Philosophicalmethodandsystematicphilosophy

AntnioManuelMARTINS
UniversidadedeCoimbra
[penultimateversion,pleasequotetheprintedversion]
[publishedin2009,.TheHumanitiesandSocialStudiesintheFarEast,(3)23:122
128.]
The very title of this essay contains contentious terms for many contemporary
philosophers. Throughout its long history, philosophy has displayed a variety of
schools, doctrines, methods. The lack of consensus has been a main feature of the
history ofphilosophysincetheverybeginning.Inthe pastthe differences between
philosophyandothersciencesasregardsitssubjectanditsmethod(s)werenotseenas
somethingdeep.Inspiteofsomeeffortstowardssomethinglikeaunifiedviewof
reality,inthetwentiethcenturyphilosophytheprevailingviewwasthatphilosophyand
thespecialsciencesdifferfundamentallyasregardstheirmethods.Philosophersusenot
justonemethodbutavarietyofdifferentmethodsaccordingtothesubjectandthemore
specific philosophical tradition within which they work: the phenomenological, the
hermeneutical,thedialectical,theanalyticaltradition,tonamejustsomeofthemore
widely known. It is quite astonishing that the two more recent and most famous
EncyclopediasofPhilosophyintheEnglishspeakingworlddonothaveanyentryon
methodorphilosophicmethod.Butwedofindinthe RoutledgeEncyclopediaof
Philosophy an article on Scientific Method. This entry is written under the
presuppositionthatthescientificmethodhasnothingtodowithphilosophy,atleast
sinceModernSciencebegan.Asamatteroffact,itisnoteasytofind,inthelast
decades,philosopherswritingontheirownphilosophicalmethod(s)oronphilosophical
methodology.TimothyWilliamson'sbook, ThePhilosophyofPhilosophy (2007), isa
remarkableexceptionbutnottheonlyone.HectorNeriCastaeda(1980),wroteoneof
themoredetailedsketchesofaphilosophicalmethodologyforhisspecificphilosophical
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programme.Rescherwrotewidelyonmethodologicalquestions.Rescher(1973)willbe
referredinsectiontwoofthispaper.Rescher(2001)isoneofthebestintroductorytexts
on philosophical methodology. We could not comment adequately the details of
Rescher(2001)andCastaeda(1980).Sowedecidedtoconcentrateouranalysisontwo
recentbooksthattakeaverycriticalstancetowardsmuchofwhatisdoneinthelast
decades,evenwithinthesocalledanalyticaltraditionandurgeabolderandmore
theoreticalapproachtophilosophy.Whetheroneagreeswiththemornotonehassurely
alottogainfromadiscussionwithtextsthatpointuswhyandhowtodomuchbetterin
philosophy.
Theessayisdividedintothreesections.Section1pointsout,briefly,someprovocative
contentions made by Williamson (2007) regarding the method and the nature of
philosophy.Section2willpresentbrieflythewayLorenzPuntel(2008)understandshis
idealized fourstage philosophical method from the standpoint of the structural
systematicphilosophy.Section3concludesthatphilosophershavemuchtogainifthey
givemoreattentiontotheconsiderationspresentedbyWilliamsonandPuntelonthe
method(s)ofdoingphilosophy.
1.Williamsononmethod
Williamson(2007:IX)startsfromthediagnosisthatcontemporaryphilosophylacksa
selfimagethatdoesitjustice:
Oftheselfimagesinheritedfromthetwentiethcentury,themostprominent
naturalism,thelinguisticturn,postmodernirony,andsoonseemedobviously
inadequatetomostofthemostinterestingworkincontemporaryphilosophy:as
descriptions, false when bold, uninformative when cautious. Less prominent
alternativestooseemedimplausibleorilldeveloped.
Anadequateselfimageisimportantforphilosophybecausewithoutitislikeliertodo
itsjobworsethanitcould.Williamsontellsusthatheconsideredtousethephrase
philosophicalmethodinthetitlebutavoideditfearingthatsomereaderscouldhope
toomuchandaboveallwhathedidntwanttodeliver:arecipefordoingphilosophy.
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WhateverthepreciseterminologyonepreferswhatisclearisthatWilliamson(2007)
addressesmanyimportantissuesaboutphilosophicalmethodology.Thewordmethod
asusedbyWilliamson(2007:3)carriesnoimplicationofamechanicallyapplicable
algorithm guaranteed to yield a result within a finite time. On the other hand,
Williamson rightly emphasizes that if one keeps in mind this loose sense of
methodology it would be disingenuous for a philosopher to claim to have none.
Williamson sees the book as "a defense of armchair philosophy" (2007: 7)orratherof
thekindofarmchair knowledge that we can hope to achieve in philosophy. The phrase
armchair knowledge was for a long time a very negative label. Williamson(2007)
intendsnotonlytorecoverthepositiveaspectsbutalsotounderlinethatmanyother
sciencesusealsothatarmchairmethodology.Thatswhyherejectstheveryideathat
philosophyhasamethodwhichisdifferentinkindfromthesciences:"...thecommon
assumptionofphilosophicalexceptionalismisfalse.Eventhedistinctionbetweenthea
priori andthe aposteriori turnsouttoobscureunderlyingsimilarities"(Williamson
2007:3).Hegoesonarguingthat"thedifferencesinsubjectmatterbetweenphilosophy
andtheothersciencesarealsolessdeepthanisoftensupposed.[...]Ingeneral,the
methodology of much past and present philosophy consists in just the unusually
systematicandunrelentingapplicationofwaysofthinkingrequiredoveravastrangeof
nonphilosophicinquiry"(2007:3).Stressingthecontinuitywiththesciencesandother
domainsofinquiry,Williamsondoesnotwanttodenyanyspecificitytothemethodsof
philosophy. Philosophers use methods of various kinds. What seems important to
Williamsonistoreflectonthenatureofphilosophyitselfsothatwecanevaluatethe
image a philosophical community has of its discipline. The kind of armchair
knowledge philosophy can provide involves no special faculty of intuition. In a very
critical tone to some widely accepted theses in the mainstream analytical philosophy,
Williamson reminds us that the possibility of such knowledge is not to be explained by
reinterpreting philosophical questions as questions about words or concepts. Although
there are philosophical questions about words and concepts, most philosophical
questions are not about words or concepts. This does not imply that our linguistic or
conceptual competence is useless orirrelevanttophilosophybutonlythatitcannotbe
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seen as the only basis for our philosophical knowledge. Nevertheless, Williamson
admitsthatthelinguisticturnhasmadepossibleandmorewidelyavailablean enhanced
ability to determine whether arguments are valid. Modern logic has provided
philosopherswithinstrumentsofunprecedentedpowerandprecisionenablingthemto
formulatehypotheseswithmoreclarityanddeterminetheirconsequenceswithmore
reliability thanever before (Willianson2007:45). Heconsiders itpositivethathe
philosophertakesadvantageofallprogressesmadeinlogicandsemantics.Whathe
resistsstronglyisthethesisthatallphilosophicalproblemsareproblemsoflanguage.
Manyofthemarebutsurelynotall.
In another front, Williamson argues that "the current philosophical mainstream has
failedtoarticulateanadequatephilosophicalmethodology,inpartbecauseithasfallen
intotheclassicepistemologicalerrorofpsychologizingthedata.(2007:45).Hegoes
ondescribingtheuseofintuitionasevidenceinphilosophyandthemethodologyof
reflectiveequilibriumasawayofstabilizingourbeliefsClaimingthatsuchapictureis
wronginvitesustogetridofinternalistpreconceptions(5).
OneofthecentraltopicsWilliamson(2007)considersistheuseofthoughtexperiments
by philosophers. Williamson argues (Chapter 6), (1) that such methodology is very
much the same whether it is used by the philosopher or by the natural scientist; (2) that
theuseofthoughtexperimentsinvolvingsuchhypotheticalcasesasthefamousonesof
Gettier and Block involves nothing more than our ordinary ability to evaluate
counterfactuals. This is one of the most interesting and controversial chapters of
Williamson(2007)butwecannotenterthedetailsofthisdiscussion.Itisenoughto
point out that, according to Williamson (2007) these thought experiments are best
interpreted as investigations of what's metaphysically possible, not of what's
conceptually possible. Here the well known views of Williamson on metaphysical
modalities come to the fore with the concomitant denial of the very notion of a
conceptualnecessityandtheappealtotheKripkeanargumentsabouttheatomicnumber
ofgoldandthefactofwaterbeingH2O.Theepistemologyofmetaphysicalmodality
provides a case study of the methodology envisaged in Williamson (2007).

Metaphysical possibility and necessity are seen as equivalent to special cases of

counterfactualconditionals.
Williamson(2007:278292)inanafterwordentitledMustDoBetter,summarizes
somekeypointsofhisevaluationofthecurrentselfimageofphilosophy.Beginning
with a thought experiment that invites us to participate in a philosophy conference
somewhereinPresocraticGreece.Themeoftheconference:whatarethingsmade
of?KeynotespeakerswerecelebritieslikeThales,Anaximenes,Heraclitus.Attending
totheconferencetherewerenotonlythefollowersofthethosePresocraticphilosophers
butalsothecriticsandpaleopragmatistsinvitingeveryonetoforgetfutilepseudo
inquiries,andtodosomethingusefulinstead(278).ButasWilliamsonnotes,nomatter
howsuccessfultheywereatthetime,atleastinoneimportantrespecttheywrong.
With however much confusion, Thales and the rest were asking one of the best
questionsevertohavebeenasked,aquestionthathaspainfullyledtomuchmodern
science(278). The moral of the well known narrative according to the positivist
interpretationmissessomekeyelements,importanttothemethodologyofphilosophy.
Williamson(2007:279)presentsthemethodologicalpointasfollows:
ThecaseofthePresocraticsshowsthatonecannotalwaystellinadvancewhich
questionswillbefruitfultopursue.Evenifacommunitystartswithnoremotely
adequateideaofhowtogoaboutansweringaquestion,itdoesnotfollowthathe
questionismeaninglessornotworthaddressing.Thatgoesforthequestionswe
nowclassifyasphilosophicalasmuchasitdoesforthoseweclassifyasempirical
ornaturalscientific.
Thiswillbeviewedbymanyasgoingtoofarintheacceptanceofapluralityofviews
andmethodologicalapproachestophilosophicalquestions.ButmaybeWilliamsonis
rightandifwereallywanttodomuchbetterthanwehavedoneweshouldnotnarrow
the range of our philosophical options. This does not imply that there is no
methodologicalconstraintinphilosophy.AccordingtoWilliamson(2007:286)therecan
be real progress in philosophy only with adequate method disciplined by logic,
semanticsorsomeotherformofphilosophicaldisciplineandhardwork:
Muchcontemporaryanalyticalphilosophyseemstobewritteninthetacithopeof
discursivelymuddlingthough,uncontrolledbyanymethodologicalconstraints.
That may be enough for easy questions, if there are any in philosophy; it is
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manifestly inadequate for resolving the hard questions with which most
philosophersliketoengage.Alltoooftenitproducesonlyeddiesinacademic
fashion, without any advance in our understanding of the subject matter.
Althoughwecanmakeprogressinphilosophy,wecannotexpecttodosowhen
wearenotworkingatthehighestavailablelevelofintellectualdiscipline.That
levelisnotachievedbyeffortlesssuperiority.Itrequiresaconsciouscollective
effort.
Williamson (2007: 286) clearly rejects the crude stereotypes according to which
analyticphilosophersuseargumentswhilecontinentalphilosophersdonot;thefirst
writeclearlyandtheothersdonot.ButWilliamsonremindsusthatintheanalytical
traditionmanyphilosophersuseargumentsonlytotheextentthatmostcontinental
philosophersdo;andasregardsclearwritingWilliamsonisverycriticalofmuchwork
doneintheanalyticaltraditionthatheconsidersobscureevenwhenitiswrittenin
everydaywords,shortsentencesandarelaxed,openairspirit,becausethestructureof
itsclaimsisfudgedwhereitreallymatters(286).
Williamson(2007)isapassionateapologyformorerigorandprecisioninphilosophy
withattentiontothedetails.ThemethodologyofPuntel(2008)weshallpresentinthe
next section is animated by same concern of rigor and precision although from a
differenttheoreticalframework.
2.Puntelsidealizedmethod
Puntel(2008:41)clearlyrejectstheveryideathatthereis(orshouldbe,ideally)only
one method for philosophy. The fourstage method is idealized because the
complexity oftheory construction requires a multifarious work with many different
tasksandprocedures.Thetechnicalityrequiredwillnotbealwaysapparentandthe
recoursetothefullrangeofprocedureswouldbepossibleonlyonthelimitcaseofthe
developmentofacompletephilosophicaltheory.ThatiswhyPuntelcansaythatin
StructureandBeing themethodisnotfollowedinsuchcompleteandcomprehensive
detail.Itdoesnotintendtodeliverthatkindofcompletephilosophicaltheorybutonly
(thisonlycansoundironicalgiventhecomplexityandthequalityofthesystematic

workpresentedbutistobetakenliterally)a theoreticalframeworkfor a systematic

philosophy[italicsadded,AMM].
Puntel(2008:42)presentsthefourstagesasfollows:
Stage1:Inventory:Identificationofstructuresandtheirpreliminarycollection,seekingmaximal
coherenceorstructuration,intoinformaltheories
Stage2:Interrelationof(informal)theoriesinitiallyandinformallyarticulatedatthefirststage
intoholisticnetworksand(inparticularcases)axiomatizedtheories
Stage3:Interrelationofcomponent(informaland/oraxiomatized)theoriesintoincreasingly
comprehensivetheories(holisticnetworks)
Stage4:Evaluationofthecomprehensivesystemornetworkwithrespecttoitstheoretical
adequacyandtruth.

AsPuntelremarks,thesefourstagescanequallywellberegardedasfourdifferent
methodsalthoughfromthepointofviewoftheconstructionofacompletesystematic
philosophy,inPuntelsense,theycanbeviewedasonecomplexmethod.Thebasicidea
behindthiscomplexfourstagemethodisnotverydifferentfromthecentralintuition
behindCastaedas(1980)methodology.Thereisawholerangeofcomplexanddiverse
datatobeintegrated(inverydifferentmannersandatverydifferentlevels)ina
theoreticalinterpretationofthesedata(orpartofthem,underdifferentpointsofview);
thesetheoriescanbesimplerormorecomplexandinterconnectedasthesystematic
work advances). Interestingly enough, although from different presuppositions,
Castaeda(1980:14)distinguishesalsofourmaintypesofactivityinhismethodology:
protophilosophical,symphilosophical,diaphilosophicalandmetaphilosophical.But
as Puntel remarks his method, especially the first stages, owe much more to the
inspirationhegotfromthecoherencemethodologydevelopedbyRescher(1973).Inthe
presentationofthefirstmethodicalstage,Puntel(2008:4244)quotessometextsfrom
Rescher(1973,19924)tocharacterizethisfirststage.Forthosewhoarenotfamiliar
with Rescher (1973) and Puntel(2008) it could be worth remembering what
Rescher(1973:168)saysabouthisconceptionoftruthasasystem:

Theconceptionthatalltruthsformonecomprehensiveandcohesivesysteminwhicheverything
hasitslogicallyappropriateplace,andinwhichtheinterrelationshipsamongtruthsaremadeduly
manifest,isoneofthemanyfundamentalideascontributedtotheintellectualheritageoftheWest
bytheancientGreeks.

ThereisoneimportantdifferencebetweenRescher(1973)andPuntel(2008).Rescher
(1993),followingKantsregulativeepistemologicalapproach,presupposes,likemany
otherphilosophers,thatthereisagapbetweenthinking,mind,etcononehand,andthe
world orwhatthereisonthe other. Puntel(2008: 17)clearly denies any such
presupposition:
In opposition to the Kantian tradition and to all similar philosophical positions, this book
establishesthethesisthattheputativegapisonethatisnotonlybridgeable,butindeedmustbe
presupposed as already to have been bridged by every serious and sensible science and
philosophy.Thecentralinsightgroundingthisthesisisthatscienceandphilosophy,evenona
minimal level, can be sensible (or, speaking loosely, can function) only on the basis of the
presupposition that the segments of actuality with which they are concerned, and ultimately,
thought through to the end, actuality or being as a whole, are expressible. In this book,
expressibilityisusedasatechnicaltermtodesignatetheentirepaletteofouraccessesto
actualityortobeing,orthemodesofarticulating(conceiving,understanding,explaining,etc)
actualityorbeingasawhole.

ThequotedtextnotonlyclarifiesonecentralpresuppositionofPuntel(2008)butalso
formulatesthecentralexpressibilitythesiswithoutwhichitisnotpossibletounderstand
adequately the proposed fourstage method. As Puntel notes, in the philosophical
commonpractice,onlystageoneandstagefourareconsideredandeventhenatamost
rudimentarylevel,mostofthetimes,sothattheproceduresarenotevenapparent:The
second and third steps or stages are usually wholly ignored.[] More ambitious
philosophicalpresentationsignoreonlythesecondstep.
2.1Thefirststageofthemethodinventory
Thefirststageinventoryisamodifiedformofsomebasicfeaturesofthecoherence
methodology developed by Rescher (1973). Puntel (2008: XIX) recognizes the
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influenceandinspirationhegotfromRescher(1973)buthequotesRescher(19924:I:
159) to present the main steps of the coherence methodology needed at this first
methodologicalstage:
1.Togatherinallofthedata(inthepresenttechnicalsenseofthisterm).
2.Tolayoutalltheavailableconflictresolvingoptionsthatrepresentthealternativepossibilities
thatarecognitivelyathand.
3. To choose among these alternatives by using the guidance of plausibility considerations,
invoking(inourpresentcontext)thevariousparametersofsystematicityregularity,uniformity,
simplicity,andtheresttoserveasindicesofplausibility.

Thetechnicalsenseof Datum/Data mentionedin(1)issimplytruthcandidate.Its

anythingthatcanbethestartingpointofascientificorphilosophicundertaking.That
wasRescher(1973)typicaldefinitionofDatuminamovewithsimilaritieswiththeone
thatledPoppertotransformthetruthsofscienceinconjectures.Thereisnopointin
goingintothedetailsofthismachineryconducing,ifallgoeswellorwellenoughto
what Rescher calls repeatedly the inference to the best systematization. Rescher
(2001: 15f) describes in a more loosely way what he understands as the Data that
constitutetherealstartingpointofaphilosophicalinquiry:
Commonsensebeliefs,commonknowledge,andwhathavebeentheordinaryconvictionsofthe
plainmansincetimeimmemorial;
Thefacts(orpurportedfacts)affordedbythescienceoftheday;theviewsofwellinformed
expertsandauthorities;
Thelessonswederivefromourdealingswiththeworldineverydaylife;
Thereceivedopinionsthatconstitutetheworldviewoftheday;viewsthataccordwiththespirit
ofthetimesandtheambientconvictionsofonesculturalcontext;
Tradition,inheritedlore,andancestralwisdom(includingreligioustradition);
Theteachingsofhistoryasbestwecandiscernthem.

AlltheseDatadeserveconsiderationbutnotacceptance.Thedonotconstituteabodyof
knowledge. Taken altogether, they are inconsistent; they are not truths but mere
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plausibilities (truth candidates). The above mentioned steps of the coherence

methodology are accepted by Puntel (2008) in order to get the initial and minimal
configuration of theories. He parts company with Rescher in many different ways
especiallyasregardsthequestionsconcerningthesemanticandontologicalstatusofthe
theoreticalframeworkofasystematicphilosophy.Aboveallthesemanticdimensionis
missedbyRescher.Onethingimportanttonotice,isthatforPuntel(2008)itmakes
sensetospeakoftruthonlyinthecontextof/orreferredtoatheoreticalframework.
Soitisoftheutmostimportancetospecify,fromtheverybeginning,towhichpossible
theoretical framework a particular collection (segment) of data could/should belong
evenifweknowthatthefirstresultswillbe,eventually,subjecttoamoreorlessradical
revision.Thisfollowsfromthefactthatwearetalkingofthefirstmethodologicalstage.
Ontheotherhand,itshouldberememberedthatmostofthe(theoretical)philosophical
workwillnotgobeyondthisdemandingfirststage.
2.2Thesecondstageofthemethod:theconstitutionoftheories.
AsaresultoftheworkdoneinstageoneshouldobtainwhatPuntel(2008:44)calls
structuralsentences:thefirstattempttoformulatelaws,universalsentences,etc.The
aimofthesecondstageispreciselytogivethefirstset(s)ofstructuralsentencesa
genuinetheoreticalform.Puntel(2008:45)admitsthatthereisnogeneralagreement
onhowtounderstandatheory.Withoutgoingintodetailsandpresupposingavery
generalcharacterizationofhisstructuralsystematictheoryPuntelpointsoutthat,from
thisperspective,themostimportanttheoryformsarethe axiomatic andthe network
form. After presenting briefly different forms of axiomatization Puntel (2008: 49)
claimsthat(1)theaxiomaticmethod(especiallyintheEuclideanstyle)is,logically,the
mostexactofall,yieldingthemostdemandingtheoryform;(2)andonemustassume
thatthereis atleastinthecasesofmany,ifnotindeedinthecasesofmostsubject
matters,aweb(network)ofrelationsthatthereforecannotbeunderstoodandarticulated
in alinearhierarchicalmanner. The important conclusionto bedrawnis that for
philosophyasacomprehensivedoctrineonlythecoherentistmethodologyissuitable.
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However, it should be underlined that Puntel(2008: 50) maintains that the results
reachedinthesefirststagescanbesubjectedtothecriticonthebasisofallcurrently
availabletheoreticalmechanisms.Allelements,whatevertheirstatusinthetheoretical
constructionatagivenmoment,aresubject,inprinciple,tocriticandrevision.Thisisa
corollaryoftheantifoundationaliststanceofthistheoreticalframework.Itisageneral
claimofnoimmunitytocriticandanalysis.Itdoesnotimplythatifthetheories(or
fragmentsof)donotreachthatlevelofformalsystematizationthentheyshouldbe
discarded.Thatwouldbeblindnesstorealityandamisunderstandingoftheverynature
of philosophy. Although Puntel (2008: 50) stresses the formal elements in the
constructionatheoreticalstructuralsystematicphilosophy,heclearlyrecognizesthat
philosophyisfundamentallyacontentdisciplineorscience,notaformalone.The
sketchofthesemethodologicalstageshasaregulativefunction.Onemustbearinmind
thattherealizationofsuchprogrammesisverydemandingandavoidthedangersof
prematureandemptyformalization.
2.3Thirdstageofthemethod:systematizationoftheories
This stage presupposes that the theoretical enterprise begins with singular theories
explainingveryspecificdomains.Thequestionofsystematizationofthesedifferent
theories becomes pressing only when the need is felt for articulation of different
theories in a broader framework or when the project of a network of theories is
envisaged.Generallyspeaking,thenetworkmodelusedatthesecondstagecouldbe
alsousedhere,butatahigherlevelofcomplexity.Herethecoherencemethodologyis
again very useful. But if Puntel (2008: 50) admits that in philosophy it is neither
requisite(norrealisticallypracticable)toaccomplishwhatthesecondstagerequires
whatisthepointofpresentingthisthirdstage?Puntelwouldreplythatwearetalking,
fromtheverybeginning,ofan idealized fourstagemethodtowhichheattributesan
importantregulativefunction.Evenifonedoesnotgoallthewayitcanchangetheway
oneseesthework(tobe)doneinphilosophy.Itwouldnotbereasonabletopresenthere

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thedetailsofthissystemconstitutingmethodexplainedinmoredetailinchapters5
and6ofStructureandBeing.
2.4.FourthstageoftheMethod:evaluationofthecomprehensivesystem
AsanonfoundationalistprojectthetheoreticalframeworkoutlinedinPuntel(2008)
onlyraisestherealquestionsoftheoreticaladequacyandtruthstatusattheendofthe
processofdevelopmentandpresentationofatheory.Thisprocedureisbestunderstood
asanadditionalformofinferencetothebestsystematization.Thequestionisvery
complexanddifficulttoanswer.AswehavealreadyunderlinedPuntel(2008)presents
just a theoreticalframeworkfor a systematicphilosophy,nottheonlyanddefinitive
frameworkorevenless the ultimatecomprehensive philosophicalsystem. This is
admittedtobebeyondthereachofeveryhumanbeing.Thatswhyitispresupposed,
fromtheverybeginning,thattherearemanypossible(different)theoreticalframeworks
and comprehensive philosophicalsystems.Whatis underevaluationis onesingular
theoretical configuration that has, ex hypothesi, attained a sufficient degree of
explanatory power. The evaluation to be made at this stage of the method can
adequately be described as an instance of inference to the best systematization
(availableatthetimeofthatevaluation).Thewayoneunderstandstheorycanmake
allthedifferencehereasatthefirststageofthemethod.Theconsequencesofanoption
for an interpretation according to the statement view or in the sense of the no
statementviewareanalysedindetailinchapter2ofPuntel(2008).
Averyimportanttobesolvedinanysystematicphilosophyisthatofgrounding.
Puntel (2008) uses this term instead of the more common justification to avoid
problemsassociatedwiththatterminologyandpointoutthespecificityofitsseveral
useswithinthescopeofthetheoreticalframeworkpresentedin StructureandBeing.
Oneofthefirstthingstoavoidistoconfuseobjectivegrounding(includingproof)
withjustification.Thereasonwhythishappenssofrequentlyisthattheissuesrelatedto
thetheoreticalframeworksarenotconsidered.Orifitassumed(orpresupposed)that
thetheoreticalframeworkwithinwhichoneoperatesistheonlyoneavailable,then
proofandjustificationcaneasilybeconfused.AsPuntel(2008:53)says:
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Objectivegroundingsareexplicationsofinnertheoreticorinnersystematicinterconnectionsthat
satisfy specific requirements established by the theories or systemsbetter, the theoretical
frameworkswithinwhichtheydevelop.

Afterabriefcriticalreviewofsomeargumentsregardingtheproblemofgrounding
mostoftheminanonsystematicwayPuntel(2008:6471)presentsbrieflyhisown
systematicconceptofgrounding,anidealizationliketheoneofmethodbutinvolving
just three stages, namely, an incipiently systematic, an innersystematic, and a
comprehensivelyormetasystematicstage.Naturally,thephilosophicalpracticediffers
greatlyfromsuchidealizedprocessesbuthephilosopherwhothinkssystematically,in
thesenseenvisagedbyPuntel(2008),andmustgroundthetheoreticalactivityateach
stageaccordingtotheresourcesavailable.
Puntel(2008)isnotthepresentationofPuntelscomprehensivephilosophicalsystemas
such,butrathertheoutlineoftheframeworkwithinwhichsuchasystemcanpossibly
bebuild.Hisapproachismuchbroaderthanissuescurrentlyconsideredmetaphysical,
since his goal is a comprehensive vision of everything there is. The centrality of
beinginthisprojectmayappeartomanycontemporaryphilosophersanimpossible
and untimely task. The project aims to show how being can show itself and be
conceivedintermsofthetheoreticalframeworkproposed.Itiscarriedoutbydrawing
onanalyticmeansofformallogicandtruthsemanticsand,atthesametime,redefining
the central intuitions of speculative philosophy throughout history. Puntel (2008)
represents a challenging attempt to overcome the contemporary fragmentation of
philosophicaldiscourse. Thisdoesnotimplythatonecannotraisecriticalobjections
againstthemethodandthedetailsoftheargument.Whatseemsbeyondanydoubtis
thatPuntel(2008)bringshispositioninasufficientlyclearandwellarticulatedway.
Thisisnottheplacetomakeaglobalevaluationoftheproject.Sufficetosaythateven
ifonedoesnotacceptallargumentsasequallyconvincingonemustbearinmindthat
thisframeworkhasanetworkstructure.Viewedagainstallthatisdevelopedinthe
differentchaptersofStructureandBeingonemustadmittheargumentforasystematic
structural philosophy is compelling. Anyway, it could invite some to cooperate or
emulate this project following the same of similar methodology. The thesis of a
13

pluralityoftheoreticalframeworksshouldinviteapositivereaction.Forthosemore
criticaloftheprojectitcouldbe,nevertheless,anexcellentopportunitytorethinkthe
assumptionsofcurrentlywellestablishedpositions.
3.Conclusion
In the short term we must use the available methods. Williamson (2007) and
Puntel(2008)viewphilosophyasaclearlytheoreticalandsystematictheenterprise.The
masteryofamethodologicaldiscipline,combinedwiththethesisofthepluralityof
theoreticalframeworks,seemsveryimportantforthefutureofthediscipline.Therewill
continue to be disagreement between philosophers as always has been since the
Presocratics.But,eventhosewhoseephilosophyinadifferentway,asanontheoretical
discipline, could learn something from the efforts made by Williamson (2007) and
Puntel(2008)todobetterinphilosophy.Thosewhoinsistthatphilosophyisbestseen
asnonpropositionalknowledgeshouldrememberthelessonsonecanlearnfromPlato
regarding this issue. Every apology of such a comprehension of philosophy that
dispensestheresourcesofpropositionalknowledgeanditsconstraintsisillconceived.
Puntel(2008)hasbuiltacompellingcaseagainstthemorewidelyknownvarietiesof
foundationalist theoretical frameworks. Against this background many antitheory
positionsinphilosophyloosetheirplausibilityandattractiveness.

References:
Almeder, Robert (1994). Defining Justification and Naturalizing Epistemology. Philosophy
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Systematic Philosophy, translated by and in collaboration with Alan White
(University Park, PA, USA: Penn State University Press). This is a translation of
Puntel, Lorenz (2006) Struktur und Sein. Ein Theorierahmen fr eine
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systematische Philosophie (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck). A Portuguese

translation of the same book: Puntel, Lorenz (2008), Estrutura e Ser. Um
quadro referencial terico para uma filosofia sistemtica,
translated by Nlio Schneider (S. Leopoldo, Brasil: Editora Unisinos).
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