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DeDev AFF Answers

War Turns

2AC F/L Short


1. A strong economy is necessary to enter a take-off phase
of sustainable transitionfinancial investment,
government reform, and public concern are negatively
affected by economic decline
Geels, University of Manchester Sustainable Consumption
Institute System Innovation and Sustainability Professor, 13
[Frank W, September, European Commission European Research Area, The impact
of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment,
governance and public discourse, www.foreurope.eu, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

the take-off phase in sustainability transitions After a decades-long emergence process, some
green niche-innovations are gathering momentum in certain countries. Sustainability
transitions may therefore be entering a new phase, moving from a pre-development phase (with an emphasis on R&D and
experimentation) to a take-off phase (with more emphasis on real-world deployment and
installation of green solutions). In the agri-food sector, for instance, the niche-innovation of organic food has
gathered pace (Table 1). In the energy sector, renewable energy has a share of 9% of primary
energy in the European Union, with several countries scoring much higher (Norway. Sweden.
Austria) and lower (UK. Netherlands. Malta) (Table 2). For electricity, the European share of renewable power is higher, about 18% in 2009 (Fig- 3). In
the US transport sector, sales of various 'green' cars (Hybrid-Electric Vehicles. Plugin Hybrid- Electric Vehicles, Extended
Range Electric Vehicles and Battery-Electric Vehicles) peaked in 2007 (Fig. 4). reaching between 2 and 3% of overall sales.11 Sales in Europe
are lower, but also dominated by hybrid-electric vehicles. 22. Wider challenges in the take-off phase With some green nicheinnovations entering the take-off phase of sustainability transitions in certain
countries, new kinds of challenges will gain importance. Firstly, greater amounts of
financial investment are needed to facilitate on-the-ground deployment of green
options. Whereas govern- ment R&D. complemented with some private equity and venture capital, tend to dominate in the pre-development phase,
up-scaling and deployment in the take-off phase tend to draw on other types of finance such
public equity markets, credit markets, mergers and acquisition, and government
subsi- dies (Fig. 5). The challenge for sustainability transitions is to mobilize large sums
of money, as Giddens (2009: 123) notes: "The role of businesses, small and large, is going to be
absolutely crucial in respon- ding to climate change, not least because they will
have to supply a good deal of the funding and also pioneer new technologies ". The
availability of these types of finance is shaped by economic conditions, financial
regulations, and investor confidence. The second challenge in the take-off phase
concerns changes in policy and institutional frame- works. In the pre-development phase green nicheinnovations are sheltered, nurtured and protected from adverse regime conditions. But in the take-off phase, they face multidimensional struggles with incumbent regimes. On policy dimensions, the odds are
often stacked against niche-innovations, because formal institutions have been
adjusted to the needs of incumbent actors (Walker, 2000}. Niche-innovations often face a 'mis-match' with existing
institutions (Freeman and Perez. 1988). So, further breakthrough and wider diffusion depends on
changes in policy and institutional frameworks . This is especially the case for
transitions towards sustainability, which refers to collective goods (with associated free rider problems).
Because private actors have no immediate incentive to address sustainability
2.1. Entering

problems, public authorities have to change economic frame conditions and formal
institutions (regulations, subsidies, incentives, taxes). That is why many green growth reports not
only call for more investment, but also for stronger policies. UNEP (2011: 2). for instance, claims that: "there is a need
for better public policies, including pricing and regulatory measures, to change the
perverse market incentives that drive this capital mis-allocation . (...) To make the
transition to a green economy, specific enabling conditions will be required . (..,) At a
national level, examples of such enabling conditions are: changes in fiscal policy ; reform and reduction of
environmentally harmful subsidies; employing new market-based instruments: targeting public
investments to 'green' key sectors; greening public procurement; and improving environmental
rules and regulations as well as their enforcement ." The OECD (2011: 8) also argues for changes in fiscal and
regulatory settings (such as tax and competition policy), innovation policy, environmental policies, which "include a mix of price-based instruments (for
instance environmentally-related taxes)and non-market instruments such as regulations, technology support policies and voluntary approaches".

Making and implementing such institutional changes will be a difficult political


process. Firstly, there is the normal problem of reluctance to change, related to institutional inertia and institutional path dependence (Pierson.
2000; Barbier, 2011). Secondly, there will be active resistance and lobby- ing from powerful
incumbent interests aimed at hindering institutional change or creating loopholes
that reduce the effectiveness of policies. Corporate interests have much influence as Levy and Newell (2000: 14) note:
'The European commission undertakes business roundtables on a regular basis to consult with leading industrialists. The European Roundtable of
Industrialists, made up of chief exec- utive officers from 45 leading European companies, is arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. (...)
Although environmental groups may exercise influence in setting the agenda, when the point of decision is reached, large multinational companies and

As
green innovations begin to compete with existing regimes, it is likely that incumbent
players will flex their economic and political muscles even more to protect their
interests. Following a useful distinction by Hall (1993). this political struggle will be played out at three levels: (a) The precise setting of policy
the organizations that represent them have key access to members of the commission, ministers, and heads of government in mem- ber states."

instruments: there will be struggles over the strictness of environ- mental regulations, height of carbon taxes etc. (b) The kinds of policy instruments;
many industries and policymakers have a preference for market- based instruments rather that regulatory instruments, and have actively lobbied for the
former in the last 10 years. But since some of these market-based instruments (e.g. European emissions trading) have not delivered what was promised,
struggles may ensue about the implementation of other policy instruments. (c) The overall goals that guide policies in particular fields and the associated
belief systems (what Hall calls a policy paradigm). In the last few decades, many (Western) governments operated on the basis of a neo-liberal policy

the financial crisis and exacerbating environmental problems have given


rise to doubts about the efficiency and capacity of markets to deliver with regard to
public goods. Hence, there are pleas for changes in governance structures and a
stronger role for governments in sustainability transitions. Scrase and MacKerron (2009:
232-233) claim that: "Market efficiency and driving down costs have their place, but governments must now become much
more active in steering societies through the necessary transitions to a low carbon
future." And Meadowcroft (2011: 71) argues that: "State intervention and governance reform are
essential. To put this in another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone (...). but they will
not produce a carbon emission-free energy system (...). Changes to law - modifying
the regula- tory frameworks within which economic actors conduct their affairs (for
example, by introducing a carbon tax of a GHC emissions cap and trade system) and a significant expenditure of social revenue (for example, to accelerate development and deployment of new
technologies and to ease societal adjustment to new patterns of production and consumption) are essential to encourage
sustainability transitions." The third challenge in the take-off phase entails securing
wider public support and cultural legit- imacy (Geels and Verhees. 2011). This is instrumentally important because
"whatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread
political support from citizens" (Giddens, 2009: 91). Urgent demands from public opinion can offer politicians incentives to jockey
for green agendas (Burnstein, 2003). Major policy shifts are therefore often accompanied by shifts in
public opinion and cultural discourse, which, in turn, are shaped by social
movements, media, industry asso- ciations, and special-interest groups (Hilgartner and Bosk,
paradigm. Both

1988). The literature on issue-attention cycles offers interesting ideas in this respect. The basic proposition is that social problems ('issues') have dynamics

Concerns about social problems tend to emerge in civil


society, then affect public opinion, subsequently spill over to political debates, and
of their own and go through several phases.

possibly lead to policies (Fig. 6). The introduction of substantive legislation often coincides with a peak in public concern (Y-axis in Fig.
6). Issue-attention cycles do not necessarily progress linearly through all phase. Public attention and concern may also decline
before substantive legislation is introduced. Downs (1972) warned that such declines may happen when publics realize
that the costs of solving the problem are very high or may require sacrifices by
large groups in the population. This realization may cause three reactions: "Some people just get discouraged. Others
feel positively threatened by thinking about the prob- lem: so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue" (p.
40). He also notes that attention to issues may decline because of competition with other
prominent issues (see also Hilgartner and Bosk. 1988. who developed a conceptual model in which social problems compete for attention in
public arenas). These considerations may be relevant for contemporary sustainability transitions, where the financial-economic crisis is potentially an issue that
competes with sustainability concerns.

2. De-dev is a one-shot solution to a multifaceted problem,


they dont address the systemic issues with capitalism but
disrupt the system and cause extinction in the process.
3. Environmental policies are more effective than De-Growth
their transition fails to alter behavioral economics
Bergh, Amsterdam University Environmental and Resource
Economics Professor, PhD, 10
[Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh is an ICREA Research Professor in the Institute of
Environmental Science & Technology of Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona, PhD in
economics from Amsterdam, Ecological Economics Journal, Environment versus
growth A criticism of degrowth and a plea for a-growth,
http://www.wachstumimwandel.at/wp-content/uploads/van-denBergh_2010_Degrowth-versus-a-growth-EcolEcon.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]
degrowth as a primary or overarching goal to solve environmental
problems is that it reflects a misinterpretation of the relevant causality . It suggests that
degrowth, however interpreted, is a first step, necessary and perhaps sufficient, to reach environmental aims. Instead, one
better would reverse the causality, and start with a safe environmental policy which then may or may
not give rise to (some type of) degrowth. Even if one might support GDP, consumption
or work-time degrowth for reasons of equity or happiness, they cannot be defended
as appropriate strategies to reach environmental aims. The reason is that they function at
best as blunt, ineffective and inefficient instruments of environmental regulation. A
The main concern about

degrowth strategy gives much weight to the scale of the economy or consumption, and underestimates or even neglects the role of
composition and technical change.8 In relation to consumption it also often reflects a belief in the effectiveness of voluntary,
bottom-up solutions. One additional belief that I have often encountered in debates with degrowth proponents is that environmental
policies do not work, or will not be implemented, and that we therefore have to find solutions outside the standard environmental

Without (standard) policies we certainly will not be


able to solve the major global environmental problems. Their global and externality
nature requires that we strike international agreements to create an international level playing field
which allows countries to implement regulatory policies that create the necessary
incentives to alter all behavior that contributes to the environmental problems . This is
policy framework. This view and judgement I cannot share.

not enough, as suggested in the previous section on a wider policy package, but it represents the core of any effective solution.

The voluntary, bottom-up view behind many (notably radical) degrowth expressions in my
opinion gives insufficient attention to modern insights of psychology and behavioral

economics. These state that humans show bounded rationality, myopia, a large degree of
self-interest (and a smaller role for altruism), and a propensity to compare, seek status and
imitate (sensitivity to fashions). Add to this the interactions between large numbers of
individuals, increasing returns to scale which lead to lock-in of undesirable behaviors and
technologies, and (energy) rebound, and we end up with an altogether impressively
complex and difficult to alter system (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). This should
stimulate social scientists to think about systematic solutions and instruments as
well as about very clever strategies to attain social political acceptance for these. Just
proposing voluntary grassroots initiatives is too easy and idealistic. It neglects the
aforementioned complications. Of course, this does not mean a plea against grassroots
initiatives but more attention for their upscaling and system-wide impacts and
associated policies. Certainly something can be learned here too from studies in psychology and economics on how to
elicit pro-environmental behavior. One may argue, of course, that I should not worry too much about a degrowth strategy, as it is

that degrowth as a political


strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians , or even a
significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of
preaching to the choir, i.e. convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the
pessimism about the political feasibility of environmental policies as a motivation to
support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of environmental
(including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out
highly uncertain to receive widespread social and political support. I indeed fear

of time which does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and
environmental policies. For me this includes trying to convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP,
relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may alter the balance in trading-off costs and
benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a).

4. Cross-apply Duncan, global economic down turn triggers


nuclear war because of destabilization---that kills the
environment and makes sustainability impossible.
5. Transition is impossibleglobalization and capitalism
permeate every level of societylocal communities wont
adopt radical alternatives
Wilson 14
Geoff A., Professor of Human Geography, University of Plymouth, School of
Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, "Community Resilience, Transitional
Corridors and Macro-Scalar Lock-in Effects", Environmental Policy and Governance,
Volume 24, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2014, Wiley Online Library
Macro-economic Lock-ins
Economic ideologies at societal level have major repercussions both for how
economic capital at community level is regulated, accumulated and distributed, and
for the worldviews of community members. As a result, the importance of ideologies
associated with globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism have been emphasized
by many authors (e.g. Castree, 2008), and it is probably in this arena that communities have least
flexibility for autonomous decision-making. Indeed, globalization means that most

communities are increasingly embedded in complex macro-economic


interlinkages that influence individual decision-making. As a result, macroeconomic lock-ins are among the most important transitional corridors influencing
the implementation of more resilient pathways at community level (Wilson, 2012b).
These lock-ins are defined by economic values and worldviews at
societal/nation-state level, although nation-states have begun to lose their autonomy of economic
decision-making (e.g. member countries of the Euro Zone in the EU; increasing importance of World Trade

Macro-economic lock-ins and their impacts on


local community resilience revolve in particular around four inter-connected
processes: economic globalization, the spread of global capitalism, the increasing
importance of Anglo-American neo-liberal economic ideologies, and the increasingly
powerful role of multinational corporations.
Organization policies on global trade arrangements).

Economic globalization refers to the increasingly global economic interlinkages


between geographical spaces, the embeddedness of (almost all) local communities
within complex financial and monetary flows, and processes associated with
increasingly uniform patterns of economic interconnectedness and embeddedness
(Harvey, 2005). A hundred or so years ago many communities still had some level of
economic autonomy i.e. key decisions affecting economic capital at community level were taken within the
community itself. Macro-economic lock-ins of communities in the 18th and 19th centuries were thus less
pronounced as global economic flows were characterized by internationalization (extension of global economic

economic globalization which, since the 20th


century, has meant the economic integration of even the remotest communities
into the global economy (Castree, 2008). Before the 20th century, economic integration of communities
was therefore more shallow based primarily on arm's length trade in goods and services, while today's
globalized communities are characterized by a much deeper degree of community
economic integration and indeed economic dependency based upon
interconnected configurations of economic production (Gray, 2002).
activities across national boundaries) rather than

This suggests that even if communities wish to disengage from global


economic flows and retake control over processes related to economic
capital, it is increasingly difficult for them to break free of the shackles of
economic globalization (Davidson, 2010). Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), as an
example of community-level attempts to partly disengage from transitional corridors
associated with economic globalization, have only partly been successful (relatively low
levels of public acceptance). LETS schemes may struggle to compete with the efficiency,
choice and global reach of the formal economy, and may be abandoned or never
taken up by more mobile and globalized community members. Alternative economic
models at community level can therefore not hide the fact that most communities
where these alternative currencies have been used continue to be firmly
embedded ideologically and practically in globalized economic pathways that define
most community actions. Gray (2002) therefore emphasized that, because of economic
globalization processes, economic capital at community level is mainly shaped by
exogenous forces, which increasingly shoehorn communities into macro-economic
lock-ins. This suggests that almost all of humanity is now within the same macroeconomic capitalist transitional corridor of economic globalization with all
its advantages and disadvantages for raising local community resilience .

Economic globalization is closely interlinked with the spread of global capitalism


during the 20th century affecting even the remotest communities on the globe . Global
capitalism as a macro-economic lock-in for many communities is closely associated with ideological lock-ins (see

capitalism is not just an economic system but also an ideology that


permeates all aspects of modern life which, with its profit-driven maxim and
ideology of continuous expansion and economic growth, influences decision-making
at all geographical levels (Harvey, 2005). Community resilience is often negatively
affected by the spread of global capitalism , precisely because of the specific
attributes associated with capitalism in the form of greed, profit-maximization,
selfishness and the increasing need for community members to integrate vertically
(i.e. with the global economy) rather than horizontally (i.e. with an emphasis on economic interlinkages
above), especially as

within and between the community itself) (Gray, 2002).

The downfall of the Soviet empire in 1990 and what some have hailed as the ideological victory of the
capitalist West has meant that almost all communities on Earth increasingly including
formerly staunchly socialist countries such as China are now embedded within transitional
corridors defined by global capitalist dictates, with often few economic
alternatives (Gray, 2002). Yet, the spread of capitalism is by no means uniform. For example,
emerging economies like China are facing geographically differentiated impacts
with regard to the influence of capitalism. While local communities in most Chinese
urban areas have begun wholeheartedly to embrace capitalism (islands of capitalism),
communities in rural China still remain largely in a sea of subsistence hardly
touched by capitalist influences (Wilson, 2012a). This has pronounced implications for
the embeddedness of Chinese communities within capitalist transitional corridors.
Chinese communities in urban areas, for example, have begun to be locked into
capitalist decision-making structures, including profit-maximization, greed, belief in
private enterprise and a dramatic move away from past socialist ideologies, with
concurrent changes in economic, social and environmental capital at community
level. Economic capital tends to increase (through vertical rather than horizontal interlinkages),
social capital is gradually eroded (many residents in the rapidly growing urban areas
are migrants from rural areas with little social embeddedness in urban networks )
and environmental capital is often reduced (e.g. large-scale pollution in most cities) (Wilson,
2012b).

The post-2008 global economic crisis has highlighted how almost all communities
are affected by similar economic processes that may have, until recently, been
perceived to be rather distant (e.g. unscrupulous lending of banks leading to bankruptcy of many
community-level businesses). The spread of both global capitalism and economic
globalization is the main reason why the formerly clearer geographical boundaries
of communities have become increasingly blurred and more globally than locally
orientated. The latter also largely explains why community relocalization
movements have, so far, not shown much tangible success, as almost all members
of the relocalization process at community level are simultaneously embedded
within the global capitalist system through their dependencies on jobs, pensions
(especially through globally operating pension funds), and economic exchanges with often global
customers, such as Internet-based firms/individuals that , although operating from within a
geographical community, are economically more interlinked with global customers (Bailey et
al., 2010). In the absence of an alternative global economic model and
ideology (at least for the moment), the transitional corridor imposed by the spread

of global capitalism is therefore likely to continue to exert a substantial


impact on the range of decision-making options available at community
level for the foreseeable future.

2AC F/L Long


1. A strong economy is necessary to enter a take-off phase
of sustainable transitionfinancial investment,
government reform, and public concern are negatively
affected by economic decline
Geels, University of Manchester Sustainable Consumption
Institute System Innovation and Sustainability Professor, 13
[Frank W, September, European Commission European Research Area, The impact
of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment,
governance and public discourse, www.foreurope.eu, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

the take-off phase in sustainability transitions After a decades-long emergence process, some
green niche-innovations are gathering momentum in certain countries. Sustainability
transitions may therefore be entering a new phase, moving from a pre-development phase (with an emphasis on R&D and
experimentation) to a take-off phase (with more emphasis on real-world deployment and
installation of green solutions). In the agri-food sector, for instance, the niche-innovation of organic food has
gathered pace (Table 1). In the energy sector, renewable energy has a share of 9% of primary
energy in the European Union, with several countries scoring much higher (Norway. Sweden.
Austria) and lower (UK. Netherlands. Malta) (Table 2). For electricity, the European share of renewable power is higher, about 18% in 2009 (Fig- 3). In
the US transport sector, sales of various 'green' cars (Hybrid-Electric Vehicles. Plugin Hybrid- Electric Vehicles, Extended
Range Electric Vehicles and Battery-Electric Vehicles) peaked in 2007 (Fig. 4). reaching between 2 and 3% of overall sales.11 Sales in Europe
are lower, but also dominated by hybrid-electric vehicles. 22. Wider challenges in the take-off phase With some green nicheinnovations entering the take-off phase of sustainability transitions in certain
countries, new kinds of challenges will gain importance. Firstly, greater amounts of
financial investment are needed to facilitate on-the-ground deployment of green
options. Whereas govern- ment R&D. complemented with some private equity and venture capital, tend to dominate in the pre-development phase,
up-scaling and deployment in the take-off phase tend to draw on other types of finance such
public equity markets, credit markets, mergers and acquisition, and government
subsi- dies (Fig. 5). The challenge for sustainability transitions is to mobilize large sums
of money, as Giddens (2009: 123) notes: "The role of businesses, small and large, is going to be
absolutely crucial in respon- ding to climate change, not least because they will
have to supply a good deal of the funding and also pioneer new technologies ". The
availability of these types of finance is shaped by economic conditions, financial
regulations, and investor confidence. The second challenge in the take-off phase
concerns changes in policy and institutional frame- works. In the pre-development phase green nicheinnovations are sheltered, nurtured and protected from adverse regime conditions. But in the take-off phase, they face multidimensional struggles with incumbent regimes. On policy dimensions, the odds are
often stacked against niche-innovations, because formal institutions have been
adjusted to the needs of incumbent actors (Walker, 2000}. Niche-innovations often face a 'mis-match' with existing
institutions (Freeman and Perez. 1988). So, further breakthrough and wider diffusion depends on
changes in policy and institutional frameworks . This is especially the case for
transitions towards sustainability, which refers to collective goods (with associated free rider problems).
Because private actors have no immediate incentive to address sustainability
2.1. Entering

problems, public authorities have to change economic frame conditions and formal
institutions (regulations, subsidies, incentives, taxes). That is why many green growth reports not
only call for more investment, but also for stronger policies. UNEP (2011: 2). for instance, claims that: "there is a need
for better public policies, including pricing and regulatory measures, to change the
perverse market incentives that drive this capital mis-allocation . (...) To make the
transition to a green economy, specific enabling conditions will be required . (..,) At a
national level, examples of such enabling conditions are: changes in fiscal policy ; reform and reduction of
environmentally harmful subsidies; employing new market-based instruments: targeting public
investments to 'green' key sectors; greening public procurement; and improving environmental
rules and regulations as well as their enforcement ." The OECD (2011: 8) also argues for changes in fiscal and
regulatory settings (such as tax and competition policy), innovation policy, environmental policies, which "include a mix of price-based instruments (for
instance environmentally-related taxes)and non-market instruments such as regulations, technology support policies and voluntary approaches".

Making and implementing such institutional changes will be a difficult political


process. Firstly, there is the normal problem of reluctance to change, related to institutional inertia and institutional path dependence (Pierson.
2000; Barbier, 2011). Secondly, there will be active resistance and lobby- ing from powerful
incumbent interests aimed at hindering institutional change or creating loopholes
that reduce the effectiveness of policies. Corporate interests have much influence as Levy and Newell (2000: 14) note:
'The European commission undertakes business roundtables on a regular basis to consult with leading industrialists. The European Roundtable of
Industrialists, made up of chief exec- utive officers from 45 leading European companies, is arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. (...)
Although environmental groups may exercise influence in setting the agenda, when the point of decision is reached, large multinational companies and

As
green innovations begin to compete with existing regimes, it is likely that incumbent
players will flex their economic and political muscles even more to protect their
interests. Following a useful distinction by Hall (1993). this political struggle will be played out at three levels: (a) The precise setting of policy
the organizations that represent them have key access to members of the commission, ministers, and heads of government in mem- ber states."

instruments: there will be struggles over the strictness of environ- mental regulations, height of carbon taxes etc. (b) The kinds of policy instruments;
many industries and policymakers have a preference for market- based instruments rather that regulatory instruments, and have actively lobbied for the
former in the last 10 years. But since some of these market-based instruments (e.g. European emissions trading) have not delivered what was promised,
struggles may ensue about the implementation of other policy instruments. (c) The overall goals that guide policies in particular fields and the associated
belief systems (what Hall calls a policy paradigm). In the last few decades, many (Western) governments operated on the basis of a neo-liberal policy

the financial crisis and exacerbating environmental problems have given


rise to doubts about the efficiency and capacity of markets to deliver with regard to
public goods. Hence, there are pleas for changes in governance structures and a
stronger role for governments in sustainability transitions. Scrase and MacKerron (2009:
232-233) claim that: "Market efficiency and driving down costs have their place, but governments must now become much
more active in steering societies through the necessary transitions to a low carbon
future." And Meadowcroft (2011: 71) argues that: "State intervention and governance reform are
essential. To put this in another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone (...). but they will
not produce a carbon emission-free energy system (...). Changes to law - modifying
the regula- tory frameworks within which economic actors conduct their affairs (for
example, by introducing a carbon tax of a GHC emissions cap and trade system) and a significant expenditure of social revenue (for example, to accelerate development and deployment of new
technologies and to ease societal adjustment to new patterns of production and consumption) are essential to encourage
sustainability transitions." The third challenge in the take-off phase entails securing
wider public support and cultural legit- imacy (Geels and Verhees. 2011). This is instrumentally important because
"whatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread
political support from citizens" (Giddens, 2009: 91). Urgent demands from public opinion can offer politicians incentives to jockey
for green agendas (Burnstein, 2003). Major policy shifts are therefore often accompanied by shifts in
public opinion and cultural discourse, which, in turn, are shaped by social
movements, media, industry asso- ciations, and special-interest groups (Hilgartner and Bosk,
paradigm. Both

1988). The literature on issue-attention cycles offers interesting ideas in this respect. The basic proposition is that social problems ('issues') have dynamics

Concerns about social problems tend to emerge in civil


society, then affect public opinion, subsequently spill over to political debates, and
of their own and go through several phases.

possibly lead to policies (Fig. 6). The introduction of substantive legislation often coincides with a peak in public concern (Y-axis in Fig.
6). Issue-attention cycles do not necessarily progress linearly through all phase. Public attention and concern may also decline
before substantive legislation is introduced. Downs (1972) warned that such declines may happen when publics realize
that the costs of solving the problem are very high or may require sacrifices by
large groups in the population. This realization may cause three reactions: "Some people just get discouraged. Others
feel positively threatened by thinking about the prob- lem: so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue" (p.
40). He also notes that attention to issues may decline because of competition with other
prominent issues (see also Hilgartner and Bosk. 1988. who developed a conceptual model in which social problems compete for attention in
public arenas). These considerations may be relevant for contemporary sustainability transitions, where the financial-economic crisis is potentially an issue that
competes with sustainability concerns.

2. Econ is a conflict dampener---even if the well find ways to


mitigate the effects of growth before the environments
destroyed
3. De-dev is a one-shot solution to a multifaceted problem,
they dont address the systemic issues with capitalism but
disrupt the system and cause extinction in the process.
4. Environmental policies are more effective than De-Growth
their transition fails to alter behavioral economics
Bergh, Amsterdam University Environmental and Resource
Economics Professor, PhD, 10
[Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh is an ICREA Research Professor in the Institute of
Environmental Science & Technology of Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona, PhD in
economics from Amsterdam, Ecological Economics Journal, Environment versus
growth A criticism of degrowth and a plea for a-growth,
http://www.wachstumimwandel.at/wp-content/uploads/van-denBergh_2010_Degrowth-versus-a-growth-EcolEcon.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]
degrowth as a primary or overarching goal to solve environmental
problems is that it reflects a misinterpretation of the relevant causality . It suggests that
degrowth, however interpreted, is a first step, necessary and perhaps sufficient, to reach environmental aims. Instead, one
better would reverse the causality, and start with a safe environmental policy which then may or may
not give rise to (some type of) degrowth. Even if one might support GDP, consumption
or work-time degrowth for reasons of equity or happiness, they cannot be defended
as appropriate strategies to reach environmental aims. The reason is that they function at
best as blunt, ineffective and inefficient instruments of environmental regulation. A
The main concern about

degrowth strategy gives much weight to the scale of the economy or consumption, and underestimates or even neglects the role of
composition and technical change.8 In relation to consumption it also often reflects a belief in the effectiveness of voluntary,
bottom-up solutions. One additional belief that I have often encountered in debates with degrowth proponents is that environmental
policies do not work, or will not be implemented, and that we therefore have to find solutions outside the standard environmental

Without (standard) policies we certainly will not be


able to solve the major global environmental problems. Their global and externality
nature requires that we strike international agreements to create an international level playing field
policy framework. This view and judgement I cannot share.

which allows countries to implement regulatory policies that create the necessary
incentives to alter all behavior that contributes to the environmental problems . This is
not enough, as suggested in the previous section on a wider policy package, but it represents the core of any effective solution.

The voluntary, bottom-up view behind many (notably radical) degrowth expressions in my
opinion gives insufficient attention to modern insights of psychology and behavioral
economics. These state that humans show bounded rationality, myopia, a large degree of
self-interest (and a smaller role for altruism), and a propensity to compare, seek status and
imitate (sensitivity to fashions). Add to this the interactions between large numbers of
individuals, increasing returns to scale which lead to lock-in of undesirable behaviors and
technologies, and (energy) rebound, and we end up with an altogether impressively
complex and difficult to alter system (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). This should
stimulate social scientists to think about systematic solutions and instruments as
well as about very clever strategies to attain social political acceptance for these. Just
proposing voluntary grassroots initiatives is too easy and idealistic. It neglects the
aforementioned complications. Of course, this does not mean a plea against grassroots
initiatives but more attention for their upscaling and system-wide impacts and
associated policies. Certainly something can be learned here too from studies in psychology and economics on how to
elicit pro-environmental behavior. One may argue, of course, that I should not worry too much about a degrowth strategy, as it is

that degrowth as a political


strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians , or even a
significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of
preaching to the choir, i.e. convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the
pessimism about the political feasibility of environmental policies as a motivation to
support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of environmental
(including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out
highly uncertain to receive widespread social and political support. I indeed fear

of time which does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and
environmental policies. For me this includes trying to convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP,
relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may alter the balance in trading-off costs and
benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a).

5. Our impacts first---brink is now tech competitiveness decline


and data localization are happening now---you only go extinct
from nuclear war once
6. Economic collapse kills cooperation---makes it impossible
for us to cooperate on natural disasters or terrorism
7. Cross-apply Duncan, global economic down turn triggers
nuclear war because of destabilization---that kills the
environment and makes sustainability impossible.
8. Transition is impossibleglobalization and capitalism
permeate every level of societylocal communities wont
adopt radical alternatives
Wilson 14

Geoff A., Professor of Human Geography, University of Plymouth, School of


Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, "Community Resilience, Transitional
Corridors and Macro-Scalar Lock-in Effects", Environmental Policy and Governance,
Volume 24, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2014, Wiley Online Library
Macro-economic Lock-ins
Economic ideologies at societal level have major repercussions both for how
economic capital at community level is regulated, accumulated and distributed, and
for the worldviews of community members. As a result, the importance of ideologies
associated with globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism have been emphasized
by many authors (e.g. Castree, 2008), and it is probably in this arena that communities have least
flexibility for autonomous decision-making. Indeed, globalization means that most
communities are increasingly embedded in complex macro-economic
interlinkages that influence individual decision-making. As a result, macroeconomic lock-ins are among the most important transitional corridors influencing
the implementation of more resilient pathways at community level (Wilson, 2012b).
These lock-ins are defined by economic values and worldviews at
societal/nation-state level, although nation-states have begun to lose their autonomy of economic
decision-making (e.g. member countries of the Euro Zone in the EU; increasing importance of World Trade

Macro-economic lock-ins and their impacts on


local community resilience revolve in particular around four inter-connected
processes: economic globalization, the spread of global capitalism, the increasing
importance of Anglo-American neo-liberal economic ideologies, and the increasingly
powerful role of multinational corporations.
Organization policies on global trade arrangements).

Economic globalization refers to the increasingly global economic interlinkages


between geographical spaces, the embeddedness of (almost all) local communities
within complex financial and monetary flows, and processes associated with
increasingly uniform patterns of economic interconnectedness and embeddedness
(Harvey, 2005). A hundred or so years ago many communities still had some level of
economic autonomy i.e. key decisions affecting economic capital at community level were taken within the
community itself. Macro-economic lock-ins of communities in the 18th and 19th centuries were thus less
pronounced as global economic flows were characterized by internationalization (extension of global economic

economic globalization which, since the 20th


century, has meant the economic integration of even the remotest communities
into the global economy (Castree, 2008). Before the 20th century, economic integration of communities
was therefore more shallow based primarily on arm's length trade in goods and services, while today's
globalized communities are characterized by a much deeper degree of community
economic integration and indeed economic dependency based upon
interconnected configurations of economic production (Gray, 2002).
activities across national boundaries) rather than

This suggests that even if communities wish to disengage from global


economic flows and retake control over processes related to economic
capital, it is increasingly difficult for them to break free of the shackles of
economic globalization (Davidson, 2010). Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), as an
example of community-level attempts to partly disengage from transitional corridors
associated with economic globalization, have only partly been successful (relatively low
levels of public acceptance). LETS schemes may struggle to compete with the efficiency,

choice and global reach of the formal economy, and may be abandoned or never
taken up by more mobile and globalized community members. Alternative economic
models at community level can therefore not hide the fact that most communities
where these alternative currencies have been used continue to be firmly
embedded ideologically and practically in globalized economic pathways that define
most community actions. Gray (2002) therefore emphasized that, because of economic
globalization processes, economic capital at community level is mainly shaped by
exogenous forces, which increasingly shoehorn communities into macro-economic
lock-ins. This suggests that almost all of humanity is now within the same macroeconomic capitalist transitional corridor of economic globalization with all
its advantages and disadvantages for raising local community resilience .
Economic globalization is closely interlinked with the spread of global capitalism
during the 20th century affecting even the remotest communities on the globe . Global
capitalism as a macro-economic lock-in for many communities is closely associated with ideological lock-ins (see

capitalism is not just an economic system but also an ideology that


permeates all aspects of modern life which, with its profit-driven maxim and
ideology of continuous expansion and economic growth, influences decision-making
at all geographical levels (Harvey, 2005). Community resilience is often negatively
affected by the spread of global capitalism , precisely because of the specific
attributes associated with capitalism in the form of greed, profit-maximization,
selfishness and the increasing need for community members to integrate vertically
(i.e. with the global economy) rather than horizontally (i.e. with an emphasis on economic interlinkages
above), especially as

within and between the community itself) (Gray, 2002).

The downfall of the Soviet empire in 1990 and what some have hailed as the ideological victory of the
capitalist West has meant that almost all communities on Earth increasingly including
formerly staunchly socialist countries such as China are now embedded within transitional
corridors defined by global capitalist dictates, with often few economic
alternatives (Gray, 2002). Yet, the spread of capitalism is by no means uniform. For example,
emerging economies like China are facing geographically differentiated impacts
with regard to the influence of capitalism. While local communities in most Chinese
urban areas have begun wholeheartedly to embrace capitalism (islands of capitalism),
communities in rural China still remain largely in a sea of subsistence hardly
touched by capitalist influences (Wilson, 2012a). This has pronounced implications for
the embeddedness of Chinese communities within capitalist transitional corridors.
Chinese communities in urban areas, for example, have begun to be locked into
capitalist decision-making structures, including profit-maximization, greed, belief in
private enterprise and a dramatic move away from past socialist ideologies, with
concurrent changes in economic, social and environmental capital at community
level. Economic capital tends to increase (through vertical rather than horizontal interlinkages),
social capital is gradually eroded (many residents in the rapidly growing urban areas
are migrants from rural areas with little social embeddedness in urban networks )
and environmental capital is often reduced (e.g. large-scale pollution in most cities) (Wilson,
2012b).

The post-2008 global economic crisis has highlighted how almost all communities
are affected by similar economic processes that may have, until recently, been
perceived to be rather distant (e.g. unscrupulous lending of banks leading to bankruptcy of many

The spread of both global capitalism and economic


globalization is the main reason why the formerly clearer geographical boundaries
of communities have become increasingly blurred and more globally than locally
orientated. The latter also largely explains why community relocalization
movements have, so far, not shown much tangible success, as almost all members
of the relocalization process at community level are simultaneously embedded
within the global capitalist system through their dependencies on jobs, pensions
(especially through globally operating pension funds), and economic exchanges with often global
customers, such as Internet-based firms/individuals that , although operating from within a
geographical community, are economically more interlinked with global customers (Bailey et
al., 2010). In the absence of an alternative global economic model and
ideology (at least for the moment), the transitional corridor imposed by the spread
of global capitalism is therefore likely to continue to exert a substantial
impact on the range of decision-making options available at community
level for the foreseeable future.
community-level businesses).

9. Cross-apply James---economic disruptions escalate conflict--countries wont cooperate on a mindset shift.


10. A risk of the econ decline means you vote aff, nuclear war
makes their impacts inevitable.

1AR Econ K2 Sustainability


Starting from a strong economy makes a sustainability
transition more viable--- incentivizes companies and
governments to make sure their resources are more useful
long-termthats Geels

1AR Env. Polices Solve


Environmental policies engage the political people---de dev is a
hard sell for politicians and public---also stimulates systemic
solutions---thats Bergh

1AR No Transition
Transition wont overcome status quo capitalism and
communities wont adopt measures---macro-level
entrenchment means attempts replicate worse forms of
capitalism---thats Wilson

Yes War 2AC

Econ controls every other facet of deterrence solves multiple


hot spots for war
Gelb, CFR president emeritus, 2010
(Leslie, GDP Now Matters More Than Force, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, ebsco)

the United States continues to be the world's power balancer of choice. It is


the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and
Iran in the Middle East. Although Americans rarely think about this role and foreign leaders often deny it for
internal political reasons, the fact is that Americans and non-Americans alike require these
services. Even Russian leaders today look to Washington to check China. And Chinese
leaders surely realize that they need the U.S. Navy and Air Force to guard the world's sea
and trading lanes. Washington should not be embarrassed to remind others of the costs and risks of the United States'
Today,

security role when it comes to economic transactions. That applies, for example, to Afghan and Iraqi decisions about contracts for
their natural resources, and to Beijing on many counts. U.S. forces maintain a stable world order
that decidedly benefits China's economic growth, and to date, Beijing has been getting a free ride. A NEW APPROACH In this
environment, the first-tier foreign policy goals of the United States should be a strong economy and the ability to deploy effective
counters to threats at the lowest possible cost. Second-tier goals, which are always more controversial, include retaining the military
power to remain the world's power balancer, promoting freer trade, maintaining technological advantages (including
cyberwarfare capabilities), reducing risks from various environmental and health challenges, developing alternative energy supplies,
and advancing U.S. values such as democracy and human rights . Wherever possible, second-tier goals should
reinforce first-tier ones: for example, it makes sense to err on the side of freer trade to help boost the economy and to invest in
greater energy independence to reduce dependence on the tumultuous Middle East. But no overall approach should dictate how to
pursue these goals in each and every situation. Specific applications depend on, among other things, the culture and politics of the
target countries. An overarching vision helps leaders consider how to use their power to achieve their goals. This is what gives policy
direction, purpose, and thrust--and this is what is often missing from U.S. policy. The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy should
be to use power to solve common problems. The good old days of being able to command others by making military or economic
threats are largely gone. Even the weakest nations can resist the strongest ones or drive up the costs for submission. Now, U.S.
power derives mainly from others' knowing that they cannot solve their problems without the United States and that they will have
to heed U.S. interests to achieve common goals. Power by services rendered has largely replaced power by command. No matter the
decline in U.S. power, most nations do not doubt that the United States is the indispensable leader in solving major international

This problem-solving capacity creates opportunities for U.S. leadership in


everything from trade talks to military-conflict resolution to international agreements on
global warming. Only Washington can help the nations bordering the South China Sea
problems.

forge a formula for sharing the region's resources. Only Washington has a chance of pushing the Israelis and the Palestinians toward
peace. Only Washington can bargain to increase the low value of a Chinese currency exchange . rate that disadvantages almost
every nation's trade with China. But it is clear to Americans and non-Americans alike that Washington lacks the power to solve or
manage difficult problems alone; the indispensable leader must work with indispensable partners. To attract the necessary partners,
Washington must do the very thing that habitually afflicts U.S. leaders with political hives: compromise. This does not mean
multilateralism for its own sake, nor does it mean abandoning vital national interests. The Obama administration has been criticized
for softening UN economic sanctions against Iran in order to please China and Russia. Had the United States not compromised,
however, it would have faced vetoes and enacted no new sanctions at all. U.S. presidents are often in a strong position to bargain
while preserving essential U.S. interests, but they have to do a better job of selling such unavoidable compromises to the U.S.
public. U.S. policymakers must also be patient. The weakest of nations today can resist and delay. Pressing prematurely for
decisions--an unfortunate hallmark of U.S. style--results in failure, the prime enemy of power. Success breeds power, and failure
breeds weakness. Even when various domestic constituencies shout for quick action, Washington's leaders must learn to buy time in
order to allow for U.S. power--and the power of U.S.-led coalitions--to take effect abroad. Patience is especially valuable in the
economic arena, where there are far more players than in the military and diplomatic realms. To corral all these players takes time.
Military power can work quickly, like a storm; economic power grabs slowly, like the tide. It needs time to erode the shoreline, but it
surely does nibble away. To be sure, U.S. presidents need to preserve the United States' core role as the world's military and

economics
has to be the main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in
diplomatic balancer--for its own sake; and because it strengthens U.S. interests in economic transactions. But

terms of GDP than military might. U.S. GDP will be the lure and the whip in the
international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be
adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.

Economic decline causes global war


Royal, U.S. Department of Defense, 10
(Jedediah, 2010, Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic
Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, p. 213-215 Accessed 7/6/15 JMB)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of
attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour
of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the
systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on
leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated
with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic
crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that
leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
(Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could
lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to
challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows
that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests
that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security
conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of
states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from
trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if
the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items
such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be
the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers
protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the
link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and
external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The
linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and
mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the
extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.
(Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an

increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which
has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore,
crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory"
suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting
governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to
create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg,
Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline
and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary
tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office
due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing
that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In
summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and
national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed
conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves
more attention.

Yes War 1AR

Economic growth outweighs collapse makes it impossible to


confront any global challenge and makes nuclear war more
likely
OHanlon, Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and
Intelligence co-director, 2012
(Michael, The real national security threat: America's debt, 7-3,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform20120703)
Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes.
Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because
much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in

American economic weakness


undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder
defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly,

about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will

take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future . Allies and
friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for
their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be
less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods.
The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable.
Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently
articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim
world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty
through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These
were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor,
there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic
strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite
to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.
begin to

Economic decline causes great power wars goes nuclear


Harris and Burrows, 9 *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of
Global Trends 2025, **member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of
the Financial Crisis, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes
the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible
permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of

While we continue to believe that


the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn
from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and
multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral
insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever.

There is no reason to think that this would


not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that
reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be
even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change
institutions (think League of Nations in the same period).

would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that
remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the
worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a
combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of

self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets


that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty
of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle
East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nucleararmed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security
arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and
consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of
stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold
War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and
the angry and disenfranchised that become

terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear
red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals
combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will

The
lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile
flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises .
Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over
resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there
is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy
scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to
energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if
produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack.

government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining
domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important

Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the
geopolitical implications.

fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and
counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea
lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water
resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in

world.

a more dog-eat-dog

Environment Turns

Strong Growth Key 2AC


A strong economy is necessary to enter a take-off phase of
sustainable transitionfinancial investment, government
reform, and public concern are negatively affected by
economic decline
Geels, University of Manchester Sustainable Consumption
Institute System Innovation and Sustainability Professor, 13
[Frank W, September, European Commission European Research Area, The impact
of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment,
governance and public discourse, www.foreurope.eu, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

the take-off phase in sustainability transitions After a decades-long emergence process, some
green niche-innovations are gathering momentum in certain countries. Sustainability
transitions may therefore be entering a new phase, moving from a pre-development phase (with an emphasis on R&D and
experimentation) to a take-off phase (with more emphasis on real-world deployment and
installation of green solutions). In the agri-food sector, for instance, the niche-innovation of organic food has
gathered pace (Table 1). In the energy sector, renewable energy has a share of 9% of primary
energy in the European Union, with several countries scoring much higher (Norway. Sweden.
Austria) and lower (UK. Netherlands. Malta) (Table 2). For electricity, the European share of renewable power is higher, about 18% in 2009 (Fig- 3). In
the US transport sector, sales of various 'green' cars (Hybrid-Electric Vehicles. Plugin Hybrid- Electric Vehicles, Extended
Range Electric Vehicles and Battery-Electric Vehicles) peaked in 2007 (Fig. 4). reaching between 2 and 3% of overall sales.11 Sales in Europe
are lower, but also dominated by hybrid-electric vehicles. 22. Wider challenges in the take-off phase With some green nicheinnovations entering the take-off phase of sustainability transitions in certain
countries, new kinds of challenges will gain importance. Firstly, greater amounts of
financial investment are needed to facilitate on-the-ground deployment of green
options. Whereas govern- ment R&D. complemented with some private equity and venture capital, tend to dominate in the pre-development phase,
up-scaling and deployment in the take-off phase tend to draw on other types of finance such
public equity markets, credit markets, mergers and acquisition, and government
subsi- dies (Fig. 5). The challenge for sustainability transitions is to mobilize large sums
of money, as Giddens (2009: 123) notes: "The role of businesses, small and large, is going to be
absolutely crucial in respon- ding to climate change , not least because they will
have to supply a good deal of the funding and also pioneer new technologies ". The
availability of these types of finance is shaped by economic conditions, financial
regulations, and investor confidence. The second challenge in the take-off phase
concerns changes in policy and institutional frame- works. In the pre-development phase green nicheinnovations are sheltered, nurtured and protected from adverse regime conditions. But in the take-off phase, they face multidimensional struggles with incumbent regimes. On policy dimensions, the odds are
often stacked against niche-innovations, because formal institutions have been
adjusted to the needs of incumbent actors (Walker, 2000}. Niche-innovations often face a 'mis-match' with existing
institutions (Freeman and Perez. 1988). So, further breakthrough and wider diffusion depends on
changes in policy and institutional frameworks . This is especially the case for
transitions towards sustainability, which refers to collective goods (with associated free rider problems).
2.1. Entering

Because private actors have no immediate incentive to address sustainability


problems, public authorities have to change economic frame conditions and formal
institutions (regulations, subsidies, incentives, taxes). That is why many green growth reports not
only call for more investment, but also for stronger policies. UNEP (2011: 2). for instance, claims that: "there is a need
for better public policies, including pricing and regulatory measures, to change the
perverse market incentives that drive this capital mis-allocation . (...) To make the
transition to a green economy, specific enabling conditions will be required . (..,) At a
national level, examples of such enabling conditions are: changes in fiscal policy ; reform and reduction of
environmentally harmful subsidies; employing new market-based instruments: targeting public
investments to 'green' key sectors; greening public procurement; and improving environmental
rules and regulations as well as their enforcement ." The OECD (2011: 8) also argues for changes in fiscal and
regulatory settings (such as tax and competition policy), innovation policy, environmental policies, which "include a mix of price-based instruments (for
instance environmentally-related taxes)and non-market instruments such as regulations, technology support policies and voluntary approaches".

Making and implementing such institutional changes will be a difficult political


process. Firstly, there is the normal problem of reluctance to change, related to institutional inertia and institutional path dependence (Pierson.
2000; Barbier, 2011). Secondly, there will be active resistance and lobby- ing from powerful
incumbent interests aimed at hindering institutional change or creating loopholes
that reduce the effectiveness of policies. Corporate interests have much influence as Levy and Newell (2000: 14) note:
'The European commission undertakes business roundtables on a regular basis to consult with leading industrialists. The European Roundtable of
Industrialists, made up of chief exec- utive officers from 45 leading European companies, is arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. (...)
Although environmental groups may exercise influence in setting the agenda, when the point of decision is reached, large multinational companies and

As
green innovations begin to compete with existing regimes, it is likely that incumbent
players will flex their economic and political muscles even more to protect their
interests. Following a useful distinction by Hall (1993). this political struggle will be played out at three levels: (a) The precise setting of policy
the organizations that represent them have key access to members of the commission, ministers, and heads of government in mem- ber states."

instruments: there will be struggles over the strictness of environ- mental regulations, height of carbon taxes etc. (b) The kinds of policy instruments;
many industries and policymakers have a preference for market- based instruments rather that regulatory instruments, and have actively lobbied for the
former in the last 10 years. But since some of these market-based instruments (e.g. European emissions trading) have not delivered what was promised,
struggles may ensue about the implementation of other policy instruments. (c) The overall goals that guide policies in particular fields and the associated
belief systems (what Hall calls a policy paradigm). In the last few decades, many (Western) governments operated on the basis of a neo-liberal policy

the financial crisis and exacerbating environmental problems have given


rise to doubts about the efficiency and capacity of markets to deliver with regard to
public goods. Hence, there are pleas for changes in governance structures and a
stronger role for governments in sustainability transitions. Scrase and MacKerron (2009:
232-233) claim that: "Market efficiency and driving down costs have their place, but governments must now become much
more active in steering societies through the necessary transitions to a low carbon
future." And Meadowcroft (2011: 71) argues that: "State intervention and governance reform are
essential. To put this in another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone (...). but they will
not produce a carbon emission-free energy system (...). Changes to law - modifying
the regula- tory frameworks within which economic actors conduct their affairs (for
example, by introducing a carbon tax of a GHC emissions cap and trade system) and a significant expenditure of social revenue (for example, to accelerate development and deployment of new
technologies and to ease societal adjustment to new patterns of production and consumption) are essential to encourage
sustainability transitions." The third challenge in the take-off phase entails securing
wider public support and cultural legit- imacy (Geels and Verhees. 2011). This is instrumentally important because
"whatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread
political support from citizens" (Giddens, 2009: 91). Urgent demands from public opinion can offer politicians incentives to jockey
for green agendas (Burnstein, 2003). Major policy shifts are therefore often accompanied by shifts in
public opinion and cultural discourse, which, in turn, are shaped by social
movements, media, industry asso- ciations, and special-interest groups (Hilgartner and Bosk,
paradigm. Both

1988). The literature on issue-attention cycles offers interesting ideas in this respect. The basic proposition is that social problems ('issues') have dynamics
of their own and go through several phases.

Concerns about social problems tend to emerge in civil

society, then affect public opinion, subsequently spill over to political debates, and
possibly lead to policies (Fig. 6). The introduction of substantive legislation often coincides with a peak in public concern (Y-axis in Fig.
6). Issue-attention cycles do not necessarily progress linearly through all phase. Public attention and concern may also decline
before substantive legislation is introduced. Downs (1972) warned that such declines may happen when publics realize
that the costs of solving the problem are very high or may require sacrifices by
large groups in the population. This realization may cause three reactions: "Some people just get discouraged. Others
feel positively threatened by thinking about the prob- lem: so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue" (p.
40). He also notes that attention to issues may decline because of competition with other
prominent issues (see also Hilgartner and Bosk. 1988. who developed a conceptual model in which social problems compete for attention in
public arenas). These considerations may be relevant for contemporary sustainability transitions, where the financial-economic crisis is potentially an issue that
competes with sustainability concerns.

Growth Sustainable
Infinite growth is possible
Harford, Senior columnist for the Financial Times, 14
[Tim, 1/24/14, FreakNomincs Can Economic Growth Continue Forever? Of Course!
http://freakonomics.com/2014/01/24/can-economic-growth-continue-forever-ofcourse/ Accessed 7/7/15 JMB]

Can economic growth continue forever? The internet seems to be full of physicists explaining that economists are clueless on this
topic. Theres the late Albert Bartletts hugely popular videos or Tom Murphys article Exponential Economist Meets Finite
Physicist.

The key issue is that exponential growth will eventually take you to
impossible places. And by eventually, the physicists mean sooner than we expect. Exponential growth is
any kind of growth that compounds like interest payments. The classic example is the rice on the
chessboard. According to an old story, the inventor of the game of chess was offered a reward by a delighted king. He requested a
modest-sounding payment: one grain of rice on the first square of the chessboard, two on the second, four on the third, doubling
each time. Yet this is actually a colossal amountmany times the annual rice production of the entire planet. The chessboard prize

it all
becomes trouble eventually, because each little bit of growth will itself be multiplied
by growth in the future. As Albert Einstein, yet another physicist, is famously said to have declared (but probably did
not), the most powerful force in the universe is compound interest. The implication
for economic growth seems obvious. Our economy grows at a few percent a year.
was 100 percent growth per square; but 10 percent, 1 percent or even 0.0001 percentits all exponential growth. And

That hasnt presented many insuperable problems so far. But growth of a few per cent a year is nevertheless exponential growth,

physicists worrywell reach a square on the economic chessboard


that we just cant fill. Economists understand this point perfectly well. One of the very first people to be called an
and eventuallythe

economist was the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who died almost two hundred years ago. Malthus was worried about exponential

in the short term technological progress


was faster than population growth. More recently population growth has been
slowing down dramatically. Theres every reason to believe that the population of
the planet is going to stabilize. I dont think anybody believes zero population
growth is unsustainable. You might well respond that even if population growth stops, growth in the economy in GDP
will continue, and fall foul of the rice-on-the-chessboard problem. But I think that here we find a serious gap in the
logic of the exponential doomsayers. Theyre looking at exponential growth in
physical processesthings like heating, cooling, lighting, movement. This is understandable,
because they are, after all, physicists. Tom Murphys blog post is particularly startling on this point. He points out that if our
energy consumption grows at 2.3 percent a year less than historical rates but enough to increase
population growth, and his math was incontrovertible. Fortunately,

energy consumption tenfold each centurythen the entire planet will reach boiling point in just four centuries. Its not the
greenhouse effect at work; its irrelevant to Professor Murphys point whether the energy comes from fossil fuels, solar power or

given off, inevitably, when we use energy to do useful


work. And its pretty hard to argue with the laws of thermodynamics. The calculation
sounds shocking, but its just the rice on the chessboard all over again. Heres the
logic lapse: energy growth is not the same as economic growth. GDP merely
measures what people are willing to pay for, which is not necessarily connected to
the use of energy, or any other physical resource. True, since the beginning of the
industrial revolution the two have tended to go hand in hand, but theres no logical
reason why that tendency needs to continue. Indeed, it appears to have stopped
already. Would you like to take a guess at energy growth per person in the United
States over the last quarter of a century? Its not just less than 2.3 percent. Its less
fairy dust. This is simply about the waste heat

than zero. The same is true for other developed economies such as Germany, Japan
and the United Kingdom. Now this is partly due to offshoring to China but the
offshoring effect just doesnt seem big enough to explain what is going on. Its also
about the changing nature of what is bought and sold in a modern economy

A2: Degrowth Solves Climate


Economic contraction doesnt reduce emissionsonly growth
can solve
Stepp, Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation, 12
[Matthew, 1/24/12, The Innovation Files, The Future of Global Climate Policy: Is
Economic Contraction a Climate Solution (Part 2)
http://www.innovationfiles.org/the-future-of-global-climate-policy-is-economiccontraction-a-climate-solution-part-2/ Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]

economic contraction a key lever for climate mitigation? In fact, there are two problems with
this as a key climate policy strategy. First, it will obviously be very difficult, if not impossible, to
actually get political economies anywhere to voluntarily and substantially stifle economic
growth. And second, the math just doesnt add up; even in the most ideal
circumstances, voluntary economic contraction in the developed world cant drive global
carbon emissions towards zero. That it would be very difficult to convince nations to
voluntarily reduce economic welfare should be a fairly uncontroversial notion. Roberts,
So is voluntary

to his credit, knows how fantastical his proposal sounds. In his book, The Climate Fix, Roger Pielke Jr. formulates an
Iron Law of Climate Policy, which states that even

if people are willing to bear some costs to


reduce emissions, they are only willing to go so far . In other words, when policies on emissions
reductions require reduced economic welfare, public tolerance for such policies will be extremely limited. Societies
do sometimes opt to pay slightly higher energy prices for cleaner air, domestic energy production, or other
intangible goals. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight, and it can only be sustained if
the economic impacts of these policies are limited. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight,
and it can only be sustained if the economic impacts of these policies are limited. In other words ,

a climate
strategy that hinges on significant, voluntary economic contraction is going to be a
steep uphill battle that at best results in marginal results and at worst will expend
significant political capital on a proposition that will almost certainly lose . Roberts
counters that the only way his approach works is through an intense climate communications effort. But it still
seems all but certain that something like the Iron Law of Climate Policy holds even under an intense PR push by
climate advocates and the most charismatic and courageous political leadership. Public tolerance for voluntary
economic contraction in the name of climate mitigation will be extremely limited at best. But lets play devils
advocate: say an intense climate communications effort convinces the rich world that we are already far too
wealthy for our own good and should happily begin a substantial reduction in our incomes and GDP. Is this a core
climate solution? The short answer is no. The math just doesnt add up. Lets work through a thought experiment.
Current global GDP per capita is roughly $9,000 per person and the global population is about 7 billion. Let us
assume for this exercise that around $15,000 per capita constitutes a happiness threshold where real
improvements in welfare and happiness stops being strongly correlated with increased wealth, as some social
researchers contend. If global wealth were somehow perfectly redistributed to each person equally (this is clearly a
thought experiment!), we would therefore need to see per capita GDP increase by 67 percent by 2050 in order for
each of the worlds inhabitants to reach incomes consistent with this happiness threshold. But at the same time,
global population is expected to rise to at least 9 billion people by 2050, an increase of 28 percent. Using our Kaya
Identity terms, we can see that global GDP would then have to rise by over 100 percent (+67% per capita GDP *

even if we were to achieve this perfect


redistribution of global wealth at exactly the ideal happiness threshold, global GDP
would still have to more than double by mid-century, at the same time that global
carbon emissions should be cut by half or more. Clearly, this is also the most
optimistic thought experiment possible, with perfect global wealth redistribution.
+28% population = +114% GDP). In other words,

Per capita GDP would fall in the richer parts of the world to $15,000 per person (down to about
half of todays per capita GDP in OECD nations) and rising in the poorer parts of the world to
$15,000 per person. You be the judge as to how likely this scenario is , or how happy you would be
to see your income fall to around $15,000. Any real-world scenario that resembles Roberts proposal for voluntary
economic contraction in the developed world is likely to have far more modest outcomes and will certainly lack the

unless were going to try to


condemn the emerging economies to permanent poverty as well, were going to see
global GDP far more than double over the next four decades. Economic contraction
is thus a non-solution to significantly reduce emissions: it simply cannot result in the
kind of substantial absolute decline in (at least) one of the Kaya Identity terms above.
We will not bend global carbon emissions rapidly downward through even the most
humane vision of voluntary economic contraction and global wealth redistribution .
Returning to our Kaya Identity, we can thus be clear: both the population and GDP per capita
terms of our equation are going to rise steadily through at least the next half
century, whether we see voluntary economic contraction in the worlds rich
nations or not. That leaves us with just one key strategy to drive emissions
towards zero: we must accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy to
perfectly equal distribution of global wealth in this example. Meaning

significantly reduce the C/GDP term of our equation. Thus, if we must drive carbon emissions towards zero as
quickly as possible, there is only one core climate lever that can get the job done: we must decarbonize the
economy as quickly as possible. As well argue in Part 3 of this series, the most important thing we can do to greatly
accelerate the global adoption of clean energy technologies and the decarbonization of the global energy supply is
to accelerate the pace of energy innovation and make clean energy cheap.

Degrowth doesnt solve climate change


Hepburn and Bowen, University of Oxford Environmental
Economics Professor and London School of Economics Principal
Research Fellow, 2012
[Cameron and Alex, October, Center for Climate Change and Economic Policy,
Prosperity with growth: Economic growth, climate change and environmental
limits, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP93prosperity-with-growth-climate-change.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

The conclusion is that even halting economic growth does not produce absolute
decoupling (as ( > 0), and it certainly does not deliver , as required to restrain
temperature increases to less than 2oC. Achieving this, under Jacksons zero growth
scenario, would still require a radical, structural shift in technology to T/T=-5.6%,
implying a dramatic reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP. Indeed, it is
precisely this sort of structural shift that Jackson rules out to justify his no growth
world. It is clear to a very large number of scholars and others that shifting from
0.7% to 7% p.a. is an extreme challenge. However, reducing to 5.6% while
simultaneously is reduced to 0% is even more difficult economically (observe the
relationship between affluence, R&D investment and the potential for a structural
shift), and impossible politically, and is socially undesirable. The consequences of
sharply slowing (let alone stopping) growth are observable in the West at present:
high unemployment, increased levels of crime and mental illness, large-scale strikes

and so on show the social damage wrought by an economic contraction. Our point is
that both paths involve Herculean challenges, and a no growth world does not
solve the problem of climate change or other environmental problems. Rather, for
the sake of prosperity and indeed the likelihood of success, it is better to drive
increases in technological progress, leading to reductions in intensity, to generate
absolute decoupling along with stable growth. Instead of trying to work out how to
stop growth at least cost, the significant and important question is how to stimulate
a structural shift and a radical change in T. We need green growth, not no growth.

Transition Answers

Collapse Worse 2AC


Transition will fail shutdown of the economy will and cause
extinction
Cobb, 11/23/2014 Kurt, after and author of the peak oil-themed thriller Prelude, Nuclear war: A
forgotten threat to human sustainability http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-11-23/nuclear-war-a-forgottenthreat-to-human-sustainability

Once a machine civilization has been in operation for some time , the lives of the
people within the society become dependent upon the machines . The vast
interlocking industrial network provides them with food, vaccines, antibiotics,
and hospitals. If such a population should suddenly be deprived of a substantial
fraction of its machines and forced to revert to an agrarian society , the resultant
havoc would be enormous. Indeed, it is quite possible that a society within which
there has been little natural selection based upon disease resistance for several
generations, a society in which the people have come to depend increasingly upon
surgery for repairs during early life and where there is little natural selection
operating among women, relative to the ability to bear children--such a society
could easily become extinct in a relatively short time following the
disruption of the machine network. The modern global economy is like a
shark; it has to move forward or it dies. The widespread adoption of just-in-time
inventory has resulted in acute vulnerabilities from even very short disruptions. The modern
global machine now requires continuous inputs of energy and materials and
continuously operating global freight transportation or it starts to break
down. Even partial destruction, say, 15 to 20 percent of the industrial plant in the
world, might be enough to make the global economic system inoperable .
Because self-sufficiency has become a dirty word in our free-trade crazed political
culture, countries have become so specialized in their manufacturing that it might
not be possible to reproduce the necessary facilities nearer home quickly enough to
prevent a global systemic breakdown. We would not simply revert back to the
level of economic activity of, say, the 1950s. Instead, we could experience a total
breakdown that leads to our inability to restart modern technical
civilization after even a limited nuclear war.

Try or die for growtheconomic collapse is worse for all their


impactscauses extinction of every other species and then
humans
Monbiot, Oxford visiting fellow, 9
[George, 8/17/9, Theguardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifgreen/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]

The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely
collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it? I

detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards almost a yearning for this
apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your

the immediate consequences of collapse would


be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass
starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But
view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that

even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other
side will be worse than our current settlement. Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its
members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from
others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can

our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of
almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another
hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that
even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species
possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost
every possible resource in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this
follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse
will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources . This
will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of
conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological
surely see that

consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species'

To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of


industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial . The answer to your question what will we
learn from this collapse? is nothing. This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to
sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the
repeated catastrophe that follows. However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing an ordered
remaining time on earth.

and structured downsizing of the global economy might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are
both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.

Transition Fails 2AC


Transition is impossibleglobalization and capitalism permeate
every level of societylocal communities wont adopt radical
alternatives
Wilson 14
Geoff A., Professor of Human Geography, University of Plymouth, School of
Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, "Community Resilience, Transitional
Corridors and Macro-Scalar Lock-in Effects", Environmental Policy and Governance,
Volume 24, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2014, Wiley Online Library
Macro-economic Lock-ins
Economic ideologies at societal level have major repercussions both for how
economic capital at community level is regulated, accumulated and distributed, and
for the worldviews of community members. As a result, the importance of ideologies
associated with globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism have been emphasized
by many authors (e.g. Castree, 2008), and it is probably in this arena that communities have least
flexibility for autonomous decision-making. Indeed, globalization means that most
communities are increasingly embedded in complex macro-economic
interlinkages that influence individual decision-making . As a result, macroeconomic lock-ins are among the most important transitional corridors influencing
the implementation of more resilient pathways at community level (Wilson, 2012b).
These lock-ins are defined by economic values and worldviews at
societal/nation-state level, although nation-states have begun to lose their autonomy of economic
decision-making (e.g. member countries of the Euro Zone in the EU; increasing importance of World Trade

Macro-economic lock-ins and their impacts on


local community resilience revolve in particular around four inter-connected
processes: economic globalization, the spread of global capitalism, the increasing
importance of Anglo-American neo-liberal economic ideologies, and the increasingly
powerful role of multinational corporations.
Organization policies on global trade arrangements).

Economic globalization refers to the increasingly global economic interlinkages


between geographical spaces, the embeddedness of (almost all) local communities
within complex financial and monetary flows, and processes associated with
increasingly uniform patterns of economic interconnectedness and embeddedness
(Harvey, 2005). A hundred or so years ago many communities still had some level of
economic autonomy i.e. key decisions affecting economic capital at community level were taken within the
community itself. Macro-economic lock-ins of communities in the 18th and 19th centuries were thus less
pronounced as global economic flows were characterized by internationalization (extension of global economic

economic globalization which, since the 20th


century, has meant the economic integration of even the remotest communities
into the global economy (Castree, 2008). Before the 20th century, economic integration of communities
was therefore more shallow based primarily on arm's length trade in goods and services, while today's
globalized communities are characterized by a much deeper degree of community
economic integration and indeed economic dependency based upon
interconnected configurations of economic production (Gray, 2002).
activities across national boundaries) rather than

This suggests that even if communities wish to disengage from global


economic flows and retake control over processes related to economic
capital, it is increasingly difficult for them to break free of the shackles of
economic globalization (Davidson, 2010). Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), as an
example of community-level attempts to partly disengage from transitional corridors
associated with economic globalization, have only partly been successful (relatively low
levels of public acceptance). LETS schemes may struggle to compete with the efficiency,
choice and global reach of the formal economy, and may be abandoned or never
taken up by more mobile and globalized community members. Alternative economic
models at community level can therefore not hide the fact that most communities
where these alternative currencies have been used continue to be firmly
embedded ideologically and practically in globalized economic pathways that define
most community actions. Gray (2002) therefore emphasized that, because of economic
globalization processes, economic capital at community level is mainly shaped by
exogenous forces, which increasingly shoehorn communities into macro-economic
lock-ins. This suggests that almost all of humanity is now within the same macroeconomic capitalist transitional corridor of economic globalization with all
its advantages and disadvantages for raising local community resilience .
Economic globalization is closely interlinked with the spread of global capitalism
during the 20th century affecting even the remotest communities on the globe . Global
capitalism as a macro-economic lock-in for many communities is closely associated with ideological lock-ins (see

capitalism is not just an economic system but also an ideology that


permeates all aspects of modern life which, with its profit-driven maxim and
ideology of continuous expansion and economic growth, influences decision-making
at all geographical levels (Harvey, 2005). Community resilience is often negatively
affected by the spread of global capitalism , precisely because of the specific
attributes associated with capitalism in the form of greed, profit-maximization,
selfishness and the increasing need for community members to integrate vertically
(i.e. with the global economy) rather than horizontally (i.e. with an emphasis on economic interlinkages
above), especially as

within and between the community itself) (Gray, 2002).

The downfall of the Soviet empire in 1990 and what some have hailed as the ideological victory of the
capitalist West has meant that almost all communities on Earth increasingly including
formerly staunchly socialist countries such as China are now embedded within transitional
corridors defined by global capitalist dictates, with often few economic
alternatives (Gray, 2002). Yet, the spread of capitalism is by no means uniform. For example,
emerging economies like China are facing geographically differentiated impacts
with regard to the influence of capitalism. While local communities in most Chinese
urban areas have begun wholeheartedly to embrace capitalism (islands of capitalism),
communities in rural China still remain largely in a sea of subsistence hardly
touched by capitalist influences (Wilson, 2012a). This has pronounced implications for
the embeddedness of Chinese communities within capitalist transitional corridors.
Chinese communities in urban areas, for example, have begun to be locked into
capitalist decision-making structures, including profit-maximization, greed, belief in
private enterprise and a dramatic move away from past socialist ideologies, with
concurrent changes in economic, social and environmental capital at community
level. Economic capital tends to increase (through vertical rather than horizontal interlinkages),

social capital is gradually eroded (many residents in the rapidly growing urban areas
are migrants from rural areas with little social embeddedness in urban networks )
and environmental capital is often reduced (e.g. large-scale pollution in most cities) (Wilson,
2012b).

The post-2008 global economic crisis has highlighted how almost all communities
are affected by similar economic processes that may have, until recently, been
perceived to be rather distant (e.g. unscrupulous lending of banks leading to bankruptcy of many
community-level businesses). The spread of both global capitalism and economic
globalization is the main reason why the formerly clearer geographical boundaries
of communities have become increasingly blurred and more globally than locally
orientated. The latter also largely explains why community relocalization
movements have, so far, not shown much tangible success, as almost all members
of the relocalization process at community level are simultaneously embedded
within the global capitalist system through their dependencies on jobs, pensions
(especially through globally operating pension funds), and economic exchanges with often global
customers, such as Internet-based firms/individuals that , although operating from within a
geographical community, are economically more interlinked with global customers (Bailey et
al., 2010). In the absence of an alternative global economic model and
ideology (at least for the moment), the transitional corridor imposed by the spread
of global capitalism is therefore likely to continue to exert a substantial
impact on the range of decision-making options available at community
level for the foreseeable future.

Transition Fails 1AR


Environmental policies are more effective than De-Growth
their transition fails to alter behavioral economics
Bergh, Amsterdam University Environmental and Resource
Economics Professor, PhD, 10
[Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh is an ICREA Research Professor in the Institute of
Environmental Science & Technology of Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona, PhD in
economics from Amsterdam, Ecological Economics Journal, Environment versus
growth A criticism of degrowth and a plea for a-growth,
http://www.wachstumimwandel.at/wp-content/uploads/van-denBergh_2010_Degrowth-versus-a-growth-EcolEcon.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]
degrowth as a primary or overarching goal to solve environmental
problems is that it reflects a misinterpretation of the relevant causality . It suggests that
degrowth, however interpreted, is a first step, necessary and perhaps sufficient, to reach environmental aims. Instead, one
better would reverse the causality, and start with a safe environmental policy which then may or may
not give rise to (some type of) degrowth. Even if one might support GDP, consumption
or work-time degrowth for reasons of equity or happiness, they cannot be defended
as appropriate strategies to reach environmental aims. The reason is that they function at
best as blunt, ineffective and inefficient instruments of environmental regulation. A
The main concern about

degrowth strategy gives much weight to the scale of the economy or consumption, and underestimates or even neglects the role of
composition and technical change.8 In relation to consumption it also often reflects a belief in the effectiveness of voluntary,
bottom-up solutions. One additional belief that I have often encountered in debates with degrowth proponents is that environmental
policies do not work, or will not be implemented, and that we therefore have to find solutions outside the standard environmental

Without (standard) policies we certainly will not be


able to solve the major global environmental problems. Their global and externality
nature requires that we strike international agreements to create an international level playing field
which allows countries to implement regulatory policies that create the necessary
incentives to alter all behavior that contributes to the environmental problems . This is
policy framework. This view and judgement I cannot share.

not enough, as suggested in the previous section on a wider policy package, but it represents the core of any effective solution.

The voluntary, bottom-up view behind many (notably radical) degrowth expressions in my
opinion gives insufficient attention to modern insights of psychology and behavioral
economics. These state that humans show bounded rationality, myopia, a large degree of
self-interest (and a smaller role for altruism), and a propensity to compare, seek status and
imitate (sensitivity to fashions). Add to this the interactions between large numbers of
individuals, increasing returns to scale which lead to lock-in of undesirable behaviors and
technologies, and (energy) rebound, and we end up with an altogether impressively
complex and difficult to alter system (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). This should
stimulate social scientists to think about systematic solutions and instruments as
well as about very clever strategies to attain social political acceptance for these. Just
proposing voluntary grassroots initiatives is too easy and idealistic. It neglects the
aforementioned complications. Of course, this does not mean a plea against grassroots
initiatives but more attention for their upscaling and system-wide impacts and
associated policies. Certainly something can be learned here too from studies in psychology and economics on how to
elicit pro-environmental behavior. One may argue, of course, that I should not worry too much about a degrowth strategy, as it is
highly uncertain to receive widespread social and political support. I indeed fear

that degrowth as a political

strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians, or even a


significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of
preaching to the choir, i.e. convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the
pessimism about the political feasibility of environmental policies as a motivation to
support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of environmental
(including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out
of time which does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and
environmental policies. For me this includes trying to convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP,
relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may alter the balance in trading-off costs and
benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a).

Crisis establishes pro-globalization consensus ironic reversal.


Bhagwati 2011
Jagdish, University Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia University,
Globalization Marches On, Project Syndicate, January 25 th 2011, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/globalization-marches-on

Indeed, the West accepted the view that globalization would result (as with trade) in mutual gain, embracing what I called in 1997
the notion of benign neglect. In the case of foreign investment and aid flows, the West went further, viewing them as being
motivated by altruism, or benign intent, whereas the East regarded globalization in a world of poor and rich nations as implying
malign impact. In some analyses, malign impact turned into a more sinister malign intent. Thus, foreign aid was regarded as a

As the
benefits of globalization became manifest, and the damage wrought by autarkic
policies also became evident, policymakers in the East began to appreciate that
their anti-globalization stance had been a mistake . But then fear of globalization moved to the West.
plot to trap poor nations in a neo-colonial embrace. What happened next was what I have called an ironic reversal.

The East had feared that it could not gain from trade with the West, which had superior infrastructure and human capital; now, the
West had come to fear that it would lose from trade with the East, which had abundant, cheap labor. The longstanding stagnation in
wages for unskilled labor was attributed to low-cost, labor-intensive imports, ignoring the corollary that Western workers
consumption of labor-intensive Asian goods offset the effect on real wages. To take another example,

the East worried

about a brain drain of professionals to the West , where opportunities seemed to be more plentiful.
Today, the West is witnessing anti-globalization opposition from members of
professional groups, who fear the loss of their jobs to foreign counterparts . Rudyard
Kipling famously wrote in The Ballad of East and West: Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.

Given the ironic reversal of globalization fears, Kipling is still right: convergence has
continued to elude East and West. The current crisis did not create the debate about globalization now
heard in the West; it only made it slightly more salient. Yet the crisis may be tilting Western policy outcomes
in favor of globalization. For example, on trade, there has been a remarkable
commitment to efforts largely successful to avoid significant backsliding into
protectionism. Moreover, the G-20 leaders have continued to express the need to conclude
the Doha Round of multilateral trade-liberalization negotiations. There are also initiatives such as the appointment by the
governments of Britain, Germany, Indonesia, and Turkey of a High-Level Expert Trade Group, with Peter Sutherland, former Director
General of GATT and the WTO, and myself as co-chairs. The four governments will report at this years World Economic Forum in

A reversal in the West is


possible, perhaps even likely. So the current crisis may thus, accidentally, establish
a pro-globalization consensus that spans East and West .
Davos on how to conclude Doha this year. In other words, Kipling could yet be proved wrong.

There are other alternatives instead of de dev that solve


Barnhizer, Professor of Law @ Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, 06
[David, 4/06, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Waking from Sustainabilitys
Impossible Dream: The Decision-Making Realities of Business and Government,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405 Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]
The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has
grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It
cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing
serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people . Even
if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences
of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly
to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and
strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that
produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts
and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice
high on a list of priorities. n60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only
to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but
also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped.
Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and
economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality.
Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot
return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to
achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the
most destructive consequences of our behavior.

The transition is impossible, but attempting it causes disaster.


Their argument is wishful thinking.
Barnhizer, Professor of Law @ Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, 06
[David, 4/06, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Waking from Sustainabilitys
Impossible Dream: The Decision-Making Realities of Business and Government,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405 Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]
Some advocates of sustainability think they can slow the world down to a point of
elegant stasis. n48 Because such people are invariably humane, I conclude they
simply do not understand the consequences to human societies and the ordinary
residents of those societies that would flow from their positions if the nightmare that
they mistake for a dream were accomplished. The naive attitudes underlying [*614]
such positions are similar to the "deep ecology" movement where nature is
accorded only benign intentions. n49 The fact that we inhabit a savage and
unheeding natural world in which species consume each other, earthquakes
destroy, tsunamis overwhelm, and volcanoes spread ash, creating years without

summers, is conveniently ignored. Sustainability represents a wide and diverse


variety of functions, methods, and values that on many levels are incompatible.
On the idealized plane this includes the values of ecological, economic, social, and
political harmony. These values are used to support an argument in favor of a form
of economic and social stasis writ large on the global stage. As an ideal, this form of
sustainability stands for such principles as the precautionary principle and embodies
the warnings about overuse of resources found in Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the
Commons, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth, or Lester Brown's Twenty-Ninth Day,
where Brown argued that an exponential progression in abuse and overuse of
natural resources will generate a catastrophic collapse of systems. n50 These
predictions of disaster are well worth heeding , but there are countervailing
social disasters that can result if we take too aggressive a stance in our efforts to
prevent the ecological harms. These trade-offs include the need to generate wealth
sufficient to sustain existing social justice and equity obligations and the
need to create jobs and opportunities to alleviate the tragedy of abject
poverty and denial of fair opportunity.