ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIORAND HUMAN PERFORMANCE27, 28, 78~95 (1981)

Exchange Variables as Predictors of Job

Satisfaction, Job Commitment, and Turnover: The
Impact of Rewards, Costs, Alternatives,
and Investments 1
D A N I E L FARRELL AND CARYL E . RUSBULT

Franklin and Marshall College

Two studies were designed to explore the ability of the investment model to
predict job satisfaction, job commitment, and job turnover. The first study was
a controlled laboratory analog of a work setting, and the second study was a
cross-sectional survey of industrial workers. The results of the two studies
were consistent. Job satisfaction was best predicted by the reward and cost
values of the job, and job commitment was best predicted by a combination of
reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment size. Both satisfaction and commitment were correlated with job turnover, but job commitment
was more strongly related to turnover than was satisfaction. These results are
in complete agreement with the investment model.

Social scientists concerned with organizational behavior have made

numerous attempts to identify the determinants of employee withdrawal,
especially in the form of job turnover. Most explorations of the causes of
job turnover have focused on job satisfaction as a primary predictor variable (Lawler, 1973; Locke, 1976; Porter & Steers, 1973; Vroom, 1964).
However, employee turnover has consistently been shown to be only
moderately related to a variety of job satisfaction measures (Koch &
Steers, 1978; Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter & Steers, 1973;
Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). As noted in a recent review of
this literature, "the satisfaction-turnover relationship, although consistent, usually accounts for less than 16 percent of the variance in turnover"
(Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979).
A number of researchers have recently turned to the study of commitment as an alternative predictor of employee turnover. For example,
i The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to Frank DiNapoli, Don Robb, and
Mark Schultze, who helped conduct Experiment 1, and to the labor unions, whose leaders'
and members' cooperation made Experiment 2 possible. The authors also thank James Price
and Michael Hubbard for critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. The research
was supported by grants from Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Kentucky Research Foundation.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dr. Daniel Farrell, Department of Management, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008. The second author is now
at the Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506.
78
0030-5073/81/040078-18502.00/0
Copyright 1981 by AcademicPress, Inc.
All rightsof reproductionin any formreserved.

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

79

Porter and his associates (Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter,
Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974) found that organizational commitment
predicted turnover better than did job satisfaction. These authors defined
organizational commitment as "the strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization" (Porter, Steers,
Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604). Similarly, Koch and Steers (1978)
found that job attachment was more strongly predictive of job turnover
than was satisfaction. In this context, job attachment refers to "an attitudinal response to one's job that is characterized by a congruence between
one's real and ideal jobs, an identification with one's chosen occupation,
and a reluctance to seek alternate employment" (Koch & Steers, 1978,
p. 120).
In light of this evidence that commitment exerts a reasonably powerful
impact on job turnover, it becomes important that the causes of job commitment be identified. However, most research on organizational commitment has either: (a) explored the relationships among a variety of
highly specific predictors and commitment (e.g., salary, social interaction
with peers and supervisors, age, education); or (b)studied the impact on
organizational commitment of one or two more abstract theoretical constructs (e.g., side bets, quality of exchange relationship) without developing a general theory concerning the causes of satisfaction and commitment (c.f., Alutto, Hrebiniak, & Alonso, 1973; Aranya & Jacobson, 1975;
Buchanan, 1974; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980).
What is needed is a clear conceptual model capable of predicting a variety
of organizational behaviors. The primary goals of the present paper are:
(a) to outline a theoretical model of the causes of, and interrelationships
among, job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover; and (b) to report the
results of two initial studies designed to assess the predictive validity of
this theory, termed the investment model.
Although most researchers define job satisfaction in terms of positivity
of affect (refer to Price, 1977; and Wanous & Lawler, 1972), commitment
has been defined in a variety of fashions. Commitment-like constructs
have been defined in terms of identification with and involvement in a
particular organization (Porter, Crampon, & Smith, 1976; Porter, Steers,
Mowday, & Boulian, 1974), behavioral intentions (Mobley, 1977), a congruence between one's real and ideal jobs (Koch & Steers, 1978), entrapment (Rubin & Brockner, 1975), or constraint (Johnson, 1973). The definition of commitment employed in this research follows that advanced by
Kiesler--"commitment is the binding of the individual to behavioral
acts" (Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966, p. 349). Thus, job commitment is related to the probability that an employee will leave his job, and involves
feelings of psychological attachment, independent of affect. Job commitment reflects behavioral intention, primarily (but not solely) degree of
intention to stay with a job. Job commitment exists to the extent that the

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FARRELL AND RUSBULT

employee perceives that he/she is "connected" to a job. This definition is

similar to those proffered by Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972), Salancik (1977),
and Johnson (1973), in his discussion of "behavioral commitment".
The investment model was originally developed as a means of describing satisfaction and commitment in romantic involvements (Rusbult,
1980). The model is in the general tradition of exchange theory (c.f.,
Homans, 1961) and is an expansion and formalization of selected aspects
of interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut,
1978). Briefly, the model asserts that job satisfaction, or positivity of
affect toward one's job, is primarily a simple function of the rewards and
costs associated with the job. Job commitment, however, is said to be a
function of rewards, costs, investments, and alternatives. In turn, job
turnover is asserted to be predicted directly by job commitment. Each of
these model parameters will be discussed below in greater detail.
The individual's evaluation of an association, or satisfaction with the
association, consists of a subjective reward-cost analysis and a comparison of this judgment to a general standard for evaluating such associations, called a comparison level (CL) (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The reward value of an association (Rx) is defined as:
Rx = ~(wiri)

(1)

where ri represents the individual's subjective estimation of the reward

value of attribute i available from association X, and wi represents its
subjective importance. Pay, opportunity for promotion, autonomy, variety, and task identity are examples of job rewards. The cost value of
association X (Cx) is defined as:
Cx = E(wjcj)

(2)

where cj is the magnitude of the subjective costs of association X with

regard to attribute j, and wj represents the importance o f j in the association. Inadequate resources, lengthy travel to work, unfair promotion
practices, and undesirable shifts are examples of possible job costs.
Satisfaction with an employment association should increase as the rewards of the association increase and costs decrease.
The comparison level represents the average quality of outcomes that
the individual has come to expect from associations, in this case,
employment. The individual compares the value of the current association
to his CL in order to assess degree of satisfaction with the association.
Satisfaction (SATx) can be represented as follows:
SATx = (Rx - Cx) - CL

(3)

The combination of rewards and costs in this formula (Rx less Cx) is
referred to as the "association outcome value" (Ox). Since the presence
of costs generally implies the absence of reward, it may be useful to view

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

81

job satisfaction as a simple function of outcome value and comparison

level. This approach corresponds to that adopted in Kelley and Thibaut's
(1978) interdependence theory, and is similar to the notions of satisfaction
described by Lawler (1973) and Porter and Steers (1973). Research has
repeatedly demonstrated that job rewards and costs such as salary, job
variety, prestige, and participation exert the predicted effects on
employee satisfaction (c.f., Bartol, 1979; Hackman & Lawler, 1971;
Locke, 1976).
According to the investment model, job commitment is a function of
several factors: the rewards and costs (satisfaction) derived from the job,
the quality of the individual's job alternatives, and the magnitude of the
individual's investment in the job. There exists abundant empirical support for the prediction that increases in job rewards and decreases in costs
(i.e., increases in satisfaction) lead to stronger job commitment. Increases
in salary have been shown to be associated with increased commitment to
the organization (Aranya & Jacobson, 1975), and greater intent to remain
in one's position (Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980). Schoenherr and Greeley (1974)
demonstrated that the requirement of celibacy (presumed to be a job cost)
served to reduce commitment among American Catholic priests. Additional support for the prediction that rewards and satisfaction are positively related to commitment, and costs negatively related to commitment, is to be found in Buchanan (1974), Dubin, Champoux, and Porter
(1975), and Hrebiniak and Alutto (1972).
Alternative value is defined as the quality of the best available alternative to relationship X, whether unemployment or an alternative job. Alternative value (Ay) is defined in the same fashion as is satisfaction with
the current association:
Ay = (Ry - Cy) - CL

(4)

This use of the concept of alternative value corresponds to that employed

in interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978, use the term CLalt)
and in Mobley's (1977) suggestions concerning the study of organizational
commitment. The investment model predicts that job alternatives ought to
be negatively related to job commitment. If an individual's job alternatives are poor, (e.g., oversupply of similarly qualified workers), commitment to his current job should become greater. Job alternatives have been
demonstrated to be negatively related to intent to remain in one' s position
(Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980), and to career commitment (McLaughlin & Butler, 1974). Indirect support for this proposed negative relationship between alternatives and commitment may be found elsewhere (March &
Simon, 1958; Marsh & Mannari, 1977; Price, 1977).
The investment model specifies that the final determinant of commitment is investment size. Investments refer to the resources that are "put

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F A R R E L L A N D RUSBULT

into" an association, usually, but not necessarily, with the intent to improve the long-term value of the relationship. Length of service, acquisition of non-portable skills, and retirement programs are common job investments. Such investments serve to increase commitment by increasing
the costs of leaving the association. The investment of resources does not
necessarily alter the value of the association, although it may occasionally
serve to change its immediate reward or cost value. Invested resources
may be material or psychological, intrinsic or extrinsic. Investment size
(Ix) is defined as:
Ix = ~(wkik)

(5)

where ik refers to the size of the investment of resource k in relationship

X, and wk refers to the importance of resource k. Similar concepts have
been introduced by other authors. One of the most commonly cited references is Becker's (1960) discussion of "side bets", although many other
authors have recently introduced similar concepts (Alutto, Hrebiniak, &
Alonso, 1973; Johnson, 1973; Salancik, 1977; Sheldon, 1971). Evidence
abounds in support of the hypothesized positive relationship between
commitment and investments such as time in organization, tenure, and
age (Alutto, Hrebiniak, & Alonso, 1973; Aranya & Jacobson, 1975;
Buchanan, 1974; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Koch & Steers, 1978; Pfeffer
& Lawler, 1980; Sheldon, 1971). Indirect support for this prediction is to
be found in research on the effects of investments on the phenomenon of
entrapment (Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Tropper, 1972), and in the work of
Staw and his associates on the process of escalating commitment to a
chosen course of action (Staw, 1976; Staw & Fox, 1977).
Commitment (COMx) may now be defined as:
COMx = (Rx - Cx) + Ix - Oy

(6)

This equation may alternatively be expressed in terms of satisfaction:

COMx = SATx + Ix - Ay

(7)

It should be clear that Equations 6 and 7 are roughly interchangeable.

Commitment should increase as the value of the relationship increases, as
the magnitude of the individual's investment in the relationship increases,
and as alternative value decreases. It is important to note that satisfaction
with a job and commitment to that association need not necessarily be
strongly correlated. Since high commitment may be caused by poor alternatives or large investments as well as by high satisfaction, it is possible
that a worker may be dissatisfied with his/her job but still remain highly
committed to it.
The final link in the investment model is that between previously defined terms and job turnover. The investment model proposes that job

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

83

commitment should be directly (negatively) predictive of job turnover.

Thus, turnover should be negatively related to job rewards, satisfaction,
and investments, and positively related to job costs and alternative value.
Although the investment model is a new means of formally distinguishing between the notions of job satisfaction and commitment, it is apparent
from the foregoing discussion of each model parameter that similar concepts have been introduced by other social scientists. The hypothesized
relations among rewards, costs, comparison level, and alternative value
are borrowed directly from interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley,
1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Becker describes an investment-like phenomenon in his argument that commitment is increased by "prior actions
of the person staking some originally extraneous interest on his following
a consistent line of activity" (Becker, 1960, p. 36). Similarly, Rubin discusses the means by which entrapment develops---the individual invests
greater resources in a line of action than that exchange objectively warrants (Rubin & Brockner, 1975). Blau (1964) captures much of the flavor
of the investment model in his statement that:
" . . . Alternative opportunities foregone strengthen commitments, and together
with the investments made sometimes produce firm attachments." (Blau, 1964,
p. 160)

Finally, in a summary of the results of their research on organizational

commitment, Hrebiniak & Alutto (1972) note that:
" . . . commitment is an exchange and accrual phenomenon, dependent on the
employee's perception of the ratio of inducements to contributions and the accumulation of the side bets or investments in the employing system." (Hrebiniak &
Alutto, 1972, p. 555)

Thus, although the investment model constitutes a new means of studying

job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover, its theoretical constructs are
firmly rooted in traditional psychological and sociological literature.
Two studies were designed to test the investment model predictions
concerning the effects of job reward and cost values, alternative value,
and investment size on job satisfaction and commitment, and to assess the
relationships among these variables and job turnover. The contributions
of the weighting factors in the reward, cost, and investment size parameters (wi, wj, and wk), and the impact of comparison level on these predictions were not explored in the present research. Study 1 is a laboratory
analog of a business setting. Job rewards, costs, alternatives, and investments were experimentally manipulated, and satisfaction, commitment,
and turnover were measured. Study 2 is a cross-sectional survey of industrial workers which obtained measures of job-related rewards, costs,
alternatives, investments, satisfaction, and commitment. Since it employs
experimental methods, the first study more effectively assesses the causal
relations among the model parameters. The second study possesses

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FARRELL AND RUSBULT

greater external validity, as it explores actual worker perceptions in real

work organizations.
The hypotheses advanced for the two pieces of research are identical. It
was predicted that job satisfaction would be influenced by variations in
job rewards and costs, but not by alternative value or investment size
(refer to Equation 3). It was also hypothesized that job commitment
would increase with increases in job rewards and investments, and decreases in job costs and alternative value (see Equation 6). (One might
also posit a relationship between job commitment and job satisfaction,
investments, and alternatives, as in Equation 7.) Job turnover should be a
direct function of job commitment, decreases in commitment producing
increases in the probability of turnover. Job satisfaction should not predict turnover as well as job commitment.
STUDY 1

Method
Participants. Sixty-four males and 64 females participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an introductory
business management course at Franklin and Marshall Co!lege. Twelve
same-sex subjects were recruited for each experimental session. Within
each session subjects were randomly assigned to one of 16 conditions.
The ratio of males to females was equal across experimental conditions.
Procedure. At the start of each session subjects were seated in a common room while the experimenter explained the study. Subjects were told
that they would first be given some training materials to read, and that
after reading these materials they would be randomly assigned one of
several alternative tasks. They would be allowed the opportunity to
choose among a number of different tasks during later stages of the experiment, and would be paid in accordance to the amount and quality of
their performance. Subjects were then assigned to individual cubicles
which adjoined the common room.
Subjects were allowed 20 minutes to read and study their job training
materials, at which time they were assigned their first task. In reality, all
subjects were assigned the same task--transcribing into longhand news
stories written in "Reporters' Speed Writing". Subjects were informed of
the approximate difficulty and pay rate of the task. At the end of a 15
minute work period subjects were presented with an alternative task
which required decoding news reports "written by telephone transmission". The reports were without punctuation or capitalization, and
selected letters were systematically replaced by numbers and symbols.
Subjects were left alone to examine these materials for a brief period of
time.
Four independent variables were manipulated in the experiment: job

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

85

reward value (high or low), job cost value (high or low), alternative value
(high or low), and investment size (large or small). Job rewards were
manipulated through variations in estimated pay ($4 for high rewards, $2
for low rewards). Changes in task demands served to vary costs. High
cost subjects were told that they would receive credit for a transcribed
sentence only if 100 per cent of the words were correct, and low cost
subjects were given a 60 percent accuracy criterion. Alternative value was
manipulated through changes in the payment for the second task (an
estimated $4 for high alternative value and $2 for low alternative value).
The type of training provided subjects served to manipulate investment
size. In the high investment condition subjects read training materials
specific to the first task (essays about reporter's speed writing), and in the
low investment condition subjects read essays that were general and only
tangentially related to the first task (essays about the field of journalism).
Training that is specific to a particular task serves as an investment in that
task (i.e., it is less transferable to other tasks), whereas general training
does not. This manipulation corresponds to a distinction drawn by Becker
(1975) in his analysis of lifetime earnings of American workers.
After examining the materials for the second task, subjects completed a
questionnaire which contained a series of seven-point Likert-type items.
This instrument assessed the effectiveness of the manipulations of job
rewards (payment is good, first task has positive qualities), job costs (task
is difficult, has negative qualities), alternative value (payment is good,
second task has positive qualities, has few negative qualities, expected
satisfaction with and liking for the second task), and investment size
(training was useful, relevant to the first task, helped performance on first
task). Two items were designed to measure job satisfaction: to what extent are you satisfied with your first task (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely)
and how much do you like your first task (1 = not at all, 7 -- extremely).
Three additional items served as measures of job commitment: how likely
is it that you will continue to work on your first task (1 = not at all likely, 7
= extremely likely), how likely is it that you will switch to work on the
second task (1 -- extremely likely, 7 = not at all likely), and how committed are you to continuing work on the first task (1 = not at all, 7 =
entirely). A final item served as a measure of job turnover, and required
that subjects elect to work on either the first or second task during the
second work period. After completing the questionniare subjects were
paid $3 and thoroughly debriefed.

Results
Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of each of the four experimental manipulations was assessed by performing four four-factor multivariate analyses of variance--one for each set of manipulation checks.

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FARRELL AND RUSBULT

These analyses revealed significant effects on the appropriate manipulation check measures for reward value (Mult. F(2,110) = 7.72, p < .001),
cost value (Mult. F(2,111) = 18.06, p < .001), alternative value (Mult.
F(5,104) = 2.71,p < .02), and investment size (Mult. F(3,110) = 123.71,
p < .001). The manipulations were therefore judged to have been successful.
Satisfaction, Commitment, and Turnover. A four-factor multivariate
analysis of variance was performed on the task satisfaction measures.
Mean satisfaction scores are displayed in Table 1. Consistent with the
experimental hypotheses, subjects in the high reward condition reported
greater satisfaction with their task than did those in the low reward condition (Mult. F(2,112) -- 2.95, p < .06 - marginal), high cost condition
subjects were less satisfied with their task than were low cost condition
subjects (Mult. F(2,112) = 12.27, p < .001), and investment size had no
significant effect on satisfaction (Mult. F(2,112) = 0.67, p < .51 - ns). An
u n e x p e c t e d finding was that variations in alternative value significantly
affected satisfaction, low alternative value subjects experiencing greater
satisfaction than their high alternative value counterparts (Mult. F (2,112)
= 4.14, p < .02).
The e x p e r i m e n t a l questionnaire c o n t a i n e d three measures o f task
commitment and one measure of turnover. An initial step in the analysis
o f these data was to assess the strength of the relationship between turnover and the measures o f commitment. T u r n o v e r was significantly correlated with reported desire to continue with the current task (r = - . 7 3 ) ,
aversion to changing to the alternative task (r = - . 7 3 ) , and commitment
to the current task (r = - . 4 5 ) . A four-factor multivariate analysis of
variance was performed on the three commitment measures and the turn-

TABLE 1
MEAN TASK SATISFACTION AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT TASK REWARD AND
COST VALUES AND ALTERNATIVE VALUE

High

Low

3.09
3.39

2.62
2.95

2.33
2.84

3.38
3.50

2.62
2.87

3.09
3.47

Reward Value-Satisfaction with current task

Attraction to current task

Cost Value-Satisfaction with current task

Attraction to current task

Alternative Value-Satisfaction with current task

Attraction to current task

Both measures were seven-point Likert-type scales. Higher numbers indicate greater
satisfaction and attraction.

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over measure. Mean values of each measure are shown in Table 2. As

predicted, significant effects were obtained for current task reward value
(Mult. F (4,109) = 3.21, p < .02), current task cost value (Mult. F(4,109)
= 2.73, p < .03), alternative value (Mult. F(4,109) = 5.06, p < .001), and
investment size (Mult. F(4,109) = 2.87, p < .03). All mean values were in
the predicted direction, greater commitment and fewer turnovers resulting from high reward value, low cost value, low alternative value, and
large investment size. Univariate analyses of the turnover measure revealed a similar pattern. Turnover was less probable under conditions of
high current task reward~value (F(1,113) = 10.42, p < .002), low current
task cost value (F (1,113) = 4.13, p < . 04), low alternative value (F (1,113)
= 14.73, p < .001), and large investment size (F(1,113) = 2.82, p < .06
-marginal).
A final set of analyses assessed the relationships among the measures of
job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover. Reported attraction to the
first task was significantly correlated with the three measures of commitment (the r's were .34, .33, and .30) and the measure of turnover (r =

TABLE 2
MEAN JOB COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT TASK REWARD
AND COST VALUES, ALTERNATIVE VALUE r AND INVESTMENT SIZE

High

Low

4.09
4.35
3.71
.47

3.03
3.85
2.89
.73

3.09
3.33
3.05
.69

4.02
4.30
3.55
.52

2.82
3.18
2.79
.76

4.30
4.45
3.81
.46

4.06
4.24
3.73
.32

3.06
3.37
2.88
.60

Reward Value-Desire to continue with current task

Aversion to changing to alternative
Commitment to current task
Turnover

Cost Value-Desire to continue with current task

Aversion to changing to alternative
Commitment to current task
Turnover

Alternative Value-Desire to continue with current task

Aversion to changing to alternative
Commitment to current task
Turnover

Investment Size-Desire to continue with current task

Aversion to changing to alternative
Commitment to current task
Turnover

The commitment measures were seven-point Likert-type scales and the turnover measure w a s a dichotomous choice of current or alternative task. Higher numbers indicate
greater commitment and percent turnover.

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-.28), and a similar pattern of results emerged for reported satisfaction

with the first task (for the three commitment measures the r ' s were .38,
.39, and .41; for the turnover measure, r = -.28). Thus, satisfaction was
significantly correlated with both commitment and turnover, but these
relationships were not strong. The finding that job commitment was more
strongly correlated with turnover than was job satisfaction is in complete
agreement with the investment model.

STUDY 2

Method
Respondents. One hundred seven male and 56 female industrial workers completed questionnaires forwarded through the cooperation of the
"locals" of three major labor unions. Out of a total of 295 mailed, these
returns represented a usable response rate of 55 percent. The overall
response rate was 60 percent, but several questionnaires were returned
partially or wholly incomplete.
Procedure. A subject list was prepared by taking a random sample of
the membership of each union. Union staff members attached mailing
labels to pre-packaged, pre-stamped mailings identified by subject numbers. Each packet contained a cover letter, a questionnaire, and a
Stamped return envelope addressed to the researchers. Follow-up mailings for respondents were prepared in a similar manner. Cover letters
assured respondents of the anonymity of their responses, stated the fact
of the unions' cooperation and approval, and summarized the purpose of
the research. The questionnaires required approximately 30 minutes to
complete.
Questionnaire. The questionnaire contained items designed to measure
all of the elements of the investment model. Since it was anticipated that
respondents would not easily be able to answer questions such as " w h a t
rewards does your job possess", the abstract concepts of the model were
"translated" into everyday language in the following manner: (a) each
abstract concept was briefly defined; (b) a series of questions representing
concrete operationalizations of each abstract concept was answered; and
(c) several global measures of each abstract concept were obtained. Values on individual global measures were summed to form a single measure
of each investment model parameter. Unless otherwise indicated, questionnaire items were nine-point Likert-type items.
In everyday work situations the absence of a specific job reward generally implies the presence of a cost (e.g., lack of monetary rewards implies
a cost, low pay). T h e r e f o r e , a single set of job o u t c o m e value
operationalization measures was used to teach respondents the meaning
of reward and cost value. Twenty-eight items assessed a variety of aspects of jobs, including pay (10 categories), opportunity for promotion,

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

89

p e r c e i v e d fairness o f promotions, routinization, autonomy, task identity,

feedback, coworker relations, resource adequacy, job challenge,
mechanization, work schedules, travel to work, vacations, physical surroundings, and formalization. Three global measures c o n c e r n e d the extent to which jobs were rewarding (1 = no good things, 9 = many good
things, 1 = not at all rewarding, 9 = extremely rewarding) and compared
favorably to ideal jobs (1 = job is worse than most, 9 = job is better than
most), and three global measures assessed costs (1 --- many negative
things, 9 = no negative things; 1 = many costs, 9 = no costs) and unfavorable comparisons to ideals (1 = more negative aspects, 9 = fewer negative
aspects).
The value of alternative associations was assessed by four concrete and
three global values. The concrete measures assessed the difficulty of
finding similar employment, availability o f workers in their geographical
area, market value of workers' skills, and the aversiveness o f unemployment. The global measures c o n c e r n e d the expected satisfaction of alternative jobs (1 = excellent, 9 = terrible), alternative as compared to the
current job (1 = alternatives are much better, 9 = alternatives are much
worse), and alternative as compared to the ideal job (1 = alternatives are
much better, 9 = alternatives are much worse).
Investments were defined as activities, events, or persons uniquely
associated with the job, and as things " p u t into" the current job. Sixteen
concrete measures assessed length o f service, job tenure, vested and
n o n - v e s t e d r e t i r e m e n t p r o g r a m s , specific or n o n - p o r t a b l e training,
spousal employment, homeownership, and community ties. Three global
measures assessed the extent to which investments had been made: in
general, how much have you invested in this job (1 = nothing, 9 = a great
deal), to what extent are there activities/events/persons/objects/behaviors
uniquely associated with the job that you would lose if you were to leave
this job (1 = none, 9 = a great many), and how does your investment in
this job compare to what you think most people have invested in their jobs
(1 = I ' v e invested less than most people, 9 = I've invested more than
most).
Only global measures o f the criterion measures o f job satisfaction and
commitment were obtained. Job satisfaction was measured by a combination o f two direct inquiries (repeated from experiment o n e - - 1 = not at
all satisfied, 9 = extremely satisfied; 1 = d o n ' t like at all, 9 = like very
much) and four indirect inquiries (would y o u r e c o m m e n d similar job to
friend, 1 = advise against it, 9 = strongly r e c o m m e n d it; closeness to ideal
job, 1 = not at all, 9 = extremely; met expectations, 1 = not at all, 9 =
definitely; possible regrets, 1 = none at all, 9 = a great many). The
resultant scale o f job satisfaction resembles the general job satisfaction
scale e m p l o y e d by Quinn and Shepard (1974). Five items measured the

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FARRELL AND RUSBULT

commitment criterion--likelihood of quitting job in near future (1 = extremely likely, 9 = not at all likely), commitment to current job (1 = not at
all, 9 = extremely), attachment to current job (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely), desired length of staying (1 = short period of time, 9 = long
period o f time), and time spent searching for a different job ( _ _
hours
on the average). This scale was adapted for the study o f job commitment
from Rusbult's (1980) research on commitment to romantic involvements.
This study did not make use of existing scales of job commitment (c.f.,
Mowday, Steers, and Porter, 1979) because of theoretical differences in
definitions of this concept.

Results
Reliability and Validity of Measures. In order to assess the reliability of
the summed indices of each model parameter, reliability estimates (coefficient alpha) were computed for the set of single measures which were
summed to form the measure for each parameter. The coefficients exceeded lowest acceptable levels (Nunnally, 1967) for measures of job
reward value (.82), job cost value (.77), alternative value (.74), investment
size (.78), satisfaction (.94), and c o m m i t m e n t (.86). Therefore, these
summed " g l o b a l " measures were employed in the remaining analyses.
The use o f operationalizations to translate investment model parameters into e v e r y d a y language allowed for the assessment of construct validity by regressing associated concrete measures onto global measures.
The multiple correlation coefficients were significant for job reward value
(R = .82), job cost value (R = .73), alternative value (R --- .39), and investment size (R -- .55), so the global measures were judged to be valid.
Job Satisfaction. Cramer's (1972) model comparison procedures were
employed to assess the ability of the investment model parameters to
predict job satisfaction and commitment. Both reward value (r = .76) and
cost value (r = - . 5 6 ) were significantly correlated with job satisfaction.
The multiple correlation of satisfaction with rewards and costs was superior to the prediction provided by either of these predictors considered
individually (R = .78). The two factor prediction (R 2 --- .61) was compared
to the two individual correlations and was found to predict satisfaction
significantly better than did either reward value (r 2 = .58) ( F (1,149) -10.74,p < .01)or cost value (r 2 = .31)(F(1,149) = 64.78, p < .001)alone.
As expected, satisfaction was not significantly correlated with alternative
value or investment size. These results are consistent with the investment
model predictions (refer to Equation 3).
Job Commitment. The investment model states that job commitment
should be predicted by a combination of satisfaction, investments, and
alternatives (refer to Equation 7). As expected, job commitment was significantly correlated with satisfaction (r = .67), investments (r = .27), and

COMMITMENT

AND

91

TURNOVER

alternatives (r = -.21). Cramer's (1972) procedures were employed to

compare the multiple correlation of the three predictor model (R2 = .51) to
the prediction from satisfaction alone (r 2 = .44). This comparison was
significant (F (2,148) = 9.25, p < .01), so the three-factor model (satisfaction, alternatives, investments) appears to predict job commitment significantly better than does satisfaction alone. In order to explore the
individual contributions of alternatives and investments to the prediction
of job commitment, increment in r 2 tests were performed. First, a model
based on satisfaction alone (r 2 = .44) was compared to a model including
both satisfaction and alternatives (R 2 = .47). The inclusion of alternatives
significantly improved the prediction of job commitment (F(1,149) =
7.98, p < .01). A model based on satisfaction and alternatives (R 2 = .47)
was then compared to the full model of satisfaction, alternatives, and
investments (R ~ = .51). This comparison also proved significant (F(1,148)
= 11.17, p < .01). These findings provide strong support for the investment model. Satisfaction, alternative value, and investment size all produce significant and (somewhat) independent effects on job commitment.
Collectively, these variables account for 51 percent of the variation in job
commitment.
Equation 6 of the investment model presents a model of job commitment which is roughly equivalent to the one described above (Equation 7).
This model includes four predictors--job rewards and costs (substituted
for job satisfaction), alternative outcome value, and investment size. Job
commitment was significantly predicted by this four variable model (R =
.60). Reduced models were compared to the full model (as described
above), and were found to result in significant reductions in predictive
power. Again, these results are in complete agreement with the investment model.
Correlations among all investment model parameters are presented in
Table 3. It should be clear that this pattern of correlations provides strong
support for the investment model. Satisfaction was significantly correTABLE3
CORRELATIONS AMONG INVESTMENT MODEL PARAMETERS

COM
SAT
R
C
A

SAT

.67 a

.51 a
.76 a

-.40 a
-.56"
-.55 ~

-.21 b
-.11
-.07
-.08

.27"
.09
.13
-.12
.07

COM = job commitment, SAT = job satisfaction, R = reward value, C = cost value, A
= a l t e r n a t i v e v a l u e , I = i n v e s t m e n t size.
p < .001; ~ p < . 0 1 ; C p < .05

92

FARRELL AND RUSBULT

TABLE 4
CORRELATIONS AMONG COMMITMENT MEASURES

Committed
Attached
Want to Stay
Won't Quit

Attached

Want to Stay

Won't Quit

Search Time

.50

.54
.60

.60
.50
.82

.16
.38
.28
.20

The "search time" measure was scored as 10 minus the reported number of hours spent
searching for a different job, so larger numbers represented fewer hours search, greater
commitment, and less likelihood of turnover. All other measures were seven-point Likerttype scales, high numbers indicating greater commitment.

lated with reward and cost values, but not alternative value or investment
size. Measures of job commitment were significantly correlated with job
satisfaction, reward and cost values, alternative value, and investment
size.
Since this survey was based on single-contact questionnaires, it was
impossible to obtain actual measures of job turnover. However, the job
commitment measures ranged in specificity from abstract notions of
psychological attachment (I am committed to this job, attached to this
job), to down-to-earth assessments of intent to turnover (how long would
you like to stay at this job, how likely is it that you will quit this job in the
near future, how many hours per month on the average have you spent
attempting to find a different job). The correlations among these measures
are displayed in Table 4. As in Experiment 1, the specific measures of
intent to turnover were significantly correlated with the more abstract
measures of psychological job commitment.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the research reported in this paper was to identify a model
capable of predicting job satisfaction, job commitment, and job turnover.
The consistency of the results of the two experiments suggests that the
investment model may be a reasonable means of describing these
phenomena. Job satisfaction was best predicted by job reward and cost
values. Job commitment was predicted by a combination of reward and
cost values, alternative value, and investment size. Thus, while job satisfaction concerns the employee's affective response to the job, and is
related to the positive and negative characteristics of the job, job commitment is additionally influenced by the quality of job alternatives and
the magnitude of the employee's direct and indirect investment in his/her
job. The business analog experiment (Study 1) demonstrated that job
commitment and actual turnover are related, and the survey of union

COMMITMENT AND TURNOVER

93

members (Study 2) indicated that abstract measures of psychological

commitment are correlated with down-to-earth assessments of intent to
turnover. Job commitment was more closely related to turnover than was
job satisfaction. These findings are in complete agreement with the investment model.
These results highlight the investment model assertion that job commitment is a much more complex phenomenon than is job satisfaction.
While satisfaction with a job is primarily a function of the good and bad
qualities.of that job, commitment to a job is additionally influenced by the
quality of the worker's job alternatives and the magnitude of his/her job
investments. These results become especially important in light of evidence that one important job-related behavior--employee turnover--is
more strongly related to commitment than it is to job satisfaction. It might
be fruitful to explore the relationships between the investment model
variables and additional organizational behaviors (e.g., absenteeism, lateness, union participation).
The first study revealed one unexpected finding. Alternative value significantly affected satisfaction, while according to the investment model it
should not. It is possible that changes in alternative value affected satisfaction through their impact on comparison level. Perhaps subjects in an
unfamiliar setting base their expectations (comparison level) primarily on
the alternatives available to them in that setting. Under normal circumstances, however, comparison level should be more stable and satisfaction should not be influenced by a single alternative. Indeed, this is
what was found in Study 2, where satisfaction and alternative value were
not significantly correlated.
These experiments provide useful information that can be applied in
everyday work situations. In the Study of job commitment and turnover,
two variables unrelated to the quality of the work experience, investment
size and alternative value, must be considered in addition to job satisfaction. Fortunately, these variables can be monitored through the observation of tenure patterns and the quality of the general labor market, and
may be manipulated by managers through programs that encourage tenure
(e.g., retirement programs) and by encouraging investments (e.g.,
supplemented home mortgages). As Salincik (1977) notes, employee
commitment may help to sustain action in the face of difficulty and the
temporary decline of reinforcements and rewards.
These findings add much to a literature that has relied primarily on job
satisfaction as a predictor of turnover. The investment model extends our
knowledge of organizational behavior by identifying abstract theoretical
determinants of satisfaction, commitment, and turnover. In addition, the
model is a simple logical approach that organizes previous concrete find-

94

FARRELL AND RUSBULT

ings a n d e x t e n d s a n d f o r m a l i z e s s o m e b a s i c c o n c e p t s o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e
t h e o r y ( K e l l e y a n d T h i b a u t , 1978), a t h e o r y w h i c h has b e e n s h o w n to h a v e
h e u r i s t i c v a l u e a c r o s s a w i d e r a n g e o f social e x c h a n g e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . It is
in a g r e e m e n t w i t h e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n e d w i t h j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n a n d
c o m m i t m e n t , a n d has b e e n s h o w n to p r e d i c t s a t i s f a c t i o n a n d c o m m i t m e n t
in r o m a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( R u s b u l t , 1980) a n d f r i e n d s h i p s ( R u s b u l t , N o t e
1) as well as b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h e r e exists a c l e a r p o t e n t i a l for
a p p l y i n g the m o d e l to o t h e r i s s u e s in the s t u d y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r ,
b o t h t h e o r e t i c a l a n d applied.

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REFERENCE NOTE
1. Rusbult, C. E. Satisfaction and commitment in friendships. Manuscript in review, 1980.