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RichmondH. Thomason
Semantic
Theory
of
195-220.
Adverbs*
RobertC. Stalnaker
i.
Introduction
In recent years adverbial constructions have attracted the attention of many logicians,
philosophers of language, and linguists. Most of this work is relevant to the content of
the present article, but that of Richard Montague and his associates deserves special
discussion since our formal semantic theory can be regarded as a special case of
Montague's.'
Montague's semantics for adverbs was a component of a general program for
developing a formal semiotic theory of natural languages such as English. The task
of the syntactic part of the program is to develop a recursive definition of the sets of
phrases of various syntactic categories of expressions (e.g. noun phrases, intransitive
verb phrases, adverb phrases, sentences) of a fragment of English. The semantic part
of the program furnishes an interpretation of this fragment in terms of intensional
model theory, and the pragmatic part deals with the interpretation of contextdependent or "indexical" expressions such as I, here,and now.In Montague's linguistic
writings2 the general semiotic program is the center of attention, and detail is not
lavished on specifics such as the treatment of adverbs. One function of this paper is
to remedy this defect.
Also, though we accept the main features of Montague's semiotic program, we
have not adopted its methodology here, but instead have followed a more conservative
approach emerging from recent work in intensional logic. According to this approach,
artificial logi-al languages are used as the objects of formal semantic theory, and are
* Each of the authors would like to thank the other for pointing out numerous errors in earlier drafts of
this article and making many helpful suggestions; but he assures the reader that his coauthor is not responsible
for any errors that remain.
We are indebted to the Council for Philosophical Studies for their sponsorship of a summer institute in
the philosophy of language, where many of the ideas of this article took shape, and to George Lakoff for an
extensive and provocative correspondence. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grants GS-25I 7 and GS-2574.
We owe special thanks to two referees of this paper who took pains to provide us with extensive comments
and criticisms. This version of the paper owes much to their care and helpfulness.
1 Of Montague's papers, Montague (I 970a) devotes most attention to adverbs. See especially pp. 212-214
of this work.
2 All of these writings are listed below in our bibliography. Some of these are difficult to obtain, but this
should be corrected by the end of I973, when the Yale University Press plans to publish an anthology of Montague's papers.
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linked to natural languages by an informal procedure of formalization.3 The application of semantic theories to English is therefore indirect, rather than direct as in
Montague's approach, since it is mediated by formalization.
This makes our account of adverbs in natural language less rigorous than Montague's, but at the same time it enables us to give a freer and more open-ended discussion of semantic problems arising in connection with adverbs. By being less direct
in relation to English syntax we can consider problematic and puzzling phenomena,
as well as those that are more perspicuous.
2.
Constructions
instance, if
(i)
(I)
John walks
is formalized by Pa, where P stands for walks and a for john, then we must, it seems,
formalize (2)
(2)
by Qa, choosing a new predicate parameter, say Q, to stand for walks slowly. Perhaps
this is not as bad as rendering (i) by Pa and John doesn'twalk by Ra, but still one feels
that Qa is unfaithful as a formalization of (2). The complex structure of the verb
phrase walks slowly, with its explicit relation to the verb phrase walks, has been erased.
Logicians, who are interested in accounting for valid inferences, may make the stronger
objection that this formalization will not make (i) a logical consequence of (2). We
will argue below, in Section 8, that this objection is questionable. But whether or not
it stands up, the need for a more faithful logical translation is clear.
An option explored by Donald Davidson is to seek a more sophisticated formalization in first-order logic itself. But Davidson's theory is explicitly narrow in its sCope,
adverbs such as slowly, greedily, carefully, and intentionallybeing excluded; and we
suspect it may prove to be even more narrow than he anticipated. There remains, then,
a need for a general semantic theory of adverbs. It is in response to this need that we
3 Formalization is the procedure of translating statements of a natural language into formulas of an
artificial language for the purpose of evaluating arguments using the statements, exposing ambiguities in them,
or revealing their "true logical form". The procedure is informal, since the rules for carrying it out are never
made fully explicit. One must use his intuitive understanding of the content and structure of the given statements.
An adequate formalization must yield a formula that has the same truth conditions as the given statement, but
beyond this, the standards of adequacy are unclear. All one can say is that the "relevant structure" of the given
statement should be reflected in the formalized equivalent. Although this standard is unsatisfactory as an abstract
account of what formalization is, in concrete cases the procedures for formalizing and evaluating formalizations
are often unproblematic.
4 For discussions of the problem, see Reichenbach
(1947), Davidson (I968), Clark (1970), Quine (1970),
and Parsons (1970).
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
propose to construct our extension of first-order logic. Research in other areas, e.g.
in the logic of tenses, has shown that it can be rewarding to build such extensions,
adding new notation to the underlying formal language as it is needed to formalize a
particular kind of discourse. The methodological rule governing such projects is that
they must be carried out with the same degree of rigor associated with familiar logical
theories. In particular, all new notation must be provided with an acceptable semantic
interpretation, or model theory.5
We now return to (2). The obvious way to handle this sentence is simply to add
a new piece of logical notation to stand for slowly. Then the formalization of (2) will
be obtained from that of (i) by adding a new symbol, say e, to Pa. But how to add it ?
Since slowly modifies walks, not John or Joohnwalks, something like (3) seems good.
(3) ePa
The task of formalizing (2) is then just a matter of transposing word order and
replacing English with logical vocabulary. John walks slowly becomes Slowly walksJohn,
which then becomes EPa.
This is nice, but not yet quite right. The trouble is that it gives ePa the same
syntactic structure as Pa, standing for the English sentence John does not walk. But
our grammatical intuitions suggest that these should be distinguished from one
another. The formula -Pa represents the negation of a sentence formed by attaching
a predicate to a subject. But ePa is the result of modifying a predicate with an adverb,
and then applying the modified predicate to a subject. So
Pa and ePa have the
following two structures.
Pa
{Pa
Pa
P /
ep
%/
In a well-designed logical language such distinctions are built into formulas themselves. What we need, then, is something like (6P)a. This notation is more perspicuous
as to syntactic structure, but is too restrictive because it provides no way of applying
adverbs to complex predicates. There is no way, for instance, to formalize examples
such as the following two.
(4)
(5)
At first glance this may not seem a serious limitation, since (4) could be simply
assigned the logical form (6P)a A (Q )a and (5) the form (eP)a v ( Q)a. Here the
5 As a branch of mathematical logic, model theory originates in the work of Tarski. Kalish (i 967) contains
an introduction to model theory suitable for nonspecialists.
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STALNAKER
fact is exploited that (4) can be paraphrased as (6) and (5) as (7):
(6)
(7)
John doodled with his pencil and John took notes with his pencil.
John walked to the hospital or John was carried to the hospital.
Sentence (8) can be true because it was doing both that John disliked-say, because
it cost too much-while he was not reluctant to do either separately. Similarly, John
could have intentionally kissed Mary or Susan by kissing the girl in the mask, knowing
that the girl in the mask was Mary or Susan. But in this case he neither intentionally
kissed Mary nor intentionally kissed Susan.
The structure of (g) is something like this.
John intentionally kissed Mary or kissed Susan
(Io)
John
intentionally
kissed Mary
kissed Susan
To capture this structure we need some formal way of building up complex predicates,
such as kissedMary or kissedSusan. Diagram (i o) suggests that this predicate is obtained
from kissed Mary and kissed Susan by an operation of disjunction. But in our logical
language the symbol v, corresponding to or, is a sentenceconnective.It links formulas,
not predicates.
It would be possible to solve this particular problem by creating another kind
of disjunction acting on predicates. But there is a far more general and deeper solution.
This consists in regarding the predicate kissed Mary or kissedSusan as derived from the
sentence He kissed Mary or he kissedSusan by a process whereby predicates are formed
from sentences. The relevant part of (io) will then appear as follows.
OF ADVERBS
THEORY
A SEMANTIC
/Z
or
he kissed Mary
he kissed Susan
(6x(Pxb v Pxc))
x(PxbIv Pxc)
Pub v Puc
Pub
Puc
I49-I52,
175-178)
here. We will sometimes drop parentheses where doing so does not result in ambiguity, and occasionally will
add them where this makes a display easier to read.
8 This introduces some of the apparatus of second-order logic, but even so our amended language remains
essentially first-order. The distinctive element of second-order logic, second-order quantification, has not been
added.
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RICHMOND
THOMASON
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STALNAKER
which speakers of English are familiar, and which are expressed in English in a
variety of ways. For example, the sentences (I2) and (I3) will most naturally be
formalized by ( I4) and (I 5) respectively.9
(I 2)
(I 3)
(6X(y)Pxy) (a)
(I 5) (y) (6XPxy)
(a)
It is important to realize that the truth conditions of (I 2) and (I 3) differ. Sentence
(I 2) would be true if he took a long coffee break between each testing, even though
he tested each single bulb quickly. His testing of all the bulbs would then be slow.
The difference between (i 6) and (I7) is represented similarly.
(I 4)
(i 6)
(I 7)
In many cases like these there seems to be no difference in meaning between the
two scope readings of a single English sentence, even though the strategy of formalization predicts the existence of two such readings. An example is (i 8), which can be
rendered as (I9) or (20)
(i8)
( I 9)
(X) 6jPyx(a)
(20)
(6j(x)Pyx) (a)
(eXPxa)(b)
(23)
(6XPbx)
(a)
4. Predicate
Modifiers
and Sentence
Modifiers
In Section 2 we took it as intuitively evident that the proper parsing of John walks
slowly is john (walks slowly), not (John walks) slowly. That is, we assumed that the
9 For simplicity here, the quantifier has been taken to range over the bulbs.
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
adverb modifies the verb rather than the sentence. This may seem an innocent
assumption; slowly is, after all, an ad-verb and not an ad-sentence. But there are many
so-called adverbs, like possibly,probably,usually, and unfortunately,for which the alternative parsing seems more appropriate. The distinction between the two parsings is no
mere matter of convention since it influences logical relationships among sentences
containing adverbs. We will therefore try to back up our intuition with arguments and
general criteria.
We shall argue that there are two kinds of adverbs in English; some modify predicates, while others modify sentences. Since a unified theory of adverbs would be
simpler than ours, the burden of proof lies on us to make this claim good. We shall
first give some general reasons why it is important to analyze the scope of a modifier
correctly and second give some specific arguments for the claim that there are
modifiers of both kinds in English. These will in turn yield criteria for classifying
various adverbs either as sentence modifiers or as predicate modifiers.
It is obvious that if the scope of a modifier is analyzed as narrower than it
should be one will get a defective account of the job done by the modifier in some
sentences. If, for example, negation were treated as a predicate modifier, one would
have no way of representing the distinction between the two readings of (24)
(24)
Nobody came,
(25)
(26)
In order to get the second reading, one must be able to include the subject of (24),
everybody,within the scope of the negation, and this is possible only if negation can
operate on sentences.
It is less obvious, but equally true, that if the scope of a modifier is analyzed as
wider than it should be, one will get an incorrect account of the logical relationships
among sentences containing the modifier and of the syntactic ambiguities in such
sentences. For example, if slowly is a predicate modifier, then John walksslowlyexhibits
the form X(a), the general form of a subject-predicate sentence. Hence, since (27) is
a valid form, the inference in (28) is valid.
(27)
X(a)
a=b
X(b)
(28)
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STALNAKER
But if slowly were analyzed as a sentence modifier, then John walks slowly would not be
an instance of X(a), and so the argument would not be valid in virtue of (27). The
analogous argument form for sentence modifiers, (29)
(29)
o(Fa)
a =b
o(Fb)
On the relevant reading of the conclusion, it is false, even though the premisses are
true.10
We could, of course, treat adverbs like slowly as sentence modifiers and account
for the phenomena by introducing special semantic principles, or meaning postulates,
to validate inferences that seem valid for such adverbs. But as a general methodological
policy it is best, all else being equal, to explain semantic relationships in terms of
structure rather than in terms of the unanalyzed content of specific words. Thus the
apparent validity of the substitution principle when applied to contexts containing
a particular adverb will be treated as prima facie evidence that such adverbs are
predicate modifiers. This evidence, together with the absence of any counterevidence,
is the principal justification for treating slowly and other manner adverbs as predicate
modifiers.
What kinds of counterevidence will show other adverbs to be sentence modifiers ?
We will give four semantically based criteria for identifying sentence modifiers, and
show why these criteria establish that a great many adverbs and adverbial phrases are
in fact sentence modifiers. These criteria involve semantic notions such as scope,
ambiguity, and paraphrase, and they will depend for their application on only the
the most general and elementary assumptions about English syntax.
First, if an adverb precipitates counterexamples to the substitution principle,
this will establish it to be a sentence modifier.
10 In classical first-order logic, any sentence containing a name a is treated as having the form X(a).
Even though negation is a sentence operator, Pa is treated as an instance of the form X(a) and the inference
of Pb from -Pa and a = b is regarded as valid in virtue of the general substitution principle. Generalizing
from this model, one might treat any sentence of the form F(Pa) as having the form X(a), and regard the counterexample as showing that the substitution principle is not valid. But this, we think, would be a mistake. The only
reason that it is harmless in first-order extensional logic to treat any sentence containing a name as an instance
of X(a), is that for the restricted language Aalu is always logically equivalent to (xEAxIu)(a),which explicitly
has the form X(a). But that equivalence does not hold generally, as we have argued in Thomason and Stalnaker
(i 968).
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
Criterioni
Only if an adverb is a sentence modifier can it give rise to opaque contexts
everywhere in a sentence in which it occurs.
Even though Richard Nixon is the President of the United States, the sentence On a
numberof occasionsRichardNixon has died in officeis false while On a numberof occasionsthe
Presidentof the UnitedStates has died in officeis true. This shows that on a numberof occasions
modifies the sentence The Presidentof the United States has died in officeand not just the
predicate has died in office.Modal adverbs like necessarilyand probably and adverbs of
attitude like unfortunatelyare shown by this test to be clear cases of sentence modification. Some locative adverbs like in severalrestaurantsalso seem to create opaque contexts.
In severalrestaurants,the maitred' wears a tuxedomay be true, even if there is no one who
wears a tuxedo in several restaurants.
One must use a certain amount of care in applying this criterion. First, in order
to be sure that it is the adverb being tested that is responsible for substitution failure,
one should find a sentence that would have no opaque contexts if the adverb were
removed. Second, in order to be sure that the adverb can give rise to opaque contexts
everywhere in the sentence, one should find a sentence with all its singular terms in an
opaque context created by the adverb. An adverb may give rise to opacity within a
logical predicate and still be a predicate modifier."1 For example, John willingly trusted
Harry may be true while john willingly trustedhis worst enemyis false (on one reading of
the latter sentence), even if Harry is John's worst enemy. From this one can conclude
that the object of trustedmust be within the scope of the adverb willingly in those sentences, but one cannot conclude that John must be within its scope. And unless john
is within its scope it is not modifying the whole sentence. Hence the example fails to
show that the adverb is a sentence modifier.
If the opacity criterion fails to apply, this is no proof that the adverb is not a
sentence adverb, for it is possible for an adverb to be, like negation, a referentially
transparent sentence modifier. The adverb actually is a paradigm of a transparent
sentence modifier.
The second criterion succeeds in showing negation to be a sentence modifier.
Criterion2
Only if an adverb is a sentence modifier can it give rise to quantifier scope
ambiguities in simple universal or existential sentences.
In particular, if there can be a semantic contrast between Q-ly someoneF's and Someone
F's Q-ly then Q-ly is a sentence modifiier. So, for example, Frequently,someonegot drunk
contrasts with Someonegot drunkfrequently (on one reading of these sentences). The
11By a logicalpredicate,we mean a part of a sentence that corresponds semantically to a propositional
function. From the sentence Dick beatsHubertone may abstract two singulary logical predicates: beingone who
beatsHubertand beingone who is beatenby Dick. Or, using the abstraction operator, x(x beatsHubert) and ?(Dick
beatsx).
RICHMOND
204
THOMASON
AND
ROBERT
STALNAKER
semantic difference can be explained only on the assumption that frequentlyis capable
of modifying the sentence Someonegot drunk,and hence is a sentence adverb.12
By a simple universal or existential sentence, we mean one containing only one
quantifier and no singular terms. The claim is restricted to sentences which are simple
in this sense because it is not meant to cover scope ambiguities which result from
quantifiers within a logical predicate. For example, the contrast between Sam carefully
sliced all the bagels and Sam sliced all the bagels carefullydoes not show carefullyto be a
sentence adverb. For this contrast can be explained by the difference between (3I)
and
(32)
(32)
(32)
(x)(Pyx)(a)
(a))
(X) ((ejPyx)
where Puv stands for sliced, a for Sam, and 6 for carefully. These two formalizations
capture the required distinction, and in neither of them is carefullyrepresented as a
sentence modifier.13
But again, this test is not decisive. It is possible for an adverb to be a sentence
adverb, and yet operate transparently through quantifiers. There is, for instance,
apparently no semantic contrast between Actually, someonegot drunkand Someoneactually
got drunk.
Criterion3
If an adverb includes within its scope an adverb or adverbial phrase that has
already been shown to be a sentence modifier, and if the whole rest of the sentence is within the scope of that sentence modifier, then the original adverb is
also a sentence modifier.
The truth of this claim is obvious, even trivial. To apply it, it is useful to use conditional sentences, since if clauses are clearly shown by Criterion i to be sentence
modifiers.'4 If a conditional sentence begins with an adverb, and if one cannot
paraphrase the sentence by putting the adverb in the consequent, then there is reason
to conclude that the initial adverb modifies the sentence following it.
12 There is no
need to classify frequentlyas a predicate adverb as well as a sentence adverb in order to
account for the ambiguity between Frequentlysomeonegot drunkand Someonegot drunkfrequently.These can be
formalized by F(3x)Px and (3x)FPx, respectively. In the first formula F modifies a closed formula, (3x)Px; in
the second, it modifies an expression, Px, derived by substituting the variable x for u in the open formula Pu.
But in both cases F acts as a sentence adverb.
13 G. Lakoff, in Lakoff (1970, 233-234) uses the contrast between Sam carefullyslicedall the bagelsand Sam
slicedall the bagelscarefullyto argue that manner adverbs like carefullvmust be represented as sentence operators,
not as operators mapping predicates into predicates. His argument, however, fails to take account of the possibility that the contrast between the two sentences can be explained in terms of the contrast between two predicates in the way we suggest.
14 To illustrate this application of Criterion i, suppose it is in fact true that John Connally is
the man
who will be elected President in 1976. On one reading of If Daniel Berriganwill be electedPresidentin 1976, then
the man who will be electedPresidentin I976 will be a priest this sentence is true. But it does not follow that John
Connally will be a priest if Daniel Berrigan will be elected President in 1976.
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
For example, the two sentences (33) and (34) differ in meaning.
(33) Frequently, if John walked to school Mary walked to school with him.
(34) If John walked to school, Mary frequently walked to school with him.
On the other hand, (35) is unacceptable.
(35) Slowly, if John walked Mary walked with him.
If one forces a reading on it, it will be the same as that given to (36):
(36) If John walked, Mary slowly walked with him.
Locatives and temporal modifiers show themselves to be sentence modifiers by this
criterion, even though many of them fail the first two tests. For example, (37) and
(38) differ in meaning, as do (39) and (40).
(37)
2o6
RICHMOND
THOMASON
AND
ROBERT
STALNAKER
But like (43), (49) is deviant and does not qualify as an acceptable paraphrase of
anything.
(49)
Locative adverbs seem to be borderline cases for this criterion. Sentence (50) is
at best awkward as a paraphrase of (5I):
(50)
(5I)
(52).
And some sentences similar to (50), such as (53), seem perfectly acceptable.
(53)
All our criteria have been presented as sufficient conditions of being a sentence
modifier. Though it is strong prima facie evidence that an adverb is a predicate
modifier if it fails all four tests, we have no conclusive criteria that will prove it is not
a sentence modifier. Criterion 4, however, comes close to being a necessary and
sufficient condition. If the operation of this criterion results in utter nonsense, such as
(43), (49), and (52), we believe that this is good evidence that the adverb is a predicate
modifier.
All four criteria are semantic and are justified by semantic arguments. While we
feel these arguments are decisive in many cases, in others they are not entirely conclusive. It may be possible to use syntactic evidence to supplement our arguments and
criteria. If syntactic features can be found that distinguish the clear cases of predicate
modifiers from the clear cases of sentence modifiers (as distinguished, in part, by the
above criteria), then these features might help to decide cases on which the semantic
evidence is indecisive.15
15 Another test for separating predicate from sentence modifiers is suggested in Geach (I970).
Geach
points out that passionatelyandpresumablyis "syntactic nonsense" and suggests that this will apply to any conjunction of a predicate with a sentence modifier. But this test is unreliable. On the one hand there is nothing
peculiar about passionatelyand often, as in He spokepassionatetyand often against the bill, or willingly but seldom,or
intentionallyand becausepopularopinionwas against the war. And on the other hand, carelesslyand to Mary and twice
and if it is foggy sound just as peculiar as passionatelyand presumably.Without refinements of the responses to
evidence such as this, Geach's test does not seem workable.
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
tn) is a formula.
Before adding a clause allowing predicates to be constructed by means of adverbial expressions, an analogy is needed. Consider for a moment the generalization
that leads from individual constants to operators.An n-aryoperator correspondsto an
n-ary function on individuals; iff is a singulary operator, for instance, thenf(t) is an
individual term if t is an individual term. More generally, iff is an n-aryoperator and
tl, . . ., tn are individual terms thenf(t1 ... tn) is an individual term. Individual terms
16
In other words, the categories are built up by simultaneous recursion. See Montague (0970b, 377) and
Montague (I97oa,
17
202).
208
RICHMOND
THOMASON
AND
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STALNAKER
can themselves be thought of as o-ary operators since they require no individual terms
in order to produce an individual term.
We will not add operators to our formal language, but instead will perform a
similar generalization on predicate adverbs. A singulary predicate adverb f would
yield formulas of the kind {(a) (SPx) (b). Constructions corresponding to this formula
are common enough in English; typically a singulary predicate adverb will be realized
by a preposition. For instance, if Pu stands for walks, e for to, a for the store, and b for
John then {(a) (XPx)(b) will formalize the sentence John walks to the store.
The formation rule governing n-ary predicate adverbs (n > o) is as follows.
(6o)
The last formation rule of our language deals with o-ary sentence adverbs. As
one would expect, this resembles the rule for negation.
(6i)
Suppose for the moment that the vocabulary of our language is arranged so that
x, y, and z are individual variables, a and b are individual constants, P is a singulary
and Q a binary predicate, e and 4 are o-ary predicate adverbs, s1 is a singulary
predicate adverb, and F a sentence adverb. Then among the formulas generated by
the above syntactic rules will be the following expressions.18
({P)a
F(Pa)
(4eP) a
{(XPx)(a)
(y)) (a)
'6(SQPx)
(x)(rlx(YQxy)(x))
b(X,Px) (a)
{(2(y)(Q( Qz.y)(x)))(a)
eX(Qxa v -qaPx)(b)
6. Formal Semantics
In setting up our semantic theory, we will make use of possible situations.'9 We will
think of propositionsas functions from possible situations into the truth values T and F,
18
Some of the formulas listed below do not seem to have counterparts in English. It is a commonplace
feature of logicians' formal languages that they permit syntactic constructions not corresponding to ones found
in natural languages, but this is not thought to reduce their logical interest or even their applicability to argumentation in natural language. Many syntactic discrepancies between English and the formal language
developed in this paper could be explained by supposing that English has no syntactic mechanism capable of
doing in full generality what abstraction does in logical languages.
19 Or possibleworlds,if you prefer more familiar terminology with a more robust, metaphysical ring; or
if you want a more neutral term that emphasizes the abstract character of the notion. Although
pointsof reference
these terminological differences suggest different applications and philosophical interpretations, from a formal
point of view they are equivalent.
SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF
ADVERBS
RICHMOND
210
THOMASON
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STALNAKER
the language. To complete the semantic interpretation of the language we lay down
the following semanticrulesshowing how an arbitraryvaluation V must assign values
to complex expressions. In these rules, Va(A) is the truth value given by V to the
formula A in the situation a. And where t is a term (i.e. an individual constant or
individual parameter), Va(t) is the member of -9 given by V to t in the situation a.
Where X is a singulary predicate, V,r(X) is the member of 91 given by V to X in the
situation a.22 Vd/u iS the valuation like V in its assignment of values to all primitive
expressionsexcept the individual parameter u; Vd/u gives u the value d.
(62)
...
. . .,
tn
* * ,Va(tn)>)(ae) = T.
.. ,
* * a)Var(tn)>)-
(65) If F is a sentence adverb and A a formula then Va(F(A)) = V(F) (f), where
f is the function in d40such that for all fiE X, f() = V8(A).
7. Some Applications
The semantic theory developed in the previous section is highly abstract and leaves
unexplored many questions that would have to be settled in the process of applying
the theory in detail to natural languages. For example, it is not possible to specify, for
any of the predicate adverbs of English we have used in our examples, the function
that is to count as its intension.23Applications of this sort, if they are possible at all,
will have to await further theoretical developments.
But if we count logical consequence as a feature of natural languages, semantic
theories such as ours will be applicable at least to this feature. A relation 1 of logical
consequence can be defined abstractly by referringto the class of all model structures
22
IfXis a primitive predicate or a predicate formed by means ofthe abstraction operator, Va(X) = V(X)
for all situations a and ,B;so, dropping the subscript, we may speak simply of V(x). But this generalization fails
to hold for predicates formed by means of predicate modifiers. For instance, Va(-qaP) is the result of applying
the function Va(qa) to the propositional function V(X). But Va(qa) will vary according to the denotation
Va(a) of a, and need not be a constant function of a. For this reason, neither need Va(,qaP) be a constant function
of a.
23 All that the abstract theory tells us is that, given a model structure <X., 9>, the intension of walks
will be some function taking members of 9 into functions from .Y* to {T, F}. It does not tell us how to go about
characterizing particular sets of possible situations and of possible individuals, such that there will be such a
function that can plausibly be called the intension of walks. To do this would presuppose a metaphysical theory
of what is to count as possible, as well as an analysis of the conditions under which an individual can be said to
walk. By saying that it is not possible to specify the intensions of certain English expressions, we mean that a
theory and analysis of this kind do not at present exist.
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
and the class of all valuations on these model structures,without having to designate
any particular model structure and valuation as the ones that are intended.
(66) Let r be a set of formulas and A be a formula. r IFA if and only if for all
model structures <X, 9>, all a E M' and all valuations V on <M, 9>, if
Va(B) = T for all B E r, then Va(A) = T.
An inference of a conclusion A from a set r of premissesis said to be valid(or, strictly
speaking, to be logicallyvalid) if and only if r IFA.
We can test and explain the definitions of Section 6 by showing how they
account for the logical character of certain inferences. As an example, we will show
why the inference (67) is logically valid while (68) is not.
(67) Oedipus intentionally marriedJocasta.
Oedipus is the son of Laius.
Therefore, the son of Laius intentionally marriedJocasta.
(68) Oedipus intentionally marriedJocasta.
Jocasta is Oedipus' mother.
Therefore, Oedipus intentionally married his mother.
As a first step, note that the formalizations of (67) and (68) are (69) and (70),
respectively.
(69)
(XPxb)(a)
a = a.,
6(XPxb)(a,)
(70)
(.Pxb) (a)
b =b
e(fPxb1)(a)
Here Puvstands for ... married , a for Oedipus,b for Jocasta,a, for theson of Laius,
b1 for Oedipus'mother,and e for intentionally.
Now, it follows from the definitions of Section 6 that any predicate X constitutes
a referentially transparentcontext for X in the formula X(t). That is, any inference
having the form (7I) is valid.
(7I)
X(t)
s=t
X(s)
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On the other hand, inference (70) is not valid according to our theory. This
inference fails because Va(exPxb) and V,(exPxbj) depend on the propositional functions Va,(SPxb)and VE(XPxbi). Even though Va(b) may coincide with Va(bl) for some
situations a the two need not coincide for all a and, if they do not, the propositional
functions can differ, and so Va(Q(XPxb) (a)) and VaC(eQ(xPXbbi)
(a)) need not be the same
truth value.
We noted above, in Section 4, that the analogue of (67) fails for sentence adverbs.
And according to our theory the inference (72)
(72)
N(Pcd)
c=c,
N(Pcld)C
does not have the form (7I), and in fact in N(Pcd) the term c occurs within the scope
of the operator N. It is a routine matter to show formally that (73) is invalid.
In making this point, however, it is important to remember that our formalized
language is syntactically disambiguated, in that each grammatical expression of the
language is assigned a unique syntactic structure.24 The semantics of the language is
then coordinated with the syntax in such a way that each grammatical expression is
assigned a unique semantic structure. But in view of examples such as John and Bill
N (Pxd)(c)
C=-C,
XN (Pxd (cl)
24
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
This reading of (72) can be captured in English by means of the locution is true of.
(75) It is true of Nixon that he never met Charles Dickens.
Nixon is the President of the United States.
Therefore, it is true of the Presidentof the United States that he never met
Charles Dickens.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the ambiguity of (72). First, it is
an oversimplificationto characterize the difference between (67) and (72) by saying
that the first is valid while the second is not. More accurately, we should say that
whereas (72) admits a reading on which it is invalid, (67) does not admit such a
reading.26Second, it is possible to regard predicate modifiers in English as "special
cases" of sentence modifiers, in the following sense: sentences in which a sentence
modifier is used will admit a reading in which the sentence modifier is used, so to
speak, as a predicate modifier. Thus, The Presidentfrequentlyvisits Californiahas a
formalization (76)
(76)
(.fF(Pxb))(a)
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ea(iPxb) (c)
a = al
ea, (.fPxb)(c)
On the other hand, the more complicated inference (8o) must be regarded as an'biguous.
(8o) I intentionally fly the spaceship to the morning star.
The morning star is the evening star.
Therefore I intentionally fly the spaceship to the evening star.
On one reading it yields an invalid inference resembling (68), namely (8i).
(8 I)
Aez(XPxb)(y)) (c))(a)
(A(
a=al
6an
Av
(XPxb)(y)
v(c )
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
OF ADVERBS
results from reversing the order in which the adverbs of (8o) are regarded as applying.
This reading of (8o), in which only the flying is intentional and not its destination, is
harder to associate with the English sentence. But such a reading is readily associated
with slightly different examples, such as He intentionallyflew his plane within a few feet
of the rooftops,overa town called Hadleyville.
8. Adverbial
Constructions
and Validity
(85)
If the theory puts no restrictions whatever on the quantifiers that interpretations may
assign to few and most, then an interpretation in which the customary meanings of
these expressions are exchanged is not excluded. In fact, the semantic theory of
logical validity will givefew and mostonly those inferential characteristics that can be
ascribed to all expressions that are construed as denoting quantifiers.28
Moreover, any syntactic-and-semantic theory of a language will determine a
relation of sameness of form among inferences such that all inferences sharing the same
form are alike valid or invalid. This means that imaginative talent is required in testing
inferences for validity, since an inference that strikes the ear as appropriate and correct
28
Inadequacies such as the one exemplified by (84) and (85) can be alleviated by adding certain meaning
postulates that serve to rule out unwanted interpretations, thus defining a nonlogical type of validity that renders
more inferences valid. As a referee of this paper pointed out, for instance, one could introduce a meaning
postulate for mostto the effect that P(most X) entails P(morethanhalf X). But though meaning postulates render
a semantic theory less abstract, in no nontrivial case will they make it so concrete that there will fail to be many
significantly different interpretations, each of which satisfies all the meaning postulates. And there are methodological reasons for seeking to avoid the use of meaning postulates. They detract from the coherence and systematic character of the resulting theory.
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may well have the same form as one that does not. Consider, for instance, the pairs
(86)-(87) and (88)-(89):
(86)
This is a tiger.
Therefore, this is an animal.
(87)
This is a cigar.
Therefore, this is an animal.
(88)
(89)
A theory that does not distinguish between the ways in which tiger and cigar, or knows
and believes,interact with interpretations cannot distinguish between the validity of
(86) and (87), or that of (88) and (89).
These cautions are appropriate because many inferences in which adverbs figure
seem correct but nevertheless are invalid relative to our theory. We have put no
restrictions whatever on the set _s10of functions that can be assigned to predicate
adverbs. In particular, these functions need not commute with one another: where
f,g E a? f(g(p)) may differ from g(f(p)) for various p E bY1.Consequently, it is not
the case that (UeP) (a) IF(U4P) (a); therefore inferences such as (go)
(go)
are classified as invalid, a result that clashes with the strong feeling we all have that
this inference is correct. But in the absence of a theory that enables us to distinguish
between quicklyand carefullywe must assign (go) the same form as (gi).
(gi)
This inference does not appear valid. To be fair, however, we should add that it
does not appear invalid, either; the first impression it presents is one of puzzlement.
But the following account of (9I) explains why this should be so. In one of its senses,
the premiss means (92):
(92)
that John was careful in his manner of carrying the eggs, but not necessarily in carrying them to the wrong house.
that John was careful in carrying the eggs to the wrong house, but not
necessarily careful in his manner of carrying them.
A SEMANTIC
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OF ADVERBS
Word order in English is not in general a very reliable clue to adverbial scope; an
adverb can usually be inserted in a variety of positions in a sentence without obtaining
results that differ in meaning. Thus, though the word order of (9I) is slightly more
natural in association with the senses we chose above, the premiss of (9i) can mean
(93) and the conclusion of (9 I) can mean (92). Since (93) clearly does not follow from
this explains why (9i) should not appear valid; it has a sense in which its con(92),
clusion can be false while its premiss is true. On the other hand, since (9i) also has
senses in which its conclusion and premiss say the same thing, we can explain why it
does not appear invalid.
Notice that it is natural to explain the ambiguity of John carefullycarriedthe eggs
to the wrong houseas one of scope.29 On the reading associated with (92) the scope of
carefullyis carriedthe eggs; on that associated with (93) it is carriedthe eggs to the wrong
house. If this is so, then commutativity must fail.
Another principle that holds for many adverbs and at first appears plausible is
that for all f, g e Q1, f(p, A P2) = f(pl) A f(P2)230 This corresponds to the joint
validity of inferences such as (94) and (95)
(94)
6(SXPx)(a)
Pa
This inference is endorsed in Davidson (I968), but Montague in Montague (I970a,
I972) rejects it because of examples such as allegedly. T. Parsons in Parsons (I970),
likewise rejects it because of in a dream.But our tests for distinguishing predicate and
sentence adverbs show both allegedlyand in a dreamto be obvious sentence modifiers;
for instance, the premissesIn a dream,thePresidentof the U.S. is AbbieHoffmanand The
President of the U.S. is Richard Nixon do not imply In a dream, Richard Nixon is Abbie
Hoffman.
29
What is more, there seems to be no other way of explaining the ambiguity in question. For instance, it
cannot be due to a lexical ambiguity in carefully,since John carefullycarriedtheeggs in his left handto the wronghouse
is three ways ambiguous. Referring the ambiguity to scope predicts this phenomenon, while lexical ambiguity
is incompatible with it.
30
Here the symbol " A " represents conjunction of propositional functions.
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Once all adverbs are excluded that show themselves to be sentence adverbs according to our tests, it becomes very difficult to find counterexamples to (96). There
is at least one class of such counterexamples, however, that is general enough to deserve
mention. It often happens that a verb expressing the completion of some prolonged
activity will take adverbs such as halfway, indicating that the activity is completed
to a certain extent. These adverbs fail our tests for sentence modifiers and presumably
are predicate adverbs. But clearly, inferences such as (97)-(99) all fail.
(97)
(98)
(99)
If enough examples such as these are forthcoming, the most natural approach to
(96), and the one to which we ourselves are most attracted, will be to refuse it logical
validity but to establish meaning postulates that guarantee the validity of many of its
instances.3' Since they must be imposed on a piecemeal basis, meaning postulates are
to be avoided. But it is difficult to see how to dispense with them entirely in any
systematic account of inference.
(I02)
(103)
( I04)
(i oo)
(Ioi)
(I05)
(i o6)
See Montague
(1972)
A SEMANTIC
THEORY
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