Assess the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. What impact did it have upon the region?

In the past few years the international community has been under considerable stress due to
increasing hostility and turmoil, starting in the Middle East but reaching North Africa and more
recently Europe. In the midst of it all, the Arab Spring what it appeared to be a beacon of hope for
democracy, has descended four years later into a sum of dire states, with Libya at the centre of a
new growing threat to its neighbours and to the West (The Economist, 2015). The question four
years later, thus, is how the so-called successful Libyan intervention of 2011 (Ban Ki-Moon, 2012: 53)
became the heart of destabilization after a promising start post-intervention that aligned with the
successful path of Tunisia and Egypt (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 1).
In this essay I will assess what appeared to be a successful NATO intervention in the midst of the
Libyan revolution, from the establishment of the no-fly zone (Bartu, 2014: 3) to the promising end of
the military campaign (Chivvis, 2012: 69) and the events that followed the intervention. Through my
assessment of the intervention I will seek to demonstrate that despite wide initial appraisal for the
campaign as a model intervention (Kuperman, 2015), the verdict has been premature. In the
sequent years, Libya has descended into a country in which the rebels who were once united
against Muammar Gaddafi and who were supported by the Western coalition, are now ideologically
divided and fighting for the control of the country (Chothia, 2015) as a result of an intervention who
failed to secure the country and left the transition to democracy in rebel hands (The Economist,
2015).
In order to reach my argument, I will start by determining the nature of the NATO intervention in
Libya whether it was a case of responsibility to protect (R2P) or a case of pragmatic humanitarian
intervention as Pape (2012) considers it. Once I have established its nature, I will move on to
providing a brief account of the events that led to intervention and the role NATO in general, and
Britain and France in particular have had in the unfolding of the crisis. Having acquired knowledge of
1

the Libyan revolution itself, I will then weight the literature that praises the intervention as a success
against less favourable arguments and pieces of evidence (Berman and Michaelsen, 2012). Next, in
order to give weight to the less favourable views, I will bring forward the literature on how the
intervention in Libya has affected not only the country itself but also its immediate neighbours
(Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 4). Finally, in the conclusion, I will sustain that Libya was a unique case for
NATO interventions and not a standard, proof being the non-intervention in Syria, before I reach the
conclusion that despite initial appraisal, only four year after the operation, Libya can be considered a
failed intervention about to become a failed state (Kuperman, 2015).
To begin with, in this first section of the paper, I will discuss the nature of the NATO intervention in
Libya 2011 by giving accounts of the pillars that constitute the two competing views that claim the
nature of the Libyan operation R2P and pragmatic humanitarian intervention.
Having a sound retrospective of previous international crises and seeking to avoid new occurrences
in which an authoritarian regime fails its civilians and turns against them, the United Nations (UN)
World Summit of 2005 has unanimously adopted R2P as a standard against genocide and mass
atrocities (Bellamy, 2010: 143). Resting on three pillars1, the principle of R2P was endorsed by the
UN2 on the idea that states, along with the international community bear a responsibility to protect
people from deliberate atrocities (Dunne and Gifkins, 2011) such as those in Libya 2011. The
principle goes beyond the concept of humanitarian intervention by emphasizing the states
responsibility to protect its own people, and by empowering the international community in aiding

The three pillars of R2P as summarised in Bellamy (2010: 143):

(1) the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from the four crimes of genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from their incitement; (2) the international
communitys responsibility to assist a state to fulfill its RtoP; and (3) the international communitys
responsibility to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, in cases where the state
has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more of the four crimes
2

For a deeper understanding of R2P see: UNGA (2009) Implementing the responsibility to protect, A/63/677,
Available online: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/SGRtoPEng%20(4).pdf, (accessed 23/03/2015).

the states in this regard or in taking military action when the state threatens with genocide and mass
atrocities (Bellamy, 2010: 143).
Such was the case when the Libyan crises occurred in 2011. It was not since the Rwanda genocide
that a regime was so firm and clear in its intent to commit a crime against humanity Gaddafis
speeches3 standing proof of his intentions (Bellamy, 2011: 265; Lynch, 2011: 68) along with his wellknown resistance to the West ideology made the perfect case for the UN to bring forward the R2P
norm (not before being confronted with sanctions, frozen assets, and a threats for a trial at the ICC)
(Gazzini, 2011: 7; 9). Although being met with initial resistance by some UNSC members, the
intervention in Libya was eventually approved and NATO assumed command of operations on March
27th, aiding protestors and conducting the operations and air strikes with such precision that the
collateral damage was minimised (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012: 3) and later on the intervention was
deemed as a success for the R2P principle which was invoked by the UN only for the second time
after its establishment (Dunne and Gifkins, 2011).
Although the international community is considering the intervention in Libya as implementation of
R2P, there is certain criticism worth noting and which reconsiders the intervention in terms of
humanitarian intervention. Pape (2012) makes the case that the coalition intervention between
NATO and Arab allies in Libya 2011 resonated more with what he calls pragmatic humanitarian
intervention (Pape, 2012: 43). Unlike R2P, this practice requires (a) an ongoing campaign of mass
homicide on behalf of the local government; (b) a viable plan of intervention whose death toll is not
higher than in peace time operations; and (c) a strategy for lasting local security (Pape, 2012: 43).
Such a practice would not need a clear declaration from the government on its intentions of mass
atrocities, nor would it violate state sovereignty4 in any other way than to help self-determination of

any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed. ABC News (2011) Defiant Gaddafi issues
chilling threat, Available online: http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3146582.htm, (accessed
23/03/2015).
4
[T]he responsibility to protect (R2P) standardis wrong for the opposite reasons. R2P sets the bar for
intervention so low that virtually every instance of anarchy and tyrannyor indeed, every potential instance
represents an opportunity for the international community to violate the sovereignty of states. At the same

local population, this only happening after having a viable plan for intervention (Pape, 2012: 43).
Under such condition, Libya 2011 met the standard for pragmatic humanitarian intervention, not
only because there was evidence of genocide, but also because it was a viable plan NATO secured
the population with minimum costs both economically and humanly (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 4),
and it left Libya in the hands of its own people for statebuilding (Chothia, 2015).
Moving forward, after having considered both possible natures of the intervention, I am arriving at
the conclusion that despite Papes compelling argument, the NATO intervention in Libya was indeed
R2P. It required the clear intention of Muammar Gaddafi to kill its own people and pressure from
the Arab League and Security Council members in order to set in motion the UNs decision to take
action (Chivvis, 2012: 71). Furthermore, it did try initially to make Gaddafi reconsider his actions
(Gazzini, 2011). Moreover, the extent to which under R2P principle the intervener should be
involved in rebuilding society is as far as the nation needs it, and in 2011, post-operation situation in
Libya seemed under control and following the path of the Arab Spring transition to democracy
(Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 1), which is why it did not violate sovereignty to any other lengths.
Having established the nature of Libya 2011, I continue to analyse it by establishing the rate of
success it has had during and after operations ended.
Progressing in assessing the Libyan intervention, I will now provide a brief background of the 2011
events before I move on to discussing their implications for Libya and the region. As stated in the
introduction, the revolution in Libya evolved as a result of a wave of rebellion sweeping across
Maghreb (Chivvis, 2012: 69) and intervention was needed not only to demonstrate support for the
Arab Spring movement but also to stop the massacre of the Benghazi protestors by Gaddafi and to
avoid a more serious humanitarian crisis as refugees would have fled to Egypt of Tunisia5 (Chivvis,

time, R2P demands ambitious nation building to replace state institutions, which would create virtually
unbounded obligations to help foreigners regardless of expense (Pape, 2012: 43).
5
Both countries were at the time coping with their own Arab Spring revolution.

2012: 79). After initial reluctance from the United States and even European states6, the UN initially
adopted Resolution 1970, which condemned Gaddafis attacks on civilians, demanded cease of
violent actions, and established an arms embargo and a travel ban resolution that the Libyan
leader breached and ignored (Bellamy, 2011: 265; Berman and Michaelsen, 2012: 350). The
realisation that sanctions and diplomatic approach will not protect civilians led to the adoption of
Resolution 1973 on March 17th, authorising the use of force7 for the protection of civilians for the
first time by the UNSC and approving a no-fly zone over Libya (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 594;
Bellamy, 2011: 263). Two days later a multi-state coalition began the military campaign, with NATO
taking control in late March over the arms embargo and the no-fly zone, but leaving ground
operations to the coalition forces (Berman and Michalesen, 2012: 349).
It is worth noting that the entire intervention has benefitted of two key supporters both in striving
for action and in carrying part of the costs of ground intervention. Despite NATOs command,
France8 and the United Kingdom are the ones who kept Libya on the table and had a say in handing
the intervention over to NATO9. Sarkozy and Cameron maintained a firm position and later on
Obama joined them in statements demanding R2P (Chivvis, 2012: 71-2; 82; Fermor, 2013: 332; 335).
It was Britain and France that submitted a no-fly zone resolution draft (Hilsum, 2012: 198; Pargeter,
2012: 234) and it was the French who fired first and who sent in jets along with the US drone and it
was the British who operated on the ground with Qatari special forces and who gave tactical advice
to rebel units (Hilsum, 2012: 200; Gazzini, 2011: 3) thus voluntarily helping alleviate the harm
Gaddafi was imposing on his people and involuntarily helping the rebels overthrow him10.

The Libyan crisis happened also on the background of US post-Afghanistan and Iraq (two very costly wars)
and on the background of European financial crisis (Chivvis, 2012: 69).
7
Authorization of all necessary measures to prevent further assaults (Fermor, 2013: 337).
8
France was reluctant to give NATO command it has played a major role in generating momentum for the
intervention (Chivvis, 2012: 71-2).
9
Mainly due to US diplomatic pressure on the matter.
10
Fact that led later in 2011 to his capture and execution by the rebel units despite the fact that no such claims
were made by the UN when adopting R2P as intervention.

Critics of the intervention have suggested that British and French intervention in Libya was in fact an
act of self-interest, concealed under the R2P umbrella. Given the proximity of Libya, British arms
producers export throughout the region, thus being responsible for supplying Libya in a period of
turmoil. Moreover, companies like BP and Exxon Mobil were active in Libya and a change of
leadership could have been beneficial for business. Also, securing Libya rich in hydrocarbon, oil
reserves, and natural gas would have been a smart move for easier access to resources usually
found in the Gulf area and it would have pleased the Arab League which also strived for intervention
(Hilsum, 2012: 187-8; Fermor, 2013: 339-41).
Regardless of the motives behind intervention, NATOs R2P mission was considered a success from
many points of view (Ban Ki-Moon, 2012: 53). It has successfully averted a bloodbath in Benghazi, it
helped eliminate the dictatorial regime, and it was conducted under a coalition between NATO and
Arab allies (Kuperman, 2013: 1). Furthermore, the air campaign was conducted so effectively that
collateral damages were minimal, all accomplished with no allied casualty and at a costs that
represented a fraction of the budget for Balkans or Afghanistan and Iraq (Daalder and Stavridis,
2012: 3; Chivvis, 2012: 78; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 4). Another big success were the first democratic
elections in Libya 2012, bringing in office a secular coalition government after decades of
dictatorship under Gaddafi, while all in all the NATO mission accomplished its immediate objectives
with a superb execution (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 4; Kuperman, 2013: 3). Moreover, compared to
neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt also transitioning to democracy, Libyan rebels were largely unified,
and Libya seemed at little risk of pro-regime insurgency11 (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 1).
Using a retrospective attitude, hindsight and deeper assessment of the NATO intervention reveals
that it backfired by increasing the duration of the civil war and the proliferation of weapons in Libya
and the region through rebel forces (Kuperman, 2013: 1; 2015), thus contributing later on to Libyas
decay and giving credibility to voices that argue the failure of the R2P mission in this next section.

11

In fact, there was little violence after the fall of Tripoli (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 1).

As mentioned above, the NATO intervention enabled rebels12 to resist against Gaddafis troops and
to later establish the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the sole legitimate representative of the
Libyan people (Gazzini, 2011: 7). This cemented its questionable, self-proclaimed authority in a
Libyan state that has never functioned properly even before Gaddafis fall; his legacy being a weak
institutional and legal system (Byman, 2013: 5). Under such conditions, Libya soon became an open
ground for conflicts rising due to strong social and political cleavages (Otto, Carlisle, and Ibrahim,
2013: 15; Chothia, 2015). As evidence of political instability and weakness stands the fact that in the
past four years, Libya had no less than seven prime ministers and its secular dream was stalled by an
Islamist dominance in the parliament (Kuperman, 2015). Moreover, failure by the government in
disarming the rebels post-intervention has led to the creation of armed militias13 in order to fill the
power vacuum (Gartenstein-Ross, 2013: 3).
Tracing the events during and post-intervention, among the first mistakes which led to considering
this case of R2P a failure was the fact that it did not respect its mandate of responsibility to rebuild
(Bartu, 2014: 13). Contrary to most interventions, the NATO military operation ended without a
peacekeeping mission or large scale nation-building (Chivvis, 2012: 78) as happened in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Furthermore, it could be argued that Libyas poorly supervised transition to democracy
was mainly a result of previous long-lasting and costly peacekeeping missions, combined with
Libyans own reluctance to Western involvement (The Economist, 2015). The direct consequence of
this mistake was that the Libyans who fought against the regime, now had the leverage in claiming
power invoking the harm inflicted on them during the revolution (Lynch, 2011: 68).
To continue, another equally important act whose consequences represent a failure for the
interventions aims, is the fact that NATO intervened when Gaddafis acts of violence were on the
verge of ending, thus prolonging the civil war for a few more months and aiding rebels to resume

12

Britain and France went beyond protection of civilians and sent trainers, equipment and supplies to rebel
forces so that they could start and coordinate their attacks (Chivvis, 2012: 77).
13
It is worth noting that these militias are not always obedient to the central government and that they are
split along region, ethnic and local lines, thus representing a security threat for Libya (Chothia, 2015).

their attacks, all without double checking the claims of intentional civilian targeting by the
government14 (Kuperman, 2015; Kuperman, 2013: 1-2). Additionally, the fact that the allies supplied
arms to the rebels, cumulated with the absence of a peacekeeping mission in a country with a fragile
democracy and a weak institutional system signals the fact that the R2P principle has failed in its
purpose of achieving long-lasting stability and security15. But the gravity of the situation was not
visible until later, when failure to evolve into a democracy was evidenced by growing human rights
abuses under the militias and armed groups16 that contributed to proliferation of conflict nationwide
(Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 20), while neighbouring states began to express concerns (Kuperman,
2015).
Furthermore, perhaps the gravest consequence of failing to secure the country was neglecting the
porous borders (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 8) that soon transformed Libya in a target for terrorist
penetration (and a safe haven at the same time) both home-grown and foreign (Kuperman, 2015).
Post-Gaddafi era is marked by releases of jihadists from jails and return of exiled extremists in the
country (Byman, 2013: 5). Some affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), some
affiliated to the Islamic State (ISIL) the returning jihadists are also part of the question on what went
wrong with the Libyan revolution (Freeman, 2015; Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 2). The terrorism
problem also opens the question on how did the failed R2P in Libya affect the region issue
discussed in the next, and final, section of this paper.

14

The United Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially
consumed by civil conflict in mid-February 2011Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurataviolence was
actually initiated by the protesters. The government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally
targeted civilians or resorted to indiscriminate force, as Western media claimed. (Kuperman, 2013: 1)
15
Cook (2014) speaks of the collective failure of all those implied in overthrowing Gaddafi, including NATO.
16
There are 9 major armed groups, currently operating in Libya: The Zintan Military Council; Misrata Brigades;
Souk al Jouma and Sadun al-Suwayli Brigades; February 17 Brigade; Libyan Shield 1; Ansar al-Sharia (Benghazi);
Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade ; Ansar al-Sharia (Derna); Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room.
For more details on each see (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 30-4).

Reaching the final step in my assessment of the Libyan intervention, I believe this would not be
complete without discussing the larger picture and implications for the region as well, since the
initial upheaval in Gaddafis Libya was tightly linked to the Arab Spring movement roaming through
the Maghreb in 2011.
Previously mentioned, the terrorist threat stemming out of Libya, was helped in part by the
porousness of the Libyan borders in particular, and of the Maghreb in general (Byman, 2013: 5;
Gartenstein-Ross, 2013:4). Taking advantage of the chaos installed in post-Gaddafian Libya, jihadist
movements have risen encouraged by the flow of arms post-intervention and the increase in human
rights abuses, all of them increasing instability in Maghreb and Sahel. Already being torn apart by
civil wars, Nigeria and Mali were added the threat of weapons being smuggled into their countries.
Moreover, for Mali, NATOs R2P mission meant a destabilization so great, that it needed French
intervention in 2013 in order to fight the jihadists in the north (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 4). Chad was
also added the threat of terrorist attack post-intervention, while the transitioning to democracy of
Tunisia and Egypt came under a bigger threat than it was during Gaddafis regime. Algerian officials
were also confronted with their initial fear regarding the Western intervention increase of AQIM
activity in Maghreb as a sign of distaste for secularization (Byman, 2013: 5; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014: 9
-10).
Despite all of Maghreb being affected by the blowback from the Libyan revolution, it is worth
mentioning that Mali was the most affected. After Gaddafis fall, the Tuareg people that supported
him, returned to northern Mali bringing with them weapons and arming a rebellion that ended in an
Islamic fighters takeover (Milne, 2014). Along with Libya, it has descended since the intervention
into a terrorist safe haven, where terrorists suppressed by Gaddafi radical Islamists re-emerged
and built strong links with AQIM, Mali becoming the largest territory under Islamic extremists
control. The crisis became of such nature, that eventually Egypt launched an air strike against

extremist militants and as mentioned, France had to intervene in 2013 to try and stop further
exacerbation of conflict (Kuperman, 2015).
All in all, as the two previous sections have shown, the success of the NATO intervention in Libya was
proclaimed too soon, as deeper understanding of its consequences reveals. In the concluding section
therefore, I will briefly re-assess the success rate of the R2P mission, suggesting that Libya, from an
operational point of view was in a unique position and that considering the implications of the
intervention, it is a solid proof of the need to shift away from R2P, since it actually increased the
likelihood of further violence (Dunne and Gifkins, 2011: 162).
Reaching a conclusion, I believe this essay has revealed in a clear manner that the military operation
in Libya 2011, brought into attention and initiated by the French and British states under NATOs
umbrella was first and foremost an R2P mission, intended to end Gaddafis acts of violence against
his own people. Seen at the time as a great success, both operationally and in terms of achieved
aims (Ban Ki-Moon, 2012: 53), Libya 2011 has proven that even the smoothest interventions cannot
account for the legacy that they are leaving behind. Moreover, in the case of Libya, R2P has failed in
its third principle responsibility to rebuild, when the mission stopped without maintaining longterm peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, thinking retrospectively, but accounting solely for the
mission itself, I would suggest that it cannot be viewed as a standard. The situation in Libya was
unique in various ways, which is why the UNSC still has to find a mandate that would allow taking
action in Syria the current crisis17. Among the reasons why Libya is a special case is the fact that
Gaddafis crimes against his people were at a larger scale than in Syria 2011, and European leaders
felt the threat closer to home and supported the intervention. Furthermore, the UNSC is yet to find a
viable plan for military action without increasing the risks for interveners due to two factors
geography and demography of Syria. Moreover, the military campaign itself worked nearly flawless

17

The rebellion in Syria, in fact, started out of support for the Arab Spring and Libya, and it was perpetuated as
a result of Libyan destabilization post-intervention. By training rebels and supplying weapons, NATO did not
account for Libyas inability to later disarm the rebels who then slipped in Syria to fight the regime (Zelin, 2013:
4).

10

because the rebels were united against Gaddafi, whereas in Syria they are unable to sustain control
of major areas (Pape, 2012: 70-1). As a result, considering the inability to replicate a successful R2P
in Syria, the fact that long-term the mission has largely failed not only in securing the country, but
also by destabilizing in sequent years the entire Maghreb, I believe that my initial argument that
declaring Libyan intervention a success, and bringing into diplomatic and strategic attention R2P as a
mature principle, that can be applied in similar situation was a verdict employed too soon. In fact, I
believe that if anything, the NATO intervention in Libya has actually made the UNSC reconsider
alternatives in order to avoid consequences of the same magnitude for both the country and the
region (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 610).

11

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15