Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines: An Assessment

DISASTER MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations
Executive Summary
History of DRRM in the Philippines
Current State of Disaster Management
Assessment of Existing Governance Framework
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
Financial Resources for DRRM
Calamity Fund
Quick Response Fund
Overall Assessment of Budget Allocation/Utilization
Department of National Defense(DND) and Office of Civil Defense
(OCD)
Department of Social Welfare and Development(DSWD)
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Department of Education (DepEd)
Department of Health (DoH)
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
(OPARR)
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
Financial Constraints and Other Operational Limitations
Inadequate but Underutilized Calamity Funds of LGUs
Assessment of Preparedness
Coordination and Collaboration among Stakeholders
Gaps in Accountability
Low Compliance to Reporting Requirement
Inability to Track Down Donations to and from Private Sources
Disaster Information and Management
Insufficient Information on the Governance Aspect of DRRM
Lack of a Comprehensive Analysis on Public Spending for DRRM
Challenges and Recommendations
1 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CCA
CCAC
CF
CSO
CY
DA
DBM
DENR
DepEd
DILG
DND
DOE
DOH
DOST
DPWH
DRRM
DRRMC
DRRMO
DSWD
EO
FFP
FY
GAA
LCF
LDRRMC
LDRRMF
LDRRMFIP
LDRRMO
LGU
MMDCC
MMDA
MOOE
NAMRIA
NCDA
NCR
NDCC
NDRRMC
NDRRMF
NDRRMP
NEDA
NGO
NIA
Climate Change Adaptation

Climate Change Advisory Committee
Calamity Fund
Civil society organizations
Calendar year
Department of Agriculture
Department of Budget and Management
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Department of Education
Department of Interior and Local Government
Department of National Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health
Department of Science and Technology
Department of Public Works and Highways
Disaster risk reduction and management
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office
Department of Social Welfare and Development
Executive Order
Family food pack
Fiscal year
General Appropriations Act
Local Calamity Fund
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund Investment Plan
Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office
Local government unit
Metro Manila Disaster Coordinating Council
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
Maintenance and other Operating Expenses
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
National Civil Defense Administration
National Capital Region
National Disaster Coordinating Council
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
National Economic and Development Authority
Nongovernmental organization
National Irrigation Authority
NOAH
OCD
OPARR
OSEC
PAGASA
PD
PDP
PDRRMC
PDRRM
Phivolcs
PIDS
PS
QRF
RA
RDRRMC
National Operational Assessment Hazards

Office of Civil Defense
Office of the Secretary
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
Presidential Decree
Philippine Development Plan
Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
Personal Services
Quick Response Fund
Republic Act
Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
Executive Summary
Super typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) is the most powerful and devastating
tropical cyclone that struck the Philippines in recent memory. The Category 5 typhoon made its
first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar in the early morning of November 8, 2013 and wreaked
havoc, primarily on the Visayas region, until its exit from the Philippine area of responsibility the
following day.
Weather officials said Yolanda had sustained wind speeds exceeding 185 kph when it made
landfall. The strong winds ripped off the roofs of thousands of homes and knocked down
shanties, trees, power and telephone lines and cell towers. Storm surge waves as high as 6 to 7
meters or a two-storey high building, were also seen, claiming thousands of lives and destroying
millions worth of properties.
The Philippines has been battered by many catastrophic storms and other natural and man-made
disasters since time immemorial due to its geographic location both at the typhoon belt and the
Ring of Fire. The country is prone to multiple recurring hazards such as cyclones, floods,
earthquakes and landslides.1 In truth, the 2012 World Risk Report ranked the Philippines third
out of 173 countries in terms of disaster risk.2
But in the wake of Yolandas catastrophic destruction, the weaknesses and significant gaps in the
countrys disaster response and management system were exposed once more. Despite a solid
and functioning disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) structure, the governments
response still came across as reactive and not proactive, insufficient, inefficient and for the most
part, too slow.
This report will attempt to paint an analysis of the countrys disaster management system in the
context of the Yolanda devastation. This is intended to help guide national agencies and local
government units (LGUs) in the allocation and utilization of precious and scarce resources to
adequately mitigate risks for calamities that regularly strike the countrys most vulnerable
communities with such ferocity and enormity, year in and year out.
In this report, the effectiveness of the governments efforts on disaster management are assessed
based on the following themes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Existing disaster governance framework

Resource Allocation, Timeliness and Quality of Spending
Preparedness/Coordination/Collaboration among Stakeholders
Accountability
Disaster Information Management
1Disaster-induced
internal displacement in the Philippines: The case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013), p. 3.
2 Ibid
History of DRRM in the Philippines

The Philippine government, from its pre-Commonwealth days up to the present, has evolved a
scheme to counteract the effects of disasters, both natural and human-induced. Our disaster
management system traces back its origin to 1941 when President Manuel L. Quezon created
Executive Order (EO) No. 335 establishing the National Emergency Commission and
implementing measures to control and coordinate civilian participation to meet serious crises.
Consequently, the Provincial Emergency Committee was created, in charge of the supervision
and control over the Municipal Emergency Committees and City Emergency Committees. In
1954, the National Civil Defense Administration (NCDA) was established through Republic Act
(RA) 1190, which also created national and local civil defense councils. Thereafter, in 1968, the
NCDA was designated as the national coordinator to oversee and implement EO 159 that
required the establishment of a disaster control organization by all government offices including
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, instrumentalities and political subdivisions of
government, including all corporations owned and/or controlled by government. The NCDA is
tasked to report on the degree of preparedness of all government offices to the Office of the
President.
In 1970, President Ferdinand Marcos saw the need to establish a Disaster and Calamities Plan
prepared by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group on Disasters and Calamities. Then in 1972,
the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) was established by Letter of Instruction 19. OCD was
mandated to coordinate national level activities and functions of the national government, private
institutions and civic organizations. Finally in 1978, through Presidential Decree (PD) 1566, the
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) was established as the highest policy-making
body and the focal organization for disaster management in the country. The law also provided
for the establishment of regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay disaster coordinating
councils.
In 2009, the Congress enacted the Climate Change Act of 2009 and in 2010, RA 10121 or the
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (PDRRM) Act. These twin laws on DRRM
have common goals and objectives: 1) to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities and
the country against natural disasters and 2) to reduce damage and loss of lives and properties due
to disasters. In particular, RA 10121 provides for the development of policies and plans and the
implementation of actions and measures pertaining to all aspects of DRRM, including good
governance, risk assessment and early warning, knowledge building and awareness raising,
reducing underlying risk factors, and preparedness for effective response and early recovery. The
law acknowledges that there is a need to adopt a disaster risk reduction and management
approach that is holistic, comprehensive, integrated, and proactive in lessening the
socioeconomic and environmental impacts of disasters including climate change, and promote the
involvement and participation of all sectors and all stakeholders concerned, at all levels,
especially the local community.3
3 RA
10121 of 2010, Sec. 2 (d)
Through the years, the Philippines has adopted various approaches from disaster preparedness
and response in the 1970s, to disaster management in the 1980s, to disaster risk management in
the 1990s and eventually disaster risk reduction in the years 2005 and beyond.
Current State of Disaster Management

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) is a body
empowered to perform policy-making, coordination, integration and supervisory functions, as
well as monitor the preparation, implementation and evaluation of the National DRRM Plan
(NDRRMP) to ensure the protection and welfare of the people in times of disaster.
Fig. 1. Expanded Membership of the

NDRRMC under RA 10121
RA 10121 or the PDRRM Act of 2010 has

expanded the membership of the previous
NDCC from 19 to 44 members (Fig. 1). The
former NDCC, as chaired by the Secretary of
National Defense, was composed of Cabinet
Secretaries and Heads of Agencies with major
contributions to disaster response. The new law
transformed the NDCC to the NDRRMC, which
is still headed by the Department of National
Defense (DND) but with four ViceChairpersons, namely: the Secretary of the
for disaster prevention and mitigation; the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) for disaster
preparedness; the Secretary of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
for disaster response; and the Director General
of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for disaster rehabilitation
and recovery.
Aside from government agencies, the Councils
membership now includes financial institutions,
local government leagues, the private sector and
civil society organizations (CSOs) which
reflects the Whole of Society approach on
disaster risk reduction.
Fig. 2. DRRMC Networks
The NDRRMC is supported by the DRRM Council (DRRMC) Networks (Fig. 2).
The council is replicated in the regional down to the barangay level, thus linking all disasterrelated offices and LGUs which have specific roles to play in disaster management.
The RDRRMC3 is tasked to coordinate, integrate, supervise and evaluate the activities of the
Local DRRM Council (LDRRMC). It is responsible in ensuring disaster-sensitive regional
development plans and, in case of emergencies, shall convene the different regional line agencies
and concerned institutions and authorities.
The LDRRMC is primarily tasked to take the lead in preparing for response and recovery from
any disaster and its effects based on the following criteria:
The Barangay Disaster Council, if a barangay is affected;

The City/Municipal DRRMC, if two or more barangays are affected;
The Provincial DRRMC, if two or more municipalities are affected;
The Regional DRRMC, if two or more provinces are affected;
The NDRRMC, if two or more regions are affected.
The NDRRMC and intermediary LDRRMCs support the LGUs who are in the frontline and have
the primary responsibility of responding to disaster. The NDRRMC and LDRRMCs set the
coordination mechanisms and policies for the private sector and civil society groups.
The present structure under a cluster approach is a National Coordinating Council, headed by the
DND Secretary, where heads of the various DRRM agencies sit as board members. Our recent
experience with typhoon Yolanda led us to take a serious look at the limitations of the ad hoc
NDRRMC, its networks and secretariat, the OCD, in dealing with the vast and critical issues
brought about by disasters.
Assessment of Existing Governance Framework
A basic institutional and legislative framework is in place and there are existing policies
that support an effective disaster risk management. There is a marked improvement in
terms of developing a regulatory framework that promotes and supports dialogue,
exchange of information and coordination. However, the complexity of large scale
disasters usually undermines existing policies and structures. An organizational structure
with a multi-sectoral, multi-agency and multi-level approach renders it difficult to come
up with an appropriate and immediate response, thus delaying critical disaster response
and recovery. RA 10121 and other laws passed by the government have provided solid
plans, but there have been significant question marks about its implementation, both in
terms of the funding made available to support implementation and the consistency in
approach throughout all levels of government.
Basic institutional and

legislative framework in
place, existing policies
support effective disaster
management
The PDRRM Act of 2010 seeks the reduction and better management
of disaster risk. It is shaped by two key assumptions: 1) that disaster
risk is something that is endemic rather than a concern only when a
cyclone, flood, drought, or earthquake occurs; and 2) that it is within
the power of the state to reduce disaster risk even though it is unable
to prevent cyclones, earthquakes or other natural hazards.
Under this Act, the NDRRMCs functions include the
development of a national disaster risk reduction and
management framework, which shall provide for a
comprehensive,
multi-sectoral,
inter-agency
and
community-based approach to disaster risk reduction and
management.4
The
National DRRM Framework (NDRRMF)
emphasizes that in time, resources invested in disaster
prevention, mitigation, preparedness and climate change
adaptation will be more effective in attaining the goal of
adaptive, disaster-resilient communities and sustainable
development. The Framework shows that mitigating the
Fig. 3. NDRRM Framework
potential impacts of existing disaster and climate risks,
preventing hazards and small emergencies from becoming disasters, and being prepared for
disasters, will substantially reduce loss of life and damage to social, economic and environmental
assets. It also highlights the need for effective and coordinated humanitarian assistance and
disaster response to save lives and protect the more vulnerable groups during and immediately
after a disaster. This Framework serves as the principal guide to DRRM efforts in the country.
4Ibid, sec 6 (a)
The NDRRMF was approved on June 16, 2011 by the executive committee of the National
Council and based on this Framework, the OCD prepared the National DRRM Plan (NDRRMP).
The plan is cognizant of the development context of disasters and seeks to leverage on the
Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011-2016 which is the national development roadmap of
the country. The PDP has identified DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) as major
crosscutting concerns.
The NDRRMP covers four thematic areas, namely: 1) Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation; 2) Disaster Preparedness; 3)
Disaster Response; and 4) Disaster Rehabilitation and
Recovery. It contains the priority projects of NDRRMP and
sets down the expected outcomes, outputs, key activities,
indicators, lead agencies, implementing partners and timelines
under each of the four areas.
The present setup is a multi-sectoral, multi-agency council
assisted by a secretariat with multi-level approach. While RA
10121 provides for vertical coordination between the regional,
Fig. 4. The NDRRM Plan
national and local levels, it is difficult to ensure smooth
coordination among these government agencies given the complexity of large scale disasters
when following regular disaster response procedures do not always work. Maintaining effective
interaction with various government officials within and outside of the council (national and
local) and ensuring uniform goals and strategies given an extremely limited communication
system and damaged infrastructures, are indeed huge challenges.
There are mechanisms for
coordination within the existing
disaster governance structure;
however, the complexity of
large-scale disasters usually
undermines these existing
policies and structures.
The multi-sectoral, multi-agency

organizational structure with
multi-level approach renders it
difficult to come up with
appropriate and immediate
response, thus delaying critical
disaster response and recovery.
The ability to carry out specific tasks under particular

conditions with desired results is built upon the
appropriate combination of people, skills, processes and
assets. Disasters of wide impact such as typhoon Yolanda
place a wide ranging demand for the governments
emergency response capabilities. Whenever several
agencies are expected to deliver a desired goal, it is
important that these agencies collaborate, coordinate and
communicate significant information to decision makers,
in order to achieve a common goal.
The degree of collaboration and decision making both
depend on the extent of damage of a disaster. Given the
complexity and magnitude of a large scale disaster, it will
be difficult to achieve the degree of collaboration and level
of decision making needed in a multi-sectoral, multiorganizational structure.
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan

The NDRRMP for 2011-2028, approved on February 7, 2012, is a roadmap on how DRRM shall
contribute to sustainable development (Fig. 4). It fulfills the requirement of the PDRRM Act of
2010 and provides details on programs and projects to be pursued, timelines to be met, the
responsible lead agencies and groups, as well as the resources needed for implementation.
The NDRRM Plan outlines the
activities aimed at
strengthening the capacity of
the national government and
the LGUs together with
partner stakeholders, to build
disaster-resilient communities,
institutionalize disaster risk
reduction and enhance disaster
preparedness and response
capabilities at all levels.
Likewise, it stipulates the DRRM approaches and

strategies to be applied to manage identified hazards and
risks. It also identifies the roles of agencies, their
responsibilities and lines of authority at all government
levels.
The Plan provides the vertical and horizontal coordination

mechanism in pre-disaster and post-disaster activities.
Significantly, it includes a system for monitoring and
evaluation of programs implementing the plan and tasked
the OCD to do the same but this is hardly done. DRRM
Plans have been formulated and targets have been set but
actual accomplishments have yet to be monitored. Except
for policy development activities, many LGUs have no reports on communities, teams and
managers trained on disaster preparedness and response and no information on the training
institutions that were established for DRRM.
While it is true that RA 10121 requires the preparation of a Disaster Management Plan, many
LGUs have not complied with this simple requirement. On the other hand, the LGUs that prepare
a Disaster Management Plan do so not to give an account on local practices but to simply comply
with government rules because if they fail to submit such plan they will not be able to access their
disaster funds. In the validation made by the audit teams, LGUs in four regions were reported to
have either not been able to prepare their Local DRRM Fund Investment Plan (LDRRMFIP) or
the Plan did not bear proof that it went through the deliberation of the LDRRMC as required
under RA 10121. In one LGU, the LDRRMF was utilized without an approved Fund Investment
Plan.
RA 10121 and other laws
passed by the government
have provided solid plans,
but there have been
significant question marks
about its implementation, in
terms of funding and
consistency in approach.
(Preparedness Issues in Typhoon Haiyan
recovery, Global Disaster Preparedness
Center)
In terms of strengthening disaster preparedness for effective

response, the collection, compilation and dissemination of
relevant knowledge and information on hazards,
vulnerabilities, actual losses and capacities is a must. This
can hardly be found in the majority of LGUs, especially in the
case of low-income class LGUs, where the human resources
and technical complement of disaster preparedness are still
wanting in terms of a systematic approach.
Even in the case of a national agency such as OCD, not much
has been accomplished with regard to the projects under Disaster Preparedness of which it is the
lead agency. There were no reported accomplishments in the calendar year (CY) 2012
Performance Review and Assessment of the NDRRMP. This may be attributed to the frequent
disasters (natural and man-made) which took place in previous years which kept the agency and
other members of the National Council preoccupied, attending to these various emergencies.
Financial Resources for DRRM
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is responsible for the formulation and
implementation of the national budget with the goal of attaining the national socio-economic
plans and objectives. It is likewise responsible for the efficient and sound utilization of
government funds and revenues to effectively achieve our country's development objectives. Its
general function includes the preparation of the national budget, issuance of budget authority and
maintenance of accounting systems, essential to the budgetary process, promotion of greater
economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, assessment of
organizational effectiveness, and review and evaluation of executive proposals having budgetary
and organizational implications.
To bolster the resilience of communities to climate change, the proposed budget in 2013 included
the following projects implemented by various government agencies:
Table 1
Programs/Projects
Implementing Agency
National Greening Program
2
3
Forest Protection
Geohazard Assessment
and Mapping Program
Unified Mapping
Department of Environment
and Natural Resources
(DENR)
DENR
Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB)
National Mapping and
Resource Information
Authority (NAMRIA)
DOST
6
7
National Operational
Assessment Hazards
(NOAH)
Rehabilitation and
Development of Esteros
Flood Control Systems
Market Transformation
through the Introduction of
Energy Efficient E-Trike
Amount
(Php)
5.9 billion
1 billion
299.7 million
1.5 billion
Output
300,000 hectares planted with forest trees
and fruit trees
4.7 million untenured forest protected
Coastal Geohazard and Climate Change
impact (548 municipalities assessed)
5.4 hectares covered by aerial
photography and satellite images
500 million
Pasig River Rehabilitation
Commission (PRRC)
Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority
(MMDA)
Department of Energy (DOE)
360 million
3 esteros rehabilitated and developed
554 million
1 pumping station constructed
20,000 e-trikes
3.1 billion
Calamity Fund
The national governments approved budget for fiscal year (FY) 2013 included a Calamity Fund
(CF), a special purpose fund intended for aid relief and rehabilitation services to
communities/areas affected by man-made and natural calamities, and repair and reconstruction of
permanent structures, including capital expenditures for disaster operation, and rehabilitation
activities. For CY 2013, the appropriated amount for the Calamity Fund was P7.5 billion, broken
down as follows:
Table 2
Purpose
1.
Aid relief and Rehabilitation Services

to Communities/Areas Affected by
Calamities, including Training of
Personnel, and other Pre-disaster
Activities
2. Repair and reconstruction of
permanent structures including,
expenditures for pre-disaster
operations, rehabilitation and other
related activities
TOTAL
0.00
Maintenance and
Other Operating
Expenses
(MOOE)
P2,650,000,000
0.00
0.00
Personal
Services
Capital Outlay
TOTAL
0.00
P2,650,000,000
P800,000,000
4,050,000,000
P4,850,000,000
P3,450,000,000
P4,050,000,000
P7,500,000,000
The Special Provisions of the 2013 General Appropriations Act (GAA) provide the following
guide in the release of the Calamity Fund:
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amounts appropriated herein may be made available for
the relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and other works or services, including predisaster activities in connection with natural calamities, epidemics as declared by the
Department of Health (DOH), crises resulting from conflicts, insurgency, terrorism, and
other catastrophes, which may occur during the budget year or those that occurred in the
immediately preceding year: PROVIDED, That the beneficiaries of relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction and other works or services in connection with the occurrence of
calamities, epidemics, crises, and catastrophes already covered by donations or grants
received by all agencies of the government shall not be entitled to support or assistance
from this Fund until the donation or grant has been fully expended or used. The
NDRRMC shall be responsible for consolidating the donations and grants given to
agencies of the government in support of calamities.
2. Releases from this Fund shall be made by the DBM directly to the implementing agencies
in accordance with the approval of the President of the Philippines, which shall consider
the recommendation of the NDRRMC for local disasters or the appropriate agency for
international crises: PROVIDED, That the NDRRMC shall take note of the donations or
grants received by agencies of the government in support of calamities in making the
foregoing recommendation to the President of the Philippines.
3. The NDRRMC shall submit, either in printed form or by way of electronic document, to
the DBM, the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance
a consolidated quarterly accountability report on the utilization of the donations or grants
given to government agencies. The Chairperson of the NDRRMC and the Council's web
administrator or his/her equivalent shall be responsible for ensuring that said reports are
posted on the official website of NDRRMC.
The detailed processes and the requirements in the release of Calamity Fund are as follows:
1. National
government
agencies/
government-owned
or
-controlled
corporations (GOCCs) submit their
request to NDRRMC through the OCD.
The required documents are as follows:
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Complete description/justification of
the project
Work and Financial Plan/Plan of the
Agency
Endorsement of the head of the
agency requesting for assistance
Pertinent documents may be
required on a case to case basis
2. OCD
evaluates
and
makes
recommendation to NDRRMC
3. The Chairman of the NDRRMC
Fig. 5. Calamity Fund Process Flow
recommends to the President
4. The Office of the President advises the
DBM to release Funds
Note that the request has to pass through the NDRRMC and OCD before it is submitted to DBM
where another series of steps still has to take place.
Data gathered from the DBM show the comparative amounts appropriated for Calamity Fund
from year 2009 to 2013 as follows:
Table 3. Calamity and Quick Response Funds (in pesos)

FUND
FY 2013
FY 2012
Calamity Fund
7,500,000,000 7,500,000,0000
Original Appropriation
7,500,000,000 7,500,000,000
Augmentation
Less: Releases
7,450,424,702 6,538,450,000
Less: Earmarked Amount
49,575,298
Less: Amount with release
document under preparation
Fund Balance
961,550,000
Quick Response Fund
2,645,000,000
Release
FY 2011
6,000,000,000
5,000,000,000
1,000,000,000
5,920,906,910
FY 2010
3,750,000,000
2,000,000,000
1,750,000,000
2,989,709,460
FY 2009
4,303,516,293
2,000,000,000
2,303,516,293
4,303,516,293
79,093,090
1,787,986,466
760,290,540
645,000,000
597,500,000
An analysis of the data shows that in the past five years, from 2009 to 2013, the original
appropriations for the Calamity Fund have increased by 275% or P5.5 billion. The increasing trend
proves that the government has shifted its fiscal priority in response to the immediate need brought
about by man-made and natural calamities that hit the country.
Fig. 6 shows a decline in the amount appropriated for the
year 2010 as compared to year 2009. However, Table 4
shows that a total of P2 billion was originally appropriated
for each year. The difference is due to a larger calamity fund
augmentation given for year 2009 to provide assistance and
defray the costs incurred when typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng
struck the country.
Fig. 6. Historical Trend:
Calamity Fund (2009-2013)
DRRM budget allocation expanded by 37.5% percent in 2011

as compared to the preceding year, showing a tremendous
increase in both allocation and releases.
Table 4. Calamity Fund Releases Distribution for 2009 to 2013

YEAR
AGENCIES
DND
% share of CF
DOTC
% share of CF
DSWD
% share of CF
DOH
% share of CF
DA
% share of CF
DPWH
% share of CF
DILG
2009
285,970,000.00
6.65%
2,171,003.00
0.05%
387,500,000.00
9.00%
243,500,000.00
5.66%
8,000,000.00
0.19%
1,004,300,000.00
23.34%
1,706,793,900.00
2010
557,900,000.00
18.66%
0.00%
1,247,500,000.00
41.73%
0.00%
0.00%
716,060,990.00
23.95%
-
2011
825,486,466.00
13.94%
0.00%
1,611,800,000.00
27.22%
0.00%
1,610,911,000.00
27.21%
1,361,357,139.00
22.99%
-
2012
0.00%
0.00%
876,971,739.00
13.41%
0.00%
0.00%
4,715,500,651.00
72.12%
-
2013
8,000,000.00
0.11%
0.00%
3,466,166169.00
46.52%
500,000,000.00
6.71%
0.00%
2,976,576,027.00
39.95%
467,732,486.00
% share of CF
SUCs
% share of CF
LGU
% share of CF
GOCC
% share of CF
DepEd
% share of CF
DOST
% share of CF
39.66%
20,800,000.00
0.48%
644,481,390.00
14.98%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
272,408,470.00
9.11%
195,840,000.00
6.55%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
144,352,305.00
2.44%
0.00%
217,000,000.00
3.66%
150,000,000.00
2.53%
0.00%
0.00%
649,826,990.00
9.94%
0.00%
296,150,620.00
4.53%
0.00%
6.28%
0.00%
31,950,000.00
0.43%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
4,303,516,293.21
2,989,709,460.00
5,920,906,910.00
6,538,450,000.00
TOTAL
7,450,424,702.00
% increase/
decrease from 2009
Source: www.dbm.gov.ph
-30.53%
37.58%
51.93%
73.12%
The figures above show noticeable increases and decreases in Calamity Fund releases from year
2009 onwards.
In 2009, the DILG received 39.66%, the largest share of the total Calamity Fund released. The
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) received the next biggest share at 23.34%.
DILG and DPWH are lead agencies for disaster preparedness and disaster recovery and
rehabilitation, respectively. It should also be noted that in 2009, two of the most destructive
typhoons, Ondoy and Pepeng, struck the country.
Using the year 2009 as the baseline, it can be observed that there has been a 30.53% decrease in
Calamity Fund releases for the following year, from P4,303,516,293 in 2009 to only
P2,989,709,460 in 2010. In that year, there was a change in the distribution of released CF, with
the DSWD getting the largest share of 41.73%, followed by DPWH with 23.95%. DSWD and
DPWH are lead agencies for disaster response and disaster recovery and rehabilitation,
respectively. It can be noted that one destructive typhoon (Juan) had hit the country in 2010, thus
the flow of Calamity Funds toward response and rehabilitation.
In 2011, a 37.58% increase in the total Calamity Fund releases was seen. Again, DSWD got the
largest share with 27.22%, followed by the DPWH with 27.21%. The 2011 budget basically
addressed the requirements for response and rehabilitation/reconstruction as a result of the major
typhoons that hit the country, two in 2010 and typhoon Pedring in 2011.
In 2012, there had been a significant 51.93% increase, amounting to P6,538,450,000, in the
annual total CF releases. In that year, the DPWH got the bulk of CF releases with 72.12%,
followed by DSWD with only a 13.41% share. The strong and destructive typhoon Pablo also hit
the country in 2012.
An even more significant increase of 73.12% in CF releases was observed in 2013. The DSWD
received a significant share (46.52%) of the released funds, followed by DPWH with 39.95%. It
was in 2013 when typhoon Yolanda, one of the most destructive typhoons in recorded history not
only in the Philippines but in the world, struck the country.
It should be noted that for the succeeding years after 2009, there has been no Calamity Fund
released to DILG, a department responsible for disaster preparedness, and the government has
shifted its priority in its distribution by giving the largest share to DSWD, an agency responsible
for disaster response.
In the distribution of the Calamity Fund, it is indispensable to consider the role of DILG because
of its close coordination with LGUs for disaster preparedness. While the government has been
giving too much priority to disaster response, recovery and rehabilitation, it would even be more
effective to distribute a bulk of the funds for disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.
Quick Response Fund

Aside from the Calamity Fund, the national budget also includes a Quick Response Fund (QRF)
which is defined in Section 21, paragraph 2 of RA 10121:
Of the amount appropriated for LDRRMF, thirty percent (30%) shall be allocated as
Quick Response Fund (QRF) or stand-by fund for relief and recovery programs in
order that situation and living conditions of people in communities or areas stricken
by disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies, may be normalized as
quickly as possible.
The QRF allocation is lodged under the budgets of the agencies enumerated below:
Table 5
1.
2
3
4.
5.
6.
7.
Agency
DSWD-Office of the Secretary (OSEC)
DND - OCD
DND - OSEC
DPWH - OSEC
Department of Education (DepEd) - OSEC
Department of Agriculture (DA)- OSEC
DA - National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
TOTAL
Amount
P 662,500,000.00
530,000,000.00
352,500,000.00
600,000,000.00
550,000,000.00
500,000,000.00
500,000,000.00
P3,695,000,000.00
It was observed, however, that the QRF provision in RA 10121 has not been consistently
followed as shown in the following tables:
Table 6
FY 2013
FY 2012
FY 2011
Calamity Fund
(CF)
P7,500,000,000.00
P7,500,000,000.00
P6,000,000,000.00
QRF releases
P3,695,000,000.00
P2,645,000,000.00
P1,787,986,466.00
30% of CF
P2,250,000,000.00
P2,250,000,000.00
P1,800,000,000.00
Difference
P1,445,000,000.00
P395,000,000.00
P(12,013,534.00)
Table 7
FY 2010
FY 2009
P3,750,000,000.00
P4,303,516,293.00
P645,000,000.00
P597,500,000.00
30% of CF
P1,125,000,000.00
P1,291,054,887.90
Difference
P(480,000,000.00)
P(693,554,887.90)
Calamity Fund (CF)

QRF releases
The tables above show that for the years 2009-2011, there were deviations in the allocation of the
QRF, resulting to an under allocation of P693,554,887.90, P480,000,000 and P12,013,534,
respectively.
We also noted that while the purpose of the QRF is to normalize the living conditions of the
affected communities as quickly as possible, the process involved in its release is also marked by
delays. In fact, during the early days after Yolanda, DSWD, the agency in charge of disaster
response, had to tap its unutilized disaster funds intended for the victims of typhoon Pablo instead
of waiting for the QRFs release.
Although it can be noted that QRF allocations increased in
the past five years (see Fig. 7), by 518% or P3,097,000,000
(2009 as the baseline), the requirement of the law was not
followed for the years 2009-2011. It was only starting in
2012 when the government had started releasing more than
30%, realizing the need for a standby emergency fund,
given the frequency of typhoons that struck the country in
the last few years.
An analysis of the QRF distribution for the same years
would show that the biggest share of QRF went consistently
to DSWD and DND, the lead agency for disaster response and the head of DRRMC, respectively.
DPWH, the lead agency for rehabilitation, got a small percentage of 20.79% in 2012 or P550
million, the highest in five years. (DPWH did not receive QRF for two years within that five-year
period.) The share of DPWH was even reduced to 16.24% in 2013 although it amounted to P600
million.
Fig. 7
Table 8 shows the QRF releases for the years 2009 to 2013 and how it was distributed to their
respective implementing agencies.
Table 8. Quick Response Fund Distribution for 2009 To 2013
YEAR
AGENCIES
DPWH
% share of QRF
DSWD
% share of QRF
DND
% share of QRF
DepEd
% share of QRF
DA
% share of QRF
TOTAL
2009
80,000,000.00
13.39%
287,500,000.00
48.12%
230,000,000.00
38.49%
0.00%
0.00%
597,500,000.00
2010
0.00%
287,500,000.00
44.57%
357,500,000.00
55.43%
0.00%
0.00%
645,000,000.00
2011
0.00%
962,500,000.00
53.83%
825,486,466.00
46.17%
0.00%
0.00%
1,787,986,466.00
2012
550,000,000.00
20.79%
662,500,000.00
25.05%
882,500,000.00
33.36%
550,000,000.00
20.79%
0.00%
2,645,000,000.00
2013
600,000,000.00
16.24%
662,500,000.00
17.93%
882,500,000.00
23.88%
550,000,000.00
14.88%
1,000,000,000.00
27.06%
3,695,000,000.00
% Increase/
Decrease from
2009
7.95%
199.24%
342.68%
Source:
www.dbm.gov.ph
518.41%
DND has a total QRF appropriation of P352.5 million for CY 2013. However, only 1.89% or
P6,650,000 were actually utilized out of this fund for the relief goods that were distributed to the
Yolanda calamity victims. DND has transferred a total of P294,212,571.82 or 83.46% of the fund
to its major services and bureaus for the following projects:
Table 9
Purpose of Transfers
Acquisition of Equipment
Petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL)
Training
Construction/Repairs, Improvement
Total
Transferee
Philippine Air Force (PAF), Philippine
Army (PA), Philippine Navy (PN)
AFP-Finance Center
PAF, PA, PN
PA, AFP-Finance Center, OCD
Amount
P153,768,193.00
17,258,805.25
16,167,160.00
107,018,413.57
P294,212,571.82
The QRF was also used in the installation, testing and commissioning of Internet Protocol (IP)
radios, switch and transceivers for Defense Situation Monitoring Center (DSMC) in the amount of
P600,257.23 which do not directly benefit the community/victims of calamities as provided for in
the GAA while the repairs and improvement done on the facilities of the Philippine Army totaling
P63,604,139.50 is not a disaster-related project and should not have been charged against this
fund. Although a huge portion of the QRF was also spent for disaster-related projects, these were
not completed within the year and thus have not been used for the benefit of calamity victims.
In the case of OCD, only 17% or 121,182,550.00 of its total available QRF of 692,766,612.00
for CY 2013 went to typhoon Yolanda victims. Prior to Yolanda, the OCDs QRF had an
available balance of 538,559,913.27, the utilization of which is shown in the following table:
Table 10
CA for operational requirements of NDRRM Operation
Center
CA for Operational Req. of Reg. VIII Operation Center
Office Supplies
FT to AFP for POL reserve for disaster operations
Various groceries/medicines for daily subsistence of duty
personnel at Command Center and Regional Operation
Center, Reg. VIII
Total
P1,600,000.00
P200,000.00
P56,445.00
P118,645,912.00
P680,193.00
P121,182,550.00
It can be observed from Table 8, that the DA only received its QRF share in 2013 while DepEd
started receiving its share only in 2012. Given the extent of damages that both the education and
agricultural sectors suffer after every calamity, both should receive a significant portion of the
QRF. Our audit, however, showed that out of the P41,268,120 QRF received by the DA Regional
Field Office in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) for assistance to typhoon, flood or
drought victims in the CAR, P9 million or 21.80% was not used immediately, hence, withdrawn
by DBM.
Tracking of public expenditures on DRRM will influence better understanding and behavior
toward a more comprehensive strategy to address the impacts of disasters. The following
discussion is an initial attempt towards this objective.
Overall Assessment of Budget Allocation/Utilization

The Phillipine public spending on disaster management is characterized as largely reactive as
shown by the huge balances of calamity funds before the occurence of a disaster and the
corresponding increase in expenditures during disaster response. Below is an indicative
distribution of calamity fund resources over the different phases of disaster management using
data on fund utilization and obligations for 2013.
Table 11. DRRM Fund Utilization, 2013
Agency
Preparedness
Mitigation
Recovery and
Rehabilitation
Response
DSWD
10,081,684,000**
MMDA
5,283,393.01
DOST
14,565,356.00
1,967,416,447.97
13,231,757.00
DND/OCD
294,212,571.82
DILG
33,071,955.88
BFAR
475,867,280.00
DENR
6,827,992,470.34*
OPARR
1,953,000.00
DOH
232,591,416.39
TOTAL
7,169,842,354.04
1,967,416,447.97
483,103,673.01
10,455,339,723.39
127,832,550
*National Greening Mapping Program,National Geohazards Assessment and Mapping Program,Unified Mapping Program,Phil.
Climate Change Adaptation Project,Rehabilitation of Esteros and Waterways
**P4,996,422,299.24 of which was obligated for typhoon Yolanda relief operations
An analysis of the 2013 Budget shows that 54% or more than half of the utilized fund for disaster risk
management went to response and rehabilitation, a post-event, while 46% of the fund utilized were
allocated for mitigation and preparedness, a pre-event.
Although there are significant achievements in DRRM, a complete paradigm shift from disaster as an
immediate product of hazards to disaster as a function of peoples vulnerability has not fully happened
yet as spending is still largely in the area of response. The reactive type of disaster spending leaves the
country more vulnerable and less prepared to handle disasters.
As disasters occur more frequently, the cost of disaster

response and mitigation also increases. We must start
keeping a precise tally of disaster spending, track the
sources and monitor utilization of DRRM funds as well as
analyze public spending or else, we may be treading a
future with more costly disaster-relief and recovery
spending.
Fig. 8
Review of DRRM Agencies Allocation and Spending for 2013

Department of National Defense(DND) and Office of Civil Defense (OCD)
The DND is mandated to maximize its effectiveness in guarding
against external and internal threats to national peace and security,
promote the welfare of soldiers and veterans, and provide support for
social and economic development.
For its part, the OCD, as the implementing arm of the NDRRMC,
has the primary mission of administering a comprehensive national
civil defense and DRRM program by providing leadership in the
continuous development of strategic and systematic approaches as
well as measures to reduce the vulnerabilities and risks to hazards
and manage the consequences of disasters.
Fig. 9
In addition to the functions enumerated above, OCDs main responsibility is ensuring the implementation
and monitoring of the NDRRMP. One of the common audit observations among DRRM agencies is the
inadequate monitoring of the implementation of DRRM activities that would have allowed timely
adjustments as necessary, replication of good DRRM practices or fast-tracking of project implementation
in areas where they are most needed. We noted a decline in OCD budget for 2013 from 1 billion to 650
million due to the deletion of the usual yearly allocation for DRRM operations. Although the QRF was
retained, it must be noted that relief and rehabilitation activities where QRF are supposedly spent, are not
included among the functions of OCD.
Based on our limited assessment, OCD does not have an

approved staffing pattern and could barely monitor the
implementation of the NDRRMP.
The DND and OCD have a combined total of P1,045,266,612
QRF appropriations for 2013. Of this amount only 12.23% or
P127,832,550 have been disbursed. In addition,
P294,212,571.82 from the DNDs general fund has been
utilized for a total of P422,045,121.82 disbursement as shown
below:
Fig. 10
Table 12
APPROPRIATIONS/
(A)
1,045,266,612
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
127,832,550*
BALANCE
(A-B)
917,434,062
*In addition,P294, 212,571.82 were utilized by DND coming from the general fund of the department.
Of the total disbursement, 30.29% or P127,832,550.00 came from the QRF of both agencies. This amount
was fully utilized for disaster response, while the DND utilized 69.71% or P294,212,571.82 of the total
disbursement for disaster preparedness. The said amount came from the DNDs general fund.
Department of Social Welfare and

Development(DSWD)
The DSWD is mandated to provide a comprehensive program of
social welfare services designed to ameliorate the living conditions
of distressed Filipinos, particularly those who are handicapped by
reason of poverty, youth, physical and mental disability, illness and
old age, or who are victims of natural calamities including
assistance to members of the cultural minorities.
The DSWDs total allotment for DRRM fund for CY 2013 is
P13,747,671,000. Of this amount, P5,404,510,106.25 were allotted
for Yolanda relief operations, P10,081,684,000 were obligated and
P4,996,422,299.24 of the total obligations was for Yolanda relief operations.
Fig. 11
Table 13
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
13,747,671,000
OBLIGATED (B)
10,081,684,000
UNUTILIZED BALANCE
(A-B)
3,665,987,000.00
As a department mandated to improve the living conditions of

victims of natural calamities, it allocated 100% of the total
obligations for disaster response as graphically illustrated at the
left. Our assessment, however, has shown that due to the
urgency of need, the DSWD resorted to the utilization of other
available funds amounting to P116,352,088.04 and
P373,187,252.42 to purchase supplies for the Yolanda relief
operations in the National Capital Region and Region VI,
respectively.
The Department has experienced long delays in the actual
releases of Calamity Funds or QRFs from past disasters even if
Fig. 12
it made an immediate request for budget releases. Thus, it had to
source from available allotments (budget) to enable it to respond and carry out its mandated tasks with
dispatch. The amounts utilized were replaced upon receipt of the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) for typhoon Yolanda.
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

The DILG, in coordination with the OCD and other DRRM agencies, is tasked to do the following:
Develop information, education and communication

(IEC) materials, conduct campaigns and develop
awareness of target population
Train communities, teams, DRRM managers and key

decision makers on disaster preparedness and
response
Establish training institutions at various levels
Develop DRRM and CCA materials for formal

education and training programs
Ensure operational and self-reliant local DRRM

councils and fully functioning local DRRM offices
Develop and implement comprehensive national and

local preparedness and response policies, plans and systems
Fig. 13
Strengthen partnership and coordination among all key players and stakeholders.
The Department has a total fund allocation for DRRM activities amounting to P76 million. Of this
amount, only P37,590,130.30 were released to different Regional Offices as training expenses for
disaster preparedness. Of the released funds, P33,071,955.88 were utilized, thereby affecting the
implementation of the project on Building capacities of the local government units in addressing the
impacts of disasters using tools in multi-hazard and vulnerability.
Table 14
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
76,000,000.00
OBLIGATIONS
(B)
33,071,955.88
BALANCE
(A-B)
42,928,044.12
In addition to the P76 million, a SARO dated December 10, 2013 in

the amount of P51 million was released to the DILG for clearing
typhoon debris in Region XI.
The Department has been mandated to develop and implement a
comprehensive national and local preparedness and response
policies, plans and systems. As illustrated above, it has allocated
100% of the total disbursement for preparedness. However, it
should also consider allocating part of the unutilized portion of the
appropriations to other phases of disaster risk management.
Fig. 14
The span and nature of coordination, complementation and interoperability of work in DRRM operations
is that complex that resource allocation cannot be confined to a single phase of disaster management
system.
Department of Education (DepEd)
RA 10121 mandates all national government agencies to

institutionalize policies, structures, coordination mechanisms and
programs with continuing budget appropriation on DRRM from
national to local levels. In line with this Act, the DepEd
constituted the DepEd DRRM Core Group to provide a venue to
discuss issues on DRRM and Education in Emergencies (EiE), to
recommend policy actions, and propose programs/projects which
will mitigate and reduce the impact of disasters to DepEd
teaching/non-teaching personnel/staff, learners and properties.
Fig. 15
The DepEd created the DRRM Office (DRRMO) to institutionalize the culture of safety at all levels, to
systematize the protection of education investments and to ensure continued delivery of quality education
services. It shall serve as the focal and coordinative unit for DRRM-related activities. The DRRMO shall
perform the following specific functions:

1. Act as the focal point for DepEd in planning, implementing, coordinating and monitoring of
activities related to DRRM, EiE and CCA.
2. Develop and recommend policy standards and actions to DepEd management on
DRRM/EiE/CCA matters.
3. Initiate and coordinate cooperation and collaborative activities with the national government
agencies, NGO and CSO.
During the year, the departments total QRF allotment, including the release for SPF-CF of DepEdOSEC, amounted to P2,123,704,288.92. This includes balance forwarded of continuing allotment from
prior year in the amount of P303,477,668.92. Out of the total allotment, P1,141,116,913.27 were suballotted to different division offices purposely to be used for the repair, rehabilitation, reconstruction
and/or replacement of school building and facilities which were affected by calamities.
Table 15
PREPAREDNESS
SUB-ALLOTMENT TO REGIONAL OFFICES

MITIGATION
RECOVERY AND
REHABILITATION
-
RESPONSE
1,141,116,913.27
As observed, the department has allocated 100% of the sub-allotment to regional offices for rehabilitation
and recovery. DepEd should take into consideration that it has been mandated to recommend policy
actions, and propose programs/projects, which will mitigate and reduce the impact of disasters to DepEd
teaching/non/teaching personnel/staff, learners and properties.
Department of Health( DOH)
The DOH, as the principal health agency in the Philippines

responsible for ensuring access to basic public health services for
all Filipinos through the provision of quality health care and
regulation of providers of health goods and services, was directed
to temporarily assume direct supervision and control over health
and sanitation operations of LGUs affected by typhoon Yolanda
(Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 18, 2013).
Some 55% or P232,591,416.39 of the total appropriations were
disbursed resulting in only 45% or P193,049,033.89 of the total
appropriations unutilized.
Fig. 16
Table 16
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)(A)
425,640,450.28
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
232,591,416.39
BALANCE (A-B)
193,049,033.89
Of the total disbursement of P232,591,416.39, 100% were utilized for

disaster response. Since the DOH has been mandated both for disaster
response and disaster recovery and rehabilitation, the agency should
also take into consideration allocating part of the unutilized
appropriations to other phases to effectively distribute its disaster
fund.
Fig. 17
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

The DENR is the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest
and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in
reservations and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain.
As the lead agency under Outcome II in implementing NDRRMP,
the DENR is also tasked to ensure DRRM and CCA-sensitive and
environmental management by formulating and implementing
policies and plans, including for land use and natural resource
management.
Fig. 18
A total of P7,929,995,683.48 were appropriated for the agency. Of

this amount 86% or P6,827,992,470.34 were utilized and 14% or
P1,102,003,213.14 were unutilized. The total amount utilized was
used entirely for preparedness such as National Greening Program,
National Geohazard Assessment and Mapping Program, Unified
Mapping Program, Philippine Climate Change Adaptation Project
and Rehabilitation of Esteros and Waterways.
Table 17
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
UTILIZATION
(B)
BALANCE
(A-B)
7,929,995,683.48
6,827,992,470.34
1,102,003,213.14
Fig. 19
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
BFAR is an agency under the DA, responsible for the development,

improvement, management and conservations of the countrys
aquatic resource
The bureau, in fulfilling its mandate of management, conservation
and development of countrys aquatic resources, has allocated 100%
of the total amount disbursed for recovery and rehabilitation.
Fig. 20
A total of P1,705,720,000 was appropriated for the rehabilitation plan

for typhoon Yolanda affected fisherfolks. Of this amount, a total of
P475,867,280 or 28% of the total appropriations was disbursed as of
April 4, 2014, resulting in a total of P1,229,852,720 or 72% of the total
appropriations unutilized.
Table 18
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
UNUTILIZED BALANCE
(A-B)
1,705,720,000.00
475,867,280.00
1,229,852,720.00
Fig. 21

(OPARR)
The OPARR acts as the overall manager and coordinator of the rehabilitation, recovery and
reconstruction efforts of government departments, agencies and instrumentalities in the affected
areas, to the extent allowed by law.
This Office did not receive an appropriation for CY 2013 as it was only created in December
2013. Since it had no appropriation yet for 2013, the Office of the President shouldered its initial
operating expenses in the amount of P249,000. For CY 2014, the Office has not yet received
appropriations from the GAA. The total agency budget was provided by the Office of the
President in the amount of P40.286 million. The latest fund utilization for CY 2014 amounted to
P1.704 million, as shown in Fig. 22.
The OPARR has indeed allocated 100% of its disbursement for recovery and rehabilitation.
Both the PIA and the Climate Change Commission (CCC)

are under the umbrella of the Office of the President. They
are mandated to assist the NDRRMC in providing accurate
and timely advice to national or local emergency response
organizations and to the general public through diverse mass
media, including digital and analog broadcast, cable,
satellite television and radio, wireless communications and
landline communications. They also assist the NDRRMC in
developing assessment tools on the existing and potential
hazards and risks brought about by climate change to
vulnerable areas and ecosystems and in formulating and
implementing a framework for CCA and DRRM from Fig. 22
which all policies, programs and projects shall be based. However, they have not quantified the
amount of appropriations made for typhoon Yolanda. Appropriations were part of the regular
agency budget but there was no specific budget for the subject activity.
Table 19
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
BALANCE
(A-B)
P40,286,000.00
P1,953,000.00
P38,333,000.00
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)

The scope of services of the authority of MMDA covers those
which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be
viable for said services to be provided by the individual LGUs
comprising Metropolitan Manila.
The MMDA, as mandated by its charter, acts as the
governments arm in coordinating disaster management
activities in Metro Manila. It is the lead agency of the
Metropolitan Manila Disaster Coordinating Council (MMDCC)
as embodied in PD 1566 which was promulgated on June 11,
1978. The MMDCC, which is composed of representatives from various national government
agencies and some of the private organizations operating in the NCR, serves as the conduit
between the NDCC and Metro Manila LGUs insofar as management is concerned. This is in line
with the principles of: 1) self-reliance, 2) mutual assistance, 3) resource complementation, and 4)
multi-disciplinary approach.
Fig. 23
The disaster management thrusts of MMDA and MMDCC are:

1. Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Building,
2. Safety Advocacy and Accident Prevention,
3. Disaster Consciousness and Education, and
4. Disaster Mitigation
For 2013, MMDA did not receive appropriations to address its
Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Building Program. However, an
aggregate amount of P6 million was received for the search and
Fig. 24
rescue operations for the victims of typhoon Yolanda. Of this P6million fund, P5.5 million came from MMDAs P8.5 million Calamity Fund as allocated under
MMDA Resolution No. 13-05 series of 2013 and P500,000 came from the Metro Manila Film
Festival in December 2013. Of the aggregate funds, 88% or P5,283,393.01 were disbursed
leaving a balance of 12% or P716,606.99 of the total funds unutilized.
Although part of its mandate is to formulate and implement programs, policies, and procedures to
achieve public safety especially preparedness for preventive or rescue operations during times of
calamities and disasters, it fully utilized its resources for recovery and rehabilitation as shown in
Fig. 23. But as mandated, it should have allocated part of its funds for mitigation and
preparedness to lessen the impact of disaster and risk of casualties.
Table 20
APPROPRIATIONS/
(A)
P6,000,000.00
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
P5,283,393.01
UNUTILIZED BALANCE
(A-B)
P716,606.99

By virtue of EO 128, the DOST is mandated to provide central direction, leadership and
coordination of scientific and technological efforts and ensure that the results therefrom are
geared and utilized in areas of maximum economic and social benefits for the people.
As the overall responsible agency in implementing the Prevention and Mitigation aspects of
NDRRMP, DOSTs objectives are to reduce vulnerability and exposure of communities of all
hazards and enhance capacities of communities to reduce their own risks and cope with the
impacts of all hazards.
Through Project NOAH, DOSTs Flagship DRRM Program, the Department has created a
technological approach to disaster prevention, mitigation and resilience.
A total of P1,995,213,560.97 was appropriated for

the Department in 2013 and this amount was fully
disbursed.
Fig. 26 illustrates the distribution of the
Departments disbursement. The bulk of 98.61% or
P1,967,416,447.97 went to mitigation, while 0.73%
or P14,565,356.00 was spent for preparedness,
0.66% or P13,231,757.00 was spent for response
and none was spent for recovery and rehabilitation.
Fig. 25
As observed, the Department has fully utilized its resources to fulfill its Flagship DRRM
Program through Project NOAH.
Table 21
APPROPRIATIONS
(A)
P1,995,213,560.97
DISBURSEMENT
(B)
P1,995,213,560.97
UNUTILIZED BALANCE
(A-B)
-
Based on the trends on the occurrences of disasters, it is evident that Calamity Funds and QRF
were not sufficient, thus it is necessary that these resources be applied where they can create the
biggest impact. Because in the final analysis, it is the quality of public spending and the
timeliness by which interventions are carried out that matter.
Financial Constraints and Other Operational Limitations

As disasters strike more frequently, the cost of disaster response and mitigation also increases.
But the national budget continues to lag behind, still unable to meet the countrys many
competing needs. The composition of government expenditures, particularly the share of nonmandatory expenses, leaves little room for flexibility to allow a bigger impact on disaster
spending. In the case of LGUs, they have varying disaster-related expenditure demands and
revenue-raising capacities which are both affected by the incidence and severity of calamities that
strike them. However, these differences are not taken into account in the allocation of resources
for disaster management, thus creating an imbalance between available resources and risk
exposure.
Under nominal circumstances, total disbursements must not exceed actual total collection plus
50% of the uncollected estimated revenue for that year. However, disbursements can only be
made for purposes and amounts included in the approved annual budget (disaster plan), implying
little flexibility in the reallocation of resources to reflect changes in expenditure priorities brought
about by the disaster. Furthermore, any overdraft outstanding at the end of a fiscal year must be
met from the first collections of the following year's revenues, which are expected to fall due to
loss and damage to properties and

livelihood as a consequence of a disaster.
This clearly creates a situation where the
impact of disaster drastically reduces
revenues but at the same time expands
expenditure due to response and recovery
efforts.
To a certain extent, an effective response
and recovery is dependent on the
availability of financial reserves and
contingency mechanisms, which are hardly
available to majority of LGUs.
Section 21 of RA 10121 states that not less
than 5% of the estimated revenue from
regular sources shall be set aside as the
LDRRM Fund to support disaster risk
management activities such as, but not
limited to, pre-disaster preparedness
programs including training, purchasing
life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and
medicines, for post-disaster activities, and
for the payment of premiums on calamity
insurance.
However, what is actually happening in the
field is starkly different from this
provision. Some LGUs, specially the lowincome class municipalities, can hardly
realize the estimated revenues as their
actual collection is always lower than the
estimated revenue. Therefore, even if
LGUs comply with the mandatory
provision for Calamity Funds, they do not
usually back it up with actual cash.
Fig. 26
All local governments are not equally prone to disasters. Some local governments are in areas
highly prone to disasters, which have a serious impact on their finances. However, the national
policy for devolution of finances does not recognize these differential vulnerabilities.
It is true that LGUs can access DRRM funds but the delays involved in accessing the funds must
be resolved. According to a recent study by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies
(PIDS), the usual programming practice for regular accounts is not appropriate for QRF where
the timing and magnitude of disaster/emergency occurrence cannot be ascertained.5 Thus, the
study is proposing a simpler process flow for QRF availment and a two-year window for the use
of QRF and other DRRM funds so that government agencies and local governments will have
enough room for resource maneuvering and fiscal adjustments to better address requirements in
the field before, during, and after times of disaster.6
Inadequate but Underutilized Calamity Funds of LGUs

A 2004 World Bank-NDCC study reports that an estimated 50% of the Local Calamity Fund go
unused each year. This is even confirmed by our collection of reports on the utilization of
DRRM funds at the local government level as shown below:
Fig. 27
Fig. 28
It is interesting to note that despite the inadequate resources of some LGUs due to their small
budget, LDRRMFs are usually unutilized or underutilized. This affirmed our earlier observation
5
Quick Response Funds and DRRM Resources in the Department of National Defense OSEC and OCD) and Various
Departments (DSWD, DPWH, DA and DepEd) (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2013)
6 Ibid
regarding reactive type of disaster spending. We also noted that some LGUs cut back on
spending the LDRRMF for they are too afraid that such expense may not be allowed by DBM or
disallowed by COA. This makes it imperative to revisit the existing laws, rules and regulations on
fund utilization to better adapt to the LGUs needs given their different experiences in disaster
response and mitigation. Thus the challenge to find ways to increase investment in disaster
preparedness and risk mitigation remains.
Assessment of Preparedness
In times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and
communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared, ready to act and equipped with the
knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management.
Disaster preparedness is described as the knowledge and capacities developed by governments,
professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively
anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events
or conditions.
The overall vision is safer, adaptive, and disaster resilient Filipino communities toward
sustainable development. It conveys a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive DRRM wherein
men and women have increased their awareness and understanding on DRRM with the intention
to increase peoples resilience and decrease their vulnerabilities as contained in the national
framework.
While it cannot be denied that there have been significant innovations in the area of disaster
preparedness and considerable amount of funds spent for the said phase, its various elements are
continuously being challenged. We noted that roles and responsibilities have been decentralized
without resolving existing limitations in financial resources and operational capacities.
Community participation and decentralization is ensured through the delegation of authority and
resources to local levels, but existing financial constraints continue to affect the capacity of
certain LGUs for effective disaster preparedness and response. While the law encourages LGUs
investment in disaster risk management, the current system, however, puts LGUs in poorer and
island provinces (usually hazard-prone) at a disadvantage as they have lower revenues and thus,
have fewer funds available. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that since the calamity
fund is based on estimated revenues, there is no actual cash backup to fund the 5% budget for
calamity funds as poor LGUs cannot fully collect the estimated revenues which is the basis of the
budget.
To strengthen the LGUs disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels, relevant
knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities, actual losses and capacities must be
collected, compiled and disseminated. Unfortunately, this is hardly implemented in the majority
of LGUs, especially among low-income class municipalities. Majority of the LGUs have no
capacity to establish database/databank which is useful in both disaster preparedness and
response. The political will to implement existing laws on DRRM such as the Building Code and
land use and zoning ordinances is another factor to consider. Mainstreaming disaster mitigation
and preparedness in the LGU development plan still remains a huge challenge. The human
resource and technical complement of disaster preparedness is still wanting in terms of a
systematic approach.
Typhoon Yolanda will likely serve as a new benchmark for planning, but LGUs need to do a
better job in risk identification and scenario planning.
Even at the level of the national government agencies, we also observed some lapses in the area
of disaster preparedness. Consider the following:
OCD
We noted that not much have been accomplished by OCD with regard to Disaster Preparedness
under the NDRRMP of which it is the lead agency. No accomplishments were reported per the
CY 2012 Performance Review and Assessment of the NDRRMP as the agency still do not have a
relevant, DBM-approved staffing pattern as required under Rule 7, Section 4 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 10121. The frequent disasters (natural and man-made) which took
place in previous years have kept the agency and other members of the National Council
preoccupied attending to various emergencies.
DILG
We noted that the DILG integrated disaster preparedness in delivering basic services and
strengthened capacities of communities to anticipate, cope and recover from the negative impacts
of calamities through Enhancing LGU Capacity on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster
Risk Reduction Management. However, the results of LGU Disaster Preparedness Profiles
assessment showed that LGUs are only 23% prepared to counter the effects of calamities.
Despite its scaled up Seal of Good Local Governance campaign that recognizes good
performance, the DILG has not successfully achieved full preparedness of LGUs, with only 23%
of LGUs in flood-prone areas prepared in terms of awareness, institutional capacities and
coordination based on the agencys own assessment.
Developing the capabilities needed to counteract large-scale disasters should be part of an overall
national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what needs to be done, where it
needs to be done, based on what standards, how it should be done and how well it should be done.
Personnel training on disaster preparedness as well as equipment buildup should also be a
continuous process and appropriate and flexible funding should be allotted for this as
recommended in a recent PIDS study.
Coordination and Collaboration Among Stakeholders

The ability to carry out specific tasks under particular conditions with desired results is built upon
the appropriate combination of people, skills, processes and assets. Disasters of wide impact such
as Yolanda place a wide ranging demand on emergency response capabilities. Whenever there are
several agencies expected to deliver a desired goal, it is important that these agencies collaborate,
coordinate and communicate significant information to decision-makers, in order to achieve a
common goal.
Coordination is influenced by several factors including governance structure, local capacity,
availability of resources, stakeholder partnership and information management system. The
NDRRMC serves as the backbone of disaster management in the Philippines, as supported by
national agencies and LGUs down to the barangay level, but based on our experience,
emergency management, command and control can hardly operate expediently in such a structure
where the authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed and resources are scattered.
The degree of collaboration and decision making required both depend on the extent of the
damage wrought by a disaster. A catastrophic disaster like Yolanda makes it difficult to achieve
the degree of collaboration and level of decision making needed in a multi-sectoral, multiorganizational structure.
There are however some recurring issues that affect coordination and collaboration among
DRRM agencies in the country and some of these are:
Lack of emergency management system to cope with a catastrophic disaster such as
typhoon Yolanda
Limited capacity in terms of staff, equipment and other logistics such as warehouses,
delivery vehicles
Lack of a systematic distribution system
Inadequately trained and equipped response team
The aftermath of typhoon Yolanda led us to search for the most appropriate and effective
organizational framework for disaster response.
Gaps in Accountability
Even in times of catastrophic disaster, one cannot discount the significance of controls and other
accountability mechanisms for they ensure the proper use of much needed resources. However,
decision makers often find themselves trapped in a struggle between implementing controls and
accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and recovery assistance. On one
hand, our audit documented many examples wherein quick action was not possible due to
longstanding policies/procedures that required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the

delivery of vital supplies and other assistance. Like the case of DA where agency officials still
waited for the auditor to conduct an inspection before the seeds and fertilizers were distributed to
Yolanda-affected farmers. On the other hand, we also found examples where processes under
procurement and distribution of relief goods to disaster victims left the government to possible
abuse of expedited transactions. In the case of DOH, the correctness of recorded issuances of
goods and equipment in the amount of P36,912,764.06 or 39% of the total distributions/issuances
of P93,620,188.54 could not be substantiated because this was not confirmed to have been
received by the concerned auditors of the DOH Regional Offices. We observed that procurement
contracts were not conducted through public bidding due to the urgency of need and yet,
significant amount of items procured remained undistributed even months after they were
purchased.
In the case of DSWD Field Office (FO) VI the system they adopted in relief distribution
operations did not provide daily and periodic reporting on the results/status of its operations as
well as accounting of funds received and its utilization.
Lapses were noted in the documentation and recording of donated cash/relief goods and supplies
were sometimes moved from warehouses without the accompanying approved supporting
documents. There are also discrepancies between the accounting and reporting of family food
packs (FFPs) between warehouse personnel and DSWD employees. It is very difficult to
establish actual inventories given the following circumstances:
Drop-off points of shipment not indicated in the tally out sheet for FFPs releases
to DSWD FO VIII, hence port of entry cannot be verified;
Requisition and Issue Slip (RIS) not attached to some tally out sheet;
Standard DSWD forms not used to document movement of goods for proper
monitoring.
It should be noted that a reliable inventory is crucial in the determination of the volume of relief
goods to be ordered as well as timeliness in placing orders. An accurate inventory also contributes
to a sound analysis of distribution of relief assistance which can eventually guide critical decision
making during disaster response.
Low Compliance to Reporting Requirement

An indispensable precondition to improve aid effectiveness is greater transparency and better
information dissemination. While there is a law that enables the sourcing and utilization of
disaster funds, compliance to the said provision is low.
Under COA Circular No. 2012-002 dated September 12, 2012, specifically paragraph 5.1.5, the
Accountant and the LDRRM Officer are required to prepare a report on the sources and
utilization of the DRRM Fund and submit it on or before the 15th day of the end of each month to
COA, copy furnished to the OCD.
During this study, we found out that this provision is not being implemented and the auditors
hardly ever receive such reports. This makes it difficult to conduct a thorough analysis of disaster
management funds. Even tracking the flow of disaster funds is challenging due to the lack of
information on what has been delivered to whom and the lack of a feedback loop that enables the
people affected by crises to say what they have received and when they received it. It is therefore
difficult to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of government response to disasters. The lack
of a system that tracks what commodities and services have been delivered to the people also
makes it hard to draw the lines of accountability.
Inability to Track Donations to and from Private Sources

While COA can access information on disaster funds channeled through government agencies, it
is completely unaware of the amount of private funds channeled through private institutions.
It must be emphasized that agencies which received extensive funding from international and
local donors must be asked to account for monies received for the rehabilitation of disaster
victims/survivors. They should be required to maintain stand-alone accounts for disaster-related
donations to ensure transparency and ease of audit. It is in this area that a guide on voluntary
reporting is needed.
In the absence of a guideline on voluntary reporting of private companies receiving donations, it
is difficult to assess the accountability of the flow of disaster-related aid to private agencies. The
flow of aid from donors to private institutions cannot be tracked and these payments are often
reflected differently in the financial reports of recipient organizations.
Disaster Information and Management

Our experience with Yolanda also invites us to focus on the need to improve risk communication
to promote better understanding of the threats of disasters. As we have seen, not enough public
understanding of storm surges led to increased casualties. The mayor of Tacloban City said more
lives could have been spared if the nature of storm surges was described as similar to a tsunami.
The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA)
fell short in the messaging aspect of its risk projection about the possible severe impact of storm
surges generated by typhoon Yolanda that may have contributed to the thousands of lives lost in
Eastern Visayas. An official from the DOST-PAGASA admitted they were not able to explain
the magnitude of storm surges in their press briefings and information materials.
Management of information is critical to any disaster management system. The information need
of disaster managers can be categorized into pre-disaster and post-disaster, which are both crucial
in guiding decision-makers. The need for information, however, is not only limited to baseline
and real-time data on the nature, effect and impact of disasters but also includes financial
information. The ability of leaders and administrators to make sound decisions on disaster
management, to analyze and strategize the appropriate response or disaster risk mitigation
techniques also depends, to a large extent, on the availability, reliability and quality of financial
information.
Insufficient Information on the Governance Aspect of DRRM

While there are considerable efforts geared at improving the countrys disaster risk management
system, significant gaps remain.
The post-disaster environment is not conducive to collecting information as this takes a backseat
to providing aid or relief. Establishing a financial information management system is critical at
the post-disaster stage but validating information is also another challenge. This is also a prime
consideration in the timing of an audit. While it is ideal to immediately conduct a post-disaster
audit given the nature of aid and the state of goods being donated, the auditing process will
simply compete for the limited time and attention of disaster managers. Accessing financial
information or even the database on disasters will be definitely arduous because their priority is
improving the condition of the affected communities.
A solid financial information management system at all levels of disaster management is badly
needed. It is essential that information be collected before, during and after the disaster. This
collected data must be integrated into the financial information management system of the entire
DRRM.
Lack of a Comprehensive Analysis on Public Spending for DRRM

Another precondition for effective disaster management is the allocation of sufficient funds for
necessary activities. By mapping the distribution of disaster management funds and how those
funds have been spent, it is possible to estimate the risk of insufficient resources or inefficiencies.
This, however, is not being done due to the absence of a comprehensive report on the sources and
utilization of funds. It may be worthy to emphasize that mapping the distribution of disaster
management funds could serve as a tool in the planning and coordination of disaster response and
recovery activities.
Challenges and Recommendations

According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) publication, there are three basic
elements in preparing for, responding to and recovering from any catastrophic disaster: 1)
leadership; 2) capabilities; and 3) accountability.7
Leadership in the form of legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all
levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.8 In this context, DRRM leadership is
clearly defined in RA 10121, the regulatory framework that promotes and supports dialogue,
exchange of information and coordination among all government agencies. In other words, the
institutional framework for DRRM as embodied in RA 10121 is already in place and operational.
The NDRRMC is the backbone of disaster management, with functional networks from the
national level down to the barangay level, backstopped by national agencies clustered under the
different phases of disaster risk management to ensure a more coherent and effective response
across all key sectors or areas of activity. The existing DRRM governance structure has grown to
include several other players, including the academe and CSOs. The field experience of NGOs
complements the scientific knowledge of the science and technology institutions and the
academe, as well as the practical skills and knowledge on post-disaster activities of the
NDRRMC. National cluster lead agencies like the DENR, DepEd and DPWH lend support to
Regional DRRM Councils to institutionalize the standards and dimensions of the cluster
approach.
But the governments response and recovery efforts in Yolanda-ravaged areas clearly showed that
its implementation of RA 10121 still leaves a lot to be desired. Given the multi-sectoral, multiorganizational structure of the NDRRMC and the complexity and magnitude of the disaster, the
Councils key players and stakeholders had difficulty coordinating, collaborating and making
timely decisions, which came across as unreadiness and ineptitude to respond to a host of
emergencies and crippling crisis. It is evident that whenever authority is shared, responsibility is
dispersed and resources are scattered, emergency management, command and control can hardly
operate in an expedient manner.
The Yolanda disaster also exposed the low level of disaster preparedness and response
capabilities of many LGUs. Despite the DILGs campaign to recognize and incentivize local
government performance in institutionalizing disaster preparedness, many LGUs have yet to
integrate DRRM policies into their own development plans. And although the national
government and some LGUs have operational DRRM programs, made ample preparations and
braced themselves for the worst, they were simply crushed and overwhelmed by the scope and
enormity of Yolandas destruction.
7
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nations Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System (GAO-06-618, United States
Government Accountability Office, 2006).
Ibid
As for developing capabilities, the same U.S. GAO publication said that it should be part of an
overall national effort designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, by whom,
and how well.9 Our public spending on disaster management is still largely reactive as shown by
the huge balances of calamity funds before the occurence of a disaster and the corresponding
increase in expenditures during disaster response and recovery. This kind of spending is not in
line with a culture of preparedness that is needed if we are to suceed in disaster risk management.
The government has progressed in raising the peoples awareness on the adverse impact of
disasters on the population and the economy by integrating natural hazard risks in its plans,
strengthening institutions, and implementing projects like early warning systems, improving
weather forecasting and strengthening disaster response. Little has been done, however, in
determining if there are sufficient levels of disaster risk financing, considering that disaster
damage and losses continue to be significantly high, and recovery and rehabilitation in affected
areas move quite slow. Tracking public expenditures for DRRM might lead to a better
understanding and behavior toward a more comprehensive strategy to address the impacts of
disasters. This has not yet been done and to date there is still no comprehensive analysis of public
spending on DRRM.
With regard to accountability, greater transparency and better information dissemination are
needed for a more effective disaster aid. Government agencies are mandated to report on the
sourcing and utilization of disaster funds, but the majority hardly comply with this rule. This
makes it difficult to conduct a thorough analysis of disaster management funds. Even tracking the
flow of disaster funds is challenging due to the lack of information on what has been delivered to
whom and the lack of a feedback loop for people affected by crises to report whatever they have
received and when they received it.
In this regard, COA has issued a new accounting guide that requires government agencies to
submit a report to the OCD and the OCD auditor to consolidate the same. These reports, however,
only cover funds and relief goods channeled through government agencies. At present, COA has
no means to capture the aggregate amount of funds and resources donated, allocated and utilized
for disaster management.
It must be emphasized that private entities which received extensive funding from international
and local donors must be asked to account for monies received for the rehabilitation of disaster
victims/survivors. They should be required to maintain stand-alone accounts for disaster-related
donations to ensure transparency and ease of audit. It is therefore imperative to develop a guide
for voluntary reporting on disaster-related aid channeled through private companies or
organizations.
All in all, the government as led by the NDRRMC must plug the holes and bridge the gaps in its
DRRM plan and implementation to address the many critical issues and problems that were
Ibid
highlighted and magnified in the aftermath of the Yolanda disaster. We need to look into the
problematic areas and aspects where the government came up short or had no response at all,
especially in the fundamental elements of leadership, capabilities and accountability. We need to
learn from the small victories, the bright spots as well as the fatal mistakes and everything in
between that were made not only from the Yolanda perspective but also from the many natural
and man-made disasters that have struck our country in the last two decades. Otherwise,
calamities will continue to exact a heavy toll not only on our economy but also on our population.

Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines: An Assessment

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Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines: An Assessment

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DISASTER MANAGEMENT

1 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Climate Change Adaptation

2 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

National Operational Assessment Hazards

3 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Existing disaster governance framework

4 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

History of DRRM in the Philippines

10121 of 2010, Sec. 2 (d)

5 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Current State of Disaster Management

Fig. 1. Expanded Membership of the

RA 10121 or the PDRRM Act of 2010 has

Fig. 2. DRRMC Networks

6 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

The Barangay Disaster Council, if a barangay is affected;

7 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Assessment of Existing Governance Framework

Basic institutional and

8 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

The multi-sectoral, multi-agency

The ability to carry out specific tasks under particular

9 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan

Likewise, it stipulates the DRRM approaches and

The Plan provides the vertical and horizontal coordination

In terms of strengthening disaster preparedness for effective

10 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Financial Resources for DRRM

National Greening Program

3 esteros rehabilitated and developed

1 pumping station constructed

11 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Aid relief and Rehabilitation Services

13 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Table 3. Calamity and Quick Response Funds (in pesos)

DRRM budget allocation expanded by 37.5% percent in 2011

14 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Table 4. Calamity Fund Releases Distribution for 2009 to 2013

Quick Response Fund

16 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Calamity Fund (CF)

18 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

19 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

Overall Assessment of Budget Allocation/Utilization

20 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

As disasters occur more frequently, the cost of disaster

Review of DRRM Agencies Allocation and Spending for 2013

Based on our limited assessment, OCD does not have an

Department of Social Welfare and

22 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN ASSESSMENT

As a department mandated to improve the living conditions of

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

Develop information, education and communication

Train communities, teams, DRRM managers and key

Establish training institutions at various levels

Develop DRRM and CCA materials for formal

Ensure operational and self-reliant local DRRM

Develop and implement comprehensive national and

In addition to the P76 million, a SARO dated December 10, 2013 in

Department of Education (DepEd)