Note

Contention 1
o Add Threat con cards
http://sdi.sagepub.com/
http://diggy.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/13534/1/UNDER%20THE
%20GUISE%20OF%20NATIONAL%20SECURITY.pdf
o Try to find more SPOT specific harms cards
Solvency
o Do we need T prempts?
Framing contention
o Like a defense of our ethic or something we can use as defense against
norm pic
o Should we include Util bad stuff?
o Do we need no war stuff here?

1AC Rough

Contention 1
Plan: The United States federal government should eliminate
the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique program.
The Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques or SPOT
Program in airports subjects Muslims to extra searches and
scrutiny [Retag maybe]
Berry 13
Maya Berry, Executive Director at the Arab American Institute, AAI Calls on DHS to
Terminate TSAs SPOT Behavioral Detection Program, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE,
http://www.aaiusa.org/aai-calls-on-dhs-to-terminate-tsas-spot-behavioral-detectionprogram, 06/07/2013//SRawal
In light of recent developments in Congress, I write to urge you to take this opportunity to end the Transportation Security

that SPOT has

been ineffective at stopping terrorists, costing the government hundreds
of millions of dollars annually without providing any tangible security
benefits to travelers. We are also troubled by the numerous reports and allegations of racial profiling in airports that
Administrations (TSA) Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. We believe

are currently using the SPOT program. In light of these failures and as a result of the release of the DHSs inspector general report,
Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS) offered an amendment this week to the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) FY2014
appropriations bill that would have denied the Department funding for the SPOT program. Though the amendment failed on the
House floor, we urge you to take the opportunity offered by Rep. Thompsons amendment to terminate the SPOT program
immediately. As you know, on May 29th DHSs Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a report on the SPOT program that included
an audit of the programs costs and benefits.[1] The OIGs report found that DHS has spent $878 million on the SPOT program as of
September 2012, including training 2,800 behavior detection officers (BDOs). Ideally, BDOs work in pairs, using their training to spot

Unfortunately, numerous experts in the

fields have challenged the basic assumption that underlies the SPOT
program, the idea that certain movements or behaviors can indicate
deception, and that those behaviors can be effectively and quickly
identified by BDOs.[2] SPOTs results seem to validate this view. According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), SPOT singled out nearly 50,000 people for extra scrutiny in 2010, but
only 300 were arrested, and none of those cases involved terrorism. The
GAO also found that 17 suspected terrorists moved through airports
equipped with SPOT without being identified by BDOs.[3] Beyond SPOTs cost and
inefficacy, we are deeply troubled by its embrace of racial, ethnic, and religious
profiling as a way to identify potential terrorists. SPOT programs in
Honolulu and Newark led to allegations of racial profiling, but it is the case
at Bostons Logan Airport that was by far the most troubling. More than 30 TSA
certain behaviors thought to indicate suspicious activity.

officers came forward last summer to expose widespread racial profiling at Logan. According to the officers, passengers were

Needless to say, the SPOT

program as practiced in Boston added a veneer of behavioral science to
simple racial profiling. SPOTs use of racial profiling has hurt TSAs and
DHSs relationships with minority communities at no benefit to traveler
security. After costing federal taxpayers nearly a billion dollars, SPOT has never effectively identified a potential terrorist, and
targeted because of their race, their appearance or their ultimate destination.

instead has devolved into a racial profiling program that violates the civil rights of minority travelers. By embittering minority
travelers,

TSA and DHS endanger the work both agencies have done to forge
effective working relationships with potential allies like the Arab American

community. The combination of the damning May 29th IG report and Rep. Thompsons amendment to
the FY2014 appropriations bill present DHS and TSA with an opportunity
to end this failed program. On behalf of concerned Arab Americans, we
urge you to seize it.

The questioning of Muslim people creates a prevailing

atmosphere of Islamaphobia
Bilici 10
(Mucahit Bilici, Assistant Sociology Professor at John Jay College; Islamophobia /
Islamophilia, Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Muslim Ethnic Comedy:
Inversions of Islamophobia, 2010, pg. 198-199)
This routine provides a perfect illustration of the Muslim airport experience, where the negative charisma of being Muslim assumes

At the airport, those who have so far (in the city, at the ticket
counter, and so on) been treated equally suddenly become suspect. At the
internal borders of the nation, they suddenly feel their protected status begin to
evaporate. Even those Muslims who do not consider themselves
particularly profiled or discriminated against in everyday life suddenly
begin to feel uneasy. Strip search and other security rites of passage
through the border show them the hard edge of the nation. Here Muslim
otherness is revealed in the most conspicuous way. Despite official efforts to present
full transparency.

searches at the airports as random, comedians like Dean Obeidallah skeptically ask their Muslim audiences: "Are you selected for

The fear a Muslim inspires is

associated with the unpredictability of his behavior. What if he is a terrorist? What if he
hijacks the plane? What if he is only pretending to be normal? All these questions that airport
authorities ask citizens to consider transform the Muslim passenger in the
eyes of his fellow travelers into a source of unpredictability and danger .
When a Muslim like Azhar Usman gets onto the plane, faces fall. Danger is imminent. The anxiety ends only when the plane lands .
People are almost thankful to the Muslim passenger for not doing what
they feared he might. Flying-while-Muslim thus becomes an extremely
public event. A crucial point here is that the airport is where Muslim
experience and American mainstream experience meet. Jokes about aviation thus have a
random search even when you are dropping a friend at the airport?"

remarkable degree of transparency and universality. Muslims and non-Muslims alike can understand and laugh at airport and
airplane jokes. They are at once ethnic and national, particular and universal. These jokes represent the comic surface where Muslim
and American perspectives intersect most "dangerously" and with full intelligibility. Jokes about the airport experience thus
constitute a significant portion of the repertoire of Muslim comedians today.

This surveillance creates conditions for psychological and

physical violence against brown people
Huus 11 (Kari Huus, Fulbright Scholar Taiwan, "Muslim Travelers Say They're Still
Saddled with 9/11 Baggage", www.today.com/id/44334738/ns/todaytoday_news/t/muslim-travelers-say-theyre-still-saddled-baggage/#.VafqhnTWKF4,
9/13/2011, sr)
Imagine it is 5 a.m. and youve landed in New York after a 12-hour
overseas flight. Standing in the line for U.S. citizens, you wait as a border

agent asks passengers ahead a few cursory questions, then waves them
through. Your family is instead ushered into a separate room for more
than an hour of searching and questioning. This was the welcome that
Hassan Shibly, traveling with his wife and infant son, said they received in
August 2010, when they returned to the United States from Jordan, after traveling to
Mecca. Are you part of any Islamic tribe? Have you ever studied Islam full
time? How many gods do you believe in? How many prophets do you
believe in? the agent at New Yorks JFK Airport asked, according to
Shibly, 24, a Syrian-born Muslim American. He said the agent searched his
luggage, pulling out his Quran and a hand-held digital prayer counter. At
the end I guess (the agent) was trying to be nice he said, Sorry, I
hope you understand we just have to make sure nothing gets blown up,
said Shibly, a law school graduate who grew up in Buffalo. A decade after Islamic
extremists used airplanes to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
Muslim American travelers say they are still paying the price for terror
attacks carried out in the name of their religion. At airports, ports and
land crossings, many contend, they are repeatedly singled out for special
screening and intrusive questioning about their religious beliefs. Others
say they have been marooned overseas, barred from flights to the United
States. Stories come pouring out' Whenever a group of Muslims sit
together stories come pouring out, said real estate agent Jeff Siddique, a
Pakistan-born U.S. citizen who has lived in Seattle for 35 years. Its story after story
after story. That is supported by a survey released in August by the Pew Research
Center, in which 36 percent of Muslim Americans who traveled by air in the last year
said they had been singled out for special screening. According to a spokesman for
the TSA, some people are chosen randomly for secondary search, while others merit
secondary screening if their luggage contains things that raise questions. The TSA
is now adding a program called SPOT Screening Passengers by
Observation Technique. We have behavior detection officers who are all
over the airport, looking for people exhibiting behaviors that are
considered anomalous doing things that suggest they're trying to hide
something, said TSA spokesman Nick Kimball. They are observing the
queue. When that person gets up to the front, they would be referred to
the side. The TSA website calls the program a positive step that does
not require ethnic profiling but looks to the pattern of behavior. These
are tools that would allow us to be more precise, but without getting into racial
profiling, which is a bad thing.One of the most chilling cases surrounding the no-fly
list is that of Gulet Mohamed, a 19-year-old American citizen of Somali
heritage. Mohamed had been visiting family in Yemen and Somalia two
countries with active Islamist terrorist groups. When he went to the
Kuwait airport to extend his visa in December, he was arrested and taken
to a detention facility, where he was blindfolded, questioned and beaten
by unknown agents, according to his lawyer, Gadeir Abbas. The
questioners were especially interested in information about Anwar alAwlaki, a dual U.S. and Yemeni citizen turned Islamic extremist in Yemen,
Abbas said. Mohamed insisted he had no information and, after a week, Kuwait
ordered his deportation. But when he tried to board a flight to the United

States, he was told he was on the no-fly list. Only after Abbas filed a
lawsuit on his behalf in January was Mohamed allowed to return home to
Virginia. Mohamed is pursuing a claim for damages and to be removed
from the list. The federal government wants the case thrown out on the
grounds that it is irrelevant now that he is back in the U.S. Meantime, it
will not confirm if he is on the no-fly list. The lawsuit is pending, after a judge
moved it to a circuit court on jurisdictional grounds. Its this very Kafkaesque world
where no one has charged (people on the list) with any crime but they can see its
effects, said Abbas, an attorney with CAIR. His case is the most heinous
example of what the no-fly list can do. Other pending court cases allege that
Muslim American travelers have encountered similar violations of their rights,
including some who were forced to take thousand-mile circuitous land routes to get
back into the U.S. or were stuck overseas for weeks or months until lawyers here
took up their cases. The ACLU, which argues that the watch list system is
unconstitutional, has filed a lawsuit against the Justice Department, the
FBI and the Terrorist Screening Center naming 20 people 18 U.S.
citizens and two permanent residents who allegedly have been
prevented from boarding airline flights to or from the U.S. The plaintiffs say
they were told by security or airline staff that their names were on the no-fly list.
Thousands of people have been barred altogether from commercial air travel
without any opportunity to confront or rebut the basis for their inclusion, or
apparent inclusion on the no-fly list," the lawsuits says. "The result is a vast and
growing list of individuals whom, on the basis of error or innuendo, the government
deems too dangerous to fly, but too harmless to arrest. In response, the
government objected on jurisdictional grounds and argued that the policy
does not violate the constitutional rights of the travelers because they
have not been denied the right to re-enter and reside in the United States,
nor have they been denied the ability to travel. But critics of the list note
that in cases like that of the lead plaintiff, Ayman Latif, a 33-year-old U.S.
citizen and disabled Marine Corps veteran, that would have meant weeks
of travel from the Middle East to the United States by sea and land, at
considerable additional expense. The U.S. District Court in Portland, Ore.,
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that it should go instead to an
appeals court. The ACLU is appealing that decision.

SPOTs ambiguous nature is what allows racial profiling- only

removing the program solves
AAI 2013 (AAI Arab American Institute (AAI) TSA SPOT PROGRAM; Arab
American Institute; AAI ISSUE BRIEF - TSA SPOT PROGRAM;
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/7665/attachments/original/14316
30938/SPOT%2525202015.pdf?1431630938- No date in article but last date cited in
past tense is November 2013)
In 2007, TSA introduced a program called Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) based on the subjective, discriminatory
screening process first used by the Israeli government. The program uses

Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) to identify passengers who behave

suspiciously in some manner, then ask them more questions or subject
them to increased physical security checks. In 2012, more than 3,000 BDOs were deployed to 176
U.S. airports to look for preselected facial expressions, body language, and appearances that the program lists as suspicious. The
Problem with any program that increases the scrutiny of American citizens
runs the risk of selecting individuals discriminatorily, especially in a
program like SPOT, where the officer who makes the initial inspection also
decides who will be inspected. This problem is exacerbated when the class
singled out is not designated by any real objective criteria. There is no
closed list of sensitive behaviors that officers can look for without using
their personal prejudices. Furthermore, there have been a number of
reports of profiling or discrimination by BDOs and other TSA officers.
Regardless of exactly how often this happens, its easy to understand how a program like SPOT
could encourage arbitrary enforcement and ethnic and/or religious
profiling against Arab or Muslim travelers, or other groups deemed
suspicious. Whether or not these problems would be tolerable in a
program that actually made Americans safer is a difficult question, but
that difficulty disappears if the program isnt actually effective. And here,
the facts leave no room for doubt: SPOT, which has cost American
taxpayers about $1 billion dollars over the last few years, has not been
shown to be an effective tool in fighting terrorism . Over and over again, independent reports
from the DHS Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have come to the same conclusion. In a
strongly critical November 2013 report, the GAO bluntly said that
available evidence does not support whether behavioral indicators [like
those used in SPOT] can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk
to aviation security. The report indicated that the techniques officers use
to identify suspicious passengers werent scientifically sound in any real
way. At a Congressional hearing in the aftermath of the report, TSA Administrator John Pistole defended SPOT, but even its
supporters on the Transportation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security seemed to acknowledge that there

Perhaps most obviously, there has not been a single

instance of a traveler flagged by a BDO who actually turned out to be a
threat to aviation security. Rep. Mark Sanford (R-SC) made the point that however helpful behavioral detection
were no real results TSA could point to.

might be in other law enforcement fields, it simply hasnt translated into success in aviation security. Rep. Sanford also agreed with
Reps. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Steven Horsford (D-NV), and Donald Payne (D-NJ) that SPOTs guidelines defining

suspicious behavior were too vague to prevent discriminatory

enforcement.

There is no scientific evidence saying SPOT can catch

terrorists.
DICKERSON 15 (DICKERSON; May 6; reporter at business insider; TSA Spot
Program is scientifically bogus http://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-spot-program-isscientifically-bogus-2015-5)
Much of the SPOT program is based on research that began in the 1970s by
psychologist Paul Ekman. Ekman's work hypothesized that subtle facial
expressions, called microexpressions, can tell you a lot about a person,
and someone trained to read those microexpressions could guess
someone's intentions. However, it's never been proven in any experiment

that someone can glance through faces in a crowded place like an airport
and tell if someone is being deceptive or lying, according to Charles
Honts, a lie detection expert at Boise State University. There are few (if
any) behaviors that are clearly linked to lying, scientists say. And it's
impossible to tell from observing someone for a few seconds in a security
line if they're keeping some kind of secret. Sure, someone might look a little
nervous or scared because they're about to commit a horrifying crime. But they
may just be nervous about flying or antsy that they're having to wait in line when
they're already running late for their flight. In 2013, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) examined over 400 studies on lie detection.
From that huge survey, the organization concluded that the average
person can only tell if someone is lying 54% of the time . That's barely
better than pure chance. From the survey, the GAO concluded there's not
any scientific evidence that someone can learn to spot who's keeping a
secret and who's not, so it recommended that funding for the SPOT
program be limited until the TSA could provide some real evidence that
it's useful. The GAO report was just a recommendation though, and the SPOT
program is still up and running. If we consider what behavioral science tells us (or
can't tell us), it looks like we really need a new method for airport security checks.
"What we know about SPOT suggests it wastes taxpayer money, leads to racial
profiling, and should be scrapped," ACLU's staff attorney Hugh Handeyside said in
the lawsuit announcement.

Contention 2: Framing
Domestic surveillance prioritizes low probability impacts and
operates under the one percent doctrine kills decisionmaking
and creates an environment of racial profiling
Crampton 8 (Jeremy W. Crampton, Professor of Qualitative and Quantitative
Social Research University of Kentucky , "The Role of Geosurveillance and Security
in the Politics of Fear",
www.researchgate.net/publication/227135033_The_Role_of_Geosurveillance_and_Se
curity_in_the_Politics_of_Fear, May 2008, sr)
Some are statistical and involve the problem of
false positives and base rates. Even seem- ingly very accurate tests can
yield far more false positives than true hits, especially if the base rate is
low. This is especially a problem if data-mining surveillance is pursued
(such as the wide-scale warrantless wiretaps carried out by the USA).
an example of a profiling test that is 99 percent
accurate in the following sense: the profile will correctly detect terrorists
99 percent of the time, and correctly detect nonterrorists 99 percent of
the time. Assume a base rate of 1 in a million people in America is a
terrorist (about 300 people). The profile will find 297 of the terror- ists (99
percent). But it will also find that 1 percent of the rest fit the profile, or
in other words some 3 million false positives (Paulos 1996, 2006a).
There are several components of risk that are worth noting in this context.

The

mathematician John Allen Paulos describes the weakness of this surveillance with

Since it will not be

known which of the positive hits are false and which true, all the positive hits will have to be investigated and surveilled. That is the logic that supports mass sur- veillance. For the same reason many doctors do not advocate
inappropriate screen- ing (for example, breast cancer screening): it will indicate many false positives and cause unnecessary worry and distress. A related issue concerns the work on human perception of risk discussed above. How

In the aftermath of 9/11, Vice-President Dick Cheney developed

his one percent doctrine namely that if there is just a one per- cent
chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it is a certainty (Suskind
2006: 62). This is exactly the low-probability, high-impact event known as
the dread risk; a risk we tend to wildly exaggerate. If the one percent
doctrine were shared by doctors, gamblers, or scientists it could have
disastrous consequences. In international relations it would lead to a huge
number of threats being misconstrued (Paulos 2006b). In scientific work it
is typical to demand probabilities not of one percent, but rather of at least
95 percent.
well do we correctly assess risk?

Even the latter means we will be wrong in one out of 20 cases. A third issue arises surrounding normalization. To assess risk it is necessary to know what comprises a normal state of affairs and

when that state of affairs has been deviated from. This might seem unobjectionable, but as more than one writer has discussed, the establishment of norms can have debilitating effects on those who are outside of those norms.

As the history of racism, homosexuality, immigrant groups, and the

feeble-minded demonstrates, the abnormals are subjected to exclusion,
mistreatment, peer pressure, and medical experimentation

. During the nineteenth century a whole array of

techniques were formalized to assist in the establishment of norms, including probability theory and the normal distribution curve. Many forms of mapping were also invented to establish what was normal across the geography of the
nation. These new techniques were used to create pro- files of groups. Then, if you belonged to the group, it was inferred that you fit the profile. Analysis was at the level of the group. This was easier than tracking people individually

So approaching terrorism through a

framework of risk and threat has the follow- ing negative unintended
consequences: it centers risk (which we misperceive and exaggerate); it
produces massive numbers of false positives; it normalizes (and
abnormalizes) through profiles; and it requires ubiquitous surveillance to
collect data on the normal and abnormal. When you live by fear,
everything is a risk.
(thematic maps, for example, tend to show distributions of populations not individuals).

We need to understand how mapping and other sources of geographical knowledge act to produce this politics of fear. The answer is not to cease using GIS and mapping

technologies (or only to use the good ones), but rather to be careful and critical about the knowledge that is constructed with them and the subsequent political rationalities that are supported by them. This claim might seem

unobjectionable, but in fact, it is often ignored. For example, in a major report in 2006 the National Research Council of the National Academies investigated the implications of new technologies in GISci, and wrote that as is true of
any technology GIS is neutral in and of itself (Committee on Beyond Mapping 2006: 47). Such a view- point traduces two decades of work in critical GIS and cartography. Surely, it is not the neutrality of technology but the very
filigrees of interrelationships between technology, power-knowledge, and societytheir geographically-situated and inherently political naturethat makes them so interesting and vital (Livingstone 2003). We cannot understand how
technologies work nor assess the rationalities they operate under if the context of their political deployment is not examined. In this light the recent paper by Klinkenberg (2007) is crucial, for he acknowledges that GIT are always

. In pursuit of this goal, he

predicts that in the future...[f]orming an integral part of a multiplemethods approach to research, [GIT] will be situated within a broader,
socially-aware context (Klinkenberg 2007: 356). I extend Klinkenbergs
analysis here by identifying risk analysis as being especially susceptible to
the political production of fear.
caught in the interplay of political applications, and it is by gaining insight into these applications that we may promote hope rather than fear

Oppositional logic allows us to create enemy images of Muslim

people. We start conflict through these negative
representations and these enemy constructions constantly get
reinforced.
Talbot 8 (Stephen Talbot @ the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 21
March 2008'Us' and 'Them': Terrorism, Conflict and (O)ther Discursive Formations
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html thw_)
Identity creation
through negation entails making a statement of in-group identity with
reference to what it is not, or does not consist of, for example I am a Christian, not a
Muslim. Strategies employed in the negation of the Other also include:
marginalisation of ethnic and religious groups through naming;
racialisation; criminalisation; and stigmatisation. Response strategies of
the out-group include: collective resistance to ascribed identities; group
empowerment; demands for collective group rights (territorial claims) in
an attempt to secure greater autonomy, legitimisation and social control
This, according to Coleman is the fundamental aspect of the in-groups identity (17).

(Rummens, 2001, p.18). 6. The outgroup images become negative, homogeneous, abstract and stereotypical
particularly in regards to the productions of enemy

images which contain an emotional dimension of

strong dislikethese images tend to become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing , serving
important interests and needs (Coleman, 2004, pp.17-18; Stein, 1999; Toscano, 1998). 5.15 Implicit within
Us/Them, East/West, Good/Bad and Self/Other binaries is the notion that opposing identities are relatively

The use of these non-specific yet all-inclusive tags also serves to

dehumanise and depersonalise a highly abstracted Other. In turn, depersonalisation
homogenous.

allows social stereotyping, group cohesiveness and collective action to occur. The construction of absolutist
discourses of this kind are an important vehicle for understanding conflict: [a]lthough generally described as

communities as loci of production, transmission, and evolution of group

foster conflict through the negotiation and manipulation of social
representations (LCC, 2001, p.6). 5.16 Here, the demarcation of the common
enemy/Other assists with the mobilisation of one group against another
(Aho, 1994). Identity demarcation of this kind further allows the mobilisation of
audiences to carry out conflict. President Bush for example has made many references to evil
integrated and homogenous,
membership

doers. He has been quoted as saying we're on the hunt...got the evildoers on the run...we're bringing them to
justice and they kill without mercy because they hate our freedoms... (Sample, 2006, The White House, 2001).

The emotive language used in speech acts of this kind are designed to
elicit in-group distinctiveness and cohesion through the negation and
disparagement of the out-group (terrorist organisations). The use of terms evil doers, them,
and they are interesting however in the sense that they refer to an enemy that extends beyond the confines of
terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda. 7. A clear and simplified depiction of good (us) and evil (them) that serves

By framing their conflict

within a discourse which accentuates a struggle between good and evil,
both religious terrorist groups and their Western-led protagonists, view non-members of either
camp to be infidels or apostates (Cronin, 2003) and immoral or fanatical respectively. The
maintenance of such a discourse can be seen as serving a dual purpose; namely, to
dehumanise the respective victims on both sides of the conflict, and
sustain in-group and out-group identities.
many functions (Brown and Gaertner, 2001; Coleman, 2004, p.18). 5.17

Vote aff to prioritize violence against Muslims. We continue to

justify the violation of human rights because the exclusion of
Islamic thought is normalized in culture and academia. Making
Islamaphobia your ethical priority is a step in reversing that
exclusion which has written of Muslims as terrorists or the
other.
Muoz 10 (Gema Martn-Muoz, Professor of Sociology Arab and Islamic World,
"Unconscious Islamophobia", scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1379&context=humanarchitecture, Voume 8, Issue 2 Islam: From Phobia to
Understanding, 1/1/2010)
This led to a process of denigrating Islams cultural and historical legacy,
which was portrayed as incapable of progressing and modernising . In
other words, all cultural elements of Islam, including the Arabic language,
were classified as regressionist and an obstacle to modern evolution. As a
result, European perceptions of Islam were full of prejudices towards
anything Islamic, and Islams intellectual and cultural legacy was once
again excluded from the modernized world. Later, European anti-colonial
thought rejected the methods of political domination and economic
exploitation employed during the colonial period, but did not question the
Wests insistence on claiming to be the universal cultural model. Progress
and development could only be achieved by mimetically copying the West.
It is important to remember that the Gulf War was the first expression of
that new order. Not only did it demonstrate US supremacy in the world, it
also consolidated the self-legitimisation of the West's supremacy over
Others (mainly Arabs and Muslims). What was theoretically a struggle to dethrone a tyrant in a given Arab
country became an exploited global cultural crusade to gain the support of vir- tually all Westerners. The outcome was to establish, with the consent of
society over- all, the main lines of Western politics in the area: protection of Israeli interests, protec- tion of energy sources in the Gulf, support to Arab
dictatorships allied with the West and the construction of a new world order based on legitimate states and rogue states in order to identify allegedly
ran- dom threats to justify huge military expen- diture in the area. The promotion of democracy and human rights was relegated (simply read the reports
by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) while the West pro- duced a completely ad hoc literature to actu- ally evade any real political analysis
and justify Western policy in the area, focusing societys attention on the cultural issues of which Western society is so enamored: in 1993 the North
American Samuel Hunting- ton published his theory on the clash of civilizations. The theory of the clash of civilizations became the ideological basis
underpinning the solemnization of Western supremacy and cultural stigmatization of actors in other parts of the world where Western political, economic
and military hegemony has important interests and who refuse to accept this hegemony and superiority. The discourse on the civilizational clash between

The formula is
as follows: if the expla- nation of events is based on anti-Western cultural
and religious determinism, the responsibilities for Western political and
military action are eluded. Huntington's expression Islam's borders are
bloody dis- closed a culturalist explanation that released the West of all
responsibility for that blood bath. Huntington's main contribution was
Islam and the West is the maininstrument used to legitimize the effects of Western policy on Muslims to Western soci- eties.

actually to provide a theoretical explanation for something that had

already existed for a long time: the Wests sense of cultural superiority
and its anti-Islamic perceptions. Thus Huntingtons thesis arrived at a time
when the attention of the international community largely focused on the
Middle East. This international focus on the Middle East conflict and the
strong impact of ter- rorism has meant that the Islamic issue has also
inevitably received great media coverage. However, the Western medias
treatment of the Muslim world tends to reinforce stereotypes. In
particular, it con- structs a media discourse at a distance: for example, it
almost never portrays individuals, only masses, and usually in relation to
violence or fanaticism, implicitly casting doubt on the state of civilization
of these peoples. It also presents Islam as the abstract key to explain the
absolute evolution of these peoples, portraying an evolving world our
worldin contrast to another Islamic world condemned to a repetitive
cycle of hopeless misery and violence. Finally, because its citizens were
merely passive transmitters of the inevitable fate of their people, the
most exceptional and extremist aspects were sought and chosen to
represent the majority; Islamic fundamentalism was used to rep- resent
Muslims worldwide. Our historical relationship with Islam has therefore accumulated a whole series of negative perceptions dominated
by preju- dices and stereotypes. We have internalized a reductionist and monolithic image of us and of them (the two cultures). It is as if these were
closed universes in which millions of human beings are designated as Western or Muslims and represent alien and even antagonistic cultures. This
concept of cultures in relations between the Muslim world and us is a product of a Western construct in which Islam and therefore all individuals
within Islam are fictitiously represented, labelled ideologi- cally as a dominant global force, in a way that portrays the behaviour and culture of that

They all are One, and the great variety of this

immense geographical area is ignored. This One is perceived as alien,
separate and with no values in common with us, inferior and dominated by
fanaticism, fundamentalism and irrationality. The combination of hostility
and reductionism that feeds this reconstructed vision of a threatening,
backward and violent homus islamicus turns Muslims into people requiring
therapeutic or punitive interventions. In terms of the limits between
Islamophobia and freedom of expression, the latter cannot be an absolute
value that, devoid of any sense of responsibility, constitutes a violation of
that right. Racist and xenophobic language cannot be justified to the
detriment of the protection of fundamental rights. The crisis triggered by
the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed demands reflec tion that, in my
opinion, cannot be reduced exclusively as a case of the issue of freedom
of expression versus the acceptance of cultural satire and caricature.
Given this dual- ity, the answers may not necessarily be so complex. Nor do I
enormous mass of people as a uniform entity.

believe that the key lies in the holy or sacrosanct nature of religious facts (although there are double standards since the Danish newspaper refused to
per- form the same experiment with Jesus Christ) because non-believers also have the right to not be constrained by beliefs they do not share. However,
what converted the publication of the cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten into a powder- keg situation was the Islamophobic nature and
incitement of hatred deriving from the portrayal of the founder of Islam as a ter- rorist. The nature of the message was clear: if the founder of Islam was a
terrorist then all its members are terrorists.

Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of warcreates priming that psychologically structures escalation
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 4
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace,
pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight messy Part VII is central to this anthologys thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized,
bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter
33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Dalys version of US apartheid in Chicagos South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter
38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the smelly working classes (Orwell, Chapter
36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions,
interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US inner city to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37
and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada,

Absolutely
central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime
violence. Close attention to the little violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites
of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it
Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34).

interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of violence studies that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity
with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology
we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of small wars and invisible genocides (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996;
1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes,
courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The

violence continuum also refers to the

ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons
and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder . We realize that in referring to a violence
and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish
Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990;
Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it

is absolutely necessary to make just

such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times .
Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of
genocide into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there

is), an even greater

risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments
daily enacted as normative behavior by ordinary good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes , such as prison
construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the
criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39),

constitute the small wars and invisible genocides to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth
mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are invisible genocides not
because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the
things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for
granted. In this regard, Bourdieus partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of
misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of normal social
practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to
reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror
and state repression, Similarly, Basaglias notion of peacetime crimes - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime
and peacetime violence. Peacetime

crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary,
everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of
war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US
immigration and naturalization border raids on illegal aliens versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the
Cherokee Trail of Tears. Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible.
Internal stability is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied strangleholds. Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. It is an easy-to-identify
peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no
less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has
taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The

public consensus is based

primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the
undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are
needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the
normative socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison

Watch 2002). In the end it

is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among

otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less
dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in
genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like
to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social
exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize
atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of
constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamins view of late modern history as
a chronic state of emergency (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled
Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to
perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals,
nursing homes, and other total institutions. Making

that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence

allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical
technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish
people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained
in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable
have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sickpoor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson
referred to pseudo- speciation as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite
to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, seemingly unintelligible
outbreaks of mass violence.

Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and

genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the
backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to
fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of angel-babies, and the municipal bureaucrats who

Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate,

and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is
dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families.

close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by symbolic violence, the violence that is often nus-recognized for something else, usually
something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls terror as usual. All these terms are meant to reveal a public
secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and peace-time crimes. Bourdieu (1977)
finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in
style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized
because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies rneconnaissance as the prerequisite of the social. The
exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the
European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989).
Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical
violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate.
While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood
as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a
person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of controlling processes (Nader 1997b) that
assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by
definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification,
depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide
possible? In this volume we are suggesting that

mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially

incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims
themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and
institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early warning signs (Charney 1991),
the priming (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the genocidal continuum (as we call it) that push social consensus toward
devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable social
parasites (the nursing home elderly, welfare queens, undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (supermaximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated
communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy Construction of terror

threats and US supremacy leads to militaristic intervention
Kumar 13 (Deepa Kumar, associate professor of media studies and Middle
Eastern studies at Rutgers University and the author of the book Islamophobia and
the Politics of Empire, "Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High",
www.truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runshigh#, 9/11/2013, sr)
KUMAR: Islamophobia is basically the term, the name given to anti-Muslim
racism. It is a form of prejudice. And it involves making generalizations
about an entire group based on the actions of a few through this mythical
understanding of what Islam is supposed to be. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And we
should mention that there was a poll that was conducted by the Arab American
Institute that found that American attitudes towards Arab and Muslims, specifically
for Republicans and Romney voters in this last presidential election, were rated to
be strongly negative. Does this mean that Islamophobia is only a problem of rightwingers or conservative voters? KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that
larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just
in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a
whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated
within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than
that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist
enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought
to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact
it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to
simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger
implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to
have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism.
DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam
since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam?
KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000
Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on
stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the
news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the
idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven
by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be
suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so
forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And
this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of
things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national
security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth.
DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's
attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play
a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It
doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long
history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world,
that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know,

somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American
war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And
similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese
need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being
bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and
defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history
within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly
potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush
administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is
basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational,
we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the
East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and
therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's
burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language,
which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they
cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination
both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this
language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into
domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR:
Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually
working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S.
imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no
humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars
abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during
the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against
whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this
justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the
external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up,
blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of
course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing.
After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting
endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going
to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and
so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear
of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in
order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich
region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always
there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat.
And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even
Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some
of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and
so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of
this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has
been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like
torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our
schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific
the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have

been demonized since 9/11. DESVARIEUX: How do you sort of categorize or

interpret these votes by different states to ban sharia law? What's your take on
that? KUMAR: Yes. This is actually the work of a far right wing Islamophobic network.
These people have been active for the last two decades, and they get, you know,
funding to the tune of $45-$50 billion over the last seven, eight years. These people
hold the view that there are no moderate Muslims, all Muslims are somehow
connected to Islamist organizations--Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood and so on.
And even though they pretend to be moderate, right--this is the language some of
these people use--in fact they are involved in a conspiracy to take over the United
States and to replace the Constitution with sharia law. Of course, this is nonsense,
this is complete conspiracy theory. But these are the people. They are lawyers,
they are academics, they are people in the military, they are people in the
security establishment. They are responsible for this campaign where, you
know, about half a dozen to a dozen states across the U.S. have adopted
these laws. It's a process of fearmongering, and it enables the right wing
to actually grow in their ranks and promote this kind of hate.

T
Profiling is a form of surveillance which the plan directly
decreases
Adey 4
Peter Adey, professor of geography that arrived in Royal Holloway at the start of
2012, and took up leadership of the new Geopolitics and Security MSc, an exciting
new programme with Politics and International Relations, Secured and Sorted
Mobilities: Examples from the Airport, SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY,
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1(4)/sorted.pdf, 2004//SRawal
The most recently publicized and perhaps most worrying form of
surveillant sorting at airports has come through a surveillance technique
known as profiling. Profiling is the ability for information or data about an
individual to be built up. People may be sorted into profiles of particular consumer groups. The psychological
profiles crime investigators use is an obvious example. Profiles are then used to predict a persons likely behaviour or the likely

Profiling also usually relies upon vast quantities of

information gathered about someone that are then stored and shared. In
characteristics a criminal may embody.

light of the growth of international terrorism, a new form of profiling has been developed called Computer Assisted Passenger PreScreening (CAPPS) in the United States. It is possible to discuss here some of the issues surrounding profiling and its potential
impacts.

Behavioral analysis is a form of video surveillance

Shaw 15
C. Mitchell Shaw, DHS Admits to Behavioral Detection Video Surveillance Program
at Airports, THE NEW AMERICAN,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/21088-dhs-admits-to-behavioraldetection-video-surveillance-program-at-airports, 06/18/15//SRawal
The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now attempting to predict
crime by doing behavioral analysis of crowds at airports via video
surveillance. The program is in the experimental stages and is being conducted using "trained actors posing as
The current surveillance state has reached a place where it is beginning to resemble the 2002 film Minority Report.

passengers, as well as members of the traveling public" according to the 14-page report published online by DHS earlier this month.

K
Perm
Muoz 10 (Gema Martn-Muoz, Professor of Sociology Arab and Islamic World,
"Unconscious Islamophobia", scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1379&context=humanarchitecture, Voume 8, Issue 2 Islam: From Phobia to
Understanding, 1/1/2010, sr)
This transmitted a dangerous message that stigmatized and humiliated a large part of humankind. Thereafter, the ques- tion
is not religious but political because it concerns something as detestable
as racism and xenophobia. In this respect, freedom of expression cannot
be an absolute value that, devoid of any sense of responsibility, is used to
abuse this privilege. In this respect, it is of little importance that there are
despotic regimes in the Muslim world that do not respect the rights of
their own or other citizens: examples include the Ira- nian president who
continually makes aberrant statements or the fact that there are terrorist
groups that only represent a minority. The existence of these realities
cannot serve as arguments to justify any type of racism or intolerance.
This is espe- cially true because when such argument are aimed at lawabiding citizens, individuals, human beings who, in addition to having to
endure these situations of oppression and injustice, suffer insults and
offences and are treated as inferiors. Since the car-toon crisis, there has been a clear failure to defend freedom of
expression and out- rightly reject the Islamophobic message transmitted in these cartoons, since there can be no room for the incitement of hatred and
xenophobia in any European demo- cratic system. A different response would have enabled an ethical reconciliation with all Muslims who were offended
by these cartoons and could have helped temper the situation. It is also impossible to reconstruct an apparently ideal situation since some sectors of
society expect the Muslim iden- tity of these citizens to dissipate and even gradually disappear during their process of European integration. According to
some, the best Muslim is one that visibly ceases to be one, hence the tendency to distinguish between good Muslims and bad Mus- lims. The former
would be Westernized Muslims who declare themselves to be sec- ular and often, without having scientific qualifications, confirm our demonized stereotypes of Islam and its alleged dis- eases. Westernized Muslims are often her- alded as the only possible ambassadors of their society and culture

). If
the rest do not prove that they are good Mus- lims, they are considered
bad Muslims. That is not the situation that must be addressed in
Western countries, but rather the situation regarding the integration and
civil normalization of many people who are Muslims and who do not want
to stop being Muslims. To achieve this, we must accept the physical,
human and territorial visibility of a people who are already part of
Europes identity. Of course, this does not mean that Muslims are not
required to abide by the laws applicable to all citizens, regardless of their
race, sex and religion. The former must never exclude the latter. However,
the best way to achieve the latter is to not exclude the former.
(although they are often merely smokescreens that prevent us from obtaining accurate knowledge of the diverse reality of the Muslim world

Terror DA

No Link
SPOT has not caught a single terrorist.
Plungis, Hughes, and Tomesco 12(Jeff Plungis, John Hughes, and Frederic
Tomesco; September 20,; reporters for Bloomberg News; How Not to Catch a
Terrorist; http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-09-20/how-not-to-catch-aterrorist)
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, theres no
evidence that Spot has caught a single terrorist. Of 353 arrests from
November 2010 to April 2012, 68 percent were for immigration offenses,
drug charges, or outstanding criminal warrants. (TSA agents cant make
arrests; they refer suspects to law enforcement.) From 2004 through
2008, according to the GAO, none of the 1,083 arrests resulting from TSA
referrals resulted in terrorism charges. Critics of Spot argue racial profiling of
black and Hispanic travelers is fueling the arrests. Sarah Wunsch, a staff attorney
for the American Civil Liberties Unions Massachusetts chapter, says 30 TSA workers
at Bostons Logan airport filed complaints with the TSA in August, alleging that
profiling was causing minorities to be pulled aside for extra questioning. Wunsch
says agents believe they need to seek out illegal immigrants or people with criminal
warrants to boost arrests and show theyre doing their job. What seems to have
happened is they were acting on stereotypes and prejudices, says Wunsch.
Theyre like, Im going to nail this person, theyre more likely to have [an
outstanding] warrant.

There is no scientific evidence saying SPOT can catch

terrorists.
DICKERSON 15 (DICKERSON; May 6; reporter at business insider; TSA Spot
Program is scientifically bogus http://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-spot-program-isscientifically-bogus-2015-5)
Much of the SPOT program is based on research that began in the 1970s by
psychologist Paul Ekman. Ekman's work hypothesized that subtle facial
expressions, called microexpressions, can tell you a lot about a person,
and someone trained to read those microexpressions could guess
someone's intentions. However, it's never been proven in any experiment
that someone can glance through faces in a crowded place like an airport
and tell if someone is being deceptive or lying, according to Charles
Honts, a lie detection expert at Boise State University. There are few (if
any) behaviors that are clearly linked to lying, scientists say. And it's
impossible to tell from observing someone for a few seconds in a security
line if they're keeping some kind of secret. Sure, someone might look a little
nervous or scared because they're about to commit a horrifying crime. But they
may just be nervous about flying or antsy that they're having to wait in line when
they're already running late for their flight. In 2013, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) examined over 400 studies on lie detection.
From that huge survey, the organization concluded that the average

person can only tell if someone is lying 54% of the time . That's barely
better than pure chance. From the survey, the GAO concluded there's not
any scientific evidence that someone can learn to spot who's keeping a
secret and who's not, so it recommended that funding for the SPOT
program be limited until the TSA could provide some real evidence that
it's useful. The GAO report was just a recommendation though, and the SPOT
program is still up and running. If we consider what behavioral science tells us (or
can't tell us), it looks like we really need a new method for airport security checks.
"What we know about SPOT suggests it wastes taxpayer money, leads to racial
profiling, and should be scrapped," ACLU's staff attorney Hugh Handeyside said in
the lawsuit announcement.