Professional Documents
Culture Documents
goals, the Crown published a set of formal rules, regulations, incentives, suggestions, and mining advice for the azufreros: the Sulphur Ordinances of . In this
article I argue that the ordinances, as an arm of the Bourbon Reforms, successfully
drove the expansion of sulphur mining during the late eighteenth century by increasing the number and size of the mines. I explore the geographical expansion of
the industry, specically detailing the mechanisms that inspired sulphur prospecting and mining development, and thus, overall production.
As for the second goal, contraband sulphur mining continued to pose problems
for the monopoly even after the Sulphur Ordinances outlined harsh penalties for
illegal possession and/or mining of sulphur. My analysis reveals why contraband
sulphur mining continued to proliferate after the ordinances were issued and how
royal administrators confronted this black-market industry. Although legal sulphur
mining oered some institutional advantages over contraband trade (Ebert ),
the incentives oered by the Sulphur Ordinances favored large landowning azufreros
over small-scale prospectors. The imbalance encouraged small-scale, illegal sulphur
mining. Although historical research on colonial contraband continues to be an
extremely elusive issue (Baskes , ), this article oers insight into why clandestine mining occurred and how colonial administrators responded to the challenges
of controlling it.
Finally, I investigate whether commodity producers, in this case the azufreros,
were passive victims of colonial domination and a repressive monopoly system. In
the case of the tobacco monopoly, for example, the complex relationships between
royal administrators and producers demonstrate a mixture of deance and resistance, as well as accommodation (Deans-Smith ). In addition, other studies
propose that Latin American producers were much more than simple marionettes
set to dance by overseas commands and demands and that producers often played
enterprising, dening, and even controlling roles (Topick, Marichal, and Frank
, ).
Although I found little evidence to support a controlling role by producers,
the azufreros did develop and exercise codependent relationships with royal administrators that were critical to the functioning of the monopoly. Fully aware the
Crown was in desperate need of sulphur and gunpowder for its military and silver
blast-mining industries, azufreros exercised considerable leverage during contract
negotiations over mining quotas and sales prices for the mineral. Although the Crown
and its colonial administration were the nal word on mining-contract details, the
azufreros indeed played enterprising and dening roles, often receiving important
concessions from the Crown.
Over the almost three-hundred-year-long colonial periodadministrators sought to control the discovery, extraction, and redistribution of New Spains
natural resources through a system of royal monopolies. Historical studies of these
resource monopolies focus on economic, administrative, and bureaucratic aspects
of key revenue-generating commodities, especially those with export potential, such
as silver (Topick, Marichal, and Frank ). The extraction and minting of New
World silver was by far the largest source of wealth for the Spanish Empire, for it
largely nanced the expansion and settlement of New Spain (Marichal and Mantecn
; Jones ). Early geographical studies of individual silver-mining districts
document the settlement and northward expansion of mining communities (Wagner
; West ); more recent research considers the impacts of silver smelting and
rening on environmental degradation (Studnicki-Gizbert and Schecter ). Silver mining in New Spain was indeed an important colonial industry that demanded
both the principal attention of the Spanish government and much of the subsequent historical and geographical research on colonial resource extraction (Brading
; Stein and Stein ).
The Crown also monopolized other protable or useful mineral and nonmineral resources, either as nished products or as complementary goods. Mercury mining was essential for the processing of silver and gold (Heredia Herrera
; Gonzlez ); copper and tin mining proved critical to Spains European
war eorts (Barrett ). The tobacco monopoly was second only to silver tithes in
generating royal revenue and was one of the largest organized industries in late
colonial Mexico (Deans-Smith ; Nater ). The Crown monopolized New
World dyes, including cochineal and indigo, and found exuberant European markets ready to pay a premium for them (Lee ; Marichal ; McCreery ).
Domestically, in New Spain the Crown monopolized the sale of alcoholic drinks
from agave, issuing lucrative sales contracts to only a few prominent families (Kicza
). Even snow and ice from mountaintops were the providence of the Crown, as
luxury items whose distribution rights colonial administrators auctioned o to only
a select few (Gonzlez de la Vara ). The breadth and diversity of naturalresource monopolies in New Spain demonstrate wide-ranging royal appetites for
New World commodities.
Within this diverse range of natural resource monopolies were smaller, less conspicuous colonial industries; namely, those without sucient economic importance,
large bureaucracies, or historic transatlantic ties to have generated a wealth of archival materials and, perhaps consequentially, interest among researchers. Many of
these resource monopolies are absent from the oft-cited tables and charts compiled
by Fabian de Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutia ([] ), Alexander von Humboldt (), and more recently, John TePaske and Herbert Klein (). The original primary sources these studies consultedroyal accounting books and yearly
sales chartsdo not include all resource monopolies in their revenue tables. Thus
many of the lesser colonial resource monopolies are absent from modern historical-economic or geographical studies.
Analysis of human and environmental aspects of the lesser resource monopolies therefore requires research in primary sources beyond the original revenue tables
and sales charts. The written correspondences between producers and colonial administrators related to the identication and development of resource deposits, applications for royal business contracts, contraband investigations, and legal
proceedings, for example, provide valuable data on the origins and development of
these lesser industries. In this article I demonstrate that, although these resource
monopolies provided little revenue for the Crown and were absent from the Royal
Treasurys books, many were far from unimportant industries.
Two notable examples of lesser resource industries that, to date, have escaped
in-depth historical or geographical inquiry are the Crowns monopolies on sulphur
and saltpeter (potassium nitrate)the two critical ingredients in gunpowder production, which, incidentally, was also a colonial monopoly (Lewis ; Villar Ortiz
; Nez ). Gunpowder was essential for New Spains military and silver
blast-mining industries, and although the Crown often included gunpowder sales
in its revenue tables (TePaske and Klein ), its component ingredients provided
little direct revenue and were therefore absent. As part of a larger project on the
human and biophysical ecology of New Spains explosives industry, I investigated
the archival record for evidence of one of these lesser industriessulphur
miningand how the Crown dealt with consistent problems of sulphur supply.
I begin by reviewing one of the few published works, colonial or otherwise,
that mentions the subject of sulphur mining in New SpainAlexander von
Humboldts Political Essay on New Spain (). After analyzing Humboldts brief
work on sulphur, I explore the archival record for additional evidence of the six
colonial sulphur mines, examining their ecological origins, their relative importance, and the challenges the Crown faced in developing them. Through these
case studies, which represent the complete available archival record, I trace the
origins and development of the monopoly. I conclude that, although the Sulphur
Ordinances of resulted in improved production, the harsh regulations and
strict mining protocols that the Crown mandated were incompatible with New
Spains geographical realities.
Humboldts Observations
Having an acute interest in New Spains mineral resources, the Prussian polymath
Alexander von Humboldt made a passing note about colonial sulphur mining on
his journey through the region. The few sentences he wrote represent the
most complete published record of the industry to date. Humboldt noted that sulphur abounded in the volcanoes of Orizaba [Citlaltpetl] and Puebla [Popocatpetl], in the province of San Luis near Colima, and especially in the intendency
of Guadalajara, where rivers bring down considerable masses of it, and that it came
quite puried from the town of San Luis Potos (, ).
The only one of these locations I veried is San Luis Potos, which is probably a
reference to the Guascam mines of Guadalcazar. Humboldts observations that
sulphur abounded in Citlaltpetl and Popocatpetl are odd, given that the rst successful scientic exploration of Popocatpetls crater occurred in , a monumental event recorded in both Mexican and international literature (smge [] ;
Garca Cubas , ; Farrington , ). Archival documents also state,
denitively, that postconquest sulphur mining in Popocatpetl did not begin until
, after a thorough investigative period (smge , ). Furthermore, ap-
plications for establishing sulphur mines in the crater of Citlaltpetl rst begin to
appear in , more than eighty years after Humboldts brief visit (ascjn , ).
Although in he certainly was privy to information not present today
in the archival record, it is equally likely that, given his expertise as a mineralogist
and his interest in volcanic environments, he simply assumed that sulphur was located at some of these places (Humboldt ). He believed that no one had successfully ascended to the summit of Popocatpetl since the time of the
conquistadores, a belief that, at least supercially, conicts with his certainty that
sulphur abounded in the volcano (, ). Furthermore, it is doubtful that
Humboldt came across information on sulphur in the historical record because he
does not mention the mines of Taximaroa, Atlixco, Tlalpopoca, Zacatln, or
Huamantla, which I investigated thoroughly. Although Humboldts greater work is
indispensable, the extant archival record oers a more complete understanding of
New Spains sulphur-mining industry.
Early Colonial Sulphur Mining and Gunpowder Production
Archival documents do, however, support Humboldts observations that most sulphur mined in New Spain was of volcanic origin, often found within the craters of
volcanoes, condensed around geothermal vents, or in deposits of porous rock. When
sulphur was commingled with other debris, azufreros mined the materials with
picks and shovels, ground and mixed them in water, and then distilled the solution
through a series of ovens and containers. Azufreros then transported the rened
mineral to Mexico City and sold it to the Royal Gunpowder Factory (agn b).
The following analysis reveals this process was labor intensive, relatively unprotable,
and often contentious.
Geographical challenges aected the development of New Spains sulphurmining industry from the time of the earliest available records. Formal organization of the industry appears to have been scant until , when workers built the
rst explosives factory adjacent to Chapultepec Hill near Mexico City (Fonseca and
Urrutia [] , ). Before that time, administrators manufactured gunpowder on the roofs of royal buildings until repeated res and explosions prompted
ocials to move the production and storage sites to the outskirts of the city. There,
the forests of Chapultepec could supply the charcoal necessary for gunpowder production, and the rebuilt aqueduct could provide water to run the powder mill (Villar
Ortiz , ). From this strategic location, the Royal Gunpowder Factory collected sulphur along with the other essential ingredients of gunpowder and shipped
both sulphur and gunpowder across its empire to controlled points of distribution
(agn c). By this number had risen, domestically, to at least distribution
points, which the Crown managed through centralized administrative oces (Figure ).
Upon receiving sulphur and gunpowder from Chapultepec, this network of administrative oces and distribution points provided both Spains military and the
growing silver-mining industry with explosives.2 In eect, azufreros transported sul-
Fig. New Spains sulphur mines and sulphur-distribution network in . In addition to the Royal Gunpowder Factory in
Mexico City and sulphur mines, administrative oces, independent administrators, and distribution points are shown. The
links between Mexico City and the administrative oces are omitted for clarity. Source: . (Cartography by the author)
phur from their mines to Mexico City at their own expense, only to have the same
sulphur, along with nished gunpowder, transported back to areas often much closer
to the original sulphur mines than to the Royal Gunpowder Factory, but this time
with a signicant increase in price to cover the Crowns added transportation costs
(agn d). Partly as a result of this ineciency, contraband sulphur proliferated.
Sulphur abounded in New Spain (Fonseca y Urrutia [] , ), but the legal
framework designed to deal with this geographical reality produced a generally
inecient system of control. In spite of itself, and the thriving contraband trade,
the royal monopoly was able to meet the Crowns basic needs.
zacatln, puebla
Although documents in Mexicos Archivo General de la Nacin mention the importance of sulphur shipments for New Spains gunpowder industry as early as
, the exact origins of these shipments remain obscure. Not until the s do
sources reveal the specic locations of the earliest sulphur mines in New Spain and
oer some glimpses into how colonial administrators utilized them. These rst accounts mention a mining operation in , just north of the Tlaxcala region in
Zacatln, Puebla. Here, the indigenous workers who mined sulphur from nearby
mountains demanded that they be paid more equitable wages for their labor in the
mines. Juan de Ortega Baldivia, administrator of the Royal Gunpowder Factory,
appears to have heeded the requests, for he ordered that the miners be paid a new
wage of three reales per day (agn ).3
Twenty-two years later, in , another dispute arose in Zacatln between the
owner of a sulphur minewhether it is the same mine is unclearGregorio de vila,
and a lessee, Pedro Garca de Sotomayor, over mining rights and payments. A royal
order resolved the dispute, mandating that Sotomayor pay pesos to vila as compensation for his management of the mines (agn ). Additional sources detail a
lengthy trial involving witnesses and interrogations regarding vilas business dealings (agn ), but they give few relevant details about sulphur mining, except that
the mines were about kilometers from Zacatln in some mountains with high
sulphur content (agn ).
Because these are the only available clues to sulphur mining in seventeenthcentury New Spain, judging the importance of the Zacatln site(s) alone is dicult.
Sotomayors payment to vila of pesos was a signicant amount for that
timeworth approximately pounds of nished gunpowder or days of Indian laborand this suggests that mining operations in Zacatln may have been
signicant. Other documents point to the growing importance of New Spains sulphur trade during the seventeenth century and the increasing shipments from the
Royal Gunpowder Factory (agn ; Villar Ortiz , ), but they do not
specify the sulphurs provenance. Not until the early s does the archival record
provide additional information on sulphur mines. Given their apparent stages of
development at that point, however, some of these mines likely yielded sulphur to
the Crown much earlier.
maravatotaximaroa, michoacn
As part of the Purpechan (Tarascan) Empire, the Maravato-Taximaroa region
now eastern Michoacnplayed a key role in early Spanish exploration and silver
and copper mining (Wagner ; Gerhard , ; Craig and West ). However, evidence of sulphur mining there is elusive until (Prez Escutia , ).
Archival accounts reveal an extensive regional operation.
With picks and shovels, azufreros mined sulphur around sulphuric geysers and
the lake known as Los Azufres, near the towns of Agua Fra, Jaripeo, Zitcuaro, and
Ucareo (agn ). Miners also extracted sulphur from the craters of Las Humaredas (the smoker) and El Chillador (the screamer) volcanoes, the latter named for
the sound made by sulphuric fumes escaping from between volcanic rocks. Upon
rising and cooling from the geysers and volcanoes, vapors condensed and yellow
sulphur crystals fell to the ground, where miners collected them or dug for older
deposits in other extinct volcanoes of the region (Figures and ) (Guadalupe
Romero , ; Bancroft , ; Cardona , ). By the middle of
the eighteenth century the Taximaroa mines provided the bulk of New Spains sulphur for gunpowder production. Yet, despite the importance of the Taximaroa mines,
the Crown was dissatised with the amount and quality of sulphur they produced
for the Royal Gunpowder Factory (agn e).
The Search for More Sulphur and the Ordinances of
Throughout the colonial period New Spain produced an insucient amount and
quality of sulphur to meet the growing demands of the Spanish Empire (agn f).
Sulphur was an essential ingredient in gunpowder explosives, whose strategic importance had been increasing from two main sectors. First, Spains military was
demanding more of the mineral to produce high-quality gunpowder for its armaments. Second, the burgeoning silver-mining industry demanded more and more
inexpensive gunpowder for blasting through rock. Accordingly, Jos de Glvez, inspector general of New Spains colonial monopolies, wrote and distributed the Sulphur Ordinances of . The ordinances were one small part of a comprehensive
legislative plan to modernize the Spanish Empire. Collectively, historians refer to
these legislative measures as the Bourbon Reforms (Florescano and Gil Snchez
). As the Bourbon Reforms pertain to sulphur mining, regulatory measures
appear to have driven the geographical expansion of sulphur mining, both improving the Crowns resources and enabling a reduction in the price of sulphur (agn
a). In turn, the expanded gunpowder industry helped improve royal solvency in
the short term by contributing to the eighteenth-century silver bonanza through
price incentives on gunpowder sales to silver miners, who used the explosive to
increase yields (Fonseca and Urrutia [] , ; West , , ; LaFevor
). But because of chronically insucient gunpowder supplies for the military,
royal gunpowder production was barely enough to avoid military defeat against
Great Britain in the Caribbean region during the s and early s (Lewis ,
). The Crown blamed the poor quality of gunpowder on insucient sulphur
Fig. An active sulphuric geyser, approximately meters wide, in Los Azufres National Park,
Michoacn, Mexico. (Photograph by the author, June )
Fig. The mouth of a ooded colonial sulphur mine, approximately meters wide, near
Taximaroa, in Los Azufres National Park. (Photograph by the author, June )
peso ne, at that time worth approximately tons of rened sulphur. Azufreros
who could not pay the ne were to receive a four-year jail term, followed by an
eight-year sentence for a second infraction (agn f). These punitive measures
illustrate how intently, at least rhetorically, the Crown sought to prohibit contraband sulphur mining.
At the Chapultepec factory an administrator measured the quantity and grade
of the sulphur, and azufreros received payment in the form of a coupon, redeemable at the Royal Treasury (agn f). Glvez wrote that, despite better earnings
for sulphur in the past, the price would henceforth be xed without harm to the
Royal Treasury or detriment to the azufreros (Fonseca and Urrutia [] ,
). Later administrators appear to have prioritized the former, for after the reforms archival sources detail tough negotiations between azufreros and Chapultepec administrators over sulphur-mining contracts, prices, and quotas. The sales
price for sulphur dropped from ten pesos per hundredweight to between six and
seven per hundredweight after the reforms, depending on the contract details
and the yearly quotas assigned to dierent mines (agn a). The shrewdness of
the Crown in these matters, combined with the increase in sulphur supplies and
the resulting downward push in pricing, probably detracted from the appeal of
sulphur prospecting, a fact intimated in several pieces of correspondence between
mine owners and Chapultepec ocials (agn ). But despite the declining protability of sulphur mining for the azufreros, the net eect of the ordinances appears to have been a modest expansion of available sulphur resources for the
Crown.
Geographical Expansion of Sulphur Mining
atlixco, puebla
In Glvez wrote that azufreros had recently discovered a promising new mine
near Atlixco, Puebla, at the eastern foot of Popocatpetl. The sulphur from this site
was purportedly of a higher quality than any from Taximaroa (agn e). In
Juan de Echeveste, administrator of the Royal Gunpowder Factory, wrote to Agustn
Ortiz, owner of the Atlixco mine, stating that the factory faced an acute shortage of
sulphur that year and that administrators greatly desired his high-quality sulphur.
Echeveste called for the immediate increase in provision of sulphur from Atlixco,
noting that the mine had been able to produce a better quality and a greater abundance than in the recent past and that a new delay in shipments was unacceptable.
Ortiz responded that the production problems had been due to the illness of his
entire family (agn ).
Despite all of this, by , during correspondence concerning an application
for another mine, Echeveste mentioned that the sulphur of the Atlixco mine had
been exhausted (agn b). Because no additional accounts of sulphur mining in
Atlixco are available, the mine so eagerly prospected during the s and s was
probably short-lived.
huamantla, tlaxcala
Correspondence concerning a newly discovered mine in Huamantla, Tlaxcala, demonstrates the lengths to which a landowner might go to bargain with the Royal
Gunpowder Factory over a mining contract. In , a two-year-long process of
applying for legal mining status and bargaining over the sales price of sulphur began between Miguel Bernardo Yllescas, owner of the hacienda at Santa Mara
Magdalena Xonecuila, near Huamantla, Tlaxcala, and Juan de Echeveste.
Yllescas had sent a Chapultepec ocial named Salvador Dampierre a sample of
sulphur from a mountain approximately kilometers from the formers hacienda.
Given the location of the hacienda, which is now a tourist destination, Yllescas was
probably referring to Malintzn (Malinche) volcano as the source. Dampierre quoted
Yllescas a sales price of between seven and eight pesos per hundredweight for the
sample he provided along with his licensing application. Echeveste spent the next
two years trying to reduce Dampierres imprudent oer to six pesos per hundredweight. Yllescas, however, let it be known in his letters to Echeveste that he knew the
Crown was in dire need of sulphur and that before the Sulphur Ordinances the
miners of Taximaroa had generously received ten pesos per hundredweight. He
also reasoned, strangely, that because the owner of some mines in San Luis Potos,
who was receiving seven pesos per hundredweight, had recently died, a price of six
and one-half pesos would be a fair compromise (agn a).
As a result of this bargaining attempt, Echeveste sent an angry letter to Yllescas
stating the Crown still was able to obtain large quantities of high-quality sulphur
from the San Luis Potos mines. He doubted that Yllescas could provide the quantity of sulphur he promised, and furthermore, that because of Yllescass insolence
during the bargaining process, the license would be denied. Yllescass mine was to
be closed immediately in order to prevent him from selling sulphur as contraband
(agn c).
The mine was apparently not closed, however. A nal letter from an Echeveste
subordinate from the scal division of the Royal Treasury granted the license to Yllescas
with the repeated condition that all sulphur be sent to the Royal Gunpowder Factory,
again expressing the dire need for sulphur. In February , two years after the application process had begun, administrators nally granted Yllescas a contract to sell
sulphur at six and one-half pesos per hundredweight to the factory, provided that its
quality was as good as the sample he had originally provided (agn d).
The Huamantla case oers a glimpse into the interactions between private
landowners and the factorys administration, demonstrating the relatively strong
hand of the former in light of the Crowns desperation for sulphur, paralleling a
similar desperation for saltpeter and gunpowder during the postreform period
(Lewis ). Echeveste did not easily dissuade Yllescas from Dampierres original oer; only after a noticeably hostile letter and the threat of closing the mine
did the parties nally agree on a contractand for an amount greater than what
Echeveste wished. During the correspondence Echeveste based his principal ar-
Fig. A rare example of a nancing contract for sulphur mining in Taximaroa, Michoacn.
Source: [] . (Reproduced with permission from the Archivo General de la Nacin,
Mexico City)
Fig. An unusually large payment to the Guascam, San Luis Potos, mines during the nal days
of the Spanish colony. Source: [] . (Reproduced with permission from the Archivo General
de la Nacin, Mexico City)
and three children, that he did not fully understand the charges against him, and
that putting him in prison would leave his family destitute. The attorney also argued that the infraction was relatively minor because Santos Corts was a rst-time
oender who had mined only a small amount of sulphur. Moreover, the twentyve-year-old did not deserve the penalty of ve years in an African jail, a curious
idea that a local ocial had proposed (agn b). Through this defense and the
fact that Santos Corts had already been in prison for six months while awaiting
trial, de la Vega appears to have had the sentence commuted after authorities credited Santos Corts for time served. Authorities sentenced two of the accomplices to
one year of unspecied public service and warned Santos Corts that they would
apply the full penalties specied in the ordinances if he again mined sulphur without a license (agn c).
The Tlalpopoca case contrasts with the Ucareo example, in which the authorities applied the ordinances more strictly: Santos Corts and his associates did in
fact receive punishment that included jail time and public service. Although this
may indicate that landowners received preferential treatment when compared with
the landless Indian Santos Corts, de la Vega nonetheless used ethnicity as a defense tool, referring to Santos Cortss minority status, to the fact that Spanish was
his second language, and to several of the Laws for Indians which mandated that
they not be as harshly punished, especially nancially, as non-Indians (agn b).
Several previous studies of New Spains judicial system also reect this general fairness toward Indians (Borah ; Kanter ; Owensby ). In any case, and
despite the spurious distinctions that can be drawn between the two, both cases
demonstrate that the Crown allowed some degree of leniency with regard to the
strict implementation of the Sulphur Ordinances.
Geographical Eects of the Sulphur Ordinances
My research revealed two distinct stages of development in New Spains sulphurmining industry. Before the Sulphur Ordinances of the Crown consistently
utilized only one network of sulphur mines, those of Taximaroa, Michoacn. Inspector General Jos de Glvez declared production from these sites to be insucient and sought to expand sulphur-mining operations to other regions. After the
ordinances were issued the number and size of mines increased. This expansion
improved the Crowns resources and enabled a reduction in the purchase price of
sulphur. During the postordinance period large landowners who survived the strict
new licensing process continued to prot from legal sulphur mining. A negative
side eect of the ordinances, however, was that they eectively forced landless, smallscale miners to mine sulphur clandestinely, which resulted in a thriving contraband
sulphur industry.
Geographical factors, including long distances between the Royal Gunpowder
Factory and the widely dispersed sulphur markets, chronic problems with colonial
transportation (Surez Arguello ), and the plentiful volcanic sulphur deposits
in distant regions made centralized control of the industry from Mexico City dicult
Fig. References to sulphur and numbers of pages containing data on sulphur mines, shipments,
and contraband found in archival records for New Spain, . (Graph by the author)
and distribution points and would have mitigated contraband trade. Although the
ordinances did improve overall sulphur production, the unintended consequences
of the legislation included a thriving contraband industry and, ultimately, a messy
and inecient management of the monopoly.
Notes
. This economic growth does not appear to have translated into economic development, however (Garner and Stefanou , ).
. The Crown also sold sulphur to hospitals and gunpowder to reworks manufacturers, although
documents reveal less about these transactions than they do about sales to the mining districts (agn
).
. In colonial Mexico, eight reales was equivalent to one peso, or piece of eight. The peso was
roughly equivalent in value to the thaler (dollar) in Europe and the English colonies of North America
at the time.
. Fonseca and Urrutia also mentioned a mine near San Luis Potos at this time, but I could not
conrm this claim in the archives ([] ). The reference appears only in their later compilation
of materials on the Royal Treasury, and not in Glvezs original ordinances. According to what I found,
licensing applications for sulphur mining near San Luis Potos began in , almost ten years after
Glvez wrote the Sulphur Ordinances (agn ).
. This and all other translations in this article are mine.
. Humboldt estimated the amount of contraband gunpowder consumed in the silver mines compared with that legally sold by the Crown was about four to one (Humboldt , ). If Humboldts
comparison were remotely accurate and this ratio extended to account for the sulphur involved in
gunpowder production, it is further evidence that a secondary market for contraband sulphur ourished.
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