Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
VIBHANSHU
SRIVASTAVA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
VIBHANSHU SRIVASTAVA
ROLL NO. 375
B.A,L.L.B.(Hons.)
1ST semester
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1) INTRODUCTION …………………………….......05
2) GENERAL PRINCIPLES…………………..…….06
5) CONCLUSION.…………..…..………………13
6) BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………….14
OBJECTIVES:
RESEARCH TOOLS: The research of this project was carried with the help of
the Internet and Library of Chanakya National Law University.
Introduction
Etymological Meaning-
The negligence of a person which, while not being the primary cause of a tort,
nevertheless combined with the act or omission of the primary defendant to
cause the tort, and without which the tort would not have occurred.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In trying claim arising out of death or injury caused by negligence, the court may
be faced with a situation where both the parties were negligent in some respect.
The court is then to decide as to whose negligence caused the death or injury.
There are three possible answers to such an query depending upon the
circumstances of the case.
It is obvious that if the finding is that the defendant’s negligence alone caused the
the death or injury, then the plaintiff would succeed even if the plaintiff or the
deceased was negligent in some respect. Similarly, if there is no difficulty in
holding that the plaintiff will fail if the deceased’s or his negligence was solely
responsible for the death or injury, as the case maybe even if defendant was in
some respect was negligent. In the third case, where the negligence of both the
parties caused the death or injury, the common law rule was that the plaintiff was
to fail even if the defendant was more at fault. In other words, if the deceased’s
negligence contributed in some degree to the death or injury, the defendant
succeeded by pleading contributory negligence irrespective of the fact that death or
injury was largely caused by the defendant’s negligence. The defence of
contributory negligence means that the defendant or the plaintiff failed to take the
reasonable care of his own safety which was a material contributory to his death or
injury.1As the defence enabled the defendant to escape completely even when he
was more at fault, the courts were slow to infer that the negligence of the plaintiff
was a contributory factor.
The Courts devised the Last Opportunity Rule which meant that if the defendant
had the last opportunity to avoid the accident resulting in injury he was held solely
responsible for the injury in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was also
collisions where the courts had the opportunity apportioning the damages under the
collision had occurred between merchant ship volute and the destroyer Radstock.
1
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Laxman Iyer,(2003) 8 SCC 731, p. 737.
2
Davies v. Mann : (1842) 10 M7W 546 : 62 RR 698 is often referred to as the originator of the rule though the
words ‘last opportunity’ do not occur there. The plaintiff in this case fettered the forefeet of his donkey and turned
it into a narrow lane. It was run over by a heavy wagon not properly looked after longing to the defendant. The
wagon was going a little too fast and was not properly looked after by the driver. In suit for damages, the plaintiff
succeeded as the defendant by using ordinary care could have avoided the accident even though the plaintiff was
also at fault in turning the donkey into the lane with its forefeet fettered.
3
British Columbia Electric Ry. V. Loach (1916) 1 AC 719
4
(1922) 1 AC 129:38 TLR 255:126 LT 425:66 SJ 156 (HL). The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, applies to India.
Under this act where by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, to their
cargoes, or freight or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion
to the degree in which each vessel was in fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally. Where loss of life or
personal injuries are suffered by any person on board of a vessel owing to the fault of that vessel and any other
vessels or vessel, the liability of the owner of the vessels shall be joint and several subject to any defence which
could have been pleaded to an action for the death or personal injury inflicted.
The volute was at fault in changing her course without giving any proper signal
and the Radstock was at fault in increasing speed although she had the
knowledge of the danger caused by the change of course of Volute. It was held
that both the ships were responsible for the collision even though the last
opportunity for avoiding the accident was with the Radstock. The decision in the
case of Volute was followed by the HOUSE OF LORDS in a non-maritime collision
case and was regarded as one of general application. 5 In this case a crossroad
collision between car and a motorcycle was occurred. Who was negligent in this
action was not clear. The HOUSE OF LORDS held that that it was a sufficient
direction. The defendant in this case while driving the car at about thirty miles an
hour along a main road, approached a point in the road without keeping a proper
look out or slowing down where it was crossed by a side road, when a man driving
a motorcycle came into the road into the side road without warning and a
collision occurred in which the motor cyclist was killed. In a suit for the the
damages filed by the widow of the deceased, the defendant was not held liable
under the common rule as the deceased was also negligent. The case lays down
that where the negligence of parties is contemporaneous as so nearly
contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say that either could have avoided
the consequences of others negligence, it would be said that negligence of both
contributed to the accident. Had it been a case of maritime collision the court
could have apportioned the damages as in case of Volute. But the question of
contributory negligence has all cases to be decided on same principles.
5
American Main Line Ltd. V. Afrika, AIR 1937 PC 168
The common law rule is that if the plaintiff’s or the deceased’s (in case of death)
negligence contributed in some degree to the injury or death, the action failed, was
illogical and its origin lay possibly in procedural and pleading anomalies of the
common law.6The Madhya Pradesh case of Vidya Devi contains an elaborate
discussion why the principle of English Act should be followed in India even
though there is no corresponding act in India.7The Supreme Court without any
reference to the English act, has held that “it is now well settled that in case of
6
LORD WRIGHT, 13 Modern Law Review 5; Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation,1974 ACJ 374 (MP)
89
7
Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport
Corporation, supra : In this case there
was a collision between a bus and a
motorcycle at a road intersection when
the bus was going on the main road and
the motorcycle came from a side road.
The person riding the motor cycle was
killed. In a claim for damages by the
widow and the children it was found that
the bus driver was negligent in not
having a proper look out while
approaching the intersection and the
deceased was negligent as he was driving
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
10 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
contributory negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the
parties as seems just and equitable.
In Municipal corporation grater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer 8, the deceased who was
riding a bicycle came from the left side and took right turn contrary to traffic
regulations. At that time he was hit by corporation bus which was running at a
moderate speed and the deceased was visible from a distance of 30 feet. It was
found that the deceased was negligent in taking a wrong turn contrary to traffic
regulations and the bus driver was negligent in not stopping the bus by quickly
applying the brakes and in omitting to blow the horn. The deceased’s negligence
was held to have 25% contributed to the damage and the compensation was
reduced to that extent.
The act applies when the plaintiff’s act contributes to the ‘the damage’
and not necessarily to the accident which results in damage although in most of the
cases it would be so. Thus the damage would be reduced if a motorcyclist involved
in an accident and suffering a head injury did not wear a crash helmet. 9 It may be
noticed that a omission to wear a helmet is not negligence contributing to the
accident but only to the damage suffered in the accident. This example also
illustrates that for being responsible for contributory negligence the plaintiff need
not be in breach of duty to the defendant. The question simply is whether the
plaintiff or the deceased had failed to take reasonable care of his own safety which
had contributed to the damage.10 As observed by BALAKRISHNAN, J.
“Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in
expression contributory negligence it does not mean breach of any duty. It only
means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his
property, so that he becomes the ‘author of his own wrong’”
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
CHILDREN
9
Oconell v. Jackson, (1972) 1 QB 270 : (1971) 3 A11 ER 129; (Damages were reduces by fifteen percent)
10
Sushma Mitra v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1974 ACJ 87 (MP) pp, 92, 95
young children are concerned. Allowance is made for their inexperience and
infirmity of judgement.11 The correct principle is that the children do not form a
separate category either for deciding whether the defendant any duty to the child
plaintiff and was guilty of negligence being in breach of that duty, or for deciding
whether the child plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but in deciding both these
questions, the age of the child plaintiff and the experience and the intelligence of
ordinary children of that age are to be taken into account with other relevant
information. The madras High Court had held that the children capable of
this case a girl of seven years was knocked down by an engine while she was
crossing the railway track after passing through a wicket gate. It was held that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the girl as she was old
enough in apportioning the danger.12 But a child of six, standing near a footpath
when knocked down by a lorry13 and the child of same age when knocked down by
a motor vehicle while trying to cross a road14 will not be held guilty of contributory
negligence for the children of that age do not have adequate road sense. Similarly,
11
Lynch v. Nurdin, (1841) 1 QB 29 : 5 Jur 797 : 55 RR 191
12
M. & S.M. Railway company ltd. V. Jayammal,(1942) ILR 48 MAD 417
13
R. Srinivasa v. K.M Parsivamurthy, AIR 1976 Karnataka 92.
14
Motias Costa v. Roque Augustihno jacinto
a child of four years was not held guilty of contributory negligence in accepting a
ride on motor cycle driven by his uncle with another person sitting on pillion.15
his brother aged seven, prevailed on an employee of the defendant company to sell
him a small quantity of petrol. The children wanted the petrol for use in a game in
which they enacted a Red Indian scene they had witnessed a cinematograph
theatre. In the result, the boy was seriously burned. It was held that a Privy Council
that the defendants having an explosive substance to a boy who had limited
knowledge of the likelihood of an explosion and its possible effect, and the boy
having done that which a child of his age might be expected to do, the defendants
could not avail themselves of the defence of contributory negligence, that the
employee’s negligence contributed to cause injuries suffered by the boy and that
CONCLUSION
15
M.P. State Road transport corporation v. Abdul Rahman, Supra
16
Yachuk v. Oliver Blais, (1949) AC 386 : (1949) 2 A11 ER 150 : 65 TLR 300
wherein, he can show some negligence on part of the plaintiff and this helps a lot
applied, if the plaintiff in any way contributed to his or her own injury, the plaintiff
is barred from recovering damages. The extreme consequence of this approach has
Since, this defense was utilized by the defendants in all the cases of
negligence, the last opportunity rule was brought in place wherein whoever among
the defendant and the plaintiff had the last opportunity to prevent the accident from
BIBLIOGRAPHY