Professional Documents
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JESICHRIS
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be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that
it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA
637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his
filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in
the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010
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In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)
The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of the
marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their
marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual cooperation
for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many
military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose
and not to the inception of the said marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No.
171577, February 12, 2014
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article
36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely
physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
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Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal
separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of nonappearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does
not destroy this presumption.
BOBBY TAN, v.GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No.
172017 / G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013
The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property
acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no
showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The
presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the
property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse.
Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
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exactly what Omaa did in this case. The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has
no legal effect and is against public policy.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370,
September 23, 2013
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property acquired during
the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the
couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the
present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held
that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA
221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of
the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where
a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to
the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses.
Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons,
like the absence of a marriage license
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San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN
G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014
As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the
applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is Article
172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind
the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs of
Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to
the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that the
disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husbands consent
is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned. In the present case, the
fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986, one
month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Aurora as
one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate,
had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it
deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family
home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to
the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house
as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
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The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA
253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony
of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO,
RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA
ADRIANO BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)
The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to
that end.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession
of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be
no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No.
175540, 14 April 2014
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without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the
intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property at the expense
of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the
land.As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within
thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to
ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case shall be remanded to
the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market value of the lot at
the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.
Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to
avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two
courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although
they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does
not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription.
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of acquisition.
Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of
the land through which the new river bed passes even without any formal act
of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a
trespasser.
Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012
Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed
to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not the
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proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title
to or interest in the lots. The petitioners status as possessor and owner of
the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985
decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed
on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
ownership of the lots.
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute.
Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs
who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the coowners. In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a
subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should not
be barred by prior judgment.
Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No.
179011. April 15, 2013
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES
MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013
Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable
parties in an action for legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/coowner A party who is not the co-owner of a land subject of a compromise
agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the
compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the
agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize.
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Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking
in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children
are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the
danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his
own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive
nuisance."
Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of
persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure
illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R.
No. 166330, September 11, 2013
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may
become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the
complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions
that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and
unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable
and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent
upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as
to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000
The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a
separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the
deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance.
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during my
lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two
aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she
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reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land
until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them
freely.
Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply
with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to
comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only then - when the
non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor's
knowledge - that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as
provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto.
Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this
does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the
statements therein. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not
suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties'
locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.
Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands
and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this
principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native
title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the
State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership
through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the
State.
SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L.
OPINION, G.R. No. 176043. January 15, 2014
Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an
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must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the
transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for
value and that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered,
and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or
entities.
Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property
as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be
considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE
MAGDALENA YBAEZ
G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014 FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin J.)
AND
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in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that any
recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L16749, January 31, 1963
Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should
be governed by Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers
back to the Philippine Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence,
Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes natural children legally
acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA
755
A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares
or complies with duties to take effect after his death."
Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524
The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania,
USA which is the national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16
and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483
The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will
should include those who are born after the testators death. To construe it
as referring to the nearest male relative at any time after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of the estate.
De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972
There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is
to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
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In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil
aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon
being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only
then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence,
and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was
not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that
Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in
accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when
Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of
securing his conformity to the draft.
Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the
testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of
the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be
said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption. 37
Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the will. This cannot be done because he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied
on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation
clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in
the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly
inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied within the execution of the will.
Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209
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The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394
The issue in this case whether the will acknowledged by the testatrix and
the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of
his commission satisfies the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of
his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material
to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard
from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. 38
Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16
The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
can be determined by the probate court.
Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute is mandatory."
Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes.
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intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not
render the destruction conditional.
Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509
The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if
the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to
authenticate. In case of holographic will if oral testimony were admissible
only one man could engineer the fraud this way.
Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator.
Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not
required to produce more than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the
holographic will were contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having denied the probate.
Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333
We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law
requires that three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting
of the deceased. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us
that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written
by the testator.
Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness
of its execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate
proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private
respondents complaint.
Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
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Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and
rightful share in said property.
Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B.
MAAMO, SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013
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daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make
a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.
Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael
who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the
Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property
may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704
The word degree means generation and the present code has obviously
followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and one generation from
the first heir.
Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491
In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first
heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular
event.
Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69
The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouses parents. There is
no provision in the civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law.
Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555
In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate
in the inheritance with the surviving nieces and nephews because the
existence of the latter excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral
line, the right of representation does not go beyond the children of brothers
and sisters.
Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567
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Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee,
petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by
telegram but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable
for damages.
MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469 July 25, 1991
Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The
failure of the owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are not
valid defenses, since consignation under such circumstances, is necessary,
and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance with the specific
requirements of the law therefor.
UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON, G.R.
NO. 149338, July 28, 2008
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation under
the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents failure to increase
the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will accommodate
their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to perform their end of
the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the other party to perform
the obligation renders the other party to demand fulfillment of the obligation
or asked for the rescission of the contract, but not simply not performing
their part of the Agreement.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R. NO.
178610 November 17, 2010
Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to pay
the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, which were suppose to
be paid through salary deduction, to the petitioner because of their
dismissal. Loans secured by their future retirement benefits to which they are
no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations and
the absence of a period within which to pay the obligation, the fulfillment of
which is demandable at once.
JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and effectivity
can take place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition
happens or is fulfilled, and if the suspensive condition does not take place,
the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
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PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926
Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the
donation and the same not having been complied with, the donation never
became effective. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the
acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied
with or is not deemed complied with, consequently, when a condition is
imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right
is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent but a
condition subsequent.
ALILEO A. MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R.
No. 188986, March 20, 2013
The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party
is implied in reciprocal obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA
correctly applied Article 1191, which provides thus: the power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after
he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.The court
shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.
EDS MANUFACTURING, INC.v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC.
G.R. No. 162802, October 9, 2013
The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental
violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the
agreement. It must be pointed that in the absence of a stipulation, a party
cannot unilaterally and extra judicially rescind a contract. A judicial or
notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place.
Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to
automatic rescission. Under Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve
reciprocal obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail
to comply with what is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked
judicially. Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made available to the
injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the
other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party entitled to
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rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot
be exercised solely on a partys own judgment that the other committed a
breach of the obligation. The operative act which produces the resolution of
the contract is the decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor.
UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29,
In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the
"Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon
default by the debtor ALUMCO, the creditor (UP) has "the right and the power
to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as rescinded without the necessity
of any judicial suit."
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds
at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court
that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was
not correct in law.
AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984
Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff having
chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot now seek rescission; and (2)
that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to rescind the obligation
has prescribed. The rule that the injured party can only choose between
fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies
when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if the fulfillment has become
impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured party to seek rescission even
after he has chosen fulfillment.
OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007
The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this recourse,
and the Invitation to Bid sent out to implement said resolutions, all have a
common subject: the Shares the 187.84 Million EPCIB common shares,
which, as a necessary consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger which saw
EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO, have been transferred to BDO
and converted into BDO common shares under the exchange ratio set forth
in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As thus converted, the subject Shares are
no longer equity security issuances of the now defunct EPCIB, but those of
BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally separate and distinct entity
from what used to be EPCIB.
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SPS.
JUAN
AND
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acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the personal
consent of individual taxpayers is not required.
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
G.R. NO. 147950. December 11, 2003
There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the
restructuring agreement since it merely provided for a new schedule of
payments and additional security giving Delta authority to take over the
management and operations of CBLI in case CBLI fails to pay installments
equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to pay a sum of money,
this Court has consistently applied the well-settled rule that the obligation is
not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes
only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with
the old ones, or where the new contract merely supplements the old one.
SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R. 167874.
January 15, 2010
A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements:
(1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain
in money or its equivalent.
PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002
Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellees letter-offer of a parcel of
land but appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered
amounts within two years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the offer into
a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms
of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer and is a
rejection of the original offer and such acceptance is not sufficient to
generate consent.
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.
NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987
The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be
considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of
a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System. The general rule
enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present, except when the law so requires requiring a
contract to be in some form for validity or enforceability.
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
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contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon
the third person.
FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September
30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent
of the stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient that the third
person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for
being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely
deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011
Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a
valid and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to
another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of
the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. Similarly, in this
case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes,
without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands.
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984
Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement,
commonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors
vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee, and the petitioner prays
that private respondents be declared liable to petitioner for whatever
amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of in pari delicto that
the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave
them both where it finds them.
CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR.
G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)
The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An
accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established
public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
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Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground
of unsatisfied judgment against respondents and It likewise moved to declare
the sale to a third party of a parcel of land in the name of the private
respondent as one in fraud of creditors which was granted by the lower
court. Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective
until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title, and an action for
rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary proceeding through a
motion, but in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial.
LAW ON SALES
PEALOSA vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23, 2001
Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the
consideration stated in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when
the deed was notarized; c) seller did not surrender a copy of the title; d)real
estate taxes were not paid. The elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent which are present in the second
Deed of Sale hence there is already a perfected contract of sale.
FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATIONvs. SECURITRON
SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015
SECURITY
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unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.", hence, petitioners "sold" nothing, it follows that
they can also "repurchase" nothing.
DAROY vs. ATTY. ABECIA, A.C. NO. 3046, October 26, 1998
The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land,
acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor to his counsel as long
as the property was not the subject of the litigation.
ARCENIO vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-89-270 July 5, 1993
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M.
NO. MTJ-92-637 July 5, 1993
The respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic to tow the jeep in
custodia legis and to place the jeep in good running condition, spending in
the process her own money and also registered the same in her brother's
name. The act of respondent judge is not unlike the prohibited acquisition by
purchase described in Article 1491 of the New Civil code and is in fact, even
worse when she did not acquire the said vehicle from it's owner but instead
whimsically spent for its repairs and automatically appropriated the jeep for
her own use and benefit.
VALENCIA vs. ATTY. CABANTING, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543
April 26, 1991
Paulino alleged that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution
concerning his house and while the petition for certiorari was pending the
trial court issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case
has already become final and executory". While it is true that Atty. Cabanting
purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending
certiorari proceeding, and a thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
FABILLO vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.
NO. L-68838 March 11, 1991
After the court declared with finality that the petitioners are the lawful
owners, they refused to comply when the respondent lawyer proceeded to
implement the contract of services between him and the petitioners by
taking possession and exercising rights of ownership over 40% of said
properties which are the subject of litigation. A contract between a lawyer
and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition
under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is
not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.
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MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. NO. 2430 August 30, 1990
Complainant alleges that for over a period of 20 years, respondent counsel
allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client and a partnership
of which respondent is one of the partners, covering parcels of land of the
estate, but respondent claims that he is only acting as an agent. Even if the
respondent signed merely as an agent, the lease contracts are covered by
the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties
involved in litigation in which he takes part.
BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. GONZALES, A.M. NO. 1625 February 12, 1990
The Solicitor General found that respondent counsel transferred to himself
one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case
where the properties were involved. Persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein
because of the existing fiduciary relationship with such property and rights,
as well as with the client.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY
OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004
Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as
he acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services,
then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for
handling his clients case. The prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption and such prohibition is founded on public policy because, by
virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his
client.
PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, G.R. NO.
170115, FEBRUARY 19, 2008
The City of Cebu was no longer the owner of the lot when it ceded the same
to petitioner under the compromise agreement and at that time, the city
merely retained rights as an unpaid seller but had effectively transferred
ownership of the lot to Morales. A successor-in-interest could only acquire
rights that its predecessor had over the lo which include the right to seek
rescission or fulfillment of the terms of the contract and the right to damages
in either case.
HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. L-46892
September 30, 1981
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Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered
land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is
relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the
purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the
land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the
registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Act
No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is
Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares
that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.
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INDUSTRIAL
TEXTILE
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 66140,
January 21, 1993 21
Respondent alleges that it cannot be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags
which were not used for packing cement as originally intended invoking it's
right of return. Article 1502 of the Civil Code, has no application at all to this
case, since the provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an
express written agreement to make a sales contract either a "sale or return"
or a "sale on approval", which is absent in this case.
Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing
that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and
purporting to embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a
contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation
securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the
contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and
reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the
parties in the "on approval" situation.
LO vs. KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 149420
October 8, 2003
The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the existence and legality of
the credit at the time of the sale, unless it should have been sold as doubtful;
but not for the solvency of the debtor, unless it has been so expressly
stipulated or unless the insolvency was prior to the sale and of common
knowledge.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
The seller, in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at
the time the Deed of Absolute Sale, is giving an implied warranty of title
which prescribes six months after the delivery of the vehicle.
PNB vs MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, G.R. NO.
173454, October 6, 2008
MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. PNB, G.R.
NO. 173456, October 6, 2008
In a contract of sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is an implied
warranty on the part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the
time when the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall have a peaceful
possession of the thing and it shall be free from any hidden faults or defects,
or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
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The seller, in pledging that he will defend the same from all claims or any
claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, is giving a warranty against
eviction. A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of these four
requisites:(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the
thing sold; (2) This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The basis thereof is by
virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (4) The vendor has
been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee.
DE YSASI vs. ARCEO, G.R. NO. 136586, November 22, 2001
Petitioner admitted that he inspected the premises three or four times before
signing the lease contract and during his inspection, he noticed the rotten
plywood on the ceiling which in his opinion was caused by leaking water or
"anay" (termites), yet he decided to go through with the lease agreement.
The lessor is responsible for warranty against hidden defects, but he is not
answerable for patent defects or those which are visible.
ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 52267, January 24, 1996
The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written
contract - and not a suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects. The
remedy against violations of the warranty against hidden defects is either to
withdraw from the contract (redhibitory action) or to demand a proportionate
reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with damages in either case.
DINO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 113564, June 20, 2001 23
Respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on
September 28, 1988 and the action to recover the purchase price of the
goods petitioners returned to the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989,
more than nine months from the date of last delivery. Actions arising from
breach of warranty against hidden defects shall be barred after six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.
LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA, G.R. NO. 137552, June 16, 2000
A MOA has this stipulation "....SELLER-LESSOR hereby agrees to sell unto
BUYER-LESSEE the property described within six (6) months from the
execution date hereof, or upon issuance by the Court of a new owner's
certificate of title and the execution of extrajudicial partition with sale of the
estate of Francisco Laforteza, whichever is earlier;...". Petitioner contends
that since the condition was not met, they no longer had an obligation to
proceed with the sale of the house and lot. The petitioners fail to distinguish
between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the contract and a
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parties, Later, petitioners resisted the action for redemption. The transaction
between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with right to
repurchase, the second instrument is just an option to buy since it is not
embodied in the same document of sale but in a separate document, and
since such option is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price,
said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them.
BAUTISTA vs UNANGST, G.R. NO. 173002, July 4, 2008
Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in
possession, as a lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage because in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the
legal title to the property is immediately transferred to the vendee, subject
to the vendors right to redeem and retention by the vendor of the
possession of the property is inconsistent with the vendees acquisition of
the right of ownership under a true sale.
ABILLA vs. ANG GOBONSENG, JR., G.R. NO. 146651, January 17, 2002
The legal question to be resolved is "May the vendors in a sale judicially
declared as a pacto de retro exercise the right of repurchase under Article
1606, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, after they have taken the position
that the same was an equitable mortgage?" No, where the proofs established
that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties intention, that the
transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro, the vendor a
retro is not entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606.
AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA, G.R. NO. 155018, December 11,
2003
The lower court's dispositive position states: "However, the vendors can still
exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil
Code." Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty (30) days from the time
final judgment was rendered, not from the defendants receipt of the
judgment, "final judgment must be construed to mean one that has become
final and executory.
Spouses CRUZ vs. LEIS et al., G.R. NO. 125233, March 9, 2000 26
The lower court rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the
consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the
Registry of Property. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the
true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in
good faith while the determination is being made, however, notwithstanding
Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of
ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of
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ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. SPS. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 141974,
August 9, 2004
The respondents offer to redeem the foreclosed properties and the
subsequent consignation in court were made within the period of
redemption, but the amount consigned did not include the interest and was
also way below the amount paid by the highest bidder-purchaser of the
properties during the auction sale. The redemption price should either be
fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court because only by
such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is
being made in good faith.
LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 104114 December 4, 1995
Petitioner questions the ruling of the Court of Appeals which concluded that a
prior tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the
filing of the action for legal redemption. To avail of the right of redemption
what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within the prescribed period.
There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly
effected. It can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by
filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price
within the prescribed period.
VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, G.R. NO. L-33158,
October 17, 1985
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed
redemption because it considered the vendee, Vallangca, a co-heir, being
married to Concepcion Villanueva. The term "third person" or "stranger in
Art. 1620 refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, either by will
or the law or any one who is not a co-owner.
PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 150060.
August 19, 2003
Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants
to an adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be
shown that the buyer or grantee does not own any other rural land.
G.R. NO. 134117. February 9, 2000
SEN PO EK MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MARTINEZ
Petitioner invokes its right of first refusal against private respondents, when
Teodora sold the property that petitioner has been leasing. Article 1622 of
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the New Civil Code only deals with small urban lands that are bought for
speculation where only adjoining lot owners can exercise the right of preemption or redemption. It does not apply to a lessee trying to buy the land
that it was leasing, especially when such right was never stipulated in any of
the several lease contracts.
CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 162421, August 31, 2007
Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses, but
they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their
co-owners vendors. In requiring written notice, Art. 1623 seeks to ensure
that the redemptioner is properly notified of (a) the sale and (b) the date of
such notice, as the date thereof becomes the reckoning point of the 30-day
period of redemption.
SPOUSES SI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122047, October 12,
2000
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A
written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have
actual notice of the sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption
within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual
notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a
fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not
demand what is unnecessary.
FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. NO. 137677, May 31, 2000
Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification
should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other
person. Since the vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to
know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale,
and is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential
obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the
vendee has been given.
LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL
149040, July 4, 2007
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
G.R.
NO.
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Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the
properties in question be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right
of redemption was not contained in a public document? NO, the phrase
"effect as against third person" in Article 1625 of the Civil Code is interpreted
as to be damage or prejudice to such third person, hence if the third person
would not be prejudiced then the assignment of right to redeem may not be
in a public instrument.
HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA,
JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, vs. MARIO A.
BATONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL,
NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL
G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality,
or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a
debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. For the
presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur:
(1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2)
the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
CEBALLOS vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO MERCADO, G.R.
NO. 155856, May 28, 2004 30
Petitioner argues that Mercados delay in registering the Deed of Absolute
Sale and transferring the land title shows that the real agreement was an
equitable mortgage. Delay in transferring title is not one of the instances
enumerated by law in which an equitable mortgage can be presumed.
DEHEZA-INAMARGA vs ALANO, G.R. NO. 171321, December 18, 2008
The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be
an absolute sale, and in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale
with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage in
consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of
property rights.
EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 109404, January 22,
1996
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the
non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase
agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?
P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he
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condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such
assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the
declaration of restrictions, a description of the condominium unit against
which the same has been assessed, and the name of the registered owner
thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized representative of the
management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions.
Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof,
the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the
registration of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and
except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the subordination
thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in
the same manner provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise provided for in the
declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at
foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption
as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such
assessment could be considered a lien upon Marual's two condominium
units. Clearly, pursuant to the above provisions, petitioner's claim can not be
considered superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of
sale wherein Marual conveyed to respondent his two condominium units, was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
MORENO, G.R. NO. 186271, February 23, 2011
vs.
SPOUSES
The petition sought to prohibit the scheduled extrajudicial sale for lack of a
special power to sell from the registered owner. Under RA 4726 (the
Condominium Act), when a unit owner fails to pay the association dues, the
condominium corporation can enforce a lien on the condominium unit by
selling the unit in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and a special authority
from the condominium owner before a condominium corporation can initiate
a foreclosure proceeding is not needed.
Pagurayan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 154577, July 23, 2008
A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative
contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to
another who undertakes to pay the rent. Being a consensual contract, it is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing and
the cause and consideration which are to constitute the contract. Without the
agreement of both parties, no contract of lease can be said to have been
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created or established. Nobody can force an owner to lease out his property
if he is not willing.
CA-AG.R.O-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. NO. 90027, March 3, 1993
We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the
safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article
1643 of the Civil Code. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of
lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and
control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters the
petitioner and the Pugaos.
PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST
LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R.
NO. 136448, November 3, 1999
A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow
money to pursue a business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise
therefrom, even if it is shown that they have not contributed any capital of
their own to a "common fund." Their contribution may be in the form of
credit or industry, not necessarily cash or fixed assets.
ROSARIO U. YULO vs. YANG CHIAO SENG, G.R. NO. L-12541, August
28, 1959
The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who
bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common
fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among
themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil Code.).
HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs .COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET
LUMBER COMPANY, G.R. NO. 126881; October 3, 2000
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to
each other are not partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership,
whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or
interest in any property which the returns are derived;
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may exist even if the partners do not use the words partner or
partnership.
Ortega vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109248, July 3, 1995
The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the
very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is,
in turn, dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each
partner's capability to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution
provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his sole
pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must, however,
act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the
dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages.
Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae
allows them to have the power, although not necessarily the right, to
dissolve the partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject
him to a possible action for damages.
Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. NO. 114398, October 24, 1997
Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa and advances the theory that
the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of partnership,
wherein Rosales (private complainant for Estafa) would contribute the funds
while she would buy and sell the cigarettes, and later divide the profits
between them But even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed
entered into by and between the parties, SC ruled that when money or
property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that
obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it, such partner is
guilty of estafa.
Moran, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-59956, October 31, 1984
The rule is, when a partner who has undertaken to contribute a sum of
money fails to do so, he becomes a debtor of the partnership for whatever
he may have promised to contribute (Art. 1786, Civil Code) and for interests
and damages from the time he should have complied with his obligation (Art.
1788, Civil Code). Thus in Uy v. Puzon (79 SCRA 598), which interpreted Art.
2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, we allowed a total of P200,000.00
compensatory damages in favor of the appellee because the appellant
therein was remiss in his obligations as a partner and as prime contractor of
the construction projects in question.
Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. NO. L-55397
February 29, 1988
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Petitioner being a partnership may sue and be sued in its name or by its duly
authorized representative. Thus, Chua as the managing partner of the
partnership may execute all acts of administration including the right to sue
debtors of the partnership in case of their failure to pay their obligations
when it became due and demandable.
Catalan vs. Gatchalian, G.R. NO. L-11648, April 22, 1959
Catalan and Gatchalian as partners mortgaged two lots together with the
improvements thereon to secure a credit. Catalan redeemed the property
and he contends that title should be cancelled and a new one must be issued
in his name. Under Article 1807 of the NCC every partner becomes a trustee
for his co-partner with regard to any benefits or profits derived from his act
as a partner. Consequently, when Catalan redeemed the properties in
question, he became a trustee and held the same in trust for his co partner
Gatchalian, subject to his right to demand from the latter his contribution to
the amount of redemption.
Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, G.R. NO. L-31684 June 28, 1973
Respondent industrial partner has the right to demand for a formal
accounting and to receive her share in the net profit that may result from
such an accounting.
ISLAND SALES, INC. vs. UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-22493, July 31, 1975
Defendant company, a general partnership purchased from the plaintiff a
motor vehicle on an installment basis with the condition that failure to pay
any of said installments as they fall due would render the whole unpaid
balance immediately due and demandable. Having failed to receive the
installment, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the unpaid balance
with Benjamin C. Daco, Daniel A. Guizona, Noel C. Sim, Romulo B. Lumauig,
and Augusto Palisoc were included as co-defendants in their capacity as
general partners of the defendant company. In this case, there were five (5)
general partners when the promissory note in question was executed for and
in behalf of the partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the
liability of the appellant Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth of
the obligations of the defendant company. The fact that the complaint
against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig was dismissed, upon motion of the
plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general partner in the
defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff
merely condoned Lumauig's individual liability to the plaintiff.
ELMO MUASQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-39780,
November 11, 1985
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The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was a
perfected contract between the parties when the application of Saura, Inc.
for a loan was approved by resolution of the defendant, and the
corresponding mortgage was executed and registered and that the
defendant was guilty of breach thereof.
An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or simple
loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself
shall not be perferted until the delivery of the object of the contract.
FRANCISCO HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L48349, December 29, 1986
Pursuant to a contract, the defendant-appellee paid to the plaintfff-appellant
advance rentals for the first eight years, subtracting therefrom the amount of
the interest or discount for the first eight years, Plaintiff-appellant insists that
the lower court erred in the computation of the interest collected out of the
rentals paid for the first eight years; that such interest was excessive and
violative of the Usury Law.
The contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan since the
provision for the payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a
repayment of a loan because there was no grant or forbearance of money as
to constitute an indebtedness on the part of the lessor, hence usury law will
not apply.
PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75223, March 14, 1990
An escalation clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that
(1) the increased rate imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling
fixed by law or the Monetary Board; (2) the increase is made effective not
earlier than the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an
increase; and (3) the remaining maturities of the loans are more than 730
days as of the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing such an
increase.
ILEANA DR. MACALINAO vs BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R.
NO. 175490, September 17, 2009
In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty
charges at the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum which was
declared as unconscionable by the lower courts for being clearly excessive,
and was thus reduced to 2% per month or 24% per annum but which the CA
modified increased them to 3% per month or 36% per annum based on the
Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card,
which governs the transaction between petitioner Macalinao and respondent
BPI.
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The courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, for
stipulations demanding interest excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant interest rates are void for being contrary to morals, if not against
the law.
ECE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs.HAYDYN HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 212689, August 11, 2014
Since July 1, 2013, the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality
of the judgment until satisfaction has been brought back to six percent (6%).
Section 1 of Resolution No. 796 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas dated May 16, 2013 provides: "The rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,
shall be six percent (6%) per annum." Thus, the rate of interest to be
imposed from finality of judgments is now back at six percent (6%), the rate
provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC CHURCH vs. CA, G.R. L-80294-95,
September 21, 1988
When respondents allowed the free use of the property they became bailors
in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return
the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse
possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property
subject matter of commodatum. Hence, an adverse claim could not ripen
into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence
of just title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BAGTAS, G.R. NO. L-17474,
October 25, 1962
The appellant had been in possession of the bull even after the expiration of
the contract. He contends, however, that since the contract was
commodatum the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull. Hence, it
should suffer its loss due to force majeure.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be
considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull.
Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued
possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the
contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of
the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous
event:
(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .
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(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless
there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a
fortuitous event; xxx
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-46145 November
26, 1986
The disputed property is private land and this possession was interrupted
only by the occupation of the land by the U.S. Navy which eventually
abandoned the premises. The heirs of the late Baloy, are now in actual
possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by the U.S. Navy.
The occupancy of the U.S. Navy partakes of the character of a commodatum,
and one's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of
another's possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not
where the possession is only intended to be transient, in which case the
owner is not divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in the
meantime.
HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-48349 December
29, 1986
The difference between a discount and a loan or forbearance is that the
former does not have to be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to
repayment and is therefore governed by the laws on usury.
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the
debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract is not
illegal. The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the stipulated
interest. Hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed void,
since it is the only one that is illegal.
INTEGRATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OBM contends that it had agreed to pay interest only up to the dates of
maturity of the certificates of time deposit and that respondent Santos is not
entitled to interest after the maturity dates had expired, unless the contracts
are renewed. When respondent invested his money in time deposits with
OBM they entered into a contract of simple loan or mutuum, not a contract of
deposit.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66826 August 19, 1988
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The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation
of safely keeping it and of returning the same, but if the safekeeping of the
thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.
BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. 104612, May 10, 1994
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans
because they earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a
bank is one of creditor and debtor, and the deposit under the questioned
account was an ordinary bank deposit; hence, it was payable on demand of
the depositor.
SERRANO vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-30511,
February 14, 1980
All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be
treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans because it can
use the same. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is
failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from
depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE
130886. January 29, 2004
CORPORATION
vs.
CA,
G.R.
NO.
Petitioners liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability
under the law. There is no question that as a surety, petitioner should not be
made to pay more than its assumed obligation under the surety bonds.
However, it is clear from the above-cited jurisprudence that petitioners
liability for the payment of interest is not by reason of the suretyship
agreement itself but because of the delay in the payment of its obligation
under the said agreement.
THE MANILA INSURANCE CO INC vs SPOUSES AMURAO, G.R. NO.
179628, January 16, 2013
Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA in treating petitioner as a
solidary debtor instead of a solidary guarantor and argues that while a surety
is bound solidarily with the obligor, this does not make the surety a solidary
co-debtor. A suretys liability is joint and several and although the contract of
suretyship is secondary to the principal contract, the suretys liability to the
obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute.
THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L28030, January 18, 1982
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Imperial Insurance, Inc. bound itself solidarily with the principal, the
deceased defendant Reyes. In accordance with Article 2059, par. 2 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, excussion (previous exhaustion of the property
of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the guarantor) has bound himself
solidarily with the debtor," hence the petitioner cannot escape liability on its
counter-bonds.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. vs. ALMEDA, G.R. NO. L-27249
July 31, 1970
There is no question that under the bonds posted in favor of the NAMARCO in
this case, the surety company assumed to make immediate payment to said
firm of any due and unsettled accounts of the debtor-principal, even without
demand and notice of the debtor's non-payment, the surety, in fact, agreeing
that its liability to the creditor shall be direct, without benefit of exhaustion of
the debtor's properties, and to remain valid and continuous until the
guaranteed obligation is fully satisfied. In short, appellant secured to the
creditor not just the payment by the debtor-principal of his accounts, but the
payment itself of such accounts. Clearly, a contract of suretyship was thus
created, the appellant becoming the insurer, not merely of the debtor's
solvency or ability to pay, but of the debt itself. Under the Civil Code, with
the debtor's insolvency having been judicially recognized, herein appellant's
resort to the courts to be released from the undertaking thus assumed would
have been appropriate.
RCBC vs. ARRO, G.R. NO. L-49401, July 30, 1982
The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique and private
respondent, is an accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal
one which, in this case is the loan obtained by Daicor as evidenced by a
promissory note. By the terms, it can be clearly seen that the surety
agreement was executed to guarantee future debts which Daicor may incur
with petitioner since a guaranty may also be given as security for future
debts, the amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against
the guarantor until the debt is liquidated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAL-FOX LUMBER CO., INC., G.R.
NO. L-26473, February 29, 1972
On whether the surety's liability can exceed the amount of its bond, it is
enough to remark that while the guarantee was for the original amount of
the debt of Gabino Marquez, the amount of the judgment by the trial court in
no way violates the rights of the surety. If it (the guaranty) be simple or
indefinite, it shall comprise not only the principal obligation but also all its
accessories, including judicial costs, provided with respect to the latter, that
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the guarantor shall only be liable for those costs incurred after he has been
judicially required to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710
October 3, 1985
The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, no
consideration was then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island
Savings Bank had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real
estate mortgage void for lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any
consideration should pass at the time of the execution of the contract of real
mortgage, it may either be a prior or subsequent matter, but when the
consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, the mortgage can take effect
only when the debt secured by it is created as a binding contract to pay.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710,
October 3, 1985
Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less
than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for
more than the actual sum due.
INTEG.R.ATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, G.R. NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-60907 June 28, 1989
The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of
assignment, has satisfied the requirements of a contract of pledge (1) that it
be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) that the
pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged; (3) that the persons
constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property, and in the
absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. The further
requirement that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the
creditor, or of a third person by common agreement was complied with by
the execution of the deed of assignment in favor of PNB.
YULIONGSIU vs. PNB, G.R. NO. L-19227, February 17, 1968 67
The defendant bank as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual
possession of the vessels, and while it is true that plaintiff continued
operating the vessels after the pledge contract was entered into, his
possession was expressly made "subject to the order of the pledgee." On the
other hand, there is an authority supporting the proposition that the pledgee
can temporarily entrust the physical possession of the chattels pledged to
the pledgor without invalidating the pledge. In such a case, the pledgor is
regarded as holding the pledged property merely as trustee for the pledgee.
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WEAREVER
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Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less
than the sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for
more than the actual sum due.
RAMIREZ vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-38185, September 24, 1986
The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land
surrendered to him by the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the
concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by its
owners, thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
OCAMPO vs. DOMALANTA, G.R. NO. L-21011, August 30, 1967
A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It
is based on a personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific
property of a person named party defendant. And, its purpose is to have the
property seized and sold by court order to the end that the proceeds thereof
be applied to the payment of plaintiff's claim.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710,
October 3, 1985
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided
among the successors in interest of the debtor or creditor. Therefore, the
debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt can not ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt
is not completely satisfied, neither can the creditor's heir who have received
his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the
prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid.
PHILNICO
INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONvs.PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE
G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014
AND
The Pledge Agreement secures, for the benefit of PMO, the performance by
PIC of its obligations under both the ARDA and the Pledge Agreement itself. It
is with the execution of the Pledge Agreement that PIC turned over
possession of its certificates of shares of stock in PPC to PMO. As the RTC
pertinently observed in its Order dated June 19, 2003, there had already
been a shift in the relations of PMO and PIC, from mere seller and buyer, to
creditor-pledgee and debtor-pledgor. Having enjoyed the security and
benefits of the Pledge Agreement, PMO cannot now insist on applying
Section 8.02 of the ARDA and conveniently and arbitrarily exclude and/or
ignore the Pledge Agreement so as to evade the prohibition against pactum
commissorium.
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vs.
Court
of
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drivers to redress their grievances with the company should not undermine
public peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of other persons.
F.F. Cruz and Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731
A fire that broke out in the furniture shop of the petitioner spread to an
adjacent house because of the shop owners failure to construct a firewall as
required by a city ordinance. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is
applied by the Court in this case, may be stated as follows: Where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353
The driver of a dump truck parked it improperly at night near his residence
and it was bumped by the driver of a car, who suffered damages. The
proximate cause of the accident was the improper parking of the dump truck.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
A fire broke out at a gasoline station while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, as a result of which several
houses were burned. Under the principle of res ipsa loquitor, the employees
negligence was the proximate cause of the fire which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen.
Gabeto vs. Araneta, 42 Phil. 232
Araneta stopped a calesa with passengers aboard on the street and seized
the rein of the horses bridle, by reason of which the driver brought the
carromata to the adjacent curb and alighted to fix the bridle, and while the
driver was engaged at the horses head, the horse moved forward bringing
down a police telephone box, and because of the noise caused thereby, the
horse was frightened and it ran away and one of the passengers jumped and
was killed. Araneta's act in stopping the horse was held as not the proximate
cause of the accident because the bridle was old, and the leather of which it
was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
Gregorio vs. Go, 102 Phil. 556
Go ordered his cargador, who had only a students permit to drive his truck,
but a policeman who boarded the truck took the wheel, and while driving the
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truck, it hit and ran over a pedestrian. There was no direct and proximate
casual connection between the defendants negligence and the death
because the proximate immediate and direct cause of the death was the
negligence of the policeman.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353
Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353
Petitioners sought the application of the doctrine of "last clear chance". The
Supreme Court said that the common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if
the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where
the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the
use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location
in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent
act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks
created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The
petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
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become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's
own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close
to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for
the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law
on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and
to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695
Respondent entrusted companys cash for deposit to his secretary who
defrauded the company by depositing the money, not to the companys
account, but to her husband who maintained similar account with the bank,
made possible because the duplicate slip was not compulsory required by
the bank in accepting the deposits. Under the doctrine of last clear chance,
an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided, the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here,
assuming that the respondent company was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud
the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384
The driver of a Pantranco bus encroached into the lane of an incoming
jeepney and failed to return the bus immediately to its own lane upon seeing
the jeepney coming from the opposite direction, resulting to the death of
eight passengers of the jeep. The doctrine of last clear chance does not take
into operation here because it applies only in a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff.
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc.,
306 SCRA 762
The passenger ship of William Lines, Inc. caught fire and sank while in the
custody of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works to which it was brought for
annual repair. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies here because the fire
that occurred and consumed MV Manila City would not have happened in the
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ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised
by Cebu Shipyard.
Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. [RCPI] vs. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 657
Defamatory words were inserted in the telegram sent by respondent Timan,
which were not noticed and were included by the RCPI in the teleG.R.am
when delivered. Since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks
for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding
the injury.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483
Custodio filed a case for damages because his tenants cancelled their
contract of lease due to adobe fences constructed by adjoining lot owners
which restricted passage from and to his apartment. To warrant the recovery
of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom as a wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan Chuan Leong, 42
SCRA 352
Although B&I Trading had knowledge of the simulated sale between Tan
Chuan Leong and his son and had entered into the contract of mortgage
pursuant to a design to defraud Leongs creditors, no damage or prejudice
appears to have been suffered by the petitioner thereby. Absent damage or
prejudice, no right of action arises in favor of the petitioner because wrongful
violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action unless
it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damages.
Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 328
House of Mayfair, a foreign manufacturer of wall covering products, with
which Yu has had an exclusive distributorship aageement was duped into
believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped
to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the
Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person
who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract,
thereby entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom.
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83122, October 19, 1990
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Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6
Million from the P4.4 Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors he
obtained for Philippine American General Insurance (Philamgen) because the
Philamgen terminated their agency agreement after Valenzuela refused to
share his commission with the company. Philamgen was found to have acted
with bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency under the
principle that every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 83
The driver was in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when
its vehicle got involved in an accident that killed three persons. For the driver
to be found negligent petitioner must show that the violation of the statute
was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto because such negligence, consisting in whole or in part,
of violation of law, like any other negligence is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck driver and a car driver
Jose Koh, which resulted in the death of Jose Koh and two others because the
Koh avoided hitting two boys who suddenly darted across the lane. Under the
Emergency Rule, Koh was not negligent because his entry into the lane of the
truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a
greater peril of death or injury to the two boys. Under this rule, a person
who, without fault or negligence on his part, is suddenly placed in an
emergency or unexpected danger and compelled to act instantly and
instinctively with no time for reflection and exercise of the required
precaution, is not guilty of negligence and, therefore, exempt from liability, if
he did not make the wisest choice of the available courses of conduct to
avoid injury which a reasonably prudent person would have made under
normal circumstances.
Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478
An overhead wire of Meralco conducting electricity parted and one of the
charged ends fell to the ground, and a nine (9) year old school child touched
the wire and was electrocuted. It is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and
the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the
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ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 327
A young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through
electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an
electric light pole owned by Meralco. Meralco was negligent in so placing the
pole and wires as to be within the proximity of a place frequented by many
persons, with the possibility of coming in contact with a highly charged and
defectively insulated wire.
Bernardo vs. Legaspi, 29 Phil. 12
Two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street
corner, and it appears from the evidence that the drivers were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the collision. Under the doctrine of
contributory negligence, neither can recover from the other for the damages
suffered.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534
The ship captain of MT Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by PNOC, was
playing mah-jong when it collided off the Tablan Strait in Mindoro, with M,V
Don Juan owned by petitioner NENACO. The owner of the ship was found
equally negligent with the ship captain because of tolerating the playing of
mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the
ship and failing to keep the ship seaworthy.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
178 SCRA 94
The jeepney of the respondents fell into an open excavation when the jeep
swerved from the inside lane of the street, respondents being aware of the
presence of said excavation. The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584
At the time of her admission, patient Erlinda Ramos was neurologically sound
but during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of a
gall bladder operation, she suffered irreparable damage to her brain and was
diaganosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage. The
damage sustained by Erlinda Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
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bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur in
medical malpractice as it was found out that brain damage does not
normally occur in the process of gall bladder operations, and does not
happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334
A piece of rubber glove was left in the abdomen of a patient after a
caesarean section operation. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies
because aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin.
Roque vs. Gunigundo, 89 SCRA 178
Atty. Gunigundo was charged by his client Roque with G.R.oss negligence in
not seasonably filing their motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting
an appeal from the trial courts order of dismissal. Atty. Gunigundo's filing of
motions for extension on the last day and sending them by registered mail
(thus giving the court insufficient time to act before the extension sought
had expired) and his omission to verify whether his second motion for
extension was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence and
fidelity in the dispatch of his clients business.
Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734
Adarne was declared in default for failure to appear in the hearing because
his one of his lawyers honestly believed that he had appeared for the
complainant only for a special purpose and that the complainant had agreed
to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of
October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. An attorney is not
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of
care and skill having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do.
Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47
Theness, a three-year old child, was killed after she was bitten by a dog while
she was playing with the child of Purita Vestil in the house of Vicente
Miranda, the late father of Purita. Spouses Vestils contention that they
cannot be faulted as they are not the owner of the house where the child was
bitten cannot be accepted because under the Article 2183 of the Civil Code
the possessor of animal is liable even if the animal should escape or be lost
and so be removed from his control.
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The demand letter sent to the petitioner on October 28, 1992, was in
accordance with an extra-judicial demand contemplated by law. When the
debtor knows the amount and period when he is to pay, interest as damages
is generally allowed as a matter of right.
TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February
29, 1988
Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee,
petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by
teleG.R.am but which petitioner did not do, despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. The
award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and,
therefore, sustained as a warning to all teleG.R.am companies to observe
due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
136202, January 25, 2007
Upon the prompting of Templonuevo and with full knowledge of the brewing
dispute between Salazar and Templonuevo, petitioner debited the account
held in the name of the sole proprietorship of Salazar without even serving
due notice upon her. The award of exemplary damages is justified when the
acts of the bank are attended by malice, bad faith or gross negligence and
the award of reasonable attorneys fees is proper where exemplary damages
are awarded because depositors are compelled to litigate to protect their
interest.
VELASCO vs.MERALCO, G.R. NO. L-18390, August 6, 1971
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation of
MERALCO and whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not
is the principal issue in this case and appellant asked that he be declared
entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages. Article 2203
clearly obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will alleviate
and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places
upon him the burden of explaining why he could not do so.
BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007
The bank froze and later unilaterally debited an amount from the account of
A.A. Salazar Construction and Engineering Services without informing her
that it had already done so, which caused plaintiff-appellee great damage
and prejudice particularly when she had already issued checks drawn against
the said account and as can be expected, the said checks bounced, thereby
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awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that: There are cases where
from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss.
AREOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 95641 September 22,
1994
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.