Why China and the

Philippines are Battling

Over Rocks, Reefs

ARTICLE

COMMENTS (4)

CHINA
FEATURED
MARITIME DISPUTE
PHILIPPINES
SOUTH CHINA SEA

By Trefor Moss
MANILAThe Philippines cried foul this week when China announced plans to begin regular patrols
of the South China Sea, known here as the West Philippines Sea. The two countries have been
engaged in a tense dispute over the region since 2012, when Chinese ships took control of
Scarborough Shoal, which is just one of the areas Beijing and Manila contest.

Click to enlarge image.

Government spokesman Raul Hernandez insisted any such patrols would be illegal because the
area in question is Filipino, not Chinese, territory: Under international law, he said in a statement
sent by text message to reporters on Jan. 22, Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, cannot
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland and Hainan Island, a province at the
southernmost end of China.
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* What does that mean? Every country with a coastline has ownership of the seas immediately
around it. This area of territorial sea extends 12 miles from the coast, and foreign ships are not
allowed to enter those waters without permission. Every country with a coastline also has an EEZ.
This zone stretches 200 miles from the coast, and the controlling country has exclusive rights to
exploit the resources within that area. That includes fishing and undersea drilling. Foreign ships are
free to sail through an EEZ.
* And beyond that? These are the high seas, and global commons: All nations have the right to sail
them and to exploit their natural resources.

Reuters

A Hamilton class high cutter from the United States in the seas around the northeastern Philippines on Aug.
2, 2013. The country has been working to update its naval fleet amid increased tension with China over
disputed waters in the South China Sea.

* Says who? The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, is the main piece
of international law that sets out maritime rules. Not all countries have ratified UNCLOS, but both
China and the Philippines have. So, in theory, both are committed to respecting the system it
prescribes.
* How does this apply to the small islands in the South China Sea? There are three types of
features to think about islands, rocks and reefs. An island is an inhabitable, though not necessarily
inhabited, feature. Whichever country owns it also own 12 miles of territorial sea plus a 200 mile
EEZ even if the island is hundreds of miles from the mainland. That explains their great value to
the claimants a remote spec of land can potentially yield a huge EEZ, complete with all the
resources it contains. Only about 20 of the 150 features comprising the Spratly Islands a scattered
South China Sea group claimed by China, the Philippines and others can be classed as proper
islands. A rock, on the other hand, is an uninhabitable feature. It gives the country that owns it 12
miles of territorial sea, but no EEZ; so rocks have limited value. A reef, or other submerged feature,
provides neither territorial sea nor an EEZ even if you build a structure on the reef that protrudes
from the water (a tactic that some countries have tried).
* So are Chinese patrols in the South China Sea legal, or not? China claims about 90% of the South
China Sea, even areas that lie well beyond 200 miles from the mainland. Beijing says it has
controlled these waters for centuries. Other claimants, including the Philippines and Vietnam, reject
that argument. If we accept Chinas claim to most of the South China Sea, then of course China can
patrol wherever it wants within that area, since a patrol is an obvious way of staking claim to those
waters. If we reject Chinas claim, Chinese ships still have the right to sail through the South China
Sea, provided they stay out of the 12-mile territorial waters surrounding any islands or rocks owned
by the Philippines, or other countries. Active patrols, however, would be seen as a statement of
ownership, and therefore potentially provocative.
* Is there a way to settle whether China or the Philippines owns the disputed islands?The Philippines
has taken the matter to arbitration at the United Nations International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea. It argues that Chinas broad-brush claim to most of the South China Sea is arbitrary and

unlawful, since it is based on a vague, broken line drawn around the claimed area, which Beijing has
never properly defined. The Philippines says that the line is not recognized under UNCLOS, and that
Chinas claim therefore has no legal basis. The U.N. court is expected to rule on the case between
March and September of this year. However, China has refused to take part in the process, and is
unlikely to accept the verdict if it loses.
* So will the dispute just rumble on? And on, and on.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard Javad Heydarian

Richard Javad Heydarian is a specialist in Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and author of "How Capitalism Failed the Arab
World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings."
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STORY HIGHLIGHTS
In recent years, the South China Sea has (one again) transformed into a theatre of competition
among rival claimant states. Outmatched and outgunned by China, the Philippines has sought
to resolve the disputes by resorting to legal arbitration, hoping that international law, particularly
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), will serve as an amicable
basis for settling maritime conflicts. But China has unequivocally rejected the arbitration process
as an infringement on its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, recently releasing a
position paper that details its rationale for opposing any third-party intervention in the disputes.
The South China Sea represents a potential flashpoint with global ramifications. Connecting one
of the most dynamic economies of the 21st century, the waters facilitate more than
In recent years, the South China Sea has (once again) transformed into a theatre of
competition among rival claimant states. Outmatched and outgunned by China, the Philippines has
sought to resolve the disputes by resorting to legal arbitration, hoping that international law,
particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), will serve as an
amicable basis for settling maritime conflicts.
But China has unequivocally rejected the arbitration process as an infringement on its national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, recentlyreleasing a position paper that details its rationale for
opposing any third-party intervention in the disputes.

The South China Sea represents a potential flashpoint with global ramifications. Connecting one of
the most dynamic economies of the 21st century, the waters facilitate more than $5 trillion in
annual trade. Crucially, the bulk of the energy imports of industrial powerhouses such as Japan and
South Korea pass through the South China Sea. The very economic survival and energy security of
major Asian economies is anchored by unimpeded access to international waters such as the South
China Sea.
Almost everyone has an interest in the peaceful settlement of the disputes. But it is far from certain
whether the Philippines' legal manoeuvre will contribute to the de-escalation of maritime tensions.
China has vehemently rejected the entire arbitration process, accusing the Philippines of stirring
trouble and jeopardising historically stable bilateral ties.
Bitter neighbours
Technically, the maritime disputes involve six rival claimant states: China, Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. The bitterest disputes, however, involve China, on one hand, and
the Philippines and Vietnam, on the other. Fortunately, the latest wave of maritime spats hasn't yet
sparked a full-scale military confrontation. The last bloody standoff was in the latter decades of the
Cold War, when China tried to wrest control of the Paracel (1974) and the Spratly (1988) islands
from the South Vietnamese and (united) Vietnam forces, respectively.

Inside Story - China improving relations

with rivals.

But amid a flurry of nationalist bombast, backed up by wide-ranging - civilian and military construction activities as well as paramilitary patrols across disputed areas, there are growing
concerns over accidental clashes and unintended escalation in the high seas.
In short, freedom of navigation (FoN) - a pillar of commerce and trade - in the South China Sea
could be in peril.
Given the significance of the South China Sea to regional trade and security, non-claimant states
such as the US, Japan, and Indonesia have also been drawn into the territorial disputes.
Washington is bound by treaty obligations to defend Asian allies such as the Philippines, against
external aggression. As some commentators would put it, the maritime rivalries resemble a threedimensional chess game, threatening strategic, economic, and political interests in the region, with
ever-growing number of players injecting additional layers of complexity and risk to the problem.

While all actors have contributed to the escalation of tensions in the area, the consensus among
independent experts is that China's sweeping claims, particularlyits notorious "nine-dashed

line" doctrine, has served as a major stumbling block in resolving the territorial disputes.
Puzzling conflict
China's claims are simultaneously expansive and ambiguous. The "nine-dashed line" covers almost
the entirety of the South China Sea, even overlapping with Indonesia's waters, but Beijing has
not clarified its precise coordinates. It isn't clear whether China is claiming the land features and their
surrounding territorial waters, or treating the entire area as an internal lake. China has evoked
"historical rights" and "inherent and indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea, which, most
experts believe, has little basis in modern international law.

In the absence of any

tangible complianceenforcement mechanism,
China can reject any
unfavourable judicial
outcome; launch a media
campaign to delegitimise
the arbitration proceedings;
contemplate sanctions and
other forms of diplomatic
counter-manoeuvres to
isolate the Philippines; and
project toughness.
Despite signing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which
discourages claimant states from unilaterally altering the status quo, China has stepped up its
construction activities and paramilitary patrols across disputed waters.
In terms of size and capabilities, China dwarfs all its neighbours combined. The regional geopolitical
landscape is highly lopsided. Eager to maintain stable ties with Beijing, Washington has consistently
refused to take sides in the disputes, limiting its concern to FoN in the South China Sea.
Against the backdrop of deteriorating regional security, leading to a brief and perilous standoff
between Filipino and Chinese forces over the Scarborough Shoal (220 km off the coast of the
Philippines, and 900km away from the nearest Chinese coastline).
In mid-2012, Manila decided to take China to the special Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague. As a
signatory to the UNCLOS, China has (under Article 298) rejected compulsory arbitration over

maritime disputes, but the tribunal has the power to determine whether it can exercise jurisdiction
over the case and judge the merits of the Philippines' complaint against China.
The Philippines aim is to pressure China to clarify its claims as well as determine the nature of
contested features in the South China Sea, specifically whether they can generate their own
independent territorial waters. In the end, the Philippines might end up with a pyrrhic victory.
In the absence of any tangible compliance-enforcement mechanism, China can reject any
unfavourable judicial outcome; launch a media campaign to delegitimise the arbitration proceedings;
contemplate sanctions and other forms of diplomatic counter-manoeuvres to isolate the Philippines;
and project toughness (to its domestic hyper-nationalist audience) by stepping up its activities in the
area.
Ultimately, the best solution may lie in direct engagement, confidence-building measures, and
sustained bilateral negotiations rather than compulsory arbitration. Both Manila and Beijing will have
to devise a diplomatic strategy outside the courts of law.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a specialist in Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and author of
"How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the
Middle East Uprisings."