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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DOCTRINE
Atty. Garcia
BOOK ONE
ARTICLE 3: FELONIES
De Guzman, Jr. vs People
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is
a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either
direct or circumstantial evidence as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestation, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault or immediately thereafter. The factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill are: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the circumstances under which
the crimes was committed and the motives of the accused. The Court have also considered
as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.
In the case at bar, the intent to kill was present. The Court found that the wounds sustained
by Alexander were not mere scuff marks inflicted in the heat of anger or as a result of a
fistfight between them. The petitioner used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical
records indicate that Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. The petitioners attach was
unprovoked with the knife used causing such wounds thereby belying his submissions and
firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.
Rivera vs. People
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. In the present case, the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the
ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of petitioners,
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
In People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003), the Court declared that evidence to prove intent
to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim,
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If
the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
The essential elements of the an attempted felony are as follows: 1. The offender
commences the commission of the felony directly by over acts; 2. He does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offenders act be not stopped
by his won spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The first requisite of an

attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That there be external acts; (2) Such
external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
In People vs. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 (2003), the Court elaborated the concept of an over act or
external act, thus: An overt act or external is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
perpetration, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for
the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of
the commission of the crime, or an over act or before any fragment of the crime itself has
been committed, and this is for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no
one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt
act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient If it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparation are made. The act done need not
constitute the last or proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a casual relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt
acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.
Villareal vs. People
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the RPC,
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is
mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the
mental state of the wrongdoer---injuria ex affect facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in physical injuries
under the RPC, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to do wrong
against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily fucntions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required
animus iniuriandi, the over act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act
does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Mere inflictions of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The RPC also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a
voluntary act from without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the
part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple prudence or negligence comprises an act done
without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere
lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.

The collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that the organization
owes to their initiates the duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. The Court
ruled that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI
medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the inflictions of physical injuries.

U.S. vs. Ah Chong


After the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door,
and called out twice, Who is there? He received no answer fearing that the intruder was a
robber, leaped from the bed and again called out: If you enter the room I will kill you. At
that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing
that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Defendant was charged with murder. While
there can be no doubt of defendants exemption from liability if the intruder had really been
a robber, under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided that the
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such
ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent, which, under the
law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent
and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where under the provisions of
the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though
the act be different from that which he intended to commit.

Loney vs. People


Mala in se cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. What makes the former a felony is the
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) while what makes the latter crimes are the
special laws enacting them.

ARTICLE 4: PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY AND IMPOSSIBLE CRIME


DOCTRINE
Garcia vs. People
Criminal liability is incurred by any person who commits a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of
the provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony;
and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful
acts. In the case at bar, it can reasonably inferred that the emotional strain from the beating
aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioners liability for his death. Where thedeath results as a direct consequence of the use
of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured
person contributed to his death does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility.

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the wrongful act performed is different from the one
he intended: el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his
guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the RPC. The Court appreciated as mitigating
circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the
victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if
the latters hear was in good condition.
Urbano vs. IAC
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under circumstances that the
person responsible for the first even should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javiers death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
People vs. Villacorta
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause.
In the case at bar, There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing
and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. Severe tetanus infections

has a short incubation period, less than 14 days. Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote
cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of
Cruzs death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
People vs. Noel Sales
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. In order that a person may criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence
of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his
son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for
the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually
perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were
reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the victim. In this case, the
appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied
their wrist to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to
inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that
immediately cause his death.
Intod vs. CA
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property. The rationale of Article (2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce and offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a
person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase inherent impossibility that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revise Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under article 4 par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
Jacinto vs. People
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioners evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to an extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken turned out to be
absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen.

ARTICLE 6: STAGES IN THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY


People vs. Lizada
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1 . The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2 . He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3 . The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4 . The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements:
1 . That there be an external acts
2 . Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity, or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation
has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act
or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this so for the reason
that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent

of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparation was made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have causal relation to the
intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory
acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a
desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to
commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under
the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. The Supreme Court declared
that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be
known or established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should
obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to
serve as ground for designation of the offense.
It is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts
to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. The
relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said
facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the
facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that
the mind be able to cause a particular injury.
The spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from the criminal liability for the
intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.
In the case at bar, the Court believed that the accused-appellant intended to have carnal
knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the
prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accusedappellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous
desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although the accused-appellant desisted from
performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was
impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. He
commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his
victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.
**Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the
penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape it is sufficient that there be
entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. The Court held that there
could be a finding of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years,
the complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury.
Baleros vs. People
Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by over acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense, that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by
overt acts of the perpetrator leading directly to its realization and consummation. Absent the
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as
where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal code.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
in the present case.
Whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape. Over or external act has been defined as
some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. Applying this to the fact of the case, it would be too strained to construe petitioners
act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to
sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner
did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to
rape Malou. There was not attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private
part.
People vs. Labiaga
A felony is consummated when all the element necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People, the Court distinguished a frustrated a frustrated felony from an
attempted felony felony in this manner:
1 . In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony the
offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution.
2 . In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some
cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted
felony, the reason, for the non- fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other
than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court the
wound sustained would have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was
mortal. Thus, the Court hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted and not
frustrated murder.
Valenzuela vs. People

Each felony under the Revise Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the
acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the
objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender passes the subjective phase of
the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, subjectively the crime
is complete.
An easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and
attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of
execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the
attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the
Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining
whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by
the accused against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates
an initial concession that all the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The
critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of
execution. The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the acts of
execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is
the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC,
while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an important characteristic if a crime, that
ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime, and
accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this
jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent, and essential for criminal liability. It
follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the
mens rea of the crime is, and the US SC held that a criminal law that contains no mens rea
requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights. The criminal statute must also
provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is
not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be actus reus.
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive
element of the crime of theft it finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a
descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. Theft
is produce when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent
to gain, and viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft is able or unable to freely
disposed of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. In theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the
accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although
his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. The most fundamental notion in the crime
of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief,
which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo
lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it
should be without his consent, a distinction of no slight importance. Unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage theft can
only be attempted or consummated. Unlawful taking is the deprivation of ones personal
property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same
time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted
theft.

People vs. Quinanola


The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the
labia or lips of the female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act. In People vs. Orita,
the Court explicitly pronounced that there is no such crime as frustrated rape. Clearly, in the
crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also, all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all
acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts.
People vs. Orande
It was error for the trial court to convict appellant of frustrated rape. The Court finds that the
rape was in fact consummated. Although appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis in
her vagina, she felt his sex organ touch hers and she saw and felt semen come out of his
penis and smear her vagina. The appellant was able to slightly penetrate her because she
felt pain and her vagina bled. It has been held that, to be convicted of rape, there must be
convincing and sufficient proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroke the external surface thereof. Nevertheless, the Court
also ruled that where penetration is not established that the rape is deemed consummated if
the victim felt pain, or the medico-legal examination finds discoloration in the inner lips of
the vagina, or the labia minora is already gaping with redness, or hymenal tags are no
longer visible. In this case, the victim testified that she felt pain and her vagina bled,
indisputable indications of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis touched the
labia and not merely stroked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be
found guilty of consummated rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.
People vs. Pareja
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated,
and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Simply put, rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ. Without any showing of
such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most it can only be attempted
rape or acts of lasciviousness. In People vs. Publico, the Court ruled that when the
touching of the vagina by the penis is couples with the intent to penetrate, attempted
rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following over
acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her, removing his clothes and briefs; lying on

top of her, holder her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
i.e., the victims loud cries and resistance. Thus, accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of
attempted rape.
Cruz vs. People
Attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. . . . But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act
objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish
its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect,
with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined
and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. . . . .
In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action
intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the
nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such
that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show
without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of
double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an
innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid
regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the
intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of
the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence
the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed
must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."
The slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words,
rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the
external genitalia of the female.
Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a
frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony
is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Obviously, the offender
attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from
that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving
nothing more to be done by him.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender
performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which

the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as
the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting
that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be
through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted
rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the
State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent
be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would
ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining
whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act
of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust
for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained
equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation,"
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted
rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts
directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal,
had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His
preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the
use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to
leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no
direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by
their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really
was.
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the
female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted
rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.
30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id]
on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of
the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he
was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and
touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack
of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on
top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.

ARTICLE 8: CONSPIRACY KINDS AND DISTINCTIONS


People vs. Pagalasan
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy darling of the modern prosecutors nursery.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately
from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven

by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design.
Settles as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is attained, unless in
the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to
the effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirators arrest, on the
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no
other overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the
arrested conspirator is concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the
greater the chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the
possibility that as the conspiracy continues, they may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy
has not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declaration of one conspirator will be
admissible against the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for
substantive crimes committed by the others.
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility
of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy
but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by
purposely engaging in conspiracy with necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result
that they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result. Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act differs radically
and substantively from that which they intended to commit.
People vs. Larranaga
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in
the commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose
and community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint design and community of interest. Otherwise stated, it
may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime. Appellants actions showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the
conspiracy as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but
not participants therein is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason
of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with
a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Responsibility of a conspirator
is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. As shown
by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the
scene of the crime.
People vs. Garchitorena
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as there was no
evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated

in their criminal designs. We are not persuaded, in People v. Maldo, the Court stated:
Conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident.
Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest. Hence,
the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is
deemed the act of all.
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellant were together in performing
the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands
and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and
straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from
them, but they were too strong. All means through which the victim could escape were
blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior
act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a
common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the
fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent
and the character of their participation, because the act of on is the act of all.
People vs. Carandang
Milans and Chuas arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they
conspired with Carandang during the latters act of shooting the three victims. However, the
Court held in People v. Sumalpong, conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual
agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the
commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which
demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient.
When conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was
established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing the door
when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and
(2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Monteclavo and Milans
following such instruction). Contrary to the supposition of appellants, these facts are not
meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1
Monteclavo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As coconspirators, all three are considered principal by direct participation.
Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a
sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection.
Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the subject felony.
People vs. Dadao, et.al.
With regard to appellants' assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were
conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can
only declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in
jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It
should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held
firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and

Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter
two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any
gun. Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a
community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired
with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability
attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which
delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its
ramifications in this manner: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is
made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence
of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who
inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because
the act of one is the act of all.
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. et.al.
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless
of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite
to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own,
"when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition
of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court
held that it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without
taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal
act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement. The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the accused,
be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible.
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the
highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take
cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was
already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accusedappellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to
distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the
respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death

occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness
of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only
intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident
from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for
that intent to kill. For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
People vs. Morilla
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended
is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the
crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate
that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common
desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of
dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive
through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla's turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check.
Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open
the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have
told the police officers that he was with the mayor. His insistence that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate
superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit. Here, Morilla and
Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs
on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry
or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was
driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going
to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation
of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal
intent, motive or knowledge.
People vs. Bokingco
Conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful
act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence
of conspiracy.

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself
and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. The finding of conspiracy was
premised on Elsas testimony that appellant fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment
where passion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas house and allegedly
ordering her to open the pawnshop vault. Based on these facts alone, it cannot be logically
inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Cols actuation can
be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against
appellant before it was amended for murder. Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out
to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove
that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best,
that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts
to escape from the crimes they separately committed. Their acts did not reveal a unity of
purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.
Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his
pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise
inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. In order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that (1) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself; (2) the admission relates to the common object; and (3) it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Bokingcos judicial admission
exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit
him in the head.
People vs. Castillo
The prosecution contends that without Padayhags help, Castillo could not have abducted
Rocky. The Court is not persuaded. There must be positive and conclusive evidence that
Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused
guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of
events that directly and definitely link the accused to the commission of the crime without
any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed, conspiracy
must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2)
unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that
contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same
unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of
conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design.
Padayhags act of fetching Ricky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillos plan,
a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo
only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhags boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on
the pretext that they were to visit Padayhags boyfriend that the two met. To impose criminal
liability, the law requires that there be intentional participation in the criminal act, not the
unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

Fernan vs. People


The burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution.
Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled
jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court
explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary: After all, secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine
in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent of each other, were fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court categorized two (2) structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely,: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is
single person or group (hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups
(the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics
or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as the legitimate business operations between manufacturers and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. The Court finds that the
conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons
who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a
single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III),
Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate
spokes of the conspiracy. Petitioners where among the many spokes of the wheel.

ARTICLE 11: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES


People vs. Regalario
When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily
owns up to the killing but he may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and
that he incurred no criminal liability therefore. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense,
namely: (b) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
However, unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.
After he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latters head and he continued hitting
the victim who retreated backward. From the moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance of Ramon
put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon
went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People vs. Cajurao, the Court held: The settled
rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has
the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying
circumstances. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life
and limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases.
If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is
retreating from the fray.

People vs. Fontanilla


An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted on unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot
invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstances.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful
aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression
attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel. The character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or
assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack.) Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an anger countenance or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden
to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that
would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established selfdefense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden of relying on
the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, would
not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against
Fontanilla, and Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone causing the mortal
injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims
fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury
from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on
the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending
physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any

medication applied to him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais
testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was
thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he
inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. The Court considered to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just defend himself.
Josue vs. People
Petitioner invoked self-defense, after he had admitted that he caused the victims wounds
when he shot the latter several times using a deadly weapon, i.e., the .45 caliber pistol that
he carried with him to the situs of the crime. In People v. Mondigo, the Court explained: By
invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was charged
albeit under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes.
Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the following
circumstance: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
In order to be exonerated from the charge, the petitioner then assumed the burden of
proving, beyond reasonable doubt that he merely acted in self-defense. While the three
elements must concur, self defense relies, first and foremost, on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no selfdefense may be successfully pleaded. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.
In the present case, particularly significant of this element of unlawful aggression is the
trial courts finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the
petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. According to prosecution witness
Villianueva, it was even the petitioner who confronted the victim, who was then only buying
medicine from a sari-sari store, Granting that the victim tried to steal the petitioners car
battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during the
fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued to
chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound
on his chest. Contrary to the petitioners defense, there then appeared to be no real danger
to his life or personal safety, for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise
justified him in inflicting the gunhshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macarios
end.
The weapon used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the
nature and location of the victims wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a
claim of self-defense to prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense
must be commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. Considering the
petitioners use of a deadly weapon when his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to
cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the victim who had attempted to flee after
already sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not act merely in
self-defense but was an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.
Toledo vs. People
The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he
adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA by claiming that he stabbed and killed the
victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised

Penal Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in the Supreme Court two divergent
theories(1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression;
hence, is justified under Article 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo
accidentally hit the victim and is, thus exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, par.4.
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because
the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental selfdefense in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent
or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused
has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense
is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human
affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense.
The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in
fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his acts is in accordance with law so much so that
the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and
civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 is
the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, par. 4 is lack
of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable
felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the
complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the
act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual
or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Self-defense and accident are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove,
with clear and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts
adduced to the trial and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in selfdefense or by accident without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted
to the accused to prove such affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not in the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his
affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted.
To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the petitioner, (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or
repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The petitioner failed to prove self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete: there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. He
arrived at appellants house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to aske
appellant why he threw stones at Rickys house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or
defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Rickys arrival at appellants
doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any
aggressive act that may have imperiled appellants well-being. Rickys want of any weapon
when he arrived at appellants doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was
presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in
stabbing Ricky.
In People vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held: for aggression to be appreciated, there must
be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong
act of real aggression. Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or

personal safety of the person defending himself or of a relative sought to be defended and
not an imagined threat.
Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellants life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there
must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellants claim of
self-defense must fail.
Dela Cruz vs. People
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to selfdefense. In other words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is
well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of
proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts
upon him. As such, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.
Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his
petition must be denied.
The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression
was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the most
essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the
one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other than petitioner's
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to petitioner's questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting
incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an
assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired,
and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already
ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After
petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak
of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC,
petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do
so, thus: In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused
admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim
shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression
coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming
that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that
it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that
when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo vs. Tagana,

424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when
the unlawful aggression has ceased (Peo vs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to selfdefense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the
present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of
his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant
legal self-defense on the part of the offender. Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call
of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on
Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the
severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot
be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey,
the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and
extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. Indeed, the means employed by a
person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner. The victim was holding the
fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof
was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire
extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs.
Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
Guevarra vs. People
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts
for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show
that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be
proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no selfdefense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing
by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly
attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place
outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate
was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with.
Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged
into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number
of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in selfdefense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real
aggressors.

People vs. Sevillano


By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds
which killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing
was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits
the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when corroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order
that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal
liability:
1 . Unlawful Aggression;
2 . Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3 . Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Appellant's version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab
him was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court's
conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to
wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of
that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has
ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. The fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds
in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies
and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the
life of the victim.

ARTICLE 12: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES


RA 9344 THE JUVENILE JUSTICE & WELFARE ACT
Madali vs. People
As to criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the CA, Raymond, who was
only 14yrs of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal
liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Section
6 and 20 of RA 9344. Although the crime was committed on April 13, 1999 and RA 9344 took
effect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of
Raymond who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. While Raymond is criminally exempt
from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to Section 6 par. 2 of RA
9344.
As to Rodels situation, he was 16yrs old at the time of the commission of the crime. A
determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to
Section 6 of RA 9344.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequence of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. The CA
found that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio
not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise they would kill him. Rodel, knew,
therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully
appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revise Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under
18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in

the proper period. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended
pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344 xx xx instead of pronouncing the judgement of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without the need of application. Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already 18yrs old or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances
of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
SC Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the law.
People vs. Sarcia
The SC finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. The Court cannot agree
with the CAs conclusion that the accused appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time
of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When the accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24yrs old, which means that in 1996,
he was 18yrs old. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place in
any month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the
exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape
was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance
of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, the Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his
age.
The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to victim and her family, particularly
considering the circumstances attending this case.
Section 38 of RA 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is
found guilty of the offense charged. The provision makes no distinction as to the nature of
the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike PD 603 and AM No. 02-118-SC. The said PD and SC Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38
of RA 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since RA 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found
guilty of a heinous crime.
While Sec. 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if
the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31yrs old and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of RA 9344. Thus, the application of Sec. 38 and 40
to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of RA 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows: A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction an upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training

facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by BUCOR, in


coordination with the DSWD. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is
not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance
with law.

People vs. Mantalaba


The appellant was 17yrs old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said
offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTCs decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no
longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of PD
603 and Sec. 32 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law, the laws
applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment because the impossible penalty
for violation of Section 5 RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death. It may be argued that the
appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sec. 38 and 68
of RA 9344. However, the Court has ruled in People vs. Sarcia: that while Sec. 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the
law is already 18yrs old or more at the time of pronouncement of his/her guilt, sec. 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of
21.
Since the appellant is now beyond the age of 21 can no longer avail of the provisions on Sec.
38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already mood and
academic. The appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA
9344, which provides: A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of
the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for the violation of Sec. 5 of RA
9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Sec. 98 of the
same law. A violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Basically means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted
the technical nomenclature of penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Agacer
Franklin is entitled to the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklins Certificate
of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16yrs old at
the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He was therefore entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty
next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the
proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and compassion is that
because of his age, the accused presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is
regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth
certificate was belatedly presented for the Courts consideration, since to rule accordingly
will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
Ty vs. People

Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from
criminal liability has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be
invoked successfully, the following requisite must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable
fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or
at least equal to that committed. It must appear that the threat that caused the
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or
limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will
as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, the fear, if any, harbored by ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she
was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate
further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. There
was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her continued
stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a wellgrounded apprehension of her death. It is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts
one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive
her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the
hospitals threats or demands. Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with
no choice but to commit a crime. By her own words, she admitted that the collateral or
security the hospital required prior to discharge of her mother may be in the form of
postdated checks or jewelry.
The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under
the justifying circumstance of state of necessity: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that
there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the
evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this
defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid
committing a crime. By her own admission she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms
of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of sate of necessity to be available, the greater injury feared
should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful
inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by
Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.

ARTICLE 13: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES


Urbano vs. People
Petitioner contents that the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim out to be appreciated in
petitioners favor.
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential
element of self-defense, the reference it to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative
act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit

the wrongful act and should be immediately precede the act. This third requisite of selfdefense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when,
even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was
sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a
provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate
to the act of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomeldens insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered
immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention
other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon.
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed
from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when
attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner
tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows
of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the
fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the
office of the LIWADs general manager. Such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from,
and would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the
victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that
Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have been possibly averted
had he had the financial means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide.
People vs. Ignas
Was the killing murder as found by the trial court or mere homicide? Not that the amended
information under which the appellant stands charged does not, unlike the original
information, charge appellant with murder but the mere unlawful killing: albeit through the
use of an unlicensed firearm. Not further that the amended information does not definitely
categorically state that the unlawful killing was attended by the aggravating or qualifying
circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating
circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information. Although the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of
Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given
retroactive application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error
for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded,
we find that the amended information under which appellant was charged and arraigned, at
best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the
scope and coverage of Article of 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial courts
order to dismiss the information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Under RA
8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no
longer be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The Court
has held that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm where another crime, as indicated by RA 8294, is committed. Although RA 8294 took

effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it was advantageous to the
appellant insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of
firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.

ARTICLE 14 AND 15: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES & ALTERNATIVE


CIRCUMSTANCES
People vs. Nazareno
The CA held that the killing of David should be characterized as one of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength. The Court finds no fault in this ruling. There is abuse of superior
strength when the aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering the victim unable to
defend himself. The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the
aggressor.
Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a
stick and Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as he
fled from them. And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed barangay
tanods, Nazareno and Saliendra exploited their superior advantage and knocked the
defenseless David unconscious. He evidently died from head fracture caused by one of the
blows on his head.
Fantastico vs. Malicse, Sr.
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery
or
any
other
qualifying
circumstance.
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate;
and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. From the facts
proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of
treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the
possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed.
There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but
was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim.
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, thus:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio
Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit
the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence also show
that Rolando Rolly Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe. And outside while
the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. Salvador also
hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the
victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip, Medico Legal
Certificate and Leg Sketch and the fracture sheet all prove that the victim suffered injuries to
both legs and multiple lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close
fracture was caused by a blunt instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by

Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a
large knife or axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on
the victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as
it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. The victim was unarmed, while his attackers
were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This
establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted
by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit
the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself.
And Salvador consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head.
Treachery is present in this case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance
against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron were all
armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with. There is clearly present
here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The evidence
must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked." The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age,
size, and strength of the parties.
People vs. Bokingco
The Court agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to
murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced.
For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted
the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody witnessed the
commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see
Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner of killing is
inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the
prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the
offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how
much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as
to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only
retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted
that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco
planned the attack.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident
premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be
properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this


case. Taking into account the fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that
he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However there was no showing that he took
advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime. Appellants claim that they
were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but
because they worked in the construction of the victims apartment.
People vs. Tabarnero
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, method, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The Court held that treachery was amply demonstrated by the
restraint upon Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively
repel, much less evade, the assault. The swiftness and unexepectedness of an attack are not
the only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured. In People v.
Montejo, the Court held that there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a
defenseless situation, as when he was being held by the others while he was being stabbed,
as the accomplishment of the accuseds purpose was ensured without risk to him from any
defense the victim may offer. The Court therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was
attended by treachery. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery
should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength would
nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this
circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already absorbed in
treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him
clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available
to the person attacked.
In People vs. Gemoya, the Court held: Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of in the commission of the crime. When four armed assailants, two of whom are
accused-appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that
excessive force was purposely sought and employed.
People vs. Vilbar
The Court agree with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the absence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The Court ruled that treachery cannot be
appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Thus, for treachery or aleviosa to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions; (a) that
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. Where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As
has been aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack and
the means, method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the
accused, because the attack was impulsively done.

Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. The
suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of aleviosa, even if
the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victims
helpless position was accidental. The circumstance that the attack was sudden and
unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of aleviosa necessary to
raise the homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor consciously
adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill
the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.
In the case at bar, the prosecution merely showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert
suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-appellant consciously adopted
such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The
surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the
presence of the victims families and the attending eyewitnesses, work against treachery. If
accused-appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have
been chosen another time and place to stab the victim. Yet accused-appellant nonchalantly
stabbed the victim in a public market at 7pm. The place was well-lighted and teeming with
people. He was indifferent to the presence of the victims family or of the other people who
could easily identify him and point him out as the assailant. He showed no concern that the
people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate in behalf of the victim. In fact, the attack
appeared to have been impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or
extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accused-appellant deliberately planned to
stab the victim at said time and place. Thus, the court reasonably conclude that accusedappellant, who at the time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted brashly and
impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.
People vs. Daniel Matibag
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In People v. Tan, the Court explained that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does
not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if
the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for
his or her defense.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun,
confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the
chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was
made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was
unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant. The
deliberateness of Matibags act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the moment
of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to effect such
dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled
with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun. Based on these findings, the
Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful
aggression. The prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and
unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibags

version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his
reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the
victim. Hence, by these accounts, Matibags allegation of unlawful aggression and,
consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The foregoing considered, the
Court upholds Matibags conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged.

INSTIGATION VS. ENTRAPMENT


People vs. Naelga
The Court find no instigation in this case. The general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or
that the criminal act was done upon the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisting in its commission. This is particularly true in that class of cases where the offense
is of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course
of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.
Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential informant that accusedappellant was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of Rosales. Poseur-buyer
PO2 Sembran then pretended to be engaged in the drug trade himself and, with the help of
his fellow buy-bust operatives, arrested accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu
to him. In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the
instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offenses,
and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction; in
instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea of committing a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation
was formed by the police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to
apprehend the perpetrator.
While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached and asked him to
buy shabu for him, the same cannot be considered as an act of instigation, but an act of
feigned solicitation. Instigation is resorted to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip
received from the police informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the
public market of Rosales. In fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran
to use shabu; and despite accused-appellants statement that he did not know anybody
selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2 Sembran and directly went to Urdaneta,
where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he returned to the Rosales public
Market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.

ARTICLE 16-20: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES


PD 1612 THE ANTI-FENCING LAW
PD 1829 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
People vs. Dulay (2012)
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or

unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could
have accompanied AAA and offered the latters services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AA could have offered her own services in exchange for
monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information,
as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant,
thereafter, she was raped by Speed
People vs. Gamboa, et.al.
The Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only
as an accomplice to the crime. Jurisprudence is instructive of the element required, in
accordance with Article 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw
Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was
wrong and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to
keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will
make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that
the accused-appellants presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence she is only liable as an accomplice.
Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People vs. Clemente, et.al., where it was
stressed in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Ong vs. People
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of PD 612, as the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything
of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, or
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.

The elements of fencing are present in this case. (1) the owner of the tires corroborated by
the caretaker of the warehouse where the tires were stolen testified that the crime of
robbery was committed on February 17, 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the
tires through Sales invoice and an inventory list; (2) although there was no evidence to link
Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were
caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but 13 out of 38 missing tires were found in his
possession. Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the
total amount of P45,000 where he was issued Sales Invoice; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The fact that a person of reasonable prudence
and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was a businessman of
buy and sell of tire for the past 24yrs ought to have known the ordinary course of business in
purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
13 tires and he did not even asked for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction,
from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience
from business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if
Go was just peddling 13 tires in the street. Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law
in selling second hand tire. Section 6 of PD 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities
dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or
permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city
where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearance from the police
station for some used tires he wanted to resell, but in this particular transaction, he was
remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
People vs. Dimat
The elements of fencing are (1) robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken
during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing
derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.
Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers
of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not
reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis. Second, Dimat claims lack of
criminal intent, as his main defense. But PD 1612 is a special law, and therefore, its violation
is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. The prosecution was
able to prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and
later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtained
some gain out of his acts. Evidently Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration
and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show that Tolentino was unable to make good on
his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan
Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.

ARTICLES 21-88

RA 9346 PROHBITING THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSITION


ACT 4103 THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
PD 968 THE PROBATION LAW AS AMENDED
People vs. Nelmida

People vs. Punzalan


People vs. Dulay (2014)
People vs. Quiachon
People vs. Salome
Colinares vs. People
Villareal vs. People (2014)
People vs. CA (2014)
Suyan vs. People
Almero vs. People

ARTICLE 89-113
People vs. Bayot
People vs. Amistoso
People vs. Consorte
People vs. Bautista
Abellana vs. People
People vs. Pangilinan
Lumantas vs. Calapiz

Daluraya vs. Olivia


Solidum vs. People

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