Supremacy, the Miracle 14th Amendment, Jurisdiction, Kentucky Constitution and

Kentucky Law
What started this mess? The ACLU filed a complaint for Bourke and Love in federal district
court.
Let's first address Jurisdiction. Which of these applied to Obergefell?
Constitution for these united States, Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to
Controversies between two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of
another State; --between Citizens of different States, -- between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
HINT: The Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home State.
In other words, the controversy was between individual citizens of their respective state and the
State.
Conclusion: The Federal District court did not have jurisdiction to hear this Kentucky case.
Let's move on to Kentucky law and the oaths Kim Davis took.
Davis' oath as County Clerk:
"I, ....., do swear that I will well and truly discharge the duties of the office of
.............. County Circuit Court clerk, according to the best of my skill and
judgment, making the due entries and records of all orders, judgments, decrees,
opinions and proceedings of the court, and carefully filing and preserving in my
office all books and papers which come to my possession by virtue of my office;
and that I will not knowingly or willingly commit any malfeasance of office, and
will faithfully execute the duties of my office without favor, affection or partiality,
so help me God." 30A.20

Davis must also take this oath, which is for all officials, including members of the Bar:
" I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and
be faithful and true to the Commonwealth of Kentucky so long as I continue a
citizen thereof, and that I will faithfully execute, to the best of my ability, the office
of .... according to law; and I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that since the
adoption of the present Constitution, I, being a citizen of this State, have not
fought a duel with deadly weapons within this State nor out of it, nor have I sent
or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly weapons, nor have I acted as
second in carrying a challenge, nor aided or assisted any person thus offending,
so help me God."
Davis' sworn duty is to the electorate of the County wherein she resides.
What does Kentucky law say on this matter?
Let's look first to the Kentucky Constitution.
"Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized
as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that
of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized." Text as
Ratified on: November 2, 2004. History: Creation proposed by 2004 Ky. Acts ch.
128, sec. 1.
It is important to note some claim the approval of the Kentucky constitutional amendment by the
electorate was illegal.
One argument I've seen to counter the enactment process of the Kentucky Marriage Amendment
is that the method in which it was enacted, by initiative, is unconstitutional because of Article 2
and 6 in their Bill of Rights. This is grasping at straws.
Section 2 ... Absolute and arbitrary power denied.
Section 26 ... General powers subordinate to Bill of Rights -- Laws contrary
thereto are void.
The constitutional amendment was approved by the People of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Therefore, Absolute and Arbitrary Power was not exercised.
The Kentucky Bill of Rights is silent on marriage, although it does contain the following
religious freedom provision:

"No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or
denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of
worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to the
salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall any man be compelled to
send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed; and the
civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be taken away, or in
anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any
religious tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall, in any case
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience. Text as Ratified on:
August 3, 1891, and revised September 28, 1891. History: Not yet amended."
And this under Section 1,
"Second: The right of worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of
their consciences." Text as Ratified on: August 3, 1891, and revised September
28, 1891. History: Not yet amended.
Conclusion, Section 26 is not applicable either.
We now turn to their Statutes. Does their law coincide with their Constitution? Yes, in fact,
Kentucky's statutory law preceded the Constitutional amendment. Here is the applicable statute:
402.005 Definition of marriage. As used and recognized in the law of the
Commonwealth, "marriage" refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation
of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each
other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those whose
association is founded on the distinction of sex. Effective: July 15, 1998 History:
Created 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 258, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1998.
Therefore, the argument that Davis is a civil servant and must follow the law (a popular
argument in this case) is in fact the case - Davis is following Kentucky law.
We must now look at another statute, the one that Mrs. Davis has claimed as her guidance.
402.080 Marriage license required -- Who may issue.
No marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor. The license shall be
issued by the clerk of the county in which the female resides at the time, unless the
female is eighteen (18) years of age or over or a widow, and the license is issued
on her application in person or by writing signed by her, in which case it may be
issued by any county clerk. Effective: July 13, 1984. History: Amended 1984 Ky.
Acts Ch. 279, Sec. 1, effective July 13, 1984. Amended 1980 Ky. Acts Ch. 74, Sec.
1, effective July 15, 1980. Amended 1978 Ky. Acts Ch. 384, Sec. 518, effective
June 17, 1978. Amended 1968 Ky. Acts Ch. 100, Sec. 14. Amended 1948 Ky. Acts

Ch. 42, Sec. 1. Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts Ch. 208, Sec. 1, effective October 1,
1942, from Ky. Stat. Sec 2105.
Some claim that Kennedy's Opinion in Obergefell repeals all of Kentucy law, including their
Constitution, on the issue of marriage. They claim the Supreme Court of these united States
ruled in Obergefell that all State laws banning homosexual marriage are unconstitutional and
after all, they have the final say. It is now the law of the land. Moreover, when she took her oath,
she swore to uphold the Federal Constitution.
Let us look to the Supremacy Clause. Remember, the claim is that the Supremacy Clause asserts
that Congressional Acts and SCOTUS decisions preempt any State law where Congress, or the
Courts have spoken. The Supremacy Clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. emphasis added. Constitution
of these united States, Article VI, Clause2.
So what does this mean? In simple terms it means that the General government has sole
jurisdiction to exercise those Powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8 - Period. Nothing less.
Nothing more.
That is it. If the People, through their States, did not cede a Power to the General government,
then the Power remains with the States. Proof of this is contained in the 10th Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. It is as follows:
" The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
As we have already discussed, the General government has only those Powers enumerated in
Article I, Section 8. If a Power is not enumerated there, the Power remains with the States.
Determining what marriage is, how it is consummated and how it is dissolved has never been
delegated to the General government by the States. Therefore, it must remain with the States.
How do the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRA) by Congress and the Kentucky
legislature fit in to this discussion?
The Federal RFRA is as follows:

42 USC 2000bb
Congressional Findings
(a) FindingsThe Congress finds that
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution;
(2) laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes The purposes of this chapter are
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government. (Pub. L. 103141, 2, Nov. 16, 1993, 107
Stat. 1488.)
(c) Judicial relief - A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a
judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing
to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general
rules of standing under article III of the Constitution. (Pub. L. 103141, 3, Nov.
16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488.)
Definitions
As used in this chapter
(1) the term government includes a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States, or of a covered entity;
(2) the term covered entity means the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United States;
(3) the term demonstrates means meets the burdens of going forward with the
evidence and of persuasion; and

(4) the term exercise of religion means religious exercise, as defined in section
2000cc5 of this title. (Pub. L. 103141, 5, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub.
L. 106274, 7(a), Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law,
whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November
16, 1993.
(b) Rule of construction
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is subject to this chapter
unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.
(c) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any government to burden
any religious belief. (Pub. L. 103141, 6, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1489; Pub. L.
106274, 7(b), Sept. 22, 2000, 114 Stat. 806.)
Establishment clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way
address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the
establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the Establishment
Clause). Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent
permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this
chapter. As used in this section, the term granting, used with respect to
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of
government funding, benefits, or exemptions. (Pub. L. 103141, 7, Nov. 16,
1993, 107 Stat. 1489.)
Let's move now to the Kentucky version of the RFRA.
Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act, KRS, Title XLI, Chapter 446, Rules
of Codification, 446.350
Prohibition upon government substantially burdening freedom of religion -Showing of compelling governmental interest -- Description of "burden."
Government shall not substantially burden a person's freedom of religion. The
right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear
and convincing evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in
infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive
means to further that interest. A "burden" shall include indirect burdens such as
withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from programs or
access to facilities. Effective: June 25, 2013. History: Created 2013 Ky. Acts Ch.
111, Sec. 1, effective June 25, 2013.
Mrs. Kim Davis faces a 'Catch 22' situation.

What if she issued a marriage license to a same sex couple? If she did, she would be subject to
prosecution under Kentucky law, which reads:
"Any clerk who knowingly issues a marriage license to any persons prohibited by
this chapter from marrying shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and removed
from office by the judgment of the court in which he is convicted." Kentucky
Revised Statute 402.990(6).
Mrs. Davis has several options. She could resign, which many are calling for her to do. She
could continue to decline all couples seeking a marriage license, thus violating Judge Bunnings
order. Her other option is she could issue the license, making her subject to this Kentucky
statute, and if found guilty, she would not only become a documented criminal, she would be
removed as County Clerk by the Court. She would also violate her conscience if she issued them.
Does one person's conscience void another's because an issue has become popular? Do we live in
a Democracy where the 'mob' rules, or put another way, where two wolves and a lamb decide
what is for lunch?
1) Ms. Davis did not discriminate against anybody. In fact, she didn't issue marriage licenses to
anyone so that she would not discriminate.
2) She obeyed Kentucky law. (Read above analysis on this subject)
3) As previously discussed, although some disagreement still exists, the Federal District Court,
where the ACLU took Bourke & Love, should never have heard the case. They did not have
jurisdiction.
4) And finally, the SCOTUS should have slapped the District court on the jurisdictional issue
and Judge Bunning's partiality. Kennedy and those agreeing to the majority opinion should
never have ruled as they did. Marriage is a State issue. After Obergefell, should all marriage
licenses only come from a federal clerk of the court?
Of course some will claim, "But the SCOTUS ruled..."
The Supreme Court of these united States cannot make law - period - which is what they have
done.
There has been an incorrect claim by those who worship at the altar of government. We have
heard repeatedly that the Supreme Court has spoken so same sex marriage so Obergefell is the
law of the land. Not True.
A Tennessee judge summed up the situation well in his order dismissing the complaint and
counter-complaint in a divorce case between Pamela E. Bumgardner, Plaintiff/Counter-

Defendant vs. Thomas A. Bumgardner, Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff.

In his order he wrote:
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has noted that Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) affected what is, and must be recognized as, a lawful marriage in the State of
Tennessee. Borman v. Pyles-Borman, Tenn. Ct. App. Case No. E2014-01794-COA-RVCV, filed August 4, 2015. This leaves a mere trial level Tennessee state court judge in a
bit of a quandary. With the U.S. Supreme Court having defined what must be
recognized as a marriage, it would appear that Tennessee's judiciary must now await
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court as to what is not a marriage, or better stated,
when a marriage is no longer a marriage. The majority's opinion in Obergefell,
regardless of its patronizing and condescending verbiage, is now the law of the land,
accurately described by Justice Scalia as "a naked judicial claim to legislative-indeed,
super-legislative-power." Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, 1., dissenting). Thus, it
appears there may now be, at minimum, (and obviously without any specific enabling
legislation) concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal courts with regard to
marriage/divorce litigation. Perhaps even more troubling, however, is that there may
also now be a new or enhanced field of jurisprudence-federal preemption by "judicial
fiat." Preemption, being based upon the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2),
has generally been effected by the U.S. Congress through federal legislation. See
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct 1591, 1595 (2015). Further, there is (or at least
there once was) a presumption against finding preemption of state law in areas
traditionally regulated by the States. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101
(1989). Regardless of this presumption, and regardless of the states' traditional
regulation of the area of marriage and divorce, and regardless of what might now
arguably be concurrent state and federal jurisdiction to address those issues, what
actually appears to be the intent and (more importantly) the effect of the Supreme Court
ruling is to preempt state courts from addressing marriage/divorce litigation altogether.
The presumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction is overcome by "a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." Mims v. Arrow
Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct 740, 748 (1981) (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)). According to the majority opinion, "marriage is a
keystone of the Nation's social order" and is "a central institution of the Nation's
society." Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590 (emphasis added). Perhaps Tennessee's
perspective concerning keystones and central institutions must submit to the perspective
of those so much higher and wiser than ourselves. To say the least, Tenn. Const. art. XI,
18, having been adopted by the people of the State of Tennessee in 2006 as reflecting
the will, desire, public policy and law of this State, and to be applied by its judiciary,
seems a bit on the incompatible side with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling. Interestingly,
Tenn. Const. art. XI, 18 is barely mentioned, let alone expressly overruled, by
Obergefell. In fact, the only reference to Tenn. Const. art. XI, 18 in Obergefell this
Court has located is in one of the opening paragraphs-not in the holding. One would
think that if the U.S. Supreme Court intended to overturn all or part of a state's
constitution, it would do so expressly, rather than by implication? The conclusion
reached by this Court is that Tennesseans, corporately, have been deemed by the U.S.

Supreme Court to be incompetent to define and address such keystone/central

institutions such as marriage and, thereby, at minimum, contested divorces.
Consequently, since only our federal courts are wise enough to address the issues of
marriage-and therefore contested divorces-it only follows that this Court's jurisdiction
has been preempted. At least, according to Justice Scalia, the majority Opinion In
Obergefell represents "social transformation without representation." Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It also appears to have removed subject matter
jurisdiction from this Court. As a result, the Complaint and Counter-claim are
dismissed.
Although this Court has some vague familiarity with the governmental theories of
democracy, republicanism, socialism, communism, fascism, theocracy, and even
despotism, implementation of this apparently new "super-federal-judicial" form of
benign and benevolent government, termed "krytocracy" by some and "judi-idiocracy"
by others, with its iron fist and limp wrist, represents quite a challenge for a state level
trial court. In any event, it should be noted that the victory of personal rights and liberty
over the intrusion of state government provided by the majority opinion in Obergefell is
held by this Court only to have divested subject matter jurisdiction from this Court
when a divorce is contested. Individuals, at least according to the majority opinion, are
apparently authorized (along with the federal judiciary) to define when a marriage
begins and, accordingly, ends, (without the pesky intervention/intrusion of a state court)
leaving irreconcilable divorces under Tenn. Code Ann. 36-4-101(11), Tenn. Code
Ann. 36-4-103, and perhaps even Tenn. Code Ann. 36-4-129 to some degree (but
only when the grounds and/or irreconcilable differences are stipulated),
intact and within the jurisdiction of this Court to address.
Next, others will argue that the 14th Amendment was ratified and therefore compels Kentucky
and its citizens to obey, "The law of the land."
That would be true except, 1) The 14th Amendment has 0.0 to do with marriage. Marriage has
always been a State Power, 2) the authors of the 14th Amendment knew this. If you read the
debates recorded in the Congressional Globe (what they used to call the Congressional Record),
the debate was primarily over citizenship and property rights of the newly freed slaves. A
discussion about Gypsies, Chinese and Indians also took place in regards to citizenship and
property in order to help better define the purpose of the14th Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act.
It has long been held that marriage is a State issue. You will find no Power that the States
delegated to the Federal government enumerated in Article I, Sec 8.
We must put an end to the continued centralization of Power and Authority to, what we should
now refer to as: A Central Government.
Anyone who knows the history of the Founding knows most of what Congress does (yes, both
Republicans and Democrats) is way out of line with the Compact between the States (in other
words, you and I) and the newly formed government.

If you don't like our Constitution in its true form, then elect those who will offer an amendment
to abolish it, sending it to the States for ratification. Good luck with that! Until then, we must
use it how it was intended.
Lastly, the time is long overdue for the Courts to end their practice of rewriting the purpose of
the 14th Amendment. And yes, in ALL cases, not just this one.
In closing, I'm not sure why non-believers insist that a believer must follow the conscience of
others rather than follow their own conscience.
Every time I see one of those Coexist bumper stickers I chuckle.
Coexistence doesn't mean I must bend to the will of others where I object. I also doesn't mean
they must bend to mine. What it means is that we find a way to accept each other's beliefs
without using the Power and Force of government to trample the other.
What most of the courts are doing is saying that religious liberty, one of the primary reasons for
coming to America, is of lesser importance than marriage.
So what now? I suggest the following:
1. States should put an end to issuing marriage licenses and issuing divorce decrees.
2. States should put an end to civil authority (government) marriages. In other words, no civil
unions.
3. All tax codes, federal and State, should eliminate the married filing jointly and married filing
single tax brackets.
4. Put an end to all earmarks married people get. Again, none, nada.
Summed up, wipe marriage out of every text, law, statute, ordinance, rule...
Ken Rineer
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