and more tasks better than we do, including predicting our behaviors ...
This is what I have defined as the fourth revolution in our self-understanding. We are
not at the center of the universe (Copernicus), of the biological kingdom (Darwin), or
of the realm of rationality (Freud) Science is based on Big Data and algorithms,
simulations and scientific networks, all aspects of an epistemology that is massively
dependent on, and influenced by, information technologies. Conflicts, crime, and
security have all been re-defined by the digital, and so has political power. In short, no
aspect of our lives has remained untouched by the information revolution.
3 According
to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013), Gilles Deleuze has also been referred to as
a library of Babel by his colleague Jean-Franois Lyotard.
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Following this line of reasoning, we may readily conclude that older mythical
elements re-emerge as part of a digitalized and globalized epistemological
fabric. Put differently, myths are not only the subject of the fine arts, cinema,
video games or literature. Mythical references can be found everywhere, in the
rationalized sphere of the political economy and technology as well as in
debates about geopolitics. This rich mythical repertoire consists of narratives
that have developed under specific historic, cultural and social circumstances,
and have now been incorporated into the globalized techno-capitalist system.
However, examples of mythical incorporation are certainly abound. They
range from the incorporation of the Greek pantheon into the Roman religion, to
the gods, heroes, villains and tricksters that have now been incorporated into
the movies of the Hollywood industry.
Moreover, there are numerous rituals and mythical references in politics and
the economy that are used to legitimize hierarchies as well as contested claims
to power, starting from the insignia and crowning of queens and kings to the
bread and games spectacles of popular culture that are used to ideologize
consumerism.
This means that a decolonial perspective of enchantment has to be more
than an act of mythologization, de-mythologization or re-mythologization.
Simply speaking in mythical or metaphysical terms about ourselves or the living
environment is not per se a decolonial position. Quite to the contrary. As the
case of Ramses II has shown, mythical repertoires are as much an expression of
genuine spirituality as they are of worldly power. And of course, they may be
misused as technologies of enchantment (Gell 1992) to support various forms of
coloniality, dogmatism, and extremism.4
4 Alfred
Gell differentiates between the technology of enchantment on the one hand, which he describes as a
process in which technical activities such as art, music, ritual and architecture are used to express sacred or
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For instance, there is a clear trend toward cultural appropriation that can be
observed with regard to mythical imaginaries and experiences of so-called
indigenous people. Indigenous visions which encourage greater harmony with
the environmentrather than its permanent appropriationare frequently
discarded as subaltern forms of knowledge that have to be incorporated into
the greater epistemic canon of modern techno-science. At the same time, there
is a whole industry at work that turns indigenous philosophies into consumer
products such as books, films or seminars, which often promote mere selfoptimization, intellectual escapism, or esoteric kitsch. It is prudent to be
politically mindful at this point. Indigenous ways of becoming-with the
environment are not meant to be calls for more conscious geoengineering,
business-yoga, the patenting of indigenous medicine, or new green revolutions
led by the agro-chemical industry.
So what can we learn from this state of affairs with regard to the relationship
between nature, society and technology? And what does this mean for a
decolonial approach to the politics of the Anthropocene?
If you would simply ask me whether I see myself as a scientist, whether I
enjoy the achievements of modern techno-science, medicine and the agroindustry, then I must honestly say: Yes, I do. I am writing this chapter on a
computer, in a peaceful setting, in a capitalist country, near a supermarket. And
still I realize that this situation is deeply connected to a system of consumption
and production which relentlessly destroys the environment and forcibly
denies the same privileges to subaltern populations, while exploiting them
metaphysical qualities. On the other hand, he speaks about the enchantment of technology, which means to
imbue technical artifacts and activitiesas suchwith metaphysical qualities, for example cathedrals,
paintings, dances, sculptures, or machines. This is an important distinction to make if we wish to
understand how enchantment and technology are related to each other. Gell himself emphasizes that both
processes may be misused as techniques of power.
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economically, culturally, and in many other ways. There is everyday racism and
discrimination. There is violence. But this is beside the point I am trying to
make.
The main point is that developing a genuinely decolonial perspective on the
Anthropocene requires scholars to practice borderthinking from their own
point of view. In many cases, this means to avoid overly simplistic either/or
choices. You are either a scientist, or you are enlightened. You either dispose
of your computer, or you are a hypocrite for criticizing modern technology ...
(which I am not doing by the way, I am merely criticizing some of the ways in
which it is used, or might be used) I will not try to answer such questions.
The idea of decoloniality, so I argue, must go beyond many of these divisions,
while still acknowledging that they do exist, and that we are often complicit in
maintaining them. In this sense, decoloniality is as much about mutual learning
and a different vision of becoming political, as it is about bridge-building and
positions of betweenness, about bringing together the international relations
specialist with the artist and the landless farmer to spark a very different
conversation that enlivens the present. The problems that stand behind the
notions of (neo-)colonial politics and the Anthropocene era are too immense to
remain out of touch.
Thus, if the notion of borderthinking can teach us one thing, it is that the
categories and language of (Eurocentric) empirical science clearly reach their
limits as soon as we are trying to describe the predicaments that are connected
to the Anthropocene idea. This is not about choosing sides. I would rather hope
that more poets write about politics. I would also hope that a new dmos finds
its places to gather, to speak, and to listen.
However, we may legitimately conclude that the idea behind the notion of
dmos is fairly nave. Does it not simply promote the ideal of citizenship, while
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ignoring the reality of who is considered a full citizen (or even human) in the
present political and economic climate? Does it not totalize the ideal of Western
liberal democracy and operate with epistemic categories that are inherently
colonial? Does the notion of dmos not exclude animals and the living
environment? Perhaps it does all of the above. Yet more importantly, these
questions about becoming political point us to an important problem that may
be best described in terms of the relationship between the philosophical
notions of telos (how things should be) and techn (how to make things that
way).
Empirical science, so is the argument, has either neglected the former aspect
of telos (how things should be), or it has reduced it to a problem of political and
economic management. At the same time, we see that the Anthropocene has an
unsettling effect on those who are primarily concerned with the how to (or
techn) of empirical science and international relationshow to deal with
climate change, how to feed nine billion people by 2050, how to understand
mass migration? The list is endless. There is no shortage of problems.
And while the problems behind the Anthropocene become more pressing, we
can see that economic growth is indeed not a very convincing answer to matters
of concern such as environmental destruction, poverty, and hunger. In a recent
article titled The Problem with Saving the World, anthropologist Jason Hickel
(2015) describes the fundamental dilemma that is arguably at the heart of the
debate about the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):
Of all the income generated by global GDP growth between 1999 and 2008, the
poorest 60 percent of humanity received only 5 percent of it. Given the existing ratio
between GDP growth and the income growth of the poorest, it will take 207 years to
eliminate poverty with this strategy, and to get there, we will have to grow the global
economy by 175 times its present size. This is terrifying to contemplate. Even if such
immense growth were possible, it would drive climate change to catastrophic levels
and, in the process, rapidly reverse any gains against poverty.
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The SDGs do, however, call for income growth for the bottom 40 percent of the
population at a rate higher than the overall average but it doesnt address the bigger
issue of the aggregate production and consumption levels that this approach requires.
For the sake of argument, lets say that poor countries manage to grow incredibly fast,
and quickly catch up to the average high-income country. According to data provided
by the Global Footprint Network, we would need at least 3.4 Earths to sustain this
level of production and consumptionand thats assuming that the already-highincome countries slow their present rates of growth to zero, which they show no sign
of doing.
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