Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Civil
Law; Obligations
and
Contracts; Voidable
Contracts;Sales; Contract
of
Sale;Consideration; The
slight
difference between the market value and the purchase price of the
properties in question may be disregarded considering that the
contracts of sale were executed between the father and the daughter,
in which case, filial love must be taken into consideration.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of
alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing
that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase
price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed
value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second
Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed
value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8.920; Exhibit
4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P24,840, while the purchase price paid
was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the
1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his
wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market
value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson
was only slight, may not be so shocking considering that the sales
were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love
must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Same; Property; Persons and Family Relations; Conjugal
Partnership; Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the application of the presumption in favor of
conjugal partnership.There is another ground relied upon by
petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject
matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the
properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
336
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for petitioner.
Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled
MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA
JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendantappellants, upholding the validity of three (3) documents
questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which
declared them as null and void; and of its resolution, dated
September 30, 1980, denying therein appellees motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina JocsonVasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent
Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra
Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate
estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the
validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed,
by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers
almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3)
share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
assails these documents and prays that they be declared null
and void and the properties subject matter therein be
2
338
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
Records).
340
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and
shall be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners
causes of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of
the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as
when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and
the action for annulment must be brought within four years
from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par.
4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be
contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is
342
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
344
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
345
16, 1989
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de
Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571,
December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs
Torela, No. L-27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly
invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first
present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.
The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests
his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the properties were
acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra).
It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by
Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were
registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,
which explains why he was described in the certificates of
title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title
show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively
Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because the
words married to preceding Alejandra Poblete are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson (Litam v.
Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27,
1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733,
December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is
the owner of the properties, the same having been registered
in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
8
346
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals
SECOND DIVISION.
714
7
14
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals
________________
Justice Jose A.R. Melo, ponente, with Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan and
716
716
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
11
prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566,CA-G.R. No. 11123SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court.
The said petition and the compromise agreement therein
were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court
pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of the
compromise agreement, as follows:
4
Ibid., 75-84.
Ibid., 85-98.
Ibid., 102-105.
Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 122-125.
717
xxx
4. For the best interest of each of them, petitioners have agreed
to dissolve their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets
thereof, under the following terms and conditionsthis document,
a pleading, being intended by them to embody and evidence their
agreement;
1. (a)Petitioners as the parties hereto agree upon the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership during the
marriage and further agree to obtain judicial approval of
their said agreement as provided by Article 191 of the
Civil Code.
2. (b)The following shall be adjudicated to petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason-Toda:
1. (1)Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) to be paid as
follows:
________________
3
pertaining to the estate of petitioner Rose Marie TuasonTodas late brother Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the sum of
P15,749,135.32 as of March 31, 1981all interest and
penalty charges after March 31, 1981 to be the
responsibility of petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
2. (b)P2,000,000.00 to be paid within 30 days after signing of
this agreement.
3. (c)The balance shall be paid within six (6) months after date
of signing of this agreement. If not paid when due, the
balance shall bear interest at 18% per annum until paid
and there shall be a 5% non-payment penalty. The
proceeds from any sale of or loss with respect to, Rubicons
shares in Philippine Air Lines, Inc., shares of Cibeles
Insurance Corporation or Hermana Mayor shall be applied
when received against the aforesaid balance, except to the
extent such proceeds are used to satisfy any
________________
9
Ibid., 110-115.
718
718
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
1. other obligation under this agreement.
2. (2)All shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation registered
solely in the name of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda
whether stock dividends or stocks acquired on pre-emptive
rights including those acquired in the names of both
petitioners Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie TuasonToda (whether jointly or alternately and/or), free from all
liens and encumbrances.
719
720
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
hereto.
The parties then prayed that judgment be rendered:
10
_______________
10
Ibid., 69-73.
11
Ibid., 73.
721
15
_________________
12
Ibid., 22.
13
14
15
Lacson vs. Lacson, et al., 24 SCRA 837 (1968); see also Tolentino,Civil
722
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
16
723
723
16
724
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
________________
17
725
19
10
11
12
20
10
Exhs. Nos. A to D.
11
12
Exh. 6Joson.
796
796
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wong vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
16
17
14
_______________
13
Exh. 4Santos.
14
15
16
Ibid., p. 54.
17
IV had earlier inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case. Hence,
Civil Case No. 2859 was transferred to Branch V of the same court.
797
21
_______________
18
Pursuant to Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals
798
798
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wong vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
22
_______________
19
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa and Leonor Ines Luciano.
799
23
Rollo, p. 56.
800
800
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wong vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
Appellate Court
categorically appeared FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedito
Yumul appeared as counsel for the defendants, but the whole
trouble is that he never expressly manifested to the Court that he
was likewise actually representing defendant ROMARICO
HENSON, for it cannot be disputed that Atty. Yumul only entered
his appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn,
January 26, 1976, Espinosa), who in turn entered his initial
appearance during the pre-trial, and through the filing of an
Answer, for defendant KATRINA HENSON. As a matter of fact
the Power of Attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the pretrial was executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON.
Accordingly, as collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be considered as duly authorized to
formally appear likewise on behalf of defendant ROMARICO
HENSON for whom principal counsel of record Atty. Gregorio
Albino, Jr. never made any formal appearance. On this score, it is
not amiss to state that A spring cannot rise higher than its
source.
Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned joint
affidavit of the spouses KATRINA HENSON and ROMARICO
HENSON, to the effect that our first lawyer in said case was Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime later Atty. Expedito B. Yumul
took over x x x.
That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was
made to sign by Atty. Yumul on August 25, 1977, after the filing of
this case, allegedly for the purpose of dissolving the writ of
execution, as claimed in paragraph XIV of the complaint herein,
and is satisfactorily explained by both plaintiff herein and his wife,
while on cross-examination by Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
802
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wong vs. Intermediate
25
A
Q
Appellate Court
if he was represented by
counsel as a party
defendant?
No, sir, he did not appear.
You are husband and
wife, please tell us the
reason why you have
your own counsel in that
case whereas Romarico
Henson did not appear
nor a counsel did not
appear in that
proceedings? (TSN, Feb.
25, 1980, pp. 6-7).
xxx
xxx
x x x.
Because that case is my
exclusive and personal
case, he has nothing to do
with that, sir. (TSN, Feb.
25, 1980, p. 9).
(Rollo, pp. 17-20)
22
24
_______________
21
Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160
23
75866, February 23, 1989,170 SCRA 563; Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, L-39272,
May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 36.
24
Ver v. Quetulio, G.R. No. 77526, June 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 80.
803
26
27
26
29
30
31
_______________
25
1989, 179 SCRA 109; Ong v. Tating, G.R. No. 61042, April 15, 1987, 149
SCRA 265.
26
Art. 160, Civil Code; Cuenca v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 72321, December 8,
28
29
30
Art. 161, Ibid.; Lacson v. Diaz,L-19346, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 183.
31
804
804
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Wong vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the
proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband, and when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrinas personal obligation to
them.
Petitioners contention that the rights of Santos and Joson
as innocent buyers at the public auction sale may not be
prejudiced, is, to a certain extent, valid. After all, in the
absence of proof that irregularities attended the sale, the
same must be presumed to have been conducted in
accordance with law. There is, however, a peculiar factual
circumstance that goes against the grain of that general
presumptionthe properties levied upon and sold at the
public auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment
debtor. Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
32
33
34
35
Art. 115.
33
34
Art. 168.
35
Art. 174.
805
See: Segura v. Segura, L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368, 374
28
De
los
private
29
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law,
an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the
court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should
govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the
parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and
large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05
January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition; viz:
1
224
224
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
_________________
2
Rollo, p. 22.
225
_________________
Rollo, p. 42.
226
226
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
III
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of
the children wish to stay.
5
31
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
__________________
___________________
7
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
illegitimate:
See Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et al. vs.
227
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
1. (1)Between
collateral
blood
relatives;
whether
legitimate
or
32
228
__________________
228
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
10
4. (9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other,
killed that other persons spouse or his or her own spouse.
8
10
229
33
_______________
11
12
Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraph (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
230
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
34
accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
of each spouse.
231
3. (3)Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive
funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her
exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law
in the conjugal partnership.
_________________
value between the market value of the community property at the time of
6. (6)Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
232
232
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
________________
35
1. funds, if any.
233
15
16
proceeding;
2. (2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership,
_________________
as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
1. revocable; and
14
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
36
15
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
16
o0o
234
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Valdes vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
________________
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed.
THIRD DIVISION.
628
6
28
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of
Appeals
VOL. 266,
6
JANUARY 27, 1997
29
Estonina vs. Court of
Appeals
Atayan of an independent action with the court other than the
one which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were
strangers to Civil Case No. 88430. Such an independent action
cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a
co-equal and coordinate court. While it is true that property in
custody of the law may not be interfered with, without the
permission of the proper court, this rule is confined to cases where
the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the
defendant has proprietary interests. But when the Sheriff, acting
beyond the bounds of his office seizes a strangers property, the
rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not
interference with another courts custody.
Civil Law; Property;Conjugal Partnership; Proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.The
evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the
matter, lead us to concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive
property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly
held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
630
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
1
40
632
632
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
3
Ibid.
633
41
_______________
5
634
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
II.
634
635
635
42
_______________
10
Enterprises, Inc., 217 SCRA 322, 325 [1993]; Guinsatao vs. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 708 [1993];Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
603 [1991]; Radiowealth Finance Company vs. Palileo, 197 SCRA 245 [1991].
10
Gaw vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 405, 413 [1993].
636
636
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
the trial court held that there is no showing at all from said
inscription that said property came from the parents of
Santiago Garcia.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in taking the
stance that the said land was the exclusive property of
13
43
Ibid.
12
13
Ibid.
637
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 333, 344 [1989]; Ong vs. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 297, 302 [1989];Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, 23
SCRA 637 [1968]; Maramba vs. Lozano, et al., 20 SCRA 474 [1967].
15
Ibid.
638
638
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
ties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that
he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
16
18
Ibid., p. 345.
17
Uy, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 275, 281 [1990]; Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991]; Ong vs. Tating, 149
SCRA 265 [1987]; Traders Royal Bank vs. IAC, 133 SCRA 141[1984].
18
639
20
45
_______________
19
20
Ibid., p. 383.
21
640
640
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Estonina vs. Court of Appeals
Chairman), Davide,
22
46
276
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
_______________
277
49
_______________
5
rollo.
278
278
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
_______________
6
279
280
280
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership x x x.
10
11
12
13
10
11
12
13
281
15
16
_______________
14
15
59 OG No. 29,4526.
16
282
282
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
284
284
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the
benefit of third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that
even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for
the family may also result,when the guarantee is in favor of
the husbands employer.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the
respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the
following:
1. (a)The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would
be prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly
salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time
because of the loan he guaranteed;
2. (b)The shares of stock of the members of his family would
appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the
loan obtained;
3. (c)His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and
his career would be boosted should PBM survive because
of the loan.
54
Ansaldo, et al. vs. Liberty Insurance Company, Inc. & Luzon Surety
Company, supra.
286
286
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
Court of Appeals Resolution of Nov. 28, 1994 denying the motion for
21
21
22
288
288
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals
57
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private
respondent and while she was in Manila seeking
employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one
half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence
and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances of this sale
are set forth in the Decision of Respondent Court, which
quoted from the Decision of the trial court as follows:
8
Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendantsspouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also
admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court
(tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although the latter says that they were
married in 1967. The couple have three children, namely: Junie
18 years old, Harriet17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the
youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her
mother testified in court. Sometime on February 14, 1983, the
couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen.
Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from
Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of
sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was
payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor
should vendee fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. 2,
tsn, p. 6, February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie
Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda
Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the one-half portion
[and] built their house thereon (tsn, p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are
thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989.
She was trying to look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal
recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime
in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, x x
x on March 11, 1990. Plaintiffs departure for Manila to look for
work in the Middle East was with the consent of her husband
Judie Corpuz (tsn, p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10, Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz
seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the
time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel,
restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Harriet Corpuz went to
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain,
plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino
Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She
was referred however to the Officer-In-Charge at the time, a
certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that he could not
do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point was not rebutted. The Barangay Captain
who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him
for the annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot
whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26,
1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the
Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners
respondent the following errors:
assign
to
public
10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as
voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned
Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the
execution of the amicable settlement by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside
the findings of the Court a quo which recognized as lawful and
valid the ownership and possession of private respondent over the
remaining one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the
ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the two lower courts:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance
________________
11
382
382
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Guiang vs. Court of Appeals
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
63
12
Rollo, p. 37.
383
________________
14
15
13
14
15
Rollo, p. 38.
384
384
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Guiang vs. Court of Appeals
sion of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision,
to wit:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
64
65
FIRST DIVISION.
571
VOL. 508,
NOVEMBER 29, 2006
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
5
71
572
572
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
_______________
1
Justices Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Arturo D. Brion, concurring; Rollo, pp.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2735.
573
573
Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was
cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in
the names of respondents.
It is petitioners contention that on 2 October 1989, when
her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and
Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his
last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed
of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of
Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 61327. On 22 June
1993, the RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found that the
terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be
complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no
compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Subsequently, on 7 November 1994, this Court, in G.R. No.
5
67
_______________
5
Entitled, Sps. Alfredo S. Ferrer and Josefa Jimenez Ferrer v. Sps. Ismael
R. Ferrer and Flora C. Ferrer and Sps. Manuel M. Ferrer and Virginia Ferrer.
6
Id., at p. 3.
574
574
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
10
11
_______________
8
Id., at p. 20.
10
11
Id., at p. 251.
575
575
68
_______________
12
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(2) of Article 121.
5. (5)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
576
576
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
69
15
_______________
577
577
13
14
Justices
Eliezer
R.
De
Los
Santos
and
Monina
ArevaloZenarosa,
Id., at p. 16.
16
Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for but before filing the answer to
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
579
20
1. (a)That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party;
2. (b)That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim;
3. (c)That venue is improperly laid;
4. (d)That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
5. (e)That there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause;
6. (f)That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations;
7. (g)That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
8. (h)That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has
been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
9. (i)That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
10. (j)That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with.
17
21
_______________
579
71
18
Christian, G.R. No. 161135, 8 April 2005, 455 SCRA 175, 183.
19
580
580
22
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
581
581
_______________
72
582
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Ferrer vs. Ferrer
6
60
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
661
75
________________
1
Fourth
Division
composed
of J.Salome
A.
662
662
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
_______________
3
Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 11. The case was docketed as RTC (of Guian,
Ibid.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
663
76
12
13
14
15
16
17
______________
10
11
Id.
12
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
17
pp. 35-36.
664
664
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
xxx
xxx
xxx
18
________________
18
Supra, p. 1.
19
665
22
________________
20
21
22
Ibid., p.
5,
citing Gregorio
vs.
Court
of
Appeals, 26
SCRA
229(1969); Tinio vs. Mina, 26 SCRA 512(1969); and Billiones vs. CIR, 14
SCRA 674 (1965).
666
666
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
78
24
25
26
24
26
27
San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, specifically, Mayor Efren Loquias, Vice
Mayor Antonio Din, Jr., and Sangguniang Bayan members Angelito Martinez
II, Lovelyn Biador and Gregorio Faciol.
667
29
30
______________
27
28
_______________
23
Ibid., see also Sps. Valentin Ortiz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65; Section 3 of Rule 46; and Section 5 of Rule 7
79
30
I. Antonio Docena, of legal age, Filipino, after being duly sworn, hereby depose and
state that:
1. 1.I am one of the petitioners in the above entitled case;
2. 2.I and my co-petitioner wife caused the preparation of the above petition and
have read the same;
3. 3.All the material allegations contained are true and correct based on our
knowledge and based on official records. The annexes attached to the
petition are duplicate original copies or true copies of the pleadings filed
with Regional Trial Court or orders issued by the said court inCivil Case
32
33
_______________
No. 446.
4. 4.I further certify that I and my co-petitioner wife have not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in this petition
within five (5) days from notice of any similar action or proceeding which may
668
668
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
Petitioner
31
32
Tinitigan, 100 SCRA 619 (1980), at p. 631. It should be noted, however that
under the New Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent, subject only to certain
exceptions specified in the law. [Heirs of Christina Ayuste vs. Court of
Appeals, 313 SCRA 493(1999), at p. 499.]
33
Bank, 118 SCRA 330(1982), at pp. 334 to 335; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 192 (1985), at p. 210; Stasa Incorporated vs. Court of
Appeals,182 SCRA 879 (1990).
669
80
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of nonforum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as
the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone,
without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an
interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the
husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal
property belongs to the husband and the wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance
where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to
the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that
even
34
35
36
_______________
34
Neither this petition nor the original case filed with the regional trial
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision is found in Article 96.
36
670
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Docena vs. Lapesura
_______________
37
Kavinta vs. Castillo, Jr., 249 SCRA 604 (1995), at p. 608; Loyola vs.
1999 and September 9, 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE and the
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman),Vitug, Panganiban andSandoval
Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.
Petition granted, resolutions set aside. Case remanded to
Court of Appeals.
Notes.A partys failure to state in the certificate of nonforum shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court of
any petition which might be filed, as required under Revised
Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked where it does not
appear that any petition related to the case has ever been
filed in any other court. (Cabardo vs. Court of Appeals, 290
SCRA 131 [1998])
Compliance with the certification against forum shopping
is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forum
shopping itself. (Melo vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA
94 [1999])
The fact that a party was abroad when the petition for
certiorari was filed is a reasonable cause to exempt him from
compliance with the requirement that he personally execute
the certification on non-forum shopping. (Hamilton vs.
Levy,344 SCRA 821 [2000])
o0o
82
FIRST DIVISION.
499
VOL. 374,
JANUARY 23, 2002
Jader-Manalo vs.
Camaisa
4
99
5
00
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jader-Manalo vs.
Camaisa
______________
1
501
84
6th
month
12th
month
18th
month
Taytay
Property
P
200,000.00
700,000.00
Makati
Property
P 300,000.00
1,600,000.00
10
500,000.00
______________
2
Id.
Supra, Note 4.
502
502
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
11
12
13
14
15
______________
85
11
12
13
14
15
Id., at p. 143.
503
______________
16
17
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
17
18
93-94.
21
19
20
21
Rollo, p. 186.
504
504
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa
1. 2.Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant
spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fees.
22
22
505
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it
entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent spouses
there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that
the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner
and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact
necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one
granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there
are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and
that therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both
parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the
facts involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the
sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and
respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto
24
87
Rollo, p. 23.
24
506
506
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa
fected such that the latter could no longer back out of the
agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
______________
25
507
______________
26
Arturo Tolentino, Vol. I, p. 461 citing the case of Nicolas vs. Court of
Appeals, 154 SCRA 635 (1987) which held that:
. . . the very conspicuous absence of the wifes conforme to such
508
508
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Casano vs. Magat
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.,
Chairman), Puno, Pardo andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.A motion for summary judgment is premised on
the assumption that a scrutiny of the facts will disclose that
the issues presented need not be tried either because these
are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine
issue as to any pertinent factit is a method sanctioned by
the Rules of Court for prompt disposition of a civil action
where there exists no serious controversy. (Raboca vs.
Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000])
It is axiomatic under the law on procedure that a
summary judgment is a final disposition in a legal suit which
can be rectified by means of an appeal therefrom. (Aqualyn
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 307[1992])
o0o
89