Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and Theology Vol 39 (2014)

CONTENTS
1-10
Philosophy after Kant

Romualdo E. Abulad, SVD
11-33
Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

Felix Baghi, SVD
34-57
Between Hope and Death: Jobs Death-Wish in 6:8-13

Randolf C. Flores, SVD
58-63
Some Annotations on Omnium in Mentem of Benedict XVI

Adolfo N. Dacanay, SJ
64-67
Book Notices

Semicentennial Theological Symposia 2013 - 2014
69-77
Divine Word Seminary: History, Perspective, and

Orientation towards New Evangelization

Antolin V. Uy, SVD
78-92
The State of Mission Today

Antonio Pernia, SVD
93-98
Response to Fr. Antonio Pernias Key Address: The State of Mission Today

John Fuellenbach, SVD
99-109
The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II: Prospect in Mission

Aris P. Martin, SVD
110-113
Response to The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II: Prospect in Mission

Emmanuel C. Marfori
114-125
The Influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium in the Mission Life of the Church

Atilano Corcuera, SVD
126-138
Philippine Education Reform Agenda: Moral Theology

on Armchair, at the Margins

Dionisio M. Miranda, SVD
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DIWA
Studies in Philosophy and Theology
Title Header
Diwa is a refereed journal published twice a year by the

Graduate Schools of Divine Word Seminary, Tagaytay City
and Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City, Philippines
Volume 39, no. 1 & 2
May & November 2014
CONTENTS
1-10

Romualdo E. Abulad, SVD
11-33

Felix Baghi, SVD
34-57
Between Hope and Death: Jobs Death-Wish in 6:8-13

58-63
Some Annotations on Omnium in Mentem

of Benedict XVI
Adolfo N. Dacanay, SJ
64-67
Book Notices
SEMICENTENNIAL THEOLOGICAL SYMPOSIA 2013 2014
69-77
Divine Word Seminary: History, Perspective, and

Orientation towards New Evangelization
Antolin V. Uy, SVD
78-92

Antonio Pernia, SVD
93-98
Response to Fr. Antonio Pernias Key Address:

John Fuellenbach, SVD
ii Diwa 39 (2014)
Title Header
CONTENTS
99-109
The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II:

Prospect in Mission
Aris P. Martin, SVD
110-113 Response to The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of
Vatican II: Prospect in Mission

Emmanuel C. Marfori
114-125 The Influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium
in the Mission Life of the Church

Atilano Corcuera, SVD
126-138 Philippine Education Reform Agenda:
Moral Theology on the Armchair, at the Margins

Dionisio M. Miranda, SVD
Contributors (Diwa 39, nos. 1 & 2)

1. ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD is former chair of the philosophy
department of the University of San Carlos (Cebu City). He is currently
teaching at the Christ the King Mission Seminary (Quezon City) and the
University of Santo Tomas (Manila), where he holds a doctorate in philosophy
(1978).
2. FELIX BAGHI, SVD is taking up his doctoral studies in philosophy at
the University of Santo Tomas (Manila). He is a guest lecturer at St. Paul
Major Seminary in Maumere, Indonesia.
3. RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD teaches scripture courses at the Divine
Word Seminary where he is currently the dean of studies. He holds a
doctorate in sacred theology from the Loyola School of Theology, Ateneo de
Manila University (Quezon City) and a Licentiate in Sacred Scripture (SSL)
from the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome (1999). He is a board member of
the Catholic Biblical Association of the Philippines (CBAP, 2008-2011) and
is the editor of Diwa.
4. ADOLFO N. DACANAY, SJ holds a doctorate in Canon Law (JCD)
from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome (1989). He teaches
theology at the Ateneo de Manila University. He authored Canon Law on
Marrige: Introductory Notes and Comments (Ateneo de Manila, 2000) and
The Sacraments of Initiation: A Commentary on Cc. 849-958 of the Code of
Canon Law (Anvil, 2006).
5. ANTOLIN V. UY, SVD, former rector and dean of studies at the Divine
Word Seminary (Tagaytay City), has been teaching Church History for more
than 25 years. He holds a Licentiate in Sacred Theology and a doctorate in
Church History from the Pontifical Gregorian University (Rome).
6. ANTONIO PERNIA, SVD holds a doctorate in systematic theology from
the Pontifical Gregorian University. A former superior general of the Society
of the Divine Word, he is the first Asian/Filipino to head an international
male religious congregation. He is currently the dean of the Divine Word
Institute of Mission Studies.
7. JOHN FUELLENBACH, SVD obtained a licentiate in theology in Rome
at the Gregorian University, a degree on sociology in Washington, D.C., and
a doctorate in theology from the Catholic University in Washington D.C.
His teaching career spans 30 years, which includes seven years at the
Divine Word Seminary. He is the author of Proclaiming His Kingdom,
The Kingdom of God: Jesus Central Message, Throw Fire, and Church:
Community for the Kingdom.
8. ARIS P. MARTIN, SVD holds a licentiate in sacred theology from
the Pontifical Gregorian University. He teaches dogmatic theology at the
Divine Word Seminary and the Ateneo de Manila University.
9. EMMANUEL C. MARFORI holds a doctorate in systematic
theology from the Universidad de Navarra in Pamplona, Spain (2009).
He teaches theology at the Divine Word Seminary.
10. ATILANO CORCUERA, SVD holds a licentiate in Sacred Liturgy
from the Pontifical University of St. Anselm (Rome) and teaches courses
on liturgy and the sacraments at the Divine Word Seminary.
11. DIONISIO M. MIRANDA, SVD obtained his doctorate in moral
theology from the Accademia Alfonsiana in Rome (1984) and had worked
as a missionary in Paraguay (1978-1981) before joining the faculty of
the Divine Word Seminary (1984-2006). He authored five books, all
pioneering studies in inculturation and Filipino moral theology. He is
the current president of the University of San Carlos in Cebu City.

ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD
University of Santo Tomas

Espaa, Manila
t is possible that Kant had initially hoped to design a philosophy

which would follow the secure path of a science after he would have
accomplished his critical project, as can be gleaned especially from the
Preface to the 1787 edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is where he
famously spoke of a Copernican revolution in philosophy, in imitation of
the sciences of logic, mathematics and physics, whose turning point came
about when a new light flashed on their respective proponents such
that they realized that reason has insight into that only, which she herself
produces on her own plan.1 I will argue that, if that indeed was a part
of his original intention, he had thus not succeeded in that objective and
that, as an offshoot of this failure, there is consequently no way of calling
anything, except only loosely, as a Kantian philosophy. There is properly no
Kantian philosophy to speak about, much less one which may be dubbed
Kantianism, and this is probably also how Kant eventually wanted it all to be.
Arguably the most important contribution of Kant to philosophy is
something negative, what he himself calls and should deservedly be more
widely and popularly known in our time as critique of pure reason, actually
not an original enterprise as recognized by the philosopher himself who, in
the Preface to the 1781 edition, mentioned the name of Locke prominently
ahead of all the others. What Locke accomplished is a certain physiology of
the human understanding, Kant said.2 Locke himself explained the purpose
of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding as follows: to inquire into
the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the
1
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii, trans. F. Max Mller (New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), p. xxxi.
2
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Ax; Mller, p. xxiii.
Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10
grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.3 Indeed, Kant considers
the critique of pure reason as his response to the Socratic appeal for selfknowledge, the most difficult of its duties.4 There is, however, something
ambivalent here considering the status of the self as discussed later in the
Paralogism of Pure Reason which, we may assume, owes much to the
outcome of the empirical procedure in the mature reflection of it by David
Hume, the man who famously woke up Kant from his dogmatic slumber.5
This preoccupation with the self goes, of course, as far back in modernity
as Ren Descartes and his re-discovery of the cogito. It will be recalled
how his method of universal doubt endeavors to clear the mind of all its
contents, leaving alone the pure thinking self, later identified by Kant as the
pure transcendental consciousness or apperception.6 What in Descartes is
readily taken to be a substance suffers a double explosion, first in the hand of
Bishop Berkeley who questions the existence of an underlying non-empirical
substrate,7 and then in Kants own reference to it as a mere transcendental
idea. The cogito as an existing substance is one of at least three classical
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. 1 (New York: Dover
Publications, n.d.), p. 26.
4
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi; Mller, p. xxiv.
5
I openly confess that my remembering David Hume was the very thing which many
years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of
speculative philosophy a quite new direction. Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics,
260, trans. Paul Carus as rev. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1977), p. 5.
6
It must be possible that the I think should accompany all my representations: for
otherwise something would be represented within me that would not be thought, in other
words, the representation would either be impossible or nothing, at least so far as I am
concerned . . . I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical apperception,
or original apperception also, because it is that self-consciousness which by producing the
representation, I think (which must accompany all others, and is one and the same in every
act of consciousness) cannot itself be accompanied by any other. I also call the unity of it the
transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that it contains the possibility
of knowledge a priori. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B132; Mller, p. 77.
7
If it be allowed that no idea nor anything like an idea can exist in an unperceiving
substance, then surely it follows that no figure or mode of extension, which we can either
perceive or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in matter, not to mention
the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct
from extension, to be the substratum of extension. Be the sensible quality what it willfigure
or sound or colorit seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which does not perceive
it (George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Bobbs-Merrill Library
of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, 1977, p. 30). Similar thoughts are scattered throughout the
Dialogues, effectively demolishing the idea of an unperceived and unperceiving material
substance and replacing it with a mind that perceives; thus, the famous Berkeleyan statement,
Esse est percipi, To be is to be perceived.
3
R. Abulad, Philosophy after Kant
assumptions which, in fact, Descartes fails to subject to question, thus making

of the universal doubt less than what it presumes itself to be, that is, a universal
doubt. The two other assumptions which escape the Cartesian doubt are
those of innate ideas, which Locke takes to task, and causality, which Hume
effectively deconstructs. It is actually in Kants critique of pure reason where
the universal doubt becomes complete. Thus, one can say that the modern
project which begins with Descartes culminates in Kants critique of pure
reason. The critique of pure reason is the completion of the universal doubt,
indeed the authentication of the universality of the doubt which Descartes
fails to live up to. Seen in this light, the whole of modernityfrom Descartes
to Kantbecomes three centuries of continuous transition from the dying
years of the classical age to the beginning of postmodernity.
This will justify Heideggers mention of two beginnings in the Beitrge,
the first beginning which took place among the Greeks and the second
beginning which belongs to our time.8 Sandwiched between these two
beginnings is modernity which is in truth the transition period, the period
of the demolition of all classical assumptions which makes possible the new
beginning, called here, for lack of a better term, postmodernity. This justifies,
too, the much-bannered paradigm shift usually attributed to the philosopher
of science, Thomas Kuhn.9 The kind of paradigm shift we are talking about
here, however, is not only one of many paradigm shifts, but the paradigm shift
that fathers all the other shifts eventually felt in every area of life and thought.
It is important to keep in mind the radical meaning of the paradigm shift we
are here speaking about and to connect it with Heideggers second beginning
in order to understand the inevitability of what is variously referred to as the
end of all things, including philosophy. The so-called end of philosophy spells
the culmination of that metaphysics inaugurated by the Greeks and which
has taken a more or less final shape in the speculative system of Aristotle.
When Aristotle declared being to be substance and then reduced all earthly
beings, including human being, to something hylemorphically constituent,
that is, a composite of matter and form, everybody was readily taken in by
this theory so friendly to common sense that it became difficult to imagine
the world as anything other than that. Even the Church, then in search of
a theology, got wind of that ingenious thought experiment which fits very
8
Contributions to Philosophy enacts a questioning along a pathway which is first traced
out by the crossing to the other beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering.
Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 3.
9
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970).
Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10
majestically with its conception of an other-worldly kingdom of the spirit, the

abode of the soul, in contradistinction to the earth which is the locus of the
material body. In this way Plato and Aristotle have become friends divinely
linked in a Church which makes the Greek model canonically acceptable,
indeed dogmatically binding on all Christians for at least a thousand years.
Further strengthening the hold of the Greeks on human history is the
conception of the human being as a rational animal, a beast tamed by a
higher spiritual faculty which, in general, is called reason. This makes humans
formally distinct from the rest of the animals, distinct in fact from all the rest
of the physical order, for there is something he/she essentially possesses which
elevates and connects him/her to a supra-physical world, a world beyond
this one, which is spiritual and thus eternal. That was a beautiful thought, a
thought which has captivated humans for as good as two millennia, in many
ways marvelous for its achievements and towering geniusin the arts and
letters, as well as in science and technology. There is hardly anything we have
now which cannot be credited to the classical assumption of a rational animal
and of a world of matter and form. Put these two togetherthe human being
and worldand you can very well reconstruct the two millennia during
which the raw material of human beings ingenuity is transformed into all
that we have and are now.
So, both the Church and science have been shaped by what Heidegger
calls the first beginning, the one which the Greeks, as it were, miraculously
evolved and worked out tediously and incessantly until it reached the point
of exhaustion at least two thousand years later, or, to put it in other words,
until the project of reason is brought to its limits, beyond which reason
alone no longer extends profitably. This is where Kant comes in. Initially
sympathetic to the cause of classical thinking, he tries to institute a court
of appeal by which to settle once and for all the legitimate rights of reason,
not perhaps expecting that this singular effort of his will redound to the
radical shift not only of the various scientific paradigms but of the entire
human way of thinking. Perhaps he intended his Copernican revolution to
provide a scientific base only for metaphysics, indeed merely as an imitation
of the other already established sciences, but, as it turned out, his project
accomplished something beyond anything one could possibly imagine. His
critique of pure reason marked the end of that kind of thinking begun by the
Greeks, thus the end of the first beginning.
Let us now see how, more or less, Kant did it. The Prefaces are explicit
about the metaphysical concern of the Critique of Pure Reason, and theres
no need to speculate that he changed his mind simply because theres hardly
a mention of the term metaphysics in the rest of the book. For one, under
the general problem of How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? the
Introduction cites as one sub-question the following: How is metaphysics
as a science possible? The meticulously systematic discussion that comprises
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, the latter being the
first part of the Transcendental Logic, has been calculated to lead to the
Transcendental Dialectic, being the second part of the Transcendental Logic,
which is actually all about classical metaphysics and its three concerns: God,
freedom and immortality.
Filipino students of pre-martial law years still knew that ontology,
which is otherwise called metaphysics, could be either general or special, the
former being all about being as such and the latter about God (theodicy),
world (cosmology) and humans (psychology). One can see how the question
of freedom relates to cosmology as another type of causality in the world,
while the question of immortality is where the discourse on humanity
ultimately goes. Using only rational arguments, classical ontology is able to
prove the reality of all the three conceptsGod, freedom and immortality.
These are concepts, however, which, during the time of Kant, were already
under question, so that in Hume we find all such knowledge succumbing
to academic skepticism. The aim of the critique of pure reason is thus to
locate the source or sources of these concepts, now more specifically called
ideas. Ordinary concepts, such as chair, dog, airplane, radio, computer,
etc., are sourced in the faculty of understanding which functions hand in
hand with the faculty of sensibility. God, freedom and immortality are none
of these concepts since in no way can they have been coordinates of the
sensibility; none of them are in space and time, and to distinguish them
from the ordinary concepts they are thus called ideas. Ideas are therefore
pure rational concepts which in no way can be presented as phenomena; they
are simply thatideas. Ideas are thoughts, but they are without contents;
hence, there is no way to establish their real existence. Thoughts without
contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.10 With these ideas
we are ingeniously groping among mere concepts, rigorously supported by
the logic based on the principle of non-contradiction, whether Aristotelian
or mathematical, without having been received as an object of sense. This is
why, in the end, the proof of them is demolished so soon as established, as
shown in the Antinomy of Pure Reason.
The conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason is that, no matter how
hard we try, we cannot extend our knowledge beyond how things appear to
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A52=B75; Mller, p. 45.
10
Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10
us, and indeed only those things which appear to us, or at least are capable
of appearing to us, can fall within the scope of what, humanly speaking, we
can know.11 Thus, the possibility of experience becomes the gauge for the
knowledgeability of an object.12 Experience, however, is impossible if exercised
by thought alone; the work of sense is indispensable to experience. It also
goes to say that thought alone, otherwise called pure reason, may infinitely
indulge in thinking without the benefit of sense intuition, concocting ideas
beyond imagination, so to say, but none of this can count as knowledge in
a legitimate sense. Therefore, in regard to God, freedom and immortality,
since they are not given to sensibility, since they are products simply of pure
reason, they cannot fall within the scope of what can be known. However,
because of the integrity of what they stand for, we may, if we like, believe in
them. It is in this sense that knowledge gives way to belief.13 To say so is
tacitly to admit that no science of them is possible. The science of God, or
theology, is no science at all, in the strictest sense of the word. Shall we then
restrict meaningful discussion to science?
Now I come to the real object of this paper. Granted that, with Kant, we
have successfully accomplished the objectives of the critique of pure reason,
what then? Is it business as usual for philosophy? Is metaphysics dead or
alive? Let me answer the second of these questions first. If by metaphysics
we mean the metaphysics as we have inherited it from the Greeks, especially
Aristotle, then that metaphysics is as good as done and finished. That is the
metaphysics that culminated in the First Cause who is Uncaused, in other
words God. That God, says Nietzsche, is dead. That is the metaphysics which
This is the conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental
Analytic, as follows: Even if we could impart the highest degree of clearness to our intuition,
we should not come one step nearer to the nature of objects by themselves . . . What the
objects are by themselves would never become known to us, even through the clearest
knowledge of that which alone is given us, the phenomenon. (A44=B61; Mller, p. 36)
If by noumenon we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our intuition, and make
abstraction of our mode of intuition, it may be called a noumenon in a negative sense. If,
however, we mean by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we admit thereby a peculiar
mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which, however, is not our own, nor one of which
we can understand even the possibility. This would be the noumenon in a positive sense.
(A253; Mller, p. 198).
12
This thesis is developed by Kant in Analytic of Principles, following immediately after
the Analytic of Concepts, of the Transcendental Logic. For example, the highest principle
of all synthetical judgments is formulated thus: every object is subject to the necessary
conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience. Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, A158=B197; Mller, p. 132; italics supplied.
13
I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief. Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx; Mller, p. xxxix.
11
is also a theodicy, which is why we have heard it described as ontotheology,

a subject which has grown in disrepute in recent years. The proud name of
Ontology, says Kant, should now give way to a more modest Analytic of
pure reason.14 Does this death of metaphysics mean the cessation of all
metaphysical thinking? If we go by recent developments, this does not seem
to be the case. Of course, the immediate successors of Kant, the German
idealists, tried to continue the Greek legacy and attempted a phenomenological
metaphysics in the rationalistic mode of classical philosophy. The crowning
achievement of that enterprise is the greatest of all great systems, that one of
Hegel, which, however, failed to gain following among the most important
of the succeeding philosophers. Instead, we find Husserl repeating the
attempt to do a scientific philosophy which is based on intuition rather than
pure reason, with the same result that the classical emphasis on scientific
knowledge for a disciplinary metaphysics or philosophy had to give way to
one grounded on existential experience.
Heideggers metaphysics is no longer that of Aristotles. Seen in the light
of the second beginning, the metaphysics appropriate to the first beginning
is dead. More accurately, however, we should say that todays metaphysics has
superseded classical metaphysics, in the same way that the Greek invention
of a rational animal has now evolved a new species of human reality, a postrational human reality. As Heidegger says, We now have not a rational
animal, but Dasein.15 Dasein should not be confused with a rational animal;
we now see what Bergson calls lan vital inventing here a new species beyond
the intellectual, which he figures out to be a species of intuition, not the
intuition of Kants sensibility but one closer to the intuition of the mystical,
the seer of Indian philosophy.16 With the Dasein what counts is authenticity,
while all intellectual and moral values are transvaluated and gone beyond.
So, it is not business as usual for philosophy. The end or death of philosophy
refers only to that begun in Greece two thousand years ago. After Hegel and
Husserl, that kind of metaphysics experienced a closure, which is tantamount
14
[T]he proud name of Ontology, which presumes to supply in a systematic form
different kinds of synthetical knowledge a priori of things by themselves (for instance the
principle of causality), must be replaced by the more modest name of a mere Analytic of the
pure understanding. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A247=B304; Mller, p. 193.
15
This amounts to an essential transformation of the human from rational animal
(animal rationale) to Da-sein. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 3.
16
The lan vital is a concept developed by Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution (trans.
Arthur Mitchell, The Modern Library, New York, 1944), while the idea that connects it to
the mystical is found in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (trans. R. Ashley Audra and
Cloudesley Brereton [Doubleday Anchor Books: New York, 1935], esp. pp. 238-239).
Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10
to a vindication of Kant. Kant has effectively brought classical philosophy to a

close and later attempts to resurrect the ideal of reason, such as those of Hegel
and Husserl, are attempts, otherwise known as enlightenment, that can only
miserably fail. Philosophy after Kant is therefore also post-Hegelian and postHusserlian, with the difference that, unlike Hegel and Husserl, Kant did not
hard-headedly insist on the scientific basis for philosophy. The true successor
of Kant is not the German idealists, such as Hegel and Husserl, but Heidegger.
While Husserl tries to repeat Descartes, Heidegger happily tries to repeat Kant
and then go beyond, to use a Nietzschean word. The bermensch of Nietzsche
is the Dasein of Heidegger; both have successfully crossed the limits of reason,
otherwise Kants stormy sea of illusion, without reverting to the primitive and
thereby find themselves always pushing forward, thus toward the future. What
sort of philosophy is valid in this new beginning? How does one philosophize
post-Kant?
Kant himself shows this new way of philosophizing in the hardly discussed
second part of the Critique of Pure Reason. In what he calls the Method of
Transcendentalism, he enumerates the prerequisites of the new philosophy,
namely, discipline, canon, architectonic and history, all having to do not so
much with the what as with the how to philosophize. If one recalls the
objection of Max Scheler to Kants ethics, that it is formalistic, and why he
(Scheler) now endeavors to improve on that by designing a non-formal or
material ethics of values,17 the same can be said of the philosophy Kant leaves
us with at the end of his critique of pure reason. My personal opinion is that
it remains doubtful whether Scheler has truly improved on Kants ethics and
whether it is not in fact to the credit of Kants ethics that it remains silent
when it comes to its matter. It may, moreover, be argued that it is precisely
the matter, the what, of ethics which is endlessly transvalued, even in the
radical sense of Nietzsche, and Schelers objective a priori hierarchy of values
is no particular exception to this transvaluability of values. If at all, the
four requirements of what Kant calls the method of transcendentalism make
the task of philosophy dauntlessly demanding, even as it does not rigidly
establish the content or matter of its activity.
Lets briefly look at these methodic requirements of the new philosophy.
First, discipline is, one might say, a negative requirement which makes a
practitioner check his or her own tendency toward excess. Discipline is thus
a system of caution and self-examination, founded on the nature of reason
17
The very title of Schelers main work attests to this anti-Kant position, see Formalism
in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
and of the objects of its use, before which no false sophistical illusion could
stand, but should at once betray itself in spite of all excuses.18 In short, one
can no longer philosophize without keeping in mind the critique of pure
reason and its various lessons and findings. One will thus have seen that
it is not in accordance with the very nature of philosophy to boast of its
dogmatical character.19 Yet, this is not to be construed that philosophy is
mindless and clueless meandering and haphazard thinking. On the contrary,
the discipline which is none other than the critique of pure reason is
rigorously hard and strict, as we have by now seen. Kant himself describes it
as a court of appeal (which) protects the just rights of reason, but dismiss(es)
all groundless claims, and does this not by means of irresponsible decrees,
but according to the eternal and unalterable laws of reason.20 The amazing
outcome of this ruthless examination of reason is the discovery that there is
no real contradiction in reason herself,21 that there is really no antithetic
of pure reason,22 and this ought to give us real comfort and inspire reason
with new courage.23 It is then useful to grant reason the fullest freedom,
Kant says.24
Allow, therefore, your adversary to speak reason, and combat him
with weapons of reason only. As to any practical interests you
need not be afraid, for in purely speculative discussions they are
not involved at all. What comes to light in these discussions is
only a certain antinomy of reason which, as it springs from the
very nature of reason, must needs be listened to and examined.
Reason is thus improved only by a consideration of both sides of
her subject.25
And if asked, What then is to be done? Kants answer would be: Let
these people go! If they show talent, if they produce new and profound
investigations, in one word, if they show reason, reason can only gain. If you
have recourse to anything else but untrammelled reason, if you raise the cry
of high treason, and call together the ignorant mob as it were to extinguish a
conflagrationyou simply render yourself ridiculous.26
20
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A11; Mller, p. xxiv.
21
22
23
24
25
Ibid.
26
18
19
10
Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10
In short, the discipline we speak of here is twofold, the negative one

that rigorously checks our natural tendencies to go beyond what we can
legitimately claim to know and the positive one that, granted we keep to the
negative discipline, affords us the freedom to explore as much of the field as
we can intelligently and courageously care to go. We are told by Kant, too,
that there is no need to fear of any censorship on any practical pretext, since
speculative thinking should not thereby be subject to restraint. Indeed, as the
second requirement shows, there is no field more greatly advanced by such
an expansion of knowledge than that of practice. The resultant freedom of
reason, we may simply say here, leads to eternal peace.27
Having said this, we can be very brief with the rest of the methodical
requirements of the new philosophy. The canon amplifies the positive
implication of the critical philosophy, claiming that if there exists any
correct use of pure reason at all, and, therefore, a canon relating to it, that
canon will refer not to the speculative, but to the practical use of reason,28
which now belongs to ethics and so shall not be attempted in this paper. The
architectonic refers to the speculative task itself, which one can presume to
have a boundless scope, often also described nowadays as global, inclusive
and borderless. Finally, however, Kant correctly insists on knowledge of
history. In this regard, postmodernity necessarily implies modernity, not the
barbaric ignorance of it, which further implies knowledge of the entire first
beginning which commenced in Greece.
Judging by the state of philosophy as we find it today, we can say that
philosophy is thriving and precisely in the way Kant has predicted it, none of
which carries his name even as none can ignore him.
27
The critique of pure reason . . . must secure an eternal peace. Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, A751=B779; Mller, p. 486. In the field of pure reason, therefore, hypotheses are
admitted as weapons of defence only, not in order to establish a right, but simply in order
to defend it; and it is our duty at all times to look for a real opponent within ourselves.
Speculative reason in its transcendental employment is by its very nature dialectical. The
objections which we have to fear lie in ourselves. We must look for them as we look for
old, but never superannuated claims, if we wish to destroy them, and thus to establish a
permanent peace. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A777=B805; Mller, p. 500.
28

FELIX BAGHI, SVD
Catholic Trade (Manila)

Sta. Cruz, Manila
Introduction
iscourse on recognition (reconnaissance) has been in the lectionary

of contemporary political philosophy since the beginning of the
twentieth century. This discourse then expanded in post-modern
political ethics at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Charles Taylor
and Axel Honneth are the names that are often discussed when people
speak about the struggle for and politics of recognition.1 However, Paul
Ricoeur is the philosopher who is now most quoted in discussions about
recognition as a long journey. This theme is investigated in his final,
insightful and remarkable work, Parcours de la Reconnaissance (2004), which
was published 15 months before his death in May 2005.2 Ricoeur himself
acknowledged this work as the conclusion of his journey as a philosopher.
Firstly, Ricoeur begins his study of the meaning of recognition by
looking at the common usage of the term, and also by noting different
connotations of the dictionary references to it.3 According to him, looking
at the dictionary meaning of a term is a necessity so that we can understand
every philosophical notion which is contained in it. Although he is aware,
that the purpose of philosophy is not exclusively tied to the grammatical
definition, he is also conscious of the fact that any philosophical problem will
always be influenced by grammar as it is used.4
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutman

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Alex Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition,
trans. Joel Anderson (London: Polity, 1995).
2
Paul Ricoeur, Parcours de la Reconnaissance (Paris: Editions Stock, 2004).
3
Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 15.
4
Ibid., p. 32.
1
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
12
In line with this, Ricoeur first examines the meaning of recognition

as an inseparable pair of identifying and distinguishing. To recognize
something as the same, as identical to itself and not other than itself, implies
distinguishing it from everything else.5 Then, recognition means identifying
using a process of differentiation. Recognizing an identity of something
always means to recognize something as it is, that is, to recognize something
for its own sake. This kind of recognition can also be considered as an effort
to differentiate. Ricoeur says, identifier, cest distinguer, which means that
the way to identify is to distinguish.6 Consequently, it is necessary to open a
discussion with a discourse on recognition as identification.
This hypothesis is followed up in chapter two of the book. In this
chapter, however, he makes a transition from recognition as a general form
of identification towards the particular action of recognizing oneself. This is
done with the intention of affirming oneself via a responsible action. First,
the self can be viewed both in an individual and in a collective sense. Both
are preconditions for understanding ones own identity. Then, the way of
recognition from the process of identification towards self-identity reaches
its climax in mutual recognition as the final theme in chapter three. In
this chapter, Ricoeur intends to explore reciprocal recognition in light of
asymmetric relationship. It should be noted here, in general, that Ricoeur
examines his discourse on recognition using the structure of the hermeneutic
theory, as he had done in his previous works.
This paper does not intend to simplify the thoughts of Ricoeur, but
rather to create a means of exploring consistently his ideas and philosophical
method on recognition in the light of political ethics. Thus, in order not
to deviate from the main idea of Ricoeur, I will try to be faithful to the
texts of Parcours de la Reconnaissance, and the English translation by David
Pellauer, as well as other sources which are connected with Ricoeurs own
main subject.
Recognition: Identifying and Distinguishing

Ricoeurs hypothesis about recognition begins by associating identification
with distinction. Ricoeur claims that to identify and to distinguish constitute
an inseparable verbal pair. In order to identify, it is necessary to distinguish,
and it is in distinguishing that we identify.7 Identification can only be
Ibid., p. 21.
Ricoeur, Parcours de la Reconnaissance, p. 223.
7
Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, p. 25.
5
6
F. Baghi, Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition
13
understood via a process of differentiating. The process of knowing an object

or a person is a process of identification. This process begins when someone
is able to differentiate in his/her mind a particular object or a person. Ricoeur
believes that to distinguish this thing, be it an idea, a thing, or a person,
is to identify it.8 We are not able to know something in its entirety. Our
knowledge is always particular, and this particularity is signified by the way
we make fine and detailed distinctions. This is the process of verification.
With reference to the views of Descartes, Kant and Michael Proust,
Ricoeur maintains the recognition as identification in the field of epistemology
as a process of verification and identifying an opinion about something.
This process, firstly, is supported by our mental capacity to make choices in
dividing the true from the false.9 Then, Ricoeur argues that recognition can
mean an action of knowledge in which a decision is made about whether or
not something is right or wrong.
In his tract, Discourse on Method, Descartes, as quoted by Ricoeur,
stresses the following statement: It was always my most earnest desire to
learn to distinguish the true from the false, in order to see clearly into my
own actions and proceed with confidence in life.10 Coming from Descartes,
Ricoeur appears to focus his attention on the statement, voirclair, assurance,
which means to see clearly and to have more confidence.11 This serves as the
basis on which one receives something with certainty. Here, epistemologically,
to recognize (reconnaitre) also means to know something correctly.
The purpose of the epistemological method of Descartes is initially to
acquire an understanding with the aid of mental ability. This mental ability for
Ricoeur is included in the verb to receive. True recognition means to receive in
my belief the ideas that are clear and certain.12 We are only able to acquire ideas
that are clear and certain if we are able to set limits and make differentiations
between what is clear and what is obscure, between what is distinct and what
is confusing. For Descartes, knowledge appears to be restricted to the process
of how the mind accepts an idea as being true after going through the
stages of differentiation.13 Ricoeur goes further, admitting that even though
we always receive a truth through the medium of ideas that are clear and
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
10
Ren Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoohoff, and Dugald Murdoc (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.
29.
11
12
Ibid., p. 30.
13
Ibid., p. 34.
8
9
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
14
certain, phenomenologically, a clear and certain idea is always connected to

a particular phenomenon which is contained in that idea.
As a result, according to both dictionary and epistemology, to recognize
means to grasp (an object) with the mind, through thought and accept
(it), take (it) to be true [or take (it) as such].14 This is only possible through a
process of differentiation. For Descartes, recognition as identification cannot
be separated from the process of differentiation. This process is tested by
various doubts and rejections. Here, the possibility is always open, that in
every form of recognition, there could be a misrecognition.15 This means
that sometimes, we recognize something as evident in our mind and we call
it the truth of recognition. Later, we are faced with the situation where our
understanding of the truth might disappear in our mind. There is a risk that
in a process like this, we can fall into the trap of making a misrecognition.
Ricoeur argues that recognition as a process of identification should always
be contrasted with misrecognition so that we can reach a stage which is clearer
and more certain. This is obviously needed to sharpen and to test whether
this recognition is true or not.
As in Descartes, Kant defines recognition as an action of identifying or
understanding something through thought. Kant, though, says, to identify is
to join together.16 Here, Ricoeur deliberately takes a straight line of thought
from the view of Kant to the dictionary meaning of recognition as a process of
identification. This process can be considered together by grasping an object
with the mind, creating images of the object with perception, distinguishing
or identifying the judgment or action, and knowing it by memory.17 It seems
that the process of identification is determined, too, by the action of making
a decision, by the way of receiving all kinds of expressions and spontaneous
unified insights.
Ricoeur states that both Descartes and Kant consider recognition as a
process of identifying an object in the structure of decision-making that is
epistemic. However, this form of recognition is still rather general because
it is restricted to an understanding of identification as happening through
a process of making distinctions. Ricoeur, at this stage, concludes that our
recognition tends to be limited to what we identify. Indeed, this has a negative
side, because one can fall into the trap of misrecognition. Likewise, there is
something here that is considered incomplete. Recognition also takes into
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid.
16
Ibid., p. 37.
17
Ibid.
14
15
15
account the dimension of feeling and touches the world of life experience. It
also includes various forms of expression and all kinds of change that are a
part of reality.18
Recognizing Self: Recognizing Ones Personal Responsibility

In the second stage of his discourse on recognition, Ricoeur begins his
presentation with a short statement: le chemin est long pour lhomme.19
This statement describes the difficult process of understanding recognition.
This road is influenced by the twists-and-turns of the actions and sufferings
of humanity. It touches every true effort to express itself. It is influenced by
our struggle to set free our neighbor. It is connected with the loss of respect
for dialogue, and the absence of a mutual relationship that is symmetric.
All of these indicate that recognition is an easy struggle. In fact, recognition
can be something that is pointless, particularly if tested in the light of
misrecognition, as well as those aspects of life that are less harmonious.
Ricoeur begins his search for the meaning of self-identity from the
perspective of a philosophy of action or practical philosophy. Practical
philosophy is related to the reflection on a subjects responsibility for him/her
self. Nature says that every person wants to be recognized because he/she has
a capacity or ability in his/her reconnaissance del responsabilit20 Ricoeur
then states that this capacity or ability is a basic human quality, as it touches
on the expression of self-identity.
To recognize oneself, the aspect of responsibility as the basis of
anthropology is important because responsibility is connected with ethical
virtue. Human beings are called to be responsible, in accord with their choice
of life. This is their basic vocation. Everyone, and anyone, wants to do good
in ones life. All want to see themselves as heroes of goodness as they act
responsibly towards others. The personification of this recognition is likened
by Ricoeur to Ulysses in Homers epic poem, the Odyssey, the classical
Greek tragedy. Ulysses always showed the greatness of his chosen way of
life by being responsible for others. Without realizing it, through his good
actions, Ulysses made himself recognized.21
In the domain of ethics, recognition of personal responsibility is a form
of ethical virtue. It is signified by a persons capacity to make a decision (la
decision) that is appropriate, to direct him/herself well and with responsibility,
Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition.
20
Ibid., p. 111.
21
18
19
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
16
according to his/her will and intelligence. The doctrine of Aristotle about

phronsis,22 practical wisdom in every human action, is used by Ricoeur to
clarify this point. Everyone should be familiar with the exercise of wisely
making a practical decision, to come to his/her own point of view. According
to Aristotle, everyone should make a decision that directs his/her life, in a
wise manner, to happiness. However, happiness is not to be found outside a
person. The source of happiness is inside ourselves, in all our activities.23
This is the basic condition of the recognition of ones identity.
Happiness in the legacy of Aristotle is an aim that must be realized by
going along the road of practical wisdom. This is possible because humanity
by nature has that wisdom. Aristotle uses the word, phronimos the wise
person. Ricoeur claims this as a starting-point to talk about the human
person as the primary agent of intellectual virtue, because of the connection
with the wisdom of making practical decisions. Every practical decision is
internal, in the person of the subject. Because it is internal, the practical
decision is also a value for the subject him/herself.24 In the same fashion,
the subjective view as the basis of rational moral consideration becomes the
main motive of every practical action. This is particularly relevant for any
consideration of the recognition of self-identity.
According to Aristotle, phronsis or practical wisdom must begin from the
capacity of a subject to make a decision by wisely weighing the possibilities
so that it can be well carried out later. This is a part of intellectual virtue.
Like Aristotle, we believe that intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, must
allow the subject to carry out his task well.25 This is because phronsis, in
the view of Aristotle himself, is connected with the capacity of the subject to
deliberate, to actively weigh issues, as a form of recognition of the need to be
responsible for his/herself.
The Phenomenology of Capability

The anthropological aspect of Ricoeurs study of the phenomenology
of the capable human being (phenomenologie de l homme capable) could be
considered the final stage in his journey of philosophical reflection. Jean
Greisch noted that the first stage in the development of Ricoeurs philosophy,
until around 1960, concentrated on fallible anthropology (anthropologie
Ibid., p. 83.
Ibid., p. 81.
24
Ibid., p. 83.
25
Ibid., p. 86.
22
23
17
de la falibilit).26 However, some questions concerning the following can be

raised: Ricoeurs transition of his anthropological study from fallibility to
capability; meaning of capability; consideration of human capability as a
special phenomenon related to strength, competency and power; and lastly,
reasons behind these considerations.
In his book Soi-Mme Comme Un Autre,27 Ricoeur seeks to find an
understanding as to why human capacity individually stems from a conviction
that every person has a reflective consciousness of him/herself. Ricoeur uses
the term soi-mme reflexif28 or the reflexive self as the basic consciousness
which forms the ipse identity of every person. Moreover, Ricoeur asserts that
this consciousness is initially identified by self-affirmation, je peux.29 This
is the basic affirmation and expression of capability of every person. This
affirmation can be investigated in different capabilities, such as the ability to
do something (pouvoir faire), the ability to speak (pouvoir dire), the ability
to relate a story (pouvoir raconter), and the ability to see the root causes
of things a person does wrong (pouvoirs imputer lorigine de ses actions).30
A grasp of all these capabilities opens up the possibility of understanding
the evidence of the recognition of personal responsibility in the context of
witnessing or attestation. Then, Ricoeur states that self-recognition, selfattestation and personal witness are the basis of the conviction, je croixque
je peux.31
Furthermore, this recognition is also marked by the capability of saying
something (pouvoir dire). This ability is a part of being human. A person has
the capability to say something. A person can talk about something. Likewise,
Austin maintains that a human being possesses the ability to do things
with words.32 The ability to speak is a sign of the justification of personal
capability. The interpretation of the actions and deeds of a person can be
checked when that person speaks about him/herself in a very personal way,
e.g., I say this or In my view. These capabilities can be considered
as expressions of the self that are very personal and cannot be assumed by
someone else.
26
287.
Jean Greisch, LItinerance Du Sense (Grenoble: Editions Jerome millon, 2001), p.
Paul Ricoeur, Soi-Mme Comme Un Autre (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1990).

29
Paul Ricoeur, Memoir, Histoir, Oubli (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), p. 136.
30
Ibid., p. 240.
31
32
J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1997).
27
28
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
18
Even though personal expressions like these do have a reference to the one
who is listening, the expressions remain personal and cannot be assumed by
another. The target of the speaker is the situation in which the conversation
is focused. This means that every act of speaking is always directed towards
another. Ricoeur states that la parole prononce par lunestune parole
addresse a lautre, which means that every speech pronounced by someone
has its intention. It is spoken to or directed to someone else. This kind of
conversation is actually a response to a call from others.33 Thus, ethically
speaking, the personal affirmation of oneself is often also a request that has
not actually been voiced by the other.
Following this same train of thought, an ability can be identified by the
capacity of the subjective action. To understand an event which happens
in society, we need to investigate every subjective action. Often we hear a
subjective statement of someone, like this, I have done that thing or I
have already done it. This statement shows the capability of the subject to
make something happen. The person who does something always has a
certain reason for doing so, because each act or deed is always intentional.
The intention is the motive and main reason for every act and deed of a
person.
Moreover, the phenomenology of capability is investigated by Ricoeur in
light of the relationship between personal identity and the act of narration.
This can be known from the ability of a person to talk about him/herself in
the form of a narration. This capability gives a picture that personal identity
is projected as a narrative identity.34 Ricoeur notes that the narrative identity
gives access to an approach towards the ipse identity. This can been seen in
the dialectic connection between the two. Narration about self is first linked
with the narration of the visible signs which are permanent by nature. It is
seen in the biological identity, e.g., genetic code (finger prints), physiology,
voice, way of walking, skin color, type of hair, and also in things such as
talents, sports, life-plan, hobbies, interests, and the other personal identities.
This is unite narrative dune vie35 or the narrative unity of life which helps
to form the narrative identity of a person.
However, the narrative identity is never considered as a closed identity.
The narrative identity is always found in contrast with another. As a result,
the question of identity has two sides, a private one and a public one. The
story of a life always takes into account both the private and public sides. It is
Ibid., p. 99.
35
Ibid., p. 155.
33
34
19
the interaction between the life of self and the life of another. Consequently,
personal identity must be open, too, to the social or collective identity. An
individual memory, then, is always influenced by the collective memory.
Memory and Promise36

Recognition of self-identity takes into account two different time
situations. These two time situations are memory and promise. Memory is
about the past, while promise is about the future. The past and the future can
only be understood in the present.
For a memory of the past, we speak about the possibility of remembering.
Certainly, what is important in the capability of remembering is the problem
of how to actualize or make present the past in the here-and-now. In
making that actualization, I remember the past and at the same time I
make a promise for the future. However, actualization is never free of being
challenged. The main challenge for a memory is forgetfulness, while the
challenge for promise is betrayal. As a consequence, everyone must keep the
fire of consciousness burning so as not to fall into the trap of forgetfulness or
of betraying a promise. Ricoeur notes that to remember is to not forget; to
keep ones promise is not to break it.37
If memory is related to the capability to remember, then the most
important question is, what do I remember? Ricoeur answers this question
by arguing that remembering refers to the capability of recognizing shadows
of the past that are present like footprints. For example, a mental footprint
that is connected with some impressions, and also a footprint in the form of a
document or a public archive; but, what is most important is for the footprint
to be in the present situation, in the here and now. Consequently, it depends
upon the thought that makes it present, interprets it, and gives its special
identity. According to Ricoeur, the enemy of the memory is forgetfulness.
The memory has a task to be always active and to be careful not to fall into
the trap of forgetfulness.38
In the history of philosophy, memory is a classic problem. Memory
and remembering (anamnesis) are closely associated. However, the struggle
against forgetfulness is not the only activity of the memory to remember.
Memory is also connected with the length of time. The past and its distance
from the present usually raises the question since when? Here, we face the
Ibid., p. 110.
38
Ibid., p. 112.
36
37
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
20
paradox of temporal distance. The past is both what no longer is, and what
has been.39
Furthermore, a more important question can be raised regarding the
contribution of the past memory to the recognition of self-identity. Ricoeur
considers this question using Bergsons thought pattern about recognizing
images.40 Concerning recognizing images, Bergson investigates the meaning
of recognition as making present something that is actually not present.
However, this meaning of recognition can be seen in pictures or images.
Here, there is a kind of magic in recognition, when that recognition especially
touches on the enigma of la presence de la absence.41 If something comes
back to life in the memory, this happens because we have not experienced the
loss of that memory. The result of all of these is that we should be thankful.
We find again something and recognize it through a process of struggle in the
memory. Ricoeur states that reconnaitre un souvenir, cest le retrouver,42
which means that, for one to get a memory and affirm it as a real recognition,
one must be in the process of exerting great effort.
In the same fashion, finding again means valuing the memory as
something useful, even though sometimes that memory might not be
accepted. We always try to look for something, to find it again, and the end
result of this searching and finding is recognition. Here, the recognition of
past images and the recognition of oneself meet again when the memory
is active and creative. Returning to the past is retrospective, while looking
forward (to the future) is prospective. When both the retrospective and the
prospective interact in the present, then self-recognition is strengthened by
two important things, namely, ones past history and a commitment to the
future. The past as considered from the present is a memory, and the future
projected from the present is hope, while what is considered and grasped as
hic et nunc is an initiative.43
Memory and promise both face opposition from their enemies. The
enemy of memory is forgetfulness, and the enemy of promise is betrayal.
In the phenomenology of promise, Ricoeur looks for a way to explain this,
stressing the action by which the self or the individual holds fast to his/
Ibid., p. 113.
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York:
Zone Books, 1988), p. 123.
41
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., p. 127.
39
40
21
her commitment. This touches on the ability to make promises.44 If one

person says, I promise, that person effectively makes a commitment to
him/herself to do something in the future. Thus, to make a promise is to
commit oneself to do what the proposition says.45 This does not mean that
the most important thing for the one who makes the promise is to carry out
his/her obligation, in accord with the promise. More important is that the
commitment must be connected with the one to whom the promise is made.
The promise connects with the action of doing, and of giving something that
is good to the other.
Moreover, and possibly more importantly, even though a commitment is
directed towards a particular person, that commitment is not only restricted
by an expression of feelings, desires and emotions. It has a stronger connection
with an action of doing or giving something. For example, an answer to
the question What can a person promise? can only be faire oudonner,46
which means that the real commitment of a promise is an action of doing
or giving something. A person only promises to do something; he/she does
not promise feelings, intentions or personal desires. What is promised is an
action of love. A promise is connected with an act, and is not tied just to
feeling.
The strength of a promise is not found in the power of spoken words of
the promise. It is found in the actions that realize that promise. These actions
are connected with the ethical principle of Ricoeur: live well together and for
the other in a fair social structure.47 A promise has an ethical power because
it is related to living well, and living well is related to taking responsibility
for the other. Ricoeur argues that this responsibility must happen in the
framework of fair social structures. For this to happen, a person must be
faithful and constant to him/her in his/her promise.
There are some practical considerations for a promise to be regarded as
an ethical action. Firstly, the person who ideally makes a promise should not
promise too much. Secondly, we should change the order of priority of the
one who promises and the one who receives it. When a promise has been
given, the receiver must hold on to the words of the promise. This means
that the priority of the promise is in the hands of the one who receives it.
Thirdly, the duty of the one who makes a promise is to give an answer to the
expectation of the receiver, as this is a part of his/her responsibility. Thus,
Ibid., p. 129.
46
47
Paul Ricoeur, Soi-Mme Comme Un Autre, p. 202.
44
45
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
22
responsibility here is connected with the capability of a person to realize a

promise for the other. This is a part of social practice. Let us now look at the
connection between capability and social practice.
Capabilities and Social Practices

As we have previously examined, every person has the right to express
his/her individual capabilities. Right and capability are two important subjects
in connection with the complex matter of the social capability of a person.
What we want to investigate in this discussion is the right to express ones
capability, which is understood as the puissance de lagir48 or the ability
to do something in the context of social praxis. When we speak about the
power to act in the light of social praxis, we are unable to be free from all
the considerations of social justice. In the political structure, social justice
touches on the aspect of juridical justification regarding the rights of a person
in that social practice.
Moreover, what is meant by social praxis must be understood as
components of action in common.49 Through social practice, every person
shows who he/she is, and shows his/her position in society. Broadly speaking,
the components of a persons action can be understood as economic, social
and political activities. All these activities are a part of culture, as they
are related to the mental representation of humanity. This representation
happens collectively and is expressed through symbols. Likewise, this mental
representation reveals the bonds of society. For Ricoeur, the social bonds are
important because they come about via a process of accord or consensus, and
become the source of a common identity.
Ricoeur suggests that social capabilities find justification in the
combination of collective representation and social praxis. On one side, we
can only understand collective representation via the medium of symbols,
because each symbol represents the social identity of a society. On the other
side, we can only understand the role of a subject through social praxis which
is carried out in that society. The subject is the agent and the protagonist in
every social activity. Then, recognition and subjective identity can only be
collectively understood via social bonds and via forms of responsibility which
are carried out in community living. This is the same as what Ricoeur intends
when he uses the expression, reconnaissance et identities collectives.50

50
48
49
23
From the previous explanation, we have argued the connection between

recognition and identity. Now, this connection will be examined more fully
and concretely in light of the collective reconnaissance de responsabilit.51
This recognition requires clear categories such as the subject, law and justice.
The subject is connected with his/her rights. Law relates to the guarantee of
the certainty of life, while justice is an aspect of the ideals of life. These three
categories form a unity which cannot be divided in social practice. Ricoeur
discusses these three aspects in the context of civic rights (les droits civiques)
such as the right to express an opinion, the right to join others, and the right
of ownership.52 All these rights relate to the capabilities, the freedom and the
choice that a person has.
To clarify this, the view of Amartya Sen53 about the connection between
capabilities and rights is explored by Ricoeur as the basis of economic
behavior. This connection is discussed in the light of moral sensitivity as
the basic issue of economic behavior. In the society, a person does not live
only to fulfill his/her personal interest or desire. Le principe dutilite as an
economic principle is not the only principle in life. A person must live with
sentiments moraux, so that everything he/she does, especially in the sphere
of economic behavior, is always geared towards that which is called bienetre, a way of being that is right and appropriate.54
As a result, the question, How should a person live? is a question
from the economic and commercial world. This question relates to the
effort to elevate personal interests on the basis of the principle of use. As a
homo economicus, every person is an agent of his/her action. He/she has the
freedom to make choices in his/her life.55 However, it should be recognized
that freedom and choice in life are never free from collective responsibility.
Economic politics should ideally take note of the connection between the
rites and the motive of economic behavior of the individual, because this
connection forms an important part of ones capabilities. In his work,
Commodities and Capabilities,56 Sen focuses on the connection between
individual rights and capabilities in the light of collective responsibility.
To understand the connection between the rights of each individual and
capability, Sen proposes an evaluation of every situation. This evaluation
would be done so that we would find a new understanding about social
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 211.
53
Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985).
54
Ricoeur, Parcours de la Reconnaissance, pp. 209-211.
55
56
Sen, Commodities and Capabilities.
51
52
24
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
justice, where the freedom of choice of each individual could be placed in the
context of collective responsibility.
Mutual Recognition: Difference, Plurality

and Reciprocal Love
In the first chapter we have briefly examined Ricoeurs discourse about
recognition as a form of identification. The aim of identification is the
differentiation of things. In the second chapter, Ricoeur expands his discourse
on recognition as the recognition of identity. The recognition of identity is a
process of self-identification. This process is carried on broadly by looking at
capabilities as they are in the person of the subject. These are the capability of
acting (pouvoir faire), the capability of narrating a story (pouvoir raconteur),
and the capability of seeing the basis of personal actions that are wrong
(pouvoirs imputer lorigine de ses actions). Focusing on the phenomenology of
the capable person, we come to the conclusion that capability in Ricoeurs
philosophy is an important aspect of every act of recognition.
Then, in his third chapter, Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between
the reflective self and difference in the form of mutual recognition. The
connection between the two can be reciprocally seen in the relationship
of one another or, more appropriately, in the relationship between each
other. This relationship is mutual. We will first consider the category of the
relationship structure of one another in order to clearly understand the
contradiction that exists in that relationship in the form of rejection or in an
asymmetric way. Certainly, these things can all be spoken of in light of the
struggle for recognition.
Mutual recognition should be considered as a struggle to overcome a
misrecognition of another and, at the same time, a struggle of recognition
by another. This explanation comes from the discourse of Ricoeur on the
struggle for recognition in the philosophy of the young Hegel and the
thoughts of Axel Honneth about Hegel.
The first question is: What should be recognized? Certainly, an answer to
this question is not to be found in the essence of recognition itself, but in the
effort to find a way of negotiating the claims of recognition. In connection
with the question of what should be recognized, the study of Ricoeur in the
third part does not focus on finding an answer by just talking about the
essence of recognition itself. Ricoeur tries, rather, to find a creative approach,
in connection with negotiation of the claims of recognition. The way towards
negotiation is an openness to a pluralistic world view. An openness like
25
this can be a sign of an effort to maintain multiculturalism. However, in

connection with recognition, this effort is not automatically played out by
looking for foundations that are exclusively symmetric.
Asymmetry is a different possibility that could hinder a better
understanding of recognition in the midst of plurality. Ricoeur, with great
caution, states that recognition which is truer and greater should begin
with an awareness of false recognition which has a tendency to be avoided.
This awareness is claimed as a moral motivation. It is analyzed by Ricoeur
in his final work, and identified as having three important aspects: peace,
the exchange of gifts, and mutual recognition. In these three aspects,
recognition changes, taking the new form of gratitude. This is an expression
of thanksgiving towards another with all his/her differences. The virtue of
giving and receiving truly is something that is clearly recognized as a sign
of limitation of asymmetric recognition, which is always tied to a feeling of
peace and a willingness to give thanks.
The concept of asymmetric recognition is examined by Ricoeur when
contrasting both the personal comfort of the ego which tends to reduce
everything into its self-consciousness and other priorities such as the
heteronomic reality which stands alone.
However, the personal comfort of the ego can be considered as a tendency
of modern philosophic thought. Descartes is the founder of modern thought
who examines the personal comfort of the ego by proposing a categorical
difference between the internal reality in the subject as res cogitansthe
center of the knowledge of truth, and the external reality in the objects as
res extensathe object of knowledge. This category has a negative effect
on asymmetricism, in which there is no balanced relationship with the other.
In the light of the thoughts of Descartes, Ricoeur states that the meaning of
the other is constituted in the subject as res cogitans.57 The meaning of
the other is only an expression of the thoughts and feelings of myself as
the subject or as res cogitans. In other words, the other with all its identity
is only considered as my alter ego. Nevertheless, the consequence of this
view is that the other is no longer regarded as a heteronomic reality that is
transcendent, that cannot be totally understood or grasped. The other exists
as far as my thoughts and feelings extend, and can explain its existence. Here,
I, as the subject, together with the other as the object of my consciousness, do
not create a kind of communal affinity. To be similar to Descartes, Ricoeur
says, moi seul apparais, suis prsent which means I alone appear, I am the
57
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
26
only one who exists.58 As a consequence, my subjectivity forms a solipsistic

power within myself which is inherent, and which brings everything else into
the totality of myself.
To contrast with Descartes concept of asymmetricism, Ricoeur tries to
investigate the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. According to him, Levinas
is the most well-known French philosopher who radically examines the
asymmetric relationship between the subject as the totality of ego and the
other as the alterity of the Infinite reality. On the word of Levinas, the other
as the alterity of the infinite is metaphorically present in the epiphany of the
face. The epiphany of the face is the representation of the transcendence which
cannot be destructed and its epiphany refuses the possession of ones power.
For Levinas, the epiphany of the face is an ethical happening which disturbs
the totality of ones subjectivity.59 The other, with all of his/her differences,
asks for justice. The epiphany of the face in the figures of the poor, the orphans,
the widows is saying something. At least its face says that he/she is present
before me, and saying, This is me! Please do not kill me! Justice comes
about if I hear the voice of the other according to his/her differences. Justice
happens when I give him/her space to express his/her differences. Justice
relates to respect and a response to the other, taking into account his/her
differences. In this sense, Ricoeur believes that justice is essentially linked to
the comparison of things that are not compared.60 Justice does not happen
in asymmetric relationship. Justice happens in an asymmetric relationship
where the true heteronomy of the other is really acknowledged, accepted and
even regarded as a field of ethics to be approached with responsibility. In the
view of Levinas, Ricoeur affirms that there is a reciprocal recognition, but
what is attractive about this is that recognition is asymmetric.
The Struggle and the Politics of Recognition

Ricoeurs examination of recognition goes further towards discussing
the views of political philosophers such as Hobbes, Hegel, Axel Honneth and
Charles Taylor.
Firstly, the view of Hobbes about recognition is implied in his political
philosophy about the nation as an artificial body. In his study on Hobbes
Political Philosophy, Alan Ryan notes that nation as an artificial body is
formed with two purposes. Foremost, a nation is centered upon the living
and conservation of life, controlling the instinct to general warfare. Next,
Emmanuel Levinas, Totalit et Infiniti (Paris: Kluwer Accademic, 1971), p. 215.
60
58
59
27
the nation is geared towards justice as the result of universal consensus. These
two aspects are intended to give birth to a social agreement. Through this
social agreement, everyone can recognize each other, and be unified with a
strength that is undivided and absolute.61 Different from Hobbes, Ricoeur
claims that Hobbes does not take into consideration or has forgotten the
dimension of difference.62
Secondly, recognition in the political philosophy of Hegel is discussed by
Ricoeur in connection with the concept of Anerkennung which appeared in
the writings of the young Hegel from 1801 to 1807.63 Recognition is seen as
the way to overcome conflict between a master and a slave. Such a conflict can
be overcome if people recognize each other in a mutual way and organize the
nation as a political institution to legitimize this recognition. The legitimation
of recognition like this is beneficial both for the relationship between people
among themselves, and also between nations with each other. Hegel says,
Just as an individual person will not become real without a connection with
another, so too a nation will not be truly an autonomous and independent
state if it is not connected with other nations.64
According to Hegel, the legitimation of the person/individual status and
the status of the nation is affirmed by the recognition of the other. This kind
of recognition takes into account a guarantee of recognizing the other, so
that the relationship between individuals and each other does not fall into an
indifferent correlation. A relationship where there is true recognition is one
that is mutual and reciprocal.
Thirdly, Axel Honneth reconstructs the philosophy of the young Hegel,
using three modes of the struggle for intersubjective recognition. These three
modes are: foremost, the need or, as he more strongly says, the demand of
love. Love influences every aspect of human life, both in connection with
the erotic and with friendship, and also in connection with family life. In
this context, love is an expression of reciprocal recognition. In love, there is
recognition, because subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to
their concrete needs and thereby recognize each other as needy creatures.65
Love is the basic and fundamental human need, because love gives birth to
Alan Ryan, Hobbes Political Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes,
ed. Tom Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 208-245.
62
63
Ibid., pp. 253-272.
64
Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde (New York: Prometheus
Books, 1996), p. 337.
65
Axel Honneth, The Struggle of Recognition, p. 189.
61
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28
self-confidence needed for mutual recognition. A relationship of love is the

basis of ones personal identity. This relationship grows in a dialectic way.
At first, there is the maternal affective dependence of a child on its mother.
Then, there is the stage of the independence and personal maturity of the
teenager in his/her broader relationships with other friends. Next, comes the
stage of adulthood which is reached through a variety of ways of socializing
with different people. Thus, love is the basic ethical structure of a human
being. The legitimization which brings order to the intimacy of love is the
individuals recognition of a personal need. For Honneth, negating love is a
form of self-punishment. Affirming love, however, is the ethical way of living,
recognizing and receiving the other. This way is legitimized by marriage.
Next, recognition juridically relates to the need for the right to be
recognized as a person who is independent, free and equal. This need
emphasizes that everyone, based on who they are, has the freedom and a basic
right to his/her own self-respect. Self-respect needs to be fittingly recognized
by others. This is to be said the legal recognition, because it is linked with
the situation in which the person and the other mutually respect each other.
The first reason for mutual respect is that both parties need to be conscious
of the social norms through which rights and responsibilities (civil, political
and social) in the community are guaranteed. Based on the legal principle of
equality, everyone is equal according to the law.
Then, recognition is a form of social esteem (lestime sociale).66 The selfesteem of each person can be placed in the frame-work of the social approval
of others. This frame-work of social approval presumes that there is a
communal solidarity which is integrated through a complex social system
involving various communication activities, for example, in the socioeconomic field such as the system of technology, the monitory and fiscal
system. This complexity is also evident in the socio-political field, where
we see bureaucracy, legal choices and consideration of public opinion. We
also see it in the socio-cultural sphere, for example, in mass-media which
can have a negative effect on social development, and also in knowledge
which can be viewed from an organizational and institutional angle.67 Social
approval needs to take into account the principle of responsibility for the
plurality of life values, while maintaining the capability to listen to and to
value differences.

Ibid., p. 203.
66
67
29
Furthermore, a mutual relationship does not automatically guarantee that

mutual recognition has actually reached the zenith of its truth. Love between
people and the struggle to recognize that love are never free from conflict and
challenge. So, too, the struggle for recognition in the face of human dignity
at the juridical-constitutional level does not always provide the last word
in the argumentation. In addition, the view of the status of humanity does
not automatically provide a guarantee for that mutual recognition. This is
because some are blind to differences.68 To cure this blindness, there must
be cooperation from all concerned.
Fourth, in the bigger picture, in connection with the life of the individual,
the family and all forms of social groupings, a test of the identity and a
challenge to recognition always come from non-recognition and misrecognition.
This challenge is investigated by Charles Taylor as being an essential part of
the politics of recognition. Therefore, as quoted by Baghi, it is the right
of every historic and cultural group that possesses an individual identity,
especially in the context of a pluralist and multicultural society,69 to be
recognized in a political way. Recognition like this is based on the existential
consideration that every person or social group must have the right to be
him/her/itself. Taylor stresses that the connection cannot be broken between
identity and recognition as a way to understand authentic ethics as a struggle
which is communitarian. He says, Our identities are formed in dialogue
with the other, in agreement with them or through struggling together that
they might recognize us.70 This means that our identity depends upon a
dialogical relationship with the other, because a dialogical relationship is an
aspect of recognition, and a way of living in a democratic community.
For Taylor, a dialogical way of life can happen only if the following three
ethical conditions are present: Firstly, there is a bond of loyal friendship.
Secondly, there is active participation in all socio-political processes. Thirdly,
there is mutual respect. These three conditions strengthen the need for and
determination of recognition. The need for recognition is a vital human
need.71 It is this need that brings Taylor to the conclusion that human
identity is truly formed dialogically through relationships and in actual
dialogue with the other. Because of this, the job of politics is to prepare a
Ibid., p. 214.
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition. Cited in Felix Baghi, ed.,
Kewarganegaraan Demokratis Dalam Sorotan Filsafat politik (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero,
2009), p. 443.
70
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1992), p. 45.
71
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, p. 26.
68
69
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
30
space for public deliberation, so that all kinds of identities can be shared
together in a democratic society. Self-identity, as a central part of authentic
ethics, can live and become visible if it is supported by a democratic society
that is deliberative.
Therefore, according to Taylor, the ethics of authenticity do not speak
about recognition of self-identity in a passive way, closed or already stable in
its own world. The ethics of authenticity,
takes into account creativity, constructivity and original
discoveries, which are often in opposition to the regulations of
society, and which potentially can challenge what has already
been acknowledged as morality... Authenticity relates to an
openness to many different boundaries.72
In brief, having a personal boundary is an authentic means to be always

open to the other people or other situation. It means to be self-referential.73
In addition, Taylor also stated that to grasp the resonance of meaning in
the great jungle of symbols, the authentic self should always be open. We
do not need to see ourselves as though we are a packet of something instant,
that we can use raw material for our projects. We must see ourselves as parts
of a broader social structure which has certain claims on us. Because of this,
To value who we are, we must know how we have become what we are, and
where our future lies.74
We understand ourselves as having roles in the narrative of a long journey
of life. In that narrative, as suggested by Taylor, we show who we are via
what we achieve, using a story that we have etched in our lives. We know
where we are through our recognition of mix of a variety of important events
in the past, and how these came about in our lives.75 These all influence the
way we understand ourselves.
Often, these ways change us, and change always has a connection with
the way we understand the other. Taylor is right when, at the end of his
reflection, he states that there is no understanding of the other, without
a changed understanding of self.76 Every self-understanding and real selfCharles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 66.
Ibid., p. 82.
74
Ibid., p. 89.
75
Charles Taylor, The Source of the Self, the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 47.
76
Ibid., p. 37.
72
73
31
knowledge always demand a price. That price can be detrimental to ones

health and it can make one sad. There can be a feeling of loss, and there can
be suffering. When facing the other, all our self-worth can be thrown into
question. This cannot be stopped by anyone. It is best for us to be constant in
our openness.77 Taylor attempts to clarify the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer
about the meaning of self-existence, which is always connected with the
other, including those things which challenge or oppose the self. Gadamer
says that openness to the other involves recognizing that I myself must
accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me
to do so.78 We cannot see the value of oneself in isolation from the presence
of the other. The presence of the other can enrich our understanding or
meaning of oneself. We should be open to every kind of presence, so that we
can understand and receive every aspect of humanity, both those in the other
as well as those in oneself. To quote Charles Taylor, life in the modern social
imaginaries is a continuous conversation.79
Mutual Recognition: Agape, the Paradox of Giving,

and the Logic of Reciprocity
The struggle for mutual recognition follows a lengthy road. That way
goes through a process of meeting with the world of human experience
which is constructed along juridical constitutional lines in a commercial
exchange. This road, for Ricoeur, is followed by states of peace (les etats de
paix).80 However, this is not without obstacles, for example, in connection
with agape. This concept appears to connect with mutual recognition. Agape
stresses the aspect of pure and genuine giving, giving without demand for a
return of any kind. While mutual recognition presumes a logic of reciprocity
in each gift, agape less expects an equivalency in giving, as it absolutely has
no interest in comparisons and calculations.81 A test of agape becomes
clearer when we speak about our concrete relationship with our neighbors.
This connection is not only restricted to love in the form of agape, because
love/agape is the form of giving without expectation of a return and is best
spoken of in the light of the dialectic of love and justice.82
Ibid.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshal (New York: Continuum, 1989), p. 361.
79
Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections, Selected Essays (Cambridge & London,
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 35.
80
81
82
Ibid., p. 223.
77
78
Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33
32
Justice is less forged in an act of pure and true love, or in a gift without
return. Justice is connected with the equality of a relationship, where the
relationship is expressed through a commercial agreement. According to the
law of the market economy, everything has a value and a price, when it is
in the logical framework of reciprocity. The rules of the logic of reciprocity
are found in the obligation to give (donner), to receive (recevoir) and to give
in return (rendre).83 What becomes a problem is whether giving something
back is truly an obligation, why someone must give something back. In fact,
someone gives something back because he/she is still tied to the first act of
giving (premier don).
In his investigation, Ricoeur urges us to move towards resolving the
issue of giving in return. He suggests that we should go further towards
giving without return as a recognition of the generosity of the giver. This
recognition has as its starting point, an answer to the request which comes
from the goodness of the heart of the one who initially gives,84 which is
clearly expressed in an attitude of gratitude. Gratitude is something genuine
and noble that comes forth expressing the thankfulness of the heart to the
giver. Because of this, giving, receiving and giving back, should exist in an
atmosphere of thanksgiving, as a single expression of recognition that has no
limits.
Conclusion
The way of recognition is a long one. This long way goes alongside the
struggle for recognition that will never end. Ricoeur notes that the struggle
for recognition remains without a final boundary.85 This struggle also
acknowledges the dialectic between recognition and misrecognition or nonrecognition. First, in the process of identifying something by making clear
distinctions, the subject claims himself to be the one who gives meaning to
the truth of knowledge. He then moves towards a process of recognizing his
self-identity with the ability to talk, to act, to tell stories, and to be faithful to
his commitment as a morally responsible subject. The person finally reaches
a level at which he opens himself and has the wisdom to recognize the other
mutually in a reciprocal ethical action.
Ibid., p. 328.
Ibid., p. 243.
85
Ibid., p. 255.
83
84
33
A long way of recognition like this is less easily followed without

obstacles. Recognition inherently bears in itself what is called misrecognition.
This especially happens when, in making a recognition, a person forgets or
just takes little account of the asymmetric and heteronomic aspect, by only
stressing mutual values and the reciprocal relationship with the other.
It would be good to come back to the ethical aspect of accepting, in
view of the presence of the other as a gift. In giving, the other, with all his/
her differences, is a form of blessing which can also bring grace. Considering
this, we should remember the other with an attitude of gratitude, with sincere
thanks, because he/she is a blessing of loving goodness.
To conclude his discourse on the ways of recognition, Ricoeur quoted
Montaigne in the epilogue about the connection between love and friendship.
This remarkably reminds us that,
In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each
other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them
and cannot find it again. If you press me to tell why I love him, I
feel that it cannot be expressed, except by answering: because it
was he, because it was I.86
Because of this, each person, in front of the other, can feel new and can
regard oneself as another.
86
Montaigne, Les Essais (Paris: PUF, 1965). Cited in Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition,
p. 263.
Between Hope and Death:

Jobs Death-Wish in 6:8-13
RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD

4120 Tagaytay City, Philippines
Its a fact that we will know,

a truth wherever we go;
the sun in the afternoon
will be setting very soon.
Says the man, already old,
thinking of life after death:
When I leave, it will be nice.
I will whistle, I will yell
on the highest mountain peaks.
Yes, one day I will be glad;
I will see my wife again!
Many things well have to say!
Then I won't want to come back.
(Ambahan 247, Hanunuo-Mangyan)
mong the texts that are pointed out as Jobs expression of a deathwish (3:11, 21-22; 7:8-10,15, 20-21;10:1,18-19; 14:13; and 17:1316), the selected pericope stands out as paradigmatic. It belongs to
Jobs first speech in the first cycle of disputation although that speech is the
second for the hero. It is chosen precisely due to the language of hope used
in this section: !TeyI-ymi in v. 8a which connotes a strong future wish capable
of fulfillment equivalent to the Latin optative marker utinam (would
that); the substantive hw"q.Ti (hope) v. 8b; and the verbal root lxy in piel
(to wait, await) in v. 11a. This section appears to be Jobs response to
Eliphazs speech 4:2-6 as indicated by the presence of the noun hw"q.Ti (4:6
and 6:8). At the onset one can already perceive Jobs initial understanding
of hope as substantially different from that of his three interlocutors.
R. C. Flores, Between Hope and Death
35
Delimitation and Structure of

the Second Speech of Job (Job 67)
This is Jobs second speech, the first one being in chapter 3. In the first
round of speeches, Eliphazs speech is presented as a response to that speech
(cf. 4:1 Then Eliphaz the Temanite answered [ hn[ in piel]). With around
385 words, the second speech is long (Eliphazs first speech has 255 words).
The medieval division into two chapters makes sense therefore, and there
could be structural reasons why the speech was split into unequal parts
chapter 6 = 214 words and chapter 7 = 171 words. It appears that the division
is signaled by the grammatical change of number and person. Towards the
end of chapter 6, Job is clearly addressing his friends (e.g., ~k,ynEP., v. 28) but
at the beginning of chapter 7, it suddenly becomes like a monologue opened
by the particle al{h] (v. 1) with a series of the first person sing. suff. As Habel
suggests, chapter 6 is a kind of indictment of the friends while chapter 7 is a
lament addressed to God.1
The problem of the suggestion above is that it is only towards the later
part of chapter 6 that there is a clear address to friends (e.g., ~t,yyIh/ hT'[;-yKi,
v. 21a) and the previous verses would sound like a monologue with the use of
the suffix of the first person singular. It is best then to divide this long speech
into three poems: 6:2-13, monologue; 6:14-30, dialogue; 7:1-21, monologue.2
The speech is embraced so to say by Jobs soliloquy. The first monologue
which has the theme of Jobs hope can be further subdivided into two parts:
vv. 2-7 which is Jobs introductory description of his present condition while
vv. 8-13 is on his hope itself.3
The dialogue with the friends in 6:14-30 falls also into two parts. First is
vv. 14-21 which appears to be Jobs description or even complaint of the kind
of friendship that these are showing him. It concludes in v. 21 with a tough
and unfriendly remark couched in an ironic play on words: For now you
have become nothing,4 you see terror [tir] but you are afraid [wattr] (v.
1
Norman H. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary, OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1985), p. 141.
2
Cf. Samuel Terrien, Job, CAT 13 (Paris: Delachaux et Niestle, 1963), p. 79.
3
See Habel (The Book of Job, 145) who discerns a chiasmus in both parts.
4
For nothing as translation, MT has two readings: (1) the Western Masoretes have a
preposition with 3d pers. suff. wl (so it is qere), and (2) the Eastern Masoretes who have the
negative particle al followed by the Targum. OG and Syriac seem to read a 1st pers. suff.
yl. BHS proposes to correct to la;l. which according to Alonso SchkelSicre Diaz (Luis
Alonso Schkel and Jos. L. Sicre Diaz, Giobbe; comment theologico e letterario, trans. G.
36
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
21). Second is vv. 22-30 which shows a much more mellowed Job who makes
a friendly appeal to the threeto make their faces look at him ( lay in
hifil, v. 30) and turn to him ( bwv, 2x in v. 31).
The final and longer monologue in 7:1-21 can be divided into two parts.
First is vv. 1-8 which acts like an exordium or introduction whose theme is
Jobs emotional description of his depressed condition;5 it ends with Jobs wish
to be no more ( yNIn<yaew>, v. 8). Second is vv. 9-21 which is also a description
of such a condition but in cosmic terms (e.g., clouds, v. 9a; ym, Sea and
the tannn, v. 12).6 Similarly, it concludes with Job being no more ( yNIn<yaew>,
v. 21). The design of the speech then may be outlined this way:
I. Jobs Soliloquy (6:2-13)

A. Introduction (vv. 2-7)

B. Jobs Hope (vv. 8-13)
II. Jobs Colloquy (6:14-30)

A. Complaint against Friendship (vv. 14-21)

B. Appeal to Friendship (vv. 22-30)
III. Jobs Soliloquy (7:1-21)

A. His Condition in Emotional Terms (vv. 1-8)

B. His Condition in Cosmic Terms (vv. 9-21)
The Text: Job 6:8-13

Translation
v. 8 Would that my wish may come true,
Borgonovo, Commenti biblici [Roma: Borla, 1985], p. 173) is superfluous. The preference
for the Eastern reading (although the negative particle with a substantive sense, i.e., al as
nothing is unusual, cf. David Clines (Job 1-20, WBC 17 [Waco, TX: Word Books, 1989],
p. 161), is supported by Targum, cf. Alonso SchkelSicre Diaz (Giobbe; comment theologico
e letterario, p. 173) and John E. Hartley, The Book of Job, NICOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.
B. Eerdmans, 1988), p. 137.
5
John E. Course (Speech and Response: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Introductions to the
Speeches of the Book of Job (Chaps. 4-24), CBQMS 25 [Washington: CBAA, 1994], p. 41)
considers this as introduction to the second part of Jobs response to Eliphaz and divides
it into three parts: (1) vv. 1-2 which is a wisdom saying; (2) vv. 3-6, description of Jobs
distress; and (3) vv. 7-8, a taunt.
6
Yam (or Yamm) and Tannin (or Tunnan) are primordial deities in the Ugaritic Baal
Cycle, see e.g., KTU 1.1 III 15 and KTU 1.3 III 40, respectively. See also Ps 74:13-14 where
Yam [Sea], Taninim [Dragons, NRSV], and another primordial creature, Leviathan, are
mentioned together.
37

And Eloah may grant my hope
v. 9 May Eloah decide to crush me;

And free his hand to sever me.
v. 10 This is still my consolation

Let me jump in its luxury sparing nothing,

For I would not hide my case from a holy one.
v. 11 What is my strength that I should wait?

What is my limit that I should prolong my existence?
v. 12 Is my strength the strength of stones?

Or is my flesh, a bronze?
v. 13 Surely, my liberation is not in me,

And victory is cut off from me.
Philological Analysis of Job 6:8-13

H;Ala/ !TEyI ytiw"q.tiw> ytil'a/v, aAbT' !TeyI-ymi (6:8)
Would that my wish may come true,
And Eloah may grant my hope.7
ytiw"q.tiw>, my hope
LXX reads th n. e lv pi,d a though the Aquila version has u p` omonh n, ,
patience. Vulgate translates, quod expecto, that which I look for. Targum
gives yrbs, similarly, Syriac yrbs and both mean my hope. Some early
commentaries emend ytiw"q.ti to ytiw"a]t; based on Prov 10:24 where the verb !tn
also occurs !TEyI ~yqIyDIc; tw:a]t;w>, and the desire of the righteous be granted.8
However, Dhorme finds it unnecessary since that word-pair ( hw"q.ti and !tn),
also occurs in Jer 29:11c ( hw"q.tiw> tyrIx]a; ~k,l' ttel', to give you a future and a
hope).9 The word-pair ytn//ytn is common in Ugaritic and Hebrew.10
All translations of the biblical texts are the authors unless stated otherwise.
S. R. Driver and G. B. Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job
Together with a New Translation, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1921), p. 37.
9
E. P. Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. H. Knight (Nashville, Cambden
and New York: Thomas Nelson, 1967), p. 81.
10
Dahood, Ugaritic-Hebrew Parallel Pairs, in Ras Shamra Parallels, vols. 1, 2, AnOr
49 and 50, ed. L. Fisher (Rome: PIB, 1972, 1975), p. 264; Anthony R. Ceresko, Job 29-31
in the Light of Northwest Semitic, BibOr 36 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1980), p. 166;
and Michel, Job in the Light of Northwest Semitic, BibOr 42 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press,
7
8
38
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
H;Ala/, Eloah
The form of this divine name is attested in the common Semitic root
for god, il- and lh could be derived from its secondary form, ilh. In
Ugaritic, Hebrew and Arabic (Allah from al-ilhu, the god), the form
is used as a divine name, e.g., Elohim, the name Eloah being a shortened
form.11 In the Hebrew Bible, this divine name occurs mostly in Job, 41 times
to be exact, and second most popular among the six names for God that
occur in the book ( lae 55x; yD:v; 31x; hwhy 29x; ~yhil{a/ 14x; and ~yhil{a/h' 3x).12
It is best then to preserve the untranslated form, i.e., Eloah, so as to highlight
its peculiar usage in the book.
ynI[EC.b;ywI Ady" rTEy: ynIaEK.d:ywI H:Ala/ laeyOw (6:9)

May Eloah decide to crush me;
And free his hand to sever me.
laeyOw>, May [Eloah] decide

The verb laeyO, hifil jussive lay is a semi-auxiliary verb and so the
second verb ynIaEK.d:ywI is an object clause.13 In this case the verb has the sense
to decide, be prepared to.14 Dhorme observes that Syriac sypj tnw, and
that he would devise reflects this sense, rather than OG a vrxa m, enoj; Targum
yrvw; or Vulgate et qui coepitthe three takes lay, to begin.15
ynIaEK.d:ywI, to crush me
As stated above, the wayyiqtol + suff. can also function as an object
clause (to crush me instead of and he crushed me). The verb ynIaEK.d:ywI
( akd in piel, to crush, pound, pulverize) is attested in the Ugaritic d-k(k);16 and in Akkadian dku, dukk/qquk/qu.17 In a Hebrew inscription written
1987), p. 136.
11
See D. Pardee, Eloah hla, in Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible, 2d ed,
p. 285.
12
See the statistics in Driver-Gray I, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book
of Job, xxxv; and the table in Samuel Balentine, Job, Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary
(Macon, Georgia: Smyth & Helwys, 2006), p. 93.
13
Cf. GKC 120g; Joon-Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew (Rome, PIB, 2006),
177c&d.
14
Cf. HALOT, 1: 381.
15
Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, p. 81.
16
Cf. DULAT, 1: 269.
17
Cf. AHw 151f., 162; see also HALOT, 1: 216 and 221.
39
in Phoenician script found at Kuntillet Arjd (KAjr 15), the verb wydkn
dkh (//dk // dwk) is used in the context of the deity marching like a divine
warrior as nature convulses.18
rTEy:, free
The meaning of rTEy: rtn is uncertain as well as the expression Ady" rTEy:
which is hapax. Dhorme suggests the sense of detach, untie, free (e.g., Isa
58:6, hj'Am tADgUa] rTEh;),, to set free the bonds of yoke) hence, that he
would free his hand.19 Gray tries to take it from the Arabic natara, to tear
away, drag violently20 (cf. NEB: snatch me away with his hand). Dahood
parses rTEy: to be an infixed -t- form of the root hry, to show, point out,
throw, shoot and so he translates: should he point his hand.21 The image
portrayed in this colon seems to be about weaving as indicated by the sense
of the next verb [cb, to cut off i.e., to sever woven part from the threads
of the woof.22 Dhormes suggestion appears to make better sense, i.e., rTEy
can connote the freeing of the hand to sever the last thread from a woven
material.23
lAmx.y: al{ hl'yxib. hd"L.s;a]w: ytim'x'n< dA[ yhit.W

vAdq' yrEm.ai yTid>x;ki al{-yKi (6:10)
This is still my consolation
Let me jump in its luxury sparing nothing;
For I would not hide my case from a holy one.
See F. W. Dobbs-Allsopp et al., Hebrew Inscriptions: Texts from the Biblical Period of
the Monarchy with Concordance (New Haven London: Yale University Press, 2005), pp.
287-88.
19
Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, 81. Other cases mentioned by Dhorme are
in Pss 105:20 and 46:7.
20
G. R. Driver, Difficult Words in the Hebrew Prophets, in Studies in Old Testament
Prophecy Presented to Professor Theodore H. Robinson, ed. H. H. Rowley (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1950), pp. 70-71. HALOT (1: 736) suggests in I rtn the meaning to loose but with
a question mark.
21
M. Dahood, Ugaritic and Phoenician or Qumran and the Versions, in Orient and
Occident: C. H. Gordon Festschrift, ed. H. A. Hoffener, AOAT 22 (Neukirchen-Vluyn:
Neukirchener Verlag, 1973), p. 55.
22
See HALOT, 1: 147-48; also TDOT, 2: 206-7; M. Pope ( Job, 3d ed., AB 15 [Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1973], p. 52) relates this verb to Job 4:21, 7:6, 27:8; Isa 38:12. See also
G. Dalman (Arbeit und Sitte in Palstina: Webstoff, Spinnen, Weben, Kleidung [Gtersloh:
Druck von C. Bertelsmann, 1937], pp. 123-24) who considers this as a technical term in the
weaving of carpets, i.e., in cutting off a woven material from the thread.
23
For contra, see Clines ( Job 1-20, p. 59) but does not provide argument for his objection.
18
40
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
dA[, still
Due to the stirring difficulty of this verse (e.g., the interesting translation
of LXX; and the suspension of Hebrew parallelism with three cola), modern
translations simply ignore dA[ or add the demonstrative pronoun this (e.g.,
This would be my consolation, NRSV). The translation of Targum ( ad),
Vulgate (haec), and Saadiah actually reflect this sense, i.e., Heb. tazO as in
Ps 119:50 ( ytim'x'n< tazO, This is my comfort). Negatively, the ancient versions
could have made adjustments due to this text occurring in the psalm.24
Positively however, it is probably an interpretation of the meaning of MT
dA[ which is a lectio difficilior. The use of still functions to connect what
Job says earlier on, i.e., his wish in chapter 3 which is still a valid hope until
now.25
hd"L.s;a]w:, let me jump

The word hd"L.s;a]w:, piel cohortative dls is hapax. There is a Ugaritic
toponym s/ld (KTU 9.388) and it is suggested to be related to the personal
name dl,s,, Seled in 1 Chr 2:30 but no meaning is given.26 The ancient
versions betray the difficulty of translating this word: LXX has ei h; de , mou
po l, ij ta ,foj e vfV h -j e pv i. teice ,wn h l` lo m, hn, Let the grave be my city, upon
the walls of which I have leaped.27 It probably reads ry[I for dA[ and Hl'yxe
his wall for hl'yxi.28 Aquilla and Theodotion have a different reading: kai.
e s' tai e t' i para k, lhsi,j mou, hence, closer to the MT and similar to Targum:
atytrb [wbaw ytmwxnt ad ahtw, And this would be my consolation, and I
would rejoice with trembling.29 In short, OG and Targum read MT dls as
to leap and to rejoice respectively. Syriac has almtva lmtva , an ethpaal:
I will be perfected.
Alonso SchkelSicre Diaz list five opinions from different modern
commentators,30 which can be reduced to three: (1) from the Arabic alada,
Cf. Driver-Gray II, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job, p. 37.
Similarly Clines (Job 1-20, p. 159) observes, still. . . points to consolation that Job
presently has and would continue to have if God would proceed to cut him off.
26
Cited in L. Grabbe, Comparative Philology and the Text of Job: A Study in Methodology,
SBLDS 34 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 47, see also p. 137. See also ld in KTU
4.303 3; 4.621 15; and sld in KTU 4.783 6.
27
Italics supplied.
28
29
Italics supplied.
30
Alonso SchkelSicre Diaz, Giobbe: commento biblico e letterario, pp. 173-74.
24
25
41
to be hard or apada, to exult but this suggestion is problematic since

the Arabic sad is phonetically different from the Hebrew samekh s;31 (2)
from Mishnaic Hebrew dls, to burn, but the meaning seems not fit in
the contextthe same word can have the nuance to recoil, jump back,
as in the line hyrwxal tdlws wvpn his soul recoils in Peshiqta Beshallah
(103a);32 and (3) to exult, emending hd"L.s;a]w: to hz"L.s;a]w: or hs"L.s;a]w:, I will
exult.33 Without having to recourse to radical emendation of MT, the best
suggestion (pro tempore) is to take its meaning from Mishnaic Hebrew (no.
2) supported by LXX reading.34
hl'yxib., in its luxury

The word hl'yxib. is another problem herethe form is fem. while the
verb is masc. It could be the fem. form of either lyxi, anguish, pain (e.g.,
unrelenting pain, NRSV); or lyIx;, force or wealth as in Syriac; but both
forms are hapax in the Hebrew Bible. It is possible though to have a feminine
subject with a masculine verb as predicate.35
We suggest to consider the final h as 3d personal feminine suffix without
the usual mappiq and refers to hm'x'n<, consolation (noun fem.) in v. 10a.
Since the language is that of jumping, i.e., rejoicing (though an irony), it
points to the sense of lyIx; as force, wealth; so our translation, in its luxury,
i.e., in the luxury of the said consolation.
lAmx.y: al{, sparing nothing

Literally, the expression should be, he/it will not have compassion or
he/it will not spare.36 In most cases, according to Clines, the verb lmx, to
comfort or to spare has an explicit subject, thus his translation, pain in
31
Driver-Gray II, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job, p. 38; also
Robert Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation and Special Notes, Moreshet 2
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1978), p. 72; and Grabbe, Comparative Philology
and the Text of Job, pp. 46-47.
32
Cited Gordis, The Book of Job, p. 72; see also M. Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim,
the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (New York: Pardes Publishing
House, 1950), p. 993.
33
As proposed by Driver-Gray II, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of
Job, pp. 38-39; see also BHS.
34
See HALOT, 1: 756.
35
Cf. GKC 145o.
36
HALOT, 1: 328.
42
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
which he (?God, one) [sic] spares not.37 In fact such problem is minimized
by Targum by attaching a conjunction waw before the negative particle, i.e.,
ay[yvr l[ swxy alw, and he will not have pity on the wicked. According
to de Rossi, there are many MSS that have lwmxy alw.38 In the same plane is
the suggestion to treat the final h in hl'yxib as the interrogative particle and
joined with al, hence lAmx.y: al{h;, Does he [God] not spare?39 This change,
however, seems to disregard Jobs earlier violent wish (v. 9) and even produces
an awkward additional colon.40
Against Clines suggestion, we need to point out that in some occurrences
of the verb lmx, it has an adverbial or impersonal function (e.g., Hab 1:17b
lAmx.y: al{ ~yIAG groh]l,; to destroy nations without mercy).41 Concerning the
Targum, it seems it is trying to smoothen out the difficulty (a case of lectio
facilior) influenced by Job 16:13 and 27:22.42
yTid>x;ki al{, I would not hide

Some commentators suggest the root dxk (hide, conceal in piel) to
mean to deny as it makes better sense for this verse. Job is claimed to be
defending his innocence here. The suggestion is based on the versions: LXX
(e yv eusa m, hn from yeu d, omain, to lie); Vulgate (contradicam); Syriac tlgd
(lgd pael), to put to shame, to deny; and Ethiopic keeda to deny (faith),
to apostatise.43 Targum, however, has ytyskysk, in piel to conceal and
does not use the root dxk which in Palestinian Aramaic means to withhold,
deny in piel.44 This meaning of the root dxk, to conceal in piel is fairly
consistent throughout the Hebrew Bible.45
Clines, Job 1-20, p. 169.

De Rossi, Variae Lectiones Veteris Testamenti ex Immensa MSS IV (Tifograpfia Regia:
Parma, 1784), p. 105.
39
Michel, Job in the Light of Northwest Semitic, p. 138; also M. Mers, A Note on Job VI
10, VT 32 (1982), pp. 234-36.
40
See the objections of Clines ( Job 1-20, p. 159) and Habel (The Book of Job, p. 140).
41
For other occurrences, see Isa 30:14 and Lam 2:2; see also C. Brockelmann, Hebrische
Syntax (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1956), 139a.
42
Job 16:13 and 27:22 both read lAmx.y: al{w>, and he [God] shows no mercy; for the
second example, the subject is impersonal, i.e., it.
43
See Gordis, The Book of Job, p. 72; Clines, Job 1-20, p. 159; and HALOT, 1: 469.
44
See Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, p. 628.
45
See HALOT, 1: 469.
37
38
43
yrEm.ai, my case
Most modern translations and commentaries read with the MT pointing
as plural construct state (e.g., words of, NRSV; yrEm.airm,ae word, thing,
matter). In the Book of Job whenever this construct form appears it is always
with maqqep (e.g., rv,yO-yrEm.ai, lit. words of honesty in 6:25; likewise, 8:2;
23:12). This may indicate that we are not to treat this as in construct with
the following nominal adjective, vAdq'. MT can be repointed to yrim.ai, my
word (cf. yrIm.a' in 9:27 and yr_"m'a], pausal, in 33:3). It forms a good parallel
with ytim'x'n<, my consolation in v. 10a.
vAdq', [from] a holy one

Early commentaries, notably from the German side, consider this last
colon, i.e., v. 10c as superfluous and thus to be considered a gloss.46 Three
reasons are pointed out: (1) the word, vAdq as divine title (Holy One)
is unlikely in Job as this is the only time this expression is used; (2) the
presence of a third colon is sudden and destroys the flow of a two-colon
parallel poetry; (3) as to the content, what is the point of Job saying he does
not hide the words of God when he is not being accused of that anyway? The
complaint of these scholars is not without a reasonable basis. Most modern
translations and commentaries no longer subscribe to this suggestion, but a
more convincing solution has yet to emerge. A recent commentary, Seows Job
1-21 (released on June 28, 2013) translates it following Delitzsch (German
original 1864; English translation 1949):
But still I have my consolation,
Even while I recoil in pain unsparing,

Because I have not suppressed the utterances of the Holy One.47
Compare:
Then I should still have comfort
(I should exult in unsparing pain)
That I have not disowned the words of the Holy One.48
46
E.g., Georg Fohrer, Das Buch Hiob, 2d ed., KAT 16 (Gtersloh: Mohn, 1989), p. 176;
for a list, see Alonso Schkel Sicre Diaz, Giobbe; comment theologico e letterario, p. 174.
47
Choon-Leong Seow, Job 1-21: Interpretation and Commentary, Illuminations (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1983), p. 451.
48
F. Delitzsch, Job, vol. 4 of Commentary on the Old Testament in Ten Volumes, trans. F.
Bolton (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976), p. 112.
44
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
Concerning the first problem pointed out above, it is true that Holy
One is unique in Job,49 and probably the poet is not referring to the Holy
One of Israel title but one of the holy ones, member of the divine council,
erstwhile referred to by Eliphaz ( hn<p.Ti ~yvidoQ.mi ymi-la,w>, and whom do you
turn to among the holy ones? 5:1). Later, Job would even mock God for not
trusting his holy one (MT ketiv Avdoq.; qere wyv'doq., holy ones, 15:15).50
With regard to the second reason above, a three-colon poetry occasionally
occurs in Job (e.g., 3:26) and perhaps for a rhetorical purpose. For the last
reason, the text is not at all about Jobs defense for not denying the words
of God, i.e., deny the commands of the Holy One, (NABRE) even if this
could be an implicit accusation by Eliphaz. There is no point, as the German
scholars rightly observe above, to make such an apologia before God by whom
he hopes to be destroyed. What Job intends to say here could be something
like a public expos of his hopehe hopes for death from God and he is not
about to hide this fact from anybody.51
yvip.n: %yrIa]a;-yKi yCiQi-hm;W lxey:a]-yki yxiKo-hm; (6:11)

What is my strength that I should wait?
What is my limit that I should prolong my existence?
yCiQi, my limit
The noun #qE (lit. end or fate as metaphor) may have the nuance
of border, limit as in the Ugaritic q (lit. hem of a cloth),52 an ironic
reference to the image of weaving in 6:9.
yvip.n: %yrIa]a;, I should prolong my existence

49
See Driver-Gray I, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job, p. xxxv;
and Balentine, Job, Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary (Marcon, Georgia: Smyth &
Helwys, 2006), p. 93, as cited above.
50
Michel ( Job in the Light of Northwest Semitic, 138, n. 42) suggests that the Ugaritic
syntax bn qd could be translated sons of the Holy One and might even be compared with
the ~yvidoQ. holy ones in Job 5:1.
51
The translation we propose, I would not hide my case from a holy one, presupposes
the preposition !mi, from since we are not treating vAdq' yrEm.ai as in construct relationship
(properly, vAdQ.mi); but a preposition can be elliptical in Classical Hebrew poetry, cf. Dahood
(Psalms III: 101-150, Introduction, Translation, and Notes, AB 17A [Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1970], p. 368) for the list of prepositions in ellipsis. Similarly, TNK translation:
That I did not suppress my words against the Holy One (italics supplied).
52
See DULAT, 1: 715; HALOT, 1: 118-19; the Ugaritic reference is KTU 1.6 II 11.
45
The syntactical combination yvip.n: %yrIa]a; is hapax and is translated

by LXX o t[ i a nv e c, etai, mou h ` yuch, that my soul endures. Aquila has
o t[ i makroqumhs, w, that I should be patient (cf. Job 7:16), and Vulgate
ut patienter (followed by NAB, NRSV, NIV, and TNK).53 The object vp,n<
lit. throat, a metaphor for life is assimilated in the meaning of the verb,
something similar to the syntax of an adjectival genitive (construct) in Qoh
7:8, x:Wr-%r<a,, lit. long in spirit or simply, patient (another e.g., Sir 5:11).
To go along with Jobs wish in v. 9, Michel thinks the phrase should
read, I should prolong my desire with vp,n<, throat being an expression
also of appetite, hence, desire.54
Dhorme, however, thinks that life as an object is to be made explicit
to emphasize Jobs diminished taste for life and prefers the Targum (also
Syriac yxwr rgad) which reads yvpn andygn, I should prolong my life, similar
to the more common syntax ~ymiy" $da (lit. to add days, hence, to prolong
life).55
vWxn"y rIf'B.-~ai yxiKo ~ynIb'a] x:Ko-~ai (6:12)

Is my strength the strength of stones?
Or is my flesh, a bronze?
~ai, or
The double particle ~a in this verse introducing a double rhetorical
question is unique in the Book of Job (but see Amos 3:6). There is then a
suggestion to replace it with the more common interrogative particle h], thus
x:Kh].56 Doing this however destroys the poetic alliteration of a (three times in
v. 12) matching the alliteration of x:Ko (also three times in vv. 11-12).
Likewise Seow, Job 1-21, p. 451: And what is my limit that I should forbear?
Michel ( Job in the Light of Northwest Semitic, 13) also refers to Ceresko, Job 29-31, pp.
189 and 233 that the parallel words vp,n< // x;Ko in Job 31:39 is collocated here in this v. 11. For
53
54
the meaning of vp,n<, desire, appetite, TDOT, 9: 505-8.

55
56
See M. Held, Rhetorical Questions in Ugaritic and Biblical Hebrew, Eretz-Israel 9
(1969), pp. 71-79. For asking questions as poetic style of the wise, see J. F. J van Rensburg,
Wise Men Saying Things by Asking Questions: The Function of the Interrogative in Job 3 to
14, in OTE 4 (1991), pp. 227-47, especially pp. 228-33 where he discusses the interrogative
particles, ~ai . . . (al)h.
46
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
vWxn", bronze
Since hv'Wxn> (with the final h) is the more common form in the book
(cf. 28:2; 41:9; and 40:18), Fohrer thinks this should be parsed as a qatul
(adjective), thus, of bronze57 while Dhorme conjectures a masculine form.58
It is possible, as Gordis thinks, that the first h in v. 13 is the final of vWxn".59
yNIM<mi hx'D>nI hY"vituw> ybi ytir"z>[, !yae ~aih; (6:13)

Surely, my liberation is not in me;
And victory is cut off from me.
~aih;, surely
Without the misplaced h, the particle ~ai has an asseverative function;60
followed by OG h ,= Vulgate ecce, and also Syriac ah.. A similar syntax occurs
in Job 1:11c: and surely [ al{-~ai] he will curse you to your face (NABRE).
ytir"z>[,, my liberation
The noun hr'z>[,rz[ usually means help but is suggested to have
strength, power as another nuance based on Ugaritic.61 That meaning,
however, is contested.62 The suggestion is also to force to relate it with
strength in vv. 11 and 12. It is possible though that what is being stated
here is that for Job, his hope to die is a liberating apart from being a triumph.
In the study of Baisas on the Ugaritic r, the sense of zr ( rz[) carries the
nuance to save, to free.63
Fohrer, Das Buch Hiob, p. 161.

59
Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary, p. 73; also Clines, Job 1-20, p. 160; see also the
list in Alonso Schkel Sicre Diaz, Giobbe; comment theologico e letterario, p. 174.
60
Although this asseverative function is not attested in non-Biblical Hebrew material
(see John Elwolde Non-biblical Supplements to Classical Hebrew IM in VT 40 [1990], pp.
221-23), it is acknowledged within Biblical Hebrew, see DCH, 1: 304.
61
See Michel, Job in the Light of Northwest Semitic, p. 141.
62
Cf. DULAT (1: 812) acknowledges this meaning but cautions it as very uncertain;
nonetheless it lists Job 6:13; 13:21 and Jdg 5:23 for this case; also deemed only a philological
possibility in TDOT, 2: 872.
63
Bienvenido Baisas, Ugaritic dr and Hebrew zr I, UF 5 (1973), pp. 41-52. See also
HALOT, 1: 810-11.
57
58
47
Connections
Jobs Vexation
The pericope, as said earlier, belongs to Jobs first soliloquy (6:2-13)
of a long response to Eliphaz and this can be divided into two parts: Jobs
description of his present condition (vv. 2-7) and a soliloquy on hope itself
(vv. 8-13), our chosen text. Jobs description is a kind of self-debasement (cf.
Ps 22:7) which functions as an introduction to the hope that he is about to
explicate. We may even say this is a rhetorical device preparing his listeners
for the shocking impact of what he is about to say.
First, he describes his situation as yfi[.K;, my vexation (v. 2), an
assent, inadvertently perhaps, of what Eliphaz said exactly a chapter earlier
concerning vexation ( f[;K') that could kill the fool (5:2). We said that
Eliphaz understands this word as a dangerous emotion and indeed Job would
later reach a boiling point with his death-wish. In any case, the metaphors
that Job utilizes here betray such emotions, or as Hartley says outburst of
emotions64 my vexation, my calamity, heavier than the sand of the
sea, the arrows of Shaddai are in me, my spirit drinks their poison,
and the terrors of Eloah are positioned against me. One could even think
that these overstretched descriptions fall into what literary critics call the
exploitation of metaphor.65 This first section ends with a citation of two
proverbs on animals and food, the typical pedagogic method of a sage also
employed by friends (cf. 4:10-11), but then unlike them, Job would apply
these proverbs personally to himself.
The first proverb is about big and wild animals (the wild donkey and
ox) which do not bellow anymore when they have food (note the rhetorical
question expecting a negative answer). The second one concerns tasteless food
(like juice of mallows) that is palatable only when it is relished with spice like
salt. The key to interpret these proverbs is in the personal application where
Job says his throat would not even like to taste it anymore as it makes him
sick. The point is that food sustains any living thing, even the beasts are
calmed down by it. If food is bland, one can easily add flavor to it. But for
Job food has now become unpalatable, just like any person with physical or
emotional ailments. Similarly, the sufferer in Ludlul bl Nmeqi (Tablet II) has
this sort of complaint:
Hartley, The Book of Job, p. 131.
J. J. M. Roberts, Jobs Summons to Yahweh: The Exploitation of a Legal Metaphor,
in The Bible and the Ancient Near East: Collected Essays (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
2002), pp. 117-22.
64
65
48
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57

My hunger is prolonged, my throat stopped up
When grain is served, I eat it like stinkweed
89 Beer, the life of mankind, is distasteful to me.
90 My malady is indeed protracted.
91 Through lack of food my countenance is changed.66
87
88
For Job, food can no longer sustain him nor calm down what is inside
him. Vexation ( f[;K;) has now become his food. This is well anticipated in
Jobs first speech when he complains: For instead of my food [ ymix.l; ynEp.li]
comes my sighing, and my groanings are poured out like water (3:24); and
similar to the just sufferer who laments, My tears have become my food day
and night (Ps 42:4a). Job has lost his taste for life, as one commentator
quips.67
Jobs Hope for Death
Jobs Death Wish. Our pericope vv. 8-13 is clearly demarcated with markers,
in v. 8 ( !TeyI-ymi) and in v. 13 (the asseverative particle ~ai). Thematically, as
Habel points out, it is embraced by Jobs cry of anguishin v. 8, the anguish
that hope is unrealized; and in v. 1, the disgust over the absence of victory.68
Furthermore, we can differentiate five parts of the text following the elements
of a death-wish in the Old Testament: (1) Emotions Preceding the DeathWish; (2) Death-Wishers Address to God; (3) Statement of a Death-Wish;
(4) Reason for the Death-Wish; and (5) Death-Wish Thwarted by Divine
Intervention.
Depressing emotions initiate the death-wish (no. 1). For example, Elijah
is afraid and flees for his life (1 Kgs 19:3); Jonah is angry (4:1) and later
on, very angry until death ( tw<m"-d[; yli-hr"x' bjeyhe, 4:9); Tobit is griefstricken in spirit, groaning, weeping and sobbing loudly (Tob 3:1); likewise
Sarah is deeply grieved in spirit, goes to a room in tears with the intention
of hanging herself (Tob 3:10). For Job, however, we hear of his vexation
but still could consider his death-wish as his comfort (6:10a), as something
worthy of an ecstatic and unrestrained merrymaking (cf. the metaphor of
jump in luxury sparing nothing, 6:10b). It is short of saying that a joyful
BWL, p. 45.
68
Habel, The Book of Job, p. 141.
66
67
49
rather than a depressing emotion accompanies Jobs death-wish.69 Could this

be indicative of Jobs inner turmoil ( zg<ro)?
For no. 2, all of the above address their wish to God but it is only in
Job that it is not in the context of a prayer. Jobs wish is couched in a rather
impersonal linguistic construction: Would that (6:1).
Concerning the statement of the death-wish (no. 3), Job declares that his
hope is for God to terminate his life, using again the image of a divine warrior
crushing the enemy70 and a more common wisdom image of ending a life like
a weaver severing the thread (cf. Qoheleth). This image of a violent deity
finds a more intense antecedent in the Ugaritic Story of Aqhat. The goddess
Anat conspires with the warrior god Yatipan to kill Aqhat for being defiant
by not giving her the bow which she wanted very much. The sinister plan is
to be done while Aqhat eats his food which reminds us of Jobs reference to
food in his death-wish (cf. 6:6-7).
When Aqhat sits down to sup,
The son of Daniel to dine,
The birds circle [above him],
The flock of hawks hovers (?)
[Among] them Anat circles,
Over [Aqhat] she aims him (KTU 1.18 IV 29-33).
The murder is described in gory details:

To strike him twice [on the head],71
Three times over the ear,
Spi[lling] his blood [like] a butcher,
[Down to his knees], like a killer (KTU 1.18 IV 34-35).72
On this aspect, see Francois T. de Villiers, Symptoms of Depression in JobA Note
on Psychological Exegesis, OTE 17 (2004), pp. 9-14.
70
For God as a divine warrior in Israel, see Patrick D. Miller, The Divine Warrior in Early
Israel (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006; first printing 1973), pp. 128-40.
71
For Ugaritic qdqd, head, compare han who goes out from the divine assembly
to inflict sores on Job from the sole of his foot up to qodqd, his head (Job 2:7).
72
For the translation, see S. Parker, Ugaritic Narrative Poetry, SBL Writings from the
Ancient World Series (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), p. 66; for the interpretation of the text
69
50
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
The statement in the death-wish of Elijah is more subdued. Threatened

by the queen Jezebel, he hides in the wilderness of Beersheba and prays:
It is enough; now, O Lord, take away my life, for I am no better than my
ancestors (1 Kgs 19:4, NRSV). The expression, it is better for me to die
than to live occurs in the death-wish of Jonah (4:3, 9, twice), Tobit (Tob
3:6) and Sarah (Tob 3:10). Sarah, in fact, wants to hang herself (Tob 3:10).
The reason for death-wish (no. 4) has the underlying motif of unjust
persecution: Jobs complaint of being Gods target (6:4); harassment of Elijah
by the royal couple Ahab and Jezebel; the unjust conversion of Nineveh and
the loss of a shade for Jonah; and in the Book of Tobit, the insults against a
blind Tobit (3:6) and a childless Sarah (3:10).
About the divine intervention (no. 5), it usually comes in the form of an
angelic being stopping the death-wish. An angel of the Lord, for instance,
touches and commands Elijah twice to get up and eat (1 Kgs 19:5) whereas the
angel Raphael comes to heal Tobit and Sarah (Tob 3:17). For Jonah, it is God
himself who intervenes (4:4, 9). In the case of Job, divine intervention comes
only after more discourses, towards the end of the drama when YHWH
appears in the whirlwind (38:1) which appears to be too much delayed or
too anti-climactic. What is then unique in Job in this part is that he himself
rejects his own death-wish. For example he says that if God will kill him,
he will still hope (cf. 13:15a). It goes to say then that what Job is hoping
afterwards is no longer to be slain by God but something else, for in death
he would have no chance to defend his ways to his [Gods] face (v. 15b,
NRSV). Job hopes, in fact, to be kept temporarily in Sheol (14:13a).
Jobs Cursing the Day. Closely related to death-wish is the Cursing the
Day genre which finds its way in the first speech of Job (chapter 3). Before we
proceed to connect it with our pericope, let us see some examples from the
ancient Near East.
Some Antecedents from the Ancient Near East
In the study of Jacobsen and Nielsen, four examples are provided of this
literary genre, all coming from Mesopotamia.73 The oldest is a Sumerian text
assumed to be composed before 2000 B.C.E. which is about a mother who
laments over the death of her son named Damu:
see D. P. Wright, Ritual in Narrative: The Dynamics of Feasting, Mourning, and Retaliation
Rites in the Ugaritic Tale of Aqhat (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2001), pp. 127-35: Anats
Killing of Aqhat.
73
Th. Jacobsen and K. Nielsen, Cursing the Day, SJOT 6 (1992), pp. 187-204.
51
Woe to that day, that day! . . .

A day to be wiped out, that I would I could forget.74
The second example is the Lament over the Destruction of Ur composed

most probably after the city of Ur was destroyed around 2004 B.C.E. The
task of mourning is given to the goddess, Ningal, wife of Nanna, Urs patron
god:
O father Nannamay that day of storm
not alight inmidst your city,
.
May that day of storm
[seep into] the earth and not recur.
.
May that day of storm be destroyed, all of it.
.
May its accounts be taken down...75
The third example comes from the Epic of Atra-ass, one of the three
surviving Babylonian flood stories (ca. 2000 B.C.E.). Mami, the birth
goddess, mourns over the destroyed city due to the flood: May the day grow
ever darker; may it become obscure.76
The last is from the Gilgamesh Epic (Tablet XI) with a similar motif of a
goddess, Belet-ili, weeping aloud as she mourns over the death of her people
because of the flood: Would that day had turned to nought.77
Speaking of a common pattern among these examples, we have the
following: (1) the mourners are all women, a mater dolorosa of sort (goddesses
mostly); (2) the assembly of gods and goddesses are responsible for the
misfortune (mostly natural disasters); (3) the latter is perceived as unjust; and
(4) the literary style is one of lament more than curse.78
The text is cited from ibid., p. 188.

Text cited from ibid., p. 191; for other translation, see ANET, p. 463.
76
Text cited from Jacobsen and Nielsen, Cursing the Day, p. 192; for other translation,
see COS, 1: 451.
77
Translation from COS, 1: 459.
78
For this kind of theme, see Flores, Assembly of Gods and Goddesses and the Fate
of Humanity: A Survey of Cuneiform Texts from Ancient Near East, Diwa: Studies in
Philosophy and Theology 31 (2006), pp. 24-41.
74
75
52
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
In Jobs first speech, the word curse is found right away at the start
(cf. llq, 3:1). The divine assembly ( ~yhil{a/h' ynEB., lit. sons of God)79 is
clearly responsible for his misfortunesboth natural and personal disasters.
Jobs initial reaction to these is one of submission to Gods will rather than
a reaction against injustice, though a reaction comes up later. The only two
examples of this kind in the Old Testament have pater doloroso rather than
mater dolorosa mournersJob and Jeremiah. Likewise, a significant novelty
is on the object of the curse, i.e., not only on any given day but the day of
conception (or birth in the case of Jeremiah, 20:14-18).
Jobs First Speech
Commentators usually divide the text into two units after the introduction
(vv. 1-2), indicating two literary genres: curse vv. 3-10; and lament vv.
11-26.80 The first section is indicated by an uncommon word for curse, llq
(v. 1); the second section uses the typical marker of a lament in the Hebrew
Bible and in the ancient Near EastWhy? ( hM'l' or [:WDm;). However, the
weakness of this structure lies in the imbalance of stropheseight verses in
the first section against sixteen in the second. It appears that a better division
should be into three equal parts as shown by Borgonovo:81
1. The Curse on the Day (vv. 3-10)

A Curse on the Day and the Night (v. 3)
B Curse on the Day (vv. 3-5)

A' Curse on the Day and the Night (v. 6)
B' Curse on the Night (vv. 7-9)

C Cause (v. 10)
2. First Lament: Why did I not die in the womb? (vv. 11-19)

A First Question (vv. 11-12)
B The Response in Sheol (vv. 13-15)

A' Second Question (v. 16)
B' Peace and Equality in Sheol (vv. 17-19)

For other terms used for the divine council in ancient Near East and ancient Israel,
see ibid., p. 59.
80
Habel, The Book of Job, p. 103.
81
Gianantonio Borgonovo, La note e il suo sole: Luce e tenebre nel Libro di Giobbe, Analisi
simbolica (Rome: PIB, 1995), p. 113. This tripartite division has been proposed earlier in
D. N. Freedman, Pottery, and Prophecy: Studies in Early Hebrew Poetry (Winona Lake, IN:
Eisenbrauns, 1980), p. 325.
79
53
3. Second Lament: Why is life given to the miserable? (vv. 20-26)

A A Life Longing for Death (vv. 20-23)

A' A Life Being Spent in Trouble (vv. 24-26)
The structure moves from the macrocosmos to microcosmos: curse in a

cosmic way (Perish the day/night) going down to a sort of personal lament
concerning conception (Why did I not die in the womb?) and ends with
another lament but now concerning birth itself (Why is life given to the
miserable?). The first part then has a type of a curse of which its power is
conveyed in the magnificence of its poetry. For instance the first line goes
with a literal translation in respect of the poetic lines.
rb,g" hr"ho rm;a' hl'y>L:h;w> AB dl,W"ai ~Ay db;ayo (3:1)

May day perish! I was born in it.
And the night said, A man is conceived!
With the good intention to make the poetry understandable, translations,

ancient and modern tend to be prosaic than poetic. LXX, for example, has:
a pv o l, oito h ` h m` e ,ra e nv h - | e gv ennh q, hn Let the day perish

on which I was born,
kai. h ` nu x, e nv h - | ei=pan ivd ou . a r; sen And the night in which they said,

Behold a male!
In MT, the personification of the day is emphasized by omitting the

definite article which LXX does not do. Instead of a personification of the
night (cf. MT rma 3d pers. sing.), LXX uses an impersonal they (cf. ei=pan
3d pers. pl.) and refers to the birth of a male while MT delivers an irony in
the conception of a grown-up man ( rb,G<).82
When we compare the Cursing the Day genre in Jeremiah (20:14-18)
we immediately notice how the Job poet presents a more intensified poetry
than the author of the prophetic book.83 Regarding literary structure, the
text in Jeremiah begins gradually with a lament (20:7-13) and ends with a
curse (20:14:18) while in Job, it starts right away with a curse (i.e., it starts
with a bang). The poetic style in Jeremiah is subdued: no merismus of day
See Robert Althann, Job 3 in the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint, Orientalia
Christiana Periodica 73 (2009), pp. 348-49. Modern translations follow, e.g., NABRE:
Perish the day on which I was born, the night when they said, The child is a boy! (italics
supplied). For the meaning of rb,G<, strong man, see HALOT, 1: 175-76.
83
For more examples of intensification by the Job poet, see E. Greenstein, Jeremiah as
an Inspiration to the Poet of Job, in Inspired Speech: Prophecy in the Ancient Near East: Essays
in Honor of Herbert B. Huffmon, ed. J. Kaltner and L. Stulman (London New York: T&T
Clark, 2004), pp. 98-108.
82
54
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
and night or light and darkness; no personification of time; the curse is on a

birthday rather than a day of conception as in Job; and the text tends to be
more prosaic than poetic.84
In any case, the opening line of Jobs curse is not exactly similar to the
Cursing the Day genre in the ancient Near East as we pointed out earlier.
Nonetheless, it shares the same theme of natural disasters caused unjustly
by the divine assembly. In terms of divine assembly causing natural disasters
and personal suffering and curse as human beings response, the Ugaritic
Story of Aqhat may also shed light on Jobs curse.85 Daniel [Ug. Danilu],
the protagonist in the Ugaritic narrative and who at times is tagged as a
biblical Job (cf. Ezek 14:14, 20), mourns over his only son who is murdered
by one of the goddesses, an act sanctioned by the divine assembly.86 The
crime affects nature as plants wither with the coming of a drought. After his
sons burial, Daniel goes around the country pronouncing a curse [Ugaritic
ym, KTU 1.19 III 46]87 on three towns near to where his son was murdered.
To Abiluma, the last town, Daniel cries with a loud voice:
Woe to you, town of Abiluma
Near which Aqhat was slain:
May Baal strike you blind [wrt]
From henceforth and forever,
From now and through all generations.88
If the deprivation of sight is the content of Daniels curse, Jobs is the

deprivation of light:
v. 4 That day, let there be darkness,

May Eloah not seek it

Nor make the sun shine on it.89
For example, the relative pronoun rv<a] (cf. Jer 20:14a) tends to be elliptical in classical
Hebrew poetry, i.e., asyndetic relative clauses, see Joun-Muraoka, 158a.
85
Flores, Story of Aqhat: Ugaritic Background of the Narrative Framework of the Book
of Job, Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and Theology 33 (2008), pp. 189-210.
86
For the motif of divine assembly in control of the destiny of nature and human beings,
see Flores, Assembly of Gods and Goddesses, pp. 57-80.
87
For the interpretation of the curse on the towns, see Wright, Ritual in Narrative, pp.
182-90.
88
KTU 1.19 IV 2-6. For this translation, see Parker, Ugaritic Narrative Poetry, p. 75.
89
For the last stich (3:4c), MT has hr"h'n> wyl'[' [p;AT-la;w>. The word hr"h'n> is hapax.
Borgonovo (La note e ilsuo sole, p. 105) suggests the sense ray of the sun based on Targum
( rwhn) and also Syriac (arhwn). Moreover, the verb [p;AT is a taqtul (either 2d pers. or 3d pers.
fem.), perhaps the fem. gender is attracted by fem. noun ending in hr"h'n>. For a discussion, see
Robert Althann, Studies in Northwest Semitic, BibOr 45 (Rome: PIB, 1997), pp. 133-34; for
84
55
In reverse, to hope for light becomes out of sight.

v. 9 May its twilight stars darken it,

May it hope [ lxy] for light, but there is none,

May it not see the eyelashes of Sachar.90
In what way then can we relate this to the death-wish genre? We can
outline the answer in the following way:
(1) Emotions Preceding the Death-Wish (v. 1)

After this, Job opened his mouth and cursed his day.
(2) Death-Wishers Address to God: (v. 4b)

May Eloah not seek it.
(3) Statement of Death-Wish (v. 11):

Why did I not die from the womb [ ~x,r<me],91

Emerge from the belly and expire?
(4) Reason for the Death-Wish (v. 10)

Because it did not shut the doors of my womb [ ynIj.bi],92
Nor conceal trouble [ lm'[']93 in my eyes.
(5) Death-Wish Thwarted by Divine Intervention

--missing, but cf. YHWH answered Job out of the whirlwind
(38:1).
the problem of taqtul, see ibid., pp. 25-60.

90
A personal name Sachar (MT rx;v') seems to exist in Punic language, pr, see
Borgonovo, La note e il suo sole, p. 107.
91
Althann (Studies in Northwest Semitic, pp. 135-36) explains the function of the
ambiguous preposition in ~x,r<me which should have a locative function here taking its verb
from ytiac'y" in the second stich. Thus, the first stich may mean, Why did I not not die
(emerging) from the womb. . . .
92
MT ynIj.bi, lit. my womb should properly be her womb; but this can be simply
a poetic style employing a series of the suff. of 1st pers. sing., interpreted as: my mothers
womb (cf. NRSV). For a discussion, see Althann, Studies in Northwest Semitic, pp. 75-78.
93
The root lm[, trouble appears in the Aramaic Inscriptions of Sefire in a curse
formula: [ b ynba] dpra l[ $syw lm[ hmlkw !ymXbw qrab hyxl hmlk dd[ [ h $sy] rXa (And)
[may Ha]dad [pour (over it)] every sort of evil (which exists) on earth and in heaven and every
sort of trouble (italics supplied), see KAI 222A.26, 53.
56
Diwa 39 (2014): 34-57
Job Between Death and Hope

From the philological analysis above as well as from the literary contour
of the text, i.e., death-wish, we may have to assert again the obvious but this
time with a degree of certitude that the object of Jobs hope is death. This
makes clearer and even more intensified the death-wish that we find in Jobs
Cursing-Lament (chapter 3). In the study of Kummerow, he observes the
changing concept of death of the herofrom death as equalizer, to death
as liberator (the sense of 3:18).94 At this point in Jobs speech, death is now
considered both as my liberation and my victory (6:13). This appears to
be what makes Jobs object of hope, i.e., death, good.
The theme of death in the Old Testament has not been sufficiently
explored by scholars.95 One reason is that death is a subdued topic in the
first testament, This life with its inevitable death is what the Bible wants to
emphasize, as one scholar observes.96 Thanks to the books of Qoheleth and
Job, the theme comes to the fore. In the Book of Job, the theme is intimately
connected with hope. Some recent studies have tried to set a direction as to
how to handle death in this book. Zuckermann states matter-of-factly that
verse-for-verse, no book in the Bible is more death oriented than Job and
proceeds to consider the death-theme as one of the major parodies in Job.97
Two important texts that he deals with are Job 3 and our pericope (6:8-13)
but it is the former that he sees Jobs death-wish [in] its fullest expression.98
While Jeremiahs death-wish ends with a tacit affirmation of Gods certainty
to respond with mercy to Jeremiahs appeal, Jobs Curse-Lament is not meant
to connote subservience to his divine master. . . but his wish of serving notice
D. Kummerow, Job, Hopeful or Hopeless? The Significance of mg in Job 16:19 and
Jobs Changing Conceptions of Death, Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 5 (2005, online journal),
pp. 24-27. www.arts.ualberta.ca/JHS/Articles/article_44.pdf (accessed June 21, 2013).
95
Most significant ones are Nicholas J. Tromp, Primitive Conceptions of Death and
the Nether World in the Old Testament, BibOr 21 (Rome: PIB, 1969) and Lloyd R. Bailey,
Biblical Perspectives on Death, OBT (Philadelphia, PA: Fortresss, 1979). Most studies devote
greater discussion on the ancient Near Eastern understanding of death, e.g., Johnston, Shades
of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
2002); Brian B. Schmidt, Israels Beneficent Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient
Israelite Religion and Tradition, FAT 11 (Tbingen: Mohr, 1994); Klaas Spronk, Beatific
Afterlife in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East, AOAT 219 (Kevelaer: Butzon &
Bercker, 1986).
96
Alan F. Segal, Some Observations about Mysticism and the Spread of Notions of
Life After Death in Hebrew Thought, in SBL Seminar Papers, 1996, SBLSP 35 (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1996), pp. 385-99.
97
Zuckerman, Job the Silent: A Study in Historical Counterpoint (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), p. 118.
98
Ibid., p. 123.
94
57
on God that this Righteous Sufferer has had enough.99 Another example
is the work of Matthewson, Death and Survival in the Book of Job which
holds the thesis that it is due to Jobs traumatic experience that such radical
wish-for-death emotions flare up; the author terms it the desymbolization of
death.100 Death-wish then is a kind of a survival technique.
In any case, both studies affirm the dynamics of a death-wish in the
Book of Job. Even if the death-wish is to be rejected by Job himself at some
point in the drama, the Job poet allows ample time for the protagonist to
ruminate on the issue. We can see this in Jobs soliloquy on death and hope.
Job does not make good the death-wish by committing suicide.101 This hope
for death then turns out to be an imaginative exploration,102 which itself is
a passage-way to another level of hope, i.e, the hope for afterlife.
Ibid., pp. 125-26.

Dan Mathewson, Death and Survival in the Book of Job: Desymbolization and
Traumatic Experience (New York - London: T&T Clark, 2006). Matthewson grounds his
thesis in the works of the psycho-historian Robert Jay Lifton who studied war survivors (cf.
Hiroshima survivors), their traumatic experiences, and their struggles to survive, see ibid.,
pp. 23-27.
101
The Old Testament has six narratives on suicide: Abimelech, son of Gideon (Judg
9:54); Samson (Judg 16:2531); Saul (1 Sam 31:34; 1 Chr 10:34); Sauls escort (1 Sam
31:5; 1 Chr 10:5); Ahithophel (2 Sam 17:23); and Zimri (I Kgs 16:1819). For this theme,
see Yael Shemesh, Suicide in the Bible, Jewish Biblical Quarterly 37 (2009), pp. 158-68.
102
See the title of the article of Lindsay Wilson, Realistic Hope or Imaginative
Exploration? The Identity of Jobs Arbiter, Pacifica 9 (1996), pp. 243-52 (italics supplied).
99
100
Some Annotations on
Omnium in Mentem of Benedict XVI
ADOLFO N. DACANAY, SJ
Ateneo de Manila University

Quezon City, Philippines
his document, issued motu proprio from the Supreme Pontiff dated
October 26, 2009 introduced three amendments to the Code of
Canon Law.
(a) C.1008 is reworded in this way: By divine institution, some of the

Christian faithful are marked with an indelible character and constituted as
sacred ministers by the sacrament of Holy Orders. Thus they are consecrated
and deputed so that each according to his own grade, they may serve the
People of God by a new and specific title.
(b) This third paragraph was added to C.1009: Those who are constituted
in the order of the episcopate or the presbyterate receive the mission and
capacity to act in the person of Christ the Head, whereas deacons are
empowered to serve the people of God in the ministries of the liturgy, of the
word and of charity.
(c) The novel concept of departure from the Church through a formal
act is removed from Canons 1086.1, 1117, and 1124. [i] C.1086.1 [on the
impediment of disparity of cult] now reads: A marriage between two persons
one of whom has been baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it
and the other of whom is not baptized, is invalid. [ii] The amended version
of C.1117 [those who are obliged to observe the canonical form]: The form
established above must be observed if at least one of the parties contracting
marriage was baptized in the Catholic Church or has been received into it
without prejudice to the prescripts of C.1127.2. [iii] The reformulation of
C.1124 [concerning mixed marriage]: Without express permission of the
competent ecclesiastical authority, a marriage is prohibited between two
baptized persons of whom one is baptized in the Catholic Church or received
into it after baptism and the other of whom is enrolled in a Church or ecclesial
community not in full communion with the Catholic Church.
A. N. Dacanay, Annotations on Omnium in Mentem
59
1. The change introduced by Omnium in Mentem in Canon 1008

deleted the clause to nourish the people of God, fulfilling in the person
of Christ the Head the functions of teaching, sanctifying, and governing.
Coccopalmerio explains that this change reflects the amendment to the
Catechism of the Catholic Church1 in order to make it clear that deacons do
not act in the person of Christ as head, but rather in the ministry of service.2
The previous formulation of the canon (They are consecrated and designated,
each according to his grade, to nourish the people of God, fulfilling in
the person of Christ the Head the functions of teaching, sanctifying, and
governing) could be misinterpreted to mean that the deacons too act in
the person of Christ the Head and share in the triple functions of teaching,
sanctifying, and governing.3 The added third paragraph of C.2009 makes it
clear that only bishops and presbyters share in the triple ministry and that
deacons are ordained for the ministry of service to the People of God in the
Liturgy of the Word and in charity. By reserving the mission and the faculty
to act in the person of Christ the Head to bishops and presbyters and not
to deacons, the amendments serve to clarify that the deacons configuration
to Christ within the ordained ministry is as Servant rather than as Head.4 It
must be noted that this does not introduce a new doctrine and the substance
of the law is not changed. The amended formulation expresses more clearly
and unambiguously the content of the law.
The amended C.1008 and the added third paragraph of C.1009 assert
that while the deacon does not participate in the tria munera of Christ the
head as the bishop and the presbyter do, there is still a distinction between
the priesthood of the ordained and the priesthood of the baptized. The
ordained are consecrated and deputed so that each according to his own
grade may serve the People of God by a new and specific title, not simply by
virtue of baptism but by the new title of the sacrament of orders.
1
The revision of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1581: Ab eo (Christo)
episcopi et presbyteri missionem et facultatem agenda in persona Christi capitis accipiunt,
diaconivero vim populo Dei serviendi in diaconia liturgiae, verbi et caritatis.
2
Francesco Coccopalmerio, Articulus explanans motum proprium Omnium in mentem
a Summo Pontifice die 16 Decembris 2009 datum, Communicationes 41 (2009), pp. 334337.
3
Jose San Jose Prisco, Carta Apostolica del Sumo Pontifice Omnium in Mentem con la
cual son modificadas algunas normas del Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Revista Espanola de
Derecho Canonico 67 (2010), pp. 437-445.
4
R. Coronelli, Il diaconato alla luce delle modifiche apportate al Codice dal motu
proprio Omnium in mentem, Quaderni di Diritto Ecclesiale 24 (2011), pp. 142-168.
60
Diwa 39 (2014): 58-63
2. The concept of the defection from the Catholic Church by a formal

act (actus formalis defectionis ab Ecclesia catholica) is a novel element introduced
into the canonical vocabulary only in the Code of 1983. It is so new as a
matter of fact that the meaning has not been clear from the very beginning.5
There were many questions and doubts and requests for clarification about
this departure from the Catholic Church by a formal act that the Pontifical
Commission for the Interpretation of Legal Texts was compelled to issue
the following clarification in 2006. (a) It is necessary that there be the
internal decision to leave the Catholic Church; that there be the realization
and externalization of that decision; that decision must be received by the
competent ecclesiastical authority. (b) The substance of the act of the will
must be the rupture of those bonds of communionfaith, sacraments, and
pastoral governancethat permit the Faithful to receive the life of grace
within the Church. The formal act of defection must be more than merely
juridical and administrative (the removal of ones name from a Church
membership registry, or from a government record to produce certain civil
effects); it must be a real separation from the constitutive elements of the
life of the Church so that such a departure therefore supposes an act of
apostasy or heresy or schism. (c) The juridical-administrative act of leaving
the Church (for example, deleting ones name from a government registry
indicating a persons membership in the Catholic Church for purposes such
as the church tax collected by the government) does not in itself constitute
a formal act of defection as understood in the Code, given that there could
still be the will to remain in the communion of the faith. Such a person
may not want to pay the church tax but he may still want to avail of the
channels of grace. (d) The defection must be a valid juridical act, placed by
a person who is canonically capable and in conformity with the provisions
5
In the view of one writer, these provisions of the Code of 1983 introduced a new
element of confusion and created a new category of valid but clandestine marriages. P. Lopez
Gallo, Formal Defection from the Catholic Church, Monitor Ecclesiasticus CXX (4/98),
pp. 620-646. Another author thinks that its interpretation poses certain difficulties arising
from the individual elements of the formula: defecting from the Church; the nature of
the act by which one can defect; and what constitutes the formalities of such an act. V. de
Paolis, Alcune annotazioni circa la formula actu formali ab Ecclesia catholica deficere,
Periodica LXXXIV (4/95), pp. 579-608. According to Raad, the general opinion was that
the norm had not attained the good consequences that had been envisaged. The provision
has been a dead letter from the outset due to the difficulty on interpreting what is meant
by the phrase. G. Raad, Formal Defection: The End of the Road, Canon Law Society
Newsletter (128/01), pp. 71-75. The phrase has been so problematic that as early as 1999, the
Pontifical Commission for the Interpretation of Legal Texts voted unanimously to request
the suppression of that clause from CC.1086.1, 1117 and 1124. J. Huels, Defection from
the Catholic Church by a Formal Act and the Circular Letter of 13 March 2006, Studia
Canonica 41 (2007), pp. 515-549.
61
of the Code that regulate such matters (Cc.124-126). (e) This act must be
manifested by the interested party in written form before the competent
ecclesiastical authority: the Ordinary or the proper pastor who is uniquely
qualified to make the judgment concerning the existence or non-existence
of the act of the will. Thus, only the convergence of the two elementsthe
theological content of the interior act and its manifestation in the manner
definedconstitutes the formal act of defection from the Catholic Church.
(f) In such cases, the competent ecclesiastical authority to whom this
was manifested is to make note of it in the Baptismal Registry, explicitly
mentioning defection ab Ecclesia catholica actu formali. (g) The sacramental bond
of belonging to the Body of Christ the Church, conferred by the baptismal
character, is an ontological and indelible bond is not lost by reason of any act
or fact of defection.6
By virtue of the Omnium in mentem, this possibility of formally abandoning
the Catholic Church and its consequence that such persons who have left
the Catholic Church by a formal act are released from the obligation to
observe merely ecclesiastical laws, have been removed. One way of putting
it crudely is that ex Catholics continue to be bound by ecclesiastical laws,
such as will be discussed infra; while, before Omnium in mentem they were not
anymore bound by merely ecclesiastical laws such as the canonical form of
marriage and the impediment of disparity of cult. Some canonists think that
the abrogation of the departure from the Catholic Church through formal
act creates as many problems as it may solve, and that from the point of
view of ecumenism and human rights, it represents a regression.7
3. C.1086 concerns the impediment of disparity of worship. Before
Omnium in mentem, the marriage between two persons, one of whom has
been baptized in the Catholic Church or received into and has not left it
by a formal act, and the other is non-baptized, is invalid. If such a person
(baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it and has not left it by a
formal act) marries a non-baptized, the marriage is invalid. But if he has left
the Catholic Church by a formal act, such a person in the circumstances
described marries validly. He is not bound by the impediment of disparity
of worship.
6
A clarification issued by the Pontifical Commission for the Interpretation of Legal
Texts addressed to the Presidents of episcopal conferences, dated March 13, 2006, and over
the signature of Julio Card. Herranz, its president, in Communicationes XXXVIII, No. 2
(2006), pp. 172-174.
7
See for example: J. Werckmeister, Le motu proprio Omnium in mentem et le marriage
des ex-catholiques, Revue de Droit Canonique 57 (2/2007), pp. 241-254.
62
Diwa 39 (2014): 58-63
But with Omnium in mentem, the exempting circumstance of departure

from the Catholic Church by a formal having been removed, the person who
is baptized in the Catholic Church or has been received into iteven if he
has left the Church, continues to be bound by this ecclesiastical law. If he/
she contracts marriage with a non-baptized, he contracts invalidly.8
4. The second canon from which the clause has been excised is C.1117
which determines who are bound to observe the canonical form prescribed
for marriage. Before Omnium in mentem, those who have left the Church by a
formal act are not bound to observe the canonical form of marriage. Such
a person if he/she contracts a civil marriage or some other religious non
catholic ceremony contracts validly. His/her departure from the Catholic
Church by a formal act frees him from this obligation.9 Aznar Gil compares
this pre O
mnium in mentem discipline, which permits the recognition of such
a formal act of defection, with the not dissimilar dispensation permitted in
the Code of 1917 for the once baptized Catholics who have been brought up
as non-Catholics, allowing them to marry without observing the canonical
form of marriage.10
But with the possibility of departure from the Catholic Church by a
formal act having been removed, all persons who have been baptized in
the Catholic Church or who have been received into it are now obliged to
observe the canonical form of marriage. A civil marriage or the celebration
of the sacrament in some other religious denomination will be invalid, unless
a dispensation has been obtained according to the provisions of C.1078.
Thus, Aznar Gil concludes that the present revocation of the possibility of a
formal act of defection and the corresponding nullity of the marriages of all
those baptized Catholics, regardless of their present religious adherence or
convictions, who marry contrary to the norms of Canon Law, is a return to
the earlier state of affairs.11
5. According to the pre Omnium in mentem, the marriage between a person
baptized in the Catholic Church or was received into it and has not left it by
a formal and one who is enrolled in a Church or ecclesial communion not in
8
P. Hallein, Le motu propio Omnium in mentem et les consequences canoniques des
modifications, Studia Canonica 45 (2011), pp. 414-441.
9
A. Arza Arteaga, Bautizados en la Iglesia Catolica no obligados a la forma canonica
del matrimonio: problemas que presenta, in Theriault and Thors, eds., The New Code of
Canon Law II (Ottawa: University of St. Paul, 1986), pp. 897-930.
10
F. R. Aznar Gil, La revocacion de la clausula actus formalis defectionis ab Ecclesia
catolica de los cc. 1086.1, 1117, 1124, Revicta Espanola de Derecho Canonico 67 (2010), pp.
447-457.
11
Ibid.
63
full communion with the Catholic Church is prohibited without the express
permission of the competent ecclesiastical authority. [C.1124] Under this
discipline, those who have left the Catholic Church by a formal act are not
bound by this law; consequently, they do not need permission if they were
to marry one from a Church or ecclesial community not in full communion
with the Catholic Church.
But with the amendment of canonical discipline regarding mixed
marriage introduced by Omnium in mentem, those who have left the Catholic
Church, even by a formal act, are now bound again (as they were before the
Code of 1983) by the obligation to obtain permission from the competent
authority, if they were to marry a baptized non-Catholic.
6. Practical Norms and Pastoral Applications. The motu proprio is dated
October 26, 2009 and was published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis January
8, 2010. According to C.8, universal ecclesiastical laws are promulgated by
publication in the official commentary AAS. They take effect only after
three months have elapsed from the date of that issue of the Acta. The vacatio
legis is continuous time and C.202 determines that if the time is continuous,
a month and a year must be always taken as they appear in the calendar.
Therefore, the exceptions given to the ex Catholicsthat they are not
bound by the impediment of disparity of worship established in C.1097, that
they are not obliged to observe the canonical form prescribed in C.1117, and
that they do not need to obtain permission to contract a mixed marriage
on the basis of C.1124are hereby rescinded effective April 8, 2010. The
three-month vacatio legis ends April 8, 2010, and the provisions of Omnium
in mentem take effect the following day. In the concrete, this would mean
that an ex Catholic who marries a non-baptized without dispensation from
the impediment of disparity of cult, from April 9, 2010 onwards contracts
invalidly. In a similar way from April 9, 2010 onwards, an ex Catholic
who does not observe the canonical form prescribed for marriage marries
invalidly. Starting on the same date, an ex Catholic who does not secure
permission from the competent ecclesiastical authority to marry a nonCatholic Christian contracts illicitly, although validly, having fulfilled the
other requirements.
Book Notices
RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD
This section gives short comments on recent books in philosophy and theology
published in the Philippines. Books for notice can be sent to:
The Editor
Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and Theology
SVD Road
Email: diwasvd@yahoo.com
PHILOSOPHY
RAYMUN J. FESTIN, SVD, Mindfulness (Manila: Logos Publications,
2012), pp. xiii + 437.
This book is a result of the authors experience of teaching philosophy,
mostly in a seminary setting. Its aim is to motivate both the students and
the reading public to explore the exhilarating world of philosophers (p. ii).
Chapter 1: The Original Wonder (pp. 22-57) discusses the ancient Greek
philosophers. Chapter 2: The Fragility of the Human Condition (pp. 58116) is about Plato and Aristotle. Chapter 3: Being and Language (pp. 117168) deals on Descartes and Kant with a special attention to the theme of
language and the ideas of the relatively unknown Johann Georg Hamann and
Heidegger. Chapter 4: Overlaps and Overtones (pp. 169-225) continues the
discussion on language with the insights of Collingwood and Wittgenstein.
Chapter 5: The Other is Like Me (pp. 226-287) introduces the insights of
Sartre and Buber on alterity. Chapter 6: The Otherness of the Other (pp.
288-343), the last chapter, draws its concluding reflection from the Jewish
philosopher Levinas.
R. Festin is a guest professor at the Divine Word Seminary-Tagaytay and
rector of Christ the King Mission Seminary.
THEOLOGY
MICHAEL G. LAYUGAN, SVD, Ecce Ancilla Domini: A Narrative History
of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (Manila:
Logos Publications, 2014), 528 pp.
BOOK NOTICES
65
The book is a history of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Immaculate

Heart of Mary (SIHM; members are also known as the Tuding Sisters), a
native congregation in the Cordillera region founded in 1952. Part 1 outlines
the life of its founder, Bishop William Brasseur, CICM (pp. 25-82). Part
2 (pp. 83-192) is on the lives of the Missionary Sisters of Saint Augustine,
notably of Dame Marie Columba, the co-foundress (pp. 83-117); the roles
they played; and the activities of SIHM between 1952-1971. Part 3 accounts
the pioneers and the superiors from 1970-1999 and the direction that SIHM
took during those years (pp. 193-296). The first superior was Sr. Assunta Claver
who was born on July 23, 1925 in Natonin, Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Part 4 documents SIHMs apostolates from 1999-2004 in particular, their
missions outside the Mountain Province including abroad: Northern
Mariana Islands (2006), Caroline Islands (2006); and Canada (2009). The
appendices (pp. 374-528) contain the congregations constitutions, directory
and list of members.
MICHAEL G. LAYUGAN, SVD, From Mission Church to Missionary
Church: Divine Word Missionaries in the Philippines 1909-1957 (Manila:
Logos Publications, 2004), xviii + 609 pp.
From Mission Church contains parts of the authors doctoral dissertation
in Church History (Catholic University of Louvain, 2013).
Part 1 (pp. 21-88) provides the socio-political and religious context of
the Philippines more than a decade prior to the arrival of the first SVD
missionaries to the Philippines in 1909: the Philippine Revolution in 1896;
Aglipayan Schism in 1902; and the arrival of the Protestant missionaries in
1898. It ends with the different letters exchanged between the SVD Founder
Arnold Janssen and the Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines.
Part II (pp. 89- 172) presents the first ten years of the Philippine SVD
mission: the arrival of the pioneers Ludwig Beckert and Johann Scheiermann;
the first mission area in the mountains of Abra; the arrival of the SSpS
missionaries in 1912 in Tayum, Abra; until the deportation of the SVD
missionaries in 1918.
Part III (pp. 173-318) recounts the expansion of the SVD mission from
1920-1932, notably the mission in Mindoro under the leadership of the
regional superior, Theodor Buttenbruch.
Part IV (pp. 319-470) reports more mission areas accepted from 19321947 especially the mission in Cagayan. This period also saw the establishment
66
Diwa 39 (2014): 64-67
of Christ the King Mission Seminary in 1933 and the martyrdom of Bishop
Wilhelm Finneman during the Japanese Occupation.
Part V (pp. 471-562) presents the period of the consolidation of the
SVD missionary endeavors (from the parts title) between 1947-1957: the
SVDs in Cebu City (the University of San Carlos); the beginnings of the
SVD Chinese Apostolate in Manila (the St. Jude Parish); and the sending
abroad of the very first Filipino SVD missionaries, a historical turning point:
Fr. Fernando de Pedro and Fr. Manuel Villaruz were sent to Indonesia on
November 25, 1951.
The book also contains reproductions of 81 archival images.
Layugan is currently rector of the Divine Word Seminary-Tagaytay.
FEDERICO VILLANUEVA AND JOSEPH TOO SHAO, The Book
of Psalms 1-72, Asia Bible Commentary Series (Manila: Asia Theological
Association, 2013), xiv + 324 pp.
The series (ABC) aims to enable readers to understand the Scriptures
in their own context, and to interpret and apply them to the plurality of
Asian cultures in which they live and work (from the blurb). The volume is
a commentary with a contextual application of Books 1 and 2 (Psalms 1-41
and 42-72 respectively).
The author is a guest professor at the Divine Word Seminary-Tagaytay.
CHRISTINA A. ASTORGA, Catholic Moral Theology and Social Ethics: A
New Method (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2014), xxviii + 571 pp.
The Introduction (pp. 1-70) provides an overview of Catholic moral
theology after the Vatican II. The book has a tripartite framework, the
authors proposed paradigm: Vision (Part I, pp. 71-236); Norm (Part II,
pp. 237-394); and Choice (Part III, pp. 395- 496). The concluding section,
Integration, (Part IV, pp. 497-516) attempts to make a synthesis of the three
parts.
FRANZ-JOSEF EILERS, SVD (ed.), Church and Social Communication:
Basic Documents 1936-2014, 3rd ed. (Manila: Logos Publications, 2014), 639 pp.
The collection consists of documents of the Church on social
communication (first edition in 1993; the second in 1997). The editor also
BOOK NOTICES
67
provides a helpful introduction of this latest edition (pp. 7-8). It would be of

interest to know that the very first document was on motion pictures (Pope
Pius XI, Vigilanti Cura, 1936) and the latest is a bit dated, Church and
Internet (Pontifical Council for Social Communication, 2002), apart from
the usual papal messages during World Communication Day.
The editor is a former professor at the Divine Word Seminary-Tagaytay.
JAMES H. KROEGER, MM, Asias Dynamic Local Churces: Serving Dialogue
and Mission (Quezon City: Claretian - Jesuit Communications, 2014), xii +
197 pp.
This publication emerges from an intense interest in and serious study
of the Asian Church over several decades. It is presented in seven thematic
chapters that reflect a 2013 lecture series at Dharmaram Vidya Kshetramnm
in Bangalore, India. The book seeks to capture and highlight the central and
pivotal theological-missiological themes emerging in the Asian Church in
recent decades, themes which reflect the Spirit-inspired movement already
noted earlier. Pope Benedict XVI asserted (September 20, 2012) that the
new evangelization started precisely with the Council, which Blessed John
XXIII saw as a new Pentecost. Likewise, the profound and extensive renewal
in and of the Church in Asia is intimately linked with living the Council in
Asia [from the Introduction].
LUCAS F. MATEO-SECO, Ang Iisa at ang Tatlo sa Diyos, trans. Emmanuel
Marfori (Translators publication, 2013).
The book is a translation from Spanish of Mateo-Secos textbook on
the Trinity (Universidad de Navarra, 2008). The translator teaches systematic
theology at the Divine Word Seminary.
DWST Semicentennial
Theological Symposia
2013-2014
__________________________
This section presents selected lectures from a series
of monthly theological symposia held throughout the
school year 2013-2014 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Divine Word Seminary Tagaytay.
Divine Word Seminary: History, Perspective,

and Orientation towards New Evangelization
ANTOLIN V. UY, SVD

ith the idea of decongesting Christ the King Seminary,

the Provincial Council sent the father provincial to
scout a piece of land for sale in Cavite in 1954. The
initial transfer to the proposed site would, however, involve
neither the minor seminarians nor the theologians but the novices.
The purchase of a 65-hectare land was effected in the middle of January

1957. In April 1957, then Superior General Aloisius Grosse-Kappenberg
commanded that the two departments must be separated, and that
immediately.1 The Provincial Chapter of December 1957, by a vote of 17 to
8, resolved that the major department should leave the present Christ the
King.2 The following year, October 12, Kappenbergs successor,3 Superior
General John Schuette, decided to sell the 65-hectare land in Alfonso and
recommended the purchase of a piece of land, between 13 to 15 hectares,
in Tagaytay, 15 kilometers from Alfonso. Schuettes recommendation was
approved four months later in 1959 by the Generalate with an accompanying
sum of 100,000 as a contribution towards the purchase.4 Which department,
finally, to transfer?
With a push from Schuette, a decision was arrived at in the Provincial
Chapter of 1963. A number of capitulars airing reservations voted 19 against
1
Letter of Fr. Provincial Francis Kutscher to Fr. General John Schuette, April 30, 1958.
Kutscher was SVD Provincial, 1956-58. Schuette was SVD General, 1958-67.
2
Resolutions of the Provincial Chapter at Christ the King, Manila, December 2830,
1957, p. 1.
3
Schuette was elected superior general on March 28, 1958. Catalogus Sodalium Societatis
Verbi Divini (Steylensis: Domus Missionum ad S. Michaelem Achangelum, 1958), p. 7.
4
The property purchased in 1964 was 15 hectares worth 435,000.00. See Divine
Word Seminary, Tagaytay City, in Witness to the Word: Society of the Divine Word Philippines,
1909 2009, ed. Antolin Uy (Manila: Logos Publications, 2009), p. 149.
70
Diwa 39 (2014): 69-77
5 in favor of retaining theology at Christ the King, and of moving out

philosophy and novitiate as a unit. Schuette, who was presiding at the
chapter and who seemed to see the future better than the 19 capitulars,
suggested that we ought to stick to this as an overall plan. If at a later date
we want to build theology at Tagaytay, it will still remain a possibility.5 This
initial decision did not prevail for long.
While lack of space in Christ the King was the original and most weighty
reason to transfer, Rector Fr. Alphonse Mildner added as another reason the
deterioration in discipline. Exaggerating a bit, he wrote the General: The
biggest seminary in the Far East and the worst in discipline, both in the
minor and the major department We have no more the best spirit in
the major department.6 An American confrere and professor, Fr. Bernard
Telenko, added his two-piece advice: a stay of 10 to 14 years in one place is
too long and the socializing with the opposite sex of scholastics excessive.7
The confreres agreed with Fr. Joseph Bette, the novice master, who was living
with only one lung: die Ruhe, die Kuehle, die Atmosphaere makes for an
ideal place. The argument that Manila offered excellent schools with top
professors could be debunked provided that the Society takes real care and
interest in the seminary.8
On March 9, 1963, Schuette erected canonically the mission house in
Tagaytay, and on March 12 the novitiate. The Holy Spirit was named patron
of the seminary.
In Tagaytay: The First Days

On September 12, 1963, a Thursday and the Feast of the Holy Name of
Mary, the first group of pioneers arrived. They were two professed brothers;
thirteen brother novices; Fr. Leo Muehl, their novice master; and Fr. August
Smarzly, procurator. The house chronicler described Tagaytay some forty
years ago:
It is a dead city for there are very few people living here and very
few houses. Perhaps its because of banditry and hold-ups which
have occurred not too infrequently in the past. However, the place
itself is famous for its cool climate much cooler than Manila
5
p. 9.
Minutes of the Provincial Chapter at Christ the King, Manila, January 1719,1963,
Divine Word Seminary, p. 151.

Ibid., p. 150.
8
Ibid., p. 151.
6
A. V. Uy, Divine Word Seminary
71
but milder than Baguio. Indeed, it is a place conducive to prayer,

study, and meditation. And, perhaps, this is one of the reasons
why it has been chosen as the seedbed of the Major Department
of the Philippine SVD. Tagaytay City is also noted for its scenic
spots, e.g., the panoramic, breath-taking view of Taal Lake with
its famous volcano standing majestically in the midst.9
The 44 clerical novices who arrived on November 7, 1963 were

accompanied by Fr. Jose Vicente Braganza, socius to the novice master, Fr.
Bette. Fr. Alois Lehberger, the in-coming and first rector, would assume his
post on July 4, 1964.10 Officially appointed with Lehberger was Mildner, the
new novice master. He would remain in office for twelve years. On June 15,
1964, Schuette and the Provincial Council voted viva voce for the transfer of
all scholastics to Tagaytay, and ordered the construction of a new building
for theology and that a church would have to be built as soon as possible.11
The philosophers left Christ the King on July 6, 1964. The week after, on
Monday (July 13), the theologians followed suit even though the scholasticate
building was under construction. All stayed jam-packed at the new novitiate
building before transferring to the philosophy (Janssen) building in August
1964. The Tagaytay community then numbered 131 in all, clerical novices
included. The first ordination to the priesthood, of Rev. Benjamin Raboy and
Rev. Fernando Baral, took place on December 7, 1964 at Imus Cathedral.
Scholastics and Social Involvement

On August 13, 1967, the Pope John XXIII Training Center, now the
postulancy, was blessed in the presence of Bp. Artemio Casas of Imus and
Dean Jeremias Montemayor, founder and president of the Federation of
Free Farmers. The beginnings of the center were rough and the reasons for
its existence were hotly questioned. Is the undertaking, volunteered the
treasurer general in Rome, not a big bother for Tagaytay?12 Understandably,
seminary professors and formators also aired their reservations but, by and
large, acknowledging the rationale of their young charges, allowed them with
fatherly caution. Fr. Manfred Mller offered 38,388 for the construction
of the center. On their own, the scholastics helped raise funds by holding
House Chronicle, Divine Word Seminary, September 1963.
House Chronicle, Divine Word Seminary, July 1964. Fr. Lehberger left Tagaytay for
the Interdiocesan Major Seminary in Vigan in July 1965. He came back again as Rector in
July 1966, resigning in 1968.
11
Letter of Fr. Frederick Scharpf to the author, April 9, 1989.
12
Divine Word Seminary, p. 154.
9
10
72
Diwa 39 (2014): 69-77
concerts. Fr. Caloy Rodriguez, now a Trappist monk in the Abbey of Our
Lady of Gethsemani in Kentucky, used to sport cowboy clothes and to belt
cowboy songs. The center was more than just a place, it symbolized the SVD
scholastics involvement in social action which was held to be an integral
part of religious missionary formation.13 Human progress and development,
after all, are not alien to the Churchs mission to transform the world.
The barrio apostolate aimed at the creation of self-sufficient, independent
Christian communities. The fratres association with the Federation of Free
Farmers (FFF) led not only to the establishment of local chapters and in the
conscientization process of the farmers. They joined demonstrations for and
with farmers.14 They linked with cause-oriented groups.
Rallies were directed against government malpractices and abuses against
privileged oligarchs. In one mass protest against an extravagant wedding
anniversary celebration where jetsetters and the Manila elite mingled, the
police drove the scholastics with truncheon and water hose. Fr. Briggs
Odtohan recalls a memorable bukol on his head. Edicio de la Torre, Charlie
Avila, Max de Mesa, and Conrado Balweg were names identified with street
rallies. The school year 1973 1974 produced the biggest ordinations in 50
years: 22 new SVDs. It must ultimately be said that the 1970s ushered in
the glory days of the scholastics history of social involvement; the 1970s are
justly the glory days of Divine Word Seminary Tagaytay (DWST).
An SVD Seminary or a Consortium

It was not unforeseen, in fact, not unexpected, that Divine Word
Seminary located in scenic Tagaytay would evolve into something more, like
into a central seminary. Casas expressed a desire for the SVDs to take over
the dioceses minor seminary and to send his major seminarians to Tagaytay.
Bp. Alejandro Olalia of Lipa was of the same intent and willing to put up a
formation house nearby. Bp. Wilhelm Duschak of the Vicariate of Calapan
procured a three-hectare land for a formation and resthouse for the vicariates
diocesan seminarians and priests. The Superior General was out and out for
it.15 Other bishops, according to Duschak, have similarly shown an interest
in the project and the Papal Nuncio is fire and flame for a central seminary
in Tagaytay.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 154-155.
15
Ibid., p. 155.
13
14
73
The dream of a common seminary failed to create a consortium of member

religious congregations with shared authority and responsibility; instead,
DWST developed into a cluster of autonomous affiliated houses of formation:
eleven congregations and three from the diocesan clergy. They are the Clerks
Regular of Somasca (CRS), Fil-Mission Seminary (MSP), Congregation of
Jesus and Mary (CJM), Oblates of Saint Joseph (OSJ), St. Augustine Major
Seminary (SASMA), St. Lawrence of Brindisi House of Studies (OFM Cap),
San Pablo Theological Formation House (SP), Pontifical Institute for Foreign
Mission (PIME), Tahanan ng Mabuting Pastol (TMP), Religious Tertiary
Capuchins of Our Lady of Sorrows (Amigonians), Servants of the Paraclete,
Society of the Divine Saviour (SDS), Society of the Divine Word (SVD)
and a couple of lay auditors.16 The seminary is conducting presently a special
program, the Certificate for Theological Studies, directed mainly to the laity.
Divine Word Seminary in Numbers

In its first 25 years of theology (1964 1989), Divine Word Seminary
counted 690 graduates from the 4-year ecclesiastical course: 312 SVDs, 241 of
the diocesan clergy, and 137 from various congregations and religious houses.
In the next 25 years (1989 2014), the seminary graduated 954 students264
more than the last 25 years. The SVDs numbered 244, less by 68 compared to
the previous 25 years. The diocesan graduates experienced a perceptive increase
from 259 to 500. The religious congregations still enjoyed a good figure of 183.
In short, the last 50 years of Divine Word Seminary graduated 1,644 fourth
year graduates; the presumption is that most, if not all, became priests. Of the
556 SVDs, 127 are presently in foreign lands, e.g., 28 in the Americas, 25 in
Africa and 25 in Asia. The 741 diocesan graduates is a sizeable addition to the
countrys diocesan clergy. The religious congregations, some of them new in the
country, still gained 320 in the last 50 years.
Today, DWST counts 255 clerical and lay students: 40 SVDs, 56 diocesan
seminarians (from 13 dioceses), and 76 from different religious houses of
formation. To this is to be added 83 lay students. The 83 laymen and women
belong to the Certificate for Theological Studies which offers a 2-year course of
excellent lectures in scriptures and missiology. Started in 2007, it now counts
101 graduates. Also under the umbrella of DWST is the Alternative Learning
System which enrolls out-of-school youth.
Ibid., p. 157.
16
74
Diwa 39 (2014): 69-77
The Council and the Chapters

Divine Word Seminary is a child of Vatican II and a happy fruit of the
Societys vision of the recent General Chapters. In many ways Divine Word
Seminary anticipated as well as put into action the ideas of the Council. The
Churchs fervor after Pope John XXIIIs reign excited the world and no less
Tagaytay. Quite on their own, the scholasticsfeeling freer, less legalistic,
and full of initiativesexhibited a relaxed attitude without being lax; their
creativity, however, always was tempered by a sense of responsibility. Within
the seminary structure the scholastics reorganized themselves, establishing the
Forum in 1969, diversifying their apostolates into retreat giving, catechetical
programs, social action groups, and social studies. Their outreach program
revolved around the barrios of Tagaytay and neighboring towns. Individual
fratres went for campus ministry in several non-Catholic universities in Metro
Manila. In barangays and in schools, occasional vocation catch would come
up for Christ the King. Within the seminary grounds the medical and housing
projects of Brother Ignatius transformed fratres into instant medical aids and
house inspectors. The city officials of Tagaytay, the City Mayors and their
council believe that, from the very start of its existence until today, the presence
and the various apostolates of DWST have contributed towards a peaceful life
in the tourist community.
The concept of mission has profoundly evolved since the Louvain-Muenster
controversy, until resolved by the Ad Gentes of Vatican II. A look at our last
three General Chapters reveals that the concept of mission has further evolved
into a finer and richer understanding. This contemporary concept, we can
honestly say, perhaps with pride, is uniquely and properly SVD, and got clearly
enhanced with the Societys emphases given the terms new evangelization and
interculturality in Chapter documents. The thrust of prophetic dialogue and
its four characteristic dimensions towards our mission partners has rendered
our scholastics more aware of the transformative power of mission. The harder
and more challenging the mission area is, the more attractive to them. The
cultural minorities are the preferred mission partners for dialogue. For regency
and mission summer exposures, they go with the Mangyans, Palawanons,
Muslims, Tingguians, Kalingans, and Subanons. The seminary itself plays
host to Vietnamese, Indian, Malagasay, Indonesian, and Burmese students.
The seminary is reliving the heritage of Fr. Arnold Janssen and our ethnologist
Fr. Wilhelm Schmidt, of discovering God among primitive tribes. Preaching
the good news and proclaiming salvation is singularly effected through the
proclamation of the love of God.
75
The establishment of the Divine Word Institute of Mission Studies

(DWIMS) is expected to boost the missiological slant of the seminary. A
pioneering project of the Central Province and the Generalate, DWIMS will
attract ASPAC professors and students as well as members from different
religious, missionary congregations, male and female, in the country. Because
of its interconnection with the pontifical University of Santo Tomas, DWIMS
is scheduled to grant post graduate ecclesiastical and civil degrees in Missiology.
The research work and courses are designed to broaden and enrich our SVD
insights of new evangelization and interculturality and prophetic dialogue.
Divine Word Seminary will do its share to complement the academic programs
of DWIMS.
Akin to interculturality is the internationality of our Society, observed in
Divine Word Seminary studentry and, more importantly, in the professorial
staff and the SVD community. Up to the 2000s, non-Filipino SVDs formed
a part of the administration and professorial roster. Added to this were the
Caucasian guest professors from different congregations. Advantages abound
in an international community, not only the pleasant company on a personal
and intellectual level, but on some other aspects. Our Arnoldus Library is
a gift from Czechoslovakia via the SVD Dutch Province. The funds for the
philosophy building, or retreat house, or the present DWIMS building came
from the Generalate. One can still see the marks of the architech, Fr. Frederick
Linzenbach in the four main structures of the seminary. Not many years
ago, foreign professors visited and taught at Tagaytay through the initiative
of the Generalate, in particular the secretary of education. The Society is
much centralized, yet the office of the Superior General has always been for
the advantage of the life and development of Tagaytay. Centralization means
sharing each others assistance and support.
The Mission Seminary

Our Filipino SVDs found in various countries both feel at home and
also sense a measure of triumph. And rightly so. The late Fr. Erasio Flores,
for years a Consultor General, advances an observation:
By force of history, the Filipino has had more ample exposure
to other cultures, especially to western cultures; more perhaps,
than all of his Asian peers. It is no surprise that he has kind
of developed a natural capacity for accommodating other
cultures. The Filipino is friendly, light hearted, cheerful, patient,
condescending, a bit easy-going, qualities that can be so easily
mistaken for being childish.
76
Diwa 39 (2014): 69-77
This is confirmed by sundry examples from our confreres abroad.

Says Fr. Teofilo Perey from Benin: Nowadays, there prevails a
harmonious co-existence among Moslems, Christians, and non-believers
alike. In the religious ministry, a similar harmony prevails.
Listen to a veteran from Congo: About ten heavily armed troops took
turns in interrogating me, as they suspected me of harboring elements and
worse, being one of them. The interrogation lasted from 9:30 pm to 2:30 am.
I held the Bible up and told them, This is my only weapon.
Fr. Julius Plaza personally helps a Colombian bishop: We do our best
to mediate and dialogue with opposing political and military forces so that
respect for human rights and dignity of the human person are upheld.
Finally, another enlightening testimony from Fr. HS: A Filipino
missionary can work wonders for Indonesiansthe identity shared by both
is unbelievable: brown skin, similarity of language, same flora and fauna.
As missionaries, we blend well with them in terms of thought, heart, and
expression. The walls of difference seem nowhere to be found.
Divine Word Seminary has been from the very beginning always
considered a mission seminary in parallel with Christ the King Mission
Seminary. In Germany our seminary is called a Missionshaus. Rumor was
a high prelate casually dropped a remark that DWST could be the second
pontifical seminary in the country with specialization in missiology. The
remark touches on a point not particularly known to many. In 1981 Pope
John Paul II stressed the missionary vocation of the Philippines: I wish
to tell you of my special desire that the Filipinos will become the foremost
missionaries of the Church in Asia. This repeats what Paul VI expressed in
1970, and still years before, the wish of the mission pope, Pius XI. The same
Pope encouraged Provincial Teodoro Buttenbruch in 1932 in his dream of
setting up a mission house in the country.
Even as bishops desire that their seminarians receive pastoral training,
they also expect the seminary to imbue in them solid missiological orientation.
A number of religious congregations entered DWST precisely because it is
strong in mission theology. With the Divine Word Institute on Mission
Studies (DWIMS) in place, the seminary will hopefully lift the missionary
awareness of the Philippine Church.
77
Divine Word Seminary, Next Semi-Centenary

Fifty years is only a measure of time, but it is intimately connected with
the missionary nature of Christ and his Church. As long as there are mission
partners to dialogue with and peoples to evangelize, our seminary does not see
its demise in the foreseeable future. The number of vocations is diminishing
everywhere, and our seminary does not expect any exception. It will survive
and persevere for as long as the Philippines remains strongly Catholic. It will
not die, it will just fade away in the bosom of Gods providence.
Two questions persistently haunt us: vocationsI speak specifically
of SVD vocations. The other is the flow of professors, i.e., SVD resident
professors.
First: four hundred eighty SVD confreres scattered throughout the
archipelago and the more than 50,000 students in our schools are no
mean and useless numbers. We consequently have no reason not to tap
the resources at hand so as to intensify recruitment campaign. Non-SVD
religious congregations visit our schools and invite candidates for themselves.
Why cant we? They appropriate personnel just for this purpose. Why dont
we? We can certainly organize better, program our campaign proficiently.
Second: right in Tagaytay, and unlike the previous generations, the scholastics
manifest willingness to become formators and to proceed for further studies.
The late Bp. Duschak once remarked on us SVDs: Money they have for
good buildings but not the brain for a strong faculty.17
With our DWIMS and with the prevailing great interest in mission
studies, it is imperative that we strengthen our faculty. We should seize the
day when we could demonstrate that our Society and Tagaytay are, in our
vision and mission, truly missionary.
17
Letter of Bishop Wilhelm Duschak to Father Provincial Heinemann October 7, 1966.
Sie haben das Geld fuer gute Bauten, aber nicht das Him fuer einen guten Lehrkoerper.
Bishop Duschak concluded the letter with these words.

ANTONIO M. PERNIA, SVD

irst of all, I would like to thank the organizers of the DWST Semicentennial
Celebration Committee for the invitation to speak at this symposium
on the topic of the State of Mission Today. It is a privilege for me to
do so today, on the occasion of the Grand Alumni Homecoming, organized
as the culmination of the year-long celebration of DWSTs golden jubilee.
Thank you allpresent and former students, professors, formators and staff
of the Divine Word Seminary in Tagaytayfor coming and making these two
days a joyous celebration of the 50 years of existence of our dear Alma Mater.
And now to the topic assigned to me in this symposium. I would like to
divide this talk on The State of Mission Today in two parts. In Part One, I
would like to speak about the shifts in mission today, and then in Part Two,
I would like to draw out some of the implications of these shifts for mission
today.
Two Shifts in Mission Today

In speaking about The State of Mission Today, one cannot overlook
the important changes that have taken place in our understanding and in our
practice of mission over the recent past. Of the many such changes, I wish
to single out two important ones, namely, the shift in the concept of mission
and the shift in the situation of mission today. Thus, (1) a Paradigm Shift
and (2) a Situational Shift.
The Paradigm Shift: From Missio Ecclesiae to Missio Dei

Theologians of mission today speak of a paradigm shift in mission
theology. There are various ways of describing this shift of mission paradigm.
A. M. Pernia, The State of Mission Today
79
Some say it is a shift from a Church-centered to a Kingdom-centered

understanding of mission.1 Others say it is a move from a conquest-mode
to a dialogue mode of mission.2 However way it is described, this shift
of mission paradigm entails a change of our understanding of the origin of
mission, the goal of mission, and the mode of mission.
The Origin of Mission
The most basic change in the understanding of mission concerns the
question of the origin of mission, namely, that the origin or source of mission
is not the Church but the Triune God himself. This idea comes from Vatican
II itself. As we know, Vatican IIs document on the missionary activity of
the Church, Ad Gentes, traces the origin of the mission of the Church to
the sending by the Father of the Son and the Holy Spirit in order to bring
about Gods universal plan of salvation (AG 1-2, 9). This idea has come to be
known as the Trinitarian origin of Mission.
This idea of Vatican II parallels the notion of missio Dei in Protestant
theology, by which mission is understood as derived from the very nature of
God.3 Mission is not primarily an activity of the Church, but an attribute
of God. As Triune God, God is a missionary God, and mission is seen as a
movement from God to the world. The Church is viewed as an instrument
for this mission. Thus, there is Church because there is mission, and not vice
versa. Or, it is not the Church of Christ that has a mission, but the mission
of Christ which has a Church.4
1
For instance, Michael Amaladoss, New Images of Mission, Promotio Iustitiae 94
(2007), pp. 21-22; Id., New Faces of Mission, UISG Bulletin 99 (1995), pp. 21-33.
2
For instance, Edmund Chia, Mission, Dialogue and Missionary Congregations,
SEDOS Bulletin 34 (2002), pp. 52-53.
3
Cf. David Bosch, Transforming Mission: A Paradigm Shift in Theology of Mission
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 389-393. As a modern missiological concept,
missio Dei can be traced back to the work of Karl Barth in the 1930s. It was first introduced
at the International Missionary Conference (IMC) at Willingen in 1952 by K. Hartenstein,
director of the Basel Mission. However, the idea, missio Dei, did not gain prominence in
missiological thinking until the 1990s, perhaps because of a certain passivity with which
it became associated in some circlesthat is, if mission is Gods work then perhaps it is
best left to God, without our interference. Indeed some saw in it a tendency to exclude the
involvement of the Church in mission. However, in the 1990s it was increasingly seen as an
important expression of mission spiritualitythat is, that those involved in mission must
be conformed to the Mission and ministry of Jesus. Cf. also Theo Sundermeier, Theology
of Mission, in Karl Mller et al. (eds.), Dictionary of Mission: Theology, History, Perspectives
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), p. 434.
4
Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (New York: Crossroad,
1975), pp. 967-969, s.v. Mission. Cf. also Stephen Bevans and Roger Schroeder, Constants
in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), p. 8.
80
Diwa 38 (2013): 78-92
The theology behind all this is the vision of the Triune God as communion
and communication, interaction and dialogue, between Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. And this inner communication or dialogue overflows intoor
better, embracescreation and history. Mission, then, is the Triune Gods
ongoing dialogue with the world and with humanity, a dialogue that invites
and draws humanity into full communion with the divine community. Thus,
there is mission not because it is mandated by the Church, but because God
is a Triune God. Thus, Mission, before being about what the Church does,
is about who God is.
The Goal of Mission
The second change in the understanding of mission flows from the first,
namely, that the goal of mission is not the Church, but Gods universal plan
of salvation. The Trinitarian understanding of mission enlarges the scope
of mission. Its goal is no longer just the extension of the visible Church in
those places where it is not yet present, but the realization of Gods mission
or Gods salvific plan as such. This salvific plan is universal and embraces the
whole human race and, indeed, all of creation.
St. Paul speaks of it as uniting all things in heaven and on earth in
Christ (Eph 1:10) or as reconciling all things in Christ (Col 1:20). The Book
of Revelation speaks of the emergence of a new heaven and a new earth (Rev
21:1-4). Jesus proclaims it as the good news of the coming of the Kingdom
of God. The image of the Kingdom of God in Jesus preaching is his vision
of Gods plan for a world of justice, freedom, fellowship and love, requiring
both personal conversion and social transformation.
The biblical text that brings this out most clearly is Lk 4:16-30 which
narrates Jesus programmatic discourse in the synagogue of Nazareth at
the start of his public ministry. Applying to himself and to his ministry the
prophecy of Isaiah (Isa 61:1f), Jesus outlines the features of his ministry:
bringing the good news to the poor, liberty to the captives, sight to the blind,
freedom to the oppressed. The aim and purpose of proclaiming the good
news is liberation. This chapter of Luke ends with Jesus telling the people: To
the other towns also I must proclaim the good news of the kingdom of God,
because for this purpose I have been sent (Lk 4:43). For some missiologists,
this text of Luke has, for all practical purposes, replaced Matthews Great
Commission (Mt 28:16-30) as the key text for understanding not only Jesus
mission but also that of the Church.5
Cf. Bosch, Transforming Mission, p. 84.
81
The Mode of Mission

The third change in the understanding of mission concerns the mode of
mission or the way of doing mission. During the era of colonization mission
was carried out in the so-called conquest mode. In those days, missionaries
often came on the coat-tails of the colonizers.6 Friars and colonizers stood
side by side each otherthe one with cross and the other with sword in
handto evangelize the natives, but also to subdue them to foreign rule. This
way of doing mission operated out of medieval theology where the Church
believed herself to be the one and only bastion of truth. Other religions were
regarded as in error at best and demonic at worst. And the Church saw it as
her moral obligation to conquer, dominate and replace these religions.
Seeing mission as missio Dei acknowledges that God has been in dialogue
with all peoples from the beginning. Other religious and cultural traditions,
therefore, contain seeds of the Word (AG 11) or rays of the Truth (NA
2). They are not entirely evil or totally in error. Thus Vatican II introduced
the theme of dialogue. Dialogue, of course, presupposes a certain respect
and regard for the partner-in-dialogue. For no one engages in dialogue with
another who is regarded as unworthy or inferior. Thus, documents of Vatican
II state that the Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in other religions,
and urge Catholics to enter with prudence and charity into discussion and
collaboration with members of other religions.7
Post-conciliar documents underline this idea even more strongly. For
instance, a 1984 document of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious
Dialogue8 states that dialogue is the norm and necessary manner of every
form as well as of every aspect of Christian mission. In other words, dialogue
is no longer simply an option that we are at liberty to do or not do. Dialogue
is now a missiological imperative. Other post-conciliar documents say the
same thing, like Pope Paul VIs first encyclical Ecclesiam Suam (e.g., 72) and
Pope John Paul IIs mission encyclical Redemptoris Missio (e.g., 57).
6
This was the era of the marriage between church and state, when the missionary
work of the Church was undertaken under the patronage of kings and emperors, e.g., the
Patronato Real.
7
For instance, Nostra Aetate 2, Ad Gentes 11, 12.
8
Cf. Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, The Attitude of the Church towards
the Followers of Other Religions, 1984.
82
Diwa 38 (2013): 78-92
The Situational Shift: From Missio Ad Gentes to

Missio Inter Gentes
The second shift refers to the situation of mission. This can be expressed
as a shift from Mission understood exclusively as missio ad gentes to Mission
understood also as missio inter gentes.
Since the time of the early Church, a clear distinction and demarcation
existed between the gentes (ethne) and the populus Dei (laos tou theou)
that is, the distinction between the chosen people of God and the nations, or
the Jews and the gentiles, the circumcised and the uncircumcised, the believers
and the pagans. In fact, this distinction became the basis of the division of
labor between Peter and Paul. they saw that I had been entrusted with
the gospel to the uncircumcised, just as Peter to the circumcised, for the one
who worked in Peter for an apostolate to the circumcised worked also in me
for the Gentiles (Gal 2:7-8).
Along with this distinction was the other distinction between the center
of faith and the periphery of unbelief, or the distinction between inside
and outside. In the early Church, the center of faith was Jerusalem and the
surrounding nations the periphery of unbelief. In much of the history of the
Church, Christian Europe was the center of faith and the rest of the world
was the periphery of unbelief. In the context of this dual distinction, missio
ad gentes was necessarily missio ad extra. Mission was going out to the
pagan nations. Mission was a one-way movement from Christian Europe
to the pagan world. Thus, the expressions mission sending (or missionary
sending) countries and mission receiving (or missionary receiving)
countries. Or, the expressions missionary Church and mission Churches.
Changed Circumstances
Two recent developments have changed this situation radicallyone in
the Church and the other in the world.
Missionaries from the South
The first development is the emergence of missionaries originating from
the south of the world. Europe is no longer the sole or even the primary source
of missionaries. This has to do with the drastic drop of religious and priestly
vocations in Europe and North America. So, we are now witnessing the
phenomenon of missionaries originating from the southfrom Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. This, in turn, has to do with the growth of vocations and
the maturity of what formerly were called mission churches or the Churches
of the so-called mission receiving countries. This is not only a question of
83
what sometimes is called reverse missionthat is, missionaries from the

former mission territories going as missionaries to Europe or North America.
For missionaries from the south also go as missionaries to Asia, Africa and
Latin America. Thus, we speak today not only of a south-to-north but
also of a south-to-south mission, in contrast to the earlier situation where
mission was largely a north-to-south phenomenon.
An indication of this is the Society of the Divine Word. As we all know,
in the SVD today, there are some 800 Asian missionaries working outside
of their home countries in Europe, the US, Latin America, Africa, and other
parts of Asia. Indeed, the SVD Asia-Pacific (ASPAC) zone has not become
a primary source of missionaries in the SVD. In recent years more than two
thirds of those receiving first assignments in the Society have come from
ASPAC. Of these, about 53% received first assignments outside their home
countries. Similarly, but on a smaller scale, we have around 50 African
SVD missionaries working outside Africa, and about the same number of
Latin American SVD missionaries working outside Latin America. This
would mean close to a thousand missionaries from the south only from one
missionary congregation.9
Multiculturality
The other development is the growing multiculturality of many of
the cities and countries of the world. Due to the phenomenon of people
on the move (whether because of international migration or the refugee
situation), societies are becoming more and more multicultural. At the turn
of the millennium, it was estimated that there were 150 million international
migrants worldwide (this is one out of 50 persons).10 Similarly, it was
estimated that there were 50 million refugees or forced migrants (that is,
one out of 120 persons).11 It is said that today, after the first decade of the
new millennium, the number of people on the move has increased by almost
45%, which means a total of around 280 million people on the move.
While migration is an age-old phenomenon, the global nature of
migration in our age is what gives it a particular prominence. More people
today choose or are forced to migrate than ever before, and they are travelling
to an increasing number of countries. International migrants come from all
9
Cf. also Rose Nkechi Uchem, Shifting Perceptions of Mission: Values for Missionary
Life Today: Problems and Prospects, SEDOS Bulletin 41 (2009), pp. 261-270.
10
Cf. IOM (International Organization for Migration), Global Migration Trends: An
Era of International Migration, Geneva: IOM Publications, http://www.iom.int.
11
Cf. Michael Blume, Il Fenomeno Globale Dellimmigrazione, Citt del Vaticano:
Pontificio Consiglio della Pastorale dei Migranti e degli Itineranti, May 29, 2000.
84
Diwa 38 (2013): 78-92
over the world and travel to all parts of the world. As a result, people from
different cultures not only are in much closer contact today, oftentimes
they are forced to live alongside each other. Many of the worlds cities today
are inhabited by widely diverse cultural groups. And often the diversity of
cultures also means a diversity of religions. This massive movement of people
is radically changing the face of our cities.
Missio Inter Gentes
It follows from what has just been said that today missio ad gentes can
no longer be identified exclusively with missio ad extra. For the gentes are
no longer only those who are out there, those who are outside. The gentes
are also here among us and around us. It may be the family that lives next
door, the person I sit beside in the bus, the young man who comes to fix my
television, the lady in the market I buy vegetables from.
Today, more and more, missio ad gentes needs to be understood as also
missio inter gentes.12
And when seen not as a replacement of but as a complement to missio
ad gentes, missio inter gentes can enrich our understanding of mission today.
Three nuances of missio INTER gentes can be of particular help in enlarging
our concept of mission today.
Mission as Dialogue WITH People
While ad gentes underlines the necessity of proclamation, inter
gentes stresses the indispensability of dialogue in mission. While the direct
proclamation of the Gospel remains a permanent requirement in mission,
dialogue has also become a missiological imperative. As mentioned earlier,
the 1984 document of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue
states that Dialogue is the norm and necessary manner of every form as
It should be said, however, that while missio inter gentes is a distinct possibility in our
home countries, this does not eliminate the necessity of missio ad gentes ad extra. Indeed, the
traditional mission territories continue to need the witness of cross-cultural missionaries
from abroad. In fact, missio ad extra is essential if missio inter gentes at home is to become a
serious commitment. First, missio ad extra provides the missionary the experience of being a
minority in a foreign land. This usually allows the missionary to see how mission needs to be
dialogue inter gentes and not just proclamation ad gentes. This will also make the missionary
realize why humility, powerlessness, respect and solidarity are required in mission. Second,
missio ad extra also allows the missionary to be exposed to the original cultures and religions
of the migrants who come to other countries. This will give the missionary an opportunity
to study and truly understand the cultures and religions of these people. Such an experience
will eventually benefit missio inter gentes at home.
12
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well as of every aspect of Christian mission. In other words, dialogue is no

longer simply an option that we are at liberty to do or not do. It is now an
imperative in mission. Pope John Paul II in Redemptoris Missio put it in the
following way: Each member of the faithful and all Christian communities
are called to practice dialogue, although not always to the same degree or in
the same way (RM 57).
Mission as Encounter BETWEEN Peoples
While ad gentes brings out the idea of a specialized group of persons
(missionaries, religious, priests) being sent on mission to other peoples, inter
gentes evokes the notion of mission taking place in the encounter between
entire communities or groups of people. One can think, for instance, of the
dialogue of life between the members of one Catholic parish and those of
a local Muslim community, or the students of a Catholic school and those
of a non-Christian school. One can also think of the witness given by
Catholic migrants in a Muslim country in the Middle East, or the witness of
Catholic migrant domestic helpers in the homes in secularized Europe. As
Church documents never tire of repeating, mission is not just a prerogative
of specialized individuals in the Church but the duty of the entire People of
God.
Mission as Finding a Home AMONG the People
While ad gentes stresses the cross-cultural nature of mission and evokes
the picture of the missionary being sent to another people, inter gentes
underlines the fact that the missionary is sent in order to settle in and find a
new home among the people. Ones mission is meant not just as a temporary
work place but as a permanent home among a new people. This is part of the
whole purpose of inculturation and cultural adaptation. This is part of the
logic of the incarnation. Just as the Divine Word pitched his tent among us,
so also the missionary is expected to pitch his or her tent among the people
he or she is sent to. This is exemplified in the life of many of our earlier
missionaries. An example is our first SVD missionary to China, St. Joseph
Freinademetz, who strove to become a Chinese among the Chinese. Only
when one succeeds in transforming oneself to become one with the people,
will the missionary be able to transform the people to become followers of
the Gospel of Jesus.
Thus, Missio INTER Gentes enlarges our understanding of mission
mission as dialogue WITH people, mission as encounter BETWEEN
peoples, and mission as finding a home AMONG the people.
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Implications for Mission Today

Let me now move to the second part of this talk, namely, the implications
for mission today of the above-mentioned Paradigm Shift and Situational
Shift.
The Task of Promoting a Multicultural Church

The first implication, which flows from the second shift, i.e., the
situational shift described above, is that mission today needs to address
the challenges of an increasingly multicultural world. This entails missionary
activities like the ministry to migrants, refugees and other displaced people.
Other related ministries are urban ministry (since most migrants and
refugees are found in the cities), ministry among women (since women make
up the bulk of migrants and often have to carry the heaviest consequences
of migration), inter-faith and ecumenical dialogue (since migration brings
together not only people of different cultures but also people of different
religions).
But all of these ministries which are related to a multicultural world
need to be seen in the context of the larger vision of mission as promoting
a truly multicultural Church. A truly multicultural Church is one which is
characterized by three things, namely, (1) the Church as a home for people of
different cultures, (2) the Church as an instrument of intercultural dialogue,
and (3) the Church as a sign of the all-inclusiveness of the Kingdom of
God.
Home for People of Different Cultures
A multicultural Church will be seen by strangers and foreigners not just
as a more tolerant but also a more welcoming Church. And for the Church
to be more welcoming, three elements are essential,13 namely, that it be a
Church that fosters the recognition of other cultures (i.e., allows the culture of
migrants, strangers or foreigners to be visible in the community), encourages
respect for cultural difference (i.e., avoids any attempt to level off cultural
differences by subsuming the minority cultures into the dominant culture),
and promotes a healthy interaction between cultures (i.e., seeks to create
a climate whereby each culture allows itself to be transformed or enriched
by the other). With these characteristics, a multicultural Church will be a
community where people of various cultures will feel they belong.
Cf. Robert Schreiter, Ministry for a Multicultural Church, http://www.sedos.
org, Articles in English.
13
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Instrument of Intercultural Dialogue

A truly multicultural Church, however, cannot limit itself to just caring
for those who belong to its community, i.e., strangers and foreigners who are
Christians or Catholics. A truly multicultural Church must also look beyond
itself and minister to non-Christian migrants, refugees and displaced people
by being an instrument of intercultural dialogue in the larger society. It must
work towards creating in the larger community the conditions whereby the
three elements mentioned above can be realized, i.e., recognition of other
cultures, respect for cultural difference, and healthy interaction between
cultures. This will mean promoting genuine dialogue among people of
various cultures.
Sign of the All-inclusiveness of Gods Kingdom
A Church that fosters genuine interculturality within itself (ad intra)
and promotes intercultural dialogue outside itself (ad extra) will be a truly
credible sign of the all-inclusiveness of the Kingdom of God. It will be a
witness to the universality and openness to diversity of Gods Kingdom. Such
a witness is especially needed in the age of globalization. For globalization
tends on the one hand to exclude and marginalize the poor and the weak and
on the other hand to create a uniformity which eliminates all differences.14
A multicultural Church will be a proclamation that the Kingdom includes
everyone and excludes no one, and that in it there are no strangers or foreigners
but only brothers and sisters. It will be an image of a universal gathering of
all peoples about which the prophet Isaiah speaks: Thus says the Lord: I am
coming to gather all nations and tongues; and they shall come and shall see
my glory (Isa 66:18).
The Conversions Required in Mission Today

The second implication, which flows from the first shift, i.e., the
paradigm shift described above, is that the notion of missio dei entails some
fundamental conversions in our way of doing mission today. For me, four
such conversions are required, namely, (1) from activism to contemplation,
(2) from individualism to collaboration, (3) from superiority to humility, and
(4) from only evangelizing to also being evangelized.
From Activism to Contemplation
14
Cf. SVD, XV General Chapter Statement, in: In Dialogue with the Word, No. 1, Sept.
2000, nos. 48-51.
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The first conversion is from activism to contemplation. Very often we are

very Pelagian15 in our way of doing mission. We act as if mission depends
more on our efforts than on Gods grace. And so we frequently fall into the
danger of activismthat is, the danger of thinking that the best way to
do mission is to become effective in what we do. And so we work and work
and work, and give our attention almost exclusively to the effectivity of what
we do, and no longer have the time to also pay attention to the quality of
our lives and the credibility of our personal witness. This is the danger of
behaving as if all that counts is what we do and thus neglecting to care for
who we are.
Seeing mission as missio Dei makes us realize that our participation in
mission is fundamentally an encounter with mysterythe mystery of the
Triune God who calls all of humanity to share in his life and glory, the
mystery of Gods salvific plan for the world, the mystery of the presence and
action of Christ and the Spirit in the world. Thus, the very first challenge in
mission is to seek out, discern and strengthen the presence of Christ and the
action of the Spirit in the world. But it will be impossible to discern if we do
not approach mission in contemplation. For to contemplate is precisely to
look, to listen, to learn, to discern, to respond, to collaborate.
The missionary, then, evangelizes not primarily by doing things for the
people but by being with them and enabling them to do things for themselves.
The missionarys mission method will be marked not by frenetic activity but
by contemplative presence among Gods people. The missionary will not be
tempted to explain away the mystery of God, but rather try to lead people
into this very mystery through signs and symbols in respectful dialogue. He
or she will give priority to being missionary over doing missionary things.
Thus, one expectation of missionaries today is the development of
the contemplative spirit in mission. We need to abandon the idea that
contemplation is the opposite of mission. We need, rather, to promote the
idea that contemplation is a constitutive dimension of mission. In fact,
experts tell us that contemplation entails not just an ascending moment of
prayer, meditation, adoration but also a descending moment of gazing at
the world with the eyes of God. The ascending moment of learning to gaze
at God leads to the descending moment of learning how to gaze at the world
with the eyes of God. For it is only from the wider perspective of Gods world
15
I refer here to the famous controversy in Church history between St. Augustine who
emphasized the primacy of grace and Pelagius who, in contrast, emphasized the primacy
of human effort in the human beings relationship with God.
89
that we see how much the world is in need of redemption, liberation and
salvation. Only from the wider perspective of Gods world do we see how
much the world suffers, how many are the people who hunger, how often the
children die an untimely death. Only from this perspective do we see how
much the world needs mission.
How different would our world be if we all learned to see the world
with the eyes of God. Under the gaze of Gods eyes, enemies would become
friends, separating walls, would become open doors, strangers would become
brothers or sisters, borders would become bridges, diversity would lead not
to differences but to unity. Indeed, only if people learn to see the world with
Gods eyes would our mission truly bear fruit.
From Individualism to Collaboration
A second conversion is from individualism to collaboration and
teamwork. Often we think that we are the only ones called to mission
whether in the sense of the individual or in the sense of ones congregation.
Rugged individualism has long been a description of our early missionaries.
This description came along with the notion of the missionary as a bush
missionary who single-handedly tried to create a Christian community in
the midst of a hostile environment.
Indeed, very often, we do our work, and do it well, but it is our work and
no one elses. Another missionary is only a nuisance or a hindrance to our
work. This can apply to the individuale.g., I do not need any other confrere,
no assistant, no companion. But this can also apply to our congregation
e.g., we do our work well when we do it by ourselves. We do not need other
missionaries. Let them find some other work. We have our own work and we
have no need of collaborators.
Seeing mission as missio Dei makes us realize that our call to mission
is really a call to share in Gods mission, which implies a call to collaborate
with God, first of all, and with all others who are similarly called by God.
missio Dei implies that mission is larger than what each individual or each
congregation can do. It is even larger than what all of us together can do.
Collaboration, then, is not just a strategy for mission. We collaborate not just
because we want to be more effective in mission. Collaboration, in fact, is
an essential characteristic of mission. Collaboration is a statement about the
nature of mission. By collaborating we are saying that mission is Gods first
in the first place and that the primary agent of mission is Gods Spirit.
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Thus, another expectation of missionaries today is the promotion of a

collaborative attitude in mission.
From Superiority to Humility
A third conversion is from superiority to humility. I was once talking
with an African colleague who decried the fact that missionaries in the past
preached the gospel as if they owned the faith, dictating thereby the terms
by which it must be understood (doctrine/dogma), lived (morals/ethics)
and celebrated (liturgy/worship). Coming largely from Christian Europe,
many missionaries indeed acted as if the gospel was theirsthat is, as
if it was part and parcel of their European heritage and of their European
identity. Coming, likewise, from what was assumed to be a higher culture
and from economically developed and technologically advanced countries,
missionaries in the past often evangelized from a position of power and
superiority. And apparently, this assumed superiorityreligious, cultural,
economic and technologicalgave them the right to impose the Christian
gospel on peoples who were considered culturally primitive, religiously
pagan, economically poor and technologically backward.
Seeing mission as missio Dei makes us realize that the Christian gospel
is not the possession of any one people of a particular culture, but that it
is meant for all peoples and cultures, and for all times and generations.
The missionary is never the owner or master of the gospel, but only its
steward and servant. Today, then, the missionary is called to preach the
gospel not as if he or she owned it, dictating thereby the terms by which it
must be understood, lived and celebrated. The approach of the missionary
today must be to share the faith as a gift received from God through others,
conscious of himself or herself as merely its steward or servant and never its
owner or master.
Mission, as we mentioned earlier, is entering into the Triune Gods
ongoing dialogue with peoples. But in doing so, the missionary should be
careful not to interpose himself/herself as an intermediary in this ongoing
dialogue, but should rather promote it. He/she should guard against imposing
his or her own agenda, but should rather discover Gods agenda in this
ongoing dialogue. The missionary, therefore, will respect the freedom of God
who is present and active among the people, and respect as well the freedom
of the people who are responding in their own way and at their own pace.
The missionary will walk with the people and respect the pace of the peoples
walking. As a person of dialogue, the missionary will be one who facilitates
rather than blocks the ongoing dialogue between God and Gods people.
91
This entails that today the missionary is called to evangelize from a

position of powerlessness, lowliness and humility.16 He or she will not seek
powereconomic, cultural, technological, or even media power. The only
power he or she will need is the power of the Word and of the Spirit. And
that power is the power of love, which is manifested in self-giving. The
ultimate reason for humility in mission is that mission is Gods and not
ours. Put differently, the Kingdom of God is an eschatological reality. And,
even if we are called and sent to work for it, we do not know how, when
and in what form Gods Kingdom will emerge in the world. Thus, another
expectation of missionaries today is the development of the spirit of humility
and powerlessness in mission.
From only evangelizing to also being evangelized
A fourth conversion is from only evangelizing to also being evangelized. In
the past, mission was thought of as a one-directional activity. Evangelization
was like a one-way street, where everything was done by the missionary for
the people. The missionary was the evangelizer, the people the evangelized.
The missionary was the bearer of good news, the people the recipient of the
gospel. The missionary was the subject, the people the object. The missionary
was the preacher who preached the truth, the people the ones who needed
conversion.
Seeing mission as missio Dei which entails dialogue changes our view
of mission. It corrects the notion of mission as a one-way street which puts
the emphasis almost entirely on the great work done by missionaries and
the great gift brought by them, with little attention paid to the recipients of
this gift. Dialogue underlines the fact that the Spirit is at work in the people
being evangelized as well as in the evangelizers, and that mission is a twoway exchange of gifts between missionaries and the people with whom they
work.
Consequently, missionaries must be ready to give and receive, to
evangelize and be evangelized, to speak and to listen. They must be prepared
to change and be changed, to form and be formed, to invite to conversion
and be converted.
Thus, a fourth expectation of missionaries today is the promotion of
openness to being evangelized. We need to abandon the idea that mission
In his first letter, Peter says that Christians should always be ready to give an
explanation to anyone who asks for a reason for your hope, but that they should do so
with gentleness and reverence (1 Pet 3:15-16). Likewise, in his book Transforming Mission,
David Bosch speaks of doing mission in bold humility.
16
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entails only the task of evangelizing the people. We need to correct the
assumption that evangelization is only for the people and not for the
missionaries. We need to promote the idea that mission necessarily entails also
our own ongoing evangelization as missionaries. As St. Joseph Freinademetz,
our first SVD missionary to China, used to say: The greatest task of the
missionary is the transformation of ones inner self. We can expect the
people to be converted to the Gospel and become disciples of Jesus only if we
ourselves are ready to be converted and become truly one with the people.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by saying that today is an exciting time for mission.
A new mission paradigm calls for missionaries to be more contemplative,
collaborative, humble and open to being evangelized themselves. A new
mission situation suggests the need to promote a Church which is more
inclusive and truly multicultural.
Our times are made even more exciting by the charismatic leadership
of Pope Francis as Universal Pastor of the Church. He dreams, he says, of
a missionary Church, more outward-looking rather than inward-looking,
more concerned with affairs ad extra rather than with issues ad intra (cf. EG
27-28), ready to be bruised, hurting and dirty because it has been out on
the streets, rather than unhealthy from being confined and from clinging to
its own security (EG 49).
And it is a mission that involves all of us together. For the basis of mission
is the Joy of the Gospel, a joy which is a missionary joy, and a joy which
excludes no one, for it is a joy for all people (cf. EG 20-23). Thus, the Pope
says, all of us are asked to obey his call to go forth from our own comfort
zone in order to reach all the peripheries in need of the light of the Gospel
(EG 20).
Today, then, as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of this mission seminary,
the Divine Word Seminary of Tagaytay, allow me to join Pope Francis in
inviting you all to join in Mission and to embark on this adventure of joy,
the Joy of the Gospel.
Response to Fr. Antonio Pernias Key Address:

JOHN FUELLENBACH, SVD
Sankt Augustin, Germany
irst of all, with all my heart I would like to thank the organizers of
this celebration for inviting me to be the one to give a response to
the key note speaker Tony Pernia to his address entitled The State of
Mission Today. It is not usually the case that the teacher gives a response
to his students key note address. At least I can say, I feel honored to do so.
Response:
First of all, I must say I am impressed by how Pernia brought together a
topic that took over 50 years after Vatican II to unfold to maturity with such
clarity and competenceand in only one speech. The material he presented
is not just a fine intellectual presentation of thoughts, it puts together a lot
of observations and experiences as well. It is precisely this mixture that made
your topic so exciting and convincing.
What I can do in the time span allotted for my response is to pick out
from his comprehensive presentation a few points of which we should make
ourselvesconscious and aware once again.
The speaker divided his talk into two parts: first, the theological
foundation based on the documents of Vatican II and their unfolding over
the last 50 years.
Secondly, the pastoral and spiritual implications that have developed
from there, you put under one heading: Implications for Mission Today,
though they deal with both the pastoral and the spiritual or contemplative
dimension of mission. I will structure my response accordingly: theological,
pastoral and spiritual.
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Diwa 38 (2013): 93-98
The Theological Foundation

The paradigm shift (defined as: a change in the basic assumptions) that
occurred in Vatican II and whicht the speaker namesamong others
as the first and the most important and basic one: a shift from Churchcentered to Kingdom-centered, is based on the insight that Gods saving
will, incarnated in Jesus Christ, is present now through the Holy Spirit in
every culture and religion on earth. (The alignment: Kingdom, the whole
World and the Church in the service of the Kingdom, meant for the whole
of creation.)
What that means I would like to illustrate with a picture I discovered
on an island in the South Pacific and which serves me always in a visible
way to show the main achievement of Vatican II. On the banner you see a
large ship approaching the inland. In front of the ship stands a bishop with
a number of missionaries. The bishop is solemnly dressed with a cross in his
hand and the missionarieswith the Bible in both hands waving them high
in the air to greet the large crowd gathered at the shore to watch the ship
approaching. What caught my attention was: in the middle of the natives
there is Jesus waving with his hands welcoming the missionaries as if he was
saying: Finally, you are coming. I have been here already for centuries. It is
high time that you found the way to find me here already present among my
native brothers and sisters.
Of course, this basic shift in Vatican II had significant repercussions on
all topics of theology. For mission it might be best expressed as Pernia put it:
a shift from conquest mode to dialogue mode.
For many, even theologians, however, it took a long time to see and to
understand the tremendous shift that had happened in Vatican II where this
shift was officially accepted.
In theology at the present moment, there is a call for a re-reading of the
documents of Vatican II. This time however it is from the situations of our
present day which Pernia calls the situational shift.
Others have called it a shift from the inside to the outside, i.e., from the
statements of faith and practices (Dogma and Morals) towards the people
(conquest mode) to a shift from the outside to the inside, meaning, from
the people and their social-cultural practices, in which they find themselves
when they practice their faith in their own local churches.
Pope Francis asks precisely for such a shift for the whole Church when
he demands from the Church to see everything from the periphery, that is,
J. Fuellenbach, Response to The State of Mission Today
95
from the outside inward and he demands this look not only from the Church
but regards it as a particular task of religious because it has always been
regarded as their charism to carry out the prophetic ministry of the Church.
As institutionalized prophecy as it has been called, it was always regarded
as having a particular sensitivity for the signs of the times.
Therefore we can say: the hermeneutical challenge of todays rereading
of the Council texts is to be found in the category of change of locality
indicated in the Councils Pastoral Constitution: The Church in the World
Today.
Pernias presentation is preciselyeven if at times very briefa masterly
put together summary of what has already happened in the understanding of
mission because of this paradigm shift.
Pastoral Aspect of Mission

The theological argument for a paradigm shift is ultimately bound to
the question: where is God and his saving will to be found today first and
foremost, and therefore, where do we have to locate ourselves today? This is
a life issue today particularly for us as a missionary order with a mission at
the fringe of society.
It has to be said with some pride that we SVDs in almost all general
chapters after the Council have paid particular attention to this ongoing
shift that had happened and was still happening by constantly reformulating
our understanding of mission. At least, we did that on paper (called chapter
resolutions). How far we put these resolution into practice, will be the real
test of how seriously we take what we say. Or one could say: will our chapter
resolutions remain merely paper tigers or will we give the tigers real teeth?
Pernia touches this issue in his talk under the topic of a multicultural
Church. The answer given to this was our option for the poor. This however
has to be more specified, since mission applies to the whole world which is by
now multicultural almost anywhere.
The poor of today show their faces more distinctly in the refugees, the
migrants, the displaced people, and women.
Pope Francis seems never to get tired in voicing and promoting these
priorities in speech and personal actions. This might be coming forth from
his social and pastoral background as bishop in the South-American setting.
If the primordial place of Gods presence is among his people, and in a
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special way among the poor, this incarnational approach is the fundamental
orientation of the Church today. If this is so, then one would expect to find
it strongly reflected, both spiritually and ministerially, in the contemporary
religious life paradigm.
Our present Superior General, Heinz Kulke, seems to be very much
concerned with this commitment to the poor whichlike in the case of the
present Popemight be due to his intense pastoral involvement with the
marginalized in Cebu.
Some pastoral theologians have analyzed the change of location made
by the Council by showing the difference between a church as a religious
community and a church as a pastoral community. As a religious community,
the Church is still a relatively powerful institution with influence and social
presence.
The novelty that the Second Vatican Council has brought can be found
mainly in the fact that the Church should be seen decisively from the viewpoint
of the pastoral community. This has far-reaching consequences: Away from
the orientation on social forms towards the orientation on pastoral tasks!
For real practice is not the mere execution of what has been planned but the
risk of the unplanned, as Karl Rahner already pointed out. This, however,
means that we must turn the usual Catholic school of thought from its head
to its feet! This might be the meaning of what Pope Francis wanted to say
with the well-known phrase: The shepherd must walk among his sheep in
order to smell like them.
This whole issue of how and where we have to insert ourselves today,
Pernia presented in detail very well. The Church as a whole and the religious
in particular are bound to look at the situation from a point of pastoral
challenges, to create flexible social forms and find imaginative and Spirit-led
ways to solve them. The rule of thumb is clear and irreversible: First only
(pastoral) content and then (religious) form! Such a reorientation of Church
action, aligned to the Council event defines and qualifies pastoral action in
a radically new way: as a creative and action-related confrontation between
the Gospel and human existence today.
The option for the poor, which prefers the injured bodies and the
precarious existences that, in the sense of what Metz calls the mysticism of
open eyes, demands our special attention. Therefore, religious life of postmodernity would be vita consecrata situalisand not primarily vita consecrata
institutionalis. The first task of such a vita consecrata situalis would be to look
J. Fuellenbach, Response to The State of Mission Today
97
for best practice places, where already now a different order of things is
visible.
The Spiritual or Contemplative Aspect of Mission

The realization that Gods mission concerns the whole world (Kingdom
as broader than the Church) led to a change of locality to where we should
insert our mission. Particularly the apostolic orders like ours took this
challenge most seriously with the effect that they moved from the monastic
(with a dominant stress on community and spirituality) to the social
ministries giving all attention to what we do. The monastic or contemplative
aspect got very often dangerously neglected. The danger was and still is that
missionaries are seen and even see themselves more as development agents
than as witnesses of the mission of God, who wants all people to share in his
glory and life.
The drifting apart of the contemplative and the ministerial aspect in
our being Christians has been lamented and critically observed. In contrast
to the apostolic orders with their stress on the ministerial instead on the
contemplative new orders and movements made their appearance as a fresh
beginning. They restore well understood traditional themes and practices
(e.g., Eucharistic adoration, the religious habit), while marrying them to the
modern impulses of option for the poor, simplicity of life, spirituality. And
there is seemingly a knock-down argument in their favor at least in Europe
and the USAwhatever vocations seem to go to them!
It is no secret that John Paul II as well as Benedict XVI saw renewal of
religious life rather happening among the newly emerging movements than
as forthcoming from the traditional apostolic orders (Legions of Christ, The
Neocatechumenate and Opus Dei). Both Popes lamented that the traditional
orders were losing the fire and the enthusiasm essential for their vocation.
In coming to see the Trinitarian origin of mission with the ultimate
aim and goal of creation to be transformed into an icon of the Trinity (Karl
Rahners basic view of creation), the contemplative aspect of the Churchs
mission gained once again proper significance. Karl Rahner foresaw this in the
sixties when he postulated his now famous pronouncement: The Christian
in the future will be no Christian anymore unless he/she is a mystic. That
means he/she has made the experience that the Triune God lives already in
him/her and he/she is driven to let others find the same truth in themselves.
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This reminds me of the famous advice Roger Schutz (former Abbot of

Taize) always gave to the young people, who came to Taize: The only Gospel
people will still read today is you as an embodiment of the message of Jesus.
I definitely could not say it better than Pernia in his speech: We need
to abandon the idea that contemplation is the opposite of mission. We need,
rather, to promote the idea that contemplation is a constitutive dimension
of mission. In fact, experts tell us that contemplation entails not just an
ascending moment of prayer, meditation, adoration but also a descending
moment of gazing at the world with the eyes of God. The ascending moment
of learning to gaze at God, leads to the descending moment of learning how
to gaze at the world with the eyes of God. For it is only from the perspective of
God that we can see how much the world is in need of redemption, liberation
and salvation.
All this has been said over and over again by the last general
administration, it has been put down in Chapter-resolutions, in the agenda
of our Nemi renewal courses and the Circular letters of the Generalate. That
real conversion is needed, everyone talks about today. Fundamental to this
sign of the time is the call to go back to the demand of the gospel: to follow
the Lord as he walked on this earth. In short, it asks us to contemplate again
Jesus own definition of what he demanded from everyone who seriously
wanted to walk with him in order to bring to final completion the mission
that the Father had entrusted to him. Whoever wants to carry Gods mission
to the whole world must put him/herself in second place, take up his/her
cross and follow Christ with total commitment.
Let me conclude with the words of Pope Francis which Fr. Pernia quotes
at the end of his speech:
Pope Francis dreams of a missionary Church, more outward looking
rather than inward-looking, more concerned with affairs ad-extra rather
than with issues ad-intra (cf. EG 27-28), ready to be bruised, hurting and
dirty because it has been out on the streets, rather than unhealthy from being
confined and from clinging to its own security (EG 49). And it is a mission
that involves all of us together. For the basis of mission is the Joy of the
Gospel, a joy which is a missionary joy, and a joy which excludes no one, for
it is a joy for all people (cf. EG 20-23).
The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II:

Prospect in Mission
ARIS MARTIN, SVD

I. Introduction
mbitious as it is to talk about the Eucharist, the Church and the Second
Vatican Council in a few pages, this essay will try to revisit, or at least
have a feel of, Vatican IIs climate and go as far as biblical sources
to better understand the renewal of the Church. It all begins with a man,
Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, canonized Saint John XXIII on April 27, 2014.
The election of this 77-year-old Pope after the death of Pius XII on
October 9, 1958 gave way to the idea of a transition stage in the Catholic
Church. G. Alberigo writes, The conclave had elected Cardinal Roncalli
on October 28, 1958, with the confident expectation that this would be a
transition pontificate, that is, one that would be short and would peacefully
heal the traumas inflicted by Pius XIIs long and dramatic reign.1 With an
old pope, nobody expected a major event in the Church, especially a council.
In fact, Alberigo continues, already during the conclave some cardinals must
have talked about the possibility of having a council. For this reason, the
choice of Cardinal Roncalli, keeping in mind his age, is a deliberate choice
which avoided such a scenario.2 In the minds of the many, the age of the pope
seemed to contradict the complex and lengthy project of the Council.3
To the surprise of many, three months later on the festive anniversary of
the Conversion of St. Paul, at the heart of his message, John XXIII addresses,
Venerable brothers and our beloved sons! We announce to you, indeed
trembling a little with emotion, but at the same time with humble resolution
1
Giuseppe Alberigo, The Announcement of the Council: From the Security of the
Fortress to the Lure of the Quest, in History of Vatican II, Vol. 1: Announcing and Preparing
Vatican II Toward a New Era in Catholicsim, ed. G. Alberigo and J. A. Komonchak
(Maryknoll, NY - Leuven: Orbis - Peeters, 1995), p. 2.
2
See Alberigo, The Announcement of the Council, p. 3.
3
Ibid.
100 Diwa 39 (2014): 99-109

of intention, the name and the proposal of a twofold celebration: a diocesan
synod for the city, and an ecumenical council for the Universal Church.4
Immediately, the old Pope boldly calls for a commission to prepare for a
council (the Central Preparatory Commission). He invited the Catholic
episcopate to take an active role at the level of the universal Church in the
preparation of a future Council: it was the Pope himself who insisted on
guaranteeing the effective freedom of this consultation.5
From 1959-1960, sometimes called the pre-preparatory period, the Curia
and Cardinal Tardini proposed sending the bishops questionnaires asking
for suggestions as to the topics that should be discussed at the Council.
However, the Pope rejected the proposal, preferring a completely free and
unconditional consultation.6 Confirming this historical data is then Cardinal
Ratzinger who recalls the story that moved Cardinal Frings.
John XXIII had not personally decided on themes for the Second Vatican
Council, but he invited the worlds bishops to make their suggestions, so
that the subjects to be treated by the Council might emerge from the lived
experience of the universal Church. In the German Bishops Conference,
the urgent task at hand seemed to be to offer a comprehensive vision of the
Church, and that the theme of the Council should be the Church. However,
the senior bishop of Regensburg, Bishop Buchberger, who was esteemed
and respected far beyond his diocese for having conceived of the 10-volume
Lexicon fr Teologie und Kirche, now in its third edition, asked to speak and
said: Dear brothers, at the Council you should first of all speak about God.
This is the most important theme.7
In the end, Ratzinger affirms that the Second Vatican Council clearly
wants to speak of the Church within the discourse on God, to subordinate the
discourse on the Church to the discourse on God and to offer an ecclesiology
that would be theo-logical in a true sense.8
Ecclesiology that is theo-logical in a true sense is what the Council has
to unearth. What does it mean? Two words may help us understand the spirit
of the Councils ecclesiology that is theo-logical, namely, the banners of the
Vatican II The Voice of the Church, Pope Johns Announcement of an Ecumenical
Council, http://vatican2voice.org/91docs/announcement.htm (accessed August 23, 2014).
5
G. Alberigo, Vatican II and Its History, Concilium 4 (2005), p. 9.
6
Ibid., p. 14.
7
J. Ratzinger, The Ecclesiology of the Constitution on the Church, Vatican II Lumen
Gentium, http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/ cdfeccl.htm (accessed December 16, 2011).
8
Ibid.
4
A. Martin, Eucharistic Ecclesiology 101
Italians which is aggiornamento and the French which is ressourcement. Two

pillars of Vatican II: aggiornamento and ressourcement. Initially, these words
express ideas almost diametrically opposed to each other since aggiornamento
looks forward (updating) whereas, ressourcement looks backward, going
back to the source. But one thing brings them together, both are geared
to change. This makes Vatican II an event. These pillars, aggiornamento
(updating, looking forward) and ressourcement (back to the source/ back to
the biblical and the fathers of the Church, looking backwards), were the
pillars for renewal.
Ressourcement is linked to the Latin Ad fontes which is the motto of the
humanist Renaissance, a call to return to the good literature of antiquity. In
Catholic thought it is a recovery of an older theology or of the theology of
the Fathers. This was the spirit not only of the Council but also of the preconciliar stage which can be traced back to Newman in his first encounter
with the Church Fathers in the autumn of 1816. The ressourcement during
the Second Vatican Council started many centuries before it. J. Carola adds,
Rooted in a strong sense of history, the pre-conciliar patristic retrieval
sought to reinvigorate the study of theology with the works and the spirit
of the patristic age. This retrieval took place in a context that can be called
Catholic in so far as it operated according to an hermeneutic of continuity,
resisting the temptation to interpret the patristic age in opposition, as it were,
to subsequent ages.9 The importance of the recovery of the patristic mode
significantly expresses a return to the life-giving well-springs of theology.
Return to the Fathers; return to the apostolic age; return to biblical
times; return to the fullness of time; return to Christ! This was clear to John
XXIII, to the Council fathers, to Vatican II. This is what Vatican II offers
after opening the windows of the Church in order for fresh air to come in.
This is renewal. This is being responsive to the signs of the times. Does the
Church want renewal, to be relevant, to be updated? Then she must go back
to Christ!
II. The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II

Norman Tanner, the author of The Councils of the Church, posed a
question during exams: With all the challenges that the Church is facing, do
you think we need another council to address them? My immediate answer,
after going through some of the documents of Vatican II was a categorical
See J. Carola, Pre-conciliar Patristic Retrieval, Augustinian Studies 38 (2007), p. 382.
102 Diwa 39 (2014): 99-109

NO. And my reason was: We have not explored and exhausted the richness
and beauty of Vatican II. If only, we seriously take into consideration the
documents of Vatican II, then the Church will be secured in the midst of
adversities. This is the reason why, then Pope Benedict announced this year a
year of faith in commemoration of the 50 years of Vatican II with the purpose
of appreciating the beauty of our faith. Saint Augustine says, we can only
love that which we think is beautiful. We can never appreciate, nurture and
take good care of our faith, if we are not convinced of its loveliness. Norman
P. Tanner claims that we belong to a privileged generation, because we are
the only generation to have lived in the light of this great council. More
fortunate, he adds, are those who have lived before and after the Council,
for the experience of pre-Vatican or post-Vatican adds greater appreciation.10
Some interesting data about Vatican II make it a great event in the
history of the Church. Approximately, 2,300 persons attended as members
of the Council. Great theologians were made: Monsignor G. Philips, E.
Schillebeeckx (from Belgium); H. Kng (Germany/Switzerland); B. Hring,
K. Rahner (Germany); Y. Congar, H. de Lubac and J. Danilou (France);
and C. Murray (USA). Kroeger in his book, Vatican II Journey opens with
this phrase: Ignorance of Vatican II is ignorance of the action of the Holy
Spirit in the Church Today.11 Indeed, Vatican II is the new Pentecost.
In Vatican II, there were grading in the status of the 16 decrees although
these distinctions were never defined officially. There were declarations
(those on education, non-Christian religions and religious freedom). This is
the lowest status because there was not sufficient unanimity for a fuller or
more authoritative statement. There were nine decrees and four were given
the solemn title constitutions. Of the constitutions that on the liturgy has
no further qualification. The other three do have: Dogmatic Constitution
on the Church (November 21, 1964); Dogmatic Constitution on Divine
Revelation (November 18, 1965); and Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the World of Today (December 7, 1965).
Now let us turn to the two significant documents of Vatican II: Lumen
Gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, a cornerstone document
from which other documents are simply expansions of its chapters; and
Sacrosanctum Concilium, the Constitution on Sacred Liturgy.
N. P. Tanner, The Councils of the Church: A Short History (New York: Crossroads,
2001), p. 96.
11
James H. Kroeger, Vatican II Journey: Fifty Milestones (Makati City, Philippines: St.
Pauls, 2012).
10
On December 4, 1963, the end of the second year of the Council, the
first document, which is a Constitution on Sacred Liturgy, was approved
with a general vote of a wide margin 2,147 to 4. One of the reasons why there
was a relatively early acceptance of the Constitution on Sacred Liturgy was it
provided a common ground to the so-called conservative and the progressive.
They both agreed on two points: first, the need for greater participation in
the liturgy especially of the laity and in the Eucharist and, second, the need
to return to the sources of liturgy. Ratzinger sees it differently. He claims that
the Constitution on Sacred Liturgy was the first text approved in the Council
not for pragmatic motive but it has a deeper meaning within the structure of
the Council: adoration comes first, therefore God comes first.12
We know very well that liturgy is primarily the work of God, opus Dei,
where we are privileged to have been invited to participate.
The document opens with these words:
This sacred Council has several aims in view: (1) it desires
to impart an ever increasing vigor to the Christian life of the
faithful; (2) to adapt more suitably to the needs of our own
times those institutions which are subject to change; (3) to foster
whatever can promote union among all who believe in Christ;
(4) to strengthen whatever can help to call the whole of mankind
into the household of the Church (SC 1).
Immediately after presenting the objectives of the Council, Sacrosanctum

Concilium talks about the nature of the church which is implied in the
liturgical celebration of the Eucharist. It says, For the liturgy, through
which the work of our redemption is accomplished, most of all in the divine
sacrifice of the Eucharist, is the outstanding means whereby the faithful may
express in their lives, and manifest to others, the mystery of Christ and the
real nature of the true Church (SC 1).
Clearly this Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy points us immediately
to the Church whose nature and mission is expressed in the Eucharist.
Ratzinger once again comments that the issue about God in the liturgy was
codified ecclesiologically.13 It is in the celebration of the liturgy especially in
the Eucharist that the church is truly herself. In other words, the churchs
nature and mission are truly manifested in the Eucharist. The renewed
liturgy brought about a renewed church. Keith Pecklers observes that the
J. Ratzinger, The Ecclesiology of the Constitution on the Church, p. 2.
Ibid.
12
13
104 Diwa 39 (2014): 99-109

new Roman Catholic liturgy brought about by Vatican II recovered the
churchs identity as subject of the liturgical actioneven as the primary
locus of Christs presence.14
Lumen Gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church affirms that
taking part in the Eucharistic sacrifice, which is the fount and apex of the
whole Christian life, they offer the divine victim to God, and offer themselves
along with it (LG 11). Turning to the constitution on the Church where it says
that the Eucharist is a liturgical act which is considered the fount and apex of
Christian life, reinforces the inviolable connection between the Eucharist and
the Church. Ratzinger explores this connection in his book, Il Dio vicino with
a subtitle, Leucaristia curore della vita Cristiana, by concluding that, the life
of the Church is drawn ultimately from the Eucharist.15 The identity of the
Church comes from the Eucharist.
Archbishop Marini comments, Celebrating the Liturgy is itself the
primordial source of renewal in the Church. We learn the liturgy by celebrating
it. The more we succeed at celebrating the liturgy, the more we live Christian
life and the more we succeed in transforming the Church.16 The celebration
of the Eucharist as a liturgy is a reflection of the Church. [A] Christian
community is judged by the liturgy it celebrates. For the liturgy of the
Church is an infallible index of that particular churchs inner dynamism. In
other words, the way we worship together reveals the kind of church that we
are.17 In fact, liturgy is considered as the life of the church, without which
the church is lifeless. Liturgy is the life of the community, without which we
are dead. The Catechism of the Catholic Church says, Those who receive the
Eucharist are united more closely to Christ. Through it Christ unites them
to all the faithful in one body: the Church.18
III. The Earliest Biblical Account on the Eucharist

There are four Eucharistic accounts in the Bible, three in the synoptics
and one in 1 Corinthians 11. The Gospel of John does not have a Eucharistic
account, instead it has the long bread of life discourse in chapter 6. In the
spirit of ressourcement of Vatican II, let us go to the earliest Eucharistic
K. Pecklers, Worship: New Century Theology, (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2005) p. 112.
J. Ratzinger, Il Dio vicino: Leucaristia curore della vita Cristiana, Vaticano 2005.
16
Quoted by K. Pecklers, The Genius of the Roman Rite: On the Reception and
Implementation of the New Missal (London: Burns & Oates, 2009), p. 115.
17
A. Pieris, The Asian Way to Celebrate the Eucharist, Worship 81 (2007), p. 320.
18
CCC 1398.
14
15
account by St. Paul written around the year 54-57 in Ephesus, two years
after leaving Corinth. Why was this letter written? 1 Cor 1:11 says, It has
been reported to me about you, my brothers, by Chloes people, that there
are rivalries among you. What kind of rivalry? Paul continues, I mean that
each of you is saying, I belong to Paul, I belong to Apollos, or I belong
to Cephas, or I belong to Christ. Then Paul inquires, Is Christ divided?
Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?
(1 Cor 1:12-13). This division in the Corinthian church is reflected even in
the celebration of the Lords Supper.
Then Paul reminds them, I am writing you this not to shame you, but
to admonish you as my beloved children (1 Cor 4:14). And how will Paul
admonish them? 1 Cor 10:16 says, The cup of benediction which we bless,
is it not the participation (koinonia) of the Blood of Christ? The bread which
we break, is it not the participation (koinonia) of the Body of Christ? Then,
Paul admonishes, Because the bread is one, we though many are one body,
all of us who partake of this one bread. It is no doubt that koinonia is the
context proper to both the Lords Supper and the church. This word koinonia
which means fellowship is closely associated with metoke (metoch ), , which
means participation.
Very interestingly, Paul is trying to solve the problem of rivalry
and division in the Corinthian church and as a solution he proposes this
Eucharistic tradition:
For I received from the Lord what I also handed on to you, that
the Lord Jesus, on the night he was handed over, took bread, and
after he had given thanks, broke it and said: This is my body
which is for you. Do this in remembrance of me. In the same way
also the cup, after supper saying, This cup is the new covenant
in my blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance
of me. For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup
you proclaim the death of the Lord until he comes. Therefore,
whoever eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily
will have to answer for the body and blood of the Lord. A person
should examine himself, and so eat the bread and drink the cup.
For anyone who eats and drinks without discerning the body,
eats and drinks judgment on himself. That is why many among
you are ill and infirm, and a considerable number are dying
(1 Cor 11: 23-32).
The early Church considered the Eucharist as the primary act of witnessing
by any baptized Christian. It is a privilege of the baptized to participate in
106 Diwa 39 (2014): 99-109

the Lords Supper. Baptism as a sacrament of being incorporated to Church
serves as a condition sine qua non to participate in the Eucharistic celebration.
Baptism as membership of the Church is linked to the Eucharist. Implying
the unity in Christ through baptism, Paul reminds missionaries or leaders of
their roles as collaborators (1 Cor 3:9) or even ministers or servants. And the
role of the ministers or leaders is to unite everybody in Christ, which is also
the purpose of liturgy, i.e., the eating of the same bread and drinking of the
same cup (1 Cor 10:16). Unity therefore is not only a quality added to the
nature of the Church or an attached character in celebrating the Eucharist.
Unity is inherent in the being of the Church and in the celebration of the
Eucharist.
Paul strongly wants to teach the Christians that the divisions among them
which come from the socio-cultural structure are affecting their community
life and the way they celebrate the Lords Supper. Because of this, he uses the
Eucharist as a way of explaining the value of communion or koinonia, which
is an enduring theme, a leitmotif of the whole letter.
Basically for Paul, the church is not only a relationship among members
but at the same time relationship with Christ who is the foundation of, and
is always present in, the Church. Christ, who is the head of this body, is the
principle of unity among the members.
An interesting point that we have surfaced so far in our study is that
this image of the body which is referred to the church and an expression of
unity, is also the reality of the Eucharist. In the gathering of the Christians
around the table of the Eucharist from which they partake of the reality of
the Body of Christ, they form the image called Body of Christ, the Church,
an expression of unity. In the celebration of the Eucharist, the Church is
made manifest. The Body of Christ is both referred to the Church and the
Eucharist. With this observation, Johnson asserts that it is impossible to
avoid the conclusion that Pauls understanding of the church involves a deep
and mystical identity between the community called the church and the
risen Christ mediated by the Holy Spirit in the Eucharist.19
This indicates that the death of Jesus seen from the perspective of the
Eucharist is a sacrifice which inaugurates the new covenant between God
and his people already foretold in the Old Testament, thus establishing the
new people of God. For this reason, some theologians including Ratzinger
and Kattenbusch believe that the foundation of the church as a new people
19
Luke Timothy Johnson, Pauls Ecclesiology, in The Cambridge Companion to Paul,
ed. J. Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 207.
of God was simultaneous with the institution of the Eucharist. Ratzinger

argues that with the Eucharist, the church herself was established. Through
Christs body, the church became one, she became herself, and at the same
time, through his death, she was opened up to the breadth of the world and
its history.20 The institution of the Eucharist took place with a ritual meal
commemorating the foundational event of the people of Israel, which is their
deliverance from the slavery in Egypt. In this ritual meal also, the new Israel
which is the Church is born of his sacrifice.
It is therefore not accidental that the Lords Supper occurred on the day
before Jesus suffered. In a more precise time, on the night he was handed
over. With this exact date, the event of the Eucharist is seen properly in
reference to the suffering and death of Jesus as his way of offering himself
for you. And just as Jesus offered his life for us in his passion, death and
resurrection, so as recipients of the Eucharist, our lives must be for others. In
the Eucharist, the offering of Jesus compels us to offer our lives for others,
so that any form of individualism or selfishness is a direct betrayal of the
celebration itself, better yet, it is emptying the content of the liturgy.
In order to restore the credibility and identity of the Church, the true
spirit of the Eucharist must be recovered. For it is only in the true spirit of
celebrating the Eucharist, when its contents are not emptied, that the church
becomes alive. Indeed, it is in the true spirit of the Eucharist, in a liturgy well
celebrated that the Church is manifested. The best catechesis of the Eucharist
and the Church is a liturgy well celebrated, to paraphrase Benedict XVI.21
It is not an exaggeration to say that koinonia as a participation is both
the heart of the Eucharist and the Church. Without koinonia, the church is
meaningless; without koinonia, the Eucharist is empty. In this sense, we can
say that the eating of the same loaf and the drinking from the same cup are, in
fact, communal acts. And the sin which is directly against this communal act
is the eating and drinking without consideration or without being sensitive
to the other members of the body. In modern terms, this koinonia may be
a rough equivalent to what we call solidarity. Solidarity then, reinforces the
Church and the Eucharist. Its absence, in turn, deprives the Church and the
Eucharist of sense and mission.
Christians, when they come together do not only form the body, but
they are also incorporated to the body that is Christ. Thus, division within
20
Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to the
Resurrection (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2011), p. 138.
21
Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), no. 64.
108 Diwa 39 (2014): 99-109

the Church means dividing Christ and to offend the weak members of the
Church is to offend Christ. Thus, to be incorporated in Christ and to form
his body means avoiding unnecessary divisions and exclusions. For the very
quality of this Body of Christ, in its Eucharistic and ecclesial dimension,
is inclusive and respects diversity. The Body of Christ, in its Mystical and
Sacramental sense, is indeed catholic. Pauls idea of koinonia is crowned in
1 Cor 12:26. If one member of the body suffers, all suffer. If one member is
honored, all share its joy.
It is not therefore difficult to understand that the Church is by nature
catholic and the Eucharist is the sacrament of communion. To interchange
the adjectives is also true, i.e., the Church is communion and the Eucharist
is catholic. With the Eucharist and through the Eucharist, we hope to be in
communion with our brothers and sisters in the Church.
IV. Conclusion: Prospect for New Evangelization

McPartlans celebrated book, The Eucharist Makes the Church, is
a concrete fruit of the Churchs renewal on ressourcement. Zizioulas, a
prominent Eastern theologian in our time, admits this book, represents one
of the most significant developments in the ecumenical dialogue of our time
because it understands the Eucharist not just [as] one of the sacraments but
as the sacrament of the sacraments, the heart of the Church, the center of
Christian unity and the basis of her structure.22 Further, this Eucharistic
approach to ecclesiology brings the divided East and West closer to the light
of a common faith. Truly, Eucharistic ecclesiology is faithful to the call of
Vatican II for Christian unity.
After investigating the first biblical Eucharistic account in 1 Corinthians
11 using Vatican II as a pathway, we have discovered that the experience of the
Eucharist is a medicine to a Church wounded by division. More fundamental
still, the Eucharistic liturgy gives birth to the unity of the Church and sends
her for a mission. It is not accidental that the Latin word Missa refers both
to the Mass as a liturgy and to the Mission drawn from such liturgy. And
the last words of the presider Ite, Missa est (Go forth, the Mass is ended)
is expressive of both, what has been participated (koinonia) and what is
to witness to the world (missio). The experience of the Eucharist urges the
22
Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church: Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas
in Dialogue (T&T Clark, 1996), p. xiii.
Church for a mission.23 McPartlan asserts that mission is essentially bound

up with the nature of the Church.24
Just as communion is experienced in the Eucharist so, it is the content of
our evangelization. In a wider sense, the Eucharist, which makes the Church,
also commissions those who participate to bring the whole of creation back
to God.25 To bring all things back to the original communion is the mission
of the Church drawn from the Eucharist. This is the project of Vatican II, the
dream of the man who started it all, Angelo Guiseppe Roncali. Further still,
this is the prospect of the new evangelization. The new evangelization, which
is in fact the recovery of the original experience of communion, is now in a
mystical way accessible in the gathering of the Church around the table of
the Eucharist. This is Eucharistic ecclesiology. Eucharistic, before it is a verb,
to give thanks, was a disposition of a person who received much. The Church
has received much, much more than she deservesChrist. She is what she
receives; she becomes what she proclaims.
Stephen Bevans and Roger Schroeder, Constants in Context, A Theology of Mission

Today (Quezon City: Claretian Publications), p. 362.
24
McPartlan, p. 289.
25
Ibid., p. 291.
23
Response to The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of

Vatican II: Prospect in Mission
EMMANUEL C. MARFORI

n his talk, The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II: Prospect

in Mission, Aris Martin rightly connected the link between two
key paradigms of Vatican II: ressourcement and aggiornamento, two
key ideas which can be considered as two explanations of a third key
idea, a key paradigm, of Vatican II: the hermeneutics of continuity,
which, as was already pointed out, was really the mind of the Council.
This ressourcement, or going back to the sources both biblical and patristic,
as a vehicle for authentic aggiornamento, has been reflected in the Trinitarian
manner of reflecting on the Church in Lumen Gentium:1 as the people of
God the Father, the body of Christ, and the temple of the Holy Spirit. This
is the perspective which reflects and shows to the human being of today, and
to the Church today, that what is past is not always pass. This shows that
there is something ancient yet wise, time-tested yet still relevant, about the
insights and writings of the church fathers. This is really a welcome relief,
since the study of the Fathers had long suffered from very bad propaganda
by the modernists, partly influenced by the anti-Church attitude of the
adherents of the so-called Enlightenment or Aufklaerung. The Church, yes,
is an institution. But she is not only an institution. She is, primordially, the
new people of God, the body of Christ, and the dwelling-place of the Holy
Spirit.
The Sacrosanctum Concilium2 has intended to provide the Catholic
faithful with a teaching on the crucial relevance of the liturgy in the life of
Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium,

http://w w w.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_
const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html (accessed August 22, 2014).
2
Second Vatican Council, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy Sacrosanctum Concilium
[December 4, 1963], http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html#_ftnref1 (accessed
August 2, 2014).
1
E. C. Marfori, Response to Eucharistic Ecclesiology 111
the Church. In particular, the Eucharist as the source and summit of ones
Christian life.
Lumen Gentium is commonly seen as the vertebra or backbone, of
Vatican II, which the other constitutions support; then the decrees are the
concretions of the salient points of the constitutions; and the declarations are
concretions of the decrees. Nevertheless, Vatican II can also be seen in the
light of both Lumen Gentium and Sacrosanctum Concilium, since through
these documents, the Council has tried to point out the primacy of liturgy
in the Church and the relevance of the Church to todays human being
and to the world. We could also glean from the conference a circularity or
interdependence between the liturgythe apex of which is the Eucharist
and the Church: the Eucharist makes the Church, and the Church is truer
to who she is and to her mission by being centered on the Eucharist. In his
book, Gott ist uns nah, or God is near us, then Cardinal Ratzinger pointed
out that God is indeed near us, today, here, precisely in the Church, and
in her expression of faith, the liturgy, and more in particular, in the Holy
Eucharist.
The explanation of some biblical passages regarding the Eucharist, like
1 Cor 1113, showed the importance of connecting the Eucharist to
community life, and that both have to be centered on Christ. The Eucharist,
in order to really bear fruit in the life of the Christian who receives Holy
Communion, has to bear fruit in the community living in harmony, in
unity.
What does all this tell us? Koinonia, communion, Filipino pagsasalusalo, will always be a timely topic in the Church. Its not only referred to
Christ, but is also a calling to mirror the Trinity. Yes, at the bottomline, it
is a mystery. But, we may recognize something about the relevance of the
Trinitarian revelation in our lives: as God is love, we are also called to love.
The divine Persons are distinct from one another; so, too, are we. But at the
same time, God is one; we are also called to be united. This is a perennial
challenge in the everyday lives not only of the Church as a whole, but in
the different communities: the presbyterium, the seminary community, the
religious community, the novitiate, the parish community, the transparochial
communities and new movements in the Catholic Church, the basic ecclesial
communities (BECs), Catholic Bible sharing/study groups, etc. Sometimes,
it is indeed difficult. But there is always the hope that difficulties can become
challenges to be overcomeof course, with Gods grace.
Let me illustrate further this awareness of the connection between the
Eucharist and community life with some examples:
112 Diwa 39 (2014): 110-113

First, in the Didache, or the Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles (90/100
A.D.), 9, 4b: Just as this bread, broken, was scattered on the mountains, and
gathered, was made one, so too is thy Church gathered from the ends of the
earth to Thy kingdom (houto synaxthto sou he ekklesa ap ton perton tes ges
eis ten sen basileian).3
Second, St. John Chrysostom, in his homily on John, ca. 389, 46,3,
reminds us: that we may be one like a body joined to the head (hna hen
ti hyprxomen, kathper soma kephal synemmnon).4 And in his homily on
1 Cor, ca. 392, 24, 2, he eloquently compares: What, then, is bread (ho
rtos)? The Body of Christ (Soma Christou). What do the communicants
(metalambnontes) become? The Body of Christ (Soma Christou). Not many
bodies, but one body (ouk smata poll, all soma hen).5
Third, St. Augustine, in one of his sermons, reminds us: If you received
[the Holy Eucharist] well, you are that which you received (Si bene accepistis,
vos estis quod accepistis). Why so? Because the Apostle says: Unus panis, unum
corpus multi sumus (1 Cor 10:17). He discovers an insight which may be
plainly obvious to a baker, a panadero, and can be useful to our reflection:
before [the grains of wheat] become bread, they were separated; theyre
joined together through water (antequam ad panem venirent, separata erant;
per aquam coniuncta sunt...).6 This can be considered an allusion to the Holy
Spirit: water. And if we are to reflect further on, we can remind ourselves
that in baking bread, aside from the other ingredients, one would need water,
air, and heat (all allusions to the Holy Spirit!). St. Augustine, too, in his
Treatise on the Gospel according to John (416/7 a.D.), 26,13, reminds us of
the Eucharist being the sacrament of piety, sign of unity, link of charity (O
sacramentum pietatis! o signum unitatis! o vinculum caritatis!).7
Fourth, St. Cyril of Alexandria, in his Commentary on John 11:11 (on
John 17:21), reminds us that we in the Church are linked by a mystical
communion (di tes mystiks metalpseos).8 In other words, that we are linked
to the Mystery, God.
Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion Patristicum (Spain : Friburgi Barcinone, 1959), p. 2.

Ibid., p. 443.
5
Ibid., p. 454.
6
Ibid., p. 529.
7
Ibid., p. 591.
8
Ibid., pp. 771-772.
3
4
E. C. Marfori, Response to Eucharistic Ecclesiology 113
And fifth, Joseph Ratzinger (who is now our Pope Emeritus Benedict
XVI) reminds us that the Eucharist, in the early Church, was also often
called agape love, or pax peace.9
The question is: What is the Holy Mass (objectively speaking)? What
is it for me (subjectively speaking)? How do I connect it with my life with
my brothers and sistersdo I follow Christ outside the Mass, outside the
Christian templewhen I hear ite, missa est (Go forth, the Mass is ended),
when I am sent by God to continue my encounter (Filipino pakikipagtagpo)
with Him in my encounter with my neighbor? Who is my neighbor (Filipino
kapwa)? What is the Church for me? Am I aware that I am part of Christs
body, the Church?
Ressourcement, aggiornamento, and continuity (drinking from the source,
moving forward, seeking connections) are not just Vatican II terms, or terms
made more famous because of Vatican II, but are challenges to face, daily,
here, now, everywhere. Unitylike bread, is something called to be made
an-d offered and shared. This calls for an awareness that in life, there are
indeed tensions, and it is up to us to consider them as healthy tensions. This
is also a reminder and a challenge for teachers and students of theology. After
most things have been taught or heard, more tasks then come into play:
witnessing (doing what one teaches and/or learns) and catechizing (teaching
the faith in a way understandable to the listener, from a post-graduate
university student to the inarticulate yet devoted informal settler)by all,
the clergy, the religious, the laity. And also, establishing ecumenical and
interreligious dialogue. Indeed, ressourcement, aggiornamento and continuity
remain tasks to be carried out up to now (fifty years later!). We are all called
to appreciate in mind, at heart, and in practice (in witnessing, and then
in teaching, and in listening) what the Scripture, Tradition (including the
Church Fathers) and the Magisterium have to say about the Eucharist and
the Church. After fifty years, indeed, Vatican II is still waiting to be entirely
and correctly applied. Yes, all of this requires more (= more time and better
quality) effort to follow the motions of the Holy Spirit at work in Vatican II.
But, with Gods grace, we hope to carry out this task entrusted to us by Jesus
Christ (cf. Matthew 28:19).
J. Ratzinger, Gesammelte Schriften, 11. Band, S. 425.
The Influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium in

the Mission Life of the Church
ATILANO CORCUERA, SVD

I. Mission Life
n his book entitled Transforming Mission, the author David Bosch

makes distinction between Mission and missions. Accordingly when
we use the word Mission we bear in mind that we mean Gods selfcommunication to the world, in which the Church is privileged to participate.
We call this missio Dei. It follows that the Church begins to be missionary not
through its universal proclamation of the Gospel, but through the universality
of the Gospel it proclaims.1 Before missions comes missio Dei: God is for
all. The Trinity communicates himself to the world through Jesus in the power
of the Spirit. The Father and the Son and the Holy SpiritGod is Mission.
Missions, in the plural, points to the missionary ventures of the church,
referring to particular forms related to specific times, places or needs,
of participation in the missio Dei. These ventures of the Church he calls
missiones ecclesiae.2 This concept obviously originated from the document
Ad Gentes3 which states in no. 6 that preaching the Gospel and implanting
the Church among people who do not yet believe in Christ are generally
called missions. Missions belong necessarily to the nature of the Church
(AG 2). The entire Christian existence is to be characterized as missionary
existence this dimension is not an optional extra or it denies its very reason
to exist.4
David Jacobus Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission

(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991).
2
Bosch, Transforming Mission.
3
Second Vatican Council, Decree Ad Gentes on the Mission Activity of the Church,
http://w w w.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_
decree_19651207_ad-gentes_en.html (accessed August 2, 2014).
4
Eugel, cited in Bosch, Transforming Mission.
1
A. Corcuera, The Influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium 115
To avoid treading clumsily forward, missions in this paper is defined as

follows:
1. Mission life among people who do not yet believe in Christ. There are
more than two billion people in the world today who have never or barely
heard the Gospel message. Included here are peoples united by cultures,
ancient religions, those with no knowledge of God, the atheists, faith seekers
and even those who attack Gods existence (AG 6, 10). These territories are
defined and recognized by the Holy See.
2. Mission life in territories where Catholics are a minority surrounded by
cultures and religions which form the majority; and where at times the majority
exerts an overwhelming pressure against the Church. These are places where
missionaries patiently, and with great faith ought at least bear witness to the
love and kindness of Christ and thus prepare a way for the Lord, and in some
way make him present (AG 6).
3. Mission life in far-flung islands and regions where regular and normal
transportation is most difficult to obtain.
II. A Personal Glimpse of the Liturgy before Vatican II

Before exploring the influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium5 (SC) in the
respective territories of different missionaries, may I share with you first a
glimpse of how our worship was before Vatican II. Let us remember that
this was the time of strict universal uniformity. I am confident that what I
experienced reflected what was done in the whole Catholic world, including
the missions.
I started being close to the Church as an altar server at the age of 11 in
the year 1958. Serving in the Mass at that time was not only giving wine and
water to the celebrantforemost was to memorize the Latin responses first.
And the responses were not only Amen and Et cum spiritu tuo. We had
to start with the prayers at the foot of the altar before the priest ascended to
kiss the relics embedded in the altar. For some senior citizens around, you
will remember that the pre-Vatican II priests started the Mass with, Introibo
ad altare Dei, to which we servers had to reply, Ad Deum qui laetificat
Second Vatican Council. Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy Sacrosanctum Concilium

[December 4, 1963], http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html#_ftnref1 (accessed
August 2, 2014).
5
116 Diwa 39 (2014): 114-125

juventutem meam. We had to memorize the responses because we had to
represent the people who were silent and just attending the celebration.
The Latin responses, in particular the longest, Confiteor Deo were
difficult to memorize especially when we had absolutely no idea what they
meant. To motivate my brother and me to learn by heart the prayers, my
mother had to offer an attractive reward to the one who could memorize first.
Without my mother knowing it, however, I had other motivations in
becoming an altar server. Honestly they had nothing to do with liturgy. One
of them was to get an altar boys award at the end of the school year. Another
was to be seen by many high school girls who came to church, especially on
Wednesdays for the Perpetual Help novena. And third, to accompany the
priests to barrio fiesta Masses, expecting that after the Eucharistic feast and
baptisms, the first and best table at lunch was served to the priest and altar
servers.
I was a server for some years, but I never came to understand what
was going on at the altar. I listened to homilies in vernacular but I do not
remember having been touched by the Word of God proclaimed in Latin in
heavenly rituals.
With regards to participation, well, the people sometimes smelled the
smoke of the incense, heard the voice of the presider, crossed themselves
with holy water and saw the candles and vestments of the clergy up on the
sanctuary.
Other forms of participation were putting coins in the collection bags
during the liturgical service. Also, I must admit that bodily postures, such
as kneeling, sitting and standing were rather strictly participated in by the
people. I remember, one Sunday, my father and I went to the last Mass of the
day. As usual the pews of the parish church were full of late churchgoers. In
our pew, my father and I had a problem with spacewe could not kneel nor
sit at the same time. So my father whispered to me, When I kneel, you sit;
when I sit, you kneel.
Another example of pre-Vatican II liturgy was the way concelebration
was celebrated. In my first year in the seminary, concelebration meant several
priests with their respective servers coming out together in one line from
the sacristy and going their separate ways to the different altars within the
church. Every morning several masses were being celebrated to the delight of
one or two scrupulous persons in the church who could attend several masses
in one day.
Servers at the time served mostly at Mass. One day, however, I had
the chance to assist the parish male secretary in serving at baptism. It was
in Latin of course, and we were not asked to memorize the responses of
baptismal rituals. So all responses were recited by the secretary, including
I believe questions to the parents and godparents. At one point I heard the
server say, Bolo, bolo, bolo. I knew what bolo meant, but I wondered what
it had to do with baptism. It was only in the seminary that I learned that
bolo was really vollo which means I want. Obviously that was an
answer supposed to be said by the parents or godparents, but was done for
them by the server.
To be fair, however, to the practices at that time, there was a particular
liturgy a number of the congregation was rather faithful to: the first Friday
confession. I remember we were quite accustomed to this practice upon
the rather aggressive order by our mother. And in church I saw a sizable
number of penitents on this day. Moreover, more than one priest usually and
faithfully sat at the confessional boxes every first Friday of the month to hear
confessions. It was fortunate that confessions before Vatican II, except the
absolution, were done in the vernacular and English, and not in Latin.
One last example was the prayer said by the priest before putting the
sacred host on the tongue of each communicant. Before, it went like this:
Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christi custodiat animam tuam in vitam
aeternam. Amen. Communion was distributed by priests alone. Thanks to
SC now the priests and lay ministers simply say, The Body of Christ.
To sum up, before SC, liturgy was less participated in and not understood
but considered effective in a magical sort of way, because it was done in
mechanical ways through attendance on set days and performing the rituals
as they should be done. Devotional confessions on first Fridays, I believe, filled
up to some degree what was wanting from the Latin liturgy. Incidentally, my
constant presence as altar server during fiestas together with our diocesan
priests before Vatican II led me to enter the seminary.
III. Interviews
1. GHANA
Frank Quainoo, 32
Frank Quainoo is from East Ghana, Africa. He belongs to the Diocese

of Kofundua. At present he is a theology student studying to be a missionary
priest someday.
118 Diwa 39 (2014): 114-125

He estimates that in his country, 25% of the population is Catholic.
With their liturgy, the most significant aspect is that their celebration of the
sacraments, from baptisms to weddings, is what could be called community
celebrations. The whole community comes and participates with delight. In
baptism, it is especially clear to them that the whole community welcomes the
new members. The community takes pride in welcoming the newly baptized
into their Church in the midst of many sects around them. Hymns and songs
are done in their language and cultural melodies to the accompaniment of
organ and drums. Full participation and understanding of the rites have gone
a long way through the intense and sustained efforts of their catechists.
For the priests Sunday liturgy is doubly meaningful, because the people
bring along to their worship all that they need for the coming week. The
priests do not have to go to the market to procure what they need!
2. MADAGASCAR

Nicolas Rakotondramasy, 30
Diderick Andrinjotovo, 26
Nicolas Rakotonodramasy and Diderick Andrinjotovo come from the

Dioceses of Ambohimiadana and Mananjary, Madagascar. They claim that
in their place there are only two priests taking care of 36 parishes. In spite of
priests shortage, their liturgy is full of life. Worship is expressed fully in body
participation in songs and dances. They appreciate that in their worship even
the bishop dances, joining the people in expressing gladness. Their liturgy is
done in Malagasy language.
Their secret of full and active participation lies in preparations and
personal involvement of their priests and bishop. In baptism for instance the
bishop himself meets the parents and godparents of candidates at least four
times during Lent before baptism. First communicants and confirmands are
prepared for two years. In Sunday liturgy, before new songs are introduced,
people are prepared for two months. Serious and intense their worship
preparations are.
Ministers in the Eucharist are guided by trained catechists, especially in
the tasks of reading, serving, and helping at communion.
They observe that at times their liturgy plays a big role in settling
conflicts among community members. Giving of peace is taken seriously and
personally.
They lament, however, that out of 2,000 Catholics, only 500 to 600 come
regularly on Sundays. Young people are also dwindling in their attendance.
3. INDONESIA

Gregorius Robinus Darman, 28

Fransiskus Subandi, 27
Gregorius Darman and Fransiskus Subandi are Indonesians from the

island of Flores. The two belong to Ruteng Diocese but are from separate
parishes. Liturgy brought about the formation of basic ecclesial communities
(BEC) in the diocese. Bahasa language is used in worship. While everybody
understands what is going on in their celebrations, the people still feel the
foreign elements in the worship. However, the liturgy is very lively. It could
be said that the people in their parishes have begun slowly to consider their
worship as their own.
It would seem that their people are not ready yet to welcome lay ministries
into their worship. There are no ministries of lectors and communion helpers.
Each BEC group is assigned to take care of Sunday masses at regular intervals.
Lectors are taken from the group. Communion helpers are exclusively
religious sisters and seminarians.
There is one part of the liturgy on Sundays that is held close to the heart
of their parishioners. For the presentation of the gifts, the leader of the group
in charge of a particular Sunday stands before the priest and recites a prayer
in their own dialect (not Bahasa), after which the priest replies and then,
he accepts the gifts. Our two seminarians look forward to this part of the
Mass.
4. TAIWAN
Fr. Edgardo Bugtong, SVD, 56
Fr. Edgardo Bugtong has been working in Taiwan for 14 years already.
His latest assignment is in Taipei, a big city. Attendance in daily masses is
20-25 local churchgoers.
His description of the liturgy in the communities he has been assigned
to is as follows:
In general the Catholic Chinese prefer quiet and solemn rites. Whereas
most Catholics prefer Chinese liturgy, some like the liturgy in Latin. The
songs they use have Chinese words but the melodies are Western. It is only
in recent times that missionaries are trying to discover Chinese melodies to
apply to their local lyrics. What moved missionaries faster to this direction
are the Protestants aggressive approach and their much livelier rites.
5. CONGO
Fr. Pio Estepa, SVD, 62
Fr. Pio Estepa is a veteran missionary. He stayed in Africa for eight

years, and finally worked in Oaxaca, Mexico for two years. At present he
120 Diwa 39 (2014): 114-125

is teaching in Catholic University in the USA. For this paper I would focus
on his experiences in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly
Zaire.
Eucharist in the DRC is most meaningfully celebrated in Kekonggo
language. The structure of the Mass is quite unique. The introductory rites
include invoking of saints and ancestors in faith. The penitential rites come
after the homily. The Eucharistic prayer is sung in dialogue with the presider.
The songs, chants and dances are all done in tribal melodies. There is dancing
from the beginning up to the end. The presider is dressed like a chief in
a tribe. The liturgy is the fruit of collaborative work of the local liturgical
leaders, the clergy and missionaries.
SC brings to the awareness of Christian communities in the DRC that
where the Church makes the Eucharist, the Eucharist makes the Church.
Estepa characterizes the Church there as living Christian communities
through the power of Gods Word and the sacraments.
Interesting to note in his mission is the way the communities look
at sickness. When somebody gets sick it is believed that somebody in the
community has committed sin. And therefore it has become imperative that
at one time the whole community gathers around the sick to communally ask
pardon from God for that sin. The rite ends with the washing of hands or of
a part of the body to signal that reconciliation has taken place.
At present, the local church, upon the inspiration of SC, is looking
and digging into its culture and studying the elements discovered and their
corresponding symbolism.
6. VIETNAM
Fr. Peter Tran Xuan Vu, SVD, 33
Fr. Peter Tran Xuan Vu is a newly ordained missionary priest. He is a

Vietnamese coming from Nha Trang, Central Vietnam where Catholics are
a minority among Buddhists and traditional religions.
Catholics in this region are granted more freedom in their practices by
the communist government. Vocations to the religious life and priesthood
are abundant.
Worship follows a more conservative path. For instance, it is still
customary to separate men and women inside the church. Confessions are
done in confessional boxes; face-to-face confession is not practiced at all. Lay
ministries are unheard of; instead, religious sisters and seminarians in habits
assist the priest in altar functions.
On the other hand, SC has allowed them to use Tieng Viet, their
language, in the liturgy. Even their music and lyrics are now in their native
melodies and language. As a result, the liturgy on Sundays and weekdays
are very much actively participated in by the people, even without any
commentator to animate them. Moreover, preparations for the celebration
of other sacraments take six months to one year, in the form of intense
catechism.
Because of Vatican II liturgy, Tran Xuan happily proclaims that the
center of their Catholic community is their Church in prayer.
7. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Fr. Linus Nicasio, SVD, 64
This bonus interview with Fr. Linus Nicasio came about at a chance
meeting after his arrival from a month-long spiritual journey and talks in the
United Arab Emirates this year. He stayed with the Capuchins in Sharjah, as
he went around giving talks and recollections to OFWs. Catholics who came
to the Eucharistic celebrations were not only Filipinos, but also Catholic
Indians, Bangladesh, Indonesians, and other Asians.
The first thing that struck him was when he made his initial greeting
to those gathered for the Mass. His The Lord be with you was met by
a thunderous And with your spirit! The reply according to Nicasio was
so overwhelming that he got goose pimples. It went on for the whole
celebration.
Another thing he noticed was how foreign workers dressed up for the
liturgy. No one came shabbily attired. Everybody dressed up, like each one
was ready to enter heaven. This and other things made Nicasio also sad,
thinking of how it was in many churches at home during liturgical rites.
8. PAPUA NEW GUINEA Fr. Lukas Gewa Tiala, SVD, 34
Fr. Lukas Gewa Tiala is an Indonesian who worked in Papua New Guinea
for six years on a coastal or lowland area under the Diocese of Wewak. In six
years time, he was in three parishes.
Liturgy is celebrated in Pidgin language, the national tongue used
throughout PNG. He described liturgical celebrations as fully alive, especially
in big celebrations where processions within the rites were given prominence.
The natives of PNG are musically talented; for this reason there is no lack of
indigenous music and songs in the liturgy.
Ministries in their diocese play active roles in the Church, especially in
reaching out to far stations to celebrate communion service on Sundays.
122 Diwa 39 (2014): 114-125

To facilitate evangelization, villages are grouped into areas. One area
would have two to five villages. That would mean 500 to 2,000 members
per area.
Surrounded by different sects, traditional religions and recently by the
Pentecostals, the Church is now doubling her efforts to attract and keep her
members within the fold by coming up with more meaningful and creative
liturgy.
9. SAMOA
Fr. Edgar Javier, SVD, 65
Fr. Edgar Javier worked in Samoa for ten years, six years in Fiji Islands,
and at present is very much involved in formation and teaching work in
ICLA and different seminaries in the Philippines. His residence is the Divine
Word Seminary in Tagaytay where he is busy jumpstarting the Divine Word
Institute of Mission Studies (DWIMS).
From his mission place in Samoa what follows are some highlights he
experienced with regards Vatican II liturgy together with his people there.
According to Javier, the life of his people is centered in the practice of
their faith. A day is not complete in their lives without prayers and liturgy.
On Sundays, after the morning Mass, they make the so-called little liturgy,
take a short rest, and go back to the church for benedictions and devotions.
In some family visits Javier noticed so many bibles in the house. Later
he found out that during first communion each child is gifted with a bible.
It will be the childs bible which s/he will use until death. Even to the grave
the bible accompanies the baptized. The symbolism is not lost, namely, Gods
Word which guided the baptized in life will now be the light to the path of
life eternal.
Once a month his community celebrates penitential rites. What is
striking in the celebration is when the chief of the tribe approaches the altar,
kneels in front and covers himself with a mat. At this point a song to the
God of mercy follows, invoking God to forgive the sins of the community
by granting forgiveness to the chief.
Javier in the interview explained to me that this rite came from the cultural
practice of the tribe when a family seeks forgiveness from an aggrieved family.
For example, when a family member caused an injury to a member of another
family, the head of the first family goes to the house of the other family to
seek forgiveness. He does this by kneeling in front of the house of the injured
family covered with a mat. Forgiveness and reconciliation happens when the
head of the offended family comes out of the house and lifts the mat off the
one seeking forgiveness. The time to lift the mat could last from a minute to
several days! Clearly this practice reflects the truth that when I offend you,
my community injures your community.
In their Sunday liturgy, three elements of the rites stand out. First, before
the readings begin, the Word of God is accompanied by singing and dancing
in a procession. Before the actual reading, the book, chapter and verses are
announced, and everybody opens his/her bible. Then the reader reads the
first verse, after which everybody continues to read together the rest of the
reading aloud.
The second element distinctively peculiar to the Sunday liturgy is the
garlanding of the sacred species after the consecration of the bread and wine.
A family assigned solemnly lays a garland of flowers around the consecrated
bread and wine; after which, the presider offers Jesus to the Father. This
makes everybody cognizant of the heart of the Eucharist: We offer you Lord
the Bread of Life and the Chalice of Salvation
The third touching moment in the Sunday Eucharist is the celebration
of the small liturgy after the Mass. The people who leave the church go
home to fetch their baskets of food and proceed to families assigned to them
to deliver the food. In this way, according to Javier nobody gets hungry in
their community.
At the end of the interview, Javier sighed and said, My liturgical life
acquired tremendous meaning in the missions. If I were younger I would go
and study liturgy and missions.
IV. Conclusion
Sacrosanctum Concilium definitely brought light of understanding to
the language that liturgy uses in the worship of the Church, especially in
the missions. When people understand the language that the true God
uses to communicate his love and salvation, they are transformed from
strangers into a living community, eager to respond in faith to the offer of
love and become active participants in an encounter with God, celebrated
in meaningful rituals. The Church will be happy to note that, with SC, her
people, through a good understanding of the rites and prayers, now take
part in liturgy, conscious of what they are doing, with devotion and full
collaboration (SC 14, 18).
124 Diwa 39 (2014): 114-125

Whereas inculturation starts with the use of the vernacular language, there
are other factors that contribute nowadays towards meaningful, creative, and
joyful celebrations in the missions. Indigenous music accompanied by organ,
drums, and gongs is one factor. Using the whole body, as in local dances, to
express ones sentiments in worship goes a long way to respond and connect
with the transcendence in a most intimate way. Dancing as a community
before God heightens awareness of being a people united with each other
moving to meet their God. All these were made possible by SC when 50 years
ago it proclaimed that Church fosters and respects the qualities and talents
of various races and nations (SC 37). And she adds, Provisions shall be
made for legitimate variations and adaptations to different groups, regions
and peoples, especially in mission countries (SC 38).
Participation certainly does not only mean dancing, singing and praying
joyfully. The DRC approved liturgy may be full of movements and swaying
of bodies to naturally express their sentiments in their worship, but it does
not mean that the Chinese in Taipei participate less. SC speaks also of active
participation internally taking into account age, condition, way of life
and standard of religious culture (SC 19).
Another fruit of the SC in the life of the Church, and especially in the
missions, is the animated looking and digging into the cultural wealth of
peoples with regards music and elements that could help in their worship.
Foreign and local missionaries join heads together to uncover the beauty and
treasures that God has granted to individual communities and cultures.
The search and discovery also galvanized the missionaries into evaluating
their paradigms and ways of doing missions, leading missionaries to be more
like the Incarnate Jesus who inserted himself into a particular culture and
people.
There are still many things to be done after 50 years of SC. Inculturation
is just beginning in many other mission territories. Inter-cultural and
religious dialogues are now part of mission work. Be that as it may, let us
also look back and appreciate the contribution SC has done in the worship
of the Church, especially in mission territories where the Gospel is being
proclaimed, deeply planted and nurtured.
Finally, one most important contribution of SC, especially to the missions,
is to bring communities together in faith around the liturgy. Mircea Eliade,
in his studies of tribal religions, discovered that local tribes moving from
place to place carry with them a long pole.6 In every new land they come
upon, they plant the pole into the earth and the head would proclaim, This
is the center of the world! The pole becomes the gathering point of the tribe.
They return to it after days of hunting and food gathering. The pole gives
meaning to their existence. In the OT, Psalm 48 speaks of Mount Zion,
true pole of the earth, where God has shown himself...
Something like this is happening around the liturgy that SC has given to
the Church and especially, to her missions. Communities that gather in the
Church to celebrate the liturgy become aware of each other as people of God.
The rites are fully and experientially participated in, because they understand
them as Gods presence in their midst, and they in turn, embrace God in
their own particular way through signs and symbols. The rites become the
center of the world, the meaning of their life and the foretaste of their
destiny.
May I conclude with the first paragraph of Ad Gentes: In the present
state of things the Church is ever more urgently called upon to save
and renew every creature, so that all things might be restored in Christ, and
so that in him men (and women) might form one family and one people of
God. And may I add, for the Church to more fully accomplish this goal, she
only has to fearlessly release the power of Sacrosanctum Concilium!
6
Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University, 1991), pp. 48-51.
Philippine Education Reform Agenda:

Moral Theology on the Armchair,
at the Margins
DIONISIO M. MIRANDA, SVD
University of San Carlos

6000 Cebu City, Philippines
ducation has always been recognized as the engine par excellence

for social change and as the unparalleled instrument of personal
transformation. It is a precious resource for the promotion of the
common good such as peace, understanding, freedom, development and
social justice; it is also a potent tool against the threats to human dignity
such as poverty, ignorance, social discrimination and exclusion. By its very
nature education constantly changes its foundations, assumptions and goals.
Today, educations mission is to engage a society where knowledge is the new
commodity, where the new literacy is measured by information technology,
and where relationships are being changed by a virtual reality without borders.
If ethics is essentially about becoming good and resisting evil, and if
moral theology is nothing less than education for the same, what is the role
of Filipino moral theology vis--vis the Philippine education reform agenda
in the context of globalization? Why does it seem to be, as I suggest in this
piece, absent from the discourse, or at best figuratively asleep in an armchair
at the margins of the controversy?
I. Philippine Education in Transition

The state policy on education is found in Art. II, Section 17 of the
Philippine Constitution. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism, and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation
and development.1 Consistent with these objectives the state commits to
Republic of the Philippines, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
under The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Article II,http://www.
gov.ph/constitutions/the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/the-1987constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-article-ii/ (accessed August 14, 2014).
1
D. M. Miranda, Philippine Education Reform 127
fulfill its duty to satisfy the right to education. According to Art. XIV,
Section 1, The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to a
quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.2
In this age of cybernetics and globalization, is the Philippine
education system adequate to address the great cultural challenges, social
transformations, scientific and technical advances, and the dynamics itself of
education in pursuit of its mission?
Recent assessments of the state of Philippine education today, from
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) to the rural teacher, pessimistically point to by now familiar
plaints: glaring jobs-skills mismatch due to poor design, dysfunctional
structures, fragmented administration, leadership issues, financial gaps and
much more.
And all this is not without the benefit of historical initiatives. Attempts
to align the education system with the evolving state of the nation and its
economy date back to as early as the second decade after the establishment
of the public education system by the Americans. Cosmetic changes finally
gave way to a structural and systematic reform agenda with the election of
an education president, campaigned for by the movement called Education
Nation, which sought to conscienticize the country about the changing
assumptions as well as the internal and external pressures on Philippine
education, implicit in movements like the Bologna Process, Washington
Accord, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) integration.
The Philippine education situation cannot be repaired with the usual
reform measures; nothing less than an education revolution has to happen.
The fragmented and incremental transitions attempted in the past to
transform Philippine education are no longer adequate in the face of the severe
dislocations happening globally, as manifest in major social transformations
in demography and workforce, globalization pressures, the inexorable advance
of the digital age, the new assessment and ranking market for education and
so much more. Against such challenges the alignment of academic calendars
(tertiary level, basic education) with Asean and other partners is hardly the
most urgent of our priorities.
Ibid.
128 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138
II. Publicly Debated Issues

Symptoms of the educational malaise are evident in publicly debated
issues, such as the following. Already in this debate I would have expected
moral theologians to be very much in evidence; that they are not may be due
to the fact that the issues have not been explicitly framed as moral issues and
therefore not meriting express attention in a seminary curriculumbut that
is an issue for another day.
1. There are the overt official justifications for education reform which
revolve around the contentious issues of access, quality and equity. Anyone
with a superficial understanding of the everyday issues of education cannot
but conclude that a restructuring at all levels can no longer be avoided: reform
must occur at all levelsprimary, secondary, higher, vocational, technical,
skills development and alternative systems.
2. Because we have not responded in a timely manner, the time-frames
for reform have understandably become unnervingly constricted. The issues
of K to 12 are complex individually and as an ensemble: mother-tonguebased multilingual education (MTB-MLE), spiral progression as pedagogy,
streaming via outcomes-based education (OBE), internship issues with
industry in senior high school (SHS), and so on. All these must at the same
time be coordinated, even at the SHS level, with the Philippine National
Qualification Framework (PNQF), with all its reconfiguring implications for
tertiary all the way to post-doctoral degrees. Time-wise administrators have
not yet determined for planning purposes whether to count the transition
period from 2016-2018, 2016-2024 or 2016-2032.
3. As with every revolutionary action, resistance cannot be far behind.
Beyond the populist resistance, there are legitimate themes of contention,
such as the uneven playing field between public and private education (in
terms of expectations and regulation), the legal issues of vested interests or
proprietary rights (in the degradation of universities to colleges or institutes),
the extent of autonomy of academic freedom specially when distinguishing
and disjoining (mandatory) regulation from (voluntary) accreditation and so
on.
4. Tuition and other fees are of course the neuralgic issues of education
reform in any age. The basic issues of access and quality education necessarily
involve educational financing, a thorny issue even for developed economies.
Right now it is free for public basic education (and supported by the
Conditional Cash Transfer program), while tuition is socialized for public
tertiary education, i.e., universities and colleges at the local and national
levels, such as the University of the Philippines (UP). Congress demands

highest quality education at the lowest costs from private education, when
it cannot even do the same for public education; how equitable is this? Is it
equitable when the Department of Education (DepEd) finally realizes that
without private education acting as backup to capacity lack, DepEds own
K to 12 program is doomed to fail? Writers of our laws and rules are not
interested in debate on fundamental issues, focusing only on cosmetic ones
like the ban on No permit, no exam rule. Kristel Tejadas suicide over
unpaid tuition fees resurrects the distinction between skolar ng bayan (scholar
of the nation) from non-skolar ng bayan at private schools. Opinion-makers as
usual stoke the emotional, populist, uninformed and superficial responses; the
enlightened exceptions are few and far between (e.g., David and Magno,3 who
usually offer a sociological and financial perspective, respectively). Quality
education does not come cheap. Thankfully more intelligent segments of the
state have seriously looked into incipient programs for PPPs (Public Private
Partnership), and a national student loan facility.
III. Latent Moral Issues

The most pressing moral issue, to my mind, is that there is no longrange plan, but only medium-term development plans for the country as a
whole. For education in particular no one has a roadmap, not to speak of
the basic elements which can be stitched together into a grand strategy with
corresponding policy directions. Accordingly these latent moral issues cry to
moral theologians in particular for urgent explicit attention.
1. The Goals of Philippine Education. This is the opportune moment for
moral theologians to respond to their authentic vocation, by examining
and assessing the underlying philosophies of stakeholders (e.g., on liberal
education vs. functionalist education). The educational reform poses
tremendous decisional challenges to parents, education consumers and
educational decision-makers, and they cannot respond meaningfully without
the assistance of teleological elaboration.
2. Agents of Education. Education involves a variety of agents and partners,
notably the public sector and the private sector (family-owned schools,
sectarian schools); each of them with varied responsibilities. At the microRandy David is a professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines and a
columnist with the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Alex Magno is a faculty member in the
department of political science under the same university and a columnist for The Philippine
Star.
3
130 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138

level, reform will have differential impacts first on the students, but also
on owners, administrators, faculty and staff. Until recently employers and
employees, for example, were deadlocked on issues related to college faculty
transferring to basic education; the recent issuance of the Joint Guidelines
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), DepEd, Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) and Commission on
Higher Education (CHEd) will not mute all the grumbling.
3. Business and Industry. Stakeholders in education convey to the fore the
unexamined notion of collaboration among social sectors. If the education
reform has gotten traction today, it is because of the business and industry
sector which finally realized they cannot maintain their enterprises or grow
as desired, unless they had the corresponding manpower resources, which
can only come from the education sector. On the other hand, the reform,
now underway, has yet to lay out how B&I will participate in the actual
training that will be required of the changing systems.
4. Roles of Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs). The slogans have been
heard before, particularly from the Catholic HEIs, on being the critical
conscience of the nation, prophetic voice of society, center of creative
ferment and transformation, agent of consensus and national identity, etc.
The education reform now requires that schools place their money where
their mouths are. Beyond preaching ideas or making expansive claims,
Catholic education as a whole still has to begin producing the sort of science
and technology that will actually help address the problems of society. And
beyond the preaching and the research, it has to launch more organized
systems to demonstrate what the power of the Gospel can do in community
outreach.
5. Financing Education. The lack of equity in educational finance is truly
iniquitouswitness the glaring imbalances in the provinces, regions, social
sectors in contrast with the NCR. This is the time to raise the question of
public financing of education at all levels (not only for basic education but
possibly for all HEIs as well). Inquirer columnist Montelibano rightfully
asks, public subsidy for college, for whom and for what?4 There is a need
for a nation-wide system of scholarships and student loans, and the Unified
Financial Assistance System for Higher and Technical Education (Unifast) is
but an early proposal. However, the issue is not simply about universal access
but about equitable access to education, and here there is so much to learn
4
Jose Ma. Montelibano, College subsidy for whom, for what? Glimpses, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2013, http://opinion.inquirer.net/49217/college-subsidy-forwhom-for-what (accessed August 14, 2014).
from our Asean partners. The irresponsibility of our political class is once
more evident in the fact that pork barrel and intelligence fund misuse occurs
at the expense of education and social services. There is also the matter of
co-financing by stakeholders of education (skills consumers in business and
industry vs. skills providers in the academe, or academe-industry partnership,
OJT, tax credits, dual science system).
6. Quality and Assessment in Education. College practices have always
been assessed by students, faculty, administrators and the state, usually
without corresponding action. Today NGOs and ranking organizations
have engaged in the same as a businessin terms of standardized tests to
assess progress, benchmarking, validity of criteria (size, compensation levels,
research and publications), and methodologies (videotaped classes), etc.
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), Shanghai Jiaotong and other ranking agencies
are a new phenomenon. Moral theology needs to inform itself about these
activities and also assess their ethics.
7. Leadership and Management of Knowledge-Based Institutions. The
qualities desired of education leaders (transformational, developmental,
futuristic) are in woefully short supply. With a glut of doctors in education one
would have expected more understanding of the higher education ecosystem;
that expectation is summarily disappointed. The glowing descriptions of
educators of their institutions as exceptional academic record and research
orientation, strong administrative ability and relationship orientation are
more often than not mere hollow slogans. In light of current realities there is
a tremendous need to develop standards to determine what is meant in the
academe by high professional integrity and ethics, global exposure, ability
to change, etc. There is a special need to assess the educational praxis of
Catholic higher education (be this private, congregational, or diocesan).
8. Public Regulation of Higher Education. The high levels of corruption
noted in society generally have been a permanent feature of the public system
of basic education, and even higher education is no exception. A prime
example is the unregulated proliferation of local and national universities and
colleges created by irresponsible congressmen, senators and local government
officials. Regulatory capture of state agencies has virtually liberated for-profit
and even non-profits from any effective regulation and control. Even where
accreditation was introduced and eventually mandated, the rot was not
contained. In the tired moral question, quis custodiet custodies? we must ask
whether voluntary accreditation agencies are a guarantee of quality education
or not.
132 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138
IV. Moral Theology as Observer on the Margins

If anyone should have been the first to note the vacuum of purpose in any
social domain, it should have been the moral theologians, teleology being a
major instrument in their toolkit. If anyone should have monitored Congress
for its purity of intention and virtue in writing rules, it should have been
the moral theologians, particularly those who preach virtue (obsessively for
sexuality but myopically for any other domain, such as politics, economics,
culture, or education). Apparently deontology and utilitarianism and so
many other formal concepts studied at length and in detail in the seminary
classroom have no meaningful applications in the real world. Maybe if moral
theology would be tasked with providing solutions rather than with merely
identifying problems, theologians would be more circumspect in their
moralistic critiques.
1. Context. Measured against context, moral theology is largely irrelevant.
If it truly desired to be relevant to the issues faced by education, moral theology
could be more engaged in the challenging issues arising out of our actual
contexts, such as the alleviation of poverty, the branching into educational
oligopoly by the political dynasties, the revisionist versions of martial law
(sanitizing Marcoss legacy) and of EDSA (the cultural politics of memory).
Relevant moral theology would confront the jobs-skills mismatch: the hard
and soft skills and the consequent OBE (soft skills referring to communication,
collaborative, critical, constructive, versatility capabilities). Moral theology
could focus on population as a scientific issue and not only a doctrinal or
political issue; one can only wonder how much moral enlightenment was
really delivered by the controversies involving institutions like Ateneo de
Manila University (ADMU), University of Santo Tomas (UST), De La Salle
University (DLSU), and University of San Carlos Office of Population
Studies (USC-OPS) in relation to the then Reproductive Health (RH) Bill
aka Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RA
10354).
2. Social Attitudes and Norms. Moral theology has been disappointingly
uncritical of current social attitudes and norms. On the educational front
moral theology could have been more critical of the regulatory capture of the
educational system by politicians, family corporations, and churches. It could
have initiated critical discussion of issues such as the credentialist or diploma
culture, or university status obsession of HEIs. It could have offered itself as
guide to the mandatory compliance with international standards (themselves
manifold), or wholesale overhaul of academic program policies, standards
and guidelines at tertiary and post-graduate levels. Beyond education it could
have broadened its critique of warlordism, killing of journalists and human

rights campaigners, fraternity hazing and other social issues.
3. Economics. Moral theology could have been more critical of the
counterproductive economics of education. Economics-informed moral
theology could have proposed more appropriate models of financing education;
corrected the lack of level playing field between public and private sectors
(unfair and excessive regulation, e.g., on tuition fee increases); exposed the
graft and corruption in regard to textbooks, and feeding programs. It could
have promoted a broader debate on the ADMU and mining controversy.
Moral theology could have lent its voice against economic oligopolies and
cartels, or non-inclusive growth (in 2011 the 40 richest Filipino families on
the Forbes wealth list accounted for 76% of the countrys GDP growth).
It could have helped dissect defective laws like the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act (EPIRA) which economists themselves have trouble explaining
(the same for other public utilities) and so on.
4. Catholic Education. Moral theology could have done more to shake
Catholic education from its parochial interests and self-serving agendas to
focus on its essential mission. Apprised of the fears of survival of parochial
schools, colleges, and universities, DepEd Secretary Armin Luistro countered
that perhaps it was time for Catholic education to rediscover its authentic
educational missionand focus afresh on the least in the education
universe, such as the out-of-school-youth (OSY), indigenous peoples (IPs),
alternative learning systems (ALS), etc. Even the laity has been turned off by
the narrow Catholic perspective on sex education associated with opposition
to the RH debate. Opposition to RH has provoked others to recall that in
the mid-1950s the Catholic Church opposed the inclusion of Rizals works
in the curriculum because of its portrayal of Padre Damaso (who fathered
Maria Clara) and Padre Salvi (who attempted to have Ibarra murdered, and
probably raped Maria Clara). The then Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) preached land reform to the elite, but certain bishops
resisted its application to their own diocesan landholdings. Apparently
the episcopate has unrestricted right to criticize everybodyexcept itself
(regarding financial mismanagement, clerical sex abuse, hierarchical coverups, etc.). If Catholic moral theology has little credibility it is because of its
failure of authenticity.
5. Moral Theology and Philippine Educational Reform. On the issue of
reform we can offer a few sample observations.
(a) Because of the education reform Philippine society as a whole is in
crisis, sectors are dislocated, and conflicts are aggravated. Our people are
134 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138

confused and in need of direction, but where is the teaching (magisterial)
Church on the issues of education? Where, in the absence of the bishops, is
the community of moral theologians?
(b) Time and again the Catholic Church has given us its diagnosis of
the nations malaise, and has pointed through pastoral letters at the turn of
the millennium to politics and culture as major problems. It could be argued
that both are the products of wrong education and can therefore be addressed
better by right education. Hence the urgency for the CBCP to engage
educational issues directly and move away from hackneyed analyses. At least
technical education can provide jobs, food, shelter and security in better
ways than sheer moralizing or cultivation of folk spirituality ever can. What
outcomes can we point to as a consequence of our emphasis, even prejudice,
in favor of liberal and humanistic education? Beyond moral exhortation and
a handful of norms we urgently need profound policy reform, comprehensive
and coherent road-maps and fast-track implementation. One is reminded of
Benedict XVIs new evangelization agenda; yet even from a purely numberperspective, can new evangelization succeed without involving Catholic
education?
(c) With moral theology lazing on its armchair, moral discussion had to be
sourced elsewhere, and the vacuum was in fact provided from unlikely places.
Editorials and commentaries of columnists or letters to the editor sometimes
manifest more relevance, engagement and sophistication than what we get
from the clergy. There are significant moral discourses in cyberspace blogs.
There are moral initiatives like the Integrity Pledge of Makati Business Club,
the Philippine Business for Education (PBED) Summits, the Pathways for
Education Project, and so on.
(d) The local magisteriums instrumentalization of its RH position for a
Catholic vote can be arguably considered as a case of moral mis-education.
In light of its tepid support for Daang Matuwid because President Benigno
Aquino III failed the litmus test for Catholicity with his support for the RH
bill, it is difficult to see how the Church can claim the moral high ground not
only on sexual but other issues as well.
V. Moral Theology as Committed Participant

It should be abundantly clear at this point that moral theology should
abandon its observant bias and become more engaged as a committed
participant in the educational reform process.
1. Moral theology and educational mission. Socially, moral theologys

mission is to identify the centers of gravity of a communitys social life and
structures, economic means of production, political governance, cultural
aspirations and the like so that it can thematize its moral contents and
corresponding value challenges. It needs to assume leadership that will
point to the promised land for the Philippines: as in the vision of Isaiah, a
land of peace and prosperity because it is founded on justice and solidarity.
Education-wise, we need to return to the basic questions such as, what is
the raison detre of Catholic education in the Philippines? How relevant,
effective, and transformative is it? What differentiates Catholic education
from similar sectarian education and both from state education? How is the
Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) different from
the Coordinating Council of Private Educational Associations (Cocopea)
partners especially among the non-stock and non-profit? How should
congregational and diocesan educational institutions collaborate instead of
compete with each other?
2. Fundamental rather than casuistic approaches. The contemporary need
is not for classic or revisionist moral theology, but something like a post-war
reconstruction approach to education morality. Analysts claim that one of
the most direct paths out of poverty is improving worker skills (hence K to
12 in basic education), rebuilding the countrys manufacturing sector (hence
Higher Education Reform Agenda [HERA] and typologies), or using higher
tax revenues to boost spending on infrastructure (robust indigenous research).
In that light, and without surrendering her distinctive emphasis on religious
issues (itself impossible without the liberal and humanist dimensions of
education), the Church should actively cultivate moral discussion in the HEIs
on such structural evils and systemic solutions. Here the challenge is to define
its relationship with education as magister/magistra, seen less as protection of
academic freedom, but more as nurturer of academic responsibility.
3. From academic freedom to academic responsibility. Despite its many
obvious faults CMO 46 s20125 has at least the merit of raising the question
of basic identity in requiring all HEIs without exception to articulate anew
their distinctive mission in education and how they intend to operationalize
the same and assure its quality according to their chosen typology. As
a concrete illustration of the effort to Christianize or Catholicize the
CMO 46 s2012 (CHEd Memorandum Order no. 46 series of 2012 with subject:
Policy-Standard to Enhance Quality Assurance (QA) in Philippine Higher Education
through an Outcomes-Based and Typology-Based QA, http://www.ched.gov.ph/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/CMO-No.46-s2012.pdf (accessed August 16, 2014).
5
136 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138

University of San Carlos (USC), allow me to offer below USCs experimental
framework of Scientia, Virtus et Devotio taking off from the classical tasks
of the university: instruction, research and community engagement. Moral
theology should offer equal if not more attention to education ethics and
morality than that given to sexual morality. Academic responsibility raises the
question of employability after graduation as opposed to a totally unregulated
system supported by academic freedom without academic responsibility.
What kind of tracer studies should we be constructing for Catholic schools
beyond employability? More importantly, how can we use academic freedom
to sharpen our sense of academic identity as Catholic schools?
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary
Ultimately, are we preparing to become who God wants us to be, as
school persons and community of professional academics worthy to serve the
Catholic schools of the future? At USC the following have been adopted as
our directions for the educational reform.
Basic Education (USC BED)
(a) Scientia: cultivation of higher order thinking skills, developing
employable competencies.
(b) Virtus: moral education for life and profession.
(c) Devotio: cascading the blessings of education to society, and to Gods
least in particular.
This threefold emphasis must be empirically demonstrable and
mathematically proportional in the curriculum.
Higher Education
(a) Scientia: Moral education means discernment of what truly belongs
to God and what belongs to other teachers: e.g., science and philosophy
and hence Catholic education must promote familiarity with our catechism
but also competency in discussions of faith and reason. What then are the
scientific, intellectual and cultural challenges to Philippine Christianity in the
third millennium? Some of the larger challenges to the Church are scientism,
secularism, youth cultures, fundamentalist or tunnel-vision temptations of a
partisan Catholic vote and the like.
(b) Virtus: Moral education in the end is about conscientization, not

just in the narrow sense of sexual morality but as socio-politico-economiccultural morality, hence, addressing structural evils such as land reform,
business monopolies, political dynasties (the biggest scourge because the
source of all iniquity in the country, protecting their turfs through lobby,
ensuring that no level playing field will ever come to be); wrong designs and
policies with regard to power and transport, and the historical neglect of
disadvantaged groups.
(c) Devotio: Faith without works is dead: Catholic education must be
OBE, where outcomes are referenced to the values of Gods reign; in secular
terms it must issue in nation-building beginning at community level. Some
quick examples: engineering praxis as it relates to public infrastructure (roads,
ports, bridges, lamp-posts, etc.); wanton disregard of bioethics within the
Department of Health (DOH) itself; graft and corruption in the education
sector; etc.
Post-Graduate
(a) Scientia: technological innovation; using technology to reduce graft
and corruption, e.g., automated election, online tracking of budgetary
disbursements, etc.
(b) Virtus: preference for maintaining the classical, liberal, humanist
tradition over the hegemonic functionalist paradigm.
(c) Devotio: global competitiveness which does not neglect the poorest
of the poor in ones backyard; the need to dialogue towards a national vision,
implied in the PNQF by its absence.
Conclusion
It has already been observed that although we have a proliferation of
Christological symbols of popular piety in Seor Santo Nio and Poong
Nazareno, we also have a dearth of symbols of Hesus Labrador (distinct from
San Jose and San Isidro) despite the fact that he was first known as The
Carpenter. In contrast to the Church qua Magistra, the symbol of Jesus as
the education professional is relatively unused, even though he was in time
better known as the Master Teacher, whom the Magdalene affectionately
called, Rabboni. Might not a correction be in order, particularly for Catholic
educators?
138 Diwa 39 (2014): 126-138

Further, as church we Catholics have not yet fully understood the power
of organizations and institutions nor explored their power to anoint and bless
reform associations, organizations and institutions. The Catholic Church
is no stranger to power, as it has shown in the RH Bill. Will the Church
finally use its power for the good of the Kingdom in the area of educational
reform? Will moral theology finally rise from its armchair and fall on its
knees as suggested by Hans Urs von Balthazar? Will moral theology finally
stop observing its flock from the margins and witness to its role as moral
guide and educator?

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CONTENTS

Semicentennial Theological Symposia 2013 - 2014

Randolf Flores, SVD, SThD, PhD

Antolin Uy, SVD, PhD

Manuscripts for publication, books for review

ISSN 0115 592X

Studies in Philosophy and Theology

Diwa is a refereed journal published twice a year by the

Volume 39, no. 1 & 2

May & November 2014

Philosophy after Kant

Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

Between Hope and Death: Jobs Death-Wish in 6:8-13

Some Annotations on Omnium in Mentem

Divine Word Seminary: History, Perspective, and

The State of Mission Today

Response to Fr. Antonio Pernias Key Address:

The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Vatican II:

110-113 Response to The Eucharistic Ecclesiology of

Vatican II: Prospect in Mission

114-125 The Influence of Sacrosanctum Concilium

in the Mission Life of the Church

126-138 Philippine Education Reform Agenda:

Moral Theology on the Armchair, at the Margins

Contributors (Diwa 39, nos. 1 & 2)

Philosophy after Kant

University of Santo Tomas

t is possible that Kant had initially hoped to design a philosophy

Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10

R. Abulad, Philosophy after Kant

assumptions which, in fact, Descartes fails to subject to question, thus making

Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10

majestically with its conception of an other-worldly kingdom of the spirit, the

R. Abulad, Philosophy after Kant

Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10

R. Abulad, Philosophy after Kant

is also a theodicy, which is why we have heard it described as ontotheology,

Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10

to a vindication of Kant. Kant has effectively brought classical philosophy to a

R. Abulad, Philosophy after Kant

Diwa 39 (2014): 1-10

In short, the discipline we speak of here is twofold, the negative one

Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

Catholic Trade (Manila)

iscourse on recognition (reconnaissance) has been in the lectionary

Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutman

Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33

In line with this, Ricoeur first examines the meaning of recognition

Recognition: Identifying and Distinguishing

F. Baghi, Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

understood via a process of differentiating. The process of knowing an object

Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33

certain, phenomenologically, a clear and certain idea is always connected to

F. Baghi, Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

Recognizing Self: Recognizing Ones Personal Responsibility

Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33

according to his/her will and intelligence. The doctrine of Aristotle about

The Phenomenology of Capability

F. Baghi, Ricoeurs Ways of Recognition

de la falibilit).26 However, some questions concerning the following can be

Jean Greisch, LItinerance Du Sense (Grenoble: Editions Jerome millon, 2001), p.

Paul Ricoeur, Soi-Mme Comme Un Autre (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1990).

Diwa 39 (2014): 11-33