The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier, 1772-1779

Author(s): Allan J. Kuethe

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Aug., 1970), pp. 467-481
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2512192 .
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The Pacification Campaign on the

Riohacha Frontier, 1772-1779
ALLAN J. KUETHE*

colonial period, royal governmentin

the Viceroyalty of New Granada conducted vigorous
pacification campaigns against hostile Indians on two
separate frontiers. The better known of these endeavors was waged
in the Isthmus of Darien beginning in 1785.1 The other was launched
during the preceding decade in the province of Riohacha. Until the
present that action has remained obscure, and it is the subject of the
present article.
The campaigns in New Granada were only part of a widespread
intensification of frontier operations in the Spanish Empire during
the closing decades of the eighteenth century. In New Spain, for
example, the royal government conducted extensive actions on the
northern frontier, which Teodoro de Croix highlighted with his pacification efforts, 1776-1783, as commandant general of the Interior
Provinces. And in Rio de la Plata the authorities waged a wide
variety of operations in Mendoza, Cordoba, and Buenos Aires, from
the 1770s into the last decade of the century.3 The distinguishing
characteristic of these new frontier actions was the preponderant role
played by military force, betraying an increasingly secular approach
to the problem of unpacified Indians. The late eighteenth-century
campaigns involved large contingents of armed forces, frequently used
in an offensive capacity, while missionaries, who had traditionally
borne the main responsibility for pacification, found themselves relegated to a secondary position at best. The frontier campaign in the
province of Riohacha provides an interesting illustration of such a
shift in emphasis.
Riohacha was located on New Granada's Caribbean coast between
URING TUE LATE

Professor of History at Texas Tech University.

de las expediciones militares al Dari6n en
1785-86," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XVIII (Sevilla, 1961), 333-416.
B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New
2 Alfred
Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, 1941).
Comadran Ruiz, "IEn Torno al problema del Indio en el Rio de la
8 Jorge
Plata," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XII (Seville, 1955), 39-74.
*The author is Assistant

1 Manuel Luengo Mufioz, "Genesis

468

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ALLAN J. KUETHE

the provinces of Santa Marta in the west and Maracaibo in the east.
The northern coast of the viceroyalty was of primary military importance to the Spanish Empire, both because it shielded transportation routes into the upland interior and because it lay near the
strategic crossroads to the Pacific Ocean, the Isthmus of Panama.
Long afflicted by foreign marauders, the coastal area experienced
direct attack during the War of Jenkins' Ear at the hands of Spain's
foremost colonial rival, Great Britain, which scored preliminary
victories on the Isthmus of Panama and then in 1741 launched a fullscale assault upon the city of Cartagena. The viceroyalty managed to
repulse that invasion, but the margin of victory was dangerously
small, and Spain remained fearful that her archenemy might strike
again at South America through New Granada. The British capture
of Havana in 1762 during the Seven Years' War reinforced that
concern, and thereafter the security of the Caribbean provinces, including Riohacha, took on additional significance.4
For military purposes, Riohacha formed part of the Commandancy
General of Cartagena, as did Santa Marta. Cartagena was the key
defense base and stronghold of coastal New Granada, and following
the Seven Years' War Spain maintained from one to two battalions
of regular troops there on a permanent basis as part of an intensified
defense program. In addition, the crown often supplemented these
forces with rotating battalions, based in Spain, but dispatched to
America in time of need. Cartagena frequently had to share its
troops with the commandancy general 's subsidiary provinces, although Santa Marta normally maintained a contingent of several
companies in its own right. Riohacha, however, did not possess a
separate regular garrison.5
The source of Indian trouble in Riohacha was the Guajiros, who
occupied most of the province and had long resisted efforts to fasten
royal control upon them. They were a nomadic people, dependent
mainly upon cattle herding, hunting, and gathering, and their mobility and the geographical features of the region made them nearly immune to outside conquest. They lived on a dry, open grassland
spotted by trees and streams. To the south rugged hill and mountain
country afforded a refuge in case of danger. Here the Guajiros could
easily detect and elude invaders and at the same time command an
excellent position for counterattack. Against this tribe the govern4 Allan James Kuethe, " The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of New
Granada, 1773-1796" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1967), chapter 1.
5 Ibid.
6 A valuable description of the Guajiros and their domain can be found in

THE PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER

469

ment could maintain only one stronghold in the area, the coastal city
of Riohacha on the western fringe of the province; elsewhere, and
especially on the Guajira Peninsula which extends northeastward
from that city, the Indians were firmly in control.
While there were troublesome Indians other than those around
Riohacha, the authorities had come to regard the Guajiros as a special
menace to the security of the viceroyalty because they commanded
the coast and particularly because they had formed a close relationship with citizens of Spain's dangerous rival, Great Britain.7 On the
one hand, they defied and harassed the local Spanish authorities at
will. On the other hand, they were known to maintain a thriving commerce with English and Dutch merchants from whom they obtained
ample quantities of firearms and other supplies. Worse, during the
Seven Years' War the Guajiros were believed to have provided some
600 head of beef to the British Caribbean fleet.8 These circumstances
were intolerable and seemed to call for military punishment. Riohacha was in effect a dangerous soft spot in the viceroyalty's line of
coastal defenses.
Viceroy Manuel Guirior, who assumed office in 1772, devised a
major pacification program for the Guajiro Indians. His plan consisted of concerted action from three sources: the armed forces, missionaries, and colonists. In his scheme of operations he assigned a
preponderant role to the military, which was to occupy strategic locations within hostile territory, construct and garrison fortified towns,
and then from these bases coerce the Indians into an acceptable pattern of life. Behind this protective shield would function missionaries
to propagate the Catholic faith and Spanish culture and colonists to
populate the land and promote its economic development. Guirior's
program followed nearly a century of unsuccessful efforts to subdue
the Guajiros, first in the missionary field and then by outright military conquest. The events surrounding these failures merit consideration because both efforts influenced his program.
Just before the beginning of the eighteenth century, Capuchin
missionaries had undertaken the pacification of the Guajiros by conversion. While at times during the ensuing decades this action may
Eliseo Reclus, Viaje a la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Biblioteca Popular de
Cultura Colombiana, CXII (Bogota', 1947), 81-97.
' Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandon, "Estado del virreinato de Santafe,
Nuevo Reino de Granada, .... afio de 1772," Boletin de Historia y Antigiedades,
XXIII (Bogota', 1936), 564-567, 572-577.
8 Governor Antonio de Narvavez y la Torre to Viceroy Manuel Flores, Riohacha,
August 6, 1779, in Jose Felix Blanco and Ram6n Azpuruia (comps.), Documentos
para la historia de la vida pixhlica del Libertador . . . (Caracas, 1875-1878), I,
187-188.

470

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ALLAN J. KUETHE

have given the government a small inroad into the province, it was
nevertheless far from successful. Even the missionaries themselves
soon shed their illusions about the extent of their progress and frequently lamented that they served no other purpose than bearing
witness to Guajiro insolence and mischief.9 Moreover, they and a
small number of settlers who also managed to enter the region were
there only upon the sufferance of the Guajiros and lived in constant
danger of some day falling victim to their wrath.
An abrupt turn for the worse came in 1769 during the administration of Viceroy Pedro Messia de la Cerda. A band of Guajiro warriors, selected by Governor Geronimo de Mendoza from mission villages to punish a troublesome neighboring Cocino tribe, turned their
wrath instead against the government and precipitated a general uprising. With mission Indians in the vanguard, the Guajiros quickly
cleared their lands of intruders. They expelled the Capuchins, destroying six of eight missions, and they murdered many loyal vassals,
sparing neither woman nor child. Soon the Guajiros had re-established full hegemony over the province and threatened the stronghold of Riohacha itself.10
Faced by this disastrous collapse of mission endeavors in Riohacha,
Viceroy Messia de la Cerda expressed in his reaction de mando, 1772,
his profound disillusionment with the traditional mission system for
subduing frontier areas. He lamented that for the past century the
missions of New Granada had remained stagnant, neither expanding
nor producing lasting results, and further noted that catechized
Indians were prone to flee back into the wilderness and revert to
their savage, pagan ways. He blamed this failure not on any want of
government fiscal or moral support but rather on a lack of evangelical
fervor and vocational dedication by the missionaries themselves. Consequently, he advised his successor, Manuel Guirior, to be very careful if he intended to recover the lost ground."Among those who were impatient with frontier stagnation at thisI Antonio de Ale.(cer, Las misiones capuchinas en el Nuevo Reino de Granada,
hoy Colombia (1648-1820) (Bogota, 1959), 44, 52, 56-59, 138-139.
10 Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, May 27, June 8, July 9, August,
1769, January 27, and March 26, 1770, Archivo Nacional de Colombia, Milicia y
Marina (cited hereinafter as ANC, MM), vol. 138, fols. 839-844, 868-869, 871872, 968-972, 974-980, 1046-1068, and 1072-1082; Governor Manuel Herrera Leyba
to Messia de la Cerda, Santa Marta, July 19, 1769, ibid., fols. 982-983; Alcacer,
Las misiones capuchinas, 166-168; Moreno y Escand6n, "Estado del virreinato,"
562.
del estado del virreinato de Santa
'1 Pedro Messia de la Cerda, "Relacion
Fe . . . 1772," Relaciones de mando: memories presentadas por los gobernantes
del Nuevo Reino de Granada, Eduardo Posada and Pedro Maria Ibafiez (eds.)
Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, VIII (Bogota, 1910), 97-98.

THE PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA

FRONTIER

471

time was Francisco Moreno y Escandon, fiscal protector de indios of

the royal audiencia. In a 1772 report on the state of the viceroyalty,
he agreed point by point with the viceroy's evaluation of the missions.12 To contend with the problem, he advocated a larger role for
military force, although recognizing that restrictions in the laws of
the Indies made recourse to arms unacceptable as a general frontier
policy :13
Because of the experiencethat the gentle leniency of admonishments,far
from producing the desired end of conversion, serves rather as cause for
insolenceto these barbariansand to those whom they shelter, the gravity of
these evils so deeply rooted in the body politic of the viceroyalty does not
admit to any solution other than the chastisementof arms.
He went on to postulate that "fortunately" military rigor could be
invoked against the Guajiros with good conscience because of the
heinous nature of their crimes. Their excesses included, he said, rebellion and forsaking the faith, corrupting innocent Indians, usurping
the property of loyal vassals, and especially consorting with foreign
enemies of the crown.'4 Significantly, military punishment was not
applied as a general instrument of frontier policy in New Granada
during the following years, but was restricted to the Guajiros (and
later the Cunas of Darien), whose crimes were most grievous and who
posed a genuine threat to the state. Meanwhile, the mission in its
traditional form continued to function on the inland frontiers of the
viceroyalty.
There was also serious doubt in 1772 about the utility of outright
military conquest as a pacification technique, because of an unsuccessful attempt at mass invasion of the Guajiro territory in the previous
year. When hostilities began in 1769, the neighboring provinces of
Santa Marta and Maracaibo had sent Riohacha reinforcements to
bolster a local citizens' militia defending the capital; and when the
Guajiro menace displayed no indication of abating, the authorities in
Cartagena dispatched 100 regulars.15 Initially, these troops were
designated for defensive action while the government tried to persuade the Guajiros to cease their belligerence.'6 Much to the con12
13
14

Moreno y Escand6n, "cEstado del virreinato,'" 559-560.

Ibid., 575-577.

Ibid.

lb Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, May 27, June 8, June 10, July 9,
July 19, and August 1769, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fols. 839-844, 868-869, 871-872,
968-972, 974-980, 982-983; Governor Fernando Morillo Velarde to Messia de la
(Cerda, Cartagena, October 11, 1769, and June 7, 1770, ANC, MM, vol. 65, fols.
576-582, 759-762.
's Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, August, 1769, ANC, MM, vol.

472

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ALLAN J. KUETHE

sternation of the authorities, these endeavors proved unsuccessful,

and the state of hostility endured into the year 1771.
Governor Geronimo de Mendoza, his successor Francisco de
Baraya, and the governor of Santa Marta, Manuel Herrera Leyba,
all advised Viceroy Messia de la Cerda that recourse to military action
was the only plausible solution to the problem.'7 With Cartagena,
the regional stronghold, garrisoned by only a battalion of regulars,
however, the viceroy did not have adequate forces at his disposal to
attempt such action. A Spanish rotating unit, the Battalion of Savoy,
arrived early in 1771, but Spain had dispatched these reinforcements
to New Granada during a war scare, when alerts had been sent to
both Cartagena and the viceregal capital, Santa Fe de Bogota. Therefore, although he initiated preparations for a major expedition, the
viceroy was unable to authorize an immediate departure.18
Finally, on August 30, 1771, he ordered to Riohacha an expedition
of 500 regulars, 400 of these from the newly arrived battalion, the
remainder from the fixed garrison of Cartagena.19 He gave command
of the enterprise to Colonel Benito Encio from the Battalion of Savoy.
Although Messia de la Cerda instructed Encio first to seek peaceful
solutions, the viceroy dispatched the force on the assumption that
it would be required to administer a sound beating to the Guajiros,
and that in so doing it would teach them respect for Spanish arms
and authority as well as the value of peaceful habits.20 The troops
left Cartagena by sea on November 3 and arrived in Riohacha two
weeks later.2'
By local standards of the time, the assemblage of military power
which gathered in Riohacha during the autumn of 1771 was impressive. In addition to the main expeditionary force, Encio had at his
disposal 200 regulars already there, 150 from Cartagena, the re138, fols. 968-972; Governor Francisco de Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, June
26, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 644.
17 Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, June 8, 1769, ANC, MM, vol.
138, fols. 839-844; Herrera Leyba to Messia de la Cerda, Santa Marta, July 19,
1769, ibid., fols. 982-983; Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, Julne 26, 1771, ANC,
MM, vol. 124, fol. 644.
18 Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, June 26, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol.
644; Governor Gregorio de la Sierra to Messia de la Cerda, Cartagena, August
11, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 643, 646.
for Colonel Benito Encio by de la Sierra, Cartagena, October
19 Instructions
30-31, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 9, fols. 186-203.
20 Ibid.;
Manuel Guirior, "lRelaci6n del estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada
1776," Relaciones de mando, 177.
21 "Respuestas
que da el coroner del Regimiento de Savoya Josef Benito
Encio a las interrogaciones," Riohacha, October 12, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 124,
fols. 508-511.

THE PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER

473

mainder from Santa Marta, as well as roughly 340 activated militiamen.22 But the Guajiros' strength was impressive too. Contemporary
estimates placed their number between 30,000 and 40,000, approximately 10,000 of these warriors armed with British weapons.23 Prior
to the arrival of the expedition, discussions had dealt mainly with
the necessity of drastic military action; now, somewhat belatedly,
the question shifted to whether the expeditionary force, for all its
size, was actually capable of accomplishing its mission.
To the dismay of Viceroy Messia de la Cerda, Colonel Encio concluded after a preliminary appraisal that an offensive was impossible.
This judgment was due both to the difficult nature of the terrain and
to the size of the Guajiro opposition. He estimated that at least 2,000
first-class troops would be required for an effective invasion of the
Guajira Peninsula, and that this maneuver would in itself accomplish nothing if retreat routes into the backland mountains were not
blocked beforehand. This was a task for which there were not sufficient military forces in the whole viceroyalty. An invasion with a
smaller force would pose an unacceptable danger because in all likelihood the Guajiros would cut off its own avenues of retreat and destroy it. Therefore, Colonel Encio resolved to take no action. Subsequent urgings had no effect on him, including a scathing denunciation from the commandant general of Cartagena, Gregorio de la
Sierra, who in effect accused the colonel of ineptitude, cowardice, and
dereliction of duty.24 Events were at this juncture when Manuel
Guirior arrived at Cartagena in June 1772, and was advised by his
embarrassed predecessor that the viceroyalty did not possess sufficient
strength to conquer the Guajiros.25 Guirior was left to find a workable solution.
The new viceroy addressed himself to his inherited problem with
vision and energy heretofore unknown on the Guajiro frontier. Discovering from preliminary investigations that by the middle of 1772
the Guajiros had begun to desist from their hostilities, he quickly
sought new accommodations with them. First he replaced Encio with
Ibid.
Francisco Silvestre, Descripcio6n del reyno de Santa Fe de Bogota', o,qritta
en 1789, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, CXXI (Bogota, 1950), 60;
Antonio de Narvaez y la Torre, "Relaci6n, o informe de la provincia de Santa
Marta, y Riohacha. . . ." Escritos de dos economistas coloniales, Sergio Elias
Ortiz (ed.) (Bogota, 1965), 36.
24De la Sierra to Messia de la Cerda, Cartagena, April 11, 1772, ANC, MM,
vol. 70, fols. 227-236; "Respuestas que da el coroner del Regimiento de Savoya
Josef Benito Encio a las interrogaciones," Riohacha, October 12, 1772, ANC,
MM, vol. 70, fols. 227-236; Guirior, "Relaci6n," 177.
2 Messla de la Cerda, "IRelaci6n," 114-115.
22

23

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ALLAN J. KUETHE

Antonio de Arevalo, colonel of engineers at Cartagena and one of the

most capable public servants in the viceroyalty, and in November
dispatched him to Riohacha. In compliance with viceregal instructions, Commander Arevalo issued a general pardon, presented gifts as
peace offerings, and, upon finding that these measures were having
the desired effect, disbanded the bulk of the expeditionary force.26
He also conducted an investigation into the causes of the 1769 uprising and concluded that a large portion of blame fell to former
Governor Geronimo de Mendoza and several henchmen, who were
guilty of corruption and abuse of authority. The viceroy fined them
accordingly.27

With outright military conquest impossible and the mission technique uncertain, Guirior took advantage of the lull to inaugurate a
fresh pacification approach which assigned a role to the armed forces
commensurate to their limited potential, and which afforded the friars
a surer basis for operations. The plan established three fortified towns
garrisoned by troops and under Arevalo's supervision: Bahia Honda,
on the northern point of the peninsula, a former center of Guajiro
trade, and because of good port facilities a departure point for
activities east; Sinamaica, on the eastern side of the peninsula just
inland from the Gulf of Venezuela; and Pedraza, in the interior
of the province east of Riohacha. For each of these the government
recruited colonists to serve as a counterbalance to the Indian population as well as to help define the locality and form the basis for
a new society. By 1775 these three locations possessed a total of
231 families.28 For the Indians, four mission villages were rebuilt and
four new centers were founded.29 In 1775 twenty Capuchin missionaries arrived to staff these and several other settlements remaining
from the pre-1769 era.30
The military's function within the new program consisted largely
of a holding action or what might be called a "defensive offense."
20 Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, December 26, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 93, fol.
190; idem to idem, Riohacha, January 26, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 836838; idem to idem, Riohacha, April 12, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 97, fol. 248;
"Estado de fuerza de la tropa al regresar," Riohacha, May 4, 1773, ibid., fol.
257; Guirior, "Relaci6n," 178; Alcacer, Las missions capuchinas, 202.
" Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, May 26, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 97, fols. 235,
242; Secretary of the Viceroy Pedro de Ureta to Arevalo, Santa Fe, August 15,
1773, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 721; Guirior, "IRelacion," 176-177.
28 "Estado
que manifiesta la tropa, milicias, y fundadores que existen en las
nuevas fundaciones," Riohacha, September 11, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fol.
1051.
29Guirior, "IRelacion, " 176, 178-179.
30I Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las
misiones, 1788," in Alcacer, Las mnisiones capuchinas, 210-213, 226.

THE PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER

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The method was to occupy a strategic location, fortify it, wait until
the opposition had grown weary, and then gradually assert the authority of arms. This system envisioned punishing only individuals
or small groups committing misdeeds and abandoned any hope of
chastising the Guajiro nation as a whole. A primary aim was to
divorce the Indians from foreign influence and by so doing eventually
sway them to their rightful ruler. Military detachments were also
provided for the missions, where in addition to taking charge of
general security they assisted in conducting entradas to lure Indians
into the missions.31 The operations, being essentially defensive, required fewer troops than originally allotted for all-out conquest, but
subsequent events were to prove that the authorities went too far in
military cut-backs.
Although relations remained uneasy, the Guajiros seemed inclined
to give the government another chance. Their motive for doing so,
however, is not entirely clear. They may have merely grown weary
of hostilities; they may have been placated by government promises;
or they may have been intimidated by the military buildup under
Encio. In view of the local power ratio, the latter possibility would
seem unlikely except that throughout this period, unless they enjoyed
an overwhelmingly superior position, the Guajiros consistently chose
to back down in the face of opposition rather than risk casualties.
Whatever the explanation, many had already indicated a willingness
to return to their villages prior to Arevalo's coming. Recalling that
Viceroy Messia de la Cerda had admonished him first to seek peaceful
solutions, Colonel Encio shortly before being relieved dared claim to
have accomplished his mission on that basis.32 Subsequently, Guirior
and Arevalo claimed for themselves the credit for the pacification,
apparently on the pretense that their peace initiative had produced
sincerer pledges from the Indians than those obtained by Encio.
The crown duly congratulated both for their achievements.33
In spite of apparent successes in establishing a government foothold, the commanding authorities during the Guirior administration
did not have enough confidence in the military position to try corrective action. In 1774 the newly appointed governor, Josef Galluzo,
requested authority to deal with the persistent Guajiro insolence and
smuggling. Arevalo, the commander of the expedition, who had returned to duties in Cartagena, but retained his Riohacha appointment
" Guirior, " Relaci6n, " 179.
Eneio to Guirior, Riohacha, July 26, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 93, fols. 154-155;
idem to idem, Riohacha, September 28, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 767-768.
3 Julian de Arriaga to Guirior, Spain, December 18, 1773, ANC, MM, vol.
124, fols. 422-425.
82

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ALLAN J. KUETHE

with authority over the governor, severely admonished Galluzo to

exercise forbearance, reminding him that disciplinary measures might
provoke retaliation and endanger the entire enterprise. Until the
government had a tight grip on the region, he said, the military must
act primarily to protect the various agents of the crown. Meanwhile
the governor would have to permit the Guajiros to continue their
abominations. This order was emphatically sustained by Viceroy
Guirior.34
The exercise of forbearance at the outset was indeed a realistic
policy. A military presence in the province was the key to the conduct of the whole venture and vital to colonists and missionaries
alike. If all the Guajiros were aroused, they would surely be more
than the armed forces could handle, and premature engagements, if
unsuccessful, might discredit the military and even precipitate a reenactment of 1769. One of the major advantages of the Spanish was
that the Guajiros seldom if ever acted in concert. With time, tribal
divisions might be widened by the isolation of hostile groups. However, the authorities never reached this point. Before they could
substantially expand their influence and win the confidence of significant portions of the Guajiros, the expeditionary force did suffer
serious defeat. The pacification-colonization effort never recovered
from it.
The military reverse arose out of an attempt in late 1775 to establish a fourth fortified town at a site called Apiesi, on the eastern side
of the peninsula between Bahia Honda and Sinamaica. There, efforts
to persuade the local Indians to accept missionaries had been unsuccessful, and the authorities hoped that a new stronghold nearby
might induce them to reconsider.35 Commander Arevalo went to
Riohacha himself to supervise plans for the enterprise and, when all
was ready, he returned to Cartagena, leaving Governor Galluzo in
immediate command.36 Accompanied by some 300 troops, forty-three
of whom were regulars, Galluzo began his march from Bahia Honda
to Apiesi on December 3. Ominous warnings soon reached him, however, that hostile warriors awaited in ambush along the trail, and
that lie would be the special target of their weapons, because they
feared that he was coming to seize their lands.
34 Galluzo to Arevalo, Riohacha, January 30, 1774, ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols.
40-42; Arevalo to Galluzo, Cartagena, February 11, 1774, ibid., fols. 36-37;
Arevalo to Guirior, Cartagena, February 11, 1774, ibid., fol. 43; Ureta to Arevalo,
Santa Fe, March 15, 1774, ibid., fol. 35.
" Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, September 10, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 138,
fols. 1048-1055.
"'T''lnfo-me a SFul M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefeeto de las
misiones, 1788," in Alefaer, Las misiones capuchinas, 213.

THE PACIFICATION

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER

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As a precaution, the governor changed the march to an alternate

route, but to no avail. On December 6 the expedition found its advance blocked by felled trees. Some 1,000 warriors appeared on a
nearby llill-top.37 So confronted, Galluzo stood firm, ordered his
troops to reopen the trail, and dispatched a message to the Guajiros
asking why they defied him. The following morning, two chiefs, one
each from the Apiesi and Macuira factions of the Guajiro people,
came forward to answer him. Their English and Dutch friends, they
said, had advised them that the purpose of his mission was to establisb a stronghold which would be used to stop their foreign trade,
disarm them, and then dominate them. Counsel received from Indians
dwelling within pacified localities corroborated this information. Unable to deny the charges, Galluzo replied that he was determined to
proceed in spite of their opposition, and that he had brought military
forces in anticipation of just such an eventuality. The warriors withdrew rather than risk battle. The expedition then continued its march
and on the same day found a suitable location for an establishment.
Although several more warnings of Guajiro displeasure arrived,
Galluzo started construction at once.
In spite of the safe arrival, the danger had not passed. The following morning the Indian leadership further tested the governor's
resolve. A messenger warned Galluzo to give up his quest; if not, the
Indians threatened to block the exit trails and begin hostilities.
Galluzo remained undaunted, however, and advised the Indians to
accept the fact that the Spaniards were there to stay, that they
could continue the fight for years, and that in the long run the
Indians would suffer greater losses than the Spaniards. Later the
same morning Galluzo received a second message announcing that
the Guajiro leadership had decided on war, but once again he remained calm. He replied that the Guajiros would be received as they
came, whether in war or in peace.
At this juncture, events seemed more promising, for, having gained
nothing by their threats, the Guajiros momentarily backed down.
In a complete reversal of tactics, the chiefs admitted that war would
accomplish nothing, because the Spaniards could not be prevented
from ultimately establishing themselves as masters. Moreover, the
chiefs went so far as to offer their services in constructing the stronghold. Although skeptical of their motives, Galluzo accepted their
labor, and without incident the construction was completed by December 15, including a wall, church, and interior buildings. His mission apparently accomplished, the governor assigned ninety men to
" This estimate could well have been exaggerated.

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the stronghold, including the regulars, and also left a missionary to

care for their spiritual well-being. He departed with the bulk of
his forces for Bahia Honda and from there proceeded to Riohacha.38
As soon as he had left, the Guajiros attacked. They demolished
the new establishment, decimated the garrison, and murdered the
missionary. Only twelve regulars and twenty-one militiamen made
their way back to Bahia Honda.39 Although not apparent at the
moment, the Apiesi episode was the beginning of the end for the Riohacha pacification-colonization venture. The defeat severely diminished the reputation of Spanish arms, and the whole fragile structure
began to collapse. Throughout the province Guajiros displayed new
arrogance and hostility. In the missionary settlements, Indians
threatened to kill the priests and burn their churches.40 Fearful
for the missionaries' safety, the local director of the Capuchin order
permitted those in danger to seek refuge in the city of Riohacha."
Meanwhile, Arevalo returned to the peninsula. In anticipation of a
general uprising, he undertook the construction of additional batteries and fortifications in the strongholds, while the governors of
Santa Marta and Cartagena sent replacements and reinforcements.42
In June 1776 Arevalo dispatched an expedition of 325 men to
punish the Indians responsible for the Apiesi disaster, but the action
produced little reason for satisfaction. As Colonel Encio had predicted, when the Indians were confronted by strength, they merely
faded into the backlands. The whole venture netted only twenty-five
victims. This time, however, the government forces did successfully
establish a fortified city north of Apiesi at Sabana del Valle, but the
accomplishment did little to restore civilian confidence.'3 Indeed,
uncertainties multiplied, as horrifying accounts spread concerning
S Diary of Galluzo, November 20-December 16, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 140,
fols. 402-411; "Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto
de las misiones, 1788,'' in Alcalcer, Las misiones capuchinas, 213-214.
39 Ibid., Galluzo to Arevalo, Riohacha, February
12, 1776, ANC, MM, vol.
124, fols. 387-391.
40Prai Miguel de Pamplona to Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores, Maracaibo,
April 11, 1776, in Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 218.
" Ibid., 215, 218.
42 Arevalo to Flores, Riohacha, March 17, and March 26, 1776, ANC, MM,
vol. 140, fols. 415-435; Governor Nicola's Diaz de Perea to Flores, Santa Marta,
March 19, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 96, fols. 335-337; Governor Juan Pimienta to
Flores, Cartagena, March 26, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 65, fols. 1115-1120.
to Flores, Riohacha, April 7, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 140, fols.
4"Arevalo
388-389; Pimienta to Flores, Cartagena, April 12, April 26, and May 11, 1776,
ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols. 45-51; Arevalo to Pimienta, Riohacha, June 26, 1776,
ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols. 145-146; "Informe a S [u] M [ajestad] dcel P [adre]
Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las misiones, 1788,'' in Alcacer, Las misiones
capuchinas, 214-215.

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CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER

479

the fate of deserters fallen victim to roving Guajiro bands.44 Fearful

colonists began fleeing their settlements, and in view of the continuing
danger, the Capuchin missionaries sharply curtailed their endeavors.
Most of the priests, still only recent arrivals, transferred to other
localities never again to return.45 Thereafter, in addition to serving
the fortified cities, missionaries maintained only two settlements,
Boronato and Camarones. Both of these were relatively advanced
centers, directly supported by the military; neither was burned in
1769.46

After the reverses of 1775-1776 the pacification campaign never

recaptured the initiative. Some local officials favored a substantial
military buildup in hope of recovering lost ground some day, but
for the most part the authorities in Santa Fe ignored such entreaties.
Fearful that a large-scale deployment of troops from Cartagena might
endanger its security, Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores, who succeeded
Guirior in early 1776, firmly insisted on limiting regular troops from
that stronghold to merely 200 men, not enough to renew the struggle.47
Efforts were made to improve the local militia, but it alone could not
be relied upon for major military operations.48 Yet in the short run,
although the Spanish won no new major victories, they did not lose
any additional ground either.
Actually, it was not the Guajiros themselves who finally destroyed
the pacification project but military demands elsewhere. Spain's
entrance into the War of American Independence in 1779 precipitated
an extensive reduction of military commitments in Riohacha with a
corresponding curtailment of the entire frontier project. Upon viceregal order the detachment from Cartagena withdrew, leaving only
forty regulars from Santa Marta. Without the core forces, there was
little hope that all the establishments could be defended and indeed
Narvaez, "IRelacion, " 39-40; Arevalo to Flores, Cartagena, September 11,
1776, ANC, MM, vol. 140, fols. 659-661.
I IEstado actual de las misiones . . . ano de 1788," in Alcacer, Las misiones
46
capuchinas, 229; ibid., 219-226; Diaz Perea to Flores, Santa Marta, January 4,
1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fols. 531-532.
41 "Estado
Governor Ramon de
de la tropa de las nuevas fundaciones,"
Garcia tie Leon y Pizarro, Riohacha, July 25, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fol. 299;
"Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las
nisiones, 1788,'' in Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 211-212.
4 Ramon Garcia de Leon y Pizarro
to Flores, Riohacha, July 12, and July
26, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fols. 294-296, 298-301.
de Narvaez y la Tonre to Flores, Santa Marta, April 19,
48 Governor Antonio
1777, ANC, MM, vol. 95, fols. 276-282; "Estado de fuerza del ejercito," Santa
Marta and Riohacha, Narvaez, August 1784, ANC, MM, vol. 101, fols. 445-446;
Narvaez to Flores, Santa Marta, October 26, 1784, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols.
229-230.

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a very real danger that they might fall into enemy hands. Consequently, the remaining expeditionary force tightened its defense line
to run from Sinamaica to Pedraza to Riohacha across the base of the
peninsula and totally abandoned and destroyed both Bahia Honda
and Sabana del Valle.49 The colonists of the two evacuated settlements along with those of Pedraza were discharged, and Sinamaica
retained only a reduced number.50 Although throughout the war
local militia conducted patrolling actions to hamper British extraction of beef supplies, the upland peninsula largely regressed to unabated Guajiro activity and foreign influence.5'
In the postwar era Riohacha never regained the prominent position in the frontier policy of the viceroyalty which it had occupied
during the previous decade. Rather, attention turned toward the
Isthmus of Darien. The vital geographical position of the Isthmus
and its deteriorating position caused the government to undertake
a colonization-pacification campaign almost identical with that waged
against the Guajiros. During that action Riohacha fell into the background and was allowed to stagnate, although at the end of the war
one unsuccessful effort had been made to reestablish the government
position. That effort came in 1783 when a 100-man force attempted
to reclaim Bahia Honda and Sabana del Valle, only to be destroyed
by Indian attack. Motivated again by fear of a general uprising, the
authorities dispatched a punitive and security expedition of 300 men,
similar to those of the preceding decade.52 It was withdrawn without significant accomplishment in 1785, however, when plans for operations in Darien were activated.53 Thereafter the eastern frontier of
the viceroyalty was guarded mainly by local militia, which manned the
defense line along the base of the peninsula from Sinamaica to the
city of Riohacha.
The Spanish did not liquidate remains of the pacification program
until 1790, during the economy-minded regime of Viceroy Jose de
Espeleta. At that time the Santa Fe government abandoned the
central stronghold of Pedraza and transferred Sinamaica in the east
4 Narvdez to Flores, Santa Marta, October 6, 1779, and May 26, 1780, ANC,
MM, vol. 117, fols. 943-964; idem to idem, Santa Marta, December 29, 1780,
ANC, MM, vol. 101, fols. 823, 826.
'0Idem to idem, Santa Marta, May 26, 1780, ANC, MM, vol. 117, fols. 951952.
6' Idem to idem, Santa Marta, March 1781, ANC, MM, vol. 49, fol. 681.
2 Colonel Anastasio
Zejudo to Viceroy Antonio Caballero y G6ngora, Riohacha, January 23, 1785, ANC, MM, vol. 30, fol. 222; Aledeer, Las misiones
capi'chinas, 227.
"' Narvaez to Caballero y Gongora, Santa Marta, November 24, 1785, ANC,
MM, vol. 120, fols. 263, 275.

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481

to the jurisdiction of the recently created Captaincy General of Caracas.54 The withdrawal from Pedraza amounted to the last step in
returning the Guajira Peninsula to the aboriginals and their British
allies. Thereafter the city of Riohacha became the western barrier
against Guajiro penetration, and government influence over the peninsula itself was almost nonexistent.55
When all factors are taken into consideration, the significance of
the events in Riohacha lies not in lasting pacification but in the shift
of frontier policy toward a more overt acceptance of military coercion. Outright conquest had to be abandoned as a course of action because it did not work. But the system of fortified towns initiated by
Guirior rested upon armed intimidation to such an extent that when
Spanish weakness became obvious, hopes disappeared for lasting
pacification of the peninsula. In the ensuing decade, the viceroyalty
employed a similar system in Darien, complete with fortified towns,
military garrisons, and colonists, although with even less missionary
participation.56 We do not yet have enough information from an institutional point of view to form hard and fast conclusions about the
empire as a whole. Nevertheless, the extensive use of military force
on the frontiers of the Interior Provinces and Rio de la Plata indicates that the experience of New Granada may have been typical of
a hardening imperial policy.
" Narvdez to the governor of Maracaibo, Riohacha, March 16, 1791, in Blanco,
Documentos, I, 233; Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 236.
6 Pedro Mendinueta, "Relacion del estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada . . .
1803," Relaciones de mando, 559-560.
"' Kuethe, " The Military Reform, " chapter 5.