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Robert Heck and Dawud Reznik

Religion 5365: Modern Islamic Thought


Dr. Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons
May 2, 2007

The Islamic Thought of Ali Shari’ati and Sayyid Qutb

Introduction 1

Since 9/11, a disproportionate amount of international political rhetoric and

mainstream social science research has focused on “Islamism,” a supposed threat of

unimaginable proportions ready to efface Western civilization if given a chance. “Islamist”

groups from al-Qaeda to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been described as

well-organized networks of international terrorism, collectively known as the “axis of evil.”

Islamic social movements of all types have been lumped under the “Islamist” umbrella term

without regard for their differing ideologies and practices. Praising Allah or asserting the truth

of the Qur’an is enough these days to be de-legitimized as an Islamic “fundamentalist”.

Underlying the Western discourse on “Islamism” is the preconceived notion that political

Islam is inherently antithetical to human development. The basic principles of an Islamic

political worldview are assumed to be mutually exclusive of universal ideals such as democracy,

diversity, equality, and freedom. “Islamism” is thus perceived as an illegitimate submission to

religious dogma that is incapable of producing valid knowledge, technical progress, and just

social order.

At a time of such hysteria, it is important to reflect critically on the varying intellectual

forms of “Islamism.” There are diverse renditions of political Islam that emerge from different

1
This section was co-authored.

1
socio-political-historical contexts; this fact alone negates the homogenizing logic of the Western

discourse on “Islamism.” Furthermore, visions for social change differ from “Islamist” thinker

to thinker, making it critical to engage each on their own terms rather than simply lumping

together (often times contradictory) viewpoints under an overarching umbrella term.

In this vein, the purpose of this paper is to deconstruct the two differing “Islamist”

worldviews of Ali Shari’ati and Sayyid Qutb. The paper will attempt to provide an introduction

to the Islamic thought of these two important radical Muslim intellectuals of the twentieth

century. First the epistemology, methodology, and social ontology of each will be discussed.

Then, a critical comparative analysis will reveal the similarities and differences between their

worldviews, particularly with regard to Islamic practice.

Ali Shari’ati 2

Epistemology

Understanding Shari’ati’s epistemology begins with recognizing his critique of Cartesian

dualism. He describes the Islamic worldview as fundamentally anti-dualist, since it is impossible

for humans to access the unmediated realm of absolute Knowledge, which is only God’s to

behold. For Shari’ati, attempts at achieving epistemological objectivity, contingency-less truth,

and factual purity are misguided and idolatrous.

In particular, Shari’ati criticizes the Western project of positivism for falsely proclaiming

the ability to separate knowledge from its human context. He describes this deceit as a sinful

skirting of social responsibility:

Science has been separated from the fabric of society. It has lost touch with
people’s thoughts. Not being able to criticize the present situation, it… no longer

2
This section was written by Dawud.

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help[s] solve life’s problems… It no longer concern[s] itself with the fate of
society and its ability to control its own destiny and achieve its ideals. 3

Shari’ati chastises the mala, or intellectuals, for aligning themselves with the mutrif, or

exploiting classes. 4 He argues that all science should actively affirm its human interests, rather

than pretending to rise above them. Human knowledge should thus always be recognized as

having been produced through human social relations.

What separates Shari’ati’s epistemological perspective from other critiques of Cartesian

dualism made by the Geisteswissenschaften schools of pragmatism, phenomenology, and

postmodernism is his emphasis on the inherent axiological quality of knowledge. He sees the

inextricable link between subject and object as judgment. In this regard, he believes that

humanity’s defining feature is its ability to approach the world in terms of value:

Value consists of the link that exists between man and any phenomenon,
behavior, act, or condition where a motive higher than that of utility is at issue; it
might be called a sacred tie, as it is bound up with reverence and worship to the
extent that people feel it justifiable to devote or sacrifice their very lives to this
tie…What grants man, a non-material being, an independence from, as well as a
superiority over, all other natural beings is his high regard for value. 5

Shari’ati has thus introduced a new co-founding principle to the standard existentialist doctrine:

it is an ethical existence that precedes essence. All human knowledge, including basic self-

awareness, emerges from a fundamental position relative the universal values of Good and Evil,

or as Shari’ati calls them the “infinitely exalted plus” and “infinitely vile minus.” 6

Using this epistemological framework, Shari’ati argues that all developments in

knowledge, even the supposedly secular rationalism since the Enlightenment, represent a form of

religion as an ethical proposition of faith:

3
Shari’ati, Ali. 1990. School of Thought and Action. Albuquerque, NM: Abjad, pgs. 32-3.
4
Shari’ati, Ali. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam. Oneonta, NY: Mizan Press, p. 33.
5
Shari’ati, Ali. 1980. Marxism and Other Western Fallacies. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, pgs. 26-7.
6
Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 91.

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History knows no era or society which lacks religion. That is, there is no
historical precedence of a non-religious society. There has been no non-religious
human being in any race, in any era, in any phase of social change on any part of
the earth. 7

Since all human knowledge is intrinsically tied to the human knower, and all humans are

religious, all knowledge is thereby necessarily religious.

In short, Shari’ati views the history of thought as a struggle of religious concerns.

Specifically, epistemological conflict through the ages has symbolized the struggle between the

religion of legitimation (shirk/multitheism) and the religion of revolution (tauhid/monotheism).

Multitheism is characterized by idolatry, beliefs in various forms of determinism and

predetermination, and reactionary attempts to conserve the conditions of dualism and inequality

that have pervaded human societies throughout history. Monotheism reflects the prophetic

attempt to destroy all idols, abolish all social hierarchy, and thus construct the Kingdom of God

on earth.

Within this context, Shari’ati distinguishes between Good and Evil using “the

transcendental dimension of human existence” 8 as his defining criteria. The evil multitheists

worship the idols of either the measurably physical (materialism) or the manifestly thinkable

(idealism), without recognizing that neither is as virtuous as the supernatural and supra-logical

spirit of God that can never be fully begotten:

Man’s propensity for what actually exists degrades him. By pursuing values that
do not exist in nature, he is lifted above nature, and the spiritual and essential
development of the species is secured. 9

In other words, Good knowledge emerges from love of existence as a dynamic movement

oriented towards the future, rather than servitude to the idols of the present-past.

7
Shari’ati, Ali. 2003. Religion vs. Religion. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications, p. 20.
8
Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 31.
9
Ibid., p. 100.

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To summarize, Shari’ati’s epistemology posits that all knowledge is inherently value-

laden relative the universal ethics of Good and Evil which join existence in preceding essence.

All knowledge must therefore be situated within the historical struggle between the religions of

legitimation and revolution. Shari’ati thus advances an axiological epistemology that collapses

Cartesian dualism without affirming a subjectivist, “anything-goes” ethical relativism.

Methodology

Consistent with the axiological anti-dualism of his epistemology, Shari’ati prescribes a

methodology of critical hermeneutics. Because only God has universal knowledge of cause and

effect, any attempts at unearthing an absolute semiotics is futile and impossible. Instead,

Shari’ati argues that the only appropriate model for advancing human knowledge is the

continuous interpretation of facts relative to their social construction and religious politics.

Broken down into its constituent parts, Shari’ati’s hermeneutical method involves

“objection, criticism, and the inner choice or selection of the individual.” 10 This process of

negative dialectics emerges from the idol-destroying tradition in Islamic monotheism; one must

seek out and supersede the fundamental contradictions of human thought, since only God’s

thought is complete, infinite, and limitless.

The first part of Shari’ati’s method calls for objecting to any human knowledge that

claims to be universal and free from interpretation: “the necessity of the religion of monotheism

is rebellion, denial, and saying ‘no’ before any other power.” 11 The point here is that Godly

knowledge cannot be humanly beholden, and so any human attempts to build Godly knowledge

10
Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 52.
11
Ibid., p. 39.

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must be resolutely rejected as the construction of a temple of idolatry. In Shari’ati’s words,

“How disgraceful… are all fixed standards. Who can ever fix a standard?” 12

Following the objection to supposedly pure knowledge, human agency must be

recognized as the basis for the production of all human knowledge. Hence Shari’ati advocates a

line of interpretive criticism that traces the construction of knowledge back to the human

presence and power relations. He calls on all monotheists to recognize that “the course… [a

multitheist] has chosen for our humiliation is the best guide for us to choose as the way to our

glory: Returning from the same way that he has led us.” 13 The negation of God that the

multitheist has promoted through an idolatrous claim to value-freedom must thus be itself

negated.

Criticism can only be accomplished by discovering the contradictions and limits to the

knowledge in question, particularly with reference to its axiological quality:

Fixed and motionless forms that have become crystallized into ineffective
“sacred” institutions should be transformed into moving and active elements, with
a clearly defined role in the existential movement of society. 14

This process of recognizing the qualitative aspects of knowledge allows for a nuanced

understanding of the history of any knowledge. In particular, Shari’ati urges the situating of

knowledge relative the political struggle between multitheists and monotheists.

These combined efforts of both objection and criticism ultimately result in a religiously-

vital democratization of knowledge, as persons can only begin to make informed decisions about

faith when idols have been destroyed. Citing the example of the Prophet (PBUH) and his

companions, Shari’ati encourages all to become conscious self-aware mujahideen. 15 He asserts

12
Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 93.
13
Shari’ati, Ali. 1992. Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications, p. 34.
14
Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 29.
15
Ibid., p. 30.

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true belief in God can only be actualized through this process, which comes as a result of

critically interpreting all knowledge:

Correct thought is the prelude to correct knowledge, and correct knowledge is the
prelude to belief; these three taken together are the necessary attributes of an
aware conscience and of any movement that strives in practice and theory for the
attainment of perfection. 16

When knowledge has been negated, critiqued, and situated relative its axiological-religious roots,

the enlightened individual can perform his/her prophetic-like duty of shining the light of

revelation on others so they too can begin to “discern things as they really are.” 17

In short, Shari’ati’s negative dialectical method of critical hermeneutics flips the

mainstream scientific methodology of positive knowledge creation on its head. Instead of

converting human experience into empirical data in order to abstract supposedly objective facts,

critical interpretation grounds all knowledge into its existential constitution: the historical

politics of personal ethics, value, and religion. Representing a truly democratic understanding of

religious faith, Shari’ati’s method calls for criticism of all knowledge in order to attain

consciousness of its limitations and ethical implications. Only then can the individual make the

“dutiful and aggressive passage” 18 to monotheistic faith.

Social Ontology

Shari’ati’s imagery for social order is perhaps the most important element of his

liberation theology. Much of his writings are dedicated to detailing the subtle nuances of tauhid,

or the Islamic concept for the absolute Unity of God, as a social ontology. This metaphor allows

for the indivisibility of humanity without the imposition of abstract structural mechanisms or

systemic metaphors, since all humans are understood to be God’s creation.

16
Ibid., p. 34.
17
Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 12.
18
Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 207.

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As with his discussions of epistemology and methodology, Shari’ati describes tauhid first

by contrasting it from its opposite: shirk, or the legitimation of social inequality based on

multitheistic beliefs and idolatry. Shirk rears its ugly head in both realism and nominalism, the

traditional social ontologies of Western mainstream thought.

Realists conceive of society as a structural whole requiring the assimilation and

integration of its individual parts according to an abstract, mechanistic logic that is supposedly

divorced from human agency. 19 This imagery of society as an autonomous system sui generis

has historically been used by social theorists as a way to control what they perceive to be the

innate chaos and disorder of individuals if left to their “human nature.”

Employing his critical hermeneutical method, Shari’ati rebukes realist social imagery.

He points out the political interests of multitheism as the axiological underpinnings of realist

ontologies that legitimate an assimilatory social order:

It is [multitheism] which continuously denies social power, social control, the


responsibility of human beings in their fate, their expectations and the physical,
spiritual, and instinctive needs of individuals, all to the advantage of the coercive
and wealthy forces. 20

Hence Shari’ati highlights the power interests involved in the Western realist tradition, including

the neo-liberal ideal of the capitalist market as a supposedly neutral arbiter of social life.

Nominalism, on the other hand, posits that only the individual is existentially real, and

thus social ties are simply utilitarian means for achieving self-centered, egocentric ends. This

social Darwinist image of society legitimates a survival of the fittest scenario, whereby

individuals compete for a scarce quantity of resources to survive.

19
Murphy, John W. 1989. Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.
20
Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 58.

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Shari’ati shrewdly points out that the same multitheist interests involved in realism are at

play in promoting nominalism. In his eyes, individualistic social imagery is used as a means to

divide-and-conquer the masses and reinforce the inequalities in society produced by shirk:

It is [also multitheism] which opens separate metaphysical accounts for each of its
members so that through this means, the assembling of people would be
transformed into dispersion and isolation. 21

His point here is that a religion of revolution is thoroughly undermined when the masses are

viewed as self-interested monads competing for individual salvation. Shari’ati also identifies the

undemocratic nature of realist conceptions of history, which are supposedly driven

spontaneously or by elites. This contradicts the model set forth in the Qur’an, which posits that

al-nas, or “the masses,” are actually the ones behind historical change. 22

Thus, according to Shari’ati, the religion of legitimation offers two contradictory images

of social order to keep persons from recognizing their inherent equality as common creations

from God: society as a structural whole constraining its individual parts and society as an

aggregation of autonomous, sovereign atoms. Both of these social ontologies are used by those

who profit from an alienated, fragmented, and unequal society to keep the masses from

recognizing their common existential ancestry in God and consequently effecting revolution.

In opposition to the realist and nominalist metaphors of shirk, Shari’ati defines tauhid as

simply “the unity of nature with metanature, of man with nature, of man with man, of God with

the world and with man.” 23 Shari’ati describes the personage of society as the “Household of

God,” 24 a metaphor which asserts the existential equality of all humanity as the common product

of the divine realm of creation. Tauhid also mandates the liberating framework of praxis, or the

21
Ibid., p. 59.
22
Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 49.
23
Ibid., p. 85.
24
Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 20.

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unity and simultaneity of thought and action. Shari’ati again cites the example of the Prophet

(PBUH) and his companions, who did not “divide up life into two sections, the first consisting

exclusively of talk and the second, exclusively of action.” 25

With tauhid, social order is presupposed between persons without having to resort to the

assimilatory ideals, contractual obligations, or other structural props of realist social imagery. In

other words, humans need not belittle or deny themselves to fit into an autonomous social

totality. Instead, as Shari’ati points out:

The relation of God and man is one of reciprocity, where self-knowledge and
knowledge of God come to be synonymous, or, alternatively, where the former
functions as a preliminary to the latter. 26

Hence in tauhid true actualization of one’s individuality reinforces the inherent sociality of

human existence and the essential unity-in-diversity of God’s creation.

At the same time, however, Shari’ati describes the individual in tauhid as fundamentally

different from the nominalist notion of atomistic, zero-sum sovereignty. In tauhid, the individual

can only recognize his/her uniqueness relative to another, which means having to always see

oneself in reference to the totality of God’s creation. In this manner, Shari’ati argues:

To the extent that the man of tauhid perceives his poverty, he perceives his
wealth; to the extent that he feels humility, he feels a pride, a glory, within
himself; to the extent that he has surrendered to the service of God, he rises
against whatever powers, systems, and relations exist. 27

The point here is that by resisting the zero-sum logic preached by a society of shirk, an

individual remains true to the virtues of God’s creation and realizes tauhid.

Shari’ati lays out a social ontology which manages to collapse dualism while reaffirming

individuality. He refutes the idolatry of worshipping abstract schemes like realist assimilation or

25
Shari’ati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 40.
26
Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 69.
27
Ibid., p. 120.

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nominalist individualism. Instead, persons in society are essentially tied together through their

common creator and can therefore feel secure in actualizing their uniqueness and individuality as

a mutual recognition of tauhid.

Sayyid Qutb 28

Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb also put forth how Islam, as a complete system of

thought and action, could serve as a useful model for liberation. Qutb is widely linked to the rise

of the Muslim Brotherhood and other oppositional Islamic organizations. Like Shari’ati, Qutb

asserted his ideas were true to the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)

and his companions. Yet Qutb’s conclusions widely differ at times. His emphasis is on creating

a just and harmonious Islamic society through instituting Shari’ah, the Divine Law direct from

Allah that “provides the necessary ways and means to overcome any problem.” 29 One of the

main obstacles according to Qutb is the prevalence of jahiliyyah, or the corrupt and immoral

“rebellion against God's sovereignity on earth.” 30 This open hostility towards not only the

imperialism and materialism of the West but the servile mimicry of his own society meant Qutb

ultimately met the same fate as Shari’ati, facing imprisonment and torture by his own

government before being executed in 1966.

Epistemology

To understand Qutb’s Islamist worldview, it is critical to identify first his epistemology

of Islamic truth:

28
This section was written by Robert.
29
Qutb, Sayyid. 1993. Islam and Universal Peace. Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, p. 2.
30
Qutb, Sayyid. 1990. Milestones. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, p. 4.

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Islam’s [epistemological] stand is very clear. It says that the truth is one and
cannot be divided; if it is not the truth, then it must be falsehood. The mixing and
co-existence of the truth and falsehood is impossible. 31

Hence Qutb places knowledge within a Cartesian dualist binary, using the logic of Aristotle

(A=A, B=B, A≠B). The point here is that for Qutb, there is a singularity to truth; it is an

indivisible objective reality or a fully-formed “thing.” Anything outside of this “thing” is

absolutely false, and the objective truth and all the surrounding falsehood are eternally mutually

exclusive.

To this dualist binary Qutb adds an axiological element, seeing religion as “a criterion, to

approve what is good and to discard what is evil.” 32 In other words, Qutb understands

knowledge in an either/or framework of righteous truth and sinful falsity. Within this

framework, Qutb argues the epistemological struggle of truth and falsehood is reflected in the

struggle between Islam, or absolute devotion to Allah, and jahiliyyah, or ignorance born out of

“rebellion against the authority of God” 33 through worship of humans and their constructs

(including knowledge).

For Qutb, only Islam as revealed through and practiced by the Prophet (PBUH) offers

truth, since it has “the purity of the first source of Islamic guidance” 34 Knowledge is only

considered true when it is absolutely divorced from the human knower, in parallel with Allah’s

total sovereignty from humanity and the world. In this sense, the separation between the worldly

realm and the metaphysical is bridged through the revelation of the Qur’an. Through the

complete implementation of Allah’s Divine Law, i.e. Shari’ah, and the subsequent creation of an

31
Ibid., p. 116.
32
Ibid., p. 80.
33
Ibid., p. 4.
34
Ibid., p. 7.

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Islamic society, humanity is given the “ability to contact the eternal source of power, to

comprehend the universe and to harmonize [ourselves] with it.” 35

Since it is directly from Allah, Islamic knowledge is thought to be cleansed from the

subjective contingencies of mortal beings:

The pure law of God cuts through [human] roots and provides a system of laws
which has no human interference, and it is not influenced by human ignorance or
human desire or for the interests of a particular group of people. 36

Even the uncertainty and irrationality that can be thought to underlie the existential human

challenge to believe in Allah is annihilated in Qutb’s Islamic epistemology, since “matters

pertaining to faith had been explained fully.” 37 The complete application of Shari’ah

“automatically” translates to “complete emancipation from all forms of enslavement” 38 and

provides the “necessary ways and means to overcome any problem.” 39

In short, Qutb argues that the only “pure” knowledge is Islamic knowledge as revealed in

the Qur’an and the Prophet’s (PBUH) life, since its divine source transcends the inherently error-

prone nature of all humanly-constructed knowledge. This knowledge is not only pure and true,

but good, natural, and righteous as it submits completely to the epistemological sovereignty of

Allah and does not have the taint of human desires or jahilliyah.

Methodology

Reinforcing his epistemology, Qutb articulates what some Western critical theorists call a

“realist” methodology. 40 Because the human mind is considered to be passive vis-à-vis Allah,

and truth is thought to be an accessible objective reality, “unmediated” knowledge becomes the

35
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 1.
36
Qutb, Milestones., p. 118.
37
Ibid., p. 10.
38
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 27.
39
Ibid., p. 2.
40
Murphy, John W. 1989. Postmodern Social Analysis and Criticism. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.

13
ultimate goal for Qutb. He thus privileges formalized procedures, technical rigor, and

circumscribed parameters over more subjective considerations such as interpretation and socio-

historical analyses.

Specifically, Qutb advocates a literalist return to the divine truth of Allah that was

revealed during the time of the Prophet (PBUH). Strictly literal readings of the Qur’an and

hadith are not only possible, but the mandatory procedure for accessing truth in Qutb’s eyes:

If there is a clear text available from the Qur’an or from [the Prophet (PBUH)],
then that will be decisive and there will be no room for Ijtihad (using one’s
judgement). 41

Only when “clear judgement” is unavailable does Qutb believe that the human being can begin

to turn to interpretation, although strictly within “well-defined principles” that prevent the

infusion of human “opinions and desires” from invalidating the otherwise untainted truth. 42

Hence Qutb’s rendition of ijtihad has no “vagueness or looseness;” it is limited to “a sincere

attempt… to find out the will of God through reference to [the Qur’an] and the teachings of [the

hadith].” 43

Here it is important to note a contradiction: although Qutb argues for a strict literalism, he

does not offer any criteria for assessing the “clarity” of the text nor the “sincerity” of the

interpretation. While he is unmistakably clear on the need for an absolute absence of human

interpretation in Islamic truth-claims formally speaking, Qutb is ironically silent on the criteria

for judging the content of these truth-claims. This is a tautology, or circular logic, since the

“literality” of the text and the validity of the interpretation are thought to be self-evident. Yet

“self-evidence” is a fluid and dynamic rhetorical tool that can be appropriated by anyone.

41
Qutb, Milestones, p. 43.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., p. 80.

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Thus, the text is still left open for interpretation through this circular logic. This allows

Qutb to interpret the Qur’an and hadith with particular lenses and assumptions that he holds—

like sexism, anti-Semitism, and belief in private property—while purporting to use a universal

lens, i.e. the true, literal meaning behind Allah’s message revealed through the Prophet (PBUH).

For example, even though Qutb acknowledges all are equal before Allah, he incorporates his

anti-Semitic views on “world Jewry” into his supposed universal interpretation:

Jews penetrate into body politic of the whole world and then may be free to
perpetuate their evil designs. At the top of the list of these activities is usury, the
aim of which is that all the wealth of mankind end up in the hands of Jewish
financial institutions which run on interest [contradictory to Islamic law]. 44

Since this is also related to Qutb’s imagery of social order, this will be explored in more detail in

the following section on social ontology.

Regardless of these apparent contradictions, there is a methodological aspect of Islamic

life that Qutb presents in a very liberating fashion: jihad. To understand Qutb’s

conceptualization of jihad, it is important to first reflect on his understanding of Islam as praxis.

For Qutb, Islam is always already dialectical between theory and practice, thought and action,

believing and becoming. Rather than simply an abstract, inwardly-focused, and metaphysical-

reaching spirituality, Qutb sees Islam as “a practical religion,” 45 “a dynamic movement which

changes conditions and events,” 46 as well as “a way of life working with actuality.” 47 He asserts

that Muslims are compelled to struggle against injustice and oppression, “whether inflicted upon

Muslims, non-Muslims, allies, or non-allies.” 48 Qutb chastises the “Western concept of

44
Ibid., p. 58.
45
Ibid., p. 15.
46
Ibid., p. 7.
47
Ibid., p. 15.
48
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 73.

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‘religion’” for merely representing “a ‘belief’ in the heart” while Islam relates directly “to the

practical affairs of life.” 49

However, one must first plant “the seed of faith,” 50 in the form of absolute personal

surrender to Allah, before the collective mobilization of Islamic jihad can be undertaken. Only

when the individual has made a conscious decision to attain the purity of the Islamic way can

jihad be said to have begun. In Qutb’s words, Islam is “the spirit of knowing with the intention

of acting upon it,” 51 and thus “the [Islamic] movement should become a real representation and

an accurate mirror of its belief.” 52 Although Islam is dialectical for Qutb, he unfortunately

contradicts this liberating potential by falling back to an atomistic and metaphysical

understanding of individual belief. This paradox will be further discussed in the following

section on Qutb’s social ontology.

Qutb goes on to define jihad as the liberation of a truly democratic space within which

the populace can practice Islam without interference. He points out that while Islam “forbids the

imposition of its belief by force,” every Muslim is expected to work toward the annihilation of:

All of those political and material powers which stand between people and Islam,
which force one people to bow before another people and prevent them from
accepting the sovereignty of God. 53

In this sense, jihad “has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in

which it is conducted,” 54 since it is not governed by a logic of seeking political power, natural

resources, or any other materialist aim, nor is it practiced through primarily military means.

Instead, jihad is a personal and collective existential struggle of resistance in refusing to bow

49
Qutb, Milestones, p. 37.
50
Ibid., p. 32.
51
Ibid., p. 12.
52
Ibid., p. 20.
53
Ibid., p. 28.
54
Ibid.

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before any power other than Allah, including a rejection of the intersectional matrix of

domination that Qutb describes as “political power which rests on a complex yet interrelated

ideological, racial, class, social and economic support.” 55

With this rendition of jihad, Qutb appears to transcend some of realism in his Islamic

methodology. For instance, contrary to his aforementioned reification of ijtihad, Qutb proclaims

that absolute “obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of [idol] worship” 56 which must be

eschewed through jihad. Hence prayer practices, cultural rituals, and religious traditions are not

to be followed blindly, since “all the people of the earth should be free of servitude to anyone

other than God.” 57 Qutb also argues that jihad is “not a temporary phase but… the eternal

struggle for the freedom of man.” 58 This description of jihad as a permanent revolution can

potentially counter previous notions that the Islamic way is pre-given and prescribed. Yet

whether Qutb ultimately takes advantage of this potential will be further discussed in the

following section on his social ontology.

To summarize, then, Qutb’s Islamic methodology involves a pre-occupation with

literalism. He attempts to limit Islam to a “clear” and “sincere” emulation of the explicit laws

and rituals revealed in the Qur’an and practiced by the Prophet (PBUH). However, he does not

offer any standards or criteria for assessing the clarity or sincerity of Islamic practice, thus

leaving open the possibility for power interests to interpret according to their own interests.

Nevertheless, Qutb offers a vision of Islamic jihad which calls for revolutionary action from all

idolatry, including political power and the worship of technique. Hence there is a clear tension

in Qutb’s Islamic methodology between realism in form and humanist praxis in content.

55
Ibid., p. 29.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., p. 30-1.

17
Social Ontology

Finally, it is important to discuss Qutb’s Islamic social ontology as it relates to his

epistemology and methodology. Although much of his writing reflects concern for the Islamic

community as a whole, Qutb expresses a nominalist understanding of the human condition.

Typical of those who believe in nominalism, Qutb then calls for realist measures to ensure social

stability since individuals, conceptualized in an atomistic and inherently negative fashion, are

thought to be in need of an overarching social structure to bind them together.

The first element of Qutb’s nominalism emerges in his description of belief and faith.

Repeatedly he stresses the importance of purifying persons’ individual hearts, hence

appropriating a metaphor which physiologically separates human beings as existential atoms.

Qutb separates the public and private spheres of life, asserting “relationships of understanding

are one thing and daily business is something else.” 59 This creates the conceptual space for

individuals to be ontologically divorced from the social world in which they exist.

Given such nominalist tendencies, Qutb advocates a realist social order predicated on the

sovereignty of Allah:

All affairs have been submitted to the laws of God and the society as a whole is
willing to accept the just division of wealth prescribed by Him, and every
individual of the society…firmly believes that this system has been legislated by
God Almighty. 60

“This system” is Shari’ah, which Qutb believes to be universal and directly handed down

from Allah, in keeping with Qutb’s dualist epistemology and supposed literalist

methodology:

[Allah] who has created the universe and man, and who made man obedient to the
laws which also govern the universe, has also prescribed a Shari’ah for his
voluntary actions. If man follows this law, then his life is in harmony with his
59
Ibid., p. 8.
60
Ibid., p. 21.

18
own nature. From this point of view, this Shari’ah is also a part of that universal
law which governs the entire universe, including the physical and biological
aspects of man. 61

Hence, Allah is constructed not in the manner Shari’ati argues for, i.e. the relationality and unity

of all social living, but as the ultimate ontological being abstracted from existence. Such

imagery allows for an ontological force ordering atomistic individuals from above and outside

the social milieu of humanity in order to keep “total harmony between human life and the law of

the universe... living in accord with its laws and its movements.” 62 As Qutb mentions

throughout his works, persons should live with the understanding that they are under the constant

surveillance of Allah, the absolute metaphysical arbiter of social existence.

Qutb’s vision of all humanity consolidated under the rule of a sovereign is thought to

transcend and neutralize more “worldly” divisions across contemporary societies. He sees the

Islamic “community of belief” 63 as moving beyond all previous “low associations” 64 of identity,

whether class, race, language, or nationality:

The homeland of the Muslim, in which he lives and which he defends, is not a
piece of land; the nationality of the Muslim, by which he is identified, is not the
nationality determined by a government; the family of the Muslim, in which he
finds solace and which he defends, is not blood relationships; the flag of the
Muslim, which he honors and under which he is martyred, is not the flag of a
country; and the victory of the Muslims, which he celebrates and for which he is
thankful to God, is not a military victory. 65

In other words, truly Islamic society will bring together peoples across their humanly-

constructed divisions into a new sense of community predicated on submission to the law and

order of Allah. Here one sees the tension in Qutb’s methodology once again, for although such a

re-conceptualization of identity is more in-tune with Qutb’s notions of jihad as praxis, i.e. you

61
Ibid., p. 45.
62
Ibid, p. 46.
63
Ibid., p. 43.
64
Ibid., p. 78.
65
Ibid., p. 45.

19
are what you do and practice, Muslim identity refers back in the end to a rigid, narrow, and

literalist definition of a supposedly universal Islamic practice.

Ultimately, Qutb seeks a totalizing social system that would reflect the “Will,” “Power,”

and “Law” of Allah 66 :

Total harmony between human life and the law of the universe is entirely
beneficial for mankind, as this is the only guarantee against any kind of discord in
life. Only in this state will they be at peace with themselves and at peace with the
universe, living in accord with its laws and its movements. In the same way, they
will have peace of mind, as their actions will agree with their true natural
demands, with no conflict between the two. Indeed, the Shari’ah of God
harmonizes the external behavior of man with his internal nature in an easy way.
When a man makes peace with his own nature, peace and cooperation among
individuals follow automatically, as they all live together under one system. 67

Similar to Thomistic natural law principles that were used to legitimate the Christendom model

in Europe during the Middle Ages, individuals are simply part of a larger “system,” which for

Qutb is Islamic society with Shari’ah. As previously stated, this system is thought to be able to

function independent of humanity even though it is nothing more than social relations, a product

of human practices and ideas. Yet Qutb frequently asserts this system is not composed of “man-

made laws.” 68 Shari’ah was not created through historical and political contestation but by

direct “legislation from Allah.” 69 Through absolute submission to a theocratic code of laws, the

individual will be in a state of peace with society, and in turn society with the rest of the natural

universe. All of the possible conflicts that would occur within an Islamic society under Shari’ah

are thus neutralized, since they are thought to simply be part of the natural order of the rule of

Allah.

66
Ibid., p. 83.
67
Ibid., p. 84.
68
Ibid., p. 11.
69
Ibid.

20
An unfortunate effect of conceptualizing social order so individuals are simply a part of a

larger system that impinges upon them is that people can be easily sacrificed in order ensure the

continuation of the harmonious operation of the system. This is typified in Qutb’s failure to

critique the capitalist economic relations. Private property, which Shari’ati identifies as a basis

for shirk since it creates hierarchies and encourages greed, does not contradict the Islamic

principles of equality and justice for Qutb. Although Qutb attacks the boundless greed that he

identifies with the West, he sanctifies private property and the modern division of labor as

“freedom to express individuality” 70 and a “legitimate and justified… individual right” 71 despite

the wage slavery and class hegemony that capitalism produces. This is because the divinely

inspired “Islamic laws governing property… conform to human nature [and] safeguard the

society and the individual from class friction.” 72 Qutb appropriates other neoliberal principles

when comparing an Islamic believer to “the holder of a precious stone,” 73 reducing faith to being

“the only commodity in demand” in “God’s market,” 74 and describing the community of

Muslims as “mere workers for God” who receive just remuneration and have no right to question

the nature of their “endeavor.” 75

In similar fashion, Qutb’s social ontology constantly invokes the supposed universality of

the Islamic community, asserting that Islam “commands unqualified tolerance towards all human

beings.” 76 However, he argues that the allowing women to work outside the home is prohibited

by Shari’ah. Qutb even goes so far to contradict his supposed literalist methodology since there

is no explicit mention of this in the Qur’an:

70
Ibid., p. 75.
71
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 66.
72
Ibid.
73
Qutb, Milestones, p. 132.
74
Ibid., p. 137.
75
Ibid., p. 142.
76
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 74.

21
There must be one captain to every ship. In family life likewise there must be a
leader who assumes the responsibility and brings about order and discipline. In
Islamic logic, the choice of this leader is simple, as we have to choose between
the wife who is naturally adapted to the task of motherhood and the man who is
responsible for the support of the family. Leadership is assigned here to the man
for this reason and because he is the more fit owning to his natural role in life. 77

“Free mixing of the sexes” is likewise prohibited because “sexual urges are so powerful they

cannot be sublimated by constant exposure to temptation.” 78 Qutb’s sexism is buttressed by his

social ontology since he believes allowing women to work outside of the home and mixing with

men contravenes natural roles, results in “moral depravity,” and upsets the harmonious social

balance created by an Islamic society. 79

And finally, Qutb’s social ontology requires a “vanguard” group which has the ability to

see beyond “the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world” 80 and lead

the people “in order that they come of darkness into light and may get rid of their miserable

condition.” 81 This group of prophetic-like visionaries is required to at once “keep itself aloof

from [the] all-encompassing Jahiliyyah” in the world today while simultaneously keeping “some

ties with it.” 82 The promotion of a vanguard contradicts the otherwise unified social system that

Qutb presents. Yet Qutb argues it is a necessity since those “who have understood [pure]

Islam” 83 have a responsibility of upholding the supposedly “natural” order under the guidance

and supervision of Allah.

In conclusion, Qutb conceptualizes Islam in a nominalist fashion, arguing that the

atomistic individual is the indivisible unit of existence. To mitigate this nominalism, he employs

77
Ibid., p. 31.
78
Ibid., p. 33.
79
Ibid., p. 55.
80
Qutb, Milestones, p. 6.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.

22
realist imagery of a social order imposed from above and outside of human agency by Allah

through the Shari’ah. Like Islamic knowledge and method, the Shari’ah is considered pure and

untainted by human political interests. Therefore, Qutb believes that its implementation will lead

to a harmoniously-integrated social system that will achieve universal peace and natural order,

despite the many possible inequities and social problems that are glossed over in the process.

Comparisons and Conclusions 84

As the preceding accounts of the Islamic thought of Shari’ati and Qutb reveal, there are

different epistemologies, methodologies, and social ontologies within “Islamism.” Although

both scholars believed in the inextricable intertwining of Islam and politics, their visions

diverged fundamentally regarding what Islamic knowledge constitutes, how Islam should be

actualized, and what an Islamic social order entails. In this section, a review of the specific

points of similarity and difference between Shari’ati and Qutb will lead to some conclusions

about how “Islamist” movements can dialectically synthesize the thought of both in their

everyday activities toward liberation.

Epistemologically speaking, Shari’ati and Qutb represent the two sides of the centuries-

old debate on dualism. While Shari’ati espouses a rejection of the separation between knower

and the known, Qutb appropriates dualist binaries in abstracting the Qur’an and hadith as divine

knowledge that transcends all subjective contingencies. While both include an axiological

component to their understandings of truth, Shari’ati’s criteria for Good and Evil is in fact the

post-modern condition wherein there are limitless truths. Qutb, on the other hand, sees truth as a

84
This section was co-authored, with all references to Shari’ati written by Dawud and all references to
Qutb written by Robert.

23
reality sui generis, a universal and totalizing singularity that is forever mutually exclusive from

the evil and sinful falsehood outside the Truth.

With regard to methodology, Shari’ati and Qutb reveal important similarities in their

politicization of Islam, but diverge in their Islamic hermeneutics. For both, praxis is the key to

true Islam; Islam is always already a political project that is both theoretical and practical. In

fact, both Shari’ati and Qutb go a step further in articulating Islam as a permanent revolution of

unifying all humanity within absolute monotheism. The terms of this monotheism, however, are

where the two disagree: while Shari’ati’s methodology employs a negative dialectic that would

invalidate the elevation of any human interpretation over another, Qutb champions a literal

rendering of the Qur’an and hadith by a vanguard of Muslim scholars that includes himself.

Hence both seek the Islamization of the world, but the consequences of such a project are

radically different.

These differences in the epistemologies and methodologies between Shari’ati and Qutb

ultimately manifest in fundamentally different imageries of social order. Shari’ati consistently

invokes the notion of tauhid to symbolize the fundamental unity of existence (humanity and

nature) with Allah; instead, Qutb emphasizes the sovereignty and thus separation of Allah from

all creation. In this sense, Qutb abstracts Allah above and outside human relationality as an

ontological being that can somehow be begotten by human consciousness yet is not beholden. A

human construct—including the conscious objectification of Allah—becomes a thing for

worship, sacrifice, and surrender. Such reification would be considered idolatry in the social

ontology of Shari’ati.

The similarities and differences between the Islamic thought of Shari’ati and Qutb are

perhaps most evident and meaningful, however, in their practical implications. By all accounts

24
both were practicing Muslims (albeit one Shi’a and the other Sunni). And both had harsh

criticisms for the way they saw most Muslims worldwide treating Islam as empty idealism

without material consequence or significance. For instance, Shari’ati was not shy in condemning

Islam as practiced by the majority of Muslims, calling it “tightly bound, overly ritualized, [and]

socio-politically castrated.” 85 Qutb echoed such sentiments, proclaiming that:

It is necessary to revive that Muslim community which is buried under the debris
of the man-made traditions of several generations, and which is crushed under the
weight of those false laws and customs which are not even remotely related to the
Islamic teachings, and which, in spite of all this, call itself the “world of Islam.” 86

Hence both Shari’ati and Qutb seemed to understand Islam in a radically different manner than

the political mainstream in their times, a fact that was substantiated by the ways they were

brutally attacked for their views.

However, their views on Islamic practice diverge from this point forward. Shari’ati

argues that a lack of critical interpretations and democratic debate has stifled Islam; he notes that

the Qur’an has been converted into a “storehouse of scientific and technical information” rather

than a “human, historical, and intellectual movement.” 87 For Shari’ati, the worst possible

direction for Islam to take is a fetish over tradition, since that would reflect “multitheism hid[ing]

behind the mask of monotheism.” 88 His key concern was that religious scholars not usurp their

powerful positions in society to negate the public’s ability to actively participate in interpreting

dynamically the meanings and principles within the Qur’an:

By preventing people from studying the Qur’an and thinking about it, religious
scholars made it into a book so that only its form remained for the people. Its
spirit, purpose and aim remain unknown. They turned it into phrases and verses
of secret words without their meaning being understood. 89

85
Shari’ati, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals, p. 11.
86
Qutb, Milestones, p.3.
87
Shari’ati, School of Thought and Action, p. 24.
88
Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 36.
89
Shari’ati, School of Thought and Action, p. 34.

25
For Shari’ati, a hyper-emphasis on the purity of practice in Islam mirrors the problems of the

secular movement of Western positivist science in its standardization, formalism, and technical

rigor.

Relating this attitude to the “five pillars” of Islam, Shari’ati offers a fundamental break

with tradition. For instance, although he does not critique the rituals that accompany salat,

Shari’ati expands and re-conceptualizes it:

Since worship, when conscious and heartfelt, becomes a manifestation of all


absolute sacred values, the worshipper nourishes these values in a relative human
mode in his own being. 90

The practice of prayer thus becomes less a matter of technique and more an issue of the

destruction of idols through one’s actions. In this manner, prayer can be as varied in its formal

manifestations as the historical circumstances and multitheistic idols that Muslims face, since

“whether you consider yourself responsible to the people or to God, in practice, our work is the

same, our responsibility, the same.” 91

Shari’ati recognizes that zakat, the outlawing of riba, and other traditional forms of

wealth redistribution in Islam, no matter how efficient or progressive, will not be able to resolve

the systemic inequalities and class hegemony produced by capitalist modes of economic

relations. Thus Shari’ati actively promotes the abolishment of private property as a necessary

part of Islamic faith, proclaiming that “true Islam is true socialism.” 92 He refutes the notions of

“God’s property” that currently are used to legitimate an Islamic variant of capitalism:

“Wealth belongs to God” and God has given it (in trust) to the people…
[Property] is not the property of special individuals. Rather, it is property which
belongs to the people. God is the owner of property, that is, the owner of the
property is the people because the people and God are in one front as “people are

90
Shari’ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, p. 86.
91
Shari’ati, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals, p. 34.
92
Shari’ati, Religion vs. Religion, p. 6.

26
of the family of God.” It is clear that the guardian of the family is in the same
front as his own family. 93

Here Shari’ati invalidates arguments for a narrowly-defined Islamic economic system that

perpetuates private property relations given his belief in the tauhid of Allah that should manifest

in the indivisibility of humanity and its economic resources.

Although Qutb claims that Islam “encourages the individual to use his mind and body

and does not substitute ritual for rules to govern behavior,” 94 Qutb’s epistemology, methodology,

and social ontology nearly completely contradict Shari’ati’s. These contradictions are

exemplified in Qutb’s actively seeking a return to rigid Islamic traditional practices derived from

literalist interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith. Qutb often issues narrowly specific fatwa-like

declarations in his writings on specific matters ranging from conflict resolution to gender roles.

For example, he mandates the following of the traditionally prescribed three day waiting period

after disagreeing with a fellow Muslim. 95 Women are permitted the “privilege of beautifying

themselves in ways that are forbidden to men… for finery may cause effeminate behavior in

men.” 96 While Shari’ati does not fall into the trap of advocating mere reformist economic

measures, Qutb fails to deviate from the traditional inadequate forms of wealth redistribution like

centralized banking, nationalization of resources, prohibition of interest, and numerous taxes.

Even though he advocates supposedly radical principles of social justice like Shari’ati that would

theoretically lend support for socialist modes of economic relations, the form is continually

privileged over the content for Qutb.

Unlike Shari’ati, for whom there was no romantic past to which Muslims should turn for

guidance, Qutb argues that “we must return to [the era of the “Qur’anic generation”] with a sense

93
Ibid., p. 47.
94
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 3.
95
Ibid., p. 24.
96
Ibid., p. 20.

27
of instruction for obedience and action.” 97 While Shari’ati emphasizes that we too can struggle

with conviction just as the Prophet (PBUH) and his companions, Qutb’s fetishism of this “golden

age” of Islam leads him to claim that “no other generation of this caliber was ever gain to be

found... even in the entire history of man.” 98

In Qutb’s eyes, “the entire range of human activity” 99 is circumscribed by “the Divinely-

ordained method” 100 of Shari’ah:

Its system extends into all aspects of life; it discusses all minor or major affairs of
mankind; it orders man's life—not only in this world but also in the world to
come… it penetrates through the whole system of life, which is a practical
interpretation of this faith. By this means, those who believe are already pleased
with the system which this faith uniquely determines and submit in principle to all
the laws and injunctions and details even before they are declared. Indeed, the
spirit of submission is the first requirement of the faith. Through this spirit of
submission the believers learn the Islamic regulations and laws with eagerness
and pleasure.

Islam is conceptualized not as a liberating framework that guides one’s life with noble and just

principles but as a system that imposes itself and which individuals must conform to. Thus, the

radical potential Qutb identifies for Islam, that it “does not tolerate oppression” and “all humans

are equal before the law,” 101 is ultimately annulled through his dualist epistemology, literalist

methodology, and nominalist social ontology.

In conclusion, Islam is often characterized as having two main traditions: a reactionary

and conservative “Islamism” that is backwards and harsh, and a “progressive” form of Islam that

attempts to assimilate its practices and beliefs into Western modernity. However, the preceding

comparative analysis of Qutb and Shari’ati reveals that modern Islamic thought potentially offers

more than previously considered. Through making a sort of “post-modern turn,” Shari’ati does

97
Qutb, Milestones, p. 9.
98
Ibid., p. 6.
99
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 3.
100
Qutb, Milestones, p. 19.
101
Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, p. 73.

28
not have to reject principles of social justice for fear of not conforming to the mandates of

history. Indeed, for Shari’ati the struggle between shirk and tauhid is a historical one, and

therefore he seeks the dialectical “way out” of the contemporary situation of sin.

Without rejecting or undermining Islamic identity and/or practice, Shari’ati asserts a new

type of Islam that is centered on the obligation not to worship idols. As he so brilliantly

illustrates, true monotheism is always already a paradoxical solution to the ever-worsening

existential crisis of humanity, since only through the complete surrendering to the irrational and

unknown can humanity hope to transcend the labyrinth of multitheism in which it has lost itself.

For Shari’ati, the moment of pure tauhid in Islam is yet to be found, for it has no precedent in the

past or manifestation in the present; it can only therefore be realized in the future. His poetic

words are an inspiration to all, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to carry the torch of Islamic

revolution forward ceaselessly through a denial and rejection of all worldly possessions/desires:

Make your land a sacred area


For you are in the sacred area.
Make your age a sacred time
For you are in the sacred time.
Make the earth into a sacred mosque
For you are in the Masjid al-Haram.
For “the earth is God’s mosque”
And you see that:
It is not. 102

On the other hand, Qutb’s writings seem to embody many of the philosophical

assumptions in the Western tradition of neo-liberalism. This is ironic since Western neo-liberals

have been some of the most responsible for constructing the false “good Muslim, bad Muslim”

dichotomy in modern Islam. Although certainly arriving at different conclusions, both Qutb and

neo-liberals typify dualist epistemology, realist methodology, and nominalist social order. Qutb

102
Shari’ati, Hajj:Reflections on its Rituals, p. 255.

29
thus sees history as an autonomous force of development, as evidenced by his celebration of

modernity:

This was the era during which Europe’s genius created its marvelous works in
science, culture, law, and material production, due to which mankind has
progressed to great heights of creativity and material comfort. 103

In this sense, Qutb simply seeks to reform modern “progress” so that it is controlled by Islamic

Shari’ah law, never once questioning the sinful roots of the Western project which surely

manifest in its resulting products.

And herein lies perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two thinkers.

Although it is difficult to sense the pain and suffering that Qutb must have felt during his

repeated tortures by the Egyptian government, he did indeed espouse a worldly grasp of power

which is precisely the bane of Islam in Shari’ati’s eyes. For Qutb, Muslims should “feel superior

to others when weak, few, and poor, as well as when strong, many, and rich.” 104 In this sense,

Qutb separated the material “benefits” of modernity from Islamic ideals, while Shari’ati

consistently recognized the dialectical nature of idealism and materialism. Qutb, although

expressing ambivalence at times about worldly authority, still advocated for Islamic “dominance

in the world,” 105 a notion that Shari’ati categorically rejected as idolatrous.

Therefore, in the end, while both Shari’ati and Qutb are inspirational in their calls for

“Islamist” praxis, it is ultimately the former whose thought reveals fewer contradictions and a

wider range of possibilities for effecting human liberation. A more penetrating biographical-

historical account of the two might reveal material reasons for their differences, including a

nuanced discussion of the comparable severity of their mistreatments and the social location of

their families/upbringings within two differing contexts of intersectional domination.

103
Qutb, Milestones, p. 3.
104
Ibid., p. 127.
105
Ibid., p. 147.

30
Regardless, however, what is clear is that while Shari’ati leaves the reader with a sense of

limitless world-openness, Qutb’s proposed solutions to the crises in modern Islam feel far more

stifling. An appropriation of Qutb’s unsurpassed passion and revolutionary spirit within the

epistemological, methodological, and social ontological framework of Shari’ati’s worldview

would represent perhaps the greatest possible synthesis in modern Islamic thought.

References

Qutb, Sayyid. 1993. Islam and Universal Peace. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications.

------. 1990. Milestones. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications.

------. 1980. This Religion of Islam. Salimiah, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation
of Student Organizations.

Shari’ati, Ali. 2003. Religion vs. Religion. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications.

------. 1992. Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals. Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications.

------. 1990. School of Thought and Action. Albuquerque, NM: Abjad.

------. 1980. Marxism and Other Western Fallacies. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press.

------. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam. Oneonta, NY: Mizan Press.

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