REPUBLIC v SANTOS III

FACTS: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B in the Regional Trial Court in
Parafiaque City. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been
in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
The City of Paraaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that title to the
property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Arcadio was the riparian owner by accretion of Lot 4998-B
2. Whether Lot 4998-B may be acquired through prescription
RULING:
1. No. Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
establish that the property was an accretion to their land. However, respondents did not
discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Paraaque River. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article
457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership.
2. No. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of
public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. They cannot acquire the land by prescription or by other means
without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the
State as part of its public dominion. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to
have acquired the property through prescription.
CIR v CAMPOS RUEDA
FACTS: Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the estate of Maria Cerdeira, a
Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier,
Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. The Collector of Internal Revenue
assessed against and demanded from Campos Rueda deficiency estate and inheritance taxes,
including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the
Philippines and belonging to Maria Cerdeira. Campos Rueda requested for exemption, but the

CIR denied on the grounds that there was no reciprocity with Tangier, which was moreover a
mere principality, not a foreign country as contemplated in Section 122 of the NIRC.
ISSUE: Whether Tangier is a foreign country as contemplated in Section 122 of the NIRC
RULING: Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state,
it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized
corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its
commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual
defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described
by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light of its
historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it
then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted
area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted
to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact
independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not
successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on
January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically held by us:
"Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax
Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the
exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the
Philippines." There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the
alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country
within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
SHIPSIDE INC v CA
FACTS: On 1958, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four
parcels of land - Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, and Lot 4. On April 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed
by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, et al. On August 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots
No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. On February 1963, unknown to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La Union issued an Order
declaring the OCT issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the
cancellation thereof. On October 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to Shipside
Inc. Lots No. 1 and 4. In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration
against the order issued by the trial court but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of
Judgment, certifying that its decision became final and executory on October 1973. Twenty four
years thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court. Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss,

based on, among other things, the grounds that the Republic of the Philippines is not the real
party-in-interest because the real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled,
allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and
administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No.
7227, and thus RP's cause of action is barred by prescription. An opposition to the motion to
dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General alleging among others, that the real party-in-interest is
the Republic of the Philippines and prescription does not run against the State.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment
RULING: No. An action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time
said judgment becomes final. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the
same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the
subject matter. Under Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992, Camp Wallace was transferred to BCDA. BCDA, under RA No. 7227,
is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government. It may not be
amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. It is certain that the functions
performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and
social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in
general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. It may thus be said that the
BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Moreover, under RA No. 7227, BCDA has the capacity to sue and be sued. Having
the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel
petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest.
CABANAS v PILAPIL
FACTS: The deceased, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the
plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased.
Florentino insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother Fransisco to
act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Melchora
Cabanas, with whom the child is living, filed a complaint seeking the delivery of such sum.
ISSUE: To whom should the proceeds be paid
RULING: To Melchora Cabanas. The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor
to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen that family relations may press their
respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but
the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been different if the conflict
were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot
remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, there is this quotation from an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads:

"The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so
wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt
that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
LAUREL v MISA
FACTS: Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the
United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration
with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned
over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the
respondent Director of Prisons. Anastacio filed a petition for habeas corpus on a theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114
of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: Whether the sovereignty of the Philippines and allegiance thereto of Filipino citizens
were suspended
RULING: No. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. The sovereignty vested in the titular
government must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension. What may be suspended
is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. As a corollary of the conclusion that
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the
allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of
the petitioner's contention rests.
Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government
and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the
exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the
occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. Consequently, all acts

of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of
the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with
such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and
binding upon said inhabitants.
Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only
passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort,
the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend
the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort
to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military
service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his
army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign. Therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied
territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or
submit thereto without becoming a traitor.
Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or
enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government
without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who
are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the
people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of
their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.
PERALTA v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS: William Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other
necessaries was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a)
of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He was
found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the socalled Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Constitution and laws of the said Republic. After the recoupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government, Peralta filed a petition for habeas corpus
on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of
which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and therefore, null and void ab initio, that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are

violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and that the petitioner
herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was
valid
2. Whether the punitive sentence during the Japanese military occupation was valid
3. What is the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and
the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
RULING:
1. Yes. As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the
legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in
International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The
so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not
a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the
duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and
sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or character
of the law so applied.
2. Yes. It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of
the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the
laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined
in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with
different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military
necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and
efficiency, and the success of its operations.
3. No. Under the principle of postliminy, political acts of the belligerent occupant fall
through, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country,
or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. The execution
also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts
not criminal by the municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against
the security or control of the invader. Thus, all judgments of political complexion of the
courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the
islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the
present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQD v NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed in the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department, a department of an international organization,
the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. The chief of SAEFDC-ACD then sent a
notice of termination to Lazaga. Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-ACD's failure to pay Lazaga his
separation pay, the latter filed a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation
benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the
case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-ACD is an international organization.
ISSUE: Whether SEAFDEC-ACD is an international organization over which the NLRC has no
jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. The Republic of the Philippines is a signatory to the Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments,
enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office
is located. Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines
agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council and that its
national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an
agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the
establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned. It expressly waived the application of
the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD. Furthermore,
respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing
because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause
of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can
provide one.
MINUCHER v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: An Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also
known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher
and one Abbas Torabian. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity
of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would become one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution. The presiding judge for the case rendered a decision acquitting
the two accused. Minucher then filed a civil case for damages on account of what he claimed to
have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo, after two
years of trial, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy addressed to the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original.
ISSUE: Whether Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
RULING: Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending

state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency can be gleaned from the facts heretofore
elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the
latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers
who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in
the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY v PHIL. GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT
FACTS: PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and
promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of
the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects. The civil works of the project commenced.
Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a
sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf
course. PHILGOLF then filed a collection suit against PTA for the construction of the golf
course. PTA now invokes state immunity.
ISSUE: Whether PTA is immune from suit
RULING: No. PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity.
The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign
transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering
into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of
a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial
liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
SSS v CA
FACTS: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real
estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot as collateral. Pursuant to this real estate ban
said spouses executed the corresponding real estate mortgage covering the aforementioned
property as shown in their mortgage contract. From the proceeds of the real estate loan the
mortgagors constructed their residential house on the mortgaged property. The mortgagors

complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in
their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month. Defendant SSS
then filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the plaintiffs. The Cruz spouses instituted an action for damages and
attorney's fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations
and had not defaulted in any payment.
ISSUE: Whether SSS may be sued
RULING: Yes. SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers
separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect
of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutoy law has given to the
private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has
been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes
unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and
even for tort. What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not
perpetrated and that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress
particularly when it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said
individual and the System.