Thesis Complete4 PDF

Sixteen Words
By Patrick Conway
This thesis is presented for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
of Murdoch University, 2007.
I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main
content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary
education institution.
________________________
Abstract: Although almost five years have passed since the start of the Iraq War, there
has yet to have been a comprehensive investigation into the Bush administrations use
of intelligence in its public case for war with Iraq. The narrative section of this
dissertation examines a vast body of government documents, media reports and
reference works to trace the intelligence underlying the administrations media
campaign from the attacks of September 11, 2001 to the outbreak of war in March
2003. The section reveals that a disinformation operation manufactured intelligence of
Iraqs weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda to help the administration
make the case that Iraq was a threat to the United States.
The theoretical section explores the narratives Iraq War conspiracy as the practical
application of Straussian political theory. The work of political theorist Leo Strauss is
widely misunderstood. To determine the content of Strauss true teaching, the
theoretical section reviews several of Strauss most important commentators as well
as a range of Strauss work. The section demonstrates that Straussian theory explains
the Bush administrations understanding of Iraq, the way in which the administration
sought to analyse intelligence and why the administration believed it absolutely
necessary to convince the public of the threat from Iraq.
For my parents.
5
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Narrative Section
The United States Intelligence Community Circa 2002
Common Acronyms
Introduction: The Conspiracy
13
Chapter 1: The Aluminium Tubes
31
Chapter 2: Salman Pak
118
Chapter 3: Curveball
193
Chapter 4: Niger
249
Theoretical Section
Introduction
397
Literature Review
411
Strauss True Teaching
440
The Meme
459
Esoteric Analysis is Team B Analysis
474
The Campaign
491
Conclusion
508
Bibliography
Narrative Section
514
Theoretical Section
545
6
Acknowledgements
Thanks to my supervisor, Dr. David Moody. Your support and encouragement has
been much appreciated. Thanks for letting me pursue this thing when I was supposed
to be doing something else.
Peter Eisner and Knut Royce, thanks for the copies of the Niger Documents. Thanks
also to David Loepp for the translations and to David, Marcy Wheeler and eRiposte
for two years of the Niger thread.
Friends and family. Thanks for everything.
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003.
You will know the truth and the truth will set you free.
John 8:32. Unofficial motto of the Central Intelligence Agency.
8
The United States Intelligence Community Circa 2002*
Vice President
Dick Cheney
Deputy
Secretary of
Defense Paul
Wolfowitz
Undersecretary
of Defense for
Policy Douglas
Feith
Secretary of
Defense Donald
Rumsfeld
President George W.
Bush
National Security
Advisor
Condoleezza Rice
The White House
Deputy National
Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley
Secretary of State
Colin Powell
Wurmser-Maloof
Project
National
Intelligence
Council (NIC)
Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI)
George Tenet
Department of Defense
National Security
Agency (NSA)
Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)
Army, Navy, Air

Force, Marine
Intelligence
National Ground
Intelligence
Center (NGIC)
National Imagery
and Mapping
Agency (NIMA)
Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
Directorate of Operations
Department of
State
Department of
Energy
Department of
Justice
Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR)
Office of Intelligence
(DOE)
Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
Directorate of Intelligence
Center for Weapons

Intelligence,
Nonproliferation and
Arms Control
(WINPAC)
Counter Proliferation
Division (CPD)
Near East Division
Office of Near Eastern,

South Asian and
African Analysis
(NESAF)
Counterterrorism
Center (CTC)
European Division
Office of Russian and

European Analysis
(OREA)
Counterterrorism
Center (CTC)
Various Other
Operational Divisions
Etcetera...
Latin America Division
Office of Asian Pacific

and Latin American
Analysis (APLA)
Various Other
Analytical Offices
Etcetera...
*Some agencies/offices not shown.
Common Acronyms
BND
Bundesnachrichtendienst. Germanys Federal Intelligence Service. The

BND debriefed the source known as Curveball.
BW
Biological Weapons. Examples include anthrax and botulinum toxin.
CW
Chemical Weapons. Examples include mustard gas and sarin gas.
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA collects and analyses foreign

intelligence for the US government.
CPD
Counterproliferation Division. Part of the CIAs Directorate of

Operations, the CPD collects foreign intelligence on WMD proliferation.
CTC
Counterterrorism Center. The CTC has the CIAs experts on terrorist

groups, such as al-Qaeda.
DCI
Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI is the defacto head of the CIA
and coordinates the various branches of the US Intelligence Community.
During the run up to the Iraq War, the DCI was George Tenet.
DGSE
Direction Gnrale de la Scurit Extrieure. The Directorate-General

for External Security is Frances foreign intelligence service.
10
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency. Part of the US Department of Defense, the

DIA collects and analyses foreign military intelligence.
DOE
Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy. The DOE has the

Intelligence Community experts on uranium enrichment.
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Part of the US Department of Justice,

the FBI collects intelligence inside the United States.
INC
Iraqi National Congress. An Iraqi opposition group led by Ahmad

Chalabi. Expert propagandists.
INR
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR analyses intelligence for the

US State Department.
ISG
Iraq Survey Group. After the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the ISG scoured
Iraq for evidence of prohibited WMD programs. The US team
determined Saddam had abandoned his WMD programs after the 1991
Gulf War.
JIC
Joint Intelligence Committee. The JIC coordinates the United

Kingdoms various intelligence services.
MI6
Secret Intelligence Service. The United Kingdoms foreign intelligence

service.
11
NESAF
Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Analysis. Part of the
CIAs Directorate of Intelligence, NESAF has the CIAs experts the
Middle East, South Asia and Africa. NESAF analyses intelligence on
countries such as Iraq and Niger.
NGIC
National Ground Intelligence Center. Part of the DIA, the NGIC has the
Intelligence Community experts on conventional weapons such as
tactical rockets.
NIC
National Intelligence Council. The US Intelligence Communitys center

for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. As part of the Office of
the DCI, the NIC helps coordinate the Intelligence Communitys
consensus judgment and vets the speeches of US officials to ensure they
accurately reflect the available intelligence.
NIE
National Intelligence Estimate. Authored by the National Intelligence

Council, an NIE is the US Intelligence Communitys most authoritative
written judgment on a given national security issue. Represents the
consensus of the entire US Intelligence Community.
NIMA
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Part of the US Department of

Defense, NIMA analyses satellite imagery.
NSA
National Security Agency. Part of the US Department of Defense, the
12
NSA eavesdrops on foreign communications.
SISMI
Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare. Italys Military

Intelligence and Security Service. During the run up to the Iraq War,
SISMI director Nicolo Pollari played a substantial role in the
dissemination of the Niger Documents.
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. UN weapons inspection

team established after the 1991 Gulf War to ensure Iraq had dismantled
its WMD programs. UNSCOM was withdrawn from Iraq in 1998 and
disbanded the following year.
WINPAC
Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control.

The CIAs expert WMD analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence.
WINPAC contained a Team B intelligence cell.
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Chemical, biological and nuclear

weapons.
13
The Conspiracy
The Meme
Over the weekend of September 15-16, 2001, President George W. Bush, 55, met
with his war council at Camp David. Osama bin Ladens al-Qaeda terrorist network
had attacked the United States. On September 11, al-Qaeda hijackers had crashed
passenger aircraft into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington, DC. More than 3000 were dead. President Bush was on a war footing.
He was confident, determined, forceful. I want you all to understand that we are at
war and we will stay at war until this is done, he had told his counterterrorism team
the day of the attacks. Nothing
else matters. Everything is
available for the pursuit of this
war. Any barriers in your way,
theyre gone. Any money you
need, you have it. This is our only
agenda.1 The United States was at
Figure 1 Vice President Dick Cheney, President

George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin
Powell meet at Camp David, September 15, 2001.
Source: http://www.sptimes.com/
war. The President planned to win it.
At Camp David, the President and his war council reviewed all diplomatic and
military plans for the War on Terror.2 Present were Vice President Dick Cheney,
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George
Clarke, Richard A. Against All Enemies. New York: Free Press, 2004. p. 24.
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Thomas H. Kean. (Chair). Washington DC: Government
Printing Office. July 22, 2004. p. 332. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm Accessed:
December 5, 2005.
2
14
Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
his Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.3 The President made it clear that the
US would punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks, but also those who harboured
them.4 The War on Terror would extend beyond al-Qaeda. At the meetings, the
Presidents war council debated how to eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of
life.5
Every member of the Presidents war council knew that the US would almost
certainly have to hit Afghanistan. The war-torn country had been al-Qaedas base of
operations for almost a decade. The 9/11 hijackers had trained there. Afghanistans
Taliban government was never to give up bin Laden. It was Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld, 68, who first brought up the subject of Iraq.
Is this the time to attack Iraq?

Rumsfeld asked.6 The Defense Secretary
was lukewarm about hitting al-Qaedas
Afghan camps. He cautioned the President
that there were no good targets in
Afghanistan.7 If the President wanted to
Figure 2 Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Source:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/
strike a real blow in the War on Terror, then

Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq was the place to start.
Ibid., p. 332.
Ibid., p. 330.
5
Ibid., p. 331.
6
Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002. p. 73
7
Ibid., p. 73.
4
15
Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defense Secretary, agreed with Rumsfeld. A
relentless neoconservative, Wolfowitz, 57, was adamant that the US response to 9/11
should include the Iraqi regime. He urged the President to take out Saddam Hussein in
this round of the War on Terror. According to Bob Woodwards Bush at War, the
Deputy Defense Secretary argued that
Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime that might break

easily. It was doable. He estimated that there was a 10
to 50 percent chance Saddam was involved in the
September 11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. would have to
go after Saddam at some time if the war on terrorism
was to be taken seriously.8
In the briefing book for Camp David, a Defense Department paper fleshed out
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitzs argument. The paper, which addressed the strategic
concept of the war on terrorism, specified three priority targets in response to
September 11: al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq. 9 Of these three, only an alliance
between Iraq and al-Qaeda posed a strategic threat to the United States.10 One day,
Saddam Husseins regime might arm al-Qaeda with a biological, chemical or even
nuclear weapon to attack the US. The Defense Department paper is the earliest Ive
been able to track down the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda.
Ibid., p. 73.
9/11 Commission, op cit., p. 335.
10
Ibid., pp. 335; 559.
9
16
A meme is an idea, concept or unit of information that can be transmitted
culturally, much like a gene can be transmitted biologically.11 The meme was the
Bush administrations justification for the Iraq War. In the run up to the war, the
administrations claims of Iraqs WMDs and support for terrorists would be repeated
over and over again until they seemed accepted facts. Through the meme, the Bush
administration would manufacture consent for war with Iraq.
The Nature of Tyranny
The meme was the brainchild of the Bush administrations neoconservatives. For
neocons like Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney, the meme was,
for all intents and purposes, an absolute truth. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Cheney did
not need evidence that Iraq had WMDs. They did not need evidence that Iraq and alQaeda were allies. As far as the neocons were concerned, the threat from Iraq was an
almost cosmic certainty. Iraq was a threat because of its nature.
According to neoconservative godfather Irving Kristol, one of the

neoconservatisms most important tenets is the belief that US foreign policy should
pursue Americas ideological interests as well as national ones. The United States,
he writes, will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under
attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal.12 For neocons like Rumsfeld,
Wolfowitz and Cheney, replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic ones would
serve to strengthen US national security. Democracies are inherently peaceful, they
11
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 189.
http://www.rubinghscience.org/memetics/dawkinsmemes.html Accessed: October 20, 2007.
12
Kristol, Irving. The Neoconservative Persuasion. The Weekly Standard. Vol. 8, Iss. 47. August 25,
2003. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=3000&R=785F27881
Accessed: October 11, 2007.
17
argued, whereas tyrannies are aggressive by their very nature. The neocons believed
that the nature of tyranny compelled Iraq to attack the US and its allies. They did not
need evidence to know that Saddam was a threat to the US.
Neoconservative scholar David Wurmser explained the nature of tyranny in

his 1999 book on US Iraq policy, Tyrannys Ally: Americas Failure to Defeat
Saddam Hussein. In the days following the September 11 attacks, the Pentagon hired
Wurmser to help develop the strategic concept of the War on Terror. He later became
Vice President Cheneys principal Middle East advisor. Wurmser may have
contributed to the Defense Department paper that first argued that Iraq is a threat
because of its WMDs and support of terrorists like al-Qaeda. In Tyrannys Ally, he
argues that Iraqs anti-Western aggression was a product of the nature of tyranny.
Iraq is a problem because it is a totalitarian tyranny, he writes. Such

tyranny is, by its very nature, violent, aggressive, and rabidly anti-Western. To deal
effectively with Iraq, the United States must strike not only at the tyrant but at the
institution of tyranny in Iraq.13 According to Wurmser, tyrannies are naturally
aggressive because tyrants need the concept of enemy to threaten their people and
justify their regime.
For tyrants, having an enemy against which to define

the struggle is indispensable. Abandoning the concept
of enemy or embarking on an introverted policy would
undermine the legitimizing structure of a tyrannical
13
Wurmser, David. Tyrannys Ally: Americas Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein. Washington DC:
The AEI Press, 1999. p. 42. http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.318/book_detail.asp Accessed:
January 8, 2007.
18
regime, by exposing the factional motivation of its
repressiveness. An Arab nationalist state at war carries
the glorious standard of pan-Arabism; at peace, it
becomes no more than a petty dictatorship pursuing
factional tyranny.14
Wurmser extrapolates from the nature of tyranny to conclude that Iraq will
never surrender its WMDs. Iraqs chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are
the pillars of Saddams regime, he writes.15 Saddams very survival depends on
weapons of mass terror to threaten his enemies, his neighbours and his own people.
Wurmser argues that if Saddam were to give up his WMDs, the Iraqi people would
kill him themselves. Genuine disarmament would be tantamount to suicide. For the
neocons, Saddams WMDs were an absolute certainty.
Wurmser continues that the nature of tyranny compels Iraq to attack the
United States in any way it can. Anti-Americanism among pan-Arabic nationalists
emerges from the same source as did Communist and Nazi anti-Americanism: the
nature of tyrannical regimes, he writes.16 Iraqs hostility towards the US had nothing
to do with US policies. Since the concept of enemy is essential to legitimize internal
repression, neighbors or superpowers that represent ideas antithetical to tyranny are
particularly threatening to the tyrant and are thus considered the most dangerous of its
foes. For Wurmser, Iraqs enemies are the United States and Israel, not because of
what they have done, but because of who they are, what they represent, and the fact of
14
Ibid., p. 60.
Ibid., p. 3.
16
Ibid., p. 61.
15
19
their existence.17 In other words, Wurmser argues that Iraq is compelled to attack the
US because America represents the cause of freedom.
Wurmser further argues that the hatred tyrants have for the United States is so
intense that secular nationalists will cooperate with religious extremists if doing so
serves their mutual, primary strategic goal prosecuting the war against the West. 18
Tyrants will pragmatically set aside their own differences out of their shared hatred of
Western values. For the neocons, it did not matter that Iraq and al-Qaeda had
completely different ideologies. The argument is that Al Qaeda has got a religious
motivation, somehow or other, and the Iraqi regime is considered to be a secular
regime, said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in early-2003. The answer to that
is, so what? The Iraqi regime will use anything it can to its advantage. Why wouldnt
they use any implement at hand?19 The nature of tyranny meant Saddam hated
America more than he hated al-Qaeda. The neocons believed Iraqs alliance with the
terrorist network, like Iraqs WMDs, was an absolute certainty.
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Cheney did not need evidence to know Iraq would
arm al-Qaeda with WMDs to attack the US. They knew the nature of tyranny and that
was enough. In 1998, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had co-signed an open letter urging
President Clinton to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.20 The
neocons had argued that in the absence of UN weapons inspections, Saddam was
17
Ibid., p. 61.
Ibid., p. 70.
19
Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Unknown. The New Yorker. February 10, 2003.
http://www.jeffreygoldberg.net/articles/tny/a_reporter_at_large_the_unknow.php Accessed: November
1, 2007.
20
Letter to President Clinton on Iraq. The Project for the New American Century. Washington DC.
January 26, 1998. http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm Accessed: November 1,
2007.
18
20
certain to restart his nuclear program. He was certain to develop a nuclear weapon and
when he did, he would be in striking distance of vital US oil interests in the Persian
Gulf. The neocons hadnt needed evidence in 1998 to know that Iraq was working on
weapons to threaten the US. They didnt need evidence in March 2001 either.
In March 2001, one of the Pentagons fiercest Iraq hawks, Richard Perle, the
Chairman of the Pentagons Defense Policy Board testified on US Iraq policy before
the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Perle argued that the absence of
evidence only meant that Saddam was hiding his WMDs.
Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction?

Sure, he does. We know he has chemical weapons. We
know he has biological weapons. We have been unable
to ferret them out and find them. We couldnt do it
when we had inspectors on the ground. We wont be
able to do it if the inspectors return. How far hes gone
on the nuclear weapons side, I dont think we really
know. My guess is its further than we think. Its always
further than we think because we limit ourselves, as we
think about this, to what were able to prove and
demonstrate. And unless you believe that we have
uncovered everything, you have to assume there is more
than were able to report.21
21
Perle, Richard. Statement of Richard Perle, Former Assistant Secretary, International Security,
Defense Department. Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on US Policy Towards Iraq.
March 1, 2001. http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/HearingsPreparedstatements/sfrc3-1-01.htm
21
For Perle and the neocons, the nature of tyranny trumped the evidence. They
knew Saddam had WMDs. They knew he would ally with al-Qaeda. They knew he
would attack the US. They knew that installing a democracy in Iraq was the only way
to protect America from Saddams chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The
neocons did not need evidence to know the meme was true. And it was just as well.
The US Intelligence Community couldnt find any.
The US Intelligence Community
During the run up to the war, the US Intelligence Community comprised about fifteen
US government agencies responsible for the collection, dissemination and analysis of
intelligence.22 This section explains the Intelligence Communitys organization and
make up circa 2002.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the most famous member of the
Intelligence Community. The CIA itself is comprised of several directorates, the
two most important of which are the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of
Intelligence.23 The Directorate of Operations does all the things you usually associate
with the CIA things like spying and overthrowing unfriendly foreign governments;
22
United States. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Charles S. Robb and Laurence H. Silberman. (Co-Chairs). Washington
DC: Government Printing Office. March 31, 2005. p. 579. http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html
Accessed: December 5, 2005.
This thesis describes the Intelligence Community as it was in 2001-2003. Since the 9/11 attacks and the
Iraq intelligence failure, the Intelligence Community has gone through several organizational
overhauls. Several offices and positions have been added, others have been renamed, reorganized or
abolished entirely.
23
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. About the CIA 1999.
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps35389/1999/15.htm Accessed: October 24, 2007.
22
the James Bond-type stuff. Less well known is the Directorate of Intelligence, which
is responsible for the CIAs intelligence analysis.24
Inside the Directorate of Intelligence there are a number of independent and

quasi-independent offices, each with its own area of expertise. Several offices are
subject matter experts. For example, the Center for Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC) analyses intelligence related to
weapons of mass destruction.25 The Office of Terrorism Analysis in the
Counterterrorism Center (CTC) houses the CIAs experts on terrorist groups like alQaeda.26 Other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence are concerned with
geographical regions. For example, the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and
African Analysis (NESAF) analyses intelligence on Middle Eastern, South Asian and
African countries.27 During the run up to the war, NESAF was responsible for
analysing political, social, military and economic intelligence on Iraq in the Middle
East and Niger in West Africa.
However, the Intelligence Community is more than just the CIA. Several US
government departments have their own intelligence agencies, which are also
considered members of the Intelligence Community. The Department of Defense has
a number of intelligence agencies under its control. For example, the Pentagons
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) collects and analyses information about foreign
24
Ibid.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence Analysis: Organization. 2007.
https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/organization-1/index.html Accessed: October
22, 2007.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
25
23
militaries.28 Inside the DIA, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has the
Defense Departments technical experts on conventional weapons rockets, tanks
guns, etcetera. The National Security Agency (NSA) monitors foreign
communications or signals intelligence.29 The National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) analyses satellite imagery.30 Each of the Pentagons intelligence
agencies are members of the Intelligence Community.
Like the Department of Defense, the Departments of State, Justice and Energy
have their own intelligence agencies too, although
they only have one each. The State Department has
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which
looks at political and diplomatic intelligence.31 In the
Department of Justice, theres the famous Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which takes
responsibility for counterterrorism and
counterespionage inside the United States.32 Then
theres the Office of Intelligence in the Department of
Figure 3 DCI George

Tenet. Source:
http://www.cia.gov/
Energy (DOE), which has the Intelligence Communitys experts on all things energyrelated.33 Like the Pentagons intelligence agencies, each of the other departments
agencies is a member of the Intelligence Community.
28
Robb-Silberman. op. cit., p. 580.

Ibid., p. 580.
30
Ibid., p. 580.
31
Ibid., p. 580.
32
Ibid., p. 580.
33
Ibid., p. 581.
29
24
The head of the Intelligence Community is the defacto head of the CIA, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI is responsible for coordinating the
Intelligence Communitys various branches the CIA, DIA, DOE, INR, everyone.
During the run up to the Iraq War, the DCI was George Tenet, 48, a member of
President Bushs war council at Camp David.
The DCIs National Intelligence Council (NIC) has one of the most important
responsibilities in the Intelligence Community. Answering to Tenet, the NIC
coordinates intelligence assessments that reflect the views of the Intelligence
Community as a whole.34 The NIC coordinates the Intelligence Communitys
consensus judgments, the most authoritative assessments the Intelligence Community
can author.
The various members of the Intelligence Community will often have different
interpretations of the same intelligence. The CIA will have one view. The DIA will
have another, INR another and DOE another still. The National Intelligence Councils
task is to harmonize all the different points of view into a single consensus position.
While the ideal is to come up with an assessment that all agencies agree reflects the
underlying intelligence, its rare that any member of the Intelligence Community
agrees with the consensus 100 percent. Analysts from different agencies argue back
and forth and usually make compromises. To get an agency to sign on to the
consensus, the NIC might water down language or use vaguer terms to accommodate
its point of view. However, sometimes compromise isnt possible. When
34
United States. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Director of Central Intelligence
Directive 2/3: Authorities and Responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council and the National
Intelligence Officers. May 27, 1999. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid2-3.htm Accessed: October
31, 2007.
25
disagreements between agencies are intractable, the consensus judgment will come
down to a simple majority vote.
The Consensus Did Not Support the Meme
Before 9/11, the Intelligence Community did not have enough evidence to reach a
consensus that Iraq had WMDs or supported al-Qaeda. There was not enough
evidence to support a judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, had
an active biological weapons (BW) program or had provided any kind of material
support to Bin Ladens terrorist network. The Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment could not support the neocons meme.
The Intelligence Community knew that after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqs nuclear
program had been largely destroyed. The International Atomic Energy Agency and
UNSCOM had destroyed portions of, and neutralized the remainder of Iraqs nuclear
infrastructure.35 For the Intelligence Community, it was evident that Saddam
certainly wanted nuclear weapons and that after 1998, the absence of UN weapons
inspections would give him greater opportunity to pursue them. However, the
Intelligence Community assessed that even if Saddam did decide to begin
reconstitution, he would need significant foreign assistance to develop a nuclear
weapon within five to seven years.36 And in any case, there was still no firm
evidence that reconstitution of Iraqs nuclear program was taking place.37
35
United States. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Communitys Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. S. Rpt. 108-301. Washington DC:
Government Printing Office. July 7, 2004. p. 84. http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf Accessed:
December 5, 2005.
36
Ibid., p. 85.
37
26
There was no firm evidence of an active Iraqi biological weapons (BW)

program either. The Intelligence Community knew that Saddam wanted biological
weapons. After UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Saddam might have decided
rebuild Iraqs BW program and done so undetected. But without direct evidence, the
strongest assessment the Intelligence Community could reach was that Iraq could
have biological weapons.38 The Intelligence Community speculated that Iraq probably
had expanded its BW efforts, but could not confirm whether Iraq has produced
biological agents.39 Prior to 9/11, there was not enough reliable intelligence to
indicate Iraq had an active BW program.
Evidence of a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda was even more tenuous.
The overwhelming view inside the Intelligence Community was that al-Qaeda and the
Iraqi regime were natural enemies, not potential allies. Osama bin Laden, a fanatical
Salafist Muslim, had founded al-Qaeda specifically to overthrow secular Arab
nationalist governments like Saddam Husseins regime. According to Daniel
Benjamin, the director of counterterrorism on President Clintons National Security
Council, In 1998, we went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if
there was a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq. We came to the conclusion that our
intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between Al
Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact.40 The Intelligence Community could not find
any direct evidence Iraq had ever provided al-Qaeda with money, weaponry, or
38
Ibid., p. 81.
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 144.
40
Dreyfuss, Robert and Jason Vest. The Lie Factory. Mother Jones. January/February, 2004.
http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0402nn/040201nn.htm#453 Accessed: October 31, 2007.
39
27
training.41 The Intelligence Community could not conclude that Iraq supported alQaeda.
Prior to the September 11 attacks, the Intelligence Communitys consensus did

not support the meme. There was not enough evidence that Iraq had WMDs or
supported al-Qaeda. The Intelligence Community could not conclude that Saddam
would arm al-Qaeda with a weapon of mass destruction to attack the US.
The Essential Problem
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz did not need evidence to know that Iraq was a
threat. They certainly didnt need the Intelligence Community to tell them what they
already knew was true. As far as the neocons were concerned, the Intelligence
Community couldnt find enough evidence because its standard of proof was too high.
The Intelligence Community was too cautious, too biased, too incompetent to see
through Saddams deception. For the neocons, the Intelligence Community could not
appreciate that Saddam was hiding the evidence of his WMDs and alliance with alQaeda. The Intelligence Communitys consensus on Iraq did not make any difference
to the decision to extend the War on Terror to Saddam Hussein. That said, the Iraq
consensus was potentially a huge problem for the neocons. Although the consensus
did not influence the decision to go to war, the consensus would affect the way in
which the war would be sold to the public.
41
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islams War against
America. New York: Random House, 2003. p. 456.
28
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted to take the War on Terror to
Saddam and they wanted to be able to tell the American people the reasons why. The
neocons wanted to say emphatically that Iraq had active WMD programs and
supported al-Qaeda. They wanted to say that Saddam would arm al-Qaeda with
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to attack the US. Most importantly, the
neocons wanted to cite specific intelligence of Iraqs WMDs and al-Qaeda ties. While
the neocons did not need evidence to know the meme was true, they did need
evidence to convince everyone else that they were right. And this was why the
Intelligence Communitys consensus was so important: the neocons could not cite
intelligence judgments in the case for war unless the Intelligence Communitys
consensus agreed.
Whenever a US official delivers a public statement that refers to intelligence

in some way, the statement must first be cleared by the Intelligence Community. The
clearance process has two purposes. First of all, the Intelligence Community must
make sure the speech does not reveal classified sources and methods.42 The second
reason is to ensure that what policymakers say on behalf of the US government is
supported by the available intelligence.43 If a US official wants to state his own
personal judgment on intelligence, he is free to do so provided he makes it clear that
thats what hes doing. But if a US official speaks for the US government or seeks to
represent what the Intelligence Community believes, then the Intelligence Community
42
United States. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Nomination of John R. Bolton to be US
Representative to the United Nations with the Rank of Ambassador. E. Rpt. 109-01. Washington DC:
Government Printing Office. May 18, 2005. p. 288.
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/bolton.pdf Accessed: November 2, 2007.
43
Ibid., p. 288.
29
must ensure that the speech accurately reflects the available evidence. The speech
must reflect the consensus judgment of the Intelligence Community.44
If the consensus didnt agree with the meme, then the neocons couldnt say it
publicly. The Intelligence Community effectively controlled the case for war. The
Intelligence Community could not find the evidence that Iraq had WMDs and
supported al-Qaeda. The neocons knew they would have to find it themselves. On
September 11, 2001, just hours after the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld ordered a massive sweep of the available Iraq intelligence. According to
notes taken by one of Rumsfelds top aides, Stephen Cambone, the Defense Secretary
wanted the [b]est info fast. Judge whether good enough [to] hit S.H. meaning
Saddam Hussein at the same time. Not only UBL. the initials used to identify
Osama Bin Laden. Cambones notes then mention the Secretary saying that it would
be [h]ard to get a good case and that they [n]eed to move swiftly. Go massive,
Rumsfeld ordered, referring to the collection effort. Sweep it all up. Things related
and not. Cambone added the reason collection against Iraq had to be so broad: Need
to do so to get anything useful.45 The Intelligence Community could not be trusted to
find anything useful, so the neocons would find it themselves whether it was related
or not.
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz already knew that Iraq was a threat because
of its WMDs and support for al-Qaeda. They did not need evidence to inform their
view. They only needed evidence related or not to convince everyone else that
44
Ibid., p. 288.
Cambone, Stephen. Notes taken by Stephen Cambone during oral communication with Secretary
Rumsfeld. United States Department of Defense. September 11, 2001.
http://tomflocco.com/Docs/Dsn/DodStaffNotes.htm Accessed October 22, 2007.
45
30
they were right. Evidence was necessary to sell the war and it didnt matter if it was
ambiguous, unconfirmed or otherwise dubious as long as it proved what the neocons
had already assumed was true. Before the neocons could make the case they wanted
to make, the Intelligence Communitys consensus had to be brought in line with their
preconceived conclusions. The story of how the neocons succeeded is the story of the
Iraq War conspiracy. It is the story of the Presidents sixteen words: The British
government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa.
31
The Aluminium Tubes
Aluminet.com
The story of the Iraq War conspiracy doesnt begin with Rumsfelds sweep or the
meme at Camp David. It doesnt begin with the September 11 attacks either. The
story begins almost a year earlier with a post on the messageboard of a metal trading
website, aluminet.com. On aluminet, people from all over the world post the
specifications of metal products theyd like to import, hoping to find a supplier. In
November 2000, an Iraqi man named Ahmed Kamel posted a message. The story
begins with Kamels aluminet post.
Kamel worked for a Jordan-based company called Ramada Import and Export,
a front company for the Iraqi military.46 After digging through aluminets archives, I
found Kamels original post from November 20, 2000. Kamel was trying to find a
supplier for a shipment of specialized aluminium tubes.
Posted by Ahmed Kamel on November 20, 2000 at 16:06:11:
I'm ready to buy 60,000 PCs. of Aluminum Alloy Tube 7075 T6 (Al Zn
Mg Cu 1.5)
46
Albright, David. Iraqs Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact From Fiction. Institute for Science and
International Security. Washington DC. December 5, 2003. p. 5.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf Accessed: October 14,
2007.
32
OD: 81mm +/-0.1
ID: 74.4mm (+0.1)
L: 900mm (+/- 0.5)
Anodized by Chromic acid 15 micron
for more details, mail me
Through Kamels front company, Saddam Husseins regime was attempting to

buy 60,000 specialized aluminium
tubes. The Iraqis were trying to
keep it a secret. What did they
intend the tubes for?
In October 2002, twentythree months later, President

George W. Bush delivered a
televised address at the Cincinnati
Figure 4 The Iraqi Tubes. Source: US Iraq

Survey Group, Vol. 2, p. 41.
Museum Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. The President claimed that the tubes were
evidence of Iraqs secret nuclear program. The evidence indicates that Iraq is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, he said. Iraq has attempted to purchase
high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which
33
are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.47 President Bush had cited the tubes
as evidence of the memes nuclear component: Iraq is a threat because it is developing
nuclear weapons.
But as the world now knows, the President was wrong.

After the fall of Baghdad, the United States Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) spent two years in Iraq searching for evidence of
weapons of mass destruction. The ISG determined Iraq had
ended its nuclear program in 1991 and had made no attempts to
reconstitute the program since then.48 Kamels tubes were not
intended for uranium enrichment. Instead, Iraq had been trying
to buy the tubes for its Nasser-81 rockets. 49
So, heres the question: How was the President able to

Figure 5 The
Nasser-81 Rocket.
Source: US Iraq
Survey Group,
Vol. 2, p. 41.
cite rocket motor bodies as evidence of an Iraqi nuclear

program?
The CIA Discovers the Tubes Procurement
By early-2001, Kamel had found a supplier for the tubes. A deal was worked out. The
tubes would be manufactured in China and shipped to Jordan. Kamel could expect the
first shipment of 2,000 tubes by June.50
47
Bush, George W. President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. Cincinnati Museum Center. Cincinnati,
Ohio. October 7, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html Accessed:
October 20, 2007.
48
United States. Iraq Survey Group. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on
Iraqs WMD. Vol. 2. Washington DC: Government Printing Office. September 30, 2004. p. 1.
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/DuelferRpt/Volume_2.pdf Accessed: October 22, 2007.
49
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
34
Around the first week of April 2001, the CIA got a hold of a copy of the tubes
specifications.51 Most likely, the US had been monitoring Kamels communications.
The CIA may have intercepted a fax with details of the order.
At first blush, it looked like the tubes might be components for a uranium
enrichment program. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq
was banned from importing high-strength aluminium tubes with outer diameters in
excess of 75mm because of their potential nuclear application.52 Kamel was buying
tubes made from the one of the strongest aluminium alloys, 7075-T6. Plus, the tubes
external diameters were specified at 81mm, far greater than the 75mm maximum.
Without a doubt, the tubes were illegal. The CIA was suspicious. Were the tubes
evidence that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his uranium enrichment program?
How to Make a Nuclear Weapon
A nuclear weapon is relatively easy to build provided youve got enough highly
enriched uranium (HEU). With about fifty kilos of HEU, all it takes is a university
physics department and someone who understands explosives to fashion a nuclear
device similar to the one dropped on Hiroshima in World War 2.53 The difficult part
50
Albright, David. Iraqs Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact From Fiction. op. cit., p. 6.
December 5, 2005.
52
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 687. April 3, 1991.
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm Accessed: October 22, 2007.
53
Dombey, Norman. What Has He Got? The London Review of Books. October 17, 2002.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n20/print/domb01_.html Accessed: October 22, 2007.
51
35
of building a nuclear weapon is not the weapon design itself, but the process of
enriching the fifty kilos of uranium.
Nuclear weapons work because of a process called nuclear fission. When

certain types of atoms (called fissionable atoms) are struck with sub-atomic particles
called neutrons, the atom will split or fission into energy.54 If the fissionable atom
is also fissile, then not only will it release energy but it will release more neutrons as
well. These new neutrons can collide with more fissile atoms, which also fission,
releasing more neutrons, which collide with more atoms, causing more fissions, and
so on and so on in what is called a self-sustaining fission chain-reaction.55 If there is
enough fissile material (i.e. the fissile material is at critical mass), then the chain
reaction will release so much energy that it will result in a nuclear explosion.56
When natural uranium is first mined out of the ground, its composed of two
types of uranium isotopes.
Isotopes are atoms of an element
that have the same number of
protons but different numbers of
neutrons.57 More than 99 percent
of natural uranium consists of
the U238 isotope, which has 146
54
Figure 6 Uranium Isotopes. Source:

http://www.nrc.gov/
What is Uranium? How does it work? Australian Uranium Association. 2008.

http://www.aua.org.au/page.php?pid=366&category=11 Accessed: December 17, 2008.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
United States. Department of Energy. What is an Isotope? 2008.
http://www.nuclear.energy.gov/isotopes/neIsotopes2e.html Accessed: December 17, 2008.
36
neutrons.58 The isotope U235 has 143 neutrons and accounts for only about 0.7
percent of natural uranium. Only U235 is both fissionable and fissile, which means
that at critical mass, it can support a nuclear explosion. Highly enriched or weaponsgrade uranium is uranium that consists of more than 90 percent U235. So to build a
nuclear weapon, you first need to separate the U235 isotopes from the U238. The
separation of uranium isotopes is whats known as the enrichment process.59
Enriching enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon is an extremely
difficult and energy intensive process. One of the ways to do it is to use uranium gas
centrifuges.
When the CIA discovered Kamels

tubes order, it looked like the tubes might
be components for uranium gas centrifuges.
Uranium gas centrifuges work because
isotopes of U235 are marginally lighter than
their U238 cousins.60 To begin enriching
enough uranium for a nuclear weapon, first
you have to convert several tonnes of
natural uranium into a gas, which you then
pump into your centrifuge. If the centrifuge
Figure 7 Uranium Gas Centrifuge
Design. Source: Albright, 2003.
is spinning very, very fast, then the

centrifugal force will push the heavier U238
58
United States. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Uranium Enrichment. 2007.

http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html Accessed: October 22, 2007.
59
Ibid.
60
Uranium Enrichment. World Nuclear Association. London. March, 2006.
http://213.198.118.156/info/inf28.htm Accessed: October 22, 2007.
37
isotopes to the edge of the centrifuge, while the lighter U235 isotopes collect in the
centre.61 The uranium isotopes are separated. The uranium is collecting at the
centrifuges centre is enriched in U235.
But uranium gas centrifuges arent quite as simple as they sound. Although
U238 is heavier than U235, the difference is only about 1.27 percent and were
talking atoms here. The centrifuges rotor basically, the tube part of the centrifuge
has to spin at more than 90,000 rpm for any kind of separation to occur. Getting a
centrifuge to spin at that speed is a very difficult thing to do
and requires a lot of specialised equipment and expertise.62
For example, the rotor has to be made out of a material thats
extremely tough but also extremely light. If its too heavy,
you wont be able to spin it fast enough. If its too weak, the
centrifugal force thats separating the U235 will tear the rotor
apart. Its a trade off. Back in the 1930s when uranium
enrichment centrifuges were first being built, one of the few
materials that was tough enough and light enough to do the
job was 7076-T6 aluminium, which happened to be the same
material as the tubes that Kamel was trying to buy.63 The
CIA thought that Kamels tubes might be intended as rotors
Figure 8 A
Centrifuge Cascade.
Source:
http://www.npp.hu/
for uranium gas centrifuges. The Iraqis might be planning to build a centrifuge
cascade.
61
Ibid.
Albright, David. Iraqs Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear
Weapons Prior to the Gulf War. Institute for Science and International Security. Washington DC.
October, 2002. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/iraqs_fm_history.html Accessed: October
22, 2007.
63
Albright, David. Iraqs Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact From Fiction. op. cit. p. 4.
62
38
What is a centrifuge cascade? A single centrifuge even if its spinning more

than 90,000 rpm will take years to enrich a gram of uranium to weapons-grade. To
get the fifty kilos of weapons-grade uranium needed for a nuclear weapon, you need a
centrifuge cascade, which is thousands of centrifuges lined up side-by-side, all
running simultaneously.64 Kamel had ordered 60,000 aluminium tubes, more than
enough for a centrifuge cascade. Were the tubes evidence that Saddam was getting
back into the uranium enrichment business? Yes, according to the CIAs Center for
Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC).
64
Dombey, Norman. op. cit.
39
WINPAC
Part of the CIAs Directorate of Intelligence, WINPAC analyses weapons of mass

destruction intelligence for the CIA. With a staff of about 500 analysts, scientists and
assorted experts, WINPAC monitors nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
programs, tracks WMD technology and makes sure countries are sticking to
nonproliferation treaties, things like that.65 When WINPAC first learned about Iraqs
aluminium tubes, it immediately thought the Iraqis were going to use them as rotors
for a uranium enrichment centrifuges.
On April 10, 2001, WINPAC published an assessment of the tubes

specifications. The assessment was not very detailed, but it noted that the tubes were
made from 7076-T6 aluminium, the same material that had been used for centrifuge
rotors in the 1950s.66 WINPAC concluded that the tubes had little use other than for
rotors in a gas centrifuge program.67 For WINPAC, the tubes were evidence that
Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear program.
The DOE
The day after the WINPAC assessment, the tubes specifications were analysed by
another part of the Intelligence Community, the Office of Intelligence in the
Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE has Intelligence Communitys experts on
65
Loeb, Vernon. CIA Is Stepping Up Attempts To Monitor Spread of Weapons. The Washington
Post. March 12, 2001. http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/europe/A55503-2001Mar11.html
Accessed: January 9, 2006.
66
67
Ibid., p. 88.
40
energy related issues, such as centrifuge uranium enrichment. The DOEs assessment
would be a more extensive analysis of Iraqs procurement.68
When the centrifuge experts took a look at the tubes specifications, they came
to a very different conclusion than WINPAC had. DOE assessed that it was highly
unlikely that Iraq intended the tubes for centrifuge rotors. DOEs assessment noted
that, yes, technically, the tubes were made of 7075-T6 aluminium, and as such were a
violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687.69 However, what stood out for DOE
was the tubes internal diameter specification. Kamel was ordering tubes with internal
diameters of 74.4mm. DOE assessed that this was only marginally large enough for
practical centrifuge applications.70 For centrifuge rotors, you want the internal
diameter to be as large as possible. The larger the internal diameter, the stronger the
centrifugal force and the more U235 will be separated from U238. The DOE thought
the tubes internal diameter specification seemed too narrow.71
DOE found it strange because the Iraqis knew what they were doing when it
came to centrifuges. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqs nuclear engineers had
successfully tested two uranium centrifuge prototypes.72 However, neither prototype
had been made from 7075-T6 aluminium. The Iraqis had used far stronger, modern
materials: carbon fibre and maraging steel.73
68
Ibid., p. 88.
Ibid., p. 89.
70
Ibid., p. 89
71
Ibid., p. 89.
72
Weapons Prior to the Gulf War. op. cit.
73
69
41
Table 1 Specifications of Iraqi Tubes and Iraqs Modern Rotors.74
Length
Outer Diameter
Inner Diameter
Wall Thickness
Material
Iraqi Tubes
900.0mm
81.0mm
74.4mm
3.3mm
7075-T6 Al
Iraqi Maraging Steel

620.0mm
Iraqi Carbon Fibre

614.0mm
145.5mm
0.35mm
Maraging Steel
145.85mm
1.0mm
Carbon Fibre
Both of Iraqs prototypes had had internal diameters almost twice the size of
the tubes internal diameter specification.75 They could spin faster and enrich
substantially more uranium. DOE assessed that if the tubes were for centrifuge rotors,
Iraqs nuclear engineers were taking a huge step backwards.76 For DOE, WINPACs
centrifuge explanation just didnt add up.
Rockets, not Rotors
One month later, the DOE figured out what the tubes were really for: rocket motor
bodies. After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had declared its possession of 160,000 7075-T6
aluminium tubes that had been intended for its Nasser-81 rocket program. The DOE
published a brand new assessment of the Iraqi tubes on May 9, 2001. In the
assessment, the DOE pointed out that all of the tubes specifications length, outer
diameter, inner diameter and wall thickness were an exact match for Iraqs Nasser81 rocket design.77
74
Ibid., p. 37. Blanks represent lack of specific data.

76
Ibid., p. 89.
77
Ibid., pp. 89-90.
75
42
Table 2 Specifications of Iraqi Tubes, Nasser-81 Rocket tubes and Zippe-Type
Rotors.78
Iraqi Tubes
Nasser-81
Rocket
Length
900.0mm
900.0mm
Outer
81.0mm
81.0mm
Diameter
Inner
74.4mm
74.4mm
Diameter
Wall
3.3mm
3.3mm
Thickness
Material
7075-T6 Al 7075-T6 Al
DOEs assessment noted that the Intelligence Communitys original analysis

of these tubes focused on their possible use in developing gas centrifuges for the
enrichment of uranium. Further investigation reveals, however, Iraq has purchased
similar aluminium tubes previously to manufacture chambers (tubes) for a multiple
rocket launcher.79
The DOE was saying that WINPAC had been wrong. Kamels tubes were
most likely for rockets, not rotors. And as the Iraq Survey Group would discover in
2003, DOE was absolutely correct. The tubes were intended for Iraqs Nasser-81
rockets, not for a uranium enrichment program.80
So, by the end of May 2001, two members of the Intelligence Community had
assessed the tubes. WINPAC, the WMD specialists, had authored the first assessment
on April 10. The assessment had not been very detailed, but had concluded the tubes
had little use other than as centrifuge rotors. DOE, the centrifuge experts, had
78
Albright, David. Iraqs Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact From Fiction. op. cit. p. 37; Iraq Survey
Group, Vol. 2. op. cit., p. 27
79
Ibid., p. 89.
80
Iraq Survey Group, Vol. 2, op cit., pp. 6-7.
43
authored two assessments, both of which were more comprehensive than WINPACs.
DOEs first assessment of the tubes disputed WINPACs conclusion. The second
assessment had discovered a more plausible end-use for the tubes: rocket motor
bodies. In other words, the Intelligence Community did not have a consensus that Iraq
intended the tubes for uranium enrichment. In fact, it looked like the consensus was
going to go in the opposite direction. It looked like a consensus would side with
DOEs view.
At minimum, the tubes ultimate end-use was disputed. There was not enough
hard evidence for the Intelligence Community to reach a consensus that Iraq nuclear
reconstitution was underway. If the President had wanted to cite Iraqs aluminium
tubes as evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program, the Intelligence Community would not
have cleared him to do so.
The WINPAC Personnel
In late-June 2001, Kamels first tubes shipment arrived in Jordan. Whether or not the
tubes were intended for centrifuge rotors, they were a violation of UN Security
Council Resolution 687. The tubes were against international law. CIA officers
cooperating with Jordanian intelligence seized the shipment before it could clear
customs.81 Iraq never received the tubes it had tried to buy.
81
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 90; United Kingdom. Committee of Privy Councillors. Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Rt. Hon. Lord Butler. (Chair). London: The Stationary
Office. July 14, 2004. p. 131. http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/index.asp Accessed: December 5,
2005.
44
After the tubes were seized, a member of the US Intelligence Community
authored another assessment of the Iraqi procurement. In the US Senate report, the
name of the authoring agency has been redacted and so the report only refers
obliquely to personnel.82 However, the Robb-Silberman Commission, the
presidential commission to investigate the WMD intelligence failure, indicates that
the personnel worked for WINPAC. 83 The Commission notes that the assessment
was a Senior Publish When Ready, which is a WINPAC assessment that is only
sent to senior Bush administration officials the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of Defense, etcetera.84 In the Senior Publish When Ready, the WINPAC
personnel told the Bush administration that the tubes were intended for an Iraqi
nuclear program after all.85
The WINPAC assessment seems to have interpreted the tubes to fit a

preconceived conclusion. The personnel assumed that the tubes were intended for
rotors and then cherry-picked evidence that supported the assumption. For example,
the assessment noted that the tubes were constructed from high-strength aluminum
(7075-T6), which was necessary for gas centrifuges.86 The assessment continued that
the tubes dimensions match[ed] those of a publicly available gas centrifuge design
from the 1950s, known as the Zippe centrifuge.87 (The Zippe centrifuge design is
named for its inventor, German physicist Gernot Zippe.)88 Because the tubes did not
match Iraqs modern centrifuge design, the WINPAC personnel had decided to
compare the tubes to a design they resembled more closely: the Zippe centrifuge from
82

84
85
Ibid., p. 90.
86
Ibid., p. 90.
87
Ibid., p. 90.
88
Ibid., p. 90.
83
45
the 1950s. WINPAC had assumed the tubes were for centrifuges and cherry-picked a
design to fit the preconceived conclusion.
Iraqs pre-Gulf War nuclear program had taken several years to get even a
prototype centrifuge to work. The only reason Iraq had eventually succeeded in that
was because it had acquired modern carbon fibre/maraging steel designs and
extensive assistance from German centrifuge experts.89 Without any evidence,
WINPAC had assumed that Iraqs engineers had abandoned their modern centrifuge
designs for a Zippe design, which they had no idea how to build and wouldnt work
anywhere near as well even if they did.90 The personnel had made a huge
assumption so the tubes would fit the preconceived conclusion.
Furthermore, if evidence contradicted the conclusion, the personnel

dismissed it as Iraqi deception. In the assessment, WINPAC concluded that Iraq was
likely to claim that the tubes were for a conventional or civilian use, a use that
cannot be discounted.91 DOE had noted that the tubes specifications were an exact
match for Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket design length, inner diameter, outer diameter and
wall thickness.92 For WINPACs personnel, DOEs assessment was completely
irrelevant. They assumed the Iraqis had deliberately purchased tubes that could pass
for rocket motor bodies as a cover story in case the tubes were intercepted.
89
Weapons Prior to the Gulf War. op. cit. See also, Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General
of the IAEA under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996). S/1997/779.
International Atomic Energy Agency. October 8, 1997.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/un/iaea-779.htm Accessed: December 18, 2008.
90
91
Robb-Silberman, op cit., p. 199.
92
46
WINPAC dismissed evidence that contradicted its preconceived conclusion as Iraqi
deception.
The WINPAC personnel interpreted the tubes to fit a predetermined truth.

Assuming the tubes were for centrifuge rotors, they cherry-picked evidence to support
the conclusion. In the absence of evidence, they made huge, unsubstantiated
assumptions. When confronted with evidence that contradicted the conclusion, the
personnel dismissed it as deception. WINPAC was determined to conclude the
tubes were evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
Joe the WINPAC Analyst
One of the personnel was almost certainly a WINPAC nuclear analyst named
Joe.93 During the run up to the war, Joe was a key player in pushing the case that
the tubes were intended as centrifuge rotors. The WINPAC personnel had compared
the tubes to the Zippe centrifuge design from the 1950s. In July 2001, Joe was using
the exact same arguments.
Joe was absolutely desperate to prove that the tubes were intended for
centrifuge rotors. In July 2001, Joe was taking part in presentations on the tubes.94 He
seems to have spent a lot of time arguing with DOE analysts. Joe was trying to
convince the Intelligence Communitys experts that, no, really, the tubes were
evidence of an Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. Each time the DOE analysts shot an
93
Gellman, Barton and Walter Pincus. Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence. The
Washington Post. August 10, 2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A395002003Aug9?language=printer Accessed: November 4, 2007.
94
47
argument down, Joe would come back with a new one. His conclusion always stayed
the same: the tubes were centrifuge rotors.
Initially, Joe used the same arguments as WINPACs personnel. He claimed

that the tubes matched rotors for the 1950s Zippe centrifuge design. All the Iraqis
would have to do, he said, would be to cut each tube in half.95 The tubes could then be
used as rotors in a Zippe centrifuge.
DOE disagreed strongly with Joes analysis. First of all, DOE repeated that the
Iraqis were highly unlikely to abandon their modern centrifuge design for a 1950s
design, which they didnt know how to build. They would have to start all their
research from scratch.96
Secondly, DOE pointed out that Joes analysis was completely wrong. The
tubes cut in half did not match Zippes rotor design.97 Zippe had designed several
centrifuge rotors and the tubes did not match any of them. In particular, the wall
thickness was wrong. No Zippe design had walls thicker than 1mm. The tubes walls
were specified at 3.3mm. The walls would be too thick for centrifuge rotors. The
tubes would be too heavy. Theyd never be able to spin fast enough to enrich
significant amounts of uranium.98 The DOE argued that the WINPAC personnel
had been wrong when they assessed the tubes matched the Zippe rotor design.
95
97
98
Ibid., p. 13.
96
48
Table 3 Specifications of Iraqi Tubes, Nasser-81 Rocket Tubes and Three

Zippe Design Rotors.99
Iraqi Tubes Nasser-81 Zippe 2.75
Zippe 3
Zippe 4
Rocket
Length
900.0mm
900.0mm
280.0mm
332.0mm
500.0mm
Outer Diameter
81.0mm
81.0mm
70.0mm
76.2mm
100.0mm
Inner Diameter
74.4mm
74.4mm
68.6mm
74.2mm
98.0mm
Wall Thickness
3.3mm
3.3mm
1.0mm
1.0mm
1.0mm
Material
7075-T6
7075-T6
2000-T6
2000-T6
7000 S
But Joe was relentless. No matter what the objections, he always came back
with the same answer. Okay, he said. What if the Iraqis cut the tubes in half and then
machined down the wall thickness? They could also expand each tubes internal
diameter so rotors could enrich more than a marginal amounts of uranium. What if the
Iraqis modified each tube until they could be used as centrifuge rotors?100
DOE responded that technically, yes, the tubes could be used as centrifuge
rotors if the Iraqis made extensive modifications. The Iraqis would need to expand the
internal diameters if they wanted to use the tubes as centrifuge rotors.101 However,
DOE also pointed out how difficult it would be to machine the inner surface of 1000s
of aluminium tubes without rendering them useless as centrifuge rotors. A centrifuge
rotor that is a few tenths of a millimetre lopsided will have significant balancing
problems. If the Iraqis did try to machine the tubes inner and outer surfaces as Joe
suggested, they would have to be extraordinarily precise. The DOE told Joe it would
cost the Iraqis significant time, energy and effort to transform each tube into a
centrifuge rotor. During the US Senates investigation of pre-war assessments, one
99
Ibid., p. 37; Iraq Survey Group, Vol. 2. op. cit., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 13.
101
100
49
DOE analyst explained what significant time, energy and effort meant: You could
turn your new Yugo into Cadillac with enough time and energy and effort as well.102
In late-July/early-August 2001, Joe came up with a brand new way to interpret

the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. Instead of comparing the tubes
to a single Zippe rotor design, Joe combined the dimensions of all the Zippe designs
so the tubes specifications would appear to match.103 In spite of DOE, Joe decided
that Zippes wall thickness could be interpreted as 2.8mm, a closer match for the
tubes 3.3mm wall thickness, and not 1mm as the centrifuge experts had insisted.104
The Iraqis would not have to make extensive modifications to the tubes after all. The
tubes dimensions matched Joes Centrifuge Frankenstein. For Joe, it did not matter
that the Centrifuge Frankenstein was not a real design. All that mattered was that the
tubes fit the predetermined truth: Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
Table 4 Specifications of the Iraqi Tubes and Joes Centrifuge Frankenstein.105

Iraqi Tubes
Joes Centrifuge Frankenstein
Length
900.0mm
279.4mm 381.0mm
Outer Diameter
81.0mm
74.2mm 81.9mm
Inner Diameter
74.4mm
68.6mm 76.3mm
Wall Thickness
3.3mm
2.8mm
Material
7075-T6 Al.
2000 or 7000 series Al.
At this point, DOE seems to have started accusing Joe of intellectual

dishonesty.106 Joe knew perfectly well that there were several Zippe rotor designs and
that their dimensions could not be presented as a range of values. The dimensions of
102

Ibid., p. 91.
104
Ibid., p. 91.
105
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., pp. 88; 91; 93.
106
103
50
each of Zippes designs had to be precise. Furthermore, DOE once again told Joe that
all of Zippes rotors had had wall thicknesses of less than 1mm. The specification
could not be interpreted as 2.8mm.107 DOE analysts told the US Senate that they
explained this to Joe several times over the next year. They even confirmed with
Gernot Zippe himself that his rotor designs would not work with a wall thickness
greater than 1mm.108 But it did not matter. Joe would not listen to DOEs objections.
Joe the WINPAC analyst was absolutely desperate to prove that the tubes were
evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. Each time the DOE shot down an
explanation, he would return with a new one. At first Joe thought the tubes only had
to be cut in half to be used as centrifuge rotors. When DOE pointed out this was
wrong, Joe was happy to assume the Iraqis would make extensive modifications to the
tubes until they could be used as such. In the absence of evidence that Iraq would turn
its Yugos into Cadillacs, the DOE considered Joes scenario highly unlikely. Joe
did not need evidence to make the tubes fit his preconceived conclusion. Finally, Joe
came up with the Centrifuge Frankenstein. He was so convinced that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program that he was willing to be intellectually dishonest to
prove he was right.
DOEs Eight-Page Smackdown
By the middle of August, DOE seems to have decided it had had enough of Joes
dishonesty. On August 17, 2001, the centrifuge experts published an extensive
107
108

Ibid., p. 110.
51
analysis of tubes, Iraqs Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?109
The eight-page analysis went out of its way to refute Joes arguments.
In the assessment, the DOE noted that the Iraqi tubes were an exact match for
Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket. Rocket motor bodies for the Nasser-81 were made from the
exact same aluminium, had the exact same length dimension, wall thickness
dimension and inner and outer diameter dimensions.110 In contrast, the DOE paper
noted that the tubes specifications did not match any known centrifuge design. The
closest design to the tubes was the Zippe three-inch rotor. However, DOE repeated
that Iraq was highly unlikely to abandon its modern centrifuge designs for a 1950s
design that it did not know how to build and would not work very well even if it
did.111
And in any case, the tubes did not match the Zippe three-inch rotor design.
The DOE assessment continued that the tubes could not be used as centrifuge rotors
without extensive modification. In particular, the tubes internal diameters were too
narrow. They would have to be expanded if they were going to enrich uranium. The
DOE paper explored various workable schemes to modify the tubes for favorable
centrifuge rotor use. These included machining the inner and outer surfaces up to
and including re-melting the tubes and restarting[the] fabrication process.112
There was no evidence Iraq would invest the significant time, energy and
effort to transform its Yugos into Cadillacs. Even if the Iraqis did make the
109
Ibid., p. 91.
Ibid., p. 91.
111
Ibid., p. 92.
112
110
52
extreme, nearly impossible modifications, they would only have rotors for a
centrifuge theyd never built, had no parts for, was more than half a century out-ofdate. As one DOE analyst put it, if Iraq was really going to use the tubes to enrich
uranium, we should just give them the tubes.113 The DOE assessment concluded
that the tubes most likely end-use was as motor bodies for Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket.
So by the end of August 2001, it looked like the debate if you can call it that
was over. The DOE had authored two comprehensive assessments that had
concluded the tubes were most likely rockets, not centrifuge rotors. Despite Joes
presentations, no member of the Intelligence Community authored a formal
assessment based on his research, not even WINPAC. The Intelligence Communitys
consensus seemed to have settled firmly on DOEs side.
If the President had wanted to cite the tubes as evidence of Iraqs

reconstitution, the Intelligence Communitys consensus would not have allowed him
to do so.
The Team B
It took me a long time before I figured out what Joe and WINPACs personnel were
doing precisely. Joe and the personnel seem to have been part of something called a
Team B.
113
53
A Team B or red team is a group of intelligence analysts who perform a
special kind of analysis. The name red team comes from US war games during the
Cold War. US officers would be assigned to play as Soviets, the red team, against
the US, the blue team, in order to test US military tactics and equipment should
open conflict with the USSR break out.114 An intelligence red team is similar because
it adopts the enemy perspective when analysing intelligence. Instead of asking if the
evidence suggests an enemy is pursuing a certain objective, a red team assumes the
enemy is pursuing said objective and then interprets the evidence to fit the
assumption. The red team, the Team B, challenges the analysis of the blue team, the
Team A, the mainstream intelligence analysts.115
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and neocons in and out of the Bush administration love
Team Bs. Over the last several decades, there have been a number of high-profile
Team Bs, all of them associated with neoconservatives. The first, Team B, was
formed in 1976.116 Stacked with hardline anti-Communists, the panel was put together
to counter the Intelligence Communitys assessments of Soviet military capabilities
and strategic objectives. The Intelligence Community had assessed that the USSRs
economy was heading towards stagnation. There was no evidence the Soviets were
building up their armed forces. However, Team B was convinced the Intelligence
Community was underestimating the Soviet threat. The panel included Bushs futureDeputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz.117
114
Kaplan, Fred. Red Herrings: Can the CIA be saved? Slate Magazine. July 9, 2004.
http://www.slate.com/id/2103650 Accessed: November 4, 2007.
115
Ibid.
116
Hessing-Cahn, Anne. Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
Vol. 49, No. 3. April, 1993. http://home.gwi.net/~jscarp/SnoweRemoval/teamb-cahn.doc Accessed:
November 4, 2007.
117
Korb, Lawrence J. Its Time to Bench Team B. Center for American Progress. Washington DC.
August 18, 2004. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/08/b140711.html Accessed: November
4, 2007.
54
Team B did not stick to the hard data, but instead interpreted intelligence of
Soviet capabilities in light of Soviet intentions.118 In other words, Team B assumed
that the USSR was pursuing an offensive strategy and cherry-picked evidence to
support the assumption. 119 The panel focussed on intelligence that suggested the
USSRs military strength was as strong as ever. In her book about the Team B
experiment, Killing Dtente, Anne Hessing-Cahn writes that
Everyone who visited the Soviet Union came back with

reports of empty grocery store shelves, busses and
trucks constantly breaking down, and nonfunctioning
elevators, so that the most desirable apartments or
offices were not in the penthouse but on the ground
floor. Despite declining growth rates, shortages of
goods and services, and recurrent poor harvests, Team
B looked only at the military sector and noted that
military power, military research and development, and
military foreign trade were increasing. And even here,
we now know that this sector, too, began to falter at that
time. As Soviet defectors were telling us in anguished
terms that the system was collapsing, Team B looked at
the quantity but not the quality of missiles, tanks, and
118
Davis, Jack. The Challenge of Managing the Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence PolicyRelations. Studies in Intelligence. Vol. 39, No. 9. 1996.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/intel_and_policy.htm Accessed: October 13, 2007.
119
Hessing-Cahn, Anne. Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment. op. cit.
55
planes, at the quantity of Soviet men under arms, but
not their morale, leadership, alcoholism, or training.120
When confronted with evidence that contradicted its preconceived conclusion,

Team B dismissed it as Soviet deception. Team B assumed that the USSR was
manipulating the intelligence in order to deceive the US. The Intelligence Community
had argued that economic chaos in the Soviet Union had degraded Soviet air defense.
However, Team B assessed the air defense system worked perfectly.121 The panel
claimed that the USSR had only made the system appear degraded. The Intelligence
Community had fallen for the USSRs elaborate subterfuge.
Team Bs assessment went far beyond the evidence available. The panel had
to make substantial assumptions to conclude that the Soviets were an expanding
military threat. For example, when Team B could not find evidence of a Soviet antisubmarine system, it assumed that the system the Soviets had deployed was
undetectable.122 The absence of evidence had become evidence itself. The Team B
had filled in the gaps in the intelligence to fit its preconceived conclusion.
Not surprisingly, Team Bs report was dramatically more alarmist than the
Intelligence Communitys assessments. When the report was released in 1976, Team
B criticised the Intelligence Community for underestimating the USSRs military
power and misinterpreting its strategic intentions.123 The threat from the Soviet Union
120
Hessing-Cahn, Anne. Killing Dtente: The Right Attacks the CIA. University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1998. http://www.igottheconch.com/index.php?title=Cold_War Accessed:
October 22, 2007.
121
Hessing-Cahn, Anne. Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment. op. cit.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
56
was far greater than the Intelligence Community had assessed. Donald Rumsfeld, then
Secretary of Defense in the Ford administration, agreed with Team Bs findings.
The Soviet Union has been busy. Theyve been busy in

terms of their level of effort; theyve been busy in terms
of the actual weapons theyve been producing; theyve
been busy in terms of expanding production rates;
theyve been busy in terms of expanding their
institutional capability to produce additional weapons at
additional rates; theyve been busy in terms of
expanding their capability to increasingly improve the
sophistication of those weapons. Year after year after
year, theyve been demonstrating that they have
steadiness of purpose. Theyre purposeful about what
theyre doing.124
The second high-profile Team B experiment was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld

himself. In the late-1990s, the Rumsfeld Commission challenged the Intelligence
Communitys assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the US. The Intelligence
Community had found that [n]o country, other than the major declared nuclear
powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that
will threaten the contiguous 48 States or Canada.125 Because of the assessment,
President Clinton had vetoed funding for a National Missile Defense system. The
124
Hartman, Tom. Hyping Terror for Fun, Profit and Power. Common Dreams. December 7, 2004.
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1207-26.htm Accessed: November 4, 2007.
125
United States. The Rumsfeld Commission Report. Congressional Record. Washington DC:
Government Printing Office. July 31, 1998. p. S9522.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/s980731-rumsfeld.htm Accessed: November 4, 2007.
57
missile shield addressed a long-range threat that our Intelligence Community does
not foresee in the coming decade, the President explained.126
For the neocons, developing a missile shield was essential for maintaining
Americas military dominance. The failure to build missile defenses will put
America and her allies at grave risk and compromise the exercise of American power
abroad, argued the Project for the New American Century, a neoconservative thinktank.127 In 1998, the US Congress established the Rumsfeld Commission to provide a
second opinion on the nature of the ballistic missile threat.
Just like Team B in 1976, the Rumsfeld Commission did not rely on the hard
data for its assessment. Instead, the Commission examined intelligence in light of its
preconceived conclusion. According to Commission member Richard Garwin, We
did not gather all the facts and then ask what they meant. Rather we asked what would
be required in the 1990s to have a program to acquire long-range missiles of ICBMs
and what facts supported or negated such a hypothesis.128 The Commission assumed
countries were developing long-range ballistic missiles and cherry-picked evidence
that supported the assumption.
The Rumsfeld Commission also filled in the gaps in the intelligence to fit its
preconceived conclusion. By examining the gaps, the Commission was able to
extrapolate a [missile] programs scope, scale, pace and direction beyond what the
126
Ibid., p. S9522.
Rebuilding Americas Defenses. The Project For the New American Century. Washington DC.
September, 2000. p. 14. http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
Accessed: November 4, 2007.
128
Ryan, Maria. The Rumsfeld Commission: Filling in the Known Unknown. NthPosition. July,
2004. http://www.nthposition.com/fillingintheunknown.php Accessed: November 4, 2007.
127
58
hard evidence at hand unequivocally supports.129 The Commission explained that the
expanded methodology was necessary because countries were attempting to deceive
the US. Absence of evidence was not evidence of absence, as Rumsfeld was fond of
saying. The lack of evidence only meant that countries were hiding their missile
programs.130 As expected, the Rumsfeld Commission concluded that the ballistic
missile threat was far greater that the Intelligence Community had assessed.
Joe and the personnel were part of a WINPAC Team B cell. They performed
the exact same kind of analysis as the Rumsfeld Commission and the 1976 Team B.
Instead of trying to find the best explanation for the evidence, Joe assumed that Iraq
was reconstituting its nuclear program and interpreted the evidence to fit the
assumption. He cherry-picked evidence that supported his conclusion. He dismissed
evidence that contradicted it as deception. In the absence of evidence, Joe filled in
the gaps in the intelligence to fit the predetermined truth. He assumed that Iraq would
abandon its modern centrifuge designs. He assumed Iraq would make the extensive
modifications necessary to use the tubes as rotors. Everything a Team B does, Joe
and the personnel did. They even countered the DOEs mainstream Team A
analysis. Joe and the personnel were part of a WINPAC Team B cell.
The Situation Circa August 2001
The neocons did not need evidence to know that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program. They only need evidence to convince everyone else that they were right. For
129
United States. Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States. Donald H. Rumsfeld. (Chair). Washington DC: Government Printing
Office. July 15, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm Accessed: November 4, 2007.
130
Ibid.
59
the neocons, the Intelligence Community was too cautious, too incompetent and its
assessments too reliant on hard facts. WINPACs Team B cell was likely set up at the
start of the Bush administration to analyse intelligence the way the neocons thought
intelligence should be analysed. The Team B cell analysed the tubes to prove what the
neocons already believed to be true: Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear program.
From April to August 2001, WINPACs Team B performed analytical

gymnastics to prove that the aluminium tubes were evidence of Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution. Although Joe and the personnel challenged DOEs mainstream
analysis, it seems the Team B had very limited influence on the Intelligence
Community. DOE authored two comprehensive assessments, both of which
concluded the tubes were most likely for rockets, not rotors. For DOE, the tubes could
not be used as centrifuge rotors without extensive modification. There was no
evidence Iraq would spend the significant time, energy and effort required to turn its
Yugos into Cadillacs. After the DOEs eight-page smackdown, it seemed the
Intelligence Communitys consensus would side with DOEs analysis. If the President
had wanted to cite the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution, the
Intelligence Community would not have cleared him to do so.
Yet in October 2002, a little over a year after DOEs assessment, President
Bush delivered an address in Cincinnati, Ohio. The President said that Iraq has
attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for
gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.131 The tubes
were centrifuge rotors, evidence of Iraqs secret enrichment program. President Bush
131
Bush, George W. Cincinnati speech. October 7, 2002. op. cit.
60
cited the tubes as evidence for the memes nuclear component: Iraq is a threat because
it is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
By the time the President delivered his Cincinnati speech, WINPACs Team B
analysis had gone from being Joes fringe theory to becoming the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment, the view of the majority of the agencies in the
Intelligence Community. Between August 2001 and October 2002, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus on the tubes would be brought in line with WINPACs Team
B.
Senior Executive Memoranda
Sweep it all up. Things related and not. On September 11, 2001, just hours after the
terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a massive
intelligence collection effort against Iraq. Like the rest of the neocons, Rumsfeld did
not need evidence to know Iraq had WMDs and supported al-Qaeda. He only needed
evidence to convince everyone else that he was right. The former chairman of the
Rumsfeld Commission did not trust the Intelligence Community to find evidence of
an Iraqi threat. The Intelligence Communitys standard of proof would be too high to
find anything useful.132 Rumsfeld knew he would have to use Team Bs, like Joes
WINPAC cell, to find the intelligence that proved what he already believed to be true.
Over the weekend of September 15-16, 2001, the Bush administration decided
on the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for al-Qaeda. Saddam
132
Cambone, Stephen. op. cit.
61
might one day arm Bin Ladens terror network with a chemical, biological or nuclear
weapon to attack the US. However, US officials could not state the meme publicly
unless the Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed that it was supported by the
available intelligence. The neocons could use Team Bs to cherry-pick as much
dubious intelligence as they liked. If the Intelligence Community did not agree, they
could not cite Team B intelligence publicly. They could not make the case for war
that they wanted to make. The neocons could not make the case for the memes
nuclear component. Before the neocons could sell the Iraq War, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus would have to be brought in line with WINPACs Team B.
A few weeks after the attacks, the debate over the tubes most likely end-use
was suddenly reignited. The Bush administration had started paying serious attention
to the tubes and Iraqs nuclear program in general. On November 24, 2001, the
National Intelligence Council, which is responsible for coordinating the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment, authored a Senior Executive Memorandum on
Iraqs nuclear program.133 The Intelligence Community memo reported the divergent
views on the tubes most likely end-use.134
According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the memo identified possible

nonnuclear applications for the tubes i.e. it referenced the DOEs assessment that
the tubes were intended for Iraqi rockets.135 The memo also noted that all intelligence
agencies agreed that the tubes could be used as centrifuge rotors, which is again a
reference to the DOE assessment.136 The DOE had assessed the tubes could be
133

Ibid., p. 198.
135
Ibid., p. 55; 198.
136
Ibid., p. 56; 199.
134
62
centrifuge rotors only after substantial modifications.137 Youd have to machine the
tubes inner and outer surfaces first. Youd have to expand the tubes internal
diameters. There was no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was going to spend the time,
energy and effort necessary to turn their Yugos into Cadillacs. In the November 24
memo, the Intelligence Communitys consensus on the tubes most likely reflected the
DOEs position. The tubes were almost certainly rockets, not rotors.
Without evidence, the Intelligence Community could not agree that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program. Unless the Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment changed, Bush administration officials would not be able to make the case
for war they wanted to make. They would not be able to state the memes nuclear
component: Iraq is a threat because it is pursuing nuclear weapons.
Cheney
Like the rest of the neocons, Vice President Dick Cheney, 61,
did not need evidence to know Iraq was developing nuclear
weapons. Cheney was one of the Bush administrations fiercest
advocates for regime-change in Iraq. According to Bob
Woodwards Plan of Attack, the Vice Presidents focus on the
Iraqi threat was seen as a fever by some of his colleagues, an
almost disquieting obsession.138 Cheney was the natural
choice to convince Americans to be very afraid of Saddam
137
138
Ibid., p. 72.
Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. p. 4
Figure 9 Vice
President Dick Cheney.
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/
63
Hussein. Not long after the Intelligence Communitys November 24 memo, the Vice
President began sounding the war drums for Iraq.
On November 29, 2001, Cheney was interviewed by Diane Sawyer of the

American ABC network. In the interview, Cheney began publicising the meme: Iraq
was a threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists. Saddam could arm a
group like al-Qaeda with a weapon of mass destruction to attack the US. However, the
Vice President was very careful about his claims regarding Iraqs nuclear program.
Was Iraq reconstituting its nuclear program? Although the Vice President
implied that it was, he never said so specifically. In fact, he described Iraqs nuclear
efforts in the past tense. He only referred to Iraqs pre-Gulf War enrichment program.
During the November 29 interview, Cheney said
Theres several things to keep in mind about Iraq and

about the Iraqis. We know that he was developing
nuclear weapons, and that in 1981, for example,
when the Israelis struck the Osirik [ph] reactor they
dealt a major blow to his program. We know, in
1991, at the time of the Gulf War, that he also was
getting close, once again, to acquiring nuclear
weapons. We know he has developed biological and
chemical agents. Hes used them, not only on his own
64
people but also on the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq
War.139 [Authors emphasis.]
Everything Cheney said was technically true. We know i.e. the US

government knows that Saddam was developing nuclear weapons in 1981 and
1991. But the Vice President could not say Iraq was currently reconstituting its
nuclear program. The Intelligence Community could not find enough evidence to
support that conclusion. The only extensive assessments of the tubes were DOEs and
DOE had assessed the tubes were for rockets, not rotors. If Cheney wanted to claim
that Iraqs nuclear reconstitution was underway, the Intelligence Community would
not have cleared him to do so.
Before the Intelligence Community would clear anything stronger than a

reference to Iraqs pre-Gulf War nuclear efforts, the consensus judgment would have
to change. To change the consensus, new information would have to come to light
that disputed the DOEs tubes assessment. The Intelligence Community would at least
need an excuse to sign off on WINPACs Team B analysis. The Intelligence
Community would need evidence that suggested the DOE was wrong.
The National Ground Intelligence Centers Text-Box
The day following Cheneys ABC interview, the tubes were being looked at again.
This time, however, it was the Pentagons Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) calling
the shots. On November 30, 2001, the DIA published Iraq: Procuring Possible
139
Cheney, Richard. Interview. ABC News. ABC Television Network. November 29, 2001.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011129.html Accessed:
October 29, 2007.
65
Nuclear-Related Gas Centrifuge Equipment. It was the first extensive analysis of the
tubes since the DOEs August smackdown. The DIA paper assessed that
Although alternative uses for the tubes are possible,

such as rocket motor cases or rocket launch tubes, the
specifications are consistent with earlier Iraqi gas
centrifuge rotor designs.140
For the DIA, it was possible to use the tubes for either rotors or rockets. The
odds were even. Had new information come to light that cast doubt on DOEs
assessment? Yes, it had. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) had
authored its own assessment of the tubes, which was included in the DIA paper as a
text-box..
The NGIC is part of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Responsible for

technical analysis of foreign ground capabilities, NGIC analysts are the Intelligence
Communitys experts on conventional weapons systems such as rockets.141 The
text-box in the DIA paper was titled Conventional Military Uses Unlikely for
Aluminum Tubes. According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the NGIC textbox stated that it was highly unlikely that the tubes were designed for use as rocket
bodies. While a rocket end-use was technically possible, the tubes specifications
made them poor choices for rockets.142 The NGIC assessed that
140

142
Ibid., p. 55.
141
66
Although 7075-T6 aluminum could be an acceptable
metal for small rocket motor bodies, the 3.3mm wall
thickness and overall weight would make these
particular tubes poor choices for rocket motor bodies.
The thickness is roughly twice that of known small
rocket motor bodies143
The NGIC text-box effectively countered the DOEs assessments. The tubes
were poor choices for rocket motor bodies because their walls were too thick. Even
though the centrifuge experts had said the tubes would make bad centrifuges rotors,
now the rocket experts were saying that the tubes would make bad rocket motor
bodies. NGIC had put DOE in check, so to speak. The question over the tubes most
likely end-use was open again. Were they rockets or rotors? The odds were even.
I think NGIC was probably lying through its teeth. The tubes wall thickness,
which NGIC assessed to be twice the size of all known rocket motor bodies, was in
fact an exact match for Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket. The Nasser-81 was based on an
Italian-made rocket, the Medusa, which also had a wall thickness of 3.3mm. After the
war, NGIC explained its mistake to the US Senate. When NGIC analysts assessed
the tubes in late-November 2001, they didnt have the specifications for the Medusa
or the Nasser-81.144 But NGICs excuse was a pretty bad one. First of all, NGIC
analysts are supposed to be the rocket experts, so youd expect them to have the
correct specifications. But also, the DOE had published the specifications of the
Nasser-81 in August, just a couple of months earlier. According to the US Senate, the
143
144
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., pp. 92-93.

Ibid., p. 100.
67
NGIC analyst who wrote the text-box said he never spoke to any DOE analysts or
read any DOE assessments.145 I think that the analyst probably cooked his assessment
of the tubes in order to undermine DOEs conclusion that the tubes were for rockets,
not rotors.
Thanks to the NGIC text-box, the DIA had decided that, yes, the tubes could
be used as centrifuge rotors after all. As far as DIA was concerned, the tubes were
evidence that Iraqs nuclear reconstitution was underway. The Intelligence
Communitys consensus was moving closer in line with WINPACs Team B. The
Intelligence Community was closer to clearing the memes nuclear component: Iraq is
a threat because it is reconstituting its nuclear program.
The Consensus Deadlocks
The NGIC text-box did not have as dramatic an effect on the Intelligence
Communitys consensus as the neocons might have hoped. Two weeks after the DIA
assessment, the centrifuge experts at the DOE authored a new tubes assessment of
their own. The DOE repeated its analysis that the tubes could not be used as rotors
without extensive modification. The Intelligence Communitys consensus on Iraqs
nuclear reconstitution was deadlocked.
In its new assessment, the DOE criticised the DIA for claiming that the tubes
were consistent with Iraqs pre-Gulf War rotor design. The DIA had compared the
tubes to a design Iraq had experimented with and then abandoned once it had acquired
145
Ibid., p. 100.
68
its modern carbon fibre/maraging steel designs: the Beams centrifuge design. DOE
pointed out that first of all, the tubes did not match Iraqs Beams design. Secondly,
DOE argued that the comparison to the design was irrelevant and misleading.146
The Beams design itself was fundamentally flawed. No one had ever been able to get
it to work.147 DOE pointed out that this was precisely the reason Iraq abandoned the
Beams design when it obtained its modern carbon fibre/maraging steel designs.
DOE repeated its conclusion that the tubes could not be used as centrifuge
rotors without extensive modifications. In particular, the tubes internal diameters
were too narrow to enrich more than marginal amounts of uranium. The assessment
examined the difficulties Iraq would encounter if it tried to build a centrifuge cascade
using tubes as narrow and as heavy as these. According to DOE, if Iraq wanted to
enrich enough uranium for a nuclear weapon in a year, it would need a cascade of
between 12,000 and 16,000 centrifuges. DOE assessed that even a small cascade
capable of enriching gram quantities of uranium would take Iraq close to a decade
to build. The rotors would have extremely low stage separation efficiencies that
would lead to a very large number of centrifuge stages with a corresponding increase
in cascade piping and complexity.148 DOE assessed it was unlikely that anyone could
deploy a centrifuge cascade using rotors with the tubes dimensions. The tubes could
not be used as centrifuges without extensive modification.
Despite taking DIA to task, DOEs new assessment seems not to have
addressed NGICs text-box, which had assessed that the tubes would make poor
rockets. DOE does not seem to have pointed out that the tubes were an exact match
146

Ibid., p. 71.
148
147
69
for Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket motor bodies. DOE and NGIC effectively cancelled one
another out. The question over the tubes end-use was still open. In other words, the
NGIC text-box had changed the consensus. The Intelligence Communitys consensus
on the tubes was now deadlocked.
The consensus did not change as much as the neocons may have liked. The
Intelligence Community still did not have enough evidence to conclude Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program. The Intelligence Community still would not clear
the neocons to state the memes nuclear component. The neocons would still not be
able to cite the Team B analysis of the tubes in the case for war.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Compromise
Prior to NGICs text-box, Vice President Cheney had to be very careful about what he
said publicly about Iraqs nuclear program. In his interview in late-November 2001,
he could only refer to Iraqs past nuclear efforts, its pre-Gulf War program. After the
text-box, the Intelligence Communitys consensus still did not allow the neocons to
say unequivocally that Iraq had resumed its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the
consensus did change enough to clear a compromise term. The Intelligence
Community could now reach a consensus that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass
destruction.
After NGICs text-box, DIA could join WINPAC and conclude Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. However, DOE still vigorously disagreed
that the tubes were intended for centrifuge rotors. By this point, the State
70
Departments intelligence agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),
seems to have sided with DOE. The Intelligence Community was split on the question
of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. WINPAC and DIA on one side. DOE and INR on the
other. The consensus was deadlocked. The Intelligence Community had a similar
situation with the consensus on Iraqs biological weapons (BW) program.
In October 2001, WINPAC had assessed that Iraq continues to produce at

least three BW agents.149 Although the DIA had signed on to the tubes, it hadnt
signed on to Iraqs BW program at least not yet. DIAs last official assessment of
Iraqs bio-warfare efforts reflected the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus at
that point. The DIA had concluded that Iraq may have biological agents and that
Iraqs dual-use facilities had the capability to produce biological weapons.
However, the DIA had cautioned that no active BW facilities are currently
identified.150 In other words, DIA agreed with WINPAC on Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution, but did not have enough evidence to agree with WINPAC on Iraqs
BW program.
As for DOE and INR, both disputed the evidence for Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution, but neither disputed WINPACs biological weapons assessment. The
DOEs analysts were physicists, not biologists. INRs BW analysts did not publish
any intelligence papers on Iraqs biological weapons program.151 Other Intelligence
Community members seem to have stayed neutral on Iraqs WMD programs entirely.
So, in December 2001, DIA disagreed with WINPAC on the status of Iraqs BW
149

151
Ibid., p. 185.
150
71
program. Like the consensus on Iraqs nuclear reconstitution, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus on Iraqs BW program was deadlocked too.
As Ive mentioned, the National Intelligence Council is responsible for

coordinating the Intelligence Communitys consensus judgments. When faced with
conflicting analyses, it will try to come up with language that accommodates all the
views of the Intelligence Community as much as possible. Sometimes this means the
NIC will use compromise language that submerges clear differences between
analysts positions.152 In December 2001, the Intelligence Community could not agree
on which weapons programs Saddam was pursuing nuclear, biological or chemical.
But the entire Intelligence Community agreed (or at least, did not dispute) that Iraq
was pursuing some kind of weapons of mass destruction program. For DIA, it was
nuclear weapons. For WINPAC, it was nuclear weapons and biological weapons. For
DOE and INR, it wasnt nuclear weapons, but neither disputed biological weapons.
The rest of the Intelligence Community was neutral on Iraqs WMDs. And so, the
National Intelligence Council worked out a compromise. The Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment was that Saddam was pursuing weapons of mass
destruction programs.153
In his interview with the ABC network in late-November 2001, Vice President
Cheney had only referred to Saddams pre-Gulf War nuclear program. But after the
weapons of mass destruction compromise, Cheney appeared on NBCs Meet the
152
Davis, Jack. op. cit.

Incidentally, the Intelligence Communitys use of this kind of compromise language was a pet peeve
of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz thought the Intelligence Community should
tell policymakers if there were substantial disagreements between analysts. Instead of the Intelligence
Community submerging the disagreements in compromise language, the policymaker should be able to
pick whichever side supported his preconceived policy position. See Davis, Jack. op. cit.
153
72
Press with Tim Russert. The Vice President was only cleared to refer to Iraqs nuclear
program in the past tense Iraq was developing nuclear weapons in 1981 and 1991.
But now, since the Intelligence Communitys new consensus, Cheney could say
Saddam had pursued weapons of mass destruction since UN weapons inspectors
had left Iraq in 1998.
The situation, I think, that leads a lot of people to be

concerned about Iraq has to do not just with their past
activity of harboring terrorist, but also with Saddam
Husseins behavior over the years and with his
aggressive pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
When we go back and look at 1981, he was pursuing
nukes. The Israelis preempted when they hit the Osirak
reactor and shut down the program. In 1991, 10 years
later, when we went in, we found evidence of a very
aggressive nuclear program.
For the last three years, there have been no
inspectors in Iraq, and he has aggressively pursued
the development of additional weapons of mass
destruction.154 [Authors emphasis.]
154
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network. December
9, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011209.html
73
A few days later, the Vice President did the same thing on the Fox News
network. Saddam was developing a nuclear weapon in 1981 and 1991. But in the
present tense, Cheney used a variation of compromise term, WMD capability.
Iraq is of concern, because of Saddam Husseins track

record, because he has tried aggressively to develop
weapons of mass destruction. He was well on his way to
developing nuclear weapons in 1981 when the Israelis
destroyed the Osirik reactor. He was well on his way
again 10 years later in 1991, when we invaded and
took out much of his WMD capability; and hes
trying again now.
Hes kicked the inspectors out three years ago, so hes
had plenty of time, using his oil revenues, the part of it
that comes around the Food for Peace program, or Oil
for Food program, using that to acquire new
capabilities, deadly capabilities.155 [Authors
emphasis.]
Because of the NGICs text-box, the DIA had concluded that the tubes were
evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution and so the Intelligence Communitys
consensus changed. Although the Vice President was not cleared to refer to specific
Iraqi WMD programs, he was allowed to refer more generally to Iraqs weapons of
155
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Fox TV News. Fox News Channel. December 11, 2001.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011211.html Accessed:
November 2, 2007.
74
mass destruction. The Intelligence Community cleared the use of consensus,
compromise language, like WMD capabilities.
The NGIC text-box had brought the Intelligence Communitys consensus one
step closer to clearing the memes nuclear component. The text-box had brought the
consensus one step closer to WINPACs Team B and the case for war the Vice
President wanted to make.
Axis of Evil
The WMD consensus stayed where it was through January 2002. Bush administration
officials could not say unequivocally that Iraq had nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons programs. Instead, they continued using the Intelligence Communitys
compromise language.
President Bushs 2002 State of the Union address is a good example. In the
January 29 speech, the President rolled out the meme loud and proud. Iraq, Iran and
North Korea constituted an Axis of Evil. They were threats because of their WMDs
and support for terrorists. One day, these regimes could arm one of their terrorist
allies to attack the United States, the President said.156 However, compare what the
President says about Iran and North Koreas WMD programs with what he says about
Iraqs. When it came to Iraq, the President has to use the Intelligence Communitys
consensus, compromise language.
156
Bush, George W. The President Delivers the State of the Union Address. US Capitol. Washington
DC. January 29, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
75
Our goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from
threatening America or our friends and allies with
weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes
have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we
know their true nature. North Korea is a regime
arming with missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, while starving its citizens.
Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports
terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian
peoples hope for freedom.
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and
to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to
develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear
weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has
already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own
citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over
their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to
international inspections -- then kicked out the
inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide
from the civilized world.157 [Authors emphasis.]
The Intelligence Communitys WMD consensus had stayed the same. Like
Vice President Cheney, the President couldnt refer to Iraqs BW program or nuclear
program in the present tense. North Korea is arming with WMDs. Iran
157
Ibid.
76
aggressively pursues WMDs. But when it comes to Iraq, the President was only
cleared to say that Iraq had plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear
weapons.158 The Intelligence Communitys consensus allowed Bush to refer only to
specific WMD programs in terms of what the Iraqis want to do, not in terms of what
they are doing. There was not enough evidence to let the President say unequivocally
that Iraq had a nuclear program. The President would still not cleared to cite the Team
B analysis of the tubes in the case for war.
Although the Intelligence Community would not let him make the case the
neocons wanted him to make, the Presidents message in the State of the Union was
clear. Well be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States
of America will not permit the worlds most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the
worlds most destructive weapons.159
The Consensus Flips for Cheneys Media Blitz
Since the publishing of the NGIC text-box, the nuclear consensus was deadlocked.
WINPAC and DIA had assessed the tubes were for centrifuge rotors. DOE and INR
disputed the assessment. The tubes could not be used as rotors without extensive
modification. Before the neocons could say unambiguously that Iraq was pursuing
nuclear weapons, DOE or INR would have to flip sides.
158
159
Ibid.
Ibid.
77
Sometime between late-January and late-March 2002, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment flipped. Up to this point, US officials had
consistently referred to Iraqs specific WMD programs using the Intelligence
Communitys compromise language. Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass
destruction. Saddam was trying to acquire WMD capability. Iraq had plotted to
develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. At the end of March 2002,
however, Vice President Cheneys statements about the Iraqi threat suddenly became
more emphatic. Saddam was actively and aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons.
The Intelligence Community seems to have agreed that Iraq was taking active steps
towards nuclear reconstitution.
On March 24, 2002 the Vice President rolled out the new consensus on three
news programs, all on the same day. Here he is on CBSs Face the Nation:
the notion of a Saddam Hussein with his great oil

wealth, with his inventory that he already has of
biological and chemical weapons, that he might
actually acquire a nuclear weapon is, I think, a
frightening proposition for anybody who thinks
about it.160 [Authors emphasis.]
This was followed by an appearance on NBCs Meet the Press with Tim Russert.
160
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Face the Nation. CBS Television Network. March 24, 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020324-1.html Accessed:
November 2, 2007.
78
And now, of course, for the last three years thereve
been no inspectors and theres good reason to believe
that he continues to aggressively pursue the
development of a nuclear weapon.
Now will he have one in a year, five years? I cant be
that precise. I dont know enough to be able to put that
kind of time frame on it. All I know is hes got
enormous resources because of his oil wealth. Theres
nobody watching. Hes had the technical expertise that
he put together in the past to pursue this kind of a
program and that hes one man out there whos not only
acquired weapons, hes used them--chemical weapons
against the Kurds and against the Iranians. I think it
would be a great tragedy if Saddam Hussein were to
be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons161
[Authors emphasis.]
And later that evening, Cheney was interviewed on CNNs Late Edition with Wolf
Blitzer.
What we said, Wolf, if you go back and look at the

record is, the issues not inspectors. The issue is that he
has chemical weapons and hes used them. The issue is
161
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network. March 24,
2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020324.html Accessed:
October 20, 2007.
79
that hes developing and has biological weapons. The
issue is that hes pursuing nuclear weapons.
Its the weapons of mass destruction and what hes
already done with them
This is a man of great evil, as the President said. And
he is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time,
and we think thats cause for concern for us and for
everybody in the region.162 [Authors emphasis.]
Somewhere along the line, the Intelligence Communitys nuclear consensus

had flipped. The compromise language was gone. Vice President Cheney was now
stating unequivocally that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear weapons. At least in
terms of the memes WMD component, the neocons had the consensus they wanted.
The consensus had been brought in line with WINPACs Team B.
The Downing Street Memo
Why had the Intelligence Community changed its consensus judgment? One factor
appears to have been analysts sense that the White House was determined to go to
war with Iraq no matter what the evidence said. Everyone knew the President wanted
to use Iraqs WMDs and support for terrorists to justify regime-change. The effect on
analysts was recorded in the infamous Downing Street Memo.
162
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. CNN. March 24, 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020324-2.html Accessed:
November 2, 2007.
80
The Downing Street Memo was produced in late-July 2002 for UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair from C, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of the UKs foreign
intelligence service, MI6. According to the memo, Dearlove reported on his recent
talks in Washington with US intelligence officials. He told the Prime Minister that
since he last met with the Intelligence Community, there had been
a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was

now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route,
and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi
regimes record. There was little discussion in
Washington of the aftermath after military action.163
[Authors emphasis.]
In the memo, the British thought the Intelligence Community knew that Bush
was going to war regardless of the facts. The Bush administrations neocons did not
need evidence to know that Iraq was a threat because of its WMDs and support for alQaeda. They only needed evidence to convince everyone else they were right. For
much of the Intelligence Community, the Iraq War was going to happen no matter
what the intelligence said. Analysts were fixing the facts around policy. They were
looking for excuses to help the President make the case for war.
163
Rycroft, Matthew. The Secret Downing Street Memo. The Sunday Times (London). May 1, 2005.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374.ece Accessed: November 2, 2007.
81
Who Flipped the Consensus?
Between late-January and late-March 2002, the Intelligence Communitys consensus

on Iraqs nuclear program had flipped. A majority of the Intelligence Community now
assessed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Who had flipped the
consensus?
The answer was the DOE. The DOE had joined WINPAC and the DIA and
concluded that Iraq might be reconstituting after all. Although INR still assessed that
there was no compelling evidence that Iraq was rebuilding its uranium enrichment
program, the State Departments analysts were now firmly in the minority. Now DOE
had flipped, the majority had concluded that Saddam was actively pursuing nuclear
weapons. Why had DOE changed its assessment?
The DOE had not revised its analysis of the tubes. DOE still insisted that the
tubes couldnt be used as rotors without extensive modification. On July 22, 2002, the
DOE published its new assessment Iraq: Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts
Underway?164 The paper listed three indications of Iraqs intention to rejuvenate
its enrichment program. However, Iraqs procurement of aluminium tubes was not
one of them.165 DOE had not changed its assessment that the tubes were far more
likely for rockets. So what had prompted DOE to conclude that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program? What were DOEs three excuses?
164
165

Robb-Silberman. op. cit., pp. 203; 59.
82
The DOEs principal excuse to change its nuclear assessment seems to have
been new information that had been reported in early-February 2002.166 Italys
military intelligence service, SISMI, had reported it had documentary evidence that
Iraq had bought 500 tonnes of uranium from the landlocked West African country of
Niger. SISMIs Niger reporting seems to have been DOEs excuse to change its
assessment of Iraqs nuclear efforts.
In July 2002, DOEs new assessment listed SISMIs reports as one of three
indications of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.167 The paper also listed a recent Iraqi
attempt to procure magnets that were banned under UN sanctions as dual-use items.
DOE assessed that although the magnets had non-nuclear applications, they could be
used as centrifuge components as well.168 DOEs third indication was Saddams
recent contact with his nuclear cadre, Iraqi scientists who had worked on Iraqs preGulf War nuclear program.169 Saddam had appeared on Iraqi state television and
praised his nuclear engineers. Really, the DOE had very little evidence that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program. SISMIs Niger reporting had provided DOE an
excuse to agree with WINPAC and DIA. Niger was DOEs excuse to help the Bush
administration make the case for war it wanted to make.
Different Equations, Same Answer
Another member of the Intelligence Community also signed on to the nuclear

consensus: the CIAs Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African analysis
166
Ibid., p. 75.
Ibid., p. 59; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 127.
168
Ibid., pp. 75; 211; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 127.
169
Ibid., p. 59; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 127.
167
83
(NESAF). In the hierarchy of the CIA, NESAF is like WINPAC in that both are
analytical offices in the Directorate of Intelligence.170 But while WINPAC has the
CIAs experts on WMD intelligence, NESAF has the CIAs experts on the Middle
East, South Asia and Africa.171 Despite this, NESAF published an assessment of the
Iraqs nuclear efforts about a week after DOE.
On August 1, 2002, NESAF published its assessment of Iraqs WMD

programs, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat.172 NESAFs
assessment, like DOEs, also listed indications that Iraq was reconstituting its
enrichment program. But instead of the Niger reporting, NESAF based its assessment
on the tubes. NESAF concluded that Iraqs persistent interest in high-strength
aluminum tubes indicates Baghdad has renewed an indigenous uranium enrichment
program.173 SISMIs Niger reporting was DOEs excuse to sign on to the consensus.
NESAFs excuse was the tubes.
DOE and NESAF had used different excuses to agree that Iraqs reconstitution
was underway. But heres the thing: each disagreed vigorously with the evidence the
other had included. NESAF, along with INR, disputed the credibility of DOEs
principal evidence, SISMIs reports that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger. (The
reports were later shown to be based on forgeries, the infamous Niger Documents,
which I discuss in detail in the Niger chapter.) In fact, the DOE was the only US
intelligence agency to base its assessment on the Niger reporting.
170
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence Analysis: Organization. op. cit.
Ibid.
172
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 48; Robb-Silberman. op. cit., p. 200.
173
Ibid., p. 93.
171
84
The Robb-Silberman Commission made a point of calling DOEs inclusion of
SISMIs reports rather dubious.174 A former senior intelligence officer remarked to
the Commission that DOEs three indications had made sense politically but not
substantively. Even a DOE analyst conceded that DOE didnt want to come out
before the war and say [Iraq] wasnt reconstituting.175 Although DOE considered the
Niger reporting an indication of reconstitution, no one else in the Intelligence
Community did.
While NESAF disputed DOEs inclusion of the SISMI reports, DOE disputed
NESAFs analysis of the tubes. In NESAFs August 1 paper, the tubes analysis was
very, very limited. A one-page outline concluded that the tubes were best-suited
for use in gas centrifuges.176 NESAF based its conclusion on the fact that the tubes
were made from 7076-T6 aluminium, which had been used to make centrifuge rotors
in the 1950s.177 NESAFs one-page outline didnt look at how the tubes dimensions
compared to rotor designs. For DOE, the dimensions meant that the tubes could not be
used as rotors without extensive modification. In particular, the tubes internal
diameter was far too narrow to enrich significant amounts of uranium. DOE disputed
NESAFs conclusion that the tubes were intended for centrifuges. The tubes were far
more likely for Iraqi rockets.
Although NESAF and DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting, they had used
different equations to reach the same answer. They had each cited evidence that the
other considered dubious. DOE had cited Niger but disputed the tubes. NESAF had
174

Ibid., p. 75.
176
177
Ibid., p. 93.
175
85
cited the tubes but disputed the Niger uranium reporting. So, in August 2002, the
Intelligence Communitys nuclear consensus was solid. However, the Intelligence
Community disagreed on the evidence underlying the consensus judgment. For the
White House, the disagreement over the underlying intelligence was a brand new
problem that would have to be resolved.
The first anniversary of September 11 was fast approaching. The White House
had planned a media campaign aimed to educate the American people about the
threat from Iraqs WMDs and its support for terrorists. Although US officials were
now clear to refer to the memes nuclear component, the Intelligence Communitys
disagreement meant that they could not cite any specific underlying intelligence. In
their upcoming media blitz, the neocons would not be clear to cite the Team B
analysis of the tubes. Before the President could make the case the neocons wanted
him to make, the Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought in
line with WINPACs Team B.
How to Pressure Intelligence Analysts Without Getting Caught
With no consensus on what evidence would make up the case for war, Vice President
Cheney stepped in and publicly admonished the Intelligence Community. On August
26, 2002, a few weeks after DOE and NESAFs assessments, the Vice President gave
a televised address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville,
Tennessee.
86
In the speech, Cheney linked Iraq to the War on Terror and asserted that
Saddam had resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.178 The Vice President
raised the spectre of an al-Qaeda armed with an Iraqi nuclear weapon as well as a
nuclear attack on the United States. However,
the consensus would not clear him cite any
specific intelligence in support of his
assertion. Cheney implied that we should
expect very little evidence of Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution, if any. The Intelligence
Community was too incompetent to see
through Saddams denial and deception.179
Figure 10 Vice President Cheney addresses the

Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, August
26, 2002. Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov
But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts

to acquire nuclear weapons Many of us are convinced
that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.
Just how soon, we cannot really gauge. Intelligence is
an uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances.
This is especially the case when you are dealing with a
totalitarian regime that has made a science out of
deceiving the international community. Let me give you
just one example of what I mean. Prior to the Gulf War,
Americas top intelligence analysts would come to my
office in the Defense Department and tell me that
178
Cheney, Richard. Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention. Veterans of Foreign
Wars 103rd National Convention. Nashville, Tennessee. August 26, 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html Accessed: October 8, 2007.
179
Ibid.
87
Saddam Hussein was at least five or perhaps even 10
years away from having a nuclear weapon. After the
war we learned that he had been much closer than that,
perhaps within a year of acquiring such a weapon.180
For Cheney, the Intelligence Community had underestimated Saddams nuclear

program prior to the 1991 Gulf War.181 It was typical that intelligence analysts once
again couldnt agree on the evidence of a nuclear program now.
Like the rest of neocons, Cheney did not need evidence to know Saddam was
working on nuclear weapons. The Vice President wanted the Intelligence Community
to assume that Iraq had a nuclear program and cherry-pick evidence that supported the
assumption, even if the evidence was weak. Analysts should expect weak evidence or
evidence with more plausible non-nuclear explanations. For Cheney, analysts should
assume Saddam was trying to conceal the status of his nuclear program. The absence
of evidence only meant that Iraq was hiding its nuclear program. Cheney wanted
analysts to fill in the gaps in the evidence to fit his preconceived conclusion. In
short, Cheney wanted an Intelligence Community that was more like a Team B. His
180
Ibid.
Cheneys statement that Iraq was perhaps within a year of a nuclear weapon is carefully caveated
(perhaps) and deserves some explanation. Prior to the Gulf War, much of the progress Iraqs nuclear
program had made was in calutron uranium enrichment technology. Iraqs calutrons would have likely
produced enough weapons-grade uranium for a weapon given another five years or so. The centrifuge
program showed promise but, at the time, was still in the prototype stage. The Iraqis had only been able
to enrich a small amount of uranium using centrifuges. Just before the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis
launched a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon very quickly. The crash program diverted
safeguarded stocks of highly-enriched uranium (leftover from the ill-fated Osirak reactor) with the goal
of enriching it further for use in a weapon. Some inspectors have estimated that Iraq could have
completed the process by the end of 1991, which is likely what Cheneys one year statement was
referring to. However, by 2002, the situation in Iraq had completely changed. Iraqs stocks of highlyenriched uranium had been removed and its calutrons had been destroyed. See, Albright, David. Iraqs
Programs to Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf
War. op. cit.
181
88
speech was not-so-subtle pressure on the Intelligence Community to let him cite Team
B intelligence in the case for war.
89
The Modification Intelligence
The neocons wanted to cite Team B intelligence to support the memes nuclear
component. They wanted to cite WINPACs analysis of the tubes. But before the
President could claim the tubes would be used to enrich uranium, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus would have to change. The consensus on the tubes was still
deadlocked. The CIA (WINPAC and NESAF) and the DIA had assessed that the
tubes were rotors. While DOE had agreed that Iraq was reconstituting, it still insisted
that the tubes could not be used in centrifuges without extensive modification. In
particular, the tubes internal diameters were too narrow to enrich significant amounts
of uranium. The State Departments INR agreed with DOE. The tubes were still
disputed. In the upcoming media campaign, the President would not be able to cite the
tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. He would not be able to make the
case the neocons wanted him to make.
In late-November 2001, the NGIC text-box had brought the consensus closer
in line with WINPACs Team B analysis of the tubes. Now, just a week or so before
the start of the White House war campaign, new information that seemed to
undermine DOE would again come to light: the Modification Intelligence.
In late-August 2002, the same week Cheney was admonishing the Intelligence
Community, the CIA received some very suspicious intelligence about the aluminium
tubes. A foreign government service claimed that Iraq had asked about modifying
the tubes. We know now that this report was false. The Iraqis always intended to use
90
the tubes for their Nasser-81 rockets.182 The tubes dimensions were an exact match
for the rocket design, so there was no reason for Iraq to want to increase their internal
diameter. Instead, I think that the Modification Intelligence looks suspiciously like the
NGIC text-box. It looks like an attempt to undermine DOEs assessment of the Iraqi
tubes. Specifically, the Modification Intelligence claimed that Iraq had asked about
increasing the tubes internal diameters.183
Since August 2001, DOE had concluded that the tubes could not be used as
centrifuge rotors without significant modification.184 The tubes internal diameters
were too narrow, barely large enough to enrich any uranium at all. The Intelligence
Communitys centrifuge experts did not think the tubes could be used in a nuclear
program unless the Iraqis increased their internal diameters.185 While WINPACs
Team B was happy to assume Iraq would make the necessary modifications to turn
their Yugos into Cadillacs, the DOE needed direct evidence.186 The Modification
Intelligence made the Team Bs assumption explicit. An excuse for DOE to change its
tubes assessment, the Modification Intelligence seems to have been intended to bring
the Intelligence Communitys consensus in line with WINPACs Team B.
As Ive stated, the Vice President did not need evidence to know Iraq was
reconstituting its enrichment program. He only needed evidence to convince the rest
of us that he was right. He wanted to cite the Team B analysis of the tubes in the case
for war. DIA was ready to sign off on the tubes and so were WINPAC and NESAF in
the CIA. If DOE or INR flipped sides, a majority in the Intelligence Community
182
Iraq Survey Group. Vol. 2. op. cit., pp. 6-7.

Robb-Silberman. op. cit., pp. 74; 211; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 97.
184
Ibid., p. 209.
185
Ibid., p. 209.
186
183
91
would agree that the tubes were for centrifuges. The consensus would be brought in
line with WINPACs Team B. Like the NGIC text-box and the Niger reporting, the
Modification Intelligence was an excuse to flip the consensus and clear the neocons to
make the case for war that they wanted to make. But did it work?
Exhibit A
On September 8, 2002, just days before the first anniversary of September 11, the
Bush administration began its media campaign to hype the Iraqi threat. The White
House leaked WINPACs Team B analysis to New York Times reporter, Judith
Miller. The tubes were on the front page: proof that Saddam was developing nuclear
weapons.
In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands

of specially designed aluminium tubes, which American
officials believe were intended as components of
centrifuges to enrich uranium. American officials said
several efforts to arrange the shipment of the aluminium
tubes were blocked or intercepted but declined to say,
citing the sensitivity of the intelligence, where they
came from or how they were stopped.
The diameter, thickness and other technical
specifications of the aluminium tubes had persuaded
American intelligence experts that they were meant
for Iraqs nuclear program, officials said, and that the
92
latest attempt to ship the material had taken place in
recent months.187 [Authors emphasis.]
The intelligence experts were likely WINPACs Team B cell, Joe and the
personnel. Only the Team B had concluded that the tubes diameter and
thickness indicated their use as centrifuge rotors.
Throughout September 8, 2002, Vice President Cheney, National Security

Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld all appeared on TV news shows to hype the meme: Iraq is a threat
because of its WMDs and its support for terrorists. The tubes were Exhibit A for the
memes nuclear component. But had the Modification Intelligence worked? Had the
consensus changed? Had the Intelligence Community cleared the White House to cite
the tubes publicly?
No, it hadnt. If you read their statements carefully, its clear that the Bush
administration officials could not say unequivocally that the tubes would be used for
an Iraqi enrichment program. The Intelligence Community still hadnt reached a
consensus. The tubes were still disputed. So instead of citing the tubes directly, the
Bush administration got around the Intelligence Community by being very, very
sneaky.
On September 8, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney was interviewed on

NBCs Meet the Press with Tim Russert.
187
Miller, Judith and Michael R. Gordon. US says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts. The
New York Times. September 8, 2002. http://www.realdemocracy.com/abomb.htm Accessed: October
20, 2007.
93
What we have seen recently that has raised our level of

concern to the current state of unrest, if you will, if I can
put it in those terms, is that he now is trying through his
illicit procurement network to acquire the equipment he
needs to be able to enrich uranium.
Specifically aluminum tubes. Theres a story in The
New York Times this morning --this is --and I want
to attribute it to the Times. I dont want to talk about
obviously specific intelligence sources. But it is now
public that in fact he has been seeking to acquire,
and we have been able to intercept and prevent him
from acquiring through this particular channel, the
kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a
centrifuge. And the centrifuge is required to take lowgrade uranium and enhance it into highly-enriched
uranium, which is what you have to have in order to
build a bomb. This is a technology he was working on
back say before the Gulf War.
And one of the reasons its of concern to him is we
know about a particular shipment --we have intercepted
that --we dont know what else, what other avenues he
may be taking out there, what he may have already
acquired So we have to deal with these bits and
pieces and try to put them together into a mosaic to
94
understand whats going on. But we do know with
absolute certainty that he is using his procurement
system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to
enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.188
[Authors emphasis.]
Cheney never says we know that the tubes are for uranium enrichment. In
fact, the Vice President goes out of his way to attribute the information about the
tubes to The New York Times. As a US government official, the only thing Cheney
was cleared to preface with we know seems to have been consensus, compromise
language: Saddam is trying to acquire the equipment needed to build a nuclear
weapon. In its July assessment, the DOEs three indications had included Iraqs
dual-use magnet procurements.189 The DIA and CIA (WINPAC and NESAF) had
based their assessments on the tubes.190 Although the individual agencies disagreed on
which equipment was nuclear-related, they all agreed that some of the equipment was
nuclear-related. The Intelligence Communitys consensus would not clear the Vice
President to refer to either the tubes or the magnets directly. To get around the
consensus, compromise language, Cheney cited the tubes to The New York Times.
The same day that Cheney appeared on Meet the Press, Secretary of State
Colin Powell appeared on Fox News Sunday with Tony Snow. Powell, like Cheney,
had not been cleared to refer to the tubes directly. Powell stated that
188
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network. September
8, 2002. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm Accessed: October 20, 2007.
189
Robb-Silberman. op. cit., pp. 203; 59; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 127.
190
95
There is no doubt that he has chemical weapons
stocks With respect to biological weapons, we are
confident that he has some stocks of those weapons and
he is probably continuing to try to develop more
With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite
confident that he continues to try to pursue the
technology that would allow him to develop a
nuclear weapon. Whether he could do it in one, five,
six or seven, eight years is something that people can
debate about. But what nobody can debate about is the
fact that he still has the incentive, he still intends to
develop those kinds of weapons. And as we saw in
reporting just this morning, he is still trying to
acquire, for example, some of the specialized
aluminum tubing one needs to develop centrifuges
that would give you an enrichment capability.
So theres no question that he has these weapons, but
even more importantly, he is striving to do even more,
to get even more.191 [Authors emphasis.]
Like the Vice President, Powell could only use a consensus, compromise term.
Iraq is pursuing the technology for a nuclear weapon. When the Secretary of State
referred to the tubes as components of a nuclear program, he had to cite it to the
reporting just this morning The New York Times article.
191
Powell, Colin. Interview. Fox News Sunday. Fox News Channel. September 8, 2002.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/fox.htm Accessed: October 20, 2007.
96
On the evening of September 8, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza

Rice was interviewed on CNNs Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer. Rice also got around
the Intelligence Communitys consensus, but she did it a little more creatively than
Powell or Cheney.
We do know that there have been shipments going

into Iraq of aluminum tubes that really are only
suited to -- high-quality aluminum tools [sic] that are
only really suited for nuclear weapons programs,
centrifuge programs We do know that he is
actively pursuing a nuclear weapon We know that
he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a
nuclear weapon... The problem here is that there will
always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can
acquire nuclear weapons. But we dont want the
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.192 [Authors
emphasis.]
Instead of citing The New York Times, Rice starts out saying aluminum
tubes and then corrects herself and says aluminum tools (whatever theyre
supposed to be). As with Cheney and Powell, the Intelligence Community would not
clear the National Security Advisor to refer to the tubes as evidence of a nuclear
program. She says we know Saddam has the infrastructure and scientists for a
192
Rice, Condoleezza. Interview. Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. CNN. September 8, 2002.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wolf.htm Accessed: October 12, 2007.
97
nuclear program, which was factually correct. She says we know Iraq is actively
pursuing a nuclear weapon again, the Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment. But Rice cannot say unequivocally that the tubes are evidence of Saddams
nuclear program. She has to misspeak and refer to tools to get around the
Intelligence Community.
The White House media blitz continued with Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfelds appearance on CBSs Face the Nation. In the interview, Rumsfeld was
asked directly about The New York Times article. But unlike Cheney, Powell and
Rice, the Defense Secretary didnt take the bait. He ducked the question and didnt
refer to the tubes at all, even obliquely. Instead, Rumsfeld seemed indignant that
anyone would want any evidence at all.
Bob Schieffer (Host): Well, let me ask you, then, tell

me about the seriousness of the problem. We read in
The New York Times today a story that says that
Saddam Hussein is closer to acquiring nuclear weapons.
Does he have nuclear weapons? Is there a smoking gun
here?
Rumsfeld: Smoking gun is an interesting phrase. It
implies that what were doing here is law enforcement,
that what were looking for is a case that we can take
into a court of law and prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. The problem with that is the way one gains
absolutely certainty as to whether a dictator like
98
Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon is if he uses it
and thats a little late. Its not late if youre interested
in protecting rights of the defendant in a court of law,
but its a quite different thing, if one thinks about it.193
[Authors emphasis.]
Like Cheney, Rumsfeld didnt need evidence to know Iraq was a threat. In the
interview, the Defense Secretary argued that in a post-September 11 world, we cant
wait for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Our standard of proof has to be much lower.
If we wait until were certain, it will be too late.
Rumsfeld implied that people who wait for smoking guns were practically
inviting another September 11. For the Defense Secretary, it didnt matter if the
Intelligence Community could not make a compelling case for Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution. Evidence wasnt necessary to know Iraq was working on nuclear
weapons. In the interview, Rumsfeld suggested that everyone should just accept the
absence of evidence. Saddam was hiding the extent of his nuclear program. In fact,
Rumsfeld seemed pissed off that anyone needed any evidence at all. Evidence was for
the chumps, the rubes, the people who hadnt learned the lessons of September 11.
So it seems that despite the Modification Intelligence and public pressure from
Cheney, the Intelligence Community hadnt cleared the tubes for the White House
media blitz. Neither DOE nor INR had flipped. The consensus had stayed the same.
The tubes were still disputed. The Intelligence Community wouldnt let the neocons
193
Rumsfeld, Donald H. Interview. Face the Nation. CBS Television Network. September 8, 2002.
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3631 Accessed: October 12,
2007.
99
cite the Team B analysis in the case for war. The Bush administration had managed to
get around the clearance process anyway. Instead of citing the Team B intelligence
directly, the neocons leaked the analysis to The New York Times. During the war
campaign, Cheney and Powell had attributed the tubes to the Judith Millers article.
Rice had referred to aluminium tools. Rumsfeld had been pissed off that anyone
should care about evidence at all. The neocons did not need evidence to know that
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. They only needed evidence to convince
the rest of us, the people who hadnt learned the lessons of September 11.
The Presidents United Nations Address
On September 8, 2002, the Intelligence Communitys consensus on the tubes was still
deadlocked. The CIA (WINPAC and NESAF) and the DIA had concluded the tubes
were for rotors. Neither DOE nor INR had flipped sides. The Modification
Intelligence and public pressure from Cheney hadnt worked. DOE still assessed the
tubes were most likely for rockets and INR agreed. In the middle of the White House
media blitz, the tubes consensus was still not in line with WINPACs Team B.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the United Nations General
Assembly to urge action against Iraq. Cheney, Powell, Rice and Rumsfeld had been
the Presidents warm-up act, so to speak. The day after the first anniversary of
September 11, the Presidents address was the climax of the media campaign, the
punchline, the money shot. The address represented the US case for war with Iraq; the
case for the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like
100
al-Qaeda. In the speech, the President cited the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution and he didnt it attribute The New York Times.
Today, Iraq continues to

withhold important
information about its
nuclear program weapons
design, procurement logs,
experiment data, an
accounting of nuclear
materials and
documentation of foreign
Figure 11 President Bush addresses the

UN General Assembly, September 12, 2002.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/
assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and

technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to
build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several
attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used
to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq
acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a
nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraqs statecontrolled media has reported numerous meetings
between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists,
leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for
these weapons.194 [Authors emphasis.]
194
Bush, George W. The Presidents Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. New York
City, New York. September 12, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209121.html Accessed: October 20, 2007.
101
Although there was no consensus on the tubes, President Bush had stated
unequivocally that Iraqs aluminium tubes were used for uranium enrichment. He had
cited Team B intelligence in the case for war. So, what had happened? I can think of
two possibilities. One, the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates the
Intelligence Communitys consensus judgments, decided to ignore the centrifuge
experts and clear the President without a consensus. After all, the Vice President,
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State had already cited the tubes. The
NIC may have decided that the tubes were a fait accompli. The President may as well
cite them too.
The second possibility is that the President was supposed to add some kind of
caveat to the tubes, but dropped it at the last minute. He may have been supposed to
say something like I believe the tubes are for centrifuges or We have reports that
the tubes are for centrifuges, which the NIC would have cleared. In fact, a White
House background paper that was released with the Presidents speech does caveat the
tubes in this way. The paper, A Decade of Deception and Defiance, says that
In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands

of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials
believe were intended as components of centrifuges to
enrich uranium.195 [Authors emphasis.]
So, it may have happened that Bush got up to the UN podium and decided, screw the
caveats. Im the President. Im going to say what I want to say.
195
United States. A Decade of Deception and Defiance. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
September 12, 2002. p. 9. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraqdecade.pdf Accessed:
November 4, 2007.
102
In any event, the President cited the tubes as evidence of Iraqs enrichment
program without the Intelligence Communitys consensus. He had cited Team B
propaganda to support the memes nuclear component. The President had cited the
tubes to convince the chumps, the rubes, the people who hadnt learned the lessons of
September 11 that Saddam was a nuclear threat.
The Panic at DOE
We know that the Intelligence Community had not reached a consensus on the tubes
because, after the Presidents UN address, the DOE seems to have gone into a panic.
The President had just told the world something the US centrifuge experts knew was
not true. On September 13, 2002, the day after the address, DOE published Iraq:
Recent Aluminum Tube Procurements. In the new assessment, DOE repeated the
conclusion it had reached more than a year earlier. The tubes were too thick for the
design Iraq would most likely be pursuing.196 They could not be used in a gas
centrifuge program without extensive modification. The new assessment also repeated
that other conventional military uses [we]re more plausible i.e. the tubes were
most likely for Iraqs Nasser-81 rocket.197 The President had told the UN that the
tubes were used to enrich uranium. DOE was saying the President was wrong.
The DOE also repeated its three indications that Iraq was reconstituting its
nuclear program. If the administration wanted to make the case for Iraqs enrichment
program, then officials should refer to Saddams renewed contact with his nuclear
196
197

Ibid., p. 57.
103
scientists, Iraqs other dual-use procurements (such as magnets) and the reports Iraq
was trying to obtain uranium from Niger.198 The DOE was clear that the President
should not rest his nuclear case on Iraqs aluminium tubes.
When the President cited the tubes without the Intelligence Communitys
consensus, he put the Intelligence Community in a very difficult position. The DOE
was forcefully asserting its assessment that, basically, the President had just lied to the
world. This was potentially a huge problem because that day, the US Congress asked
the Intelligence Community to prepare a document that would explain what,
precisely, its consensus judgment was. In the middle of the White House media blitz,
Exhibit A in the case for war was still vigorously disputed. What was the National
Intelligence Council going to tell Congress about the consensus regarding the tubes?
The National Intelligence Estimate
The document Congress had asked the Intelligence Community to prepare was a
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). An NIE is the Intelligence Communitys most
authoritative written judgment on a specific national security issue.199 Authored by the
National Intelligence Council, an NIE represents the consensus of the entire
Intelligence Community. NIEs are supposed to provide policymakers in both the
executive and legislative branches with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased
information regardless of whether analytic judgments conform to any particular
policy objective.200 Usually, NIEs are ordered by the White House to help inform
198
Ibid., p. 203.
200
Ibid., p. 9.
199
104
policy decisions. But the Bush administrations neocons did not need evidence to
know Iraq was a threat. The Iraq NIE was ordered by Congress.
During the White House media campaign, several senators had invoked a
rarely used authority to order the Intelligence Community to start work on an NIE
about Iraqs WMD programs.201 In early-October, the Congress was going to vote on
a resolution to authorise the Presidents use of force should Iraq refuse to disarm. The
senators had ordered the NIE to help them decide which way to cast their votes.202
Typically, NIEs take between three to six months to write. The Iraq NIE had to be
done in time for the vote, just three weeks away. I think that the NIE caught the Bush
administration and the Intelligence Community completely off guard.
The Intelligence Community had to explain in the NIE exactly what its
consensus judgment on the tubes was. If it did, Congress was going to find out that
the consensus was deadlocked and that the President should not have cited the tubes.
Something dramatic would have to happen to save the Presidents case for war. There
would be no more dicking around with NGIC text-boxes, Cheney speeches,
suspiciously convenient foreign intelligence service reports or leaks to The New York
Times. The Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought in line
with WINPACs Team B once and for all.
The Campaign for War Continues (albeit tube-lessly)
201
202

Ibid., p. 12.
105
While the NIE was being written, the tubes were banished from the case for war. On
September 14, 2002, the day after the panic at DOE, President Bush gave a radio
address on the danger posed by Saddams regime. He did not cite the tubes as
evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
Today this regime likely maintains stockpiles of

chemical and biological agents, and is improving and
expanding facilities capable of producing chemical and
biological weapons. Today Saddam Hussein has the
scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear weapons
program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the
equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear
weapon. Should his regime acquire fissile material, it
would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.
[Authors emphasis.]
In the radio address, the President did not refer to the Iraqi tubes directly.
Instead, he used the consensus, compromise language: Iraq had sought uranium
enrichment equipment.
A few days later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld testified before the
House Armed Services Committee on Iraqs WMD programs. Rumsfeld never once
uttered the word tube in his testimony. He asserted that Iraq had an active program
to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. Iraq was seeking an indigenous capability
106
to produce fissile material.203 (Fissile material is weapons-grade enriched uranium.)
Like the President, the Defense Secretary didnt cite the tubes as evidence of Iraqs
nuclear reconstitution.
Through much of his testimony, the Defense Secretary was once again
indignant that anyone would require firm evidence of the Iraqi threat. The
administration knew Saddam was amassing WMDs whether there was firm
supporting evidence or not. Rumsfeld believed that America had to act even if the
intelligence was weak. The situations uncertainty meant that consequences of
inaction could be catastrophic. For the Defense Secretary, the lesson of 9/11 was that
everyones standard of proof should be much lower.
I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are

back in the 20th century and still thinking in pre9/11 terms. On September 11th, we were awakened to
the fact that America is now vulnerable to
unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be
sufficient to change the way we think about our
security, how we defend our country and the type of
certainty and evidence we consider appropriate.
[]
In his UN address, the President said we know that
Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even
203
Rumsfeld, Donald H. United States Department of Defense. Testimony of U.S. Secretary of

Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq. September
18, 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=284 Accessed: October 12,
2007.
107
when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume
that he stopped when they left? To the contrary,
knowing what we know about Iraqs history, no
conclusion is possible except that they have and are
accelerating their WMD programs.204 [Authors
emphasis.]
To sum up, Rumsfeld didnt need evidence to know Iraq had WMD programs.
Iraqs history (i.e. its nature) meant that Saddam had WMDs; evidence was
irrelevant. People who needed evidence to justify war were so last century. Just like
Cheney, Rumsfeld held those of us who need evidence to reach conclusions in
contempt. Evidence was for the rubes, the chumps, the people who hadnt learned the
lesson of 9/11. For Rumsfeld, the tubes were an excuse for war, not a reason. He
already knew Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The neocons wanted to cite
the Team B analysis of the tubes to convince the rest of us that they were right.
The Red Team
While the National Intelligence Estimate was being written, the tubes had been
banished from the case for war. The NIE was going to reveal to Congress that the
Intelligence Communitys consensus on the tubes was deadlocked. The tubes were
still disputed by the DOE. If the tubes were going to return to the Presidents nuclear
case, the Intelligence Community needed to be brought in line with WINPACs Team
B cell. An NIE is supposed to be the Intelligence Communitys most authoritative
204
Ibid.
108
written judgment. The Iraq NIE would be an adjunct to a propaganda campaign. DCI
George Tenet seems to have stepped in to save the Presidents case for the nuclear
component of the meme: Iraq is a threat because it is reconstituting its nuclear
program. Tenet stepped in so that the President could make the case the neocons
wanted him to make.
An NIE is the Directors estimate, and its findings are his.205 Tenet fixed it
so Joe the WINPAC analyst could write the NIEs tubes analysis. The NIE was due to
be published on October 1, 2002. Around the time Rumsfeld was testifying in
Congress, Joe and a group of contractors started work on WINPACs first extensive
assessment of the tubes.206 The Robb-Silberman Commission, the presidential
commission that investigated the WMD intelligence failures, refers to the group as a
Team B, a red team.207
On September 16, 2002, the Red Team went to work. Joe supplied the
contractors with a stack of documents, a sample aluminium tube for visual
examination and NGICs analysis, the basis for the text-box that had concluded the
tubes would make poor choices for rocket bodies.208 The DOE wasnt invited to
brief the contractors or contribute to their assessment.209 When the US Senate asked
Joe why he hadnt consulted with the Intelligence Communitys centrifuge experts, he
said, Because we funded it. It was our testing. We were trying to prove some things
that we wanted to prove with the testing. It wasnt a joint effort.210 The Red Team
205

Ibid., p. 93.
207
208
Ibid., p. 211.
209
210
Ibid., p. 108.
206
109
interpreted the tubes to fit a preconceived conclusion: the tubes were for centrifuge
rotors.
The Red Team resurrected Joes Centrifuge Frankenstein. Instead of

comparing the tubes to a single Zippe rotor design, the Red Team combined the
dimensions of all the Zippe designs so the tubes specifications would appear to
match.211 The team also noted that the tubes length and wall thickness specifications
were similar to Iraqs pre-Gulf War rotor design, the Beams design which Iraq
had abandoned because it had never been able to get it to work.212 The Red Team had
cherry-picked designs so that the tubes would support the predetermined truth.
On September 17, 2002, the day after it started, the Red Team published its
assessment. The team argued that the tubes are consistent with design requirements
of gas centrifuge rotors, i.e. the tubes were consistent with Joes Centrifuge
Frankenstein, which is to say they werent consistent with centrifuge rotors at all.213
And thanks to NGICs analysis, the Red Team also concluded the tubes were
inconsistent with the design requirements of rocket motor casings.214 As far as the
Red Team was concerned, the tubes were evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
The team had analysed the tubes in the way the neocons wanted intelligence analysed:
to prove what they already believed to be true.
Iraqs Hunt for Aluminum Tubes
211
Ibid., p. 109.
Ibid., p. 109.
213
214
Ibid., p. 211.
212
110
The Red Team analysis became the basis of WINPACs first extensive assessment of
the tubes, Iraqs Hunt for Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Uranium
Enrichment Program. On September 25, 2002, the Intelligence Community held an
interagency coordination meeting for the NIE.215 At the day long meeting,
representatives from every member of the Intelligence Community hammered out the
official consensus judgment. Most of the day was spent debating the tubes.216 DOE
and the State Departments INR vigorously disputed WINPAC and DIAs position.217
The consensus remained deadlocked. When the NIE was published on October 1, the
WINPAC paper was the basis for the NIEs majority analysis of the tubes.218 In other
words, Joes Team B analysis had become the Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment. How did the WINPAC assessment get past DOE and INR at the
coordination meeting? How did WINPAC break the deadlock?
I dont think it did. I think the Team B analysis was shoehorned into the NIE
at the last minute. According to Robb-Silberman, the National Security Agency
(which monitors foreign communications) and the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (which analyses satellite imagery) then stepped in to break the deadlock.219
The Commission reports that both agencies supported the CIA/DIA position on the
tubes and, as a result, the WINPAC analysis became the Intelligence Communitys
consensus judgment. The DOEs analysis, which was supported only by INR, was
included in the NIE as a minority dissent.220 So, according to the Commission,
WINPACs Team B analysis won the vote over DOEs analysis fair and square.
215
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit.., p. 95.

Ibid, p. 52.
217
218
Ibid., pp. 206; 211; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit.., p. 95.
219
Ibid., 57.
220
Ibid., pp. 57; 210.
216
111
However, there are several reasons to doubt the Robb-Silberman Commissions
version of events.
First of all, theres the US Senate report. The Senate report mentions only the
deadlocked consensus with WINPAC and DIA on one side and DOE and INR on the
other.221 The report doesnt mention the alleged tie-breaking agencies, NSA and
NIMA, or even if the tie was broken at all. Secondly, the Robb-Silberman
Commission buries an important piece of information in an endnote: the NSAs
representative at the interagency meeting denies the NSA took a position on the
tubes.222 He denies that the NSA broke the deadlock. And thirdly, the interagency
meeting at which WINPACs Iraqs Hunt for Aluminum Tubes became the
Intelligence Communitys consensus judgment took place on September 25, 2002.
However, the WINPAC paper was not even published until September 30, 2002.223
Thats five days after the meeting and just one day before the NIEs publication. I
suspect that the Robb-Silberman Commission has misrepresented the facts. I dont
think the deadlock was broken at all. More likely, Tenet shoehorned WINPACs Red
Team assessment into the NIE at the last minute.
On October 1, 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqs Continuing

Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, was published with WINPACs Team B
analysis as its majority position on the tubes.224 The NIE assessed the tubes were
compelling evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.225 Their dimensions were
similar to Iraqs abandoned pre-Gulf War rotor design and nearly matched the
221

Robb-Silberman. op. cit. p. 201.
223
Ibid., p. 200.
224
225
222
112
Zippe rotor designs, i.e. Joes Centrifuge Frankenstein.226 The NIE assessed that all
the Iraqis would have to do would be to cut the tubes in half to make two 400mm
rotors. It was the exact same conclusion that Joe had reached almost a year-and-a-half
earlier in his very first assessment of the tubes.227 The Intelligence Communitys
consensus on the tubes had finally been brought in line with WINPACs Team B cell.
Cincinnati, Ohio
As Ive mentioned, NIEs are supposed to be the Intelligence Communitys most

authoritative written judgment. The Iraq NIE was, however, an element of the Bush
administrations propaganda campaign. As far as the National Intelligence Council
was concerned, Joes Team B analysis was now the official position of the
Intelligence Community, the majority, consensus position. The tubes were now
officially gas centrifuge components. The tubes could make a triumphant return to
the case for war.
On October 7, 2002, less than a week after the NIEs publication, President
Bush outlined the Iraqi threat in an address in Cincinnati, Ohio; the famous
Cincinnati speech. The consensus, compromise language was gone. The President
could now make the case the neocons wanted him to make. The tubes were evidence
of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. They were evidence of the memes nuclear
component.
226
227
Ibid., p. 70.
113
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held
numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group
he calls his nuclear mujahideen -- his nuclear holy
warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is
rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its
nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to
purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other
equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are
used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.228
[Authors emphasis.]
A few days later, the NIEs cooked intelligence helped convince Congress to
pass House Joint Resolution 114. The resolution authorised the Bush administrations
use of military force if Iraq did not disarm its WMDs.229 Since Iraq did not have any
WMDs to disarm, the path to war was set. Joes Team B analysis had done exactly
what it was supposed to do. The analysis had helped sell the Iraq War.
What Went Down
In the aftermath of 9/11, the neocons wanted to justify the Iraq War with the meme:
Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. One day,
Saddam could arm his terrorist ally with a chemical, biological or even nuclear
228

House Gives Bush Authority for War with Iraq. CNN. October 10, 2002.
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/iraq.us/index.html Accessed: November 4, 2007.
229
114
weapon to attack the United States. The memes nuclear component was essential to
selling the war: Iraq was a threat because it was reconstituting its nuclear program.
The neocons did not need evidence to know that the meme was true. They
only needed evidence to convince the rest of us that they were right. The problem was
the Intelligence Communitys control over what US officials could and could not say
about intelligence judgments. The neocons could not say that Iraq was reconstituting
its nuclear program unless the Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. While the
neocons were absolutely convinced of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution, the Intelligence
Community needed evidence before it would clear them to say so publicly. The
neocons needed evidence to prove what they already believed was true. They needed
evidence to convince the public that Iraq was a nuclear threat.
Established prior to 9/11, WINPACs Team B cell was just like the Rumsfeld
Commission and Wolfowitzs 1976 Team B. The WINPAC Team B analysed Iraqs
aluminium tube procurement to fit the neocons preconceived conclusion. To prove
the tubes were for centrifuge rotors, the Team B cherry-picked evidence that
supported its assumption and dismissed as deception everything that didnt. Joe the
WINPAC analyst created the Centrifuge Frankenstein to match the tubes
dimensions. He dismissed the rocket explanation as an Iraqi trick. Like the Rumsfeld
Commission, the Team B filled in the gaps in the data to fit its assumptions. In the
absence of evidence, the Team B assumed that Iraq would abandon its modern rotor
designs and modify the tubes to enrich uranium. The Team B analysed the tubes to
prove what the neocons already believed to be true.
115
The Intelligence Community did not agree with the Team B analysis. In
August 2001, the DOE assessed that the tubes were most likely for Iraqi rockets, not
centrifuge rotors. The tubes could not be used as rotors without extensive
modification. In particular, the tubes internal diameters were too narrow to enrich
more than marginal amounts of uranium. Prior to September 11, it looked like DOEs
assessment would become the Intelligence Communitys consensus judgment on the
tubes. Before the neocons could make the case they wanted to make, the consensus
would have to be brought in line with WINPACs Team B.
I think the neocons likely ordered the NGIC text-box, in which the Pentagons
rocket experts lied that the tubes would make poor rockets. Thanks to NGIC, the DIA
had an excuse to sign off on WINPACs Team B analysis and as a result the
consensus deadlocked. WINPAC and DIA were on one side and DOE and the State
Departments INR were on the other.
The neocons also fostered a climate of inevitability in the Intelligence

Community. As mentioned in the Downing Street Memo, analysts knew the US was
going to war with Iraq and wanted to help the White House fix the intelligence
around policy. The DOE used SISMIs Niger reporting as an excuse to assess Iraq
was reconstituting its nuclear program after all. The nuclear consensus flipped. The
neocons could now say Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapon. But they could not cite
the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution. The consensus on the tubes was
still deadlocked. The Intelligence Community would not clear the neocons to cite the
Team B intelligence in the case for war.
116
Less than two weeks before the White House media campaign, Vice President
Cheney publicly pressured analysts to be more like a Team B cell. No one should
expect strong evidence of Iraqs nuclear program. The Intelligence Community was
too incompetent to see that Saddam was hiding the extent of his nuclear program. The
Vice President was pressuring analysts to interpret intelligence to fit his preconceived
conclusion. He wanted to cite Team B propaganda to convince people that Iraq was a
nuclear threat.
The same week of Cheneys speech, the Modification Intelligence appeared to

provide DOE and INR with an excuse to flip the tubes consensus. DOE had assessed
the tubes could not be used as rotors unless the Iraqis expanded the internal diameters.
The Modification Intelligence claimed that Iraq had asked about doing exactly that.
Like the NGIC text-box, the report undermined DOEs assessment and seems to have
been an attempt to bring the consensus in line with WINPACs Team B. The
Modification Intelligence was explicit evidence for the Team Bs assumption. It
seems to have been an attempt to help the neocons make the case for war.
However, neither DOE nor INR took the bait however. As the first anniversary
of September 11 approached, the White House began its media blitz for war with Iraq.
The Intelligence Community would not clear the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution. The consensus was still deadlocked. However, the Bush administration
found a way to cite the tubes anyway. The Team B analysis was leaked to The New
York Times. Cheney and Powell cited the press to support the memes nuclear
component. Despite the deadlocked consensus, the Bush administration was
determined to use the Team B intelligence to sell the Iraq War.
117
In his UN address, President Bush claimed that the tubes would be used to
enrich uranium even though the Intelligence Community could not agree that that was
true. Either the President was cleared without a consensus or (more likely) he dropped
caveats that he was supposed to say. To protect the President and the case for war,
DCI George Tenet likely shoehorned Joes Team B analysis into the National
Intelligence Estimates majority position. The Iraq NIE was an element of the Bush
administrations propaganda campaign. The Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment had been brought in line with WINPACs Team B. The President could now
cite the Team B analysis in the case for war: the tubes were evidence of Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution.
118
Salman Pak
The Operation
The Modification Intelligence seems to have been an attempt to give DOE and INR an
excuse to change their positions on the Iraqi aluminium tubes. Laundered through a
foreign intelligence service, the Modification Intelligence looks like deliberate
disinformation. Its purpose was to help bring the Intelligence Communitys consensus
in line with the neocons Team B. It was not an isolated incident.
I think that the Modification Intelligence was part of a disinformation

operation that targeted the Intelligence Community. The operation did not seek to
influence the decision to go to war. The neocons already knew Iraq had WMDs and
supported al-Qaeda. They already believed Iraq was a threat. Instead, the operation
sought to influence how the Iraq War was sold to the public. The operation sought to
influence the Intelligence Communitys consensus so the neocons could make the
case for the meme. The neocons wanted to state unequivocally that Iraq was a threat
because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. They wanted to cite
Team B propaganda to convince the public that they were right. The disinformation
operation would help the neocons make the case that they wanted to make. The
operation was run by the neocons ally, the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
The Iraqi National Congress
119
The CIA created the Iraqi National Congress in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.
In 1991, President George H. W. Bush signed a lethal finding against Saddam
Hussein. The CIA was authorized to encourage individuals in the Iraqi government
and military to change the Iraqi leadership, i.e. to effect a coup that would remove
Saddam from power.230 At the time, the US plan was to remove Saddam but keep the
regime. Iraqs new, post-Saddam government would likely still be a dictatorship. But
the US hoped that the new dictatorship would be more amenable to American
interests. In response to the Presidents authorization, the CIA created the Iraqi
National Congress, a propaganda operation masquerading as a government-in-exile.
For all appearances, the INC was Iraqs exile

government, an umbrella group for Iraqis opposed to
Saddam Hussein. Formed officially in 1992, the INC
was an eclectic coalition of secular democrats, Shia
Islamists, Sunni Islamists, communists, monarchists,
Kurdish nationalists and ex-Baathist officers. The
INC promised human rights and rule of law within a
constitutional, democratic and pluralistic Iraq.231
Led by a slick, former banker named Ahmad Chalabi,
the INC had all the trappings of a genuine opposition
Figure 12 Ahmad Chalabi,

leader of the INC. Source:
movement.
230
United States. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The Use by the Intelligence Community of
Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. S. Rpt. 109-330. Washington DC: Government
Printing Office. September 8, 2006. p. 5. http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiinc.pdf Accessed:
September 10, 2006.
231
Katzman, Kenneth. Iraqs Opposition Movements. Congressional Research Service Report.
March 26, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-iraq-op.htm Accessed: November 6, 2007.
120
However, the INC wasnt a real opposition group. The CIA did not create the
INC to be a viable alternative government. Ahmad Chalabi had no support inside Iraq.
He wasnt considered strong enough to hold Iraqs fractious ethnic groups together. In
reality, the INC was a propaganda operation. For the first half of the 1990s, the INC
reportedly received more than $100 million in covert funding to broadcast antiSaddam propaganda from its bases in Kuwait and Iraqi-Kurdistan.232 However, the
propaganda wasnt limited to the Iraqis.
The INC itself was an image for Western audiences. Ahmad Chalabi was
fluent in English. He could be trusted to wear an immaculate suit on the BBC while
saying all the right things about democracy and human rights. The INC would
publicise Saddams cruelty and make sure Iraq never got too much sympathy in the
Western press.233 It was all part of the US plan to marginalise Saddam, weaken the
dictators grip on power and encourage a coup from inside the Iraqi regime.
Apart from propaganda, the INC had two functions. The INCs base in
Northern Iraq was supposed to provide a safe-haven for Iraqi defectors. The INC was
also supposed to keep the fractious members of the anti-Saddam opposition from
fighting each other. The group wasnt supposed to try to overthrow Saddam itself. Yet
in early-1995, thats exactly what it tried to do.
The INCs military campaign to oust Saddam was a disaster. The plan was
called End Game. End Game was based on the idea that Saddams regime was a
232
Urbina, Ian. This War Brought to You by Rendon Group. Asia Times. November 13, 2002.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/DK13Ak01.html Accessed: November 6, 2007.
233
Mayer, Jane. The Manipulator. The New Yorker. May 29, 2004.
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/06/07/040607fa_fact1?printable=true Accessed: November
6, 2007.
121
house of cards that would collapse at the slightest show of force. 234 No Iraqi would
fight for Saddam, Chalabi believed. On the contrary, Iraqis would rise up and join the
insurrection. Thered be mass desertions from the military and everyone would join
hands, sing Kumbaya and elect Chalabi the new president of Iraq. Iraq is on the
verge of spontaneous combustion, he wrote in a 1991 op-ed. It only needs a trigger
to set off a chain of events that will lead to the overthrow of Saddam.235
End Game called for a united

Kurdish force to attack Iraq from the
north while armed Shia groups
launched coordinated uprisings in the
south. Sure, Saddams army was still
reasonably well equipped and if his
soldiers stood and fought, Chalabis
free Iraqi forces would be
slaughtered. But the mannered former-
Figure 13 Iraqs No-Fly Zones circa 1995. The INC

base was south-east of Irbil in the Kurdish
autonomous region. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/
banker was certain that that wouldnt

happen. He was wrong.
In January 1995, the INC put End Game into effect. Chalabis forces would
have been killed except that the vast majority didnt show up.236 The Shia groups in
the south didnt move. Only one Kurdish militia crossed into Iraq to engage Saddams
troops. Although the fighting was fierce, Saddams forces pushed the Kurds back
234
Hersh, Seymour M. The Iraq Hawks. The New Yorker. December 20, 2001.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/targets/1220hawks.htm Accessed: November 6, 2007.
235
Ibid.
236
Ibid.
122
across the border in three days. 237 A rival Kurdish militia then decided to seize the
opportunity to settle some old scores. The rival militia, which was also a member of
the INC, invited Iraqi army units into Kurdistan to finish off the INCs troops. Forty
thousand Iraqi soldiers and 300 Iraqi tanks crossed into Kurdish territory. The US was
forced to evacuate Chalabi and the INC from northern Iraq. For many INC
employees, the evacuation came too late. Saddams troops slaughtered hundreds.238
The End Game fiasco ended up strengthening Saddams grip on power. The
dictator had crushed his opponents and forced the US from northern Iraq. To the Iraqi
people, the dictator seemed as invincible as ever. Saddam even used End Game as a
pretext to purge his regime of officers suspected of disloyalty. In one ill-considered
move, Chalabi had undone all the CIAs efforts to isolate and marginalise Saddam
and lost the US base in Iraqi-Kurdistan in the process.
The CIA was furious. With the Kurdish militias at war with one another and
the Shia groups denouncing Chalabi, the INCs days as an umbrella group for the
Iraqi opposition seemed over. Saddam had destroyed the base in Kurdistan, so the
much INCs propaganda apparatus was gone too. The CIA decided to cut its losses
and pulled the plug on the groups funding. Chalabi was black-listed in the
Intelligence Community. In 1997, President Clinton appointed George Tenet his new
Director of Central Intelligence. DCI Tenet told the US Senate that after the End
Game fiasco, We never wanted to have anything to do with [Chalabi] anymore.239
237
Mayer, Jane. op. cit.

Ibid.
239
SSCI. Phase II: INC. op. cit., p. 25.
238
123
INC Resurgent
The INC started out as a PR image, a fake opposition group, and suddenly it had
started believing it was the real thing. In the aftermath of End Game, the INC went
back to doing what it did best: manipulating public opinion.
Chalabi blamed the CIA for End Games failure. For Chalabi, the problem had
been one of perception. End Game would have worked if the Iraqis had believed the
US was serious about removing Saddam. If the CIA had provided a token sign of
support for the INCs offensive, Saddams forces would not have fought as hard as
they did. So Chalabi decided he would take the CIA out of the equation. He would
concentrate on the one place where the INC could be effective, a place where the
threat from Saddam would be taken seriously. Chalabi would establish himself in a
place where perception was more important than reality: Washington, DC.
The neocons absolutely loved Chalabi. For neocon players like Paul
Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, promoting democracy in the Middle
East was in Americas interests. Chalabi presented himself as the man to do it, an
Iraqi George Washington.240 The neocons knew that Iraq was developing WMDs and
would threaten US oil interests sooner or later. A democratic Iraq would be a strong
US ally, recognise Israel and help end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A democratic
Iraq could even be a beachhead for reform throughout the region. Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt. The neocons could roll back Middle East tyranny like Reagan had
240
Mayer, Jane. op. cit.
124
rolled communism from Eastern Europe.241 And of course, Iraq was practically
floating on a sea of oil. With free market reforms, everyone would make a ton of
money.242 What could possibly go wrong?
Chalabi told the neocons exactly what they wanted to hear. In 1998, the
neocons lobbied Congress to pass The Iraq Liberation Act, which, much to the CIAs
chagrin, secured the Iraqi National Congress $98 million in funding.243 The INC was
back in business. In September that year, Paul Wolfowitz testified before the House
National Security Committee on US Iraq policy. He pressed Chalabis case that
Saddams regime was ready to collapse at the slightest show of force. Congress
should support a plan proposed by the Iraqi opposition, he argued.244 The plan was
a new and improved version of Chalabis End Game, only now with extended no-fly
zones in Iraqs north and south. US and UK air power would protect the INC
rebellion.
Neoconservative think-tanks rallied around the INCs cause and the new and
improved End Game plan. In 1998, the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf
published an open letter to President Bill Clinton. The letter read that it was in
Americas vital national interests to recognize a provisional government of Iraq
based on the principles and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress.245 The Committee
urged the President to implement the new and improved End Game and protect the
241
Ibid.
Ibid.
243
Ibid.
244
Wolfowitz, Paul. Statement before the House National Security Committee. House National
Security Committee Hearings on Iraq. September 18, 1998.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1998_h/98-09-16wolfowitz.htm Accessed:
November 7, 2007.
245
Open Letter to the President. Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf. Washington DC.
September 18, 1998. http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/rumsfeld-openletter.htm Accessed:
November 7, 2007.
242
125
INCs anti-Saddam forces with US firepower, if necessary. The letters signatories
included several future Bush administration officials: Richard Perle, Douglas Feith,
David Wurmser, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld.246
The neocons and the INC formed a match made in heaven. Both wanted the
US to remove Saddams regime from power. Neither trusted the US Intelligence
Community. While the neocons did not need evidence to inform their policy
decisions, they did need evidence to convince everyone else that they were right.
Manufacturing evidence to manipulate public opinion was about the only thing the
INC did well. In 2001, the neocons were back in power with the Bush administration.
It was only a matter of time before they started working with the INC.
Was This Saddams Bomb?
On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush was inaugurated the 43rd President of the
United States. Less than a week later, the Iraqi National Congress was planting stories
in the press that Saddam was a nuclear threat. The London Daily Telegraph ran a
story sourced to an Iraqi defector, a former military engineer. According to the
defector, Iraq had not only reconstituted its nuclear program, the program had already
been successful. Saddam now possessed at least two nuclear weapons and was
building more.
According to the defector, who cannot be named for

security reasons, bombs are being built in Hemrin in
246
Ibid.
126
north-eastern Iraq, near the Iranian border. Last week,
the defector said: There are at least two nuclear bombs
which are ready for use. Before the UN inspectors
came, there were 47 factories involved in the project.
Now there are 64. The information has alarmed
security experts, who were aware only that the area
around Hemrin was well-guarded.247
The nuclear weapons were being assembled in a secret facility in the Hemrin
mountains, the defector warned. Only the nuclear engineers and Saddams inner circle
knew about the top secret program. The project was managed by one Dr. Khaled at
Iraqs al-Atheer factory.248
Although Im sure the defector seemed very sincere to The Telegraphs

reporter, we now know that he was lying through his teeth. As Ive mentioned, the US
Iraq Survey Group investigated all aspects of Iraqs WMD programs after the fall of
Baghdad. The ISG concluded that Iraqs nuclear program had effectively ended after
the 1991 Gulf War. There was no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the
program.249 Prior to the Gulf War, Iraqs enrichment program had been at least
several years away from developing enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear
weapon. The Telegraphs defector was actually an INC plant to paint Saddam as a
nuclear threat.
247
Berry, Jessica. Saddam Has Made Two Atomic Bombs, says Iraqi Defector. The London Daily
Telegraph. January 28, 2001. http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a737bc56b2e.htm Accessed:
November 7, 2007.
248
Ibid.
249
Iraq Survey Group. Vol. 2. op. cit., p. 1.
127
In February 2001, a month after The Telegraph story, another article appeared
in another UK paper, The Sunday Times. Was This Saddams Bomb?, by reporter
Gwynne Roberts, was based on interviews with several Iraqi defectors. Roberts
disclosed that the interviews had been organized with the help of the Iraqi National
Congress.250 The INC had arranged Roberts to meet the shadowy Leone, an Iraqi
military engineer, at the INCs newly restored base in Iraqi-Kurdistan.
Leones story was nearly identical to the story The Telegraph sourced to its
defector. Leone claimed that not only had Iraq reconstituted its nuclear program, the
program had already been successful. Just like The Telegraphs defector, Leone said
that Iraqs nuclear weapons were assembled under Mount Hemrin. The project was
managed by a Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sayeed at the nuclear weaponisation center at
Al-Atheer.251 Most likely, Leone and The Telegraphs defector were one in the
same. I think that the INC was shopping the same defector to multiple newspapers.
Leones story in The Sunday Times was a more embellished and detailed
version of the story in The Telegraph. The stockpile of nuclear weapons at Iraqs
Hemrin facility had jumped from at least two in The Telegraph to as many as
nine in The Times. Also, according to Leone, Iraqs pre-Gulf War nuclear program
had been more advanced than anyone realised. Leone told Roberts that Iraq had
conducted a successful nuclear test in 1989.
250
Roberts, Gwynne. Was This Saddams Bomb? The Sunday Times (London). February 25, 2001.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2001/stirevnws01015.htm Accessed: November
7, 2001.
251
Ibid.
128
Leone then made the staggering claim that Iraq had
conducted a nuclear test before the Gulf war.
The test was carried out at 10.30am on September 19,
1989, at an underground site 150km southwest of
Baghdad, he said.252
Why hadnt we heard of the test before now? According to Leone, Saddam had gone
to great lengths to conceal his successful nuclear test.
We went to a lot of trouble to conceal the test from the

outside world We had built a special platform for the
bomb in the Tuwaitha workshop and this was sent to the
test site. This allowed the device to be jacked up inside
the cavern. Then we sealed off the cavern by blocking
part of the tunnel inside with a 50-metre concrete plug
and piling up sand and rocks behind that. All this was
intended to muffle the explosion, and its known as
decoupling.
When the test happened, there was no dust or anything.
The air just vibrated. I was in my car at the time and it
just shook. It reached about 2.7 on the Richter scale,
and wouldnt really have been noticed by seismic
stations outside Iraq.253
252
253
Ibid.
Ibid.
129
How about the test site? Was there any evidence there? Leone asserted that there
wasnt. Saddam had managed to conceal every trace of the nuclear explosion.
After the test, they destroyed the entrance to the

tunnel. They also removed any evidence to indicate that
a test had happened.
They washed out the shaft with water to remove any
radioactivity. They then filled it with cement, rocks and
sand, and destroyed the entrance. They also created a
long river channel near the shaft entrance to drain off
contaminated ground water.254
Leone had explained the absence of evidence by claiming Saddam had

managed to hide it. However, Leone did provide Roberts with one piece of evidence
he said confirmed his account: a letter from Saddams son-in-law Hussein Kamel, the
former head of Iraqs Military Industrialization Commission. The letter was written
in Arabic and dated September 19, 1989, Roberts reported. It read,
With the help of God and the effort of the heroic

freedom fighters in the military industrialisation
institution and the atomic power organisation, we have
successfully completed Test Number One of the Iraqi
Atomic Bomb. Its strength was 10 kilotons and highly
enriched uranium was used with a purity of 93%
254
Ibid.
130
With this experiment Iraq is considered the first country
in the world to carry out this sort of experiment without
the knowledge of the international monitoring
authorities.255
The letter was certainly a forgery the INC had cooked up to make Leone seem
marginally more credible. As well as the forgery, the INC arranged for Roberts to
meet with a second defector who confirmed Leones claims.
The second defector was the shadowy Dr. Imad. Now living in Denmark,
Dr. Imad told Roberts he had also worked on Iraqs nuclear program. His story was
remarkably similar to Leones. Roberts wrote that
The story [Dr. Imad] told, unprompted by me, fitted

Leones
Imad was adamant that the Iraqis had conducted a
nuclear test, although he did not know where. Group
Four was working specifically on a Hiroshima-type
bomb. In 1986-87, they began to run computer
simulation models, but I know for a fact that in 1989
they fed in real test data.
From an actual test? I asked.
From an actual test. They modified the model
according to the test data. They finished it.
255
Ibid.
131
So does Iraq have the bomb?
Iraq tested the bomb and they have it, he said.256
Leone and Dr. Imad corroborated each others stories. With the forged letter
from Hussein Kamel, it was enough to convince Gwynne Roberts that Iraq had been a
nuclear power for more than a decade. Imads evidence meant that two former senior
Iraqi scientists one in Kurdistan and the other in Denmark had independently
confirmed that an organisation called Group Four not only existed but had
successfully tested a gun-type atomic bomb, Roberts reported breathlessly.257 The
INC seems to have had him well and truly suckered.
Most likely, the INC was coaching multiple defectors with the same story and
shopping them around to multiple newspapers. Both The Sunday Times and The
Telegraph fell for it. The INC was trying to create a media phenomenon known as an
echo chamber effect. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd described a
situation in which bogus stories ricocheted through an echo chamber of
government and media, making it sound as if multiple, reliable sources were
corroborating the same story.258 With enough multiple, reliable sources,
unsubstantiated allegations can start to seem like accepted facts. The INC was trying
to manufacture an echo chamber for its unsubstantiated allegation that Iraq had a
nuclear weapon. The neocons ally was trying to make the Iraqi nuclear threat seem
an accepted fact.
256
Ibid.
Ibid.
258
Dowd, Maureen. The Thief of Baghdad. The New York Times. September 15, 2004.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE2DA1F3AF936A25751C0A9629C8B63&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: November 7, 2007.
257
132
The Center for Security Policy
The INCs echo chamber wasnt very successful, however. The Telegraph and The
Sunday Times were the only mainstream news organisations to report the story.259 In
fact, there seems to have been only one group that took Leones claims seriously a
neoconservative think-tank, the Center for Security Policy.
Based in Washington DC, the Center for Security Policy is an organization

committed to the time-tested philosophy of promoting international peace through
American strength, according to its website. In 2001, the Center wasnt shy about its
ties to the neocons in the Bush administration (the webpages have since been taken
down, however). Several of its members were high-level Bush officials.260 For
example, Richard Perle, a member of the Centers advisory council, was appointed
chairman of the Pentagons Defense Policy Board.261 Douglas Feith, also on the
Centers advisory council, was the Bush administrations Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy, which is one of the highest offices in the Department of Defense.262 The
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is the number three official at the Pentagon.
Feith answered only to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary
259
An informed commenter notes that the story was obvious nonsense and never taken seriously by
informed opinion. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, an International
Monitoring System has been in place, utilizing a variety of measures to detect nuclear explosions. It is
highly unlikely that an Iraqi nuclear test would escape detection. See, Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Federation of American Scientists. 2008. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt Accessed:
December 19, 2008.
260
Members of National Security Advisory Council Take Top Government Posts. Center for Security
Policy. Washington DC. 2002.
http://web.archive.org/web/20020427200455/http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section
=static&page=nsac-gvtsvc Accessed: November 7, 2007.
261
National Security Advisory Council. Center for Security Policy. Washington DC. 2007.
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Home.aspx?CategoryID=47&SubCategoryID=50 Accessed:
November 7, 2007.
262
Ibid.
133
Wolfowitz. In the days after 9/11, it was Feiths office that came up with the meme
for the meeting at Camp David.263 Finally, one of the earliest members of the Center
for Security Policys board of advisors was Vice President Dick Cheney.264
The Center for Security Policy was the only group to take Was This
Saddams Bomb? seriously. On February 26, 2002, one day after Roberts article
appeared in The Sunday Times, the Center issued a press release that cited Leones
claims (it was almost as if the think-tank had had a heads-up). Roberts article was
compelling evidence of the Iraqi nuclear threat. The Center called on the newly
inaugurated President Bush to face the threat from Saddam.
At his press conference last Thursday, President Bush

reiterated a commitment he has made repeatedly in
recent months: Saddam Hussein will not be allowed to
have weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
[]
Unfortunately, there is now compelling evidence that
Saddam not only is developing WMD, but that he has
some. More worrisome still, it appears his arsenal
includes more than just chemical and biological arms.
Dreadful as these are, the Butcher of Baghdad may also
263
9/11 Commission. op. cit., pp. 335; 559.

Gaffney, Frank. Message from the President. Center for Security Policy. Washington DC. April
24, 2002.
http://web.archive.org/web/20020424050338/http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section
=static&page=message Accessed: November 7, 2007.
264
134
have acquired atomic and perhaps even thermonuclear
weapons, as well.
[]
The Times article, entitled Was this Saddams Bomb?
draws upon a wealth of circumstantial evidence and
debriefings of Iraqi defectors by investigative reporter
Gwynne Roberts. It features heretofore unpublished -and alarming -- revelations by a man going under the
alias of Leone who is described as a military
engineer who was a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission. Simultaneously... he worked for the
Republican Palace in Baghdad.
[]
These revelations oblige Mr. Bush to make good his
threat that there will be consequences. 265
The President had said Saddam would face consequences if Iraq was
discovered developing WMDs. The INC had planted a story that claimed Iraq was not
only developing WMDs, it had been successful. Citing the INCs propaganda, the
Center for Security Policy challenged the President to follow through on his promise
of consequences. What kind of consequences did the Center for Security Policy
have in mind? According to the Centers press release,
265
Truth and Consequences for Saddam. Center for Security Policy. Washington DC. February 26,
2001. http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/cfsp-01-d-16.htm Accessed: November 7, 2007.
135
Fortunately, many of his senior advisors (including
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy
Secretary of Defense-designate Paul Wolfowitz a
number of others said to be under consideration for top
posts [notably, Zalmay Khalilzad, Jeffrey Gedmin and
Douglas Feith]) have developed a blue-print for such
consequences.
Specifically, in a February 19, 1998 open letter to
President Clinton, they called for the United States,
among other things, to: recognize a provisional
government of Iraq based on the principles and
leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) that is
representative of all the peoples of Iraq; In short,
we must now help with the liberation of Iraq. 266
[Authors emphasis.]
The blue-print was Chalabis new and improved End Game plan. The
Center for Security Policy had quoted Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feiths 1998 open
letter to President Clinton. I dont think its much of a stretch to suggest that the
neocons and the INC were working together. Was This Saddams Bomb? seems a
cheap attempt to secure US backing for Chalabis End Game. As soon as the neocons
were back in power, the neocons and the INC were coordinating to manipulate public
opinion and influence US Iraq policy.
266
Ibid.
136
The Situation Circa March 2001
The Iraqi National Congress was a propaganda outfit allied with the Bush
administrations neocons. Both the neocons and the INC had grudges against the
Intelligence Community. Both had the same agenda. They wanted the US to remove
Saddam from power in Iraq and install democracy. While the neocons did not need
evidence to inform their policy decisions, they did need evidence to convince
everyone else that they were right. The INC was adept at manufacturing evidence to
influence the public. It was a match made in heaven.
Within a week of President Bush inauguration, the neocons and the INC were
working together. The INCs propaganda operation coached defectors with cooked up
stories of Iraqs nuclear program and cooked up forgeries to back them up. The
operation shopped the defectors around to gullible journalists at multiple newspapers.
Attempting to create a media echo chamber, the INC was trying to make the Iraqi
nuclear threat seem an established fact. The neocons Center for Security Policy cited
the INC-planted story to support their shared agenda: regime-change in Iraq. The
neocons and the INC were working together to manipulate public opinion. They were
working together to convince the public that the neocons were right. Saddam was a
nuclear threat.
However, the INCs early attempt to paint Saddam as a nuclear threat quickly
fizzled out. Was This Saddams Bomb? did not generate significant interest. The
INC and the neocons would have to try to influence US Iraq policy at a later date.
Saddam was not off their agenda. They would just have to wait until people were
137
more willing to believe wildly implausible tales. Unfortunately, they wouldnt have to
wait long.
See if Saddam Did This.
Within days of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration had developed the
meme to justify the Iraq War: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for
terrorists like al-Qaeda. One day, Saddam could decide to arm Bin Ladens network
with a chemical, biological or even nuclear weapon to attack the US. The only way to
keep America safe was to remove Saddam from power.
As Ive mentioned, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and the Bush

administrations neocons did not need evidence to know the meme was true. Evidence
was for the chumps, the rubes, the people who hadnt learned the lessons of 9/11.
Saddam was a tyrant and as such needed WMDs for his own survival. He was certain
to attack American interests any way he could, even if that meant arming an
ideological enemy like al-Qaeda. For the neocons, Iraqs WMDs and support for alQaeda should be assumed. The US could not wait for evidence of a threat before
removing Saddam from power.
However, the neocons did need evidence to be able to cite the meme publicly.
They could not state that Iraq had WMDs or supported al-Qaeda unless the
Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. The consensus had to agree that the
statements were supported by the available intelligence. If the Intelligence
138
Community could not find enough evidence, the neocons could not make the case for
war that they wanted to make.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Intelligence Community could not find enough
evidence that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. The day after the attacks, President Bush
ordered his counterterrorism chief, Richard Clarke, to look into the Iraq/al-Qaeda
connection. In his 2004 book, Against All Enemies, Clarke writes that
[The President] grabbed a few of us and closed the door

to the conference room. Look, he told us, I know
you have a lot to do and all... but I want you, as soon as
you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if
Saddam did this. See if hes linked in any way .. .
I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it
showed. But, Mr. President, al Qaeda did this.
I know, I know, but... see if Saddam was involved. Just
look. I want to know any shred ...
Absolutely, we will look ... again. I was trying to be
more respectful, more responsive. But, you know, we
have looked several times for state sponsorship of al
Qaeda and not found any real linkages to Iraq. Iran
plays a little, as does Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia,
Yemen.
139
Look into Iraq, Saddam, the President said testily and
left us. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty stared after him with her
mouth hanging open.
Paul Kurtz walked in, passing the President on the way
out. Seeing our expressions, he asked, Geez, what just
happened here?
Wolfowitz got to him, Lisa said, shaking her head.267
A few days later, Clarkes team authored a memo on the official position on
Iraqs relationship with al-Qaeda. All agencies and departments agreed, there was no
cooperation between the two.268 In fact, there was strong evidence against Iraqs
cooperation with al-Qaeda. Saddam and Bin Ladens mutual antipathy was well
known. The Intelligence Community saw al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime as natural
enemies, not potential allies. A fanatical Salafist Muslim, Bin Laden had founded alQaeda specifically to overthrow secular Arab nationalist governments like Saddam
Husseins regime.
As well as his counterterrorism chief, the President also ordered the

Intelligence Community to look into the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection. On September 21,
2001, the CIAs terrorism experts in the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and Middle
East experts in the Office for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Analysis
(NESAF) published a joint paper on Iraqs links to al-Qaeda.269 The highly classified
paper concluded that there was no evidence linking the Iraqi regime of Saddam
267
Clarke, Richard A. op cit., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 33.
269
268
140
Hussein to the 9/11 attacks and that there was scant credible evidence that Iraq had
any significant collaborative ties with Al Qaeda.270 In other words, there was no
evidence Iraq either had or would cooperate with al-Qaeda in an attack on the US.
The Intelligence Community could not find any evidence that Iraq had ever supported
al-Qaeda with money, weaponry, or training.271
It looks like the Bush administration did not receive the CTC/NESAF
assessment very well. A few days later, NESAF was drafting a new assessment, this
time with a much broader scope. Instead of looking at Iraqs support for al-Qaeda,
NESAFs new paper would assess Iraqs overall ties to terrorism.272 However, the
new assessment would fall short of the administrations expectations too. While Iraq
had supported several Palestinian nationalist terrorist groups in the past, there was no
evidence Iraq had trained, funded or equipped a terrorist group that would attack US
interests.273 The Intelligence Communitys consensus did not support the memes alQaeda component. Without the consensus, the neocons would not be able to say
unequivocally that Iraq would ally with al-Qaeda to attack the US. There wasnt any
evidence the Intelligence Community would let them cite to convince the public that
Iraq and al-Qaeda were allies.
270
Waas, Murray. Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel. National Journal.
November 25, 2005. http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/1122nj1.htm Accessed:
November 14, 2007.
271
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. op. cit, p. 456.
272
273
Ibid., pp. 317-318.
141
The Wurmser-Maloof Project
That the Intelligence Community could not find the evidence to support the meme
came as no surprise to the neocons. For the neocons, the Intelligence Community was
too biased, too incompetent and too cautious; its conclusions were too reliant on hard
facts. The neocons believed Intelligence Community analysts could not see through
Saddams deception. Saddam was hiding his support for al-Qaeda. The Intelligence
Community needed a lower standard of proof to detect it. On September 11, 2001,
just hours after the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a
massive intelligence collection effort against Iraq. Sweep it all up. Things related
and not, he ordered. Need to do so to get anything useful.274 If there was evidence
of Iraqs alliance with al-Qaeda, the neocons could not trust the Intelligence
Community to find it for them. They knew theyd have to find it themselves. They
would have to use a Team B.
Soon after 9/11, Rumsfeld authorized a Team B to set up in the Pentagon.275

While WINPACs Team B countered DOEs assessments of the Iraqi tubes, the
Pentagons Team B would counter the CIAs terrorism experts in CTC and NESAF.
The intelligence cell would challenge the conventional wisdom that no global
connections exist between terrorist groups.276 In other words, the Team B would
assume that terrorists like al-Qaeda were dependent on state sponsors like Iraq. The
Team B would interpret the intelligence to fit its preconceived conclusion.
274
Cambone, Stephen. op. cit.

Arkin, William M. Terrorism and Intelligence. The Los Angeles Times. February 8, 2004.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/arkin/message/66 Accessed: November 7, 2007.
276
Ibid.
275
142
The Team B was set up by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas
Feith. Feith, 48, was the number three man at the Pentagon and one of the most
zealous neocons in the Bush administration. An
advisor to the Center for Security Policy, Feith was a
fierce proponent of Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi
National Congress. After 9/11, Feiths office had
developed the meme for the War on Terror strategy
meeting at Camp David.277 Feith had a strong
reputation for being impervious to reality. General
Figure 14 Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy Douglas
Feith. The fucking stupidest
guy on the face of the earth.
Source:
Tommy Franks, the Commanding General of United

States Central Command, described Feith in Bob
Woodwards Plan of Attack as the fucking stupidest
guy on the face of the earth.278 Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to
Secretary of State Colin Powell, said of Feith, Seldom in my life have I met a
dumber man.279
The Feiths Team B was known

internally as the Wurmser-Maloof Project,
named for its two analysts, David Wurmser
and F. Michael Maloof.280 The analysts
were hand-picked by Douglas Feith. Maloof
and Feith had both been assistants to fellow
277
Figure 15 Team B analyst F. Michael

Maloof. Source: http://www.pbs.org/

Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. op. cit., p. 281.
279
Milbank, Dana. Colonel Finally Saw Whites of Their Eyes. The Washington Post. October 20,
2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/19/AR2005101902246.html
280
Arkin, William M. op. cit.
278
143
neoconservative Richard Perle in the 1980s.281 Before being detailed to the Team B,
Maloof was a Defense Department analyst in charge of tracking WMD proliferation.
He had made headlines in 1999 when he accused the Clinton administration of selling
critical military technology to China.282
Maloofs co-analyst was David Wurmser.

As Ive noted, Wurmser was the author of a book
on US Iraq Policy called Tyrannys Ally:
Americas Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein. The
books acknowledgments reveal that Wurmser was
close to Douglas Feith. Wurmser writes that
thanks are due to Doug Feith, whose inquiring
mind kept me thinking about my opinions, whose
Figure 16 Team B analyst

David Wurmser. Source:
http://www.aei.org/
example propels me to love books, and who always reminds me that peace and
principle go hand in hand.283 The acknowledgements also feature the INCs Ahmad
Chalabi, who Wurmser describes as his mentor who guided my understanding of
the Middle East. Chalabi continually inspire[s] and serve[s] by example to remind
me of the great contribution the Arab world offers when its people are accorded
intellectual freedom.284
281
Risen, James. How Pairs Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence. The New York
Times. April 28, 2004.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404E7DE1F3AF93BA15757C0A9629C8B63&sec=
282
Maloof, F. Michael. Testimony of F. Michael Maloof Chief, Technology Security Operations,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense. House Committee on Government
Reform. June 24, 1999. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1999_hr/990624maloof.htm Accessed: November 7, 2007.
283
Ibid., p. xxii.
284
Ibid., p. xxi.
144
In Tyrannys Ally, Wurmser excoriates the Clinton administration for failing
to remove Saddam Hussein from power. As Ive mentioned, Wurmser asserts that
Saddam will never voluntarily give up his WMDs because he needs them to protect
himself from his own people.285 Furthermore, Wurmser contends that Saddam, like all
tyrants, sees America as his number one threat because it represents the cause of
freedom. External aggression towards Western democracies is a product of the nature
of tyranny.286 Saddam, he argues, will ally with anyone he can, even religious
extremists, if it means he can strike US interests.287 For Wurmser, Saddams
aggression was a product of the nature of tyranny. Evidence of the Iraqi threat was
irrelevant.
The Wurmser-Maloof Project seems to have set up shop in the Pentagon by

mid-September 2001.288 With unrestricted access to the Intelligence Communitys
database of classified reporting,289 the Team B cell would analyse intelligence the
way the neocons wanted intelligence analysed. Wurmser and Maloof would interpret
the data to fit what the neocons already believed to be true: that Iraq would ally with
anyone it could, even al-Qaeda, to attack the US. The Wurmser-Maloof Project would
analyse intelligence in light of the nature of tyranny.
285
Wurmser, David. op. cit., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 61.
287
Ibid., p. 70.
288
Hosenball, Mark and Michael Isikoff. Secret Proposals: Fighting Terror by Attacking South
America? Newsweek. August 9, 2004.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2004/0809attackingsa.htm Accessed: November 7,
2007. See also, 9/11 Commission. op. cit., pp. 559-560.
289
Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker. Pentagon Sets Up Intelligence Unit. The New York Times.
October 24, 2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9806E1D7123CF937A15753C1A9649C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: November 7, 2007.
286
145
Salman Pak
Just like WINPACs Team B cell, the Wurmser-Maloof Project analysed intelligence
to fit a preconceived conclusion. The Project cherry-picked that evidence that
suggested Iraqs support for al-Qaeda and dismissed as deception everything that
didnt. In the absence of evidence, the Team B filled in the gaps. The absence of
evidence was proof that Saddam was hiding his alliance with Bin Ladens terror
network. Using Team B analysis, the Wurmser-Maloof Project would find evidence
that suggested superficially that Iraq and al-Qaeda were allies, no matter how
ambiguous, fragmentary and dubious the evidence actually was.
WINPACs Team B had the tubes. The Wurmser-Maloof Project had Salman
Pak. Located about 35km south of Baghdad, Salman Pak was a counterterrorism
training facility run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Mukhabarat. According to
former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter, Salman Pak trained units to combat
Islamic terrorism from Iraqi-Kurdistan.
Salman Pak was a camp dedicated to train Iraq to deal

with Islamic fundamentalist terrorists Their number
one target was the Islamic Kurdish party, which later
grew into [al-Qaeda allied terrorist group] Al Ansar
Iraq, as part of their ongoing war against Islamic
146
fundamentalism, created a unit specifically designed to
destroy these people.290
In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group agreed with Ritter. The ISG found that the
Mukhabarat trained Iraqis in counterterrorism operations at its facilities at Salman
Pak.291 In 2004, the Defense Intelligence Agency told the US Senate that it had no
credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support transnational
terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991. DIA said it has no information from
Salman Pak that links al-Qaida with the former regime.292 Salman Pak was not an
al-Qaeda training camp. The facility was where Iraq trained its forces to destroy alQaeda and other Islamist groups.
The Wurmser-Maloof Project didnt see Salman Pak that way, however.
WINPACs Team B assumed deception to explain away that the tubes specifications
were an exact match for Iraqi rockets. Analysing Salman Pak, the Pentagons Team B
assumed Iraqs deception as well. Counterterrorism was Salman Paks cover story,
they decided. In the absence of evidence, the Wurmser-Maloof Project also filled in
the gaps to fit its preconceived conclusion. No one knew precisely who was training
at Salman Pak or what they were being trained to do. In the absence of evidence, the
Team B assumed Iraq was hiding that Salman Pak was an al-Qaeda training camp.
290
Ritter, Scott. Interview in William Rivers Pitt, War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesnt Want You to
Know. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002. http://www.gaiaguys.net/WARONIRAQ.htm Accessed
October 18, 2007.
291
292
United States. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Postwar Findings about Iraqs WMD
Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. S. Rpt. 109-331.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office. September 8, 2006. pp. 83-84.
http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf Accessed: September 10, 2006.
147
WINPACs Team B cherrypicked the evidence that supported
its assumption that the tubes were
intended for centrifuge rotors. In the
same way, the Wurmser-Maloof
Project cherry-picked details that
suggested that Salman Pak trained
al-Qaeda. Satellite imagery of the
training camp revealed the fuselage
of a passenger plane. Although the
Figure 17 Satellite Image of Salman Pak Terror

Training Facility. Source: http://powerlineblog.com/
Iraqis would insist the fuselage was for anti-hijack training, the Team B saw the
opposite: a training site for hijackers. In addition to the fuselage, Salman Pak had also
been part of Iraqs pre-Gulf War biological weapons program. F. Michael Maloof put
two and two together. He told the PBS series Frontline that
The fact that [the airplane fuselage] was right next to

this R&D facility for chemical/biological weapons
raised all kinds of concerns to me that they were getting
some kind of potential training in chemical/biological
weapons.293
For the neocons, Salman Pak seemed powerful evidence for the meme. Just as
the tubes were evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution, Salman Pak seemed evidence
that Iraq was training al-Qaeda to use WMDs to attack the US. The neocons wanted to
293
Maloof, F. Michael. Interview. The Dark Side. Frontline. PBS Television Network. January 10,
2006. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/interviews/maloof.html Accessed: October
17, 2007.
148
say the memes al-Qaeda component unequivocally. They wanted to cite the Team B
analysis of Salman Pak to make the case for war.
However, the Wurmser-Maloof Project could cherry-pick as much dubious

intelligence as it liked. The neocons would not be able to cite it publicly unless the
Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. The Intelligence Communitys
consensus did not agree with the memes al-Qaeda component. The CIAs terrorism
experts at Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and Middle East experts at the Office for
Near Eastern, South Asian and African Analysis (NESAF) could not find enough
evidence that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. On September 16, 2001, right around the time
Feith was putting the Wurmser-Maloof Project together, Vice President Dick Cheney
appeared on NBCs Meet the Press with Tim Russert. When asked, the Vice President
could only say the consensus judgment. Saddam had supported Palestinian nationalist
groups in the past.294 Cheney could not link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks.
MR. RUSSERT: Do we have evidence that [Saddams]

harboring terrorists?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: There is--in the past, there
have been some activities related to terrorism by
Saddam Hussein. But at this stage, you know, the focus
is over here on al-Qaida and the most recent events in
New York. Saddam Husseins bottled up, at this point,
but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy
where the Iraqis are concerned.
294
149
MR. RUSSERT: Do we have any evidence linking
Saddam Hussein or Iraqis to this operation?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: No.295
Before the neocons could make the case that they wanted to make, the
Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought in line with the
Wurmser-Maloof Project. The Intelligence Community would need evidence that Iraq
had trained al-Qaeda and had cooperated with the terrorist network in attacks on the
United States. For that, the neocons would have to turn to their old propagandist
allies, the Iraqi National Congress.
The Operation Begins
Since 1995s End Game fiasco, the Intelligence Community wanted nothing to do
with Ahmad Chalabis Iraqi National Congress ever again.296 If the INC was going to
help the neocons bring the consensus in line with the Wurmser-Maloof Project, the
opposition group would have to contact the Intelligence Community through a proxy,
someone the Intelligence Community would trust. In late-September 2001, the INC
did just that. Former CIA director R. James Woolsey contacted the Defense
Intelligence Agency on behalf of the Iraqi National Congress.297 It was the start of the
INCs Salman Pak operation.
295
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network. September
296
297
Ibid., p. 66.
150
As a former Director of Central Intelligence, Woolsey, 60, knew exactly how
the Intelligence Community worked and how it processed information. He had been
in charge of the Intelligence Community in the mid-1990s (during Chalabis End
Game fiasco in fact). An extraordinarily well-connected neoconservative, Woolsey
was a member of the Project for the New American Century and honorary cochairman of the Center for Security Policys advisory council.298 In 1998, he served
on the Rumsfeld Commission, Donald Rumsfelds Team B
panel that had analysed (and exaggerated) the ballistic
missile threat to the United States.299 Woolsey is also noted
in David Wurmsers acknowledgments in Tyrannys Ally.
Wurmser writes that James Woolsey, former director of
the CIA, took time from his busy schedule to read the
manuscript and give me invaluable advice. By studying his
policies as director of the CIA and by listening to that
advice, I was greatly assisted in keeping this book pointed
Figure 18 Former
DCI R. James
Woolsey. Source:
http://newsservice.stanford.edu/
in the right direction.300
Woolsey was close to the neocons and was even closer to the INC. Since the
late-1990s, the former DCI had been working pro-bono as a representative of the Iraqi
National Congress.301 He was even one of the first to point the finger at Iraq after
September 11. His September 13 op-ed, The Iraq Connection, touted a conspiracy
298
CSP. Letter to President Clinton on Iraq. op. cit.; CSP. National Security Advisory Council. op.
cit.
299
Rumsfeld Commission. op. cit.
300
Wurmser, David. op. cit., p. xxii.
301
Weiner, Tim. Ex-CIA Chief Offers Aid to Iraqis Seeking Ouster. The New York Times. March
21, 1998.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E0D71738F932A15750C0A96E958260&n=Top/
Reference/Times%20Topics/People/W/Woolsey,%20R.%20James Accessed: November 8, 2007.
151
theory that Saddam had been behind the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.302
On September 27, 2001, Woolsey telephoned the director of the DIA to arrange a
meeting with Chalabis group.303 The INC had uncovered potentially crucial
information connecting Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, he said. An INC defector, a former
Iraqi officer, claimed to know about a secret terrorist training camp inside Iraq. The
camp was called Salman Pak.
Abu Zeinab
The day after Woolseys referral, DIA officers met with Ahmad Chalabi and another
INC employee, Haidar al-Bandar, in Washington DC.304 Bandar told the officers that
the INC was hiding a defector in Ankara, Turkey. The defector, a former lieutenantcolonel in the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, had described to Bandar
over the phone what hed seen at the Salman Pak facility. Bandar and Chalabi thought
his description sounded an awful lot like a terrorist training camp. The INC officials
offered to arrange a meeting with the defector, Abu Zeinab.305
The DIA apparently agreed to the meeting. On October 10, 2001, US officials
began debriefing Abu Zeinab in Turkey. According to the US Senate, the defector
described a special 520-member unit of the Fedayeen Saddam that he called the alQaraia Force.306 The al-Qaraia Force received specialized training in explosives,
sabotage, underwater demolition and airborne operations, i.e. hijacking civil
302
Woolsey, R. James. The Iraq Connection. The New Republic Online. September 13, 2001.
http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/iraq.htm Accessed: November 8, 2007.
303
304
Ibid., p. 66.
305
Ibid., p. 66.
306
Ibid., p. 70.
152
aircraft.307 Abu Zeinab told his debriefers that at Salman Pak, he had seen Iraqi
intelligence officers training non-Iraqi Arabs how to hijack aircraft in the facilitys
abandoned fuselage.308 From their dialect and appearance, the non-Iraqis were either
Egyptians or Gulf Arabs or a mixture of the two, Abu Zeinab said. The defector said
specifically that he did not know if they were al-Qaeda or not.309
Abu Zeinabs denials notwithstanding, his description of hijack training

clearly implied that Iraq had trained al-Qaedas hijackers for the September 11
attacks. The 9/11 hijackers had also been a mixture of Egyptians and Gulf Arabs
(United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia).310 Abu Zeinab was providing the
Intelligence Community with evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda had cooperated in an
attack on the US. He was strengthening the Team B analysis of Salman Pak.
In addition to September 11, it

seems Abu Zeinab attempted to
implicate Iraq in another al-Qaeda
attack: the 2000 bombing of the USS
Cole. The defector claimed that at a
second camp near Lake Tharthar,
approximately 120km north of
Baghdad, he had witnessed
307
Figure 19 The damage to the USS Cole,

October 12, 2000. Source:
Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., p. 70.
309
Ibid., p. 80.
310
United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Press Release: The FBI releases 19 photographs of
individuals believed to be the hijackers of the four airliners that crashed on September 11, 01.
September 27, 2001. http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/092701hjpic.htm Accessed: November 8,
2007.
308
153
underwater demolition training. According to the US Senate, Abu Zeinab said that
he had seen frogmen training to blow up mock-ups of US Navy vessels.311 Abu
Zeinab told his debriefers that after completing the training, the top 30 members of
the al-Qaraia Force had been given UAE passports. They were set to be deployed to
the UAE in October 2000 under the supervision of Iraqi intelligence. 312
Abu Zeinabs description clearly recalled al-Qaedas attack on the USS Cole.
On October 12, 2000, suicide bombers crashed an explosives-laden motorboat into the
US Navy vessels hull. The al-Qaeda frogmen killed seventeen sailors and wounded
at least 40.313 Like his description of hijack training, Abu Zeinabs description of
underwater demolition training seemed evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda had
cooperated in an attack on the US the USS Cole bombing. Through Abu Zeinab, the
INC was trying to influence the Intelligence Communitys consensus on Iraqs
support for al-Qaeda. The opposition group was trying to bring the consensus in line
with the Wurmser-Maloof Project.
Same Dog, Old Tricks
While Abu Zeinab was being debriefed by the DIA, it appears the defector was also
talking to another foreign intelligence service.314 I dont know which countrys
service it was, but Im pretty sure that Abu Zeinab was in Ankara at the time, so it
may have been Turkeys Mill stihbarat Tekilt (or National Intelligence
Agency). In October 2001, the foreign service shared Abu Zeinabs reporting with
311

Ibid., p. 70.
313
9/11 Commission. op. cit., p. 190.
314
312
154
the CIA and, as is standard practice between intelligence services, it did not name its
source. The reports identified Abu Zeinab only as a Fedayeen Saddam officer who
left Iraq in late-2000.315 The CIA wouldnt learn that the foreign services source
and the DIAs source were the same defector for another two months.316
The INC seems to have been shopping Abu Zeinab around to different
intelligence services and generating multiple reports. It was the exact same trick the
opposition group had used for its Was This Saddams Bomb? operation. In early2001, the INC had shopped the shadowy Leone to The Telegraph and, one month
later, to The Sunday Times. The multiple reports had been an attempted echo
chamber, a way to make the defectors claims seem an accepted fact. Now, the INC
was doing the exact same thing with intelligence services instead of newspapers.
In addition to the foreign service, the INC reported Abu Zeinabs information
through the State Department.317 The DIA also disseminated reports based on its
September 28 meeting with the Chalabi and Bandar, but did not mention the
information had come from INC members or that their source was Abu Zeinab.318
With the sourcing unclear, each new report seemed like independent confirmation of
the defectors story. The INC was trying to create an intelligence echo chamber. The
propaganda outfit was trying to trick the Intelligence Community into thinking that
the Salman Pak story was more reliable than it really was.
315
Ibid., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72.
317
Ibid., p. 68.
318
Ibid., p. 67.
316
155
Not that it worked, however. Nobody in the Intelligence Community seems to
have believed Abu Zeinab. The DIA did disseminate his reports, but that only means
that the defectors information was put into the Intelligence Communitys classified
database. No one, not even the DIA, cited Abu Zeinab in a finished intelligence
assessment. Analysts did not think the defector was very credible. In fact, it seems
Abu Zeinabs debriefers were suspicious that hed been coached by the Iraqi
National Congress.319
The CIAs terrorism experts at CTC and Middle East experts at NESAF had
concluded that Iraq and al-Qaeda were highly unlikely to cooperate in a terrorist
attack on the US. Without a finished intelligence assessment to challenge CTC and
NESAF, the Intelligence Communitys consensus stayed the same. There was not
enough evidence to conclude that Iraq had ever provided al-Qaeda with any
equipment, funding or training. Without the consensus, the neocons would not be able
to say unequivocally that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. They would not be able to cite the
Team B analysis of Salman Pak in the case for war.
Khodada
The INC wasnt about to give up. Abu Zeinab didnt ask the Americans to believe his
Salman Pak story on his word alone. During his interview, he explained that a friend
of his, a second defector, could confirm his story.320 According to Abu Zeinab, his
friend was a former Iraqi army captain who had also witnessed non-Iraqi Arabs
training to hijack aircraft at Salman Pak. The captain had fled Iraq in the late-1990s
319
320
Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., p. 81.
156
and was now living in Fort Worth, Texas. His name was Sabah Khalifa Khodada
Alami. Check with Khodada, Abu Zeinab said. Hell tell you that what Im saying is
true. Abu Zeinab gave his debriefers Khodadas name, address and telephone
number.321
In late-October 2001, the FBI and CIA got around to interviewing Khodada in
Fort Worth.322 The former army captain did indeed seem to confirm Abu Zeinabs
story. Khodada told his debriefers that he had seen Iraqi intelligence officers training
Islamic militants to hijack aircraft. A typical hijacking scenario involved a five-man
team, two to control the crew and three to control the passengers, he said.323
Hijackers were trained to take control of the cockpit using makeshift weapons like
knives, sticks or toy guns.324 Just like Abu Zeinab, Khodada said specifically that he
did not know if the militants at Salman Pak were al-Qaeda or not.325 Clearly,
however, the defector had described tactics that al-Qaeda had used in its attacks. The
September 11 hijackers were organized in five-man teams and armed with makeshift
weapons, box-cutters.326 It seems obvious that the INC was trying to use Khodada to
establish Iraqs support for al-Qaeda. Like Abu Zeinab, Khodada was another echo in
the INCs echo chamber.
Once again, the INC was using the same trick it had used in its Was This
Saddams Bomb? operation. In early-2001, the opposition group had coached two
defectors with the same ridiculous story about a secret Iraqi nuclear test. The Sunday
321
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 82.
323
Ibid., p. 83.
324
Ibid., p. 82.
325
Ibid., p. 80.
326
322
157
Times Gwynne Roberts interviewed Leone in Iraqi-Kurdistan and Dr. Imad in
Denmark. When the defectors seemed to confirm each other, Roberts was convinced
that Iraq had been a nuclear power for more than a decade. Now, the INC was trying
to pull the same stunt with the FBI and CIA.
Filling in the Gaps for the Intelligence Community
The INC was trying to bring the Intelligence Communitys Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus
in line with the Wurmser-Maloof Project. The Team B interpreted intelligence to fit
its preconceived conclusion that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. Analysing the Salman Pak
facility, the Project cherry-picked evidence that supported the conclusion. The facility
had an airplane fuselage on site and was associated with Iraqs pre-1991 bio-warfare
program. Evidence that contradicted the conclusion was assumed to be deception.
Counterterrorism was Iraqs cover story for the camp. In the absence of evidence,
the Team B filled in the gaps to fit its preconceived conclusion. No one knew
precisely who was training at Salman Pak or what they were being trained to do. The
absence of evidence became evidence Iraq was hiding that Salman Pak was an alQaeda camp. The Wurmser-Maloof Project did not need eyewitness accounts of
Islamic militants training to hijack aircraft, just as WINPACs Team B did not need
evidence that the tubes would make poor rocket motor bodies or that Iraq intended to
modify the tubes for use as centrifuge rotors. Through Abu Zeinab and Khodada, the
INC was trying to fill in the gaps for the Intelligence Community. The INC had
manufactured explicit evidence of the Wurmser-Maloof Projects assumptions to
bring the consensus in line with the Team B analysis.
158
Abu Zeinab and Khodada undermined the CIAs CTC and NESAF just like
the NGIC text-box and the Modification Intelligence undermined DOE. The terrorism
experts at CTC and the Middle East experts and NESAF could not find enough
evidence to conclude that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. There was no evidence of any
funding or training, nor was there any evidence of Iraqi cooperation in an al-Qaeda
attack on the US. Through Abu Zeinab and Khodada, the INC was trying to give the
CIA an excuse to change its assessment (which would flip the consensus) or the DIA
an excuse to author a brand new assessment (which would deadlock the consensus).
The INC was trying to bring the Intelligence Communitys consensus on Iraq and alQaeda in line with the Wurmser-Maloof Project.
However, the INCs coached defectors failed. No one in the Intelligence

Community believed Abu Zeinab or Khodada. The DIA did not publish an assessment
that challenged CTC and NESAFs conclusions. In fact, in November 2001, the CIA
published an assessment, Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training
Facility, which described the INC defectors claims as exaggerated and cautioned
that their reliability was questionable.327 The Intelligence Community did not
believe Abu Zeinab or Khodada. The Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus stayed the same.
Without the consensus, the neocons could not say unequivocally the memes
al-Qaeda component. They could not say that Iraq would use al-Qaeda to attack the
US or cite the Wurmser-Maloof Projects analysis of Salman Pak publicly. So far, the
INCs operation had failed to get the Intelligence Community to clear the case for war
that the neocons wanted to make.
327
SSCI. Phase II: INC. op. cit., pp. 39; 71.
159
Instead, the INC would have to get the press to make it for them. If the
neocons werent going to be able to cite Team B propaganda publicly, the INC would
make sure everyone heard about it anyway.
Salman Pak Media Month: The New York Times
In November 2001, the INC turned the full force of its propaganda apparatus on the
press. It was Salman Pak media month.
On November 8, the Salman Pak story broke on the front page of The New
York Times. The School: Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism, by reporter
Chris Hedges, was based on interviews organised with the help of the Iraqi National
Congress.328 The storys principal source was an unnamed defector Hedges described
as a former Mukhabarat lieutenant-general who had spent three days in Ankara
being debriefed by US officials.329 The defector claimed that he had worked for
several years at a secret Iraqi government camp that had trained Islamic terrorists.
Although he said specifically that he did not know if the militants were al-Qaeda or
not, he insisted that Islamic radicals from across the Middle East were training at
the camp as recently as last year. The camps name was Salman Pak.330 The
defector was almost certainly Abu Zeinab.
328
Hedges, Chris. Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism. The New York Times. November 8,
2001.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED81E39F93BA35752C1A9679C8B63&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: October 20, 2007.
329
Ibid.
330
Ibid.
160
There is a lot we do not know, the former general,
who spoke on condition that his name not be printed,
admitted. But over the years you see and hear
things. These Islamic radicals were a scruffy lot. They
needed a lot of training, especially physical training.
But from speaking with them it was clear they came
from a variety of countries, including Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. We were training
these people to attack installations important to the
United States. The gulf war never ended for Saddam
Hussein. He is at war with the United States. We were
repeatedly told this.331
In Hedges article, the defector described groups of five or six Islamic

militants training around the fuselage of a Boeing 707. We could see them practice
taking over the plane.332 The defectors reports also meshed with statements from
a second defector: Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, a captain in the Iraqi Army who
emigrated to Texas in May after working as an instructor for eight years at Salman
Pak.333 The INC had planted Abu Zeinab and Khodada in The New York Times.
331
Ibid.
Ibid.
333
Ibid.
332
161
Salman Pak Media Month: Gunning For Saddam
The INC also shopped Abu Zeinab and Khodada to the PBS documentary series,
Frontline. On November 8, 2001, the same day Salman Pak made headlines in The
New York Times, Frontline broadcast Gunning for Saddam.334 The documentary
featured dramatic interviews with both of the INCs Salman Pak defectors.
In Gunning for Saddam, Khodada

described how the Iraqi intelligence trained nonIraqi Arabs to hijack a Boeing 707 in situations
where security will not allow you to get weapons
into the plane. If guns or knives could not be
smuggled aboard, the non-Iraqis were trained to
seize control of an aircraft by improvising weapons
Figure 20 Sabah Khodada

on the PBS series Frontline,
November 8, 2001. Source:
http://www.pbs.org/
and terrorizing passengers and crew, he said.
They are even trained how to use utensils for food, like
forks and knives provided in the plane, said Khodada
through an interpreter. They are trained how to plant
horror within the passengers by doing such actions.
Even pens and pencils can be used for that purpose they
were trained. They can do it, and they can overcome
any plane because they are very well physically trained,
334
Gunning For Saddam. Frontline. PBS Television Network. November 8, 2001.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/ Accessed: October 20, 2007.
162
and they are very strong, and they can do it. They can
overtake a plane in a very efficient manner.335
The interviewer asked Khodada how his

sensational story could be checked. The former
Iraqi army captain replied confidently, Go back to
my friend who is in Turkey, who could also tell
Figure 21 LieutenantGeneral Abu Zeinab on the
PBS series Frontline, November
8, 2001. Source:
http://www.pbs.org/
you the same thing that Im telling you now.336

Khodadas friend was, of course, Abu Zeinab.
Abu Zeinab was not in Turkey anymore, however. According to PBS, Abu
Zeinabs Frontline interview was taped in Beirut, Lebanon. During the broadcast, the
Mukhabarat lieutenant-general appeared with his face obscured to protect his
identity. The defector confirmed Khodadas account of Islamic militants training at
Salman Pak. For sure they were Islamic militants because they were all very strict in
their daily prayers, he told the interviewer. They looked quite scruffy.337
Frontlines Gunning for Saddam was

virtually an INC production from start to finish.
In addition to the two Salman Pak defectors, the
documentary also featured R. James Woolsey, the
former CIA director and current INC hack, and
Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagons
335
Ibid.
Ibid.
337
Ibid.
336
Figure 22 Richard Perle on

the PBS series Frontline,
November 8, 2001. Source:
http://www.pbs.org/
163
Defense Policy Advisory Board.338 Perle, 60, was one of the most influential
neoconservatives in Washington. As an official in the Reagan administration, Perle
mentored future Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith and future Team
B analyst, F. Michael Maloof.339 In 1999, Perle wrote the forward to David
Wurmsers book Tyrannys Ally. Wurmser gushes about Perle in his
acknowledgements: Perles mind is tough, but his heart is not. That is the chief
reason why he attracts such a fiercely loyal group of followers.340
On Frontline, Perle and Woolsey cited the Salman Pak story as one of the
reasons to take the War on Terror to Iraq. The question of Saddam Hussein is at the
very core of the war against terrorism, said Perle during the interview. There can be
no victory in the war against terrorism if, at the end of it, Saddam Hussein is still in
power not only because he supports terrorism, not only because he trains terrorists
and gives them refuge but because he is the symbol of defiance of all Western
values.341
Throughout the documentary, the neocons urged the US government to

support the INC. When Perle was asked how he would have conducted the War on
Terror, he replied, I would have gone after Iraq immediately. I would not have
relegated it to some subsequent phase Phase two should be overwhelming support
for the Iraqi opposition. Theyre eager, theyre ready to go. I believe they can do
it.342
338
Ibid.
Risen, James. op. cit.
340
Wurmser, David. op. cit., p. xxi.
341
Frontline. Gunning for Saddam. op. cit.
342
Ibid.
339
164
The situation was nearly identical to the INCs Was This Saddams Bomb?
operation in early-2001. After the INC planted stories of Iraqs secret nuclear test in
the press, the Center for Security Policy cited the INC-planted story to secure US
backing for Chalabi and the INC. Its no surprise that both R. James Woolsey and
Richard Perle are also members of the Centers advisory council.343 They were doing
the exact same thing in late-2001 that they did in early-2001. The neocons and the
INC were working together to manipulate publics perception of the Iraqi threat.
Salman Pak Media Month: Vanity Fair
Salman Pak Media Month continued in the magazine, Vanity Fair. In late-November
2001, the INC arranged for Vanity Fairs David Rose to interview Abu Zeinab.
Published in January 2002, Inside Saddams Terror Regime cited Abu Zeinab alQurairy, a former brigadier-general in the Mukhabarat.344 Rose assured his readers
that Abu Zeinab was who he said he was. Nabeel Musawi, the head of INCs
intelligence program, had de-briefed [the defector] thoroughly, checking every
aspect of his story with sources inside Iraq and with other defectors, Rose wrote.
There was no doubt he was what he claimed. Before we met him, he had spent three
days in Ankara, Turkey, with agents from the FBI and CIA.345 It was too bad the
INC didnt tell Rose that the CIA and FBI believed Abu Zeinab to be a liar.
The Vanity Fair article, Inside Saddams Terror Regime, was a harrowing
account of the Abu Zeinabs career in the Iraqi intelligence service. The defector told
343
CSP. National Security Advisory Council. op. cit.

Rose, David. Inside Saddams Terror Regime. Vanity Fair. January 21, 2002.
http://web.archive.org/web/20020203080103/http://www.iraq.net/erica/news-e/archives/00000101.htm
345
Ibid.
344
165
Rose about atrocities in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and the brutal suppression of the Iraqi
Shia. As well, Abu Zeinab repeated his story about hijack training at Salman Pak,
although now he hadnt just witnessed the training, he claimed hed conducted the
training himself. Specifically, he told Rose that hed taught militants how to gain
control of the cockpit and passengers without using firearms.346
Roses article made Abu Zeinabs claims about the al-Qaraia Force public
for the first time. Previously, the defector had only told his US debriefers about the
secret unit and its underwater demolition training. Now the story was in Vanity
Fair.
Uday had ordered his closest aide and confidant, Abu

Zeinab al-Qurairy a brigadier general in Iraqs feared
intelligence service, the Mukhabarat to put together a
team of 30 specially trained fighters. In al-Qurairys
seasoned judgment, the men were the finest members of
the secret unit he administered-the 1,200-strong
commando force known as al-Qarea, the Strikers,
Iraqs elite of elites, trained to a level far beyond
ordinary special forces in sabotage, urban warfare,
hijacking, and murder.
Al-Qurairy had given the 30 men new identities,
complete with genuine United Arab Emirates passports
supplied by a corrupt U.A.E. minister in the pay of the
346
Ibid.
166
Mukhabarat: a means of travelling anywhere, without
creating the least suspicion they had originally come
from Iraq. He had overseen their final training projectan exercise, using limpet mines and diving gear, to blow
up a specially constructed mock-up of a U.S. Navy Fifth
Fleet destroyer, moored in central Iraqs Habbaniya
Lake. Like all al-Qarea exercises, it had been
conducted using real explosives and live ammunition.347
There were a few minor differences between the story Abu Zeinab told his US
debriefers and the story he told David Rose. The US Senate and Vanity Fair spell the
units name differently (al-Qaraia vs. al-Qarea).348 And it looks like Abu Zeinab
changed the location (Lake Tharthar vs. Lake Habbaniya).349 But other than that,
details such as the 30 men, the UAE passports and the mock up of the US Navy
vessel were identical.350 The INC knew the Intelligence Community wouldnt let the
neocons claim publicly that Iraq was behind the bombing of the USS Cole. Through
David Rose and Vanity Fair, the INC was bypassing the Intelligence Community and
attempting to get the American public to make the connection themselves.
Into the Echo Chamber
The propaganda on Frontline and in The New York Times and Vanity Fair
reverberated throughout the media echo chamber. The Salman Pak allegations were
347
Ibid.
349
Ibid., p. 67.
350
Ibid., p. 70.
348
167
reported and re-reported on the 24-hour news networks, evening news bulletins, daily
papers, weekly papers and news media from Birmingham351 to Madrid352 to Taipei.353
Every new report seemed to corroborate the last. Soon, the INCs unsubstantiated
allegations began to look like accepted facts. Even though the Intelligence
Community wouldnt clear the neocons to cite the Salman Pak story publicly, the
INCs echo chamber made sure everyone heard it anyway.
By early-December 2001, the Intelligence Communitys Iraq/al-Qaeda

consensus still hadnt changed. CTC, NESAF and DIA had not found either Abu
Zeinab or Khodada credible enough to cite in an intelligence assessment. On
December 9, 2001, Cheney made follow up appearance on Meet the Press. In his
September appearance, the Vice President hadnt been able to say there was any
evidence linking Iraq to 9/11. Although he still couldnt cite the Team B analysis, the
Vice President would at least be asked about Salman Pak.
RUSSERT: Let me turn to Iraq. When you were last on

this program, September 16, five days after the attack
on our country, I asked you whether there was any
evidence that Iraq was involved in the attack and you
said no.
351
War on Terror: Saddam is involved in US attacks. The Birmingham Post. November 13, 2001.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-80001710.html Accessed: November 14, 2007.
352
Fresneda, Carlos. EEUU se volcar sobre Irak tras Afganistn. El Mundo (Madrid). November 9,
2001. http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2001/11/09/mundo/1069873_imp.html Accessed: November 14,
2007.
353
Iraqi defectors say that Saddam trained terrorists for attacks against US and EU. Taipei Times.
November 10, 2001. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/against/archives/2001/11/10/110923 Accessed:
November 14, 2007.
168
Since that time, a couple of articles have appeared
which I want to get you to react to. The first: The Czech
interior minister said today that an Iraqi intelligence
officer met with Mohammed Atta, one of the
ringleaders of the September 11 terrorists attacks on the
United States, just five months before the synchronized
hijackings and mass killings were carried out.
And this from James Woolsey, former CIA director:
We know that at Salman Pak, in the southern edge
of Baghdad, five different eye witnesses--three Iraqi
defectors and two American U.N. inspectors--have
said, and now there are aerial photographs to show
it, a Boeing 707 that was used for training of
hijackers, including non-Iraqi hijackers, trained
very secretly to take over airplanes with knives.
And we have photographs. As you can see that little
white speck, and there it is.
RUSSERT: The plane on the ground in Iraq used to
train non-Iraqi hijackers.
Do you still believe there is no evidence that Iraq was
involved in September 11? [Authors emphasis.] 354
354
Cheney, Richard. Meet the Press. December 9, 2001. op. cit.
169
The Vice President did not confirm the Salman Pak story, but he certainly
didnt try to distance himself from it either. He didnt say, Well, Tim, our
intelligence officials have interviewed several of those supposed eyewitness sources
and we think theyre probably lying. He didnt say that. He was perfectly happy with
people believing that the Salman Pak defectors were telling the truth. Although
Cheney did not refer directly to the Salman Pak story in his answer, he did leave open
the question of Saddams involvement in September 11. He said that the report of
9/11 hijacker Mohammed Attas meeting with an Iraqi intelligence officer was pretty
well confirmed. The Vice President also promised that the connection between Iraq
and al-Qaeda was an avenue that we want to pursue.
Haideri
The INC had not given up on trying to corroborate Abu Zeinab and Khodada. In lateNovember 2001, David Rose interviewed Abu Zeinab in Beirut, Lebanon for Vanity
Fair. Rose wrote about how the INCs intelligence chief, Nabeel Musawi, had to leave
Beirut abruptly. It was another assignment, Rose explained, a meeting in Bangkok
with a new Iraqi defector.
This man, a building contractor, claimed to have been

working to construct new facilities that Saddam would
use to restore his biological- and chemical-weapons
arsenals and to develop a nuclear bomb. Before their
departure, the two activists showed us contracts the
defector had sent them. The documents suggested he
170
had been building radiation-proof underground
laboratories.355
The new defector was Adnan Saeed Ihsan al-Haideri, a successful civil
engineer who had fled Iraq around mid-2001. In 2003, the CIA would conclude
Haideri was one of several defectors the INC had coached to provide misleading
intelligence about Iraq.356 If Rose is right about the timing, Haideri would have met
with the INCs Musawi in Bangkok in early-December. About a week later, former
Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey, acting on the Chalabis behalf,
referred the defector to the Intelligence Community.
So, around the time Cheney was implying the memes al-Qaeda component on
Meet the Press, R. James Woolsey arranged for the Defense Intelligence Agency to
interview Haideri.357 DIA and CIA officers debriefed the civil engineer in Thailand
around mid-December 2001.358
Most of what Haideri told his debriefers dealt with Iraqs WMD capabilities.
As Rose suggested in Vanity Fair, the defector claimed that hed worked on Iraqi
facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. (Ill discuss Haideris
reporting in more detail in the next chapter.) But as well as WMD intelligence,
Haideri also provided information about Islamic militants training at Salman Pak.
355
Rose, David. Inside Saddams Terror Regime. op cit.

Bamford, James. The Man Who Sold The War. Rolling Stone. November 17, 2005.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war Accessed: October
20, 2007.
357
358
Bamford, James. op. cit.
356
171
Haideri told his debriefers that Salman Pak was rumored to provide al-Qaida
terrorist teams with training.359 The report said the site trained Afghan, Pakistani,
and Palestinian nationals. Later, the DIA issued a second report that elaborated on
how the defector obtained the information for the first report. Apparently, Haideri
knew about foreigners training at Salman Pak from an incident that happened while
he was travelling on the highway on his way home from work. The report also
provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including
one at Salman Pak.360
Haideri was yet another attempted echo in the INCs intelligence echo
chamber. Like Abu Zeinab and Khodada, Haideri was an attempt to strengthen the
Team B analysis of Salman Pak and influence the Intelligence Communitys Iraq/alQaeda consensus. He was supposed to be an excuse for the CIA (CTC and NESAF) to
change its assessment that Iraq and al-Qaeda were unlikely to cooperate in an attack
on the US. Through Haideri, the INC was attempting to bring the Intelligence
Communitys consensus closer in line with the Wurmser-Maloof Project.
Again, not that it worked. Reportedly, the defector failed a CIA-administered

lie detector test in Thailand.361 Although the DIA disseminated Haideris reporting, no
one in the Intelligence Community cited his information in an intelligence assessment.
Haideri seems not to have affected the Intelligence Communitys consensus on either
WMDs or Iraq/al-Qaeda. So, despite the INCs best efforts, the neocons still would
not be able to claim unequivocally that Iraq supported al-Qaeda nor could they cite
359

Ibid., p. 43.
361
360
172
the Team B analysis of Salman Pak in the public case for war. The Intelligence
Community would not clear it.
The CIA Cottons On
So, by the end of December 2001, the Intelligence Community had interviewed three
sources claiming that Iraq was training Islamic radicals at Salman Pak. Two of the
sources, Abu Zeinab and Khodada, had described training that matched al-Qaedas
tactics in the September 11 attacks and the bombing of the USS Cole. Although both
defectors had said that they did not know whether the militants were al-Qaeda or
not, they were clearly implying that they were. The third source, Haideri, had reported
rumours that Salman Pak was training terrorist teams. Not one of the defectors,
however, was judged credible enough to include his reports in a finished intelligence
assessment. Finally, not long after interviewing Haideri, the Intelligence Community
seems to have figured out what was going on.
As Ive mentioned, in October 2001, Abu Zeinab had been interviewed by a

foreign intelligence service while he was being debriefed by the US. The service I
think probably Turkey had forwarded Abu Zeinabs reporting to the CIA, but only
identified him as a former officer in the Fedayeen Saddam.362 The INC had been
shopping the defector to different intelligence services to create an echo chamber
effect. In December 2001, however, the CIA found out that the former Fedayeen
Saddam officer and Abu Zeinab was the same guy.363
362
363

Ibid., p. 72.
173
The foreign service had found out that the US had also interviewed Abu
Zeinab. In December 2001, the service then let the CIA know that Abu Zeinab was
the same defector it had debriefed in October.364 Unfortunately, the Senates Phase II
report redacts almost the entire next page, so we dont know what happened next. The
story picks up again in January 2002 when the CIAs Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
responded to a question from an unidentified official in the Bush administration.
Apparently, the official wanted to know why Abu Zeinabs reporting wasnt being
disseminated. The CTCs responded that Abu Zeinab was under the
influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered very
credible.365
So, by January 2002, the Intelligence Community had definitely figured out
that the INC was up to something with its Salman Pak defectors. The INC had been
trying to trick CTC and NESAF into assessing that Iraq was training al-Qaeda. But
now, the Intelligence Community had cottoned on to the INCs operation. The
Intelligence Community wasnt going to budge on Salman Pak.
Wurmser-Maloof Reassigned
Right around the time the Intelligence Community figured out the INC controlled
the Salman Pak defectors, the Wurmser-Maloof Project was broken up. The Team B
had been very, very busy in the three-and-a-half months since it was formed. With
access to the Intelligence Communitys classified database, the Team B had
interpreted the data to fit its preconceived conclusion: terrorist groups and
364
365
Ibid., p. 72.
174
authoritarian regimes were united in a grand alliance against the US. According to
The Los Angeles Times, the analysts had discovered that Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic
Jihad and other groups with disparate ideologies and objectives were increasingly
putting aside their differences and uniting behind a shared desire to harm the US.366
As Ive noted, Wurmsers book, Tyrannys Ally, explains that the nature of tyranny
compels tyrants to attack the United States in any way that they can, even ally with
groups they would otherwise oppose. Wurmser writes that
despite their enmity, a secular totalitarian regime can

cooperate tactically with a religious one if doing so
serves their mutual, primary strategic goal
prosecuting the war against the West. The very nature
of Western values establishes the Western world, and
America in particular, as the focal target for tyrants
animosity. That animosity transcends their hatred of
each other, because Western values profoundly threaten
their rule. As a result, these tyrants will pragmatically
set aside their own differences, deferring resolution or
limiting confrontation so that they can instead confront
the United States.367
In concert with their view of the nature of tyranny, the Wurmser-Maloof

Project had also produced a 150-slide briefing on contacts between al-Qaeda, Iran
366
367

175
and Iraq.368 For the Team B, each contact between Iraq and al-Qaeda was more proof
they were plotting together against the US. The Wurmser-Maloof Project had just
completed its Iraq/al-Qaeda report when F. Michael Maloof had his security clearance
revoked.
The Pentagons National Security Agency (NSA) had accused Maloof of

leaking classified material to the press. (The NSA is the part of the Intelligence
Community that eavesdrops on foreign communications, so it may have accused him
of leaking a communication intercept of some kind.) The Team B analyst denied the
NSAs charges, which, according to him, were politically motivated.369 Regardless,
Maloofs security clearance was pulled and Douglas Feith was forced to take him out
of the Pentagons Team B cell.
A few weeks later, David Wurmser was also reassigned. He was moved to the
State Department where he became a Team B analyst for yet another neocon
ideologue, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
John Bolton. A year after that, Wurmser became chief Middle East advisor to Vice
President Cheney, a position he held until 2007.370
Although Wurmser and Maloof were out of the Defense Department, the
Wurmser Maloof-Project would continue with new analysts and a new name. In
368
Scarborough, Rowan. Sabotage: Americas Enemies within the CIA. New York: Regnery
Publishing, 2007. http://www.examiner.com/a830170~Exclusive_Book_Excerpt___Sabotage__Part_1____The_CIA_goes_to_war_with_the_Pentag
on.html Accessed: November 14, 2007.
369
Ibid.
370
Dreyfuss, Robert. Cheney Targets Iran. Rolling Stone. October 18, 2007.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/16971409/cheney_targets_iran Accessed: November 14,
2007.
176
January 2002, two DIA analysts were detailed to the Pentagons new Team B, now
named the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group.371 Feiths Team B would
continue analysing intelligence to fit the neocons preconceived conclusions.
Axis of Evil
Despite the Intelligence Communitys

security concerns, the WurmserMaloof Project and its
neoconservative ideology remained
influential at the highest levels of the
American government. On January 29,
2002, just days after the formation of
Feiths Policy Counterterrorism
Figure 23 President Bush delivers his Axis of

Evil State of the Union address, January 29,
2002. Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/
Evaluation Group, President Bush delivered his famous Axis of Evil State of the
Union address. The address was clearly influenced by the neoconservatives and their
understanding of the nature of tyranny. In the speech, the President united Iraq, Iran
and North Korea three regimes with vastly different ideologies and strategic goals
in an alliance with terrorists against the West. Our goal is to prevent regimes that
sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of
mass destruction, the President said. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet
since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. [Authors emphasis.]
371
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General. Review of the Pre-Iraqi War
Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Report No. 07-INTEL-04.
February 9, 2007. p. 63. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ig020907-decl.pdf Accessed: November
14, 2007.
177
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an
axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes
pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide
these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match
their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the
price of indifference would be catastrophic.372
The Axis of Evil address was about as far towards the Wurmser-Maloof
Project as the Intelligence Community would let the President go. In the address, the
President stated a watered-down version of the memes al-Qaeda component. Iraq
continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.373 Technically,
the Presidents statement was correct, albeit misleading. Saddams regime did support
Palestinian and other secular Arab nationalist terrorist groups.374 However, the CIAs
terrorism experts in the CTC and Middle East experts in NESAF did not have the
evidence to conclude that Iraq would use any of these groups to attack the US. The
President had to use the word terror because the Intelligence Community would not
clear him to say al-Qaeda. Iraqs support for terror was the Intelligence
Communitys consensus, compromise language.
So, the President still could not make the case the neocons wanted him to
make. The neocons wanted the President to be able to say unequivocally that Iraq and
al-Qaeda would cooperate in an attack on the US. They wanted him to be able to cite
372
Bush, George W. State of the Union. January 29, 2002. op. cit.
Ibid.
374
373
178
the Team B analysis of Salman Pak. Before the President could make the case, the
Intelligence Communitys Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus would have to be brought in line
with the Wurmser-Maloof Project. The Iraqi National Congress would have to try
even harder to convince the Intelligence Community that Salman Pak was an alQaeda training camp.
The Officers Movement for Salvation of Iraq
The week following the Presidents Axis of Evil speech, the INC created yet another
echo for the Salman Pak story, yet another attempt to give the Intelligence
Community an excuse to change its Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus. This time, the INC
would be even sneakier. In December 2001, the CIA had figured out that the Salman
Pak defectors were under the INCs control.375 If, this time, the Intelligence
Community was going to judge the Salman Pak story credible, the information
couldnt be sourced back to the INC. The INC would again have to go through a
proxy, someone that the CIA trusted.
In early-February 2002, a CIA station reported to CIA headquarters with

information from one of its contacts.376 The contact was not a member the Iraqi
National Congress. Instead, he was a member of another Iraqi opposition group: the
Officers Movement for Salvation of Iraq.377
375

Ibid., p. 76.
377
Ibid., p. 76.
376
179
Attributing his information to a sub-source, the contact told the CIA station
about suicide commandos preparing for missions abroad in 2000.378 Although we
dont know much more about what the contact said than that, the CIA believed that
the sub-source was Abu Zeinab. The INC was trying to launder the Salman Pak
story through a trusted CIA contact in an attempt to make the allegations more
credible.
However, once again, the attempt did not work. On February 6, 2002, the CIA
disseminated a cable to the entire Intelligence Community. The cable summarized all
the interactions the Intelligence Community had had with Abu Zeinab and warned
that
Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we

have determined that much of his information is
inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S.
(and probably western) policy on Iraq. The fact that
he has reiterated this same story to numerous audiences
including the media had further damaged his
credibility with our service.379 [Authors emphasis.]
The February cable was the turning point for the Intelligence Community. In
November 2001, the CIA had assessed the reliability of the Salman Pak defectors was
questionable.380 In December 2001, it had cottoned on that the defectors were part
378
Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p. 76.
380
Ibid., p. 71.
379
180
an INC disinformation operation.381 Now, not only did the CIA believe Abu Zeinab
was under the control/influence of the INC, but also that his information was
aimed at influencing US (and probably western) policy on Iraq.382
There was no way that the Intelligence Community was going to let the White
House refer to Salman Pak as evidence of Iraqs support for al-Qaeda. The
Intelligence Community knew that Salman Pak was part of an INC disinformation
operation to influence US Iraq policy. As far as the Intelligence Community was
concerned, the Salman Pak story was dead.
Cheneys March Media Blitz
As I described in the Tubes chapter, on

March 24, 2002, Vice President Cheney
appeared on Meet the Press with Tim
Russert, Face the Nation and Late Edition
with Wolf Blitzer to hype the threat from
Iraq. The Intelligence Communitys
Figure 24 Vice President Cheney on
NBCs Meet the Press with Tim Russert.
Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com.
consensus on Iraqs nuclear and biological

weapons programs had flipped sometime
between late-January and late-March 2002, just in time for the March media blitz. For
the first time, the Vice President was able to say unequivocally that Iraq has
chemical and biological weapons and is pursuing nuclear weapons, the memes
WMD components.
381
382
Ibid., p. 74.
Ibid., p. 76.
181
However, Cheney was not able to say the memes al-Qaeda component.
Unlike the WMD consensus, the Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus hadnt flipped. In fact, the
Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus had actually gotten worse for the neocons. The CIAs
terrorism experts in CTC and Middle East experts in NESAF hadnt changed their
assessment that Iraq and al-Qaeda were still highly unlikely to cooperate in an attack
on the US. And now, the DIA had also weighed in with an assessment of Iraqs
relationship with Bin Ladens group. One month before Cheneys media blitz, a DIA
Special Analysis had concluded that Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Laden
any useful CB [chemical-biological weapons] knowledge or assistance.383 The
Intelligence Communitys Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus had actually moved further from
the Wurmser-Maloof Project. Both the DIA and the CIA now agreed that Iraq did not
support al-Qaeda.
So, although Vice President Cheney was now clear to say the WMD
components of the meme, he still could not state publicly that Saddam would ally
with al-Qaeda to attack the US. When asked about the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection on
Meet the Press with Tim Russert, the Vice President replied that With respect to the
connections to al-Qaida, we havent been able to pin down any connection there
weve not been able yet from our perspective to nail down a close tie between the alQaida organization and Saddam Hussein. Well continue to look for it.384
However, once again, the Iraqi National Congress would step in to help the
Vice President make the case he wanted to make. In his Meet the Press interview,
383
384
SSCI. Phase II: Accuracy. op. cit., p. 77.

Cheney, Richard. Meet the Press. March 24, 2002. op. cit.
182
Cheney managed to bring up an article that had recently been published in The New
Yorker magazine. The Vice President said
Its a devastating article I thought. Specifically, its

description of what happened in 1988 when Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons against the Kurds in
northern Iraq, against some his own people. I was aware
that he had used chemical weapons against the Kurds.
Thats been general knowledge, but what the article is
very good at is pointing it out in depth that he may have
struck, if the articles correct, as many as 200 towns and
villages over a 17-month period of time and killed
upwards of 100,000 Iraqis.385
The same day on CNN, the Vice President brought up The New Yorker article again.
He said that
Theres a devastating story in this weeks New Yorker

magazine on his use of chemical weapons against the
Kurds of northern Iraq back in 1988; may have hit as
many 200 separate towns and villages. Killed upwards
of 100,000 people, according to the article if its to be
believed.386
385
386
Ibid.
Cheney, Richard. Late Edition. March 24, 2002. op. cit.
183
The article that the Vice President was so eager for people to read was The
Great Terror by The New Yorkers Jeffery Goldberg.387 As the Vice President said,
the article was a harrowing account of Saddams use of chemical weapons against the
Kurds in 1988. But I dont think that the articles description of Saddams atrocities
was the main reason for Cheney promoted it on the air. The Great Terror had been
planted by the Iraqi National Congress; it was part of the INCs propaganda
campaign. The Vice President promoted the article because it said what the
Intelligence Community would not let him say publicly: Iraq had provided al-Qaeda
with chemical and biological weapons to attack the US.
The INC planted The Great Terror in The New Yorker much like it had
planted Was This Saddams Bomb? in The Sunday Times. As it had done for The
Times Gwynne Roberts, the INC flew reporter Jeffery Goldberg into Iraqi-Kurdistan
and gave him the dog-and-pony show. Goldberg interviewed shadowy individuals
who told him exactly what the neocons wanted him to hear. However, instead of
Leone this time, the INC arranged for the journalist to meet a captured Iraqi
intelligence officer, Qassem Hussein Muhammad. In dramatic fashion, the
supposed officer claimed he had personally guarded high-ranking al-Qaeda members
in Iraq to meet with Saddam Hussein.
Qassem, shambling and bearded, was brought into the

room, and he genially agreed to be interviewed. One
guard stayed in the room, along with my translator.
Qassem lit a cigarette, and leaned back in his chair. I
387
Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Great Terror. The New Yorker. March 25, 2002.
http://www.jeffreygoldberg.net/articles/tny/a_reporter_at_large_the_great.php Accessed: October 20,
2007.
184
started by asking him if he had been tortured by his
captors. His eyes widened. By God, no, he said.
There is nothing like torture here. Then he told me
that his involvement in Islamic radicalism began in
1992 in Baghdad, when he met [al-Qaeda second-incommand] Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Qassem said that he was one of seventeen bodyguards
assigned to protect Zawahiri, who stayed at Baghdads
Al Rashid Hotel, but who, he said, moved around
surreptitiously. The guards had no idea why Zawahiri
was in Baghdad, but one day Qassem escorted him to
one of Saddams palaces for what he later learned was a
meeting with Saddam himself.388
After Qassem, the INC introduced Goldberg to a second prisoner, an

Iranian-Arab smuggler, Jawad.389 Jawad told the journalist that he had met with
members of Saddams inner circle and smuggled weapons from Iraq to al-Qaeda. In
2000, Jawad said, Iraq had paid him $10,000 to smuggle refrigerated canisters filled
with an unknown liquid.390 The liquid, he assumed, was some kind of chemical or
biological weapon. He claimed he had delivered the canisters to his contacts in alQaeda.
388
Ibid.
Ibid.
390
Ibid.
389
185
When I asked Jawad to tell me why he worked for Al
Qaeda, he replied, Money. He would not say how
much money he had been paid, but he suggested that it
was quite a bit. I had one more question: How many
years has Al Qaeda maintained a relationship with
Saddam Husseins regime? Theres been a relationship
between the Mukhabarat and the people of Al Qaeda
since 1992, he replied.391
Im sure Qassem Hussein Muhammad and Jawad were very convincing.

However, it seems highly likely that Goldberg was taken in by the INCs propaganda
apparatus. Goldbergs article is the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and
support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. The articles message is that Saddam has supplied
al-Qaeda with a biological or chemical weapon and what happened to the Kurds in
1988 could happen to the US. The final line even reads, You must understand, the
Kurds were for practice.392 The INC was using The New Yorker, just like it used The
New York Times, PBS and Vanity Fair. If the Intelligence Community wasnt going
to let the Vice President make the case he wanted to make, the INC would plant it in
the press to make it for him. Cheney promoted the INCs planted story during his
March media blitz because the INC was helping the Vice President get around the
Intelligence Communitys consensus. The INC was working for Cheney.
391
392
Ibid.
Ibid.
186
The Immigration Service Asset
The INC seems to have had one last chance to influence the Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus.
Since late-2001, the terrorism experts at the CIAs Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
had been working on a new assessment of the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection, Iraq and alQaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship.393 The new assessment had been delayed
several times because of conflicts between CTC and the CIAs Middle East experts,
NESAF.394 Originally, CTC and NESAF had been working on the assessment
together. While NESAF took a traditional analytical approach, confirming
intelligence with multiple sources, the CTC was deliberately aggressive drawing
connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The Deputy Director for Intelligence
explained to the US Senate, What happened with the murky paper was I was asking
people who were writing it to lean forward and do a speculative piece. If you were
going to stretch the maximum evidence you had, what could you come up with?395
Even after working on several drafts over eight months, CTC and NESAF
could not agree on the new assessment. Finally, the Deputy Director for Intelligence
told them that the murky paper had to be published on June 21, 2002. The CTC
decided to publish the assessment without NESAF.396 If the Iraqi National Congress
was going to influence the Intelligence Communitys consensus, the murky paper,
in which CTC would stretch the maximum evidence possible, would be its best shot.
In June 2002, it seems the INC tried one last time to strengthen the Team B analysis
393

Ibid., p. 305.
395
Ibid., p. 307.
396
Ibid., p. 305.
394
187
of Salman Pak and bring the Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus in line with the WurmserMaloof Project.
On June 7, two weeks before the murky paper was set to be published, yet
another defector tried to report the Salman Pak story.397 This time, the defector
reported through a CIA asset who worked for an Immigration Service of an
unnamed European country. While applying for asylum, the defector told the asset
that Islamic militants were training at Salman Pak. The asset then told his CIA
handler who forwarded the defectors report to CIA headquarters. Although the
defectors name and personal details did not match Abu Zeinabs, CIA headquarters
thought his story was similar enough to conclude it was, once again, the INCs
defector.398
If the CIA was right, the INC was likely trying to launder its disinformation
through a contact that the CIA trusted. Since December 2001, the CIA had assessed
that Abu Zeinab was under the INCs control and so the INC had been forced to
launder the Salman Pak story through more credible sources. As Ive mentioned
previously, in early-February 2002, Chalabis operatives had tried to use a CIA
contact in the Officers Movement for Salvation of Iraq. Now, the opposition group
was trying to use the Immigration Service asset as yet another proxy. Like the
Officers Movement contact, the Immigration Service asset was a more credible
source. He was more likely to influence the CTCs murky paper. If the INC could
convince CTC to judge the Salman Pak reporting credible, the consensus would flip
and the neocons would then be clear to make the case for war that they wanted to
397
398

Ibid., p. 77.
188
make. They would be able to state publicly and unequivocally the memes al-Qaeda
component and cite the Team B analysis of Salman Pak in the case for war.
However, yet again, it didnt work. CIA headquarters immediately replied to

the CIA station with a tersely worded cable, which warned against contact with the
assets source.399 CIA headquarters was quite familiar with Abu Zeinab, the cable
read. The defector had been debriefed twice already. The cable concluded, we assess
his story to be entirely fabricated.400 Although the CIA didnt know for certain that
the assets source was Abu Zeinab, it didnt seem to matter. It seems that anyone
claiming Iraq trained Islamic radicals at Salman Pak was automatically suspect. The
Intelligence Community knew that the Salman Pak story was part of an INC
disinformation operation.
On June 21, 2002, CTC published its aggressive analysis of Iraq/al-Qaeda

connections, Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship. However,
despite CTCs stretching the maximum evidence available, the paper still could not
conclude that Iraq had provided Bin Ladens terrorist network with any kind of
material support. The assessment concluded, Our knowledge of Iraqi links to alQaida still contains many critical gaps Overall, the reporting provides no
conclusive signs of cooperation on specific terrorist operations, so discussion of the
possible extent of cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaida is necessarily
speculative.401 In other words, the terrorism experts still could not find enough
evidence to assess that Iraq and al-Qaeda were allies. The Intelligence Communitys
Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus stayed the same.
399
Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid., p. 77.
401
400
189
The Official Case
After its failure with the Immigration Service asset, the INC seems to have largely
given up on Salman Pak. I havent been able to find any other attempts to launder the
reporting after June 2002. Neither the DIA nor the CIA (CTC and NESAF) could find
enough evidence to conclude Iraq and al-Qaeda would cooperate on an attack on the
US. Despite its many attempts, the INC had been unable to bring the Intelligence
Communitys Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus in line with the Wurmser-Maloof Project.
In September 2002, the Bush administration began its media campaign to hype
the threat from Iraq. The focus of the campaign, however, was Iraqs illicit WMD
programs rather than its support for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The White House
cited WINPACs Team B analysis of the aluminium tubes to convince the public of
the Iraqi nuclear threat, but the Wurmser-Maloof Projects analysis of Salman Pak
was not part of the campaign. Instead, the President was once again forced to use the
Intelligence Communitys consensus, compromise language to suggest an Iraq/alQaeda alliance. He was still not cleared to state the memes al-Qaeda component
unequivocally.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly

to make the case for war. The President began his speech on Iraq by evoking the
September 11 attacks.
190
Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished
delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year
and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my
country, and brought grief to many citizens of our
world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives
taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent
duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and
without fear.402
See what he did there? The duty to which the President was referring was
the disarming of Iraq. By evoking September 11, Bush implied that disarming
Saddam would protect other lives by preventing a similar terrorist attack. He
continued to evoke the meme throughout his address. our greatest fear is that
terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies
them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale, he said.403 The President could
only imply that Iraq would arm al-Qaeda with a WMD to attack the US. The President
could only describe the meme in terms of our greatest fear.
In the terrorism section of the UN address, the President could only cite the
evidence that the Intelligence Communitys consensus had agreed on. Instead of the
Team B analysis of Salman Pak, the President cited compromise, consensus evidence.
In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq

continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations
402
403
Bush, George W. UN address. September 12, 2002. op. cit.

Ibid.
191
that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western
governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for
murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir
of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraqs
government openly praised the attacks of September the
11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan
and are known to be in Iraq.404
The compromise consensus evidence was all technically true, albeit

misleading. Iraq had supported Palestinian terrorist groups, which had attacked Israel,
and it supported a group called the Mujahidin e-Khalq, which had attacked Iran.405
However, Bush had to say Western governments because none of the terrorist
groups that Iraq had supported had ever directed violence against the US. The
President also cited Iraqs murder of dissidents abroad as well as Iraqs attempt to
assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in 1993. While both implied Iraqs
support for terrorism, the operations had been conducted by Iraqs intelligence
service, the Mukhabarat, not by terrorist proxies. The Presidents reference to alQaeda members in Iraq was factually correct as well. However, Bush couldnt say
that Iraq had anything to do with their escape or even that Iraq tolerated their
presence. Al-Qaeda members had escaped to just about every country in the Middle
East after the US assault on Afghanistan. Iraq was no different.
Because the Intelligence Community could not find a substantive link between
Iraq and al-Qaeda or Iraq and any terrorist group that might attack the US, the
404
405
Ibid.
192
President didnt cite any publicly. The Bush administration did not cite the Team B
analysis of Salman Pak or state unequivocally that Iraq supported al-Qaeda. The
INCs disinformation operation had failed to bring the Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus in line
with the Wurmser-Maloof Project. However, the opposition group would have far
more success helping the neocons make the case for the memes biological weapons
(BW) component. The INC would have better luck strengthening the Team B analysis
of Curveball.
193
Curveball
Mobile Biological Weapons Facilities
After 9/11, the Bush administrations neocons wanted to justify the Iraq War with the
meme: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorist groups like alQaeda. One day, Iraq might arm al-Qaeda with a chemical, biological or even nuclear
weapon to attack the US. Although the neocons did not need evidence to believe the
meme was true, they did need evidence to convince everyone else that they were
right. They wanted to cite ambiguous, unconfirmed and dubious Team B intelligence
to make the case for the meme. In the run up to the war, the Bush administration cited
Iraqs mobile biological weapons facilities to make the case for the memes BW
component: Iraq has a secret BW program.
On October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered his famous Cincinnati speech in

which he outlined the Iraqi threat. In the speech, he charged that Iraq had developed
mobile weapons facilities to evade UN weapons inspectors. Iraqs BW program could
not be detected.
Some believe we can address this danger by simply

resuming the old approach to inspections, and applying
diplomatic and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely
what the world has tried to do since 1991. The U.N.
inspections program was met with systematic deception.
194
The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and offices of
inspectors to find where they were going next; they
forged documents, destroyed evidence, and developed
mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of
inspectors.406 [Authors emphasis.]
Several months later, on

February 5, 2003, Secretary of
State Colin Powell presented the
US case for war to the United
Nations Security Council. Iraqs
mobile BW facilities were the
centrepiece of presentation. As the
Secretary spoke, large monitors
displayed diagrams of the alleged
Figure 25 Computer-generated image of alleged

Iraqi mobile BW facility presented by Secretary
of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council,
February 5, 2003. Source:
facilities, which Powell cited as

proof that Saddam was still defying the world.
Here you see both truck and rail car-mounted mobile

factories. The description our sources gave us of the
technical features required by such facilities are highly
detailed and extremely accurate. As these drawings
based on their description show, we know what the
fermenters look like, we know what the tanks, pumps,
406
195
compressors and other parts look like. We know how
they fit together. We know how they work. And we
know a great deal about the platforms on which they are
mounted.
As shown in this diagram, these factories can be
concealed easily, either by moving ordinary-looking
trucks and rail cars along Iraqs thousands of miles of
highway or track, or by parking them in a garage or
warehouse or somewhere in Iraqs extensive system of
underground tunnels and bunkers.
Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the
thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads
of Iraq every single day.407
We now know that Powell and the President were wrong. After the 1991 Gulf
War, Iraq did not have a biological weapons program mobile or otherwise. In 2004,
the Iraq Survey Group found no direct evidence that Iraq had plans for a new BW
program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.408 The ISG
conducted an exhaustive investigation into Iraqs alleged mobile BW facilities.
However, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW
agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.409
407
Powell, Colin. US Secretary of State Addresses the UN Security Council. New York City, New
York. February 5, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html
408
409
Ibid., p. 3.
196
The US claims of mobile BW labs were based largely on the reports of a

single source: an Iraqi asylum-seeker codenamed Curveball.410 We now know the
defector was lying through his teeth. ISG interviews with the defectors friends and
family revealed his reputation as a great liar and a con artist. His roommate at
Baghdad University labelled him a congenital liar. In fact, the sentiment was almost
universal. According to one investigator, people kept saying what a rat
Curveball was.411 Travel records showed Curveball hadnt even been in Iraq at the
time he had said he was working on the mobile program.412 Finally, in May 2004, the
CIA officially declared the defector a fabricator.413 Curveball had lied about very
nearly everything.
Somehow the President and the Secretary of State had been cleared to cite a
fabricators allegations in the case for war.
Curveball
Curveball was not like the Salman Pak defectors. After the war, a CIA investigation
could not find any evidence that the Iraqi National Congress or any other organization
had directed Curveball to provide misleading information to the Intelligence
Community.414 Instead, it seems Curveball was motivated to lie by his desire to gain
410

Ibid., p. 223.
412
Ibid., p. 107.
413
Ibid., p. 84.
414
Ibid., p. 108.
411
197
permanent asylum.415 In other words, Curveball was not part of the disinformation
operation. He was a genuine fake.
Curveball was an Iraqi chemical engineer who dreamed of a better life in

Europe. In November 1999, Curveball embezzled a large sum of money from the
Iraqi government and fled to Munich, Germany.416 He knew that hed face jail, torture
and execution if forced to return to Iraq. He desperately wanted to stay in Germany.
In broken English, Curveball told German immigration officials that he needed to
apply for political asylum.
The Germans sent Curveball to a run-down refugee centre near Nuremberg.

There, he was told the extent of his situation. In 1999, more than 95,000 refugees
applied for asylum in Germany. More than 11,000 came from Iraq.417 As far as the
Germans were concerned, Curveball was no one special. He would have to get in
line behind hundreds of thousands of exiles hoping to win a visa. The asylum-seeker
faced years of paperwork, interviews and hearings and when it was all over, there was
no guarantee that he wouldnt be shipped back to Iraq. Immigration officials granted
asylum, on average, to only one in twenty-five applicants.418 Curveball knew that
there was only one way he might receive preferential treatment. A few weeks after
arriving in Germany, he abruptly changed his story.419
415
Ibid., p. 108.
Drogin, Bob and Greg Miller. Iraqi Defectors Tales Bolstered US Case for War. The Los
Angeles Times. March 28, 2004. http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5958.htm Accessed:
October 17, 2007.
417
Germany: Annual number of asylum applications by nationality, 1980 to 2001. Migration
Immigration Source. Migration Policy Institute. Washington DC. 2007.
http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/countrydata/data.cfm Accessed: November 17, 2007.
418
Drogin, Bob. Curveball. New York: Ebury Press, 2007. p. 11.
419
Drogin, Bob and John Goetz. How US Fell Under the Spell of Curveball. The Los Angeles Times.
November 20, 2005. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1120-01.htm Accessed: November
17, 2007.
416
198
Suddenly, Curveball started claiming he had worked on a secret Iraqi program

to build mobile BW facilities. He knew that if he had important information about
Iraqs illegal WMDs, hed get the red carpet treatment. Germany was famous for
the package that it offered defectors with valuable intelligence. Curveball could look
forward to a house, a stipend, a job.420 Curveballs wife was still in Iraq. He might be
able to get her into Germany too. In early-2000, Curveball told his new story to
Germanys Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).421
Curveball told BND that as a chemical engineer in the mid-1990s, he had been
recruited by the Iraqi military to help design and build mobile BW facilities.422 He
provided BND with technical diagrams of the design, which described the facilities
fermentation units.423 (A fermenter is the heart of any biological weapons facility,
or any biological facility at all for that matter. The fermenter is where the
microorganisms are grown.)424 According to Curveball, the first facility had become
operational in 1997 and seven facilities had been completed by the time he fled to
Germany. Six of the facilities were built inside refrigerated truck-trailers, the defector
said. One facility was built inside a series of railcars.425 Using mobile facilities, Iraq
could keep its BW program concealed from UN weapons inspectors and safe from US
airstrikes.
420
Drogin, Bob. Curveball. op. cit., p. 12.

Drogin, Bob and Greg Miller. op. cit.
422
Ibid.
423
Drogin, Bob and John Goetz. op. cit.
424
Isenberg, David. Quick Reference Guide to Biological Technology Equipment. British American
Security Information Council. Washington DC.
http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/biological/QRG2BW.htm Accessed: November 18, 2007.
425
Butler Inquiry. op. cit., p. 138.
421
199
The BND found Curveballs story plausible. In early-2000, the Germans
forwarded his reports to the Defense Intelligence Agency, which passed them on to
the rest of the US Intelligence Community. The reports looked very plausible to
Intelligence Community analysts too. As luck would have it, the CIA had information
that Iraq had considered building mobile BW facilities during the Iran-Iraq War. The
information had been discovered by the UN weapons inspection team, UNSCOM.
Curveball and the UNSCOM Notes
After the 1991 Gulf War, UNSCOM was sent into Iraq to verify that Saddam was
complying with UN resolutions to dismantle his WMD programs. The weapons
inspection team had wanted to know everything about Iraqs pre-Gulf War biowarfare program. UNSCOM knew about a biological facility called al-Hakam, which
it strongly suspected of having been the nucleus of the program. However, Saddam
refused to admit that a BW program had even existed, let alone reveal the details of
what, where and how much BW agent the program had produced.426 Iraq maintained
that al-Hakam had only ever produced single cell protein, a dietary supplement for
animal feed.427 There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed
production plant, UNSCOMs deputy executive chairman later told reporters,
beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it. For the first half of the
1990s, the weapons inspectors couldnt get the Iraqis to admit anything.
All this changed in 1995 with the defection of Saddams son-in-law, Hussein
Kamel, the head of Iraqs Military Industrialization Commission. Kamel knew
426
Arnoldy, Ben and Dave Hauck. The Inspections Maze. The Christian Science Monitor. November
6, 2002. http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/inspections/index.html Accessed: November 20, 2007.
427
Ibid.
200
everything about Iraqs pre-Gulf War programs and he told everyone the US, the
UK and UNSCOM.428 After Kamels defection, the Iraqis didnt see much point in
keeping up the charade. Iraq finally admitted that, yes, it had had a BW program and
the al-Hakam facility had been a part of it. Before the Gulf War, Iraqi scientists had
grown 8,000 litres of anthrax and 19,000 litres of botulin toxin at the facility.429 It
seemed Iraq was finally cooperating. In 1996, UNSCOM destroyed al-Hakam.
(Kamel, by the way, was eventually lured back to Iraq where Saddam had him
executed for treason.)430
As part of its new found openness, Iraq handed over more than two million
documents relating to its pre-Gulf War programs. One of the documents that
UNSCOM received was several pages hand-written notes written on the letterhead of
Iraqs Military Industrialization Commission. The UNSCOM notes suggested Iraq
had once considered mobile fermentation capability.431 According to The Los
Angeles Times, an Iraqi weapons official, General Amer al-Saadi, had told UNSCOM
that he had proposed building germ-producing trucks in 1988, during the Iran-Iraq
War.432 The idea, hed said, was to protect Iraqs BW capability from Iranian
airstrikes. Regime officials at the time had rejected Saadis proposal as impractical.433
UNSCOM handed the notes over to both the CIA and the British intelligence service,
MI6. However, no one seems to have considered them significant until Curveball
showed up.
428
Ritter, Scott. Iraq Confidential. London: IB Tauris, 2005. pp. 110-113.

Iraqs Biological Weapons Program: History. Federation of American Scientists. Washington DC.
November 3, 1998. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/bw/program.htm Accessed: November 20,
2007.
430
Ritter, Scott. op. cit. p. 140.
431
Drogin, Bob and Greg Miller. op. cit.
432
Ibid.
433
Ibid.
429
201
In December 2000, about a year after Curveball arrived in Germany, the

National Intelligence Council authored an Intelligence Community Assessment on
Iraqs WMD programs.434 The paper reflected the consensus of the entire Intelligence
Community. In the section on Iraqs BW efforts, the paper described Curveballs
reports of mobile BW facilities as credible and noted that the information tracks
with UNSCOM evidence that Iraq was considering such a program i.e. the
UNSCOM notes.435 That said, the Intelligence Community was not going to conclude
that Iraq had mobile BW facilities on the word of a single asylum-seeker who had
reported through a foreign intelligence service.
The Intelligence Community Assessment cautioned that the defectors reports

came exclusively from a foreign service, Germanys BND.436 The BND had refused
to let US intelligence officials interview Curveball. The asylum-seeker disliked
Americans, BND said. In fact, the CIA would not get to debrief the defector until
four years later, in March 2004.437 The assessment also warned that Curveball was a
single source. His reports of Iraqs mobile BW program were unconfirmed.438
The assessment stated specifically that the Intelligence Community could not confirm
whether Iraq had produced biological agents.439 In other words, Curveball and
the UNSCOM notes were not enough. While Curveball was credible, the Intelligence
Community still needed more evidence before it could assess unequivocally that Iraq
had a mobile BW program.
434

Ibid., p. 145.
436
Ibid., p. 145.
437
438
439
Ibid., p. 144.
435
202
Curveball Doubted
Curveball hadnt been interviewed by US officials and his story hadnt been
confirmed. Although he had been judged credible, it wasnt long before issues with
the defectors credibility began to surface. In 2000 and 2001, the Intelligence
Community received repeated warnings that Curveball was unreliable. The asylumseekers stories of Iraqi mobile BW facilities began to look shakier and shakier.
The first warning of Curveballs unreliability came about six months after the
defector had arrived in Munich. In May 2000, the Germans permitted a single US
intelligence officer to meet with the asylum-seeker. The officer, a doctor who had
been detailed to the CIA from the Department of Defense, was sent to Germany to test
one of Curveballs claims. The asylum-seeker had told BND that hed been present at
an accident during a production run of one of the mobile BW facilities. The accident,
he had said, had cost the lives of twelve of his fellow technicians. The doctor was to
draw a sample of Curveballs blood and test whether he had been exposed to, or
vaccinated against, a BW agent.440 Although the test ultimately proved inconclusive,
Curveball made a strong impression on the American. When he returned to the US,
the doctor emailed his supervisors at the CIAs Directorate of Operations to outline
his concerns. Curveball, he thought, might be an alcoholic.
I do have a concern with the validity of the information

based on Curveball having a terrible hangover the
440
203
morning of [the meeting]. I agree, it was only a one
time interaction, however, he knew he was to have a
[meeting] on that particular morning but tied one on
anyway. What underlying issues could this be a
problem with and how in depth has he been vetted by
the [BND]?441
More problems with Curveballs credibility began emerging in early-2001. In

operational reports sent to the CIA, the BND warned that Curveball had started
having semi-psychotic episodes. According to journalist Bob Drogin, During
interviews, [Curveball] cried, he screamed, he heaped vile abuse on his handlers. He
ran away several times, disappearing for days or weeks and sending the Germans into
frantic searches.442 The BND told the CIA that Curveball was out of control.443
Another foreign intelligence service (possibly the United Kingdoms MI6,

which was also receiving BNDs reports) also contacted the CIA about Curveballs
reliability. The unidentified service told the CIA that it was not convinced that
Curveball is a wholly reliable source. The service also warned that elements of
[Curveballs] behavior strike us as typical of individuals we would normally assess as
fabricators.444
441
Ibid., p. 91.
Drogin, Bob. A Non-Fiction Spy-Thriller. TPMCaf. October 23, 2007.
http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/tableforone/2007/oct/23/curveball_spies_lies_and_the_con_man_who_c
aused_a_war Accessed: November 18, 2007.
443
444
Ibid., p. 91.
442
204
In 2001, Curveballs credibility took yet another blow. Analysts began
noticing inconsistencies in his reporting. Curveball said he had helped build the
mobile germ factories at a dusty warehouse compound called Djerf al Nadaf, just
south of Baghdad. According to him, the huge vehicles entered and exited the Lshaped main warehouse at one end, and exited through a strange swinging corner door
that he helped design. He drew detailed diagrams, built scale models and described
rooms, windows, generator sheds, etc.445
However, US spy satellites revealed a six-foot-high, solid wall had been built
in 1997 two years before Curveball left Iraq that surrounded three sides of the
main warehouse. The wall clearly blocked vehicles from entering or exiting as
Curveball had insisted.446 The satellite photos had directly contradicted Curveballs
reports. DIA BW analysts noted that Curveballs value was compromised by his
reporting inconsistencies.447
By September 2001, Curveball had largely stopped cooperating with BND.

The Germans had granted the defector a visa, relocated him to Munich and brought
his wife and daughter out from Iraq. Since the defector had gotten what he wanted, he
didnt need to keep feeding BND stories of Iraqs mobile BW program. He suddenly
forgot important details, denied some of the claims he previously had made, and
became increasingly vague about what he actually witnessed versus what he heard
from others. He suddenly argued that he did not really know what the mobile labs
445
Drogin, Bob. A Non-Fiction Spy-Thriller. op. cit.

Ibid.
447
446
205
were designed to produce, and said that he never operated them himself or saw
anyone else do so.448
The CIA was aware of the decline in Curveballs reporting. It seemed the
Intelligence Community was heading towards a re-evaluation of the asylum-seeker. It
was bad enough that Curveball was unconfirmed and had not been debriefed by US
intelligence officials. Now, a myriad of other issues had undermined the defectors
credibility. Prior to 9/11, there was no way the Intelligence Community could
conclude that Iraq had mobile BW facilities. There was simply not enough evidence
that Curveball was telling the truth.
WINPAC and Curveballs Wall
Of course, evidence meant nothing to WINPACs Team B cell. Like the Pentagons
Wurmser-Maloof Project, WINPACs Team B analysed intelligence the way the
neocons wanted it analysed: to prove what the neocons already believed to be true. In
the run up to the war, the intelligence cell assumed Iraq was developing WMDs and
interpreted intelligence to fit its assumption. Iraqs aluminium tubes became evidence
that Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear program. Curveball was evidence for the
memes BW component: Iraq has a secret BW program.
For the Team B, it did not matter that Curveball was unconfirmed or had not
been debriefed by US intelligence officials. The myriad of issues with Curveballs
credibility was of no concern either. WINPACs Team B had already assumed that
448
Drogin, Bob. A Non-Fiction Spy-Thriller. op. cit.
206
Iraq had a secret BW program. The asylum-seekers reports fit a plausible storyline
for Iraqs BW efforts: Iraq had switched to mobile facilities in the mid-1990s after
UNSCOM had destroyed its fixed facilities at al-Hakam.449 Unlike the rest of the
Intelligence Community, the Team B cell would interpret Curveball to fit its
preconceived conclusion.
In October 2001, WINPAC was the only member of the Intelligence

Community to assess that Iraq had an active BW program. WINPAC published an
assessment based almost entirely on Curveballs reporting.450 The assessment
concluded that Iraq continues to produce at least three BW agents and that the
establishment of mobile BW agent production plants and continued delivery system
development provide Baghdad with BW capabilities surpassing the pre-Gulf War
era.451 The Team B had assumed that Iraq had a secret BW program and cherrypicked Curveball simply because he supported the assumption.
In its analysis, WINPACs Team B cherry-picked the elements of Curveballs

reporting that supported its preconceived conclusion. For example, the Team B
analysis focussed on the technical accuracy of Curveballs designs.452 But when
evidence seemed to contradict its preconceived conclusion, the intelligence cell
dismissed it as Iraqs deception. WINPAC knew that satellite imagery had directly
contradicted Curveballs reports. A six-foot-high wall surrounded the building that the
asylum-seeker had said was accessible to vehicles. However, WINPACs Team B
assumed Iraq had put up a fake wall to undermine the defectors credibility. Analysts
449

Ibid., p. 83.
451
Ibid., p. 83.
452
Ibid., p. 92.
450
207
argued that the wall was a temporary structure put up by the Iraqis to deceive US
intelligence efforts.453
WINPACs Team B did not care that Curveballs claims were unconfirmed
either. In the absence of evidence, the Team B filled in the gaps to fits its
preconceived conclusion. Moreover, the absence of evidence was itself evidence that
Iraq was hiding the mobile facilities. When spy satellites could not find any trace of
Curveballs mobile labs, the intelligence cell assumed the facilities were being hidden
from satellite overflights.454 The Team B did not even consider the possibility that the
reason the facilities could not be found was because they were not there.455 According
to the Robb-Silberman Commission, Analysts use of denial and deception to explain
away discordant evidence about Iraqs BW programs was a recurring theme in our
review of the Communitys performance on the BW question.456 WINPACs
analysis was classic Team B analysis. Curveball was Team B intelligence.
The Team B cell analysed Curveball like Joe analysed the tubes and like the
Wurmser-Maloof Project analysed the Salman Pak facility. Curveball proved what the
neocons had already assumed to be true. Even though the Team B analysts did not
know that Curveball was a fabricator, it wouldnt have mattered if they did. All that
mattered was that the asylum-seekers reports fit the preconceived conclusion: Iraq
has a secret BW program.
453
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 92.
455
Ibid., p. 93.
456
Ibid., p. 92.
454
208
Cheney
The Bush administration could not make the case for the memes BW component
unless the Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. WINPACs analysis alone
was not enough. As it stood, the most the rest of the Intelligence Community could
conclude was that Iraq could have a secret program. The most recent DIA assessment
of Iraqs BW efforts reflected the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus. The DIA
had concluded that Iraq may have biological agents and that Iraqs dual-use
facilities had the capability to produce biological weapons. However, the DIA
cautioned that no active BW facilities are currently identified.457 Without the
consensus, the neocons could not say unequivocally that Iraq has active BW program.
They could not cite the Team B analysis of Curveball in the case for war.
As Ive mentioned previously, on November 29, 2001, Vice President Dick

Cheney was interviewed on Americas ABC network about Iraqs WMD programs.
His statements had to reflect the Intelligence Communitys consensus.
Theres several things to keep in mind about Iraq and

about the Iraqis. We know that he was developing
nuclear weapons, and that in 1981, for example, when
the Israelis struck the Osirik reactor they dealt a major
blow to his program. We know, in 1991, at the time of
the Gulf War, that he also was getting close, once again,
to acquiring nuclear weapons. We know he has
457
209
developed biological and chemical agents. Hes used
them, not only on his own people but also on the
Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War.458 [Authors
emphasis.]
In November 2001, Cheney was only cleared to refer to Saddams nuclear and
biological weapons programs in the past tense. The Intelligence Community needed
stronger evidence of Iraqs WMD efforts. Before the Vice President could make the
case for war that he wanted to make, the consensus would have to be brought in line
with WINPACs Team B. To do that, the Intelligence Community would need
stronger evidence of Iraqs secret BW program.
Haideri
The day after Cheneys interview, the NGIC text-box, which claimed that Iraqs
aluminium tubes would make poor rockets, gave the DIA an excuse to sign on to the
Team B analysis that the tubes were intended for centrifuge rotors. Later that week,
the Iraqi National Congress R. James Woolsey contacted the Pentagon to refer a
brand new INC defector to the Intelligence Community.459 His name was Adnan
Saeed Ihsan al-Haideri.
In the Salman Pak chapter, I described how after Woolseys referral, the DIA
dispatched a team of intelligence officers to Thailand to interview Haideri.460 Haideri
was yet another defector that the INC had directed to influence the Intelligence
458
Cheney, Richard. ABC News. November 29, 2001. op. cit.

460
Ibid.
459
210
Community.461 As Ive mentioned, the civil engineer claimed that Salman Pak was
rumored to provide al-Qaida terrorist teams with training and that Afghan,
Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained being there.462 However, most of
Haideris information had to do with secret Iraqi military facilities.463
In his interviews with intelligence officials, Haideri explained that he had been
a successful civil engineer in Iraq. His company had specialized in creating types of
epoxy. Haideri claimed that under contract with the Iraqi military, he had personally
worked on dozens of secret construction sites sites hidden under private homes and
in subterranean wells. One of the sites was underneath one of Saddams presidential
palaces. Another was below Saddam Hospital in Baghdad.464
Haideri explained that he had been contracted to line rooms with layers of
epoxy paste as well as to seal cracks in floors and walls.465 What were these facilities
for? Haideri said that he didnt know. His work was always complete before the site
became operational. But the sites couldnt be for anything legitimate if Saddam was
hiding them, could they?466
Although he didnt say it explicitly, it was clear what Haideri was implying.
There arent many reasons youd line a room with epoxy. One would be to prevent
461

463
Ibid., p. 42.
464
Miller, Judith. An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites. The New
York Times. December 20, 2001.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E6DC103EF933A15751C1A9679C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: October 20, 2007.
465
Ibid.
466
Ibid.
462
211
potentially dangerous leaks. Another would be to allow for easy decontamination.467
Given that the sites were also supposedly underground hidden from, say, UN
inspectors and US airstrikes it sounded a lot like the defector had worked on clean
rooms for biological or chemical research.
Haideris style was very similar to Abu Zeinab and Khodadas. Both the
Salman Pak defectors had stated specifically that they did not know whether the
Islamic militants training at Salman Pak were al-Qaeda or not.468 Instead, they listed
leading details, such as hijackers training with box-cutters or frogmen training to blow
up US Navy vessels, and let the analysts reach their own conclusions.469 Haideri was
exactly the same. Although he did not know if his facilities were WMD-related or
not, his description strongly implied that they were.470
Haideri had provided the DIA with evidence that Iraq had a secret BW
program. I think he was supposed to be DIAs excuse to sign on to Team B analysis
of Curveball, just like the NGIC text-box had been its excuse to sign on to the Team B
analysis of the tubes. The DIA was supposed to conclude that Haideris facilities were
WMD-related, agree with WINPAC on Iraqs BW efforts and flip the consensus.
However, it doesnt look like the INCs new defector was particularly effective.
As Ive mentioned in the Salman Pak chapter, Haideri reportedly failed a CIAadministered lie detector test.471 The DIA disseminated Haideris reporting, which
467
Chemi-Cote Epoxy Coatings. ICS Garland Inc. Cleveland, Ohio. 2007.

http://www.garlandfloor.com/epoxyinfo.htm Accessed: November 20, 2007.
468
469
Ibid., pp. 66; 82.
470
Miller, Judith. op. cit.
471
212
means it entered his reports into the Intelligence Communitys classified database.472
But it seems that the DIA did not cite Haideris reports in any finished intelligence
assessments. So, the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus stayed the same. The
neocons would not be able to cite the Team B analysis of Curveball in the case for
war or say unequivocally that Iraq had a secret BW program.
Haideri Media Month
The Intelligence Community would not let the neocons cite Haideris information in
the case for war. So, just as it had done with the Salman Pak defectors, the INC made
sure everyone heard about it anyway. Just days after the defector reportedly failed his
polygraph test, the Iraqi National Congress called New York Times reporter Judith
Miller, one of the opposition groups favourite journalists. Around mid-December
2001, the INC invited Miller to Thailand to interview its latest defector. Haideri
would be another front page scoop for The New York Times.
On December 20, 2001, The New York Times ran Millers article, An Iraqi
Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites. Miller breathlessly
reported that Haideris allegations were ammunition for Bush administration
officials arguing that Mr. Hussein should be driven from power partly because of his
unwillingness to stop making weapons of mass destruction, despite his pledges to do
so.473
472
473

Miller, Judith. op. cit.
213
An Iraqi defector who described himself as a civil
engineer said he personally worked on renovations of
secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons in underground wells, private villas and under
the Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad as recently as
a year ago.474
Miller cited government experts (read: Bush administration officials) to give

Haideri the US governments seal of approval.
Government experts said yesterday that he had also

been interviewed twice by American intelligence
officials, who were trying to verify his claims. One of
the officials said he thought Mr. Saeed had been taken
to a secure location. The experts said his information
seemed reliable and significant.475
Haideris descriptions of supposed biological facilities featured prominently in

Millers article. Haideris HAZMAT suit connected the facility to biological weapons
for the public.
Although the facility was empty when he arrived to do

the work, he said he was required before entering the
room to put on the protective clothing that researchers
474
475
Ibid.
Ibid.
214
in high- containment biological labs wear: a white
rubberized suit, a gas mask with respirator, and blue
plastic booties. The room, he said, had pipes that
brought in fresh air.476
In the days following December 20, Millers article echoed around the world.
Dozens of news outlets reported and re-reported Haideris claims of underground
weapons facilities. Stories about Iraqs undetectable/unbombable weapons facilities
showed up in Newsweek, The Associated Press, The London Times, Agence France
Presse, The Edmonton Journal, The London Independent, Asia Pulse, The Nation
(Thailand), The Weekend Australian and many others.477 Even though Haideris
allegations were unsubstantiated, they were reported so many times that soon people
started believing Saddams secret WMD sites were an accepted fact. If the
Intelligence Community wasnt going to let the Bush administration cite it, the INC
made sure everyone heard about it anyway.
The NGIC text-box was effective. Haideri was not. The INCs civil engineer didnt
persuade the DIA to change its assessment of Iraqs BW program. As Ive explained
in the Tubes chapter, the DIA had agreed that the tubes were for centrifuge rotors. In
December 2001, the Intelligence Community could not agree on which weapons
programs Saddam was pursuing nuclear, biological or chemical. But the Intelligence
Community did agree (or at least, did not dispute) that Iraq was pursuing some kind of
476
Ibid.
McCollam, Douglas. The List. Columbia Journalism Review. Iss. 4. July/August, 2004.
http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2004/4/mccollam-list.asp Accessed: October 20, 2007.
477
215
weapons of mass destruction program. For DIA, it was nuclear weapons. For
WINPAC, it was nuclear weapons and biological weapons. Both DOE and the State
Departments INR disputed nuclear weapons, but neither disputed biological
weapons. Everyone else in the Intelligence Community was neutral. And so the
National Intelligence Council worked out a compromise. The Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment was that Saddam was pursuing weapons of mass
destruction programs.
The President delivered his Axis of Evil address on January 29, 2002. As Ive
argued, President Bush could only refer to Iraqs specific WMD programs in terms of
what the Iraqis wanted to do, not in terms of what they are doing. Not long after the
State of the Union, Vice President Cheney addressed the Council on Foreign
Relations. Again, the Vice President could only use the Intelligence Communitys
consensus, compromise language. Cheney was still only cleared to refer to Iraqs
nuclear and biological programs in terms of weapons of mass destruction and
capabilities.
Iraq is clearly -- again, as the President pointed out in

his State of the Union speech -- very much of concern.
And not only do they have a robust set of programs
to develop their own weapons of mass destruction,
this is a place that has used it. You know, Saddam used
chemical agents on the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq
War, and on his own people when he used them against
the Kurds in times past. And we know he drove the
216
inspectors out three years ago, and we know he has
been actively and aggressively doing everything he
can to enhance his capabilities.478 [Authors
emphasis.]
The Vice President said we know Saddam was enhancing his WMD
capabilities. Like much of the Intelligence Communitys consensus, compromise
language, the reference was technically true, albeit misleading. In 2001, Iraq had
announced it was going to rebuild several dual-use biological facilities that
UNSCOM had destroyed in 1996.479 The facilities had legitimate civilian uses but had
been destroyed because they were capable of producing BW agent. For example,
the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, as its name suggests, was
used to make vaccine for foot and mouth disease but could easily be used to make
anthrax or botulinum toxin if thats what the Iraqis wanted to do.480 Although Iraq
claimed it was rebuilding al-Dawrah because it needed vaccine, technically it was also
enhancing its capability to produce biological weapons.481 The Vice Presidents
reference to Saddams WMD capabilities was as far as the Intelligence Community
was willing to let him go.
Before the Vice President would be able to say unequivocally that Iraq was
developing biological weapons, the Intelligence Communitys consensus would have
to be brought in line with WINPACs Team B. Because Haideri had failed his lie
478
Cheney, Richard. Remarks by the Vice President to the Council on Foreign Relations. Ritz
Carlton. Washington DC. February 15, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20020215.html Accessed: November 20, 2007.
479
Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility. Globalsecurity.org. 2005.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/al_manal.htm Accessed: November 20, 2007.
480
Ibid.
481
Ibid.
217
detector test, the DIA could not use the defectors reports as an excuse to change its
assessment and flip the consensus. Before the neocons could cite the Team B analysis
of Curveball, the DIA needed evidence that confirmed Iraqs mobile program.
Harith
The first week of February 2002 was a busy week for the INC. Within days of the
Presidents State of the Union, the propaganda outfit attempted to launder the Salman
Pak story through the Officers Movement for Salvation for Iraq, a trusted CIA source.
The INC used the rival opposition group to try and strengthen the Team B analysis of
the Salman Pak facility. The same week, the INCs operation attempted to make
claims of Iraqs secret BW program seem more credible too.
On February 8, 2002, former DCI and current INC hack, R. James Woolsey
contacted the Pentagon to refer yet another defector to the Intelligence Community.482
The referral was Woolseys third in his role as Chalabis proxy. The former CIA
director had already arranged Abu Zeinab and Haideris interviews with the DIA.
Now, he was referring the INCs brand new defector, a brand new excuse for DIA to
flip the consensus. The defector was Mohammad Harith, a former major the
Mukhabarat, Iraqs intelligence service.
Before the DIA met with Harith, it seems Woolsey passed along the transcript
of an interview that INC officials had conducted with the defector. A DIA assessment
based on the transcript breathlessly reported that
482
218
The source appears to have information that if deemed

credible may corroborate previous reporting
indicating Iraq employs transportable production trailers
and mobile R&D laboratories in its BW program.483
Curveball was still a single-source, which meant that his reports of mobile BW
facilities were still unconfirmed. Harith looked like he might provide the first solid
corroboration of Curveballs reporting. He could be DIAs excuse to sign on to the
WINPACs Team B analysis. Naturally, the DIA agreed to interview the defector.
In late-February 2002, the DIA interviewed Harith somewhere in the Middle

East.484 The former Mukhabarat major claimed that before fleeing Iraq, he had
worked in Saddams clandestine procurement network. The network supplied
equipment and materiel for all of Iraqs secret military programs. According to Harith,
one of programs the network supplied was a project to build mobile biological
laboratories.485 Although the defector never said specifically that the laboratories
were for biological weapons, he certainly implied that they were.486 Like the rest of
the INCs defectors, the former major described leading details and let intelligence
analysts reach their own conclusions.
483
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 58.
485
Ibid., p. 58.
486
Ibid., p. 58.
484
219
In his interviews, Harith told his debriefers that in mid-1996, Iraq had decided
to pursue mobile laboratories to evade UN weapons inspectors.487 From the outside
the facilities looked ordinary refrigerated trucks, but inside they contained a complete
biological laboratory. Harith described the laboratories planning, acquisition,
manufacture and storage.488 It seemed as if Harith was corroborating Curveball.
However, it looks like the INCs defector wasnt going to be believed. After
several meetings with the former major, the DIA debriefer began to have concerns
that Harith had been coached on what to say.489 As soon as it seemed that Harith
was going the same way as Haideri and the Salman Pak defectors, the INC did what it
always does when its defectors arent believed. If the Intelligence Community wasnt
going to let the neocons cite Team B propaganda publicly, then the INC would make
sure that everyone heard about it anyway. The opposition group shopped Hariths
story to the press.
Mobile Labs Media Month: Vanity Fair
March 2002 was the media month for Hariths mobile facilities. That month, the INC
arranged for David Rose of Vanity Fair to interview the former Mukhabarat major.
Roses article, Iraqs Arsenal of Terror, would be published the following May.490
487
Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., p. 58.
489
Ibid., p. 58.
490
Rose, David. Iraqs Arsenal of Terror. Vanity Fair. May 2, 2002.
http://www.ucsf.edu/its/listserv/emed-l/7339.html Accessed: November 20, 2007.
488
220
Roses article begins with Hariths account of a meeting chaired by the head
of Iraqs Military Industrialization Commission. Harith claimed that it was at that
meeting that he was officially ordered to begin reconstituting Iraqs WMD programs.
January 2000: a chilly afternoon in Baghdad. At the

downtown headquarters of Iraqs Military Industrial
Commission, the body responsible for arms
development and purchase, its then chairman, General
Amer al-Saadi, gathered 13 government officials around
the boardroom table: scientists, soldiers, spies. More
than a year had passed since the Iraqi president, Saddam
Hussein, expelled the inspectors from the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the U.N.
program designed to prevent Iraq from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. Now were a free
country again, al-Saadi said. We can do whatever we
wish. We want you to work with full force, and youll
be in a race against time. You have to win this race.
Everything you need, material or logistic, is available to
you.491
With the stage set, Rose went on to describe Hariths new information about
Iraqs progress since 2000. According to Harith, Iraq had built a network of front
491
Ibid.
221
companies, controlled by its intelligence service, to evade Western sanctions.492 The
network had been busy procuring materiel to rebuild Saddams arsenal. The defector
identified seven sites where chemical and biological weapons are designed,
manufactured, and tested, and an eighth where nuclear weapons are again being
developed.493 The article also publicised Hariths allegations of Iraqi mobile
biological facilities, which could be concealed from the most ardent weapons
inspectors.
With evident pride, [Harith] describes the success of his

scheme to build a fleet of virtually undetectable mobile
biological-weapons trucks, indistinguishable in
appearance from the vehicles used to carry chilled or
frozen food.
At this time, UNSCOM had not yet been expelled, and
he came up with a plan to enable these weapons and
development programs to evade detection, then and in
the future. They had the same problem as any
stationary facility, the defector says. I suggested
we go for mobile units.494 [Authors emphasis.]
The Intelligence Community wouldnt let the neocons cite the Team B
analysis of Iraqs mobile BW program publicly. So, the INC had done what it always
did: it made sure that everyone heard about the Team B intelligence anyway. Through
492
Ibid.
Ibid.
494
Ibid.
493
222
David Rose and Vanity Fair, the INC was creating a media echo chamber for Iraqs
mobile BW facilities.
Mobile Labs Media Month: 60 Minutes
Around the same time Harith was talking to David Rose, the INC organised the
defector to appear in a story on CBSs 60 Minutes.495 Broadcast on March 3, 2002,
Hariths interview was dramatic. His face blurred to hide his identity, Harith was
asked about Saddams WMDs by veteran correspondent Lesley Stahl.
STAHL: (Voiceover) [INC intelligence chief Nabeel]

Musawi told us that he has verified that this man was an
officer in Iraqs ruthless intelligence service, the
Mukhabarat.
Mr. MUSAWI: He holds the rank of a major. He has
certainly worked in a number of jobs which we deem to
be very important within the intelligence service.
STAHL: What is the most important thing that youve
learned from this defector?
Mr. MUSAWI: So far, probably the mobile bio-units.
(Footage of unidentified defector and Stahl)
STAHL: (Voiceover) The defector is telling Musawi
that in order to evade the UN inspectors, Saddam
495
Iraqi National Congress. 60 Minutes. CBS Television Network. March 3, 2002.

http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=9426 Accessed: November 20, 2007.
223
Hussein put his biological weapons laboratories in
trucks that the defector told us he personally bought
from Renault.
Refrigerator trucks
Unidentified Man: Yeah.
STAHL: kind of things.
Unidentified Man: Yeah.
STAHL: And how many?
Unidentified Man: Seven.
STAHL: Seven Renault trucks.
Unidentified Man: Yes. Seven.496
Harith had claimed that Saddam had built at least seven mobile facilities to
evade UN weapons inspectors. (Incidentally, Curveball had also said that he had
constructed seven mobile facilities, however, in his version, one of had been built
inside a series of rail cars.) As it had done before, the INC was helping the neocons
bypass the Intelligence Communitys clearance process. By shopping Harith to the
media, the INC made sure that everyone heard about Iraqs mobile facilities. The
opposition group was making the case for the memes BW component: Iraq has a
secret BW program.
496
Ibid.
224
The DIA Gives Harith Another Shot
In late-February, Hariths debriefer had suspected that the former major had been
coached. Harith, like all the other INC defectors, seems to have had failed to
influence the Intelligence Community and so, on March 3, he was being interviewed
on 60 Minutes. But then, something strange happened.
It seems that the DIA was desperate to help the administration make the case
for war. Despite the debriefers suspicions, the Defense Intelligence Agency didnt
want to give up on Harith. The former major was its excuse to agree that Curveball
was confirmed. Within days of the 60 Minutes broadcast, the DIA had decided to give
Harith another shot.
By March 6, 2002, the DIA had called the defector back in and administered a
lie detector test.497 We now know that Harith had been directed by the INC and was
lying through his teeth.498 Yet somehow, the former major managed to pass the DIAs
polygraph.499
So, how did Harith beat the lie detector? According to David Kay of the US
Iraq Survey Group, a number of the INCs defectors admitted that they had lied to
their debriefers before the war. Some of them claimed to have been coached by the
INC, and some of them claimed to have been coached on how to pass polygraphs,
497

499
498
225
Kay said.500 Most likely, Kay was referring to Harith. After Haideri had failed his lie
detector test, the INCs operation had adapted once again. The former major managed
to beat the polygraph because the INC told him how to do it.
After Hariths polygraph, the DIA finally had the excuse it needed to agree
with WINPACs Team B. As far as DIA was concerned, Harith had confirmed
Curveball and that was enough for the Pentagons intelligence agency to conclude that
Iraq had a secret BW program. Now that the DIA agreed with WINPAC, the
Intelligence Communitys BW consensus flipped. It didnt happen a moment too
soon.
Cheneys March Media Blitz
The BW consensus flipped just in time for Cheneys March media blitz. As Ive noted
in both the Salman Pak and Tubes chapters, on March 24, 2002, Vice President Dick
Cheney appeared on Face the Nation, Meet the Press with Tim Russert and Late
Edition with Wolf Blitzer to hype the threat from Iraq. Because the INCs Salman Pak
operation had failed to bring the Iraq/al-Qaeda consensus in line with the WurmserMaloof Project, the Vice President had to promote the INCs planted New Yorker
story to convey the memes al-Qaeda component. But now that the BW consensus had
flipped, Cheney did not have to use the Intelligence Communitys compromise
language anymore. He did not have to cite Saddams BW capabilities: Iraqs
reconstruction of its dual-use sites such as the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease
500
Dwyer, Jim. Defectors Reports on Iraq Arms Were Embellished, Exile Asserts. The New York
Times. July 9, 2004.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9506E4DB133BF93AA35754C0A9629C8B63&sec=
226
Vaccine Facility. Instead, the Vice President could now say that Saddam is
developing and has biological weapons, loud and proud. Here he is on CNN:
What we said, Wolf, if you go back and look at the

record is, the issues not inspectors. The issue is that he
has chemical weapons and hes used them. The issue is
that hes developing and has biological weapons. The
issue is that hes pursuing nuclear weapons.
Its the weapons of mass destruction and what hes
already done with them501 [Authors emphasis.]
When Harith passed his lie detector test, the BW consensus had flipped. The
INCs disinformation operation had brought the consensus in line with WINPACs
Team B. The Vice President was now able to say unequivocally that Saddam is
developing and has biological weapons. It appeared that the Intelligence Community
was now ready to clear the Team B analysis of Curveball for the case for war.
Harith the Fabricator
The INCs success was short-lived, however. In March 2002, not long after Harith
passed his polygraph, the CIA met with officials from a foreign intelligence service
(possibly the UKs MI6).502 The unidentified service warned the CIA that it had
debriefed Harith, four months earlier, in December 2001. Then, the former major had
been unable to provide specific details of his chain-of-command or places where he
501
502

227
claimed to have worked.503 The service had concluded that Harith was largely
unreliable and had partially fabricated the information he provided.504 The defector
had been coached by the Iraqi National Congress. After meeting with the service, the
CIA broke the bad news to the DIA.
The DIA was very reluctant to give up on Harith. Although it did cut off
contact with the former major, the DIA took its time issuing a fabrication notice,
formally declaring Hariths reporting unreliable. It wasnt until May 2002, after a
lengthy coordination with the CIAs Directorate of Operations, that DIA issued
Hariths fabrication notice.505 The DIAs notice read,
we have determined that [Mohammad Harith] is a

fabricator/provocateur. His information is assessed as
unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication. We
have determined that he had also been coached by the
Iraqi National Congress prior to his meeting with
western intelligence services.506 [Authors emphasis.]
On July 10, 2002, the National Intelligence Council hammered the final nail in
Hariths coffin. The NIC authored a senior executive memorandum on the Iraqi
National Congress defector program that described every defector the INC had tried
to sneak into the Intelligence Community Abu Zeinab, Khodada, Haideri and of
503
Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 59.
505
Ibid., p. 61.
506
Ibid., p. 61.
504
228
course, Mohammad Harith.507 In the memo, the NIC addressed Hariths claims about
Iraqs mobile laboratories. Although intelligence reporting on the mobile labs was
favourably received, the memo read, this information is now considered suspect.508
In other words, the NIC, which coordinates the Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgments, knew that Harith was a fabricator and working for the Iraqi National
Congress. DIA could not use him as an excuse anymore. Curveball was back to being
a single-source again.
So, around mid-July 2002, the DIA was forced to flip back its assessment of
Iraqs BW program and the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus flipped back as
well. If Curveball wasnt corroborated, there wasnt enough evidence to conclude that
Iraq was developing and has biological weapons. The neocons would not be cleared
to state emphatically that Iraq had a secret BW program, nor could they cite the Team
B analysis of Curveball in the case for war. After Harith was declared a fabricator, the
Intelligence Communitys compromise, consensus language returned to the Vice
Presidents public statements.
Back to Capabilities
With the BW consensus back to where it was pre-Harith, the Vice Presidents public
statements about Iraqs BW program were scaled back as well. On August 7, 2002,
Cheney addressed the Commonwealth Club of California. Although he was still
cleared to refer to Saddams efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the Vice President
could now only refer to Iraqs improvement of its biological capabilities.
507
508
Ibid., p. 62.
Ibid., p. 62.
229
What we know now, from various sources, is that he

has continued to improve if you can put it in those
terms the capabilities of his chemical and biological
agents. And he continues to pursue a nuclear weapon.
That program suffered a severe setback in 1981, when
the Israelis bombed the Osiraq reactor he has
resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.509
[Authors emphasis.]
Now that Harith had been declared a fabricator, the Vice President was back to
referring to Iraqs reconstruction of its dual-use biological facilities, the al-Dawrah
Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility. It was the same story on August 26, 2002,
when Vice President Cheney addressed the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in
Nashville, Tennessee. The Intelligence Community wouldnt clear Cheney to say that
Iraq is developing and has biological weapons any more. Once again, the Vice
President had to refer to Iraqs biological capabilities.
In the past decade, Saddam has systematically broken

each of these agreements. The Iraqi regime has in fact
been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field
of chemical and biological agents. And they continue
509
Cheney, Richard. Commonwealth Club Address. The Commonwealth Club of California.

Fairmont Hotel. San Francisco, California. August 7, 2002.
http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-08cheney-qa.html Accessed: November 20, 2007.
230
to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years
ago.510 [Authors emphasis.]
Before the Bush administration could state unequivocally that Iraq had a secret
BW program, the Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought back
in line with WINPACs Team B. Curveball would need to be confirmed again.
The Campaign for War
On September 8, 2002, the White House began its official media campaign for war
with Iraq. The administrations heavy-hitters Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell
appeared on national news programs to hype the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its
WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. One day, Iraq could give biological,
chemical or even nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda to use against the United States.
The tubes, of course, were Exhibit A for the memes nuclear component. As
Ive argued, the Intelligence Community hadnt cleared the tubes, but the White
House managed to get around the clearance process by leaking WINPACs Team B
analysis to The New York Times. Nevertheless, the administrations heavy-hitters
were still very careful about how they referred to the tubes publicly. Their statements
about Iraqs BW program were equally careful.
During the media campaign, Bush administration officials were careful not to
go beyond the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus. They were not cleared to
510
Cheney, Richard. VFW Convention address. August 26, 2002. op. cit.
231
state emphatically that Iraq had a secret BW program, nor were they cleared to cite
the Team B analysis of Curveball. As much as they wanted to, they could not claim
that Iraq had mobile BW facilities. Instead, the Bush administration had to use
consensus, compromise language to imply the memes BW component. The most the
Intelligence Community could conclude was that Iraq was rebuilding facilities
capable of supporting a BW program its dual use facilities, such as al-Dawrah
Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility. The administrations statements had to
reflect the consensus: Iraq was enhancing its BW capabilities.
On September 8, 2002, Dick Cheney appeared on NBCs Meet the Press with
Tim Russert. Like his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention a month
earlier, the Vice President referred only to Iraqs increasing BW capacity.
Now, the more recent developments have to do with our

now being able to conclude, based on intelligence
thats becoming available, some of it has been made
public, more of it hopefully will be, that he has
indeed stepped up his capacity to produce and
deliver biological weapons, that he has reconstituted
his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon, that
there are efforts under way inside Iraq to significantly
expand his capability.511 [Authors emphasis.]
511
Cheney, Richard. September 8, 2002. op. cit.
232
When Secretary Powell appeared on Fox News Sunday, he could only say Iraq
was probably trying to develop biological weapons, which could be done in any
pharmaceutical facility a reference to Iraqs reconstruction of its biological sites.
With respect to biological weapons, we are confident

that he has some stocks of those weapons and he is
probably continuing to try to develop more. And
biological weapons are very dangerous because they
can be produced just about in any kind of
pharmaceutical facility.512 [Authors emphasis.]
On CNNs Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Condoleezza Rice used the
Intelligence Communitys consensus term to describe Saddams pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction. With respect to biological weapons specifically, she said only,
So, we know that he has stored the biological

weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons.
And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize
those and deliver them.513 [Authors emphasis.]
Again, the National Security Advisor had used consensus, compromise language. Iraq
had stored biological weapons in the past tense.
512
513
Powell, Colin. September 8, 2002. op. cit.

Rice, Condoleezza. September 8, 2002. op. cit.
233
On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the United Nations General
Assembly to make the case for war. In the speechs nuclear section, the President
likely dropped a caveat before he said the tubes were used for uranium enrichment.
The terrorism section of the speech cited consensus, compromise evidence for
Saddams involvement in terrorism. Similarly, the President could not cite the Team
B analysis of Curveball in the speechs BW section. He could not say unequivocally
that Iraq had a secret BW program. Instead, the President cited the compromise
intelligence, the evidence the Intelligence Communitys consensus would clear.
From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no

biological weapons. After a senior official in its
weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the
regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters
of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use
with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray
tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to
four times the amount of biological agents it declared,
and has failed to account for more than three metric tons
of material that could be used to produce biological
weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and
improving facilities that were used for the
production of biological weapons.514 [Authors
emphasis.]
514
234
Again, the consensus, compromise language was all technically true. As Ive
mentioned previously, Iraq had denied that it had had a BW program until the
defection of Saddams son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, in 1995. It was also true that Iraq
had failed to account for the BW agent its pre-Gulf War program had produced.515
And the Presidents biological weapons punchline was true as well. Iraq was
rebuilding sites that had been associated with its pre-Gulf War BW program. The
President had cited consensus, compromise evidence. Since Curveball was back to
being a single-source, he could not cite Iraqs mobile BW labs or say emphatically
that Iraq had a secret BW program.
Before the President could make the case that the neocons wanted him to
make, the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus would have to be brought in line
with WINPACs Team B. The Intelligence Community would need to confirm
Curveballs reports of mobile BW facilities again.
The Mobile BW Facilities Roll Out
On September 17, 2002, about a week after the Presidents UN address, Saddams
regime agreed to let UN inspectors return to Iraq without conditions.516 The
inspectors would be able to verify that Iraq had indeed ended all its WMD programs
in 1991. Once they had done so, there wouldnt be any need for military action. Iraq
had disarmed and had nothing to hide.
515
According to the Iraq Survey Group, Iraq likely destroyed its stocks of BW agent in 1991 and 1992
In 2002, however, the UN had been unable to verify that Iraq had done so. See, Iraq Survey Group,
Vol. 3. op. cit., p. 2.
516
Iraq Agrees to Weapons Inspections. CNN. September 17, 2002.
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/16/iraq.un.letter Accessed: November 20, 2007.
235
Iraqs concession seriously undermined the Bush administrations case for
war. Iraqs increasing BW capability was the strongest evidence the White House
could cite to support the memes BW component. UN inspectors would be able to
verify if Iraqs rebuilt biological facilities were producing vaccine or anthrax. If the
Bush administration was going to maintain its drumbeat that Iraqs BW program
posed a threat, then it needed more citable BW evidence and quickly. The
administration needed Curveballs mobile BW facilities.
The day following Iraqs announcement,

September 18, 2002, the administration got its
wish. Donald Rumsfeld testified before the House
Armed Services Committee. In his testimony, the
Defense Secretary undermined the inspection
process, claiming that Iraqs WMD facilities were
undetectable. Some biological facilities were
underground and some were mobile. The UN
Figure 26 Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld
testifies before the House
Armed Services Committee,
September 18, 2002. Source:
http://www.cnn.com/
would never be able to disarm Saddam. Rumsfeld

didnt cite the mobile facilities to The New York Times or any other media. The
Defense Secretary testified that
Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have

difficulty getting at all of his weapons of mass
destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are
mobile. They can be hidden from inspectors no matter
how intrusive. He has vast underground networks and
236
facilities and sophisticated denial and deception
techniques.
[]
And furthermore, theyve had another decade another
period of years to burrow under the ground. They
now have massive tunnelling systems. They have
mobile biological capabilities.517 [Authors emphasis.]
Rumsfeld was the first US official to state unequivocally that Iraq had mobile
biological capabilities. Curveball had recently been confirmed.
The British Governments Recent Intelligence
Several months prior to Rumsfelds testimony, in mid-March 2002, the United

Kingdoms Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had published an assessment of
Saddams bio-warfare efforts. The assessment concluded that there was no
intelligence on any BW agent production facilities but one source indicates that Iraq
may have developed mobile production facilities.518 [Authors emphasis.]
Who was that one source? A defector who had started reporting through a
liaison service in 2000 and provided the vast majority of intelligence on the
mobile facilities.519 The Butler Inquiry explains that MI6 didnt get to interview the
source until after the Iraq War, at which point the UK discovered hed been lying
517
Rumsfeld, Donald. Iraq testimony. September 18, 2002. op. cit.

519
Ibid., p. 101.
518
237
through his teeth.520 In short, the UKs one source for Iraqs mobile BW facilities
was Curveball reporting through Germanys BND. As far as the British were
concerned, Curveball was unconfirmed as of March 2002.
By September 2002, however, the JICs assessment had changed. On

September 24, the UK began its own media campaign for war. Prime Minister Tony
Blair addressed parliament on Iraqs WMD programs. To coincide with Blairs
speech, the UK government released a white paper, Iraqs Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The paper, authored by the JIC and Blairs chief media advisor, Alastair
Campbell, was billed as the assessment of the British government. In both the white
paper and the Prime Ministers address, intelligence of Saddams mobile biological
weapons facilities featured prominently. The mobile BW intelligence was the
punchline of the BW section of the Prime Ministers speech.
In respect of
biological weapons,
again production of
biological agents
has continued;
facilities formerly
used for biological
Figure 27 Prime Minister Tony Blair

addresses the House of Commons. Source:
http://www.theage.com.au/
weapons have been

rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a
programme; and again Saddam has retained the
520
Ibid., p. 101.
238
personnel who worked on it, pre 1991. In particular,
the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was
trying to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities
which are easier to conceal. Present intelligence
confirms they have now got such facilities.521
[Authors emphasis.]
Blair had referred to the notes that Iraq had handed over to UNSCOM in 1995.
The UNSCOM notes, written on an Iraqi military letterhead, suggested that Iraq had
considered mobile BW capability during the Iran-Iraq War. After citing the Iraqi
documents, Blair continued that present intelligence had confirmed the facilities.
Similarly, the British governments white paper refers to recent intelligence

that had confirmed Iraqs mobile program. Alastair Campbell and the JIC had
included the mobile facilities right up front, in the papers executive summary. The
executive summary stated much the same information as Blair did.
As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has

developed mobile laboratories for military use,
corroborating earlier reports about the mobile
production of biological warfare agents.522
The body of the white paper expanded on the corroborating reports.

521
Blair, Tony. Prime Ministers Iraq Statement to Parliament. September 24, 2002.
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1727.asp Accessed: October 20, 2007.
522
United Kingdom. Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government.
London: The Stationary Office. September 24, 2002. p. 6.
http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf Accessed: November 20, 2007.
239
UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of

mobile biological agent production facilities.523
Okay. We knew about that. Thats the UNSCOM notes from 1995.
In the past two years evidence from defectors has

indicated the existence of such facilities.524
Defectors-plural? Two years fits with Curveball (he started reporting in early2000), but its clear that the UK wasnt relying on BNDs source alone.
Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military

have developed mobile facilities. These would help
Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production
from military attack or UN inspection.525 [Authors
emphasis.]
Present intelligence? Recent intelligence? The UNSCOM notes were old

news. Curveball had begun reporting several years earlier. And the Butler Inquiry
makes it clear that the recent intelligence wasnt the INCs Mohammad Harith.526 (As
Ive mentioned, MI6 was most likely the foreign intelligence that warned the CIA
about the former major in March 2002). It turns out that MI6 had discovered a brand
523
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 22.
525
Ibid., p. 22.
526
524
240
new source that UK analysts believed had confirmed Curveball.527 His codename
was Red River.528
Red River
Red River was an Iraqi official who was secretly spying for the British. According to
the Butler Inquiry, he was an established and reliable source who had previously
provided information that had been confirmed.529 The British knew Red River and
trusted him.
In early-September 2002, the UKs JIC was working on a new assessment of

Saddams WMD programs. The assessment, due to be published on September 9,
would be the basis for Tony Blairs address to parliament and the UK governments
white paper.530 A few days before the assessments publication, Red River contacted
his MI6 case officer with information from a brand new sub-source.531
Red River told MI6 what his sub-source had told him. The sub-source knew
about these mobile systems designed for the Iraqi military fermentation
systems, he said. 532 The sub-source claimed that the Iraqis had told him that these
systems produced single cell protein, which, the Butler Inquiry explains, is a
dietary supplement suitable for animal feed. However, the source was suspicious of
527
Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Jehl, Douglas. Doubts on Informant Deleted in Senate Text. The New York Times. July 13, 2004.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E5D71E3BF930A25754C0A9629C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: November 20, 2007.
529
530
Ibid., p. 80.
531
Ibid., p. 100.
532
Ibid., p. 128.
528
241
the mobile facilities true purpose.533 After all, since when did the Iraqi military
make dietary supplement? According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, Red
Rivers sub-source also claimed that the mobile fermentation units were mounted
on trucks and railway cars.534
UK analysts believed that Red Rivers sub-source confirmed Curveball.535 The

sub-source had mentioned two specifically Curveballian details in his MI6 reports.
Like Curveball, the facilities were described as fermentation systems. Curveballs
hand-drawn designs had included details of the mobile facilities fermenters.536
Similarly, Red River had reported that Iraqs mobile systems were built inside
trucks and railcars. Again, railcars is specifically Curveballian. Curveball had
told the BND that six mobile facilities were built inside trucks and one inside a series
of railcars.537 Somehow Red Rivers sub-source had managed to confirm specific
details of a mobile program that did not exist.
According to the Butler Inquiry, the sub-source did not connect [the mobile
facilities] with biological warfare.538 He did not have to. In addition to the
Curveballian details, Red Rivers source said that he had been told the facilities
produced single cell protein, which MI6 knew was an Iraqi cover story for BW
production. Iraqs pre-Gulf War BW program had been based around the al-Hakam
facility. However, the Iraqis only admitted al-Hakams role in the program after the
defection of Hussein Kamel in 1995. Prior to Kamels defection, the Iraqis claimed
533
Ibid., p. 128.
535
Butler Inquiry. op. cit., pp. 74-75.
536
Drogin, Bob and John Goetz. op. cit.
537
Butler Inquiry. op. cit., p. 138; SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., p. 145.
538
Ibid., p. 128.
534
242
that al-Hakam is and always was intended only as a single-cell protein plant for the
production of animal feed.539
Red Rivers sub-source claimed he had been told that the mobile systems
produced single cell protein: a known Iraqi cover story for biological weapons
production. Even though the source did not specifically connect the systems to biowarfare, he had listed leading details and let the analysts make the connection
themselves. Sound familiar? It should. It was exactly the same tactic that all of the
INCs defectors had used. Abu Zeinab and Khodada had said specifically that they did
not know if the militants training at Salman Pak were al-Qaeda, but they described
their training in al-Qaeda-esque tactics. Haideri had said that he did not know if the
facilities he had worked on were related to WMDs, but described details that
suggested strongly that they were. Harith never said that the mobile labs he had
procured equipment for had anything to do with biological weapons, but the DIA
thought he had confirmed Curveball. It was exactly the same with Red Rivers subsource. According to the Butler Inquiry, Red Rivers sub-source even had links to
Iraqi opposition groups.540
An INC Operation
Most likely, the sub-source was part of the INCs disinformation operation. The INC
was trying to bring the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus in line with
WINPACs Team B. Curveball was a single-source, he hadnt been debriefed by US
officials and his credibility had become increasingly questionable. Without
539
Al Hakam. Federation of American Scientists. Washington DC. October 9, 2000.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/al_hakum.htm Accessed: November 20, 2007.
540
243
confirmation of his reports, the Bush administration could not claim emphatically that
Iraq had a secret BW program. They could only cite compromise, consensus
evidence: Iraqs reconstruction of its dual-use biological sites. Curveball needed to be
confirmed before the Intelligence Community would clear the case for war the
neocons wanted to make.
I think that Red Rivers sub-source was an INC plant, laundered through the
established and reliable MI6 source so his story would seem more credible. The
British knew Red River and trusted him.541 Laundering disinformation through trusted
sources was not a new trick for the INC. In early-February 2002, it had tried to
launder the Salman Pak story through a trusted CIA contact in the Officers Movement
for Salvation of Iraq, a rival opposition group. The INC had tried the same ploy again
in June 2002, this time attempting to use a CIA asset in a European immigration
service. Like Red River, the Immigration Service asset had reported disinformation he
had acquired from a sub-source. The only difference was that the Immigration Service
asset failed to influence the Intelligence Community. Red River would succeed.
When it needed to make its disinformation seem more credible, INCs

operation adapted. Just as Harith was an improvement over Haideri, Red Rivers subsource was an improvement over Harith. Haideri didnt pass a lie detector test. Harith
did. Haideri hadnt mentioned mobile facilities. Harith did. However, Harith only
confirmed Curveballs facilities in a broad sense. He talked about the labs airconditioning, microscopes and incubators for bacteria but he didnt mention
541
Ibid., p. 100.
244
fermenters.542 He talked about buying seven trucks for the mobile program but he
didnt mention railcars.543 Red Rivers sub-source mentioned both railcars and
fermenters. The INCs operation had adapted to improve the credibility of its
disinformation
Red Rivers timing is very significant. He reported to MI6 in early-September

2002, the week before the start of White House media campaign, the same week as an
unidentified foreign intelligence service forwarded the Modification Intelligence to
the CIA. As Ive discussed earlier, for more than a year, DOE had assessed that the
tubes could not be used as centrifuge rotors without extensive modification. In
particular, the tubes internal diameters were too narrow for significant uranium
enrichment. The Modification Intelligence suggested that the Iraqis had asked about
increasing the tubes internal diameters. Red Rivers sub-source was the same week
as the Modification Intelligence; I think that he had the same purpose as the
Modification Intelligence. He was an excuse for the Intelligence Community to
change its consensus and let the neocons cite Team B propaganda in the case for war.
Although the Modification Intelligence ultimately did not influence DOEs analysis of
the tubes, Red Rivers sub-source was far more successful. Eventually.
It looks like MI6 did not share Red Rivers new information with the US right
away. The US did not receive Red Rivers information until after Saddam announced
that he would allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. Curveball was confirmed
just in time for Rumsfelds September 18 testimony before the House Armed Services
542
543
Rose, David. Iraqs Arsenal of Terror. op. cit.

60 Minutes. op. cit.
245
Committee. In his testimony, the Defense Secretary was cleared to state
unequivocally that Iraq had mobile biological capabilities.544
In late-September 2002, a few days after Rumsfelds testimony, CIA director

George Tenet briefed the US Senate Intelligence Committee in a classified hearing on
Iraqs WMD programs. Tenet told the Committee, we know Iraq has developed a
redundant capability to produce biological warfare agents using mobile production
units.545 According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, the CIA director based his
statement on Curveball, who he described as a credible defector who worked in the
program.546 Tenet continued his briefing, saying that Curveballs reporting had been
corroborated by another source MI6s Red River.547
Red River was the reason that the Intelligence Communitys BW consensus
was now in line with WINPACs Team B. The neocons could now make the case they
wanted to make, the memes BW component: Iraq has a secret BW program.
The National Intelligence Estimate
On October 1, 2002, a few days after Tenets testimony, the Intelligence

Communitys new consensus was reflected in the National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on Iraqs WMD programs. Authored by the National Intelligence Council,
NIEs are supposed to be the Intelligence Communitys most authoritative, top-ofthe-line written judgment on a given national security issue. NIEs are typically
544
Rumsfeld, Donald. Iraq testimony. September 18, 2002. op. cit.

Robb-Silberman. op. cit., pp. 83-84.
546
Ibid., p. 216.
547
Ibid., p. 216.
545
246
ordered by the White House and take between three to six months to produce. As I
mentioned in the Tubes chapter, the Iraq NIE was ordered by the US Senate and was
rushed to publication in three weeks. Thanks to Red River, Curveball had been
confirmed. The Intelligence Communitys new BW consensus was stated clearly in
the NIEs key judgments:
Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing

bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other
mobile units for researching and filling agent into
munitions or containers, according to multiple sensitive
sources. Iraq has pursued mobile BW production
options, largely to protect its BW capability from
detection, according to a credible source.548
The Intelligence Community had concluded that Iraq has mobile BW

facilities and cited the information to multiple sensitive sources. But the National
Intelligence Council hadnt relied only on Curveball and Red River to support its
consensus. According to Robb-Silberman, the NIE cited the mobile BW conclusions
to three sources: Curveball, Red River and Mohammad Harith.
Several months earlier, the INCs Harith, the former Mukhabarat major, had
been discredited as a fabricator. In July 2002, the National Intelligence Council had
assessed that Hariths information was suspect and, technically, the NIE did not cite
any of Hariths DIA reports. Instead, the defectors information was attributed to
548
247
David Roses Vanity Fair article, Iraqs Arsenal of Terror in which Harith was
interviewed.549 The Intelligence Communitys top-of-the-line written judgment had
literally cited the Iraqi National Congress propaganda campaign to make the case for
war.
The Official Case
With the BW consensus now in line with WINPACs Team B, the Bush
administration could reference Iraqs mobile program in its case for war. The mobile
BW facilities were perfect for the White House media campaign. It didnt matter that
Saddam had let UN inspectors back into Iraq. If UN inspectors couldnt find any
evidence of the mobile program, the Bush administration could claim the facilities
were doing exactly what they were designed to do evading detection. The Iraqis
could only deny that the facilities existed, which they did, although no one believed
them. The Intelligence Communitys new consensus, it was now impossible to verify
that Iraq had disarmed.
On October 7, 2002, a week after the publication of the NIE, President Bush
delivered his famous Cincinnati speech in which he outlined the threat from Iraq. The
President no longer had to use the consensus, compromise language and cite Iraqs
reconstruction of its dual-use biological facilities. After the NIE, Bush could now say
emphatically that Iraq possesses and produces biological weapons. He could claim
that Saddam had secret, undetectable mobile weapons facilities.
549
248
Some believe we can address this danger by simply
resuming the old approach to inspections, and applying
diplomatic and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely
what the world has tried to do since 1991. The U.N.
inspections program was met with systematic deception.
The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and offices of
inspectors to find where they were going next; they
forged documents, destroyed evidence, and developed
mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of
inspectors.550 [Authors emphasis.]
The President had finally been able to make the case that the neocons had
wanted him to make. The INCs disinformation operation had strengthened the Team
B analysis enough for the Intelligence Community to agree to clear the reference to
the mobile labs. Thanks to the Iraqi National Congress, the Intelligence Communitys
consensus was now in line with WINPACs Team B.
The INC was not the only group trying to help the neocons make the case for
war. In the aftermath of 9/11, another group began working just as hard funnelling
disinformation to the Intelligence Community. The Italian military intelligence
service, SISMI, would help the President make the case that Iraq was a nuclear threat.
SISMIs disinformation would strengthen Team B analysis that Saddam had
attempted to procure uranium from Africa.
550
249
Niger
SISMIs September Report
In January 2003, about six weeks before the start of the Iraq War, President Bushs
State of the Union address would include the infamous sixteen words: The British
uranium from Africa.551 Iraqs procurement attempt was part of a litany of charges
the President made against Iraq, evidence that despite being given every opportunity,
Iraq still refused to abandon its nuclear ambitions.
The sixteen words were based in part on old intelligence from 1999. An
obscure Iraqi diplomat had travelled to several African countries on an official
mission. One of the countries the diplomat had visited was Niger, the principal export
of which was natural uranium, yellowcake.
The Intelligence Community received a report of the diplomats mission not

long after 9/11. The Bush administration had put the word out to allied intelligence
services. The US needed evidence any evidence at all of Iraqs WMDs and ties to
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Eager to help, intelligence services began flooding the
CIA with old intelligence reports. Rumours. Hearsay. Fragmentary intelligence.
Everything that hadnt been significant enough to forward originally, if it seemed to
support the meme, the CIA received it now.
551
250
The Niger report was from Italys military intelligence service, Servizio per le
Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI). On September 21, 2001, SISMI
forwarded the nearly three year old intelligence to the CIA. SISMI reported that in
February 1999, Iraqs ambassador to the Vatican City in Rome, Wissam al-Zahawie,
had travelled on an official mission to Niger. During the visit, questions were asked
as to the production of uranium ore in the countrys two mines and on the mode of
exportation of that material.552
I dont think even SISMI considered its September report very significant.
Certainly the Intelligence Community didnt. The Iraqi ambassador, Zahawie, 70, was
a Chaldean Catholic and amateur opera singer, a diplomat since the days of Iraqs
monarchy. He was not a member of Saddams inner circle. SISMIs September report
did not suggest anything more than that the ambassador had asked about Nigers
uranium mines during his visit to the country. Uranium, after all, was Nigers chief
export. The Nigeriens would have likely
discussed yellowcake with any visiting
dignitary. In any case, there was no
suggestion in SISMIs report that Zahawie
had been trying to buy black-market uranium.
When SISMIs September report

reached the Intelligence Community, no one
seems to have considered it very significant
Figure 28 Iraqs Ambassador to

the Holy See, Wissam al-Zahawie.
Source:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
either. The report was just one of many fragmentary pieces of foreign intelligence the
552
Bonini, Carlo and Giuseppe DAvanzo. Nigergate, French Spymaster Debunks Sismi Version.
David Loepp (trans.) La Repubblica (Rome). December 1, 2005.
http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2005/12/1/95016/1741 Accessed: November 28, 2007.
251
CIA received in the days after 9/11. And besides, SISMI hadnt told the Intelligence
Community anything new.
The US already knew about Zahawies trip. In fact, it had known since 1999
when the CIAs own sources had reported on the Iraqi delegation.553 Similarly, the
UK had known about the trip as well. The UK had intercepted Iraqi Embassy
communications organising the African tour.554 Although its unclear whether anyone
knew the precise purpose of Zahawies mission, no one seems to have considered it
significant in February 1999. No one seems to have considered it significant in
September 2001 either. The Intelligence Community had not interpreted Zahawies
trip to Niger as an Iraqi attempt to procure uranium.
The Zahawie Mission
In fact, we know now that Zahawies visit to Africa had nothing to do with uranium at
all. After the Iraq War, the US Iraq Survey Group determined that Saddam had no
plans to reconstitute his nuclear program until after UN sanctions were lifted.555 There
was simply no need for Iraq to try to buy uranium from Niger or anywhere else.
Without an enrichment program, there was nothing the Iraqis were going to be able to
do with it.
In the 1980s, Iraq had bought uranium from several countries, including Niger,
for its pre-Gulf War nuclear program. However, the ISG found no evidence that it had
553

United Kingdom. Intelligence and Security Committee. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
Intelligence and Assessments. Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor, MP. (Chair). London: The Stationary Office.
September, 2003, p. 28. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc0203.pdf Accessed: October 20, 2007.
555
Iraq Survey Group, Vol. 2.. op. cit. p. 1.
554
252
sought uranium from abroad since then.556 On the contrary, the ISG discovered that
Iraq had been offered large quantities of uranium from a Ugandan middleman, but had
turned the offer down.557
So, if Zahawies trip to Africa had nothing to do with uranium, what was he
doing there? According to a Time magazine interview with Zahawie himself, the Iraqi
ambassador was sent to Niger as well as Benin, Burkina-Faso and CongoBrazzaville as part of an effort to convince African heads of state to visit Iraq. 558
The idea was that if heads of state visited Baghdad, it would break the UN embargo
on flights to the country and undermine UN sanctions. According to Zahawie,
Saddam probably got the idea from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.559 In the late1990s, Gaddafi had convinced Nelson Mandela to visit Tripoli despite the UN
embargo on Libya. Zahawie did not travel to Niger buy black-market uranium. His
trip was an attempt to undermine the UN sanctions regime.560
In February 1999, Zahawie met with Nigers then-head of state, the military
dictator, Ibrahim Bar. According to Zahawie, the Nigerien tyrant greeted the
ambassador warmly and accepted his invitation to visit Baghdad. He even offered
Zahawie a gift a traditional West African camels saddle called a howdah.561
(Bars trip to Baghdad never took place, however. A few months later, Bars
bodyguards assassinated the Nigerien president in a military coup.)562 Zahawie then
556
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 10.
558
Fattah, Hasan. Saddams Niger Point-man Speaks. Time. October 1, 2003.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,491666,00.html Accessed: November 28, 2007.
559
Ibid.
560
Ibid.
561
Ibid.
562
Ibid.
557
253
travelled to the rest of the countries on his tour. However, no other heads of state
accepted Saddams invitation. With his mission complete, Zahawie returned to Italy
and the Iraqi Embassy in Rome. His entire African tour had taken less than a week.563
Team B Intelligence?
As Ive argued, no one seems to have considered SISMIs September report very
significant. No one, that is, except possibly the Bush administrations neocons. The
neocons did not need evidence to know that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons.
They only needed evidence to convince the rest of us that they were right. From the
perspective of Team B analysis, Zahawies Niger mission would have looked very
significant indeed.
The neocons Team B cells, like the WINPAC cell or the Pentagons
Wurmser-Maloof Project, interpreted intelligence to fit the neocons preconceived
conclusions. In Team B analysis, evidence that supports the conclusion is cherrypicked while evidence that contradicts the conclusion is explained away as deception.
In the absence of evidence, Team Bs fill in the gaps to fit the predetermined truth.
The absence of evidence becomes evidence that the truth is being hidden.
WINPACs Team B cell cherry-picked evidence, assumed deception and filled in the
gaps to interpret the tubes and Curveball as evidence of Iraqs nuclear and BW
programs respectively. The Wurmser-Maloof Project did the same thing to interpret
Iraqs Salman Pak facility as an al-Qaeda training camp. Using Team B analysis,
563
Ibid.
254
SISMIs September report would have looked like evidence that could convince
people of the Iraqi nuclear threat.
In September 2001, a Team B would have cherry-picked details of Zahawies

Niger mission that suggested that he was a attempting to procure black-market
uranium. As Ive mentioned, Iraq had bought Nigerien yellowcake to fuel its pre-Gulf
War enrichment program. In the absence of evidence, a Team B would have filled in
the gaps and assumed that the Iraqis were trying to buy Nigerien uranium again. For
a Team B, it wouldnt have mattered that Niger was not the only country Zahawie
visited on his tour or that most of those countries had nothing to do with uranium. A
Team B wouldnt have cared that Zahawie claimed the tours purpose was to invite
heads of state to Baghdad either. A Team B would have assumed deception to explain
away evidence that contradicts its preconceived conclusion. For a Team B, inviting
heads of state to Baghdad would have been Zahawies cover story. The diplomat
would have been assumed to have travelled to countries other than Niger to mask the
true purpose of his mission. A Team B would have concluded Zahawies Niger
mission was a uranium procurement attempt regardless of how much evidence there
was against it.
Once a Team B had assumed that the Iraqis were trying to buy uranium, then
there could be only one reason why the Nigeriens didnt tell the US about it. The
absence of evidence would have meant the Nigeriens were hiding Iraqs acquisition
attempt. A Team B would have examined the motives of Nigers government in light
of the nature of tyranny. Ibrahim Bar, Nigers dictator, would have been assumed to
want to help Saddam out of a shared hatred of the United States. Iraqs procurement
255
attempt would have been assumed successful. In other words, a Team B would have
assumed that Niger had agreed to sell yellowcake to Iraq.
Zahawies Niger mission may well have been Team B intelligence just like the
tubes, Salman Pak and Curveball. We know that in the run up to the war, the Bush
administration would desperately want to cite Iraqs pursuit of uranium from Africa to
convince the public of the Iraqi nuclear threat. Uranium was a valuable image for the
White House media campaign; it was easy for people to connect with nuclear
weapons. However before the neocons could make the case they wanted to make, the
Intelligence Communitys consensus on Niger would have to be brought in line with
the Team B analysis. The Intelligence Community would need an excuse to clear
Niger for the Bush administrations case for war.
The Operation Begins: SISMIs October Report
The Niger operation began on October 15, 2001,

about three weeks after SISMIs September report.
That day, President Bush met with Italys Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi at the White House.
Berlusconi, 65, a flamboyant media-mogul-turnedpolitician, would be one of the Bush administrations
strongest supporters in the run up to the Iraq War. In
their joint press conference outside the Oval Office,
the President and Prime Minister discussed Italys
contribution to the War on Terror. Berlusconi, the
Figure 29 President Bush

and Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi at the
White House, October 15,
2001. Source:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
256
President said, understands as well as I understand that the war on terrorism will be
waged on many fronts564
The Prime Minister has been very, not only supportive, but has asked how to
help in significant ways to fight terrorism, he continued. Im pleased that were
sharing intelligence There is a sharing of information that goes on.565
Italy was indeed sharing intelligence

with the United States. The same day, the
Berlusconi government installed a new head
of SISMI, Nicolo Pollari.566 A long time
Berlusconi ally, Pollari, 58, had links to the
Bush administrations neocons and a
reputation for extra-legal intelligence
Figure 30 SISMI Director Nicolo

Pollari. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/
activities. One of his first acts as SISMI

chief was to send a brand new report to the CIA. SISMIs new report does not seem to
have explicitly referenced Zahawies 1999 mission. Far more provocative than the
September report, the October report described a possible uranium yellowcake sales
agreement between Iraq and Niger.567 It was the start of the Niger operation.
564
Bush, George W. President Bush and Italian Prime Minister Discuss War Effort. The White
House, Washington DC. October 15, 2001.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011015-3.html Accessed: November 28, 2007.
565
Ibid.
566
Bonini, Carlo and Giuseppe DAvanzo. Nigergate, French Spymaster Debunks Sismi Version. op.
cit.
567
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit. p. 36.
257
According to the US Senate, the new report claimed that SISMI had
documentary evidence that Niger planned to ship several tons of uranium to Iraq.568
The two countries had been in negotiations since at least early-1999, but the
agreement had only been approved by Nigers State Court in late-2000.569 The
president of Niger, Mamadou Tandja, had also approved the sale and had personally
communicated his decision to Saddam Hussein.570 In October 2000, the Nigerien
foreign affairs minister, Nassirou Sabo, had informed one of his ambassadors in
Europe that Niger had concluded an agreement to provide uranium to Iraq.571
The Intelligence Community was skeptical of the October report. Analysts in

the CIA, DIA and DOE described the report only as possible. Their main problem
was that the report was very limited and lacking needed detail.572 Analysts in the
State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research were openly suspicious.573
After SISMI sent its October report, INR argued that Niger would never agree to a
black-market uranium transaction because all of Nigers uranium was strictly
controlled by Cogema, a French mining consortium.574 INR pointed out that the
Nigerien government could not have siphoned off several tons of uranium without
Cogema noticing. French managers and engineers monitor the entire operation, from
mining to milling to shipping.575 INR thought that if Niger was going to try and sell
black-market uranium, it was bound to be caught.576
568
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 36.
570
Ibid., p. 36.
571
Ibid., p. 36.
572
Ibid., p. 36.
573
Ibid., p. 36.
574
Unger, Craig. The Wars They Wanted, The Lies They Needed. Vanity Fair. July, 2006.
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/07/yellowcake200607?printable=true&currentPage=a
ll Accessed: October 20, 2007.
575
Ibid.
576
569
258
No one in the Intelligence Community took SISMIs claims very seriously.

INR was suspicious. Everyone else needed more details. The Intelligence
Communitys consensus was that the report of an Iraq/Niger uranium deal was simply
not solid.
Pollaris Letter: La Signora
A few days after the October report, new SISMI director Nicolo Pollari contacted the
CIA and personally vouched for the reports reliability.577 In a letter one-and-a-half
pages long, Pollari claimed information on the uranium deal came from a very
reliable SISMI source: a mole inside Nigers Embassy in Rome.578
Pollari told the CIA that the mole, codenamed La Signora, was a secretary at
the Nigerien Embassy. She regularly passed stolen documents to SISMI the
genuine article, the SISMI director assured. La Signora was a credible source.
She had provided reliable documents before. Pollari claimed that La Signora had
provided SISMI with Nigerien government diplomatic correspondence that described
the Iraq/Niger uranium deal.579 La Signora, he promised, could be trusted.
Thanks to Pollaris letter, the CIAs Directorate of Intelligence decided to

publish an assessment of SISMIs October report. But despite Pollaris assurances, it
577
Bonini, Carlos and Guiseppe DAvanzo. Berlusconis men doctor Niger uranium dossier. Nur
al-Cubicle (trans.) La Repubblica (Rome). November 11, 2005.
http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/11/berlusconis-men-doctor-niger-uranium.html Accessed:
November 28, 2007.
578
Ibid.
579
Ibid.
259
looks as if the CIA was not completely convinced of the uranium deal. The CIA
assessment played down SISMIs information. Although the assessment described
SISMIs allegations, it also cautioned that there was no corroboration from other
sources.580 The paper further noted that Iraq had no known facilities for processing
or enriching uranium yellowcake. In other words, the CIA was saying it didnt know
if this report was true but, even if it was, it probably wasnt a big deal anyway. If the
Iraqis were buying yellowcake, there was no evidence they had any way to enrich it.
Despite Pollaris letter, the Intelligence Community did not think SISMIs October
report was very significant.
However, it looks like someone wanted the CIA to check out the report
anyway. In November 2001, the Intelligence Community tasked the US Embassy in
Niamey (Nigers capital city) with looking into SISMIs allegations. The Embassy
thought the report was highly unlikely but arranged a meeting between the American
ambassador to Niger and the Director-General of Cogemas mining operations. In
November, the Embassy reported that the Director-General had said there was no
possibility the Nigerien government could divert any yellowcake and sell it on the
black-market.581 As INR had argued, Nigers yellowcake was too well controlled.
There was no way Niger could make a deal with Iraq for 500 tonnes of uranium.
And so, the Intelligence Community had three problems with SISMIs
October report despite Pollaris personal assurance of reliability. First of all, the report
was limited and lacked needed detail; it was unconfirmed. Secondly, an Iraqi
yellowcake procurement would not be very significant since Iraq had no known
580
581

Ibid., p. 37.
260
enrichment facilities. And finally, the US Embassy had reported that Nigers uranium
mines were too well controlled. There was no possibility Niger could divert tonnes
of yellowcake to sell to Iraq. SISMIs October report did not influence the
Intelligence Communitys consensus.
Like the rest of the neocons, Vice President Dick Cheney did not need evidence to
know that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. He only need evidence to convince
everyone else that he was right. The Vice President wanted to be able to say
unequivocally that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. He wanted to cite
Team B intelligence in the case for war. However, Cheney could not do so unless the
Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. Without strong evidence of an Iraqi
nuclear program, the Intelligence Community would force the Vice President to use
compromise, consensus language to refer to Saddams nuclear efforts.
As Ive noted previously, on November 29, 2001, Cheney was interviewed on

the American television network, ABC. Cheney had to refer to Iraqs past nuclear
activities, its pre-Gulf War program.582 The Intelligence Community did not have
enough evidence to reach a consensus that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program. At the time, DOE had assessed that Iraqs aluminium tubes were intended
for rockets. No one in the Intelligence Community considered SISMIs October report
very significant. The nuclear consensus would not allow the Vice President to
describe Iraqs nuclear program in the present tense. Before the Vice President could
582
Cheney, Richard. ABC News. November 29, 2001. op. cit.
261
make the case he wanted to make, the Intelligence Community would have to be
brought in line with WINPACs Team B.
On November 30, 2001, the day after Cheneys ABC interview, the NGICs
very suspicious text-box gave the DIA the excuse it needed to assess the tubes were
for centrifuge rotors. With DIA and WINPAC on one side and DOE and INR on the
other, the Intelligence Communitys tubes consensus was deadlocked. The Vice
President still could not refer to Iraqs present pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The Intelligence Communitys BW consensus was deadlocked as well.

Although the DIA agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, it hadnt
yet assessed Iraq had a secret biological weapons program. WINPAC, of course, had
assessed that Iraq has a BW program and even though INR and DOE disagreed with
DIA and WINPAC about the tubes, they had no formal position on Iraqs BW efforts.
So, after November 30, 2001, the Intelligence Community disagreed on which WMD
programs Iraq was pursuing, but all agreed Iraq was pursuing some kind of WMD
program. The Intelligence Community allowed the Vice President to use the new
compromise, consensus language in his public remarks. Cheney could refer generally
to Iraqs pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and WMD capabilities.583
The Intelligence Communitys WMD consensus stayed the same through

December and January. On January 29, 2002, President Bush delivered his famous
Axis of Evil State of the Union address. The speech implied Iran, Iraq and North
Korea had formed an alliance with terrorists and were plotting to attack the United
583
Cheney, Richard. Meet the Press. December 9, 2001. op. cit.
262
States with weapons of mass destruction. Again, the Intelligence Community would
not let the President state emphatically that Iraq had biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons programs. Instead, the President had to use compromise, consensus
language. He had to put Iraqs WMD programs in terms of what the Iraqis would like
to do, not in terms of what they are doing. 584
Before the President could make the case the neocons wanted him to make, the
Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought in line with the Team
B analysis. The Intelligence Community would need an excuse to clear the memes
nuclear component: Iraq is a threat because it is reconstituting its nuclear program.
SISMI would have to address the Intelligence Communitys issues with the Niger
report.
SISMIs February Report
On February 5, 2002, less than a week after the Presidents State of the Union
address, SISMI sent the CIA a second report on the alleged Iraq-Niger accord.585 As
Ive noted, the first week of February was a busy week for the disinformation
operation. That same week, the Iraqi National Congress tried to launder the Salman
Pak story through a trusted CIA contact in a rival opposition group, the Officers
Movement for Salvation of Iraq. It was also the same week that the INCs R. James
Woolsey contacted the Pentagon to refer former major Mohammad Harith and his
stories of mobile biological labs. The very same week, SISMIs new Niger report
would provide the Intelligence Community the excuse it needed to break the
584
585
263
deadlocked nuclear consensus. The February report would be DOEs excuse to
conclude that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
SISMI seems to have adapted its February report to address issues the
Intelligence Community had had with its October report. One of the main reasons
analysts had been skeptical of the October report was because it was very limited and
lacking needed detail.586 In the new report, SISMI included much more information
on the Iraq/Niger uranium deal. The report included details of the negotiations and the
verbatim text of the accord itself. SISMI provided the Intelligence Community with
direct transcriptions of its supposed documentary evidence. According to the US
Senate, the report also tied the deal explicitly to Zahawies 1999 Niger mission.
[The February report] explained that, as of early 1999,

the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican planned to visit
Niger on an official mission. The report noted that
subsequently, during meetings on July 5-6, 2000, Niger
and Iraq had signed an agreement for the sale of 500
tons of uranium. This report stated that it was providing
the verbatim text of the agreement. 587
SISMI had adapted to make its February report more credible. And it seems to
have worked. Analysts at the CIA and DIA were impressed with the detail and
substance of the second report.588 They also noticed the report matched intelligence
that an Algerian businessman, Baraka, was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador
586
Ibid., p. 36.
588
587
264
to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawi, to visit Niger and other African countries in early
February 1999.589 The extra details and the explicit connection with prior, verifiable
intelligence made the February report seem more credible. It seems that after SISMIs
February report, the DOE finally had the excuse it needed to conclude that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program.
The Consensus Flips for Cheneys Media Blitz
Since August 2001, the DOE had assessed that the Iraqi tubes could not be used in
centrifuges without extensive modification. The State Departments INR agreed with
DOE. With CIAs WINPAC and DIA concluding that the tubes were evidence of
reconstitution, the Intelligence Communitys nuclear consensus had been deadlocked.
But now, thanks to SISMIs February report, the DOE had an excuse to change its
assessment. As Ive argued in the Tubes chapter, a new DOE assessment would
highlight SISMIs Niger reporting as one of three indications that Iraq was
reconstituting its nuclear program. The DOE had flipped. The deadlock had been
broken. SISMIs Niger reporting had brought the nuclear consensus in line with
WINPACs Team B.
The consensus flipped just in time for Vice President Cheneys March media
blitz. On March 24, 2002, the Vice President appeared on CBSs Face the Nation,
NBCs Meet the Press with Tim Russert and CNNs Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer to
hype the threat from Iraq. Thanks to the INCs Harith, who DIA believed had
confirmed Curveball, the Vice President could now state that Iraq was developing
589
Ibid., p. 38.
265
and has biological weapons. Thanks to SISMI, the Vice President could now say
unequivocally that Saddam was actively pursuing nuclear weapons. 590
What I Didnt Find in Africa
After DOEs flip, the Intelligence Community agreed that Iraq was taking steps
towards nuclear reconstitution. However, the neocons now had a new problem. As
Ive explained in the Tubes chapter, the Intelligence Community disagreed on what
those steps were precisely. DOE and INR still disputed DIA and WINPACs analysis
of the tubes. While SISMIs February report seems to have convinced the DOE, it
certainly didnt convince anyone else. There was no consensus on either the tubes or
the Niger reporting. The Intelligence Community would not clear Bush administration
to cite either to convince the public that Iraq was a nuclear threat.
Most of the Intelligence Community still had issues with the Niger reportings
credibility. After the Vice President was told about SISMIs February report, he began
asking questions about the alleged uranium deal.591 In response, the CIAs
Counterproliferation Division (CPD) decided to see if it could verify or refute
SISMIs reports.592 (The CPD is the part of the CIAs Directorate of Operations that
specializes in collecting intelligence on WMD-related issues.) As it would turn out,
the CPDs new investigation would cast even more doubt on the Niger reporting.
590

592
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Background Paper: Purported Iraqi attempt to get
Uranium from Niger. April 3, 2003. p. 4.
http://www.paulweiss.com/files/upload/US%20v%20Libby%20DX64.pdf Accessed: October 21, 2007.
591
266
One of the things the CPD did to verify or refute SISMIs reports was send a
former ambassador to Niger to look into the story.593 Joseph Wilson was married to
a CPD official, Valerie Plame, who suggested her husband for the trip. Plame told the
Deputy Chief of CPD that her husband was on a first-name basis with several former
and current Nigerien officials.594 In the early1990s, Wilson had been the US ambassador to
Gabon and had many contacts Western Africa.
If anyone could find out if something was going
on, he could. CPD agreed and Wilson was
dispatched to Niger to look into SISMIs
reports.
In late-February 2002, Wilson arrived in

Niger and met with former and current Nigerien
government officials. He also met with US
Figure 31 Former Ambassador

Joseph Wilson and his wife,
former CPD official Valerie
Plame. Source:
http://www.salon.com/
Embassy staff, including the US ambassador,

and representatives of the French consortium that controlled Nigers uranium mines.
After about a week, hed reached the same conclusions that the Embassy had in
November 2001. Wilson and the Embassy agreed that it was highly unlikely that
anything was going on.595
In 2003, Joe Wilson described his Niger investigation in a famous op-ed for
The New York Times. What I Didnt Find in Africa explained how difficult it
593

Ibid., p. 39.
595
Ibid., p. 42.
594
267
would be for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq as SISMI had claimed. Wilson writes that
after he arrived in Niger,
I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and
meeting with dozens of people: current government
officials, former government officials, people associated
with the countrys uranium business. It did not take long
to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such
transaction had ever taken place.
Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the
mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to
transfer uranium to Iraq. Nigers uranium business
consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are
run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian
interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium
from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium,
which in turn is strictly monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two
mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental
entities, selling uranium would require the approval of
the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably
the President. In short, theres simply too much
268
oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have
transpired.596
There was no way that Niger could make a deal to sell yellowcake to Iraq or
anyone else. Nigers uranium was too well controlled. In retaliation for Wilsons oped, senior Bush administration officials exposed Wilsons wife, Valerie Plame, as a
covert officer in the CIAs Counter Proliferation Division.597
The INR Assessment
The State Departments INR didnt need Wilson to know that the Niger reporting was
highly dubious. INR analysts had been openly suspicious of the October report.
They had argued that Niger would never agree to a black-market uranium transaction
because it was bound to get caught. Before Wilson returned to the US, INR
published a formal assessment of SISMIs February report, Niger: Sale of Uranium
to Iraq is Unlikely.598 In its new assessment, INR went into detail on why it thought
SISMIs reports were of questionable credibility.599
INRs assessment repeated that the mining conglomerate Cogema controlled

Nigers uranium industry, not the Nigerien government. Just as Wilson would report,
INR assessed that Nigers uranium mines were too well controlled. It would be next
596
Wilson, Joseph C. What I Didnt Find in Africa. The New York Times. July 6, 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/opinion/06WILS.html?position=&ei=5007&en=6c6aeb1ce960de
c0&ex=1372824000&pagewanted=print&position= Accessed: November 30, 2007.
597
See Wheeler, Marcy. Anatomy of Deceit. Berkeley: Vaster Books, 2007.
598
599
Ibid., p. 42.
269
to impossible to steal 500 tonnes of yellowcake to sell on the black-market.600 INR
also judged that Nigers President, Mamadou Tandja (who SISMI alleged had
personally written to Saddam approving the sale), was unlikely to risk Nigers foreign
aid for short-term gain.601 Finally, INR cited the logistical nightmare the conspirators
would face trying to ship 500 tonnes of uranium in secret.
Though the alleged agreement with Iraq is not specific,

it apparently calls for the 500 tons to be delivered
[redacted] in one year. This would mean that [redacted]
25 hard-to-conceal 10-ton tractor-trailers would be used
to transport the off-the-books uranium. Because Niger is
landlocked the convoy would have to cross at least one
international border and travel at least 1,000 miles to
reach the sea. Moving such a quantity secretly over such
a distance would be very difficult, particularly because
the French would be indisposed to approve or cloak this
arrangement.602
INR did not buy SISMIs Niger reporting. The Iraq/Niger uranium deal was
too implausible. The reports were too suspicious. There was no way Niger could
deliver the material. And it looks like INR convinced the CIAs Middle East and
Africa experts in NESAF as well. As Ive argued in the Tubes chapter, NESAFs
assessment of Iraqs WMD programs only cited the tubes as evidence of Iraqs
600
Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid., p. 42.
602
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Niger: Sale of Uranium
to Iraq is Unlikely. March 1, 2002. pp. 4-5. http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/niger-uranium.pdf
601
270
nuclear reconstitution. The paper did not include the Iraq/Niger uranium
information.603
With the CIAs NESAF on INRs side, there was no way the Intelligence
Community would clear the Niger reporting for the case for war. Vice President was
now able to say unequivocally that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons, but he could
not cite SISMIs reports to convince the public that he was right. Before the Bush
administration could say that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Africa, the
Intelligence Communitys consensus would have to be brought in line with the
neocons preconceived conclusions.
SISMIs March Report
On March 25, 2002, the day following the Vice Presidents March media blitz, SISMI
sent the CIA a third and final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium accord.604
Unfortunately, the US Senate reveals very little about the March reports contents.
The report is described in one short paragraph, half of which has been [redacted] by
the CIAs censor. But what little we do know suggests that the report described the
way in which Niger planned to deliver Iraqs uranium. According to the US Senate,
The report said that the 2000 agreement by Niger to provide uranium to Iraq
specified that 500 tons of uranium per year would be delivered in [redacted].605
As Ive argued, SISMI had adapted February report to address credibility

issues with the October report. SISMI may have adapted the March report to address
603

Ibid., p. 47.
605
Ibid., p. 47.
604
271
INRs problems with February. INR had assessed that the February report was highly
dubious, in part because of the difficulty in transporting 500 tonnes of uranium
without getting caught. SISMIs March report may have claimed that Niger had
indeed figured out a way to ship the uranium without getting caught. But since we
have so little of the March report to go on, we really cant be sure. The March report
may have been an attempt to undermine INRs assessment of the Niger reporting. It
may have been an excuse for DOE to ignore INR and maintain its conclusion that
SISMIs reports were evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
The Situation Circa March 2002
SISMI, Italys military intelligence service, had sent the CIA three reports based on
Zahawies 1999 mission to Niger. The head of SISMI, Nicolo Pollari, claimed the
reports source was a mole in Nigers Embassy in Rome, La Signora. According to
Pollari, La Signora had provided documentary evidence that Niger had agreed to sell
black-market uranium to Iraq. SISMIs first report, sent in October 2001, consisted of
summaries of the supposed documents.
No one in the Intelligence Community believed SISMIs October report. The

report was too limited, there was no corroboration and, even if the report was true, a
uranium procurement would not be significant for an Iraqi nuclear program. Iraq had
no known uranium facilities. SISMI had not convinced the Intelligence Community
that Niger had signed an agreement to supply uranium to Iraq.
272
After the Presidents State of the Union address, SISMI adapted its story to
address several of the Intelligence Communitys issues. SISMIs February report
provided more details direct transcriptions of La Signoras supposed documentary
evidence, including the verbatim text of the agreement. In the report, SISMI linked
the uranium accord to prior, verifiable intelligence. The Italian service claimed
negotiations between Iraq and Niger had begun during Zahawies mission to Africa in
1999.
The February report was DOEs excuse to flip the nuclear consensus. The
same week, the INCs Harith was DIAs excuse to flip the BW consensus and the INC
tried to launder the Salman Pak story to influence the consensus on Iraq/al-Qaeda.
Thanks to SISMI and DOEs flip, Vice President Cheney could now say publicly that
Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapon. However, the Vice President could not cite the
Niger reports specifically. SISMIs reporting was still vigorously disputed in the
Intelligence Community.
After SISMIs February report, the CPD launched a new investigation into the
alleged Iraq/Niger deal. Former ambassador Joseph Wilson was sent to Niger and
quickly determined what most of the Intelligence Community already determined:
there was no way Niger could steal uranium to sell on the black market.
Before Wilson even returned from Niger, INR assessed that SISMIs Niger
reporting was of questionable credibility. Nigers uranium was too well controlled,
Nigers President was unlikely to sell uranium to rogue states and the uranium would
273
be too difficult to transport without getting caught. CIAs Middle East and Africa
experts, NESAF, agreed with INR.
SISMIs third and final report, the March report, may have been an attempt to
undermine INRs assessment. The report may have claimed Niger was delivering the
uranium undetected after all. But even if it did, it doesnt look like it had much of an
effect. From March 2002, the Intelligence Communitys nuclear consensus seems to
have stayed the same. There was agreement that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons,
but no agreement on the underlying evidence. DOE and INR disputed the tubes. INR
and CIAs NESAF disputed the Niger reporting. Before the neocons could cite
specific evidence of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution, the Intelligence Communitys
consensus would have to change. The consensus on the tubes and Niger would have
to be brought in line with the Team B analysis.
The Niger Documents
No one in the Intelligence Community had noticed it yet, but SISMIs February report
contained a very telling mistake. In the report, SISMI had sent the verbatim text of
the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium accord. The verbatim text said that the accord had
been signed on Wednesday, July 7, 2000.606 However, July 7, 2000 was not a
Wednesday. It was actually a Friday.
As it would turn out, SISMIs reports were summaries and transcriptions of

forgeries, the infamous Niger Documents. We have to skip ahead now to early-
606
Robb-Silberman. op. cit., pp. 78; 214.
274
October 2002. It was several months after SISMIs third and final report. The White
House was in the middle of its media campaign to hype the Iraqi threat. The tubes
were Exhibit A that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Donald Rumsfeld had
debuted Curveballs mobile BW facilities in his congressional testimony. The
Intelligence Community had just published its National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqs
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The US Congress was just
about to vote to authorise the Presidents use of force against Iraq. It was the night of
the Presidents Cincinnati speech that the infamous Niger Documents surfaced
publicly for the first time.
The Niger Documents first surfaced with an

Italian intelligence peddler, Rocco Martino.607 An
ex-SISMI officer, Martino was fired from the
intelligence service for conduct unbecoming in
the 1990s.608 Now in his mid-60s, Martino made a
comfortable living selling state secrets and pilfered
documents freelance. In early-October 2002, he
contacted an Italian journalist with a proposition.
Rocco had a dossier to sell.609
Figure 32 Ex-SISMI officer

and freelance intelligence
peddler, Rocco Martino.
Source:
http://austin.indymedia.org/
The journalist was Elisabetta Burba, then working for the Berlusconi-owned
Italian daily, Panorama. Burba had already used Rocco as a source for several stories,
607
Burba, Elisabetta. The Scoop That Never Was. Nur al-Cubicle (trans.) Panorama. July 24, 2003.
http://nuralcubicle.blogspot.com/2005/12/panorama-magazine-niger-yellowcake.html Accessed:
November 30, 2007.
608
Ibid.
609
Ibid.
275
one of which had been an international scoop.610 On the phone with Burba, Martino
was vague about the dossiers contents. A certain moustachioed friend had bought
uranium from Africa, he told her.611 The ex-SISMI officer said he had proof:
contracts, letters, and memoranda of understanding. His asking price was ten million
lire.612
On October 7, 2002, Burba met with Rocco in a

bar in Milan. He showed her the dossier 17 pages of
documents, written in French and Italian and stamped
with words like confidentiel and urgent. The
documents appeared to be diplomatic correspondence
letters, telexes, faxes stolen from the Nigerien Embassy
in Rome. They seemed to describe Nigers sale of
uranium to Iraq.
Figure 33 Panorama
journalist Elisabetta
Burba. Source:
http://schema-root.org/
Where did he get the documents, Burba asked. Martino told Burba that a
contact of his, a woman working as a secretary in the Nigerien Embassy, had given
him the dossier.613 She was reliable, he promised. Shed sold him documents before.
But despite Roccos assurances, Burba was skeptical. The story seemed a little too
good to be true.
610
Ibid.
Ibid.
612
Ibid.
613
Ibid.
611
276
Burba went through Martinos dossier. It did little to quell her doubts.614 The
text of the purchase agreement was missing; there was only a cover letter. And
some of the documents looked suspicious. One document, a letter, dated July 30,
1999, talks about facts which occurred in 2000, Burba wrote in her 2003 account.
And someone has corrected the 99 to 2000 with a pen. Aye-yai-yai!615 With so
many doubts, Burba told Rocco that before she could pay him, she would have to
check with Panoramas editors.
The next day, October 8, she met with the assistant editor, Giorgio Mul, and
then with the editor-in-chief, Carlo Rossella.
[Giorgio] hands the document to Rossella, who narrows

his eyes to concentrate. If this is true, then we have the
smoking gun, he finally exclaims. But only if its true.
Certainly the risk of a swindle is stratospheric. What to
do? I suggest going to Niger: Agreed says Rossella.
Mul interrupts, Yes, a fact-finding mission to Niger is
absolutely essential.616
So Burba would travel to Niger to investigate potential uranium trafficking.

But her editor-in-chief also suggested another way to confirm the story: take Roccos
documents to the US Embassy in Rome. Lets consult the Americans, Rossella said.
Theyve done most of the investigating into weapons of mass destruction, so theyd
614
Ibid.
Ibid.
616
Ibid.
615
277
be the only people who can establish the authenticity of the documents.617 The
editor-in-chief called the US Embassy and set up an appointment. Burba met with the
Americans the next day.
On October 9th, Im in Via Veneto. [Location of the US

Embassy.] I have an appointment with an Italian
national a press liaison officer. He introduces me to
his American boss and disappears. We go to the
cafeteria. I begin to speak cautiously. When the
American understands what Im talking about, he makes
a phone call and takes me to his office, where three
other persons join us. I explain that Im there seeking
confirmation. They ask me questions, and try to make
me identify my source. In vain. But I tell them that
Rossella has given his permission for them to make a
photocopy. I then leave.618
The next day, October 10, 2002, Rocco faxed Burba a further two documents,
letters written in code from the Nigerien government to Nigers Embassy in Rome.
The four-page fax included the letters decryptions, which revealed more information
about the secret uranium deal. One decryption was from the commander of the
mining base. The other said that Niger would ship the uranium secretly by sea.619
617
Ibid.
Ibid.
619
Ibid.
618
278
On October 17, 2002, Burba arrived in Niamey to investigate the story.620 She
quickly came to the same conclusion that Joseph Wilson and US Embassy in Niger
had reached several months earlier: Nigers uranium was too well controlled. It was
highly unlikely that the Nigerien government could sell yellowcake to Iraq without
getting caught. Burba writes that
They put the yellowcake in 400-liter containers, filled

halfway. 200 kilograms per container. Then they are
transported to Cotonou, where they are loaded aboard
ship. The organization required for that level of
trafficking involves enormous problems of
transportation and security. The highways are infested
with bandits. Thered have to be a huge deployment of
men, in addition to trucks. My source is not aware that
500 tons are involved which would require 2,500
containers to be moved by truck from Africa and
transported to Iraq via Turkey. It seems like a political
fiction thriller I return to Italy empty-handed. As far
as fact-checking is concerned, I have little or nothing.621
Returning from Niger, Burba decided not to write the Iraq-Niger uranium
story. Martinos documents were too implausible, too suspicious. They were probably
forgeries. Much to Roccos disappointment, Burba also decided not to pay him the ten
620
621
Ibid.
Ibid.
279
million lire hed asked for. 622 And so that was that. Burba put the episode behind her.
It would be months after the Iraq War before she realised the significance of what had
happened.
The Forgeries Exposed
The Niger Documents went from Martino to Burba to the US Embassy in Rome. The
Embassy then faxed the documents to the US State Department, which forwarded
them to the Intelligence Community.623 In February 2003, just weeks before the start
of the Iraq War, the UNs International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had asked the
US to substantiate claims that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa.624 The US
handed over Roccos documents to the IAEA.
The UN quickly exposed most of the documents as bad forgeries very bad
forgeries in fact. In March 2003, the Reuters news service broke the story, Coalition
Faked It, says UN.625 UN officials had been able to determine the documents were
fake with a simple Google search.
A few hours and a simple internet search was all it took

for UN inspectors to realize documents backing US and
British claims that Iraq had revived its nuclear program
were crude fakes, a UN official said.
622
Ibid.
624
Ibid., p. 67.
625
Charbonneau, Louis. Coalition faked it, says UN. Reuters. March 13, 2003.
http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/10-11-03/discussion.cgi.21.html Accessed: November 30, 2007.
623
280
Speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, a senior
official from the UN nuclear agency who saw the
documents offered as evidence that Iraq tried to buy 500
tons of uranium from Niger, described one as so badly
forged his jaw dropped.
When [UN experts] started to look at them, after a few
hours of going at it with a critical eye things started to
pop out, the official said, adding a more thorough
investigation used up resources, time and energy we
could have devoted elsewhere.
[]
Two documents were particularly bad. The first was a
letter from the President of Niger which referred to his
authority under the 1965 constitution. That constitution
has been defunct for nearly four years, the official said.
[]
Another letter about uranium dated October 2000
purportedly came from Nigers foreign minister and
was signed by a Mr. Alle Elhadj Habibou, who has not
been foreign minister since 1989.
To make matters worse, the letterhead was out of date
and referred to Nigers Supreme Military Council
281
from the pre-1999 era which would be like calling
Russia the Soviet Union.626
About four months later, the Niger Documents were published in two Italian
newspapers, Panorama and La Repubblica. From La Repubblica the documents went
to Americas NBC News and from there they went online. My copies came from
journalists Knut Royce and Peter Eisner, who got them from Elisabetta Burba. They
were nice enough to scan the documents and email them to me.
SISMI told the CIA that it received documentary of evidence of the Iraq-Niger
uranium deal from a reliable source: La Signora, a mole in the Nigers Embassy in
Rome. However, the Niger Documents can tell us a lot about who forged them and
why. Its very unlikely that SISMI told the CIA the truth.
To distinguish between documents, internet nerds have established a practice

of referring to each document by its unofficial number: Doc 1, Doc 2, Doc 3,
Doc 4 etcetera. Since Im an internet nerd myself, I plan to keep with the
practice. Also, I dont speak French or Italian, so thanks to D for the translations.
The first documents well look at are Docs 3, 4 and 5, the so-called 1989
documents. Although theyre dated 2000, they seem like theyre stuck in a late-1980s
time warp. Docs 3, 4 and 5 all reference details about Niger names, letterheads, laws
that were accurate in 1989.
626
Ibid.
282
Document 3
283
284
Translation:
[Coat-of-Arms]
REPUBLIC OF NIGER
FRATERNITY-WORK-PROGRESS
Niamey, 07/27/2000
Mr. President,
I am honoured [or It is my honour] to refer to the Agreement # 301-NI 2000,

concerning the supply of uranium, signed in Niamey on the 6th of July 2000, between
the government of the Republic of Niger and the Government of Iraq by their official
delegated representatives.
The said supply, equivalent to 500 tons of pure uranium per year, will be delivered in
two phases.
Having seen and examined the said agreement, I approve each and all of its provisions
by the power invested in me by the constitution of the 12th of May 1966.
285
Accordingly, I pray you to consider this letter as the formal voucher [instrument, tool]
of approval of this agreement by the government of the Republic of Niger that is
hence [or thus] by this lawfully bound.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest regards
[Signature and seal of the President of the Republic of Niger]
286
Doc 3: The Presidents Letter
Dated July 27, 2000, Doc 3 claims to be a letter to the President of Iraq from the
President of Niger. In the letter, the Nigerien president communicates his approval of
a recently signed accord (agreement in the English translation). Under the terms
of the accord, Niger will supply Iraq with 500 tonnes of pure uranium in two
phases per year.
According to the IAEAs investigation, the illegible signature on the letter

bears no resemblance to that of Nigers actual president, Mamadou Tandja.627 The
badly drawn coat-of-arms and the reference to Nigers defunct 1966 constitution are
other giveaways that the letter is a forgery. However, analysis of the document can
tell us more than just that its a fake. The document can tell us about who the forger is
and what he knows about Niger.
Although its clear the coat-ofarms in the documents letterhead was

hand drawn, its definitely supposed to be
Nigers coat-of-arms. The sun in the
middle, two swords crossed over a spear
on the right, three ears of corn on the left,
all over the head of a zebu a type of
long-horned cow in West Africa are the
627
Ibid.
Figure 34 The coat-of-arms of the Republic

of Niger. Source: http://www.wikipedia.org/
287
symbols on Nigers actual coat-of-arms. The forger was copying from a genuine
image, a genuine Nigerien document.
But the fact that the forger knows where to put the zebu on Nigers coat-ofarms is quite strange. The forger gets so many other things about Niger completely
wrong. Doc 3 is dated July 2000 and cites the Presidents authority under the
constitution of 12 May 1966. However, in April 1999, Nigerien President Ibrahim
Bar was assassinated in a military coup. The coup leaders abolished Bars despotic
regime and Nigers constitution along with it. According to the CIAs World
Factbook, Niger adopted a new constitution on July 18, 1999.628 The forger seems not
to know about Nigers new constitution.
But, if the forger knows very little about Niger, how does he know where to
draw the zebu on the Nigerien coat-of-arms? My guess is that the forgers got a
genuine Nigerien document and copied the coat-of-arms from that. But I dont think
he has much else. The forger doesnt have detailed knowledge of Nigers recent
political history. He only has the document in front of him.
628
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Niger. The World Factbook. November 15, 2007.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html Accessed: November 30,
2007.
288
Document 4
289
Translation:
REPUBLIC OF NIGER
SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION
DIRECTORATE OF JURIDICAL AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS
N_______MAE/[????????]
NIAMEY, 10 OCT. 2000
[from] THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND COOPERATION
To Mister the Ambassador of Niger/
ROME
N 07254
SUBJECT: Protocol of agreement between the government of Niger and the
government of Iraq concerning the supply of Uranium, signed on the 5th and the 6th of
July 2000, in Niamey.
For your information, I am honoured to remit to [in the sense of sending a copy that is
for personal vision and use], [lawfully] issued by the Niger state, of the
abovementioned protocol of agreement signed in Niamey between the Republic of
Niger and the government of Iraq concerning the supply of Uranium.
Accompanying document: 1
Allele Elhadj Habibou
[Signature, Seal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation]
[Receipt Stamp] [28/9/00]
290
Doc 4: The Cover Letter
Doc 4 is supposedly a letter from the Nigerien minister of foreign affairs and
cooperation, Allele ElHadj Habibou. Dated October 10, 2000, the letter addresses the
Nigerien ambassador at the Niger Embassy in Rome, Italy. Doc 4 is apparently a
cover letter that accompanies the text of an accord concerning the Nigerien
governments supply of uranium to Iraq. The letter says the minister has sent the
accord to the ambassador for information purposes sort of a heads-up, an FYI.
Elisabetta Burba was suspicious of Doc 4 almost immediately.629 In the

bottom right-hand corner of the cover letter is a receipt stamp, the date the letter
supposedly arrived at the Nigerien Embassy in Rome September 28, 2000. But since
Doc 4 was dated October 10, the receipt stamp meant that the letter was received two
weeks before it was sent.
Burba also noticed that the documents attached pages, which she presumed
was the text of the uranium accord, were not included in Roccos dossier.630 (If the
Iraq-Niger uranium accord exists, it is yet to surface. On the internet, the accord is
sometimes referred to as Doc X.)
Like Doc 3, Doc 4 is a 1989 document. Both forgeries are based on

information about Niger that was accurate in the late-1980s. The dead giveaway in
Doc 4 is its letterhead and the name it lists as Nigers foreign minister. Doc 4s
629
630
Burba, Elisabetta. op. cit.

Ibid.
291
letterhead refers to Nigers former military government, the Conseil Militaire
Supreme or Supreme Military Council. The Supreme Military Council was a military
junta that ruled Niger from 1974 until May 1989.631 (After 1989, the Conseil
suprieur dOrientation Nationale or Higher Council of National Orientation took
power).632 As the IAEA noted, referring to Nigers government as the Supreme
Military Council was like referring to Russia as the Soviet Union.633
In addition to the out-of-date government, Doc 4 also cites an out-of-date

foreign minister. Allele Elhadj Habibou supposedly signed Doc 4 in October 2000.
However, Habibou was the Nigerien foreign minister from 1988-1989.634 In October
2000, Nigers foreign minister was named Nassirou Sabo.635
Just like Doc 3, Doc 4 demonstrates that the forger is probably using genuine
Nigerien documents that are out-of-date. For Doc 4, hes likely lifted the letterhead,
seal and signature from a real Nigerien diplomatic letter. But the letter would have
been from the period between 1988, when Habibou became foreign minister, and May
1989, when the Supreme Military Council ceased to exist.
It seems very unlikely that the forger had access to more up-to-date Nigerien
correspondence.
631
Niger: Heads of State: 1960-2007. Archontology.org. August 17, 2007.

http://www.archontology.org/nations/niger/00_1960_td_s.php Accessed: November 30, 2007.
632
Niger: History. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Ed. Columbia University Press, 2007.
http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/world/A0860001.html Accessed: November 30, 2007.
633
Charbonneau, Louis. op. cit.
634
Allele Elhadj Habibou. Contemporary Africa Database. The Africa Centre. London. December
17, 2003. http://people.africadatabase.org/en/person/15168.html Accessed: November 30, 2007.
635
Foreign Ministers: L-R. Rulers.org. 2007. http://www.rulers.org/fm3.html Accessed: November
30, 2007.
292
Document 5
293
294
Translation:
ANNEX 1
The direction of judicial affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the person of his
Excellency the Minister and the support of [orig. la tien? Possibly le soutien, with
the backing/support of... A possible variant would be ....in the person of his
Excellency the Minister concurring with the Ministry of Mines in the person of....]
the Ministry of Mines in the person of the Minister in Charge, gathered in assembly,
declared as follows:
The State Court, called upon to deliver an opinion in accordance with Article
20 of Ordinance n 74-13 of July 5th, 2000, concerning the creation,
composition, attribution[s] and functions of the State Court, arraigned in the
Palace Council Chamber of the said Court on Wednesday July 7th, 2000, at
nine oclock;
Read the letter n 488/MJ/SO of July 3rd, 2000, of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation:
Requesting to solicit a favourable opinion from the State Court on the

following points [accounts, clauses]:
If on one hand the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the

Republic of Niger and the Government of Iraq concerning the purchase of
pure uranium, signed on July 6th 2000, in Niamey conforms to the laws of the
295
Republic of Niger, and if it constitutes a valid and binding engagement for the
Republic;
-
If further it had been duly signed and approved by the Government of Iraq in
compliance with all administrative norms applicable and thus constituting for
the said government a valid and binding agreement;
DECLARES
That the State of Niger has satisfied all the requirements of constitutional law and all
other principals of law for a valid and lawfully binding assumption of all obligations
resulting therein [from, within] the Protocol of Agreement;
That the representative of the State of Niger and the representative of Iraq, who have
signed in the names of their respective governments, had the lawful power of
representation.
Were present Misters:
Mamadou Malan Aouami, President of the Court of Niger; Hadj Nadjir, Counsellor
[or advisor, lawyer] of the Government of Iraq, Mahamane Boukari, Acting
Counsellor [or advisor, lawyer] of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Niger, in the
presence of Mr. Bandiaire Ali, Attorney General of Iraq, and with the assistance of
Master Maiga Ali, Chief [first] Clerk.
296
Doc 5: The State Court
Of the three 1989 documents, Doc 5 is definitely the most interesting. Doc 5 is not a
letter like the other two. Instead, its the text of a Nigerien State Court (Cour dEtat)
decision, ratifying the Iraq-Niger uranium accord. The document starts by citing the
law governing the Court, then states the time and date of the decision. The Court then
reads a letter from the foreign minister, asking if an accord in which Niger has agreed
to supply uranium to Iraq is legally binding for both the governments. The Court
concludes, yes, the accord is legally binding. The representatives that signed the
agreement were legal representatives of their respective governments. Finally, Doc 5
lists the names of the court members.
Its difficult to judge about how close Docs 3 and 4 are to actual Nigerien
letters because there are so few examples of the genuine article to compare them with.
This is not the case with Doc 5, however. As it turns out, every State Court decision
from 1962 to 1994 is available online.636 With the miracle of the internet, we can see
exactly what Doc 5 is supposed to look like.
Its clear from the online database that our forger has access to genuine
Nigerien court documents. Doc 5s form and style are consistent with actual State
Court decisions. For example, Doc 5 repeats legal citations, cites the relevant law for
the courts authority, correctly names courts chamber (the Palace of the said Court
palais de ladite Cour) and follows the practice of listing the court members at the
636
Afrique de lOuest - Niger - Cour supreme. Droit Francophone. Organisation Internationale De La

Francophonie. 2007. http://droit.francophonie.org/df-web/collection.do?databaseId=252 Accessed:
November 30, 2007.
297
end of the document. However, just like Docs 3 and 4, Doc 5 is a 1989 document.
The forgers information about Niger is still limited to the late-1980s.
The forger refers to the court as the State Court, but this name is more than a
decade out-of-date. In Nigers 1999 constitution, the court is referred to as the Cour
Supreme (Supreme Court). The name used in Doc 5, Cour dEtat, was the courts
title under Nigers old military junta, the Supreme Military Council. The State Court
was renamed the Supreme Court in 1990.637
The forger makes a similar mistake with the law he cites for the courts
authority. He mentions lordonnance no. 74-13 du 5 juillet 2000, portant creation,
composition attribution et fonctionnement de la Cour dEtat. This is almost a direct
quote that appears in every State Court decision prior to 1990. The only difference is
the date of lordonnance it was actually adopted on August 13, 1974, not July 5,
2000.638 When the State Court became the Supreme Court, the law governing its
authority changed as well. Since June 1990, all Nigerien Supreme Court decisions
have cited the courts authority under la loi 90-10.639
But Doc 5s most revealing anachronism is the list of names cited as court
members. The five names are:
637
Mamadou Malam Aouami, President of the Court of Niger.
For example, compare Republique du Niger. La Cour dEtat. Arrt no 90-1/c du 18 janvier 1990.
http://droit.francophonie.org/df-web/publication.do?publicationId=972 Accessed: November 30, 2007.
and Republique du Niger. La Cour Supreme. Arrt no 90-67/s du 13 dcembre 1990.
http://droit.francophonie.org/df-web/publication.do?publicationId=1049 Accessed: November 30,
2007.
638
For example, Republique du Niger. La Cour dEtat. Arrt no 88-2/p du 7 avril 1988.
639
Republique du Niger. La Cour dEtat. Arrt no 90-52/c du 7 juin 1990.
298
Hadj Nadjir, Advisor to the Government of Iraq.
Mahamane Boukari, Interim Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Bandiaire Ali, Attourney-General of Iraq.
Maiga Ali, Chief Clerk.
All of these names show up in the online database as members of the 1989 State
Court. For example, theres this decision from February 9, 1989.
O taient prsents Messieurs :

MAMADOU MALAM AOUAMI, Prsident ;
MAHAMANE BOUKARI et HADJI NADJIR,
Conseillers ; ALI BANDIARE, Procureur Gnral, et
Matre MAIGA ALI, Greffier en Chef.640
Hadj Nadjir and Mahamane Boukari were Nigerien conseillers or

lawyers. Doc 5 also names a Bandiaire Ali as Iraqs attourney-general. The
forger used the name of Nigers attourney-general, Ali Bandiare, but switched his first
name with his last to turn him into an Iraqi.
The only time all five individuals served as members of the State Court was
between February and May 1989. Most likely, the forgers the source document for
Doc 5 was a real Nigerien State Court decision from the first half of 1989. I dont
think the real document had anything to do with a uranium sale. Probably the forger
put uranium references into whatever Nigerien documents he had available. In the
640
Republique du Niger. La Cour dEtat. Arrt no 89-4/p du 9 fevrier 1989.

299
case of Doc 2, the source document was likely an old diplomatic letter. With Doc 5,
the source document was an old State Court decision.
Docs 3, 4 and 5 and the SISMI Reports
In its October report, SISMI sent the CIA summaries of documents alleging Niger had
agreed to sell uranium to Iraq. SISMIs documents were Docs 3, 4 and 5. Everything
in the October report shows up in the three 1989 documents. In the report, the
uranium agreement had been approved by Nigers President. The President had
communicated his decision to Saddam Hussein. 641 Thats Doc 3. The report also
claimed that the State Court of Niger had approved the agreement a clear
reference to Doc 5.642 Finally, SISMIs report alleged that in October 2000, the
Nigerien foreign minister had informed one of his ambassadors in Europe of the
accords conclusion.643 Doc 4 is dated October 2000 and describes Nigers foreign
minister doing exactly that. The minister supplies the Nigerien ambassador in Rome
with a copy of the concluded accord for information purposes. The documentary
evidence SISMI summarized in its October report were Docs 3, 4 and 5.
The Robb-Silberman Commission buries the CIAs discovery that the

forgeries were the basis for SISMIs reports in an endnote:
The errors in the original documents, which indicated

they were forgeries, also occur in the February 2002
report that provided a verbatim text of the agreement,
641

Ibid., p. 36.
643
Ibid., p. 36.
642
300
indicating that the original reporting was based on the
forged documents.644
For the February report, SISMI provided direct transcriptions of the forgeries.
The February report contains direct quotes from Docs 3, 4 and 5. According to the US
Senate, SISMIs report stated that the Iraq-Niger accord was signed during meetings
held July 5-6, 2000, just as described in Docs 3, 4 and 5.645 The report also
specified the exact same amount of uranium to be shipped to Iraq 500 tonnes.646
But the dead giveaway is a mistake in Doc 5 that SISMI repeats verbatim. In
the February report, July 7, 2000 is said to be a Wednesday when it was actually a
Friday.647 In Doc 5, the State Court meets on Mercredi 7 juillet 2000 the same
Wednesday that was really a Friday. SISMIs October and February reports were
based on Docs 3, 4 and 5.
What Did SISMI Know?
So, the question now is did SISMI know its reports were based on forgeries? Was
SISMI deliberately trying to deceive the CIA? The answer is an unequivocal yes. In
its October report, SISMI corrected one of the forgers mistakes.
Docs 3, 4 and 5 are 1989 documents. The forger used information about Niger
that was accurate in 1989. In Doc 4, Nigers foreign minister informs Nigers
644

646
Ibid., p. 37.
647
Ibid., p. 47.
645
301
ambassador in Rome of the uranium accord. Although Doc 4 is dated October 2000,
its signed by Allele Elhadj Habibou, Nigers foreign minister from 1988-1989.
But heres the thing. According to the US Senate, SISMIs October report
claimed that in October 2000 Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs Nassirou Sabo
informed one of his ambassadors in Europe that Niger had concluded an accord to
provide several tons of uranium to Iraq.648 [Authors emphasis.]
In October 2000, Nigers foreign minister really was Nassirou Sabo.649 SISMI
knew that the forger had the wrong name, so it substituted the correct name in its
October report. The military intelligence service corrected the forgers mistake. That
means that SISMI knew the documents were forgeries before it sent the reports. The
CIA was set up. SISMI was in on it.
A few days after the October report, SISMI director Nicolo Pollari had
contacted the CIA and personally vouched for the reliability of SISMIs source.
Pollari claimed that the report was based on documentary evidence acquired from a
mole inside Nigers Embassy in Rome, La Signora.650 He was almost certainly
lying. Even if SISMI believed the documents were genuine (which it didnt), there is
no way Docs 3, 4 and 5 came from inside the Nigerien Embassy. If the forger was
part of the Embassys staff, he would have had access to current Nigerien
correspondence. He would have known the correct name of Nigers foreign minister.
He would have known about Nigers new constitution. His information about Niger
648
Ibid., p. 36.
Rulers.org. op. cit.
650
Bonini, Carlos and Guiseppe DAvanzo. Berlusconis men doctor Niger uranium dossier. op. cit.
649
302
would not be limited to the late-1980s. Docs 3, 4 and 5 did not come from Nigers
Embassy. Pollari lied to the CIA.
Its far more likely that the forger put together the documents on the fly, using
whatever he had available. He knew about Zahawies mission to Niger and had some
old Nigerien documents lying around. (An ex-intelligence officer perhaps? Someone
posted to West Africa in the late-1980s and kept a few souvenirs?) Around October
2001, he cooked up Docs 3, 4 and 5 and contacted SISMI. The forger used the
intelligence service to launder the documents to the CIA. Since Pollari knew the
documents were forgeries, he must have known the forger too. Most likely, SISMI
was complicit in the disinformation campaign against the Intelligence Community.
303
Document 2
304
Translation:
REPUBLIC OF NIGER
COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION
DIRECTORATE OF JURIDICAL AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS
N ---05055/MAE/IA/[?]
URGENT
[2000]
Niamey, the 30th OF JULY 1999
Please kindly contact His Excellency the Ambassador of Iraq Mister Wissam al
Zahawie to hear [find out, learn, know, have] the decision of his country concerning
the supply of uranium as agreed to in the most recent talks [or as established by the
most recent talks... or in accordance with the latest talks...] held in Niamey on June
28, 2000.
Please follow this very confidential matter with the utmost [lit. maximum] discretion
and care [or diligence].
Nassirou Sabo
[Signature, Seal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs]
305
Doc 2: The Zahawie Document
SISMIs October report was based on Docs 3, 4 and 5. Neither the report nor the
documents mention Wissam al-Zahawie or his mission to Niger in early-1999. SISMI
did not implicate Zahawie in the Iraq-Niger uranium deal until the February report.
The only forgery to explicitly name Zahawie is Doc 2.
Doc 2 is a letter is supposedly from Nigers foreign minister to Nigerien

ambassador in Rome. In the letter, the foreign minister asks the ambassador to get in
touch with Zahawie about Nigers supply of uranium to Iraq. In the narrative of the
forgeries, Doc 2 takes place just before Iraq and Niger formally conclude the uranium
accord. The document establishes Zahawie as the principal point of contact for the
Nigerien government.
When Elisabetta Burba first received Doc 2 from Martino, the Panorama
journalist was immediately suspicious of the letter.651 In terms of clumsy mistakes,
Doc 2 is perhaps the worst forgery of all the Niger Documents. The date stamp in the
letters top right-hand corner has been hand-corrected to read 2000 instead of
1999. Doc 2 seems very rushed.
But despite the clumsy mistake, Doc 2 is actually an improvement over the
1989 documents. Doc 4 uses a 1989 letterhead and is signed by Nigers 1989 foreign
minister, Allele Elhadj Habibou. Doc 5 refers to members of Nigers 1989 State
651
306
Court. In Doc 3, the forger doesnt seem to know about Nigers new 1999
constitution. In Doc 2, however, its clear that the forgers information about Niger
has been updated.
The name of Doc 2s foreign minister is now Nassirou Sabo, Nigers foreign
minister in 2000. The documents letterhead no longer refers to Nigers 1989 military
junta, but Nigers 1999 Council of National Reconciliation (Conseil de
Reconciliation Nationale). For Doc 2, the forger is using updated information about
Niger.
So, what happened? I think SISMI knew who the forger was and wanted to
help him make his forgeries more credible. Some time after the October report, SISMI
probably told the forger about the mistakes it had to fix the name of Nigers foreign
minister and the name of Nigers government. So, when forger has gone to make Doc
2 (in a rush, apparently), hes used SISMIs updated information.
I think Doc 2 was likely forged around late-January 2002. The Intelligence
Community had been skeptical of the October report and hadnt made the connection
with Zahawie. So this time, the forger makes sure Doc 2 mentions Zahawie explicitly.
Around early-February the forger drops in on SISMI again, hands over Doc 2 and
asks SISMI to send the CIA a new report the February report. The Intelligence
Community didnt make the connection with Zahawie the first time, so the forgers
trying again. Hes laundering the Niger Documents through SISMI and adapting so
the Iraq/Niger uranium deal seems more credible.
307
The Coded Letters: A and B
SISMIs March report was sent the day after Cheneys media blitz on Meet the Press,
Face the Nation and Late Edition. We dont have much information about the March
report because the US Senate redacts half of the only paragraph in which the report is
described. However, the little information there is suggests the March report
described Niger planning to deliver the yellowcake to Iraq.652 This brings us to the
two coded letters, Code A and Code B.
On October 9, 2002, Elisabetta Burba gave the US Embassy copies of the

documents shed received from Rocco Martino. The next day, she was faxed a further
two documents two letters written in code, plus their decryptions, Codes A and B.653
Were the two coded letters the basis for SISMIs March report? Possibly. The two
coded letters not only suggest Niger was planning to deliver the uranium to Iraq, but
also seem designed to undermine the Intelligence Communitys remaining issues with
the reportings credibility.
652
653

308
Code A
309
310
Translation:
08-02-2001
11:18 DE MINAFET-NIGER
0039063751807 P.01
Republic of Niger
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and African Integration
Directorate of Judicial and Consular Affairs
Niamey, 07 Feb. 2001
Message A [orig. Messaggio in Italian decrypt only]
Very urgent Very urgent Very secret Very secret
Niger ambassador in Rome
We kindly ask you to contact our Iraqi partner in Rome to transmit [to tell, to
communicate] to him 558 18 [information concerning?] the transformation of U 238
Stop.
The percentage of U 235 could pass from 0.7 percent up to 80 percent654 [Stop]
It will [or it would] be necessary to inform our partner that we could have the
possibility to have the DU655 processed.656
654
This unequivocally refers to an enrichment process. The quantity of U 235 could go from a natural
level of 0.07% up to a final level of 80%.
655
DU. This is English, although it is currently accepted in Italian. Italians are very anglophone.
Literally it should be Uranio Impoverito (UI). The French are strictly francophone. They would never
use DU. The French use uranium appauvri (UA). It is also erroneous. Yellowcake, or U 238, is
natural, not depleted.
656
There is no reason to use the adverb ne in the subordinate clause (naurions) unless it were to negate,
in which case there must also be the adverb pas (naurions pas). This would make the sentence as
follows :
[Il] Faudra aussi informer notre partenaire que nous naurions pas la possibilit de faire
travailler le DU Stop
311
Stop
The exported merchandise [will] transit through Turkey
Commander of the mining base
CHEIKH ANTA BAKE
It will be necessary to inform our partner that we may not have the possibility to have the DU
processed Stop
In French this last version is very clumsy. It would be simpler to say that it will be necessary to tell
them that we havent the possibility to enrich DU. Period.
312
Code A
Dated February 7, 2001, Code A is supposedly a fax sent to Nigers Embassy in

Rome. According to the decryption, the letter asks the Nigerien ambassador to contact
our Iraqi partner in Rome about the transformation of U238. The Iraqi partner
is a reference to Iraqs ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawie. Code A ties
into the narrative of the other forgeries: Zahawie is Iraqs principal negotiator in the
uranium deal, someone Nigers ambassador has to contact periodically. In the
narrative, Code A describes events that supposedly took place about seven months
after the signing of the uranium accord in Niamey. The commander of the mining
base has asked the ambassador to tell Zahawie about the transformation of U238.
Niger is about to ship the uranium to Iraq through Turkey.
Our forger seems to have used a real fax from Nigers Embassy in Rome to
create Code A. First of all, the letterhead has improved. Theres no reference to the
Conseil Militaire Supreme which we saw on Doc 4, or the Conseil de
Reconciliation Nationale which was saw on Doc 2. Code As letterhead refers to the
Republique du Niger, then the foreign ministry, then the directorate of judicial and
consulate affairs, which is actually how its supposed to look. After the 1999
constitution dissolved the Council of National Reconciliation, Nigeriens stopped
naming their governments the Council of whatever. In fact, they stopped naming
their governments altogether. The current government of Niger doesnt have an
official name. Code As letterhead seems to have come from genuine Nigerien
diplomatic correspondence, circa 2001.
313
Second, theres the fax time-stamp at the top of the document. The stamp
records the date and time the fax was sent, 08-02-2001
11:18,
as well as the origin.
MINAFET-NIGER apparently refers to Nigers Ministere de Affaires Etrangeres the

Nigerien foreign ministry. The stamp also includes the fax number, 00390637518017,
which checks out. The fax number really is Nigers Embassy in Rome.657 Code As
fax time-stamp represents an attention to detail that doesnt exist in the other Niger
Documents. Our forger has either done a lot of research, or, more likely, hes got a
better source document.
I think what probably happened is that the forger took the top-half of a
genuine Nigerien fax the letterhead, date and fax stamp and stuck Code A to the
bottom. Where did he get a genuine Nigerien fax? Probably SISMI. SISMI seems to
have supplied the forger with genuine Nigerien documents from Nigers Embassy in
Rome.
Code A seems designed to undermine the Intelligence Communitys

remaining issues with the Niger reportings credibility. After Nicolo Pollari vouched
for his sources reliability, the CIA published an assessment on the October report
noting that Iraq has no known facilities for processing or enriching the material.658
The Intelligence Community did not believe that a uranium procurement was
significant. Even if the reporting was true and Iraq had managed to buy yellowcake on
the black-market, Saddam had no way to enrich it and uranium enrichment is the hard
part of building a nuclear weapon. But heres what Code A does: it introduces the
possibility that the uranium is enriched already.
657
Ambasciate straniere in Italia. Naga Associazione Volontaria di Assistenza Socio. Milan.

http://www.inventati.org/naga/a3_indirizzi_ambasciate_n.html Accessed: November 30, 2007.
658
314
Code A asks the Nigerien ambassador to tell Zahawie about the

transformation of U238. The percentage of U235 in Nigers yellowcake, according
to Code A, could be anywhere from 0.7 to 80 percent. U235 and U238 are uranium
isotopes. Naturally occurring uranium consists of about 0.7 percent U235. When the
percentage is enriched above 90 percent, the weapons-grade uranium can be used as
fuel for a nuclear weapon. Code A is implying that Niger is enriching the uranium its
shipping to Iraq.659 To get around Iraqs lack of enrichment facilities, our forger has
the Nigeriens supplying Saddam with uranium that could be ready to use almost
immediately. Hes trying to undermine the CIAs assessment of the significance of
the procurement attempt.
Code A also seems to address INRs judgment that the French mining
consortium, Cogema, maintains complete control over uranium mining and
yellowcake production.660 As the US Embassy in Niamey, Joseph Wilson and
Elisabetta Burba found out, Nigers uranium was too well controlled for Nigers
government to sell on the black-market. However, Code A claims to be from the
commander of the mining base. The forger is suggesting that Cogemas control is
not quite as strict as INR believes. According to Code A, Niger has a secret mining
operation.
659
Of course, the suggestion that Niger is somehow enriching uranium is ludicrous. Niger is a third
world country that is regularly devastated by drought and famine. It has no infrastructure or industrial
base and little technical expertise in any field, let alone the field of uranium enrichment. Industrialized,
first world nations spend decades trying to enrich uranium up to 80 percent. For a Niger, it would be
next to impossible. I dont think the forger knows very much about Niger, he certainly doesnt know
anything about uranium enrichment. The forger may well be a moron.
660
315
Code B
316
317
Translation:
Message B [orig. Messaggio in Italian decrypt only]

July 2001 [orig. Luglio in Italian decrypt only]
Ambassador Niger
Rome
A government representative (it means Iraq) [orig. si intende dellIRAQ in Italian

decrypt only] has concluded his visit with his Nigerien colleague.
Negotiations are underway and look very promising.
Its necessary that you keep in close contact with the ambassador (it means Iraq)
[orig. si intende dellIRAQ in Italian decrypt only] in Rome concerning the
transportation of metal 551.91 (?) [decrypt only 551.81 in code]. The authorization
for overflight arrived too late. Our government has decided to send the merchandise
secretly by sea under the Gabon banner and tranship in international waters. Contact
re-established. Very good work done together with the personal emissary of the Iraqi
president.
Its understood that this information is top secret and personal. Be on guard as far as
all embassy personnel are concerned.
Secretary of State
MAMADOU EL HADJI
318
Code B
In the forgeries narrative, Code B is set a year after Niger and Iraq signed the
uranium accord in Niamey. Its July 2001 and Niger is preparing to ship the uranium
to Iraq. Code B asks the Nigerien ambassador in Rome to contact Iraqs ambassador
(Zahawie) and tell him Nigers plans for the transportation of the uranium. Once
again, Code B seems designed to undermine the Intelligence Communitys issues with
the Niger reportings credibility.
Another reason INR was skeptical of SISMIs reports was the difficulty Niger
would have had shipping 500 tonnes of yellowcake. 661 Although the forger does not
deal directly with how the Nigeriens plan to get the shipment to Nigers nearest port,
he does suggest that Niger has figured it out. In Code B, the forger presents the
shipment as about to happen. The yellowcake will be sent secretly by sea under the
Gabon banner and tranship in international waters. Gabon, officially the Gabonese
Republic, is another small country in West Africa. The forger has introduced the
Gabonese vessel to suggest the Nigeriens are about to send uranium to Iraq
undetected. Like Code A, Code B looks like it was created to undermine the
Intelligence Communitys remaining issues with the Niger reportings credibility.
661
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. op. cit., pp. 4-5.
319
If the March report was based on Codes A and B, then the March report was likely an
attempt to influence the Intelligence Communitys consensus on the Niger reporting.
After the February report, Vice President Cheney was free to say that Iraq was
pursuing a nuclear weapon, the memes nuclear component. However, the
Intelligence Community could not reach a consensus on the evidence underlying the
Vice Presidents statement.
The DOE had flipped its nuclear position because of the Niger reporting. It
still assessed that the tubes were for rockets, not centrifuge rotors. It seems that both
CIAs WINPAC and the DIA were ready to sign off on both the tubes and Niger. But
the CIAs Middle East and Africa experts in NESAF agreed with INR that the Niger
reporting was highly dubious. Both the tubes and Niger were vigorously disputed
and, as such, could not be cited by administration officials publicly.
The neocons did not need evidence to know Iraq had WMDs and supported
terrorists like al-Qaeda. They only needed evidence to convince everyone else that
they were right. Being able to say that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapon was not
enough. They needed to cite evidence. They wanted to cite the tubes and Niger, Team
B propaganda, to support the memes nuclear component. If the March report was
based on Codes A and B, then the report was likely an attempt to influence the
consensus so the neocons could make the case for war that they wanted to make.
320
The Campaign for War
The neocons needed to cite specific evidence for the media campaign to hype the Iraqi
threat. In late-August 2002, just before the start of the campaign, the Modification
Intelligence suggested Iraq had asked about modifying the tubes. Specifically, Iraq
asked about increasing the tubes internal diameters. The Modification Intelligence
attempted to provide DOE an excuse to change its tubes assessment, flip the
consensus and allow the White House to cite the tubes as evidence of Iraqs nuclear
program.
As Ive argued in the Tubes chapter, the Modification Intelligence didnt

work. On September 8, 2002, the Intelligence Community only allowed Bush
administration officials to use consensus, compromise language: Iraqs pursuit of
nuclear technology. To get around the Intelligence Community, the White House
leaked WINPACs Team B analysis to The New York Times. Vice President Cheney
and Secretary of State Powell cited the tubes to the Times article. Even though the
Intelligence Community hadnt cleared the tubes, the Bush administration had found a
way to cite the Team B propaganda anyway.
No Bush administration officials cited the Niger reporting in the campaigns

initial salvo. But on September 9, 2002, during the height of the media frenzy, SISMI
director Nicolo Pollari made a surprise visit to Washington, DC.662 Pollari met with
Bushs Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley at the White House. The
fact that the meeting took place at all was very strange. As the head of Italian military
662
Unger, Craig. op. cit.
321
intelligence, Pollari should have met with the Director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet. It is completely out of protocol for the head of a foreign intelligence service to
circumvent the CIA, former CIA officer Philip Giraldi told Vanity Fair magazine in
2006. It is uniquely unusual.663
Although Stephen Hadley remembers meeting with Pollari, he claims has no

recollection of what they talked about.664 So, what did Pollari and Hadley discuss?
Most likely, it was SISMIs Niger reporting. Pollari had probably made a last minute
dash to Washington to once again vouch for his sources reliability. He was trying to
help bolster the Presidents nuclear case for his UN address.
The Real UN Address
On September 12, 2002, President

Bush addressed the UN General
Assembly to make the case for war
with Iraq. The speech was the
climax of the media campaign. The
leader of the free world urged the
United Nations to live up to its
responsibilities. Saddam was a
Figure 35 President Bush addresses the UN

General Assembly, September 12, 2002.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/
vicious tyrant who had to be

stopped. Iraq was a threat because of its WMDs and ties to terrorists.
663
664
Ibid.
Ibid.
322
In the address, the President cited Iraqs continued defiance of UN resolutions.
Iraq supported terrorists, Iraq was expanding its chemical and biological weapons
capabilities and Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The nuclear section
was the climax of the speech, the climax of the war campaign. The President cited
Exhibit A, Iraqs aluminium tubes plus two new arguments as the climax of the
climax.
Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength

aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear
weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it
would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a
year. And Iraqs state-controlled media has reported
numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and
his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his
continued appetite for these weapons.665 [Authors
emphasis.]
Acquire-fissile-material and Saddam-meets-with-scientists were both very

weak arguments. As the President noted, Saddams meetings with nuclear scientists
had been broadcast on Iraqi state TV. They were Iraqi propaganda to make the
dictator seem like a captain of industry. The meetings meant nothing more than that
Saddam was an egomaniac. And while it was true Iraq could have a nuclear weapon
in a year if it acquired fissile material, the same could be said for just about any
665
323
country. In any nuclear program, developing fissile material is the hard part. Building
the bomb itself is relatively easy. Nuclear physicist Norman Dombey writes,
More than fifty countries, not counting Iraq or the

nuclear weapon states, would be able to build a bomb,
given sufficient fissile material. All it would require is a
research institution with a reputable physics group and
an army familiar with explosives. Every major Arab
country, and every EU country except, perhaps,
Luxembourg can call upon these assets.666
The White House hadnt wanted to include acquire-fissile-material and

Saddam-meets-with-scientists in the UN address in the first place. Both were
compromise, consensus arguments. The Intelligence Community wouldnt clear what
the White House had originally wanted as the campaigns climax. According to the
US Senate, the Presidents original nuclear punchline was the Niger reporting.
Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength

aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium
for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within
the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to
obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide
known as yellowcake, which is an essential
ingredient of this process. The regime was caught
666
Dombey, Norman. op. cit.
324
trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material. It
takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched
uranium for a single nuclear weapon.667 [Authors
emphasis.]
Now thats a speech. The tubes are for uranium enrichment. Theres a
dramatic pause, and then, Saddams trying to buy uranium. Its a simple equation,
effective and easy to understand. Tubes. Then uranium.
SISMIs Niger reporting was supposed to be the war campaigns punchline.

The climax of the climax. The money shot. The President was supposed to cite the
Niger reporting as the principle evidence for the memes nuclear component: Iraq is a
threat because it is reconstituting its nuclear program.
The Pollari Meeting
On September 9, 2002, just days before the Presidents UN address, Pollari flew to
Washington to meet with Bushs Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley.
Hadleys faulty memory notwithstanding, the meeting was most likely all about
SISMIs Niger reporting. In their 2006 book Hubris, journalists Michael Isikoff and
David Corn report that following the meeting, the White House was eager to add
SISMIs intelligence to the Presidents UN address.
667
325
John Gibson, a young White House speechwriter, was at
the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York on September
11, 2002, putting the final touches on the Presidents
UN speech, when he received an urgent phone call on
his cell phone. It was his boss, Michael Gerson, who
had just been talking to White House communications
aide Dan Bartlett. There was a new piece of intelligence
that Gibson might be able to thrown in the speech. They
werent sure yet. If they didnt use it in the speech, its
something we might leak to The New York Times,
Gerson said, according to Gibson. The speechwriter
sensed that there was excitement at the White House
about the latest nugget. What was it? he asked.
Gerson told Gibson to go to a secure line that had been
set up at the Waldorf for White House staff and call a
National Security aide, Robert Joseph
When Gibson reached Joseph that day, the NSC aide
had what seemed to be important new evidence of Iraqi
darkness. Saddam, Joseph said, had been attempting to
obtain a massive amount of uranium yellowcake in
Africa. Gibson immediately realized what that
meant668
668
Isikoff, Michael and David Corn. Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the
Iraq War. New York: Crown, pp. 85-86. Cited in eRiposte, WMDgate Hubris and Uranium from
Africa: The 9/9/02 Pollari-Hadley meeting. January 3, 2007.
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/009535.php Accessed: August 15, 2007.
326
So, Pollari shows up, he vouches for the SISMI reports again and the White
House tries to insert the reference into the Presidents UN address, the speechs
nuclear punchline. According to the US Senate, the CIA even cleared the language the
White House submitted.669 But if thats the case, then why didnt the President refer to
the Niger reporting in the address? Isikoff and Corn report that after initially clearing
the language, the CIA decided to take the reference to Niger out again.
That day, [White House aide Robert] Joseph and [White

House speechwriter John] Gibson conferred several
times about how to insert the yellowcake charge into the
UN speech. Joseph even faxed to Gibson the language
that had been cleared by the CIA. But, at the end of the
day, the CIA wasnt comfortable with Bush issuing this
allegation in public. The information had come from
a single foreign source. It had not been confirmed. It
was not solid enough for a presidential speech. The
CIA wanted it out. Strike it, Joseph said, and Gibson
did.670 [Authors emphasis.]
The US Senate says that the CIA cleared the UN speech and its reference to
SISMIs reporting. According to Isikoff and Corn, the CIA then took Niger out
again. Most likely, both the Senate and the journalists are being somewhat inaccurate.
When the Senate says that the CIA cleared the reference, most likely its actually
referring to CIA WINPAC. WINPAC, with its Team B cell, was ready to clear
669
670

Isikoff, Michael and David Corn. op. cit., p. 86.
327
anything the Bush administration wanted. When Isikoff and Corn say the CIA
removed the reference, most likely theyre referring to the CIAs National Intelligence
Council (NIC). The NIC coordinates the consensus judgment of the entire Intelligence
Community. There was no way the NIC was going to let the President refer to
SISMIs reports in a speech.
The NIC allowed the President to cite the tubes671 but drew the line at the
Niger reporting. Both INR and the CIAs NESAF still considered SISMIs reports
highly dubious, no matter what private assurances Pollari gave Stephen Hadley. As
Isikoff and Corn report, SISMIs reports were still unconfirmed. The NIC overruled
WINPAC and forced the White House to change the speech.
In place of the Niger reporting, the Presidents UN address had to go with

evidence that was far less compelling: acquire-fissile-material and Saddam-meetswith-scientists. Both references were misleading and borderline dishonest, but at least
they were factually correct; they were technically true. It was the most the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment would allow. The President could not cite the
Niger reporting in the case for war. Before the President could make the case the
neocons wanted him to make, the Intelligence Community would have to be brought
in line with WINPACs Team B. The Intelligence Community would need more
sources before it would clear the Presidents nuclear punchline.
671
As Ive argued, the Intelligence Community most likely cleared the tubes with a caveat, which the
President may have dropped at the last minute.
328
The UK Downplays the Tubes
On September 24, 2002, around two weeks after President Bushs UN speech, the UK
government began its own media campaign for war. Prime Minister Tony Blair
addressed parliament on the threat from Iraqs WMDs. To coincide with Blairs
speech, the UK published a white paper, Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction: The
Assessment of the British Government. The white paper laid out the UKs case for
war with Iraq.
The British and American campaigns were different in several respects. In

particular, the British did not focus on the aluminium tubes as evidence of Iraqs
nuclear reconstitution. Although the tubes were Exhibit A in the US case for war, they
barely got a mention in Tony Blairs WMD parliamentary address. The Prime
Minister cited Iraqs attempted tubes procurement at the end of a list of other dual-use
items Iraq had attempted to buy.
dual use products such as Anhydrous Hydrogen

Fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in
petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; a
filament winding machine, which can be used to
manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and has
attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more
specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to
strict controls due to their potential use in the
construction of gas centrifuges. [Authors emphasis.]
329
The UKs Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) knew perfectly well that the
tubes were not suitable for centrifuge rotors and would have required substantial reengineering to make them suitable for gas centrifuge use.672 In fact, British and
European engineers were far more experienced in gaseous centrifuge technology than
even the DOE, the US centrifuge experts.673 As a result, the Prime Minister did not
highlight the tubes like Cheney, Powell and Rice had done in the US. Prime Minister
Blair was only allowed to imply the tubes were intended for centrifuges. The tubes
were subject to strict controls due to their potential nuclear application, which was
technically true, albeit very misleading. The tubes were subject to strict controls
because of their potential nuclear application. Under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687, Iraq was banned from importing high-strength aluminium tubes
because of their potential use as centrifuge rotors.674 The Prime Minister didnt say
that that was how the Iraqis planned to use them. The JIC wouldnt let him.
The tubes were also downplayed in the UK governments white paper, Iraqs
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The papers executive summary did not refer to the
tubes specifically at all. Instead, the executive summary stated that As a result of
intelligence, we judge that Iraq has tried covertly to acquire technology and
materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons.675
672
Butler Inquiry. op. cit., pp. 131-132.

In 1970, Britain, Holland and Germany had established the enrichment conglomerate URENCO to
combine their separate centrifuge programs. URENCO had made significant advances in centrifuge
technology since then. In comparison, the US had no commercial centrifuge enrichment program. The
research group at Oak Ridge had been closed in 1985. See, Uranium Enrichment: Coming Full
Circle. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review. 2004.
http://www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v37_1_04/article_04.shtml Accessed: December 17, 2008.
674
United Nations Security Council. op. cit.
675
United Kingdom. Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction. op cit., p. 6.
673
330
In the body of the white paper, the tubes are mentioned a grand total of once.
They are again cited at the end of a list of Iraqi dual-use procurements that have
potential nuclear applications. In fact, the paper suggests that the tubes themselves
arent the problem. Its the tubes material, 7075-T6 aluminium, which is subject to
international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges.676
After listing the tubes, the white paper even cautions that there is no definitive
intelligence that [the aluminium] is destined for a nuclear programme.677 The JIC
knew that the tubes could not be used as centrifuge rotors without substantial
modifications. As a result, the UK case for war did not highlight the tubes as evidence
of Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
The UKs Exhibit A
Instead of the tubes, the UK had Exhibit A of its own: Saddams search for uranium
from Africa. Unlike the tubes, uranium-from-Africa was included in the British
white papers executive summary. As a result of intelligence we judge that Iraq
has sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active
civil nuclear power programme that could require it.678 The intelligence was also
highlighted in the white papers main conclusions; the only evidence cited that Iraq
was working on nuclear weapons.
Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons,

in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has
676
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., p. 26.
678
Ibid., p. 6.
677
331
been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear
application in Iraq.679 [Authors emphasis.]
In Prime Minister Blairs address to parliament, uranium-from-Africa featured

prominently. The intelligence formed the conclusion of the speechs nuclear section,
following directly Blairs reference to the aluminium tubes.
to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium

tubes, which are subject to strict controls due to their
potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.
In addition, we know Saddam has been trying to buy
significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though
we do not know whether he has been successful Iraq
may claim that this is for a civil nuclear power
programme but it has no nuclear power plants.680
[Authors emphasis.]
Uranium-from-Africa formed the same nuclear punchline that President Bush

had wanted in his UN address, the same simple equation. Tubes. Then uranium. Iraq
is working on a nuclear weapon. Even Blairs phrase trying to buy was reminiscent
of Bushs attempting to purchase.
The Intelligence Community had struck SISMIs Niger reporting from Bushs
UN address and from the US campaign for war. The alleged Iraq/Niger uranium
679
680
Ibid., p. 17.
Blair, Tony. Iraq address. September 24, 2002. op. cit.
332
accord wasnt solid enough. It was unconfirmed. INR and the CIAs NESAF still
thought the reports were highly dubious. In fact, the CIAs assessment of the Niger
reporting was so bad that it even tried to stop the British from citing it.
In mid-September 2002, just prior to the white papers publication, the CIA
contacted UK officials and tried to talk them out of including uranium-from-Africa.
The CIA expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting.681 But the British
did not listen. Two weeks later, the intelligence surfaced in Blairs speech and the
British case for war. Had the UKs JIC reached a different conclusion about Niger?
The Second Source
Yes, it had. The United States was not the only country to get SISMIs reports of the
Iraq-Niger uranium accord. In June 2002, a few months ahead of the campaign for
war, SISMI had sent the same information to the United Kingdom. According to the
UK parliaments Intelligence and Security Committee, a source, most likely SISMI,
sent MI6 transcriptions of documentary evidence that Iraq and Niger had signed a
uranium accord.682 In 2003, MI6 discovered that the supposed documentary evidence
were forgeries.683 The UKs June report was most likely from SISMI and based on the
Niger Documents.
We dont know if the JIC assessed SISMIs June report credible or not. The
JIC already knew that Zahawie had traveled to Niger in early-1999, although the
681
CIA. Background Paper. op. cit., p. 5.

Intelligence and Security Committee. op. cit., p. 28.
683
Ibid., p. 28.
682
333
purpose of the visit was not immediately known. 684 The JIC may have been
inclined to believe SISMIs reporting was true. But, even if it did, the JIC would still
have had the same problem the United States National Intelligence Council had: the
supposed uranium deal was unconfirmed. The information was tied exclusively to a
single source SISMI. If the JIC was going to let the Prime Minister cite the Niger
reporting in the British case for war, the Niger reporting would first have to be
corroborated. The JIC would need a second source.
In early-September 2002, it got one. The JIC was working on a new

assessment of Iraqs WMD programs that would be the basis for Prime Minster
Blairs address to parliament and the British governments white paper.685 Just before
the assessment was published, the UK received a second source that confirmed
details of SISMIs Niger reporting. The Second Source confirmed that on Zahawies
mission to Niger in 1999, the Iraqi ambassador had indeed been shopping for blackmarket uranium.686 When the CIA contacted the UK to express concerns about the
Niger reportings credibility, the reason the UK did not listen was the Second
Source.687 Because of the Second Source, uranium-from-Africa was included in the
Prime Ministers address and the UK white paper.
However, the Second Source did not confirm everything that SISMI said.
According to the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Second Source was
unsure of other details of the reporting, for example, about whether a contract had
684

Ibid., p. 80.
686
687
685
334
been signed or whether uranium had been shipped.688 Because there was
confirmation that Iraq had sought uranium in Africa, the JIC only allowed the Prime
Minister to say that Saddam has sought the supply of significant quantities of
uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful
Neither the Prime Minister nor the UK white paper claimed that Iraq had bought
uranium from Africa.689
Unfortunately, thats about all the information we have on the UKs Second
Source. In 2003, the UK government admitted to parliaments Foreign Affairs
Committee that one of the two Niger sources was based on documents that were later
shown to be forgeries (presumably, the source was SISMIs June report).690 The
government told the Committee it still had the Second Source, but refused to reveal
who or what the source was exactly. The government explained the Second Source
was still being reviewed, an excuse met with considerable skepticism from the
Committee.
We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the

Government asserts that it was not relying on the
evidence which has since been shown to have been
forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing
the other evidence We recommend that the
Government explain on what evidence it relied for its
688
Ibid., p. 28.
690
United Kingdom. Foreign Affairs Committee. The Decision to go to War in Iraq. Rt. Hon. Donald
Anderson, MP. (Chair). London: The Stationary Office. July 7, 2003. p. 23.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/81302.htm Accessed:
December 2, 2007.
689
335
judgment in September 2002 that Iraq had recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.691
The Second Sources review was complete in time for another inquiry by
the UKs Intelligence and Security Committee, apparently. MI6 concluded that the
fact the Niger Documents were forgeries did not affect its judgment of the Second
Source.692 Although the Intelligence and Security Committee said it agreed with the
basis of MI6s judgment, the Committee did not provide even vague details why.
Effectively, the Intelligence and Security Committee asks us to take its word for it
that the Second Source was reasonable, which, I think, is asking a lot.693 Just in
time for the British war campaign, the Second Source appeared out of the blue and
confirmed details of an Iraqi uranium deal that did not exist. The sources timing was
extremely suspicious.
The Modification Intelligence, Red River and the Second Source
The Modification Intelligence, Red River and the Second Source were likely all part
of the same coordinated disinformation operation. They all show up the same week.
They all apparently have the same purpose: bring the Intelligence Communitys
consensus in line with WINPACs Team B. The Modification Intelligence, Red River
and the Second Source all strengthened Team B intelligence so the neocons could cite
it in their case for war.
691
Ibid., p. 9.
693
Ibid., p. 28.
692
336
In late-August 2002, a foreign intelligence service sent the Modification
Intelligence to the CIA. For more than a year, the DOE had assessed that the tubes
could not be used as centrifuge rotors without significant modification. In particular,
the tubes internal diameters were too narrow for any meaningful uranium enrichment
to occur. The White House wanted to cite WINPACs Team B analysis of the tubes in
its campaign for war. However, it could not do so unless the Intelligence
Communitys consensus agreed. The Modification Intelligence claimed that Iraq had
asked about modifying the aluminium tubes; specifically, the Iraqis wanted to
increase the tubes internal diameters. The report was likely intended an excuse for
DOE to change its assessment and let the neocons cite the tubes as evidence of Iraqs
nuclear reconstitution.
In early-September 2002, Red River confirmed Curveball for MI6, which then
forwarded his report to the CIA. Curveball was back to being a single-source after the
Iraqi National Congress Harith had been determined a fabricator. For WINPACs
Team B, it didnt matter that Curveballs reports of mobile biological weapons
facilities were unconfirmed. It didnt matter to the White House either. The Bush
administration wanted to cite Curveballs unconfirmed reports, Team B intelligence,
in its war campaign. But unless Curveball was corroborated, the Intelligence
Communitys consensus would not allow it. Red River, like the Modification
Intelligence, provided the excuse the Intelligence Community needed to clear the
mobile BW facilities for the Rumsfelds testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee.
337
Also in early-September 2002, the Second Source confirmed details of
SISMIs Niger reporting. Apart from SISMI, no other sources had suggested that
Zahawies 1999 Niger visit was an Iraqi attempt to procure black-market uranium.
Although WINPAC was perfectly happy to clear the reports for the UN address, the
rest of the Intelligence Community refused. The State Departments INR and CIAs
NESAF still considered SISMIs reporting highly dubious. The Niger reporting was
still unconfirmed. Like Red River and the Modification Intelligence, the Second
Source seems an attempt to bring the Intelligence Community in line with WINPACs
Team B. They were most likely all part of the same operation.
The Modification Intelligence, Red River and the Second Source had varying
levels of success. Red Rivers sub-source was the most effective. After Red River,
both the UK and the US considered Curveball confirmed. The Modification
Intelligence did not influence the DOE to change its judgment. When President Bush
cited the tubes in his UN address, there was no consensus that the tubes were intended
for centrifuge rotors. The Second Source met mixed success. The UKs Joint
Intelligence Committee believed the Second Source only verified parts of SISMIs
reports; that is, that the purpose of Zahawies 1999 Niger mission was to buy
uranium. However, the Second Source did not have any effect on the US Intelligence
Community. Unlike the Modification Intelligence and Red River, the CIA did not
receive the Second Sources report at all.
The UK did not forward the Second Sources report to the CIA. When the CIA
contacted the British to express concerns about the credibility of SISMIs Niger
reporting, the UK did not listen because it had corroborating evidence that Iraq
338
sought uranium from Africa the Second Source.694 According to the CIA, the
alleged corroborating information was not shared with us.695
If MI6 had decided to the Second Sources report with the CIA, then perhaps
the Intelligence Communitys consensus on the Niger reporting would have changed.
Perhaps President Bush would then have been able to state that Iraq had sought
uranium from Africa. But MI6 did not share the Second Source and the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment stayed the same. In fact, after Tony Blair cited
uranium-from-Africa, the Intelligence Community became even more militant that the
President could not cite the Niger reporting in the case for war.
WINPAC vs. NESAF
The White House had tried to insert uranium-from-Africa into the Presidents UN
address and it tried to insert the reference into another speech on September 24, 2002,
the same day as Blairs address to parliament. According to the US Senate, the
statement the White House wanted cleared read, we also have intelligence that Iraq
has sought uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa.696 While
WINPAC once again seems to have cleared the language, the National Intelligence
Council seems to have forced the White House to remove it from the speech. A CIA
analyst (probably from NESAF, which thought the Niger reporting was highly
dubious) argued that uranium-from-Africa should be replaced with the compromise,
consensus argument, Saddam-meets-with-scientists.697
694

Ibid., p. 5.
696
697
Ibid., p. 51.
695
339
While WINPAC was willing to clear anything the Bush administration wanted
to say, the CIAs Middle East and Africa experts in NESAF drew the line at the Niger
reporting. NESAF had sold out on the tubes but when it came to Niger, it wasnt
going to back down. On October 2, 2002, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
was scheduled to hold a classified hearing on Iraqs WMD programs. CIA NESAF,
not WINPAC, was in charge of preparing the CIAs responses to the senators
questions.698
Although WINPAC seems to have

tried to persuade NESAF otherwise,
NESAF made the CIAs position on
uranium-from-Africa crystal clear at the
classified hearing. George Tenets Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, John
McLaughlin, was asked about the British
white paper and whether he disagreed
with anything in it. The Deputy DCI
Figure 36 DCI George Tenet and

Deputy DCI John McLaughlin are sworn
in before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in 2004. Source:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
testified,
the one thing where I think they stretched a little bit

beyond where we would stretch is on the points about
Iraq seeking uranium from various African
locations. Weve looked at those reports and we
698
Ibid., p. 54.
340
dont think they are very credible.699 [Authors
emphasis.]
The Deputy DCI, the second in charge at the CIA, had made sure that the US Senate
knew the CIAs position on the SISMIs reports. The Intelligence Community had
investigated the Niger reporting and concluded that it wasnt very credible. Despite
WINPAC and the UKs Second Source, the Intelligence Community was not going to
clear the President to cite uranium-from-Africa in his case for war.
The Cincinnati Speech
While the Deputy DCI was testifying that the Niger reports were not credible, the
White House was planning a major policy address for the following week: the
Cincinnati speech.700 In a televised address in Cincinnati, Ohio, President Bush would
outline the Iraqi threat to America. The White House planned to compliment the
speech with the release of a white paper with the ominous title, A Grave and
Gathering Danger: Saddam Husseins Quest for Nuclear Weapons.701 The focus of
the Cincinnati speech would be the evidence for the memes nuclear component; the
reconstitution of Iraqs nuclear program. The Bush administration wanted the
President to be able to cite the Niger reporting. This time, they planned to push the
CIA harder.
The speech and white paper were planned for October 7, 2002. On October 4,
the White House tried to get the Intelligence Community to clear uranium-from699
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 55.
701
Gellman, Barton and Walter Pincus. op. cit.
700
341
Africa for the third time in four weeks. The reference read, and the regime has been
caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide from Africa
an essential ingredient in the enrichment process.702 Once again, the CIA NESAF
told the White House to remove the sentence.703 But this time, the Bush
administration decided not to give up its nuclear punchline without a fight.
Instead of dropping the reference, the White House simply changed 500
metric tons to read substantial amounts and sent the speech for clearance again.
When the CIA received the new draft, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
intervened personally to get uranium-from-Africa removed from the speech. Tenet
contacted Bushs Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley (who had met
with Pollari on September 9, 2002), and told him that the President should not be a
fact witness on this issue because the reporting was weak.704 The Intelligence
Community had agreed that there wasnt enough evidence to conclude Iraq was trying
to buy uranium from Africa. The President could not cite the Niger reporting in his
case for war. Finally, the White House complied and removed the Presidents nuclear
punchline from the speech.705
Although the Presidents Cincinnati speech was now uranium-free, the White
House was still trying to sneak the reference into the white paper, A Grave and
Gathering Danger: Saddam Husseins Quest for Nuclear Weapons. The paper
apparently listed the evidence for Iraqs nuclear reconstitution as bullet points, the
very first one of which was uranium-from-Africa. The text the White House wanted
702

Ibid., p. 56.
704
Ibid., p. 56.
705
Ibid., p. 56.
703
342
cleared read that Iraq had sought uranium oxide, an essential ingredient in the
enrichment process, from Africa.706
Once again, it seems WINPAC cleared the reference but NESAF and the
National Intelligence Council yanked it out again.707 The White House decided not to
publish the white paper because it wasnt strong enough.708 If the only evidence the
paper presented was the aluminium tubes, Saddam-meets-with-scientists and acquirefissile-material, then the Bush administration made the right call. The strongest thing
about A Grave and Gathering Danger would have been its title.
On the evening of October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered the Cincinnati

speech, sans uranium-from-Africa, sans white paper. The speech focused on the
evidence for the memes nuclear
component; Iraqs nuclear
reconstitution. The President cited the
same simple equation hed used in his
UN address. Tubes. Then uranium.
Once again, uranium-from-Africa was
replaced with the compromise,
consensus argument acquire-fissile-
Figure 37 President Bush delivers the

Cincinnati Speech, October 7, 2002. Source:
material.
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its

nuclear weapons program Iraq has attempted to
706
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 57.
708
Gellman, Barton and Walter Pincus. op. cit.
707
343
purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other
equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are
used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal
an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger
than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon
in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a
terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would
be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his
aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the
Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten
America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position
to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.709 [Authors
emphasis.]
The Intelligence Community had forced the Bush administration to replace

uranium-from-Africa, the nuclear punchline, with a variation on acquire-fissilematerial (highly enriched uranium). Acquire-fissile-material was a weak and
misleading argument, but it was factually correct, it was technically true. If someone
gave Saddam enough highly enriched uranium, then he could use it build a nuclear
weapon, which he could then give to terrorists. It was the strongest argument the
Intelligence Community would let the President make. Uranium-from-Africa just
wasnt credible enough. The President could not make the case the neocons wanted
him to make.
709
344
The Situation Circa October 2002
Since September, the White House had tried to get the Intelligence Community to
clear uranium-from-Africa four separate times. While WINPAC was ready to clear
anything the administration wanted, NESAF and the National Intelligence Council
would not back down over Niger. The evidence wasnt strong enough. Pollaris last
minute Washington meeting hadnt persuaded the Intelligence Community to change
its assessment. Although the Second Sources information had allowed Prime
Minister Blair to cite uranium-from-Africa, MI6 hadnt shared the Second Source
with the CIA. The Intelligence Community would not clear the President to refer to
SISMIs Niger reporting publicly.
On the evening of October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered his Cincinnati

speech, sans uranium-from-Africa. The disinformation operation had failed to get
Niger into the case for war. With the Intelligence Community so set against uraniumfrom-Africa, the operation did what it always does when the neocons could not cite its
propaganda publicly. It leaked the story to the press.
The same night as the Cincinnati speech, Panorama journalist Elisabetta Burba
met with intelligence peddler and ex-SISMI officer, Rocco Martino. Rocco had a
dossier of Nigerien documents to sell.
345
Rocco the Postman
From the beginning, Rocco Martino has always insisted that he did not forge the
Niger Documents.710 The intelligence peddler was just the postman, a way for
SISMI to distribute the dossier without leaving fingerprints. So where did Martino get
the documents from? At his meeting with Burba, Rocco said that he received the
dossier from a reliable source, a mole inside the Nigerien Embassy in Rome. He
called her La Signora.711
La Signora was Laura Montini, an Italian citizen who worked as an assistant to

Nigers ambassador to Italy. In exchange for a small stipend, Montini would
occasionally supply Rocco with stolen Embassy documents, which the intelligence
peddler would in turn sell to the French intelligence service, Direction Gnrale de la
Scurit Extrieure (DGSE).712 (DGSE liked to keep tabs on Niger, a former French
colony.) According to Rocco, La Signora gave him the dossier of Niger
Documents.713
However, the story is not quite that simple. Where did La Signora get the
documents? Most likely, she got them from a SISMI officer, Antonio Nucera. Nucera
was an old friend of Roccos who had introduced the intelligence peddler to Montini
in February 2000.714 Before she stole documents for Rocco, La Signora had stolen
710
Marshall, Josh. The Italian Connection, Part III. Talking Points Memo. November 10, 2005.
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/006975.php Accessed: December 3, 2007.
711
Eisner, Peter and Knut Royce. The Italian Letter. New York: Rodale, 2007. p. 35.
712
Ibid., p. 35.
713
Ibid., p. 35.
714
Chiocci, Gian Marco and Mario Secchi. Niger-gate, ecco i verbali segreti di Martino. David
Loepp (trans.) Il Giornale (Milan). February 17, 2006.
http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2006/2/22/202646/733 Accessed: December 3, 2007.
346
documents for SISMI. She had been one of Nuceras spies.715 In February 2000,
Nucera told Montini that SISMI was putting their relationship on hold for a while. But
not to worry, he was going to introduce her to Rocco Martino, and she could sell
documents to him. According to Montini,
Nucera came one day to the Embassy and told me that

for a period of time my relations with SISMI would be
interrupted due to internal restructuring, and, therefore,
I could work with a friend and acquaintance, Rocco
Martino, who he told me worked for an intelligence
agency in Brussels. I remember that Nucera introduced
us in a bar near the Embassy.716
In 2002, Nucera arranged Montini to give the Niger Documents to Rocco. The
intelligence peddler hadnt been in touch with La Signora for more than a year.717
Then one day, Nucera called him up out of the blue and told him to get in touch with
his contact at the Nigerien Embassy.718 Montini had a gift for him, Nucera said. A
few days later, Rocco met with La Signora and she handed him the dossier. Rocco
swears he had no idea the documents were forgeries. He thinks Nucera set him up.719
SISMI knew that Martino would try and sell the dossier to DGSE and other
intelligence services. There was also a good chance Rocco would try to sell the story
715
Ibid.
Ibid.
717
Ibid.
718
Rufford, Nicholas. Italian spies faked documents on Saddam nuclear purchase. The Sunday
Times (London). August 1, 2004. http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/6282 Accessed: December
3, 2007.
719
Ibid.
716
347
the Italian press. SISMI wanted me to pass on the documents but they didnt want
anyone to know they had been involved, Martino told Nicholas Rufford of The
Sunday Times. He wasnt the forger, he says. He was just SISMIs postman.720
So on October 7, 2002, the night of Bushs Cincinnati speech, Rocco Martino

met with Elisabetta Burba and gave her the Niger Documents. Although Rocco
wanted money, SISMI would have wanted the journalist to write about on the IraqNiger uranium deal. If the Intelligence Community wouldnt let President Bush cite
the Niger reporting, the disinformation operation was going to make sure everyone
heard about it anyway. The operation wanted everyone to hear that Zahawies trip to
Niger in 1999 had been the start of negotiations to buy black-market uranium.
To make sure Burba got the narrative correct, SISMI had to include several
more Niger Documents in the dossier. One of the documents wasnt a forgery. Doc 1
was genuine.
720
Ibid.
348
Document 1
349
Translation:
Republic of Niger
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
The Embassy in Rome
Via Antonio Baiamonti, 10
00195 Rome
Rome
01/02/1999
The Ambassador
Tel: 06/3729013 - Telex 626290
To
His Excellency The Minister Of
Foreign Affairs And African
Integration.
Niamey
I am honoured to inform you that the Embassy of Iraq to the Holy See has just
informed me that His Excellency Mister Wissam Al Zahawie, Ambassador of Iraq to
the Holy See, will make an official visit to our country as a representative of His
Excellency Mister Saddam Hussein, President of the Iraqi Republic.
His Excellency Mister Zahawie will arrive in Niamey on Friday, February 5, 1999, at
6:25 PM with Air France flight 730 from Paris.
I would be grateful for whatever measures you may kindly take in regard.
With the highest esteem [or consideration],

Signed: His Excellency Adamou Chekou
Ambassador Niger Rome
350
Doc 1: The Introduction
Doc 1 is a genuine letter from Nigers ambassador in Rome to Nigers foreign

minister. Dated February 1, 1999, the letter explains that Iraqs ambassador to the
Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawie, will be travelling to Niger on an official visit. Doc 1
contains no mistakes. The Embassys address, phone and telex numbers all check
out.721 The name underneath the letters seal and signature is Adamou Chekou, who
really was the Nigerien ambassador in February 1999.722
Doc 1 is likely the actual letter the Nigerien ambassador sent to inform Nigers
government of Zahawies 1999 official mission. In February 1999, Zahawie travelled
to several other African countries to invite heads-of-state to visit Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad. Doc 1 is the original intelligence the Iraq/Niger uranium story is based on,
right down to the flight details and time of arrival. Most likely, La Signora gave
Doc 1 to SISMI while she was still on the intelligence services payroll.
Why was Doc 1 included in Roccos dossier? I think it was to give the Niger
narrative would have an introduction. SISMI wanted Martino to sell the Niger
Documents to a journalist and wanted the journalist to connect the Iraq-Niger accord
with the Zahawies mission in 1999. There was no way any journalist was going to
know about some obscure diplomats mission to an obscure third-world country. Doc
1 was included so the journalist would know where the story begins.
Doc 7 would make sure the story would have the right conclusion.
721
722
Naga Associazione Volontaria di Assistenza Socio. op. cit.

Bonini, Carlos and Guiseppe DAvanzo. Berlusconis men doctor Niger uranium dossier. op. cit.
351
Document 7
352
Translation:
REPUBLIC OF NIGER
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration
Directorate of Nigeriens Abroad
[..] 6093/ MAE/C/IA/DNE[?]
Niamey, August 28, 2001
[From] the Minister to the Ambassador of Niger [in] Rome
It is our pleasure to inform you that the delivery of the chemical merchandise- U 92
(238.028 9) has finally concluded today August 28, 2001.
All documents concerning this operation have been remitted to the NITRA Transit
Society which will assure transportation from Niamey to Cotonou via Lom.
Best regards,
For the Minister and P.O.

The Secretary General
Maiga Djibrilla Aminata
[Signature, Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
353
Doc 7: The Conclusion
Doc 7 is another forgery. However, its an extremely good one. Dated August 28,
2001, Doc 7 is a fax is from the Secretary-General (Secrtaire-Gnrale) of
Nigers foreign ministry to Nigers ambassador in Rome. The fax informs the
ambassador that a delivery of U 92 has concluded.
Like Doc 1, Doc 7 contains no mistakes. The letterhead has the correct name
of Nigers ministry of foreign affairs. The fax stamp at the top of the document
indicates it was faxed at 8:49 on August 30, 2001 from MINAFET-NIGER Nigers
foreign ministry. The Embassys fax number, 0039063729013, also checks out.723
Doc 7 mentions the NITRA transit company, which really does transport materials
from Niamey to Cotonou via Lom.724 At the bottom of the document, Doc 7 has
the signature of the Secretary General, Maiga Djibrilla Aminata. Aminata is a real
person, who really did work in Nigers foreign ministry in August 2001.725
Although Doc 7 contains no mistakes, we know its a forgery because of

Maiga Djibrilla Aminata. Aminata is currently Nigers ambassador to the United
States.726 Journalists Knut Royce and Peter Eisner contacted the ambassador and
showed her a copy of Doc 7. According to Royce and Eisner, Aminata recognised her
signature and confirmed that the letterhead was legitimate. However, Doc 7s content
723
Naga Associazione Volontaria di Assistenza Socio. op. cit.

La NITRA Niger Transit. 2005.
http://web.archive.org/web/20050426220538/www.delgi.ne/manifeste/salon/sponsors/nitra/nitra.html
725
Photos. DXpedition to Niger. The Northern California DX Foundation. 2004.
http://www.i2ysb.com/niger/foto.htm Accessed: December 3, 2007.
726
Eisner, Peter and Knut Royce. op. cit., p. 189.
724
354
was a forgery. In fact, Aminata even remembered what shed originally written: an
approval for one of her diplomats in Rome to take a holiday.727
Compared to the other forgeries, Doc 7 is outstanding. Even the French is

perfect. Doc 7 is so good that I dont think it was done by the same forger who did
Docs 2 through 5 and Codes A and B. I think Doc 7 may have been SISMIs work.
I think SISMI forged Doc 7 to provide the Niger narrative with the right
conclusion. In the context of the other Niger Documents, Doc 7 describes the final
stage of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. In August 2001, the documents date, Niger
shipped the yellowcake to Baghdad. So, by October 2002, the shipment would
probably have already arrived. Doc 7 was included so the journalist would know how
to end her story. The document was an answer to a question Prime Minister Blair had
implied in his address to parliament. The Prime Minister had said,
In addition, we know Saddam has been trying to buy

significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though
we do not know whether he has been successful728
[Authors emphasis.]
Doc 7 fills in the gaps for the Prime Minister. Yes, Saddam has been
successful. The Iraq-Niger uranium deal concluded a year ago. There was no more
time to lose. Somebody start the war!
727
728
Ibid., p. 189.
355
However, it seems things did not go as planned for SISMI. Although Rocco
gave the dossier to Elisabetta Burba, she didnt write a story on the Niger Documents.
On October 9, 2002, she handed copies of the documents to the US Embassy in Rome
and then travelled to Niger to check the story. Burba quickly came to the conclusion
that the Iraq/Niger uranium agreement was bogus. Because of Burbas skepticism,
SISMI was unable to plant the Niger story in the press.
The French Echo
The White House still wanted uranium-from-Africa in the case for war. Without the
Niger reporting, the administrations case for the memes nuclear component was
very weak. The tubes, Saddam-meets-with-scientists and acquire-fissile-material were
not compelling enough arguments. The White House wanted the Presidents nuclear
punchline, the conclusion to the simple equation. Tubes. Then uranium.
While WINPAC was perfectly happy to clear anything the White House
wanted, the rest of the Intelligence Community would not sign off on uranium-fromAfrica. The State Departments INR believed SISMIs reports were highly dubious.
The CIAs NESAF had made sure that when Deputy DCI John McLaughlin testified
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, he made the CIAs position on
uranium-from-Africa loud and clear: the reports were not credible. DCI George Tenet
had personally intervened to remove the reference from the Presidents Cincinnati
speech. Before the President could cite his nuclear punchline, the Intelligence
Community would have to be brought in line with WINPAC.
356
SISMI had funnelled the Niger Documents to Rocco Martino because it knew
he would try to sell the Niger Documents to the press and other intelligence services,
such as the French service, DGSE. Martino was a one-man echo chamber. Most
likely, SISMI hoped that Rocco would create enough independent reports of the
Iraq/Niger uranium deal that the Intelligence Community would agree to clear
uranium-from-Africa. It was the same trick the Iraqi National Congress had used with
its coached defectors.
On November 22, 2002, the French echo reached the Intelligence Community.
A French foreign affairs official told the State Department that DGSE had information
on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. The French service had investigated
and determined that no uranium had been shipped.729 In 2003, the US learned that
DGSEs information was the same dossier Burba had given the US Embassy in
Rome.730 As SISMI likely had expected, Rocco Martino had sold the Niger
Documents to the French and the French echo had reached the US, somewhat
belatedly.
The West African Businessman
The French echo had no effect on the Intelligence Community. A few days later, on
November 25, 2002, the US Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) in
729
730
Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 69.
357
Marseilles, France reported information from a mysterious source: a West African
businessman.731
The West African Businessman had contacted the NCIS to make an amazing
confession. He claimed he had coordinated a uranium transaction between Niger and
Iraq. According to the businessman, there were 20 barrels of Niger yellowcake were
in a warehouse in Cotonou awaiting shipment to Iraq.732 He said that the uranium
had been sold to Iraq by Nigers President.733
The reference to Nigers president is the giveaway. Thats Doc 3. Thats

SISMIs October report. The information in the Niger Documents had not been made
public yet. Burba had decided not to write her article. Certainly, no public officials
had implicated Niger or its president in an alleged plot to supply Iraq with uranium.
Yet somehow the West African Businessman had just confessed to arranging the deal
described in crude forgeries. He had confessed to coordinating a uranium deal that did
not exist.
The West African Businessman was part of the disinformation operation. He

was another echo in the chamber, like Pollari, Rocco Martino and MI6s Second
Source. In fact, it looks like the West African Businessman had the same function as
Doc 7, which described the final stage of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. Doc 7 claimed
that Niger was about to ship the U92 from Niamey to Cotonou via Lom. Both
the forgery and the businessman provided the same answer to the same question
731
Drogin, Bob and Tom Hamburger. Niger Uranium Rumors Wouldnt Die. The Los Angeles
Times. February 17, 2006. http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/47/17804 Accessed:
December 3, 2007.
732
Ibid.
733
358
implied in Prime Minister Blairs September 24 address to parliament. The Prime
minister had said that we know Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities
of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful734
Both Doc 7 and the West African Businessman provide the conclusion to the
Iraq/Niger narrative. Yes, Saddam has been successful. The uranium is in Cotonou
about to be shipped to Baghdad.
The West African Businessman was yet another attempt to corroborate

SISMIs Niger reporting. He was an excuse for the Intelligence Community to get in
line with WINPAC and let the President cite uranium-from-Africa, his nuclear
punchline. Another echo in the chamber, the West African Businessman was an
attempt to help the President make the case the neocons wanted him to make.
Completely Implausible
After Burba gave the documents to the US Embassy in Rome, the Embassy faxed
them through State Department channels to the State Departments Bureau of
Nonproliferation. From the Bureau of Nonproliferation, the documents were sent to
INR.735
INRs nuclear analyst was immediately suspicious of the documents.

According to the US Senate, the analyst didnt notice any inconsistencies with the
names or dates. Instead, he was suspicious because of a companion document that
had been included in the dossier but wasnt about uranium.
734
735

359
[The] companion document mentioned some type of

military campaign against major world powers. The
members of the alleged military campaign included
both Iraq and Iran, and was, according to the
documents, being orchestrated through the Nigerien
Embassy in Rome, which all struck the analyst as
completely implausible.736
The completely implausible companion document was Doc 8.
736
Ibid., p. 58.
360
Document 8
361
Translation:
CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT ON THE MEETING REALIZE[D] WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE PLAN OF ACTION GLOBAL SUPPORT.
Our group, which met today 14.6.2002, at 4 PM in the residence of the Iraqi
ambassador, via della Camillucia n 355 in Rome has determined as follows:
The group directed by the ambassadors of Niger, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Iran
have [plural in original] decided that Global Support which is composed of
specialists belonging to different military corps of the allied countries will be active
immediately.
We are convined [sic] that the high profession of the military belonging to Global
Support are [subjunctive plural in original] qualified with considerable experiences
and very diversified in the sectors of defence and security and without a doubt they
are responsible for the tasks assigned to them.
The Global Support (our group) is active worldwide, in all areas and extreme
climates.
The competences of the members of Global Support are the following:
362
- Our support will above all be extended to:

governments submitted to an embargo;
governments continually suspected, and without just cause, of producing nuclear,
bacteriological, chemical weapons; governments accused, without just cause, of
international terrorism;
Islamic patriots accused of belonging to criminal organizations, to cells having nonexistent ramifications;
SEAL OF THE EMBASSY IN ROME OF THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER
363
Doc 8: The Horror of Global Support
Unlike the other forgeries, Doc 8 isnt diplomatic correspondence. Instead, the
document claims to be the minutes of a meeting that took place in Rome on June 14,
2002. At this meeting, the respective ambassadors of Niger, Sudan, Pakistan, Libya,
Iran and Iraq agree to activate Global Support, which appears to be some kind of
international terrorist network. Yes, Doc 8 really does say Global Support (our
group), just in case our reading comprehension skills arent up to scratch. As The
American Prospects Laura Rozen remarked, Doc 8 couldnt have been more cooked
up, more staged if it had been signed P.S. We love you Saddam.737
But putting the condescending stupidity aside for the moment, what is the
forgery about? Global Support is comprised of specialists from the countries
respective militaries Special Forces perhaps? Doc 8 doesnt explain what the alleged
specialists are going to be doing precisely, but its suggested that theyre terrorists of
some sort. They have considerable experience in defense and security and,
ominously, are responsible for their assigned tasks. Global Supports support
sounds like some kind of military campaign.
Doc 8 implies that Global Support is rallying to the defense of Iraq. The
networks support is extended to governments under embargo (Iraq under UN
sanctions), governments suspected of developing WMDs (Iraq since the end of the
Gulf War), and governments accused of terrorism (Iraq since 9/11). The document
737
Rozen, Laura. Untitled weblog post. War and Piece. July 10, 2004.
http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/000899.html Accessed: December 3, 2007.
364
implies that Global Support will start targeting Iraqs oppressors, suspecters and
accusers the United States and its allies.
But Global Support isnt just about defending Iraq. Doc 8 also has the network
extending its support to Islamic patriots (patriotes Islamique), which, presumably,
is a reference to Islamic militants like al-Qaeda. So, Doc 8 unites the Islamic
patriots with two-thirds of the Axis of Evil, plus Niger, Pakistan, Sudan, and 1980s
bugbear, Libya, in a grand alliance against the US.
Doc 8 is most likely the work of our original forger, not SISMI. His French is
appalling, although he gets the address of Iraqi Embassy right it really is Via della
Camilluccia, no. 355 in Rome.738 Interestingly, the forger uses English to name
Global Support (somewhat like Code As DU to refer to depleted uranium). Our
forger may speak French and probably Italian too, but I think he thinks in English. In
fact, if I had to guess, Id say Doc 8 was written by someone who knew about the
Wurmser-Maloof Project.
The Wurmser-Maloof project was the Team B set up in the Pentagons Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The neocons did not need evidence to know
that Iraq was allied with Islamic patriots like al-Qaeda. They didnt need evidence
to know that terrorists enjoyed the global support of state sponsors. Given access to
the Intelligence Communitys classified database, the Team B had interpreted the data
738
Consulates. MK Plus International. Rome. January 23, 2000.

http://www.hslc.org/~dinallo/consul.htm Accessed: December 3, 2007.
365
to fit its preconceived conclusion: terrorist groups and authoritarian regimes were
united in a grand alliance against the US. Evidence supporting the conclusion was
cherry-picked while evidence contradicting it was dismissed as deception. In the
absence of evidence, the Team B assumed that despotic regimes were hiding their
support for terrorists and filled in the gaps. The Wurmser-Maloof Project interpreted
the intelligence to conclude that Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and other groups
with disparate ideologies and objectives were increasingly putting aside their
differences and uniting behind a shared desire to harm the US.739
Ive argued previously that for the neocons, a regimes support for terrorist
groups had nothing to do with evidence and everything to do with the nature of
tyranny. Wurmser writes in Tyrannys Ally that the nature of tyranny is the source of
all violent anti-Americanism.
Anti-Americanism among pan-Arabic nationalists

emerges from the same source as did Communist and
Nazi anti-Americanism: the nature of tyrannical
regimes. The hostility is a product of neither the U.S.
presence nor its policies. Since the concept of enemy is
essential to legitimize internal repression, neighbors or
superpowers that represent ideas antithetical to tyranny
are particularly threatening to the tyrant and are thus
considered the most dangerous of its foes. In the Middle
East, those enemies are the United States and Israel
739
366
not because of what they have done, but because of who
they are, what they represent, and the fact of their
existence. External aggression, especially against
Western nations, is inherent to all such radical, utopian
movements, be they European or Arabic. AntiAmericanism is the battle cry of tyranny, not a genuine
call for liberation.740 [Original emphasis.]
Wurmser continues that tyrants hatred of the United States is so consuming

that secular nationalists will join forces with religious extremists. Ideological enemies
like Iran, Iraq and al-Qaeda will ally with nations like Pakistan, Libya and even North
Korea if it means they can attack the United States. Wurmser writes that

740
367
Tyrants and terrorists seek to attack the US any way they can, even if that
means forming alliances of convenience with groups they would otherwise oppose.
The neocons nature of tyranny is Doc 8. The forgery is evidence of what the neocons
had already assumed was true: that a global network of terrorists and their state
sponsors had put aside their ideological differences and were preparing to attack the
US. Doc 8 had to have been written by a neoconservative. They are the only ones who
thought that this kind of thing was plausible.
The Niger Documents and the Intelligence Community
Elisabetta Burba was supposed to buy Roccos dossier, write the story that SISMI
wanted and report the Iraq/Niger uranium deal to the world. She was not supposed to
go to Niger to check the storys credibility. She was certainly not supposed to hand
copies of the Niger Documents to the US Embassy in Rome.
The Embassy forwarded the documents to the State Departments Bureau of

Nonproliferation, which passed them to INR.742 Thanks to Doc 8, INR was
immediately suspicious of the dossier. Analysts also noticed the similarities between
the Niger Documents and SISMIs reports.743 The game should have been up right
there. SISMI had been caught red-handed laundering forgeries. Doc 8 was the same
741
Ibid., p. 70.
743
742
368
wildly implausible theories the neocons and the Wurmser-Maloof Project had been
pushing since September 11. But for some strange reason, nothing happened.
On October 16, 2002, INR gave copies of the Niger Documents to the rest of
the Intelligence Community, including the DIA, DOE, NSA and the CIA.744 Yet no
one seems to have made the connection that SISMI was up to something. The CIA
didnt summon Pollari to Langley to explain why he had vouched for the reliability of
obvious forgeries. The CIA didnt caution the White House that the intelligence it
kept pushing to use in public might be disinformation. Instead, the CIA filed the Niger
Documents away without any further distribution.745 No one at WINPAC even
bothered looking at the documents for another four months.746
I think that after the Niger Documents reached the Intelligence Community,
the CIA knew precisely what was going on with SISMI, the forgeries and the case for
war. I think that thanks to Doc 8, they also knew who was behind it all.
Joe Public
I think that with the forgeries at the CIA, DCI George Tenet knew what was going on.
On December 21, 2002, he met with the President in the Oval Office to present the
Intelligence Communitys best public case for Iraqs weapons of mass
destruction.747 Also at the meeting were Vice President Cheney and National Security
744

Ibid., p. 59.
746
Ibid., p. 62.
747
745
369
Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Tenet had also brought his Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, John McLaughlin.748
McLaughlin delivered most of the presentation. Iraq hadnt been able to

account for the biological and chemical weapons it had produced prior to the 1991
Gulf War.749 They probably still had them. Several defectors had claimed that Iraq
had built mobile BW facilities that could be moved around to evade UN weapons
inspectors.750 McLaughlin probably mentioned that BNDs Curveball had been
corroborated by MI6s Red River.
There were a few more things. Some communications intercepts implied that
Iraq had banned weapons somewhere.751 McLaughlin also pointed to satellite imagery
of Iraqi rockets. The rockets had a range greater than the UN mandated maximum of
150km.752 When the Deputy DCI got to the nuclear part of the presentation, the only
point he seems to have raised was Saddams meetings with atomic scientists.753 No
tubes. No uranium.
Ive been told all this intelligence about WMD and this is the best weve
got? asked President Bush.754 McLaughlins presentation was a flop. In terms of
marketing, the examples didnt work, the charts didnt work, the photos were not
gripping, the intercepts were less than compelling.755 The President turned to Tenet.
748
Ibid., p. 247.
Ibid., p. 247.
750
Ibid., p. 248.
751
Ibid., p. 248.
752
Ibid., p. 248.
753
Ibid., p. 249.
754
Ibid., p. 249.
755
Ibid., p. 249.
749
370
Its not something that Joe Public would understand or gain a lot of confidence
from.756
Tenet protested. Mr. President, dont worry, its a slam dunk case!757 The
presentation would convince Joe Public, the DCI assured. Besides, it was the
strongest evidence the Intelligence Community had. Everything else was disputed.
Uranium-from-Africa. Even the tubes. There was no other case to make.
Needs a lot more work, the President said. He wanted a case put together by
prosecutors, not analysts.758 Bush looked Tenet in the eye. Make sure no one
stretches to make our case, the President told the DCI. He repeated himself for
effect. Make sure no one stretches to make our case.759
Tenet knew what the President meant.
WINPAC Runs the Show
From December 2002 onwards, the Intelligence Community stopped vetting the Bush
administrations case for war. Everything was left to WINPAC. The Intelligence
Communitys consensus, DOE, INR, DIA, NESAF, none of them mattered anymore.
WINPAC was in charge. WINPAC would clear the Presidents speeches on its own.
756
Ibid., p. 249.
Ibid., p. 249.
758
Ibid., p. 250.
759
Ibid., p. 250.
757
371
One day in December 2002, WINPAC director Alan Foley called his senior
intelligence analysts into his office. If the President wants to go to war, our job is to
find the intelligence to allow him to do so, he told them. WINPACs Team B cell
would be calling the shots from now on in. No interference from the rest of the
Intelligence Community. If WINPAC cleared something for the case for war, no one
was going to take it out again. The rest of the Intelligence Community wasnt even
going to see it until it was too late.
On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted had its declaration on weapons of mass

destruction to the United Nations. At 12,000 pages, the report was a detailed account
of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs from both before and after
the 1991 Gulf War. Iraqi officials claimed the report proved that Iraq no longer had
any WMDs. If the British and American governments had information to the contrary,
then they should share it with the world. WINPAC would write the US rebuttal to the
Iraqi declaration on its own.
WINPACs paper, US Analysis of Iraqs Declaration, 7 December, 2002,

was passed to the President without INR or DOE having an opportunity to review or
comment on the draft.760 In the nuclear section of the assessment, WINPAC made
only two points. Iraqs declaration had failed to explain its aluminium tube
procurement and did not acknowledge efforts to procure uranium from Niger, one of
the points addressed in the UK dossier.761 No more consensus, compromise
arguments. No more acquire-fissile-material or Saddam-meets-with-scientists. It was
760
761

Ibid., p. 60.
372
the simple equation. Tubes. Then uranium. The Presidents nuclear punchline, loud
and proud.
INR found out about WINPACs analysis on December 23, 2002. An INR
analyst sent a sarcastic email to the CIA. Do you happen to know offhand if INR will
get to review and clear the draft detailed analysis of the declaration before its issued
in its capacity as a US position? We were not invited to review or clear on the draft
preliminary US assessment.762 The title of WINPACs assessment had implied the
analysis represented the consensus of the Intelligence Community, not just
WINPACs position. If the paper was supposed to be the US analysis of Iraqs
declaration, then it should have included INRs assessment of the Niger reporting and
DOEs assessment of the tubes.763
The INR analyst forwarded his email to DOE, which was just as pissed off
that it hadnt had any say in the US analysis. A DOE analyst replied to INRs email.
It is most disturbing that WINPAC is essentially directing foreign policy in this
matter. There are some very strong points to be made in respect to Iraq's arrogant noncompliance with UN sanctions. However, when individuals attempt to convert those
strong statements into the knock out punch, the Administration will ultimately
look foolish i.e. the tubes and Niger!764
WINPAC did not care one iota about INR or DOEs grievances. The tubes and
the Niger reporting fit the Team Bs preconceived conclusion. Iraq was reconstituting
its nuclear program. As far as WINPAC was concerned, there was no reason the
762
Ibid., p. 129.
Ibid., p. 60.
764
Ibid., p. 60.
763
373
administration shouldnt be able to cite the Team B propaganda. In December 2002,
WINPAC cleared the US Ambassador to the United Nations, John Negropontes
rebuttal to the Iraqi declaration.765 WINPAC cleared the Ambassador to cite uraniumfrom-Africa. A fact sheet released to coincide with speech was unequivocal:
Nuclear Weapons
The Declaration ignores efforts to procure

uranium from Niger.
Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?766
INR hadnt seen the fact sheet or Negropontes speech until it was too late. By
the time INR ordered qualifications added to the Niger reference, the fact sheet had
already been posted on the State Departments website.767 Tenet had sold out. The
Intelligence Community wouldnt be vetting the case for war anymore. WINPACs
Team B was now running the show.
The Uranium Free-For-All
The administrations war campaign intensified in January 2003. US officials argued

that Iraq was clearly in material breach of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1441. For two months now, UN weapons inspectors had been back in Iraq
and hadnt turned up any evidence of banned weapons. The White House charged that
765
Ibid., p. 60.
United States. Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. Fact Sheet: Illustrative Examples of
Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council. December 19, 2002.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118.htm Accessed: December 3, 2007.
767
766
374
Iraq was hiding its weapons programs. For the Bush administration, the absence of
evidence was a material breach of 1441 in and of itself. The neocons did not need
evidence to know Iraq had WMDs. They only needed evidence to convince the rest of
us that they were right.
On January 20, 2003, the neocons Exhibit A for the memes nuclear
component took a huge hit. Since the Presidents UN address, the US had asserted
that Iraqs aluminium tubes were intended for centrifuge rotors to enrich uranium.
WINPACs Team B analysis had been shoehorned into the Intelligence Communitys
majority position. DOEs assessment that the tubes were for rockets had been
sidelined. But now the UNs International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had
investigated the tubes most likely end-use. On January 20, the IAEA reported its
findings to the UN Security Council. The DOE had been right all along. Iraqs
explanation that the tubes were for rockets had checked out.
The IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites

involved in the production and storage of reverse
engineered rockets, held discussions with and
interviewed Iraq personnel, taken samples of aluminium
tubes and begun a review of the documentation
provided by Iraq relating to contracts with the traders.
As a result of these inspection efforts, it has been
possible to confirm the existence of a programme for
producing 81-millimetre rockets. The IAEAs
analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the
375
aluminium tubes recently sought by Iraq appear to be
consistent with reverse engineering of rockets the
combustion chambers of which were made of highstrength aluminium.768 [Authors emphasis.]
Without the tubes, there was no other evidence to support the memes nuclear
component. The neocons needed to convince the Joe Public that they were right.
Iraq was a threat because it was reconstituting its nuclear program. Now more than
ever, the Bush administration needed to cite uranium-from-Africa. Fortunately for the
case for war, WINPAC and its Team B cell was ready to deliver anything the White
House wanted. The rest of the Intelligence Community would be powerless to
intervene.
Thanks to WINPAC, the Bush administrations public statements and

speeches became a uranium free-for-all. On January 20, 2003, the day of the IAEAs
announcement, the White House submitted a report to Congress on Iraqs
noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions.769 The report had been drawn
largely from WINPACs US analysis of Iraqs December 7 declaration. Just like the
analysis, WINPAC did not coordinate the report with the rest of the Intelligence
Community. As a result, the White House report cited Iraqs failure to declare
attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it.770
768
IAEA Update Report for the SC Pursuant to Res. 1441 (2002). International Atomic Energy
Agency. New York. January 20, 2003.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html Accessed: December 5,
2007.
769
770
Ibid., p. 63.
376
Now that WINPAC was in control, senior Bush administration officials were
free to make the case they wanted to make. They could cite Iraqs uranium
procurement attempts to convince the public of the Iraqi nuclear threat. On January
23, 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated in a New York Times
op-ed that the Iraqi declaration fails to account for or explain Iraqs efforts to get
uranium from abroad771 On the same day, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz delivered a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. Iraqs declaration
made no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad, he said.772
Similarly, on January 26, 2003, Colin Powell addressed the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland. The Secretary of State demanded Iraq answer life and death
questions: Where are the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological weapons
laboratories on wheels? Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special
equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?773
The Intelligence Communitys consensus no longer had to be brought in line

with WINPACs Team B. For all intents and purposes, WINPAC was the Intelligence
Communitys consensus. The President could now make the case the neocons wanted
him to make. He could cite Team B intelligence to support the meme: Iraq is a threat
because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda.
771
Rice, Condoleezza. Why We Know Iraq is Lying. The New York Times. January 23, 2003.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E5DF1E30F930A15752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: December 5, 2007.
772
Wolfowitz, Paul. Iraq: What does disarmament look like? Council on Foreign Relations. New
York. January 23, 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=170 Accessed:
December 5, 2007.
773
Powell, Colin. Remarks at the World Economic Forum. Davos, Switzerland. January 26, 2003.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/16869.htm Accessed: December 5, 2007.
377
The Sixteen Words
The State of the Union is one of the most important speeches a US President can
deliver. The annual address is required by the United States Constitution and is
delivered before a joint session of Congress the entire Senate and House of
Representatives. In other words, the State of the Union is when President speaks for
America to America. Everything he says had better be true. In his 2003 State of the
Union, President Bush was going to lay out the US case for war with Iraq. The speech
would be vetted by WINPAC.
On January 27, 2003, the day before the President would deliver the address,
the White House gave DCI George Tenet a draft of the State of the Union.774
According to Tenet, he handed the draft over to the CIAs Directorate of Intelligence,
although no one there recalls receiving it.775 No one was named as a point of contact
to coordinate the speech with the rest of the Intelligence Community.776 The
Intelligence Community did not vet the Presidents 2003 State of the Union address.
Tenet testified that he never even read it.777
Tenet had rolled over for the neocons. WINPAC was in charge of vetting the
State of the Union. In late-January 2003, the White House sent a draft of the speech to
the WINPAC Director, Alan Foley.778 The draft included the line we know that he
[Saddam Hussein] has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa, a reference to
774

Ibid., p. 64.
776
Ibid., p. 64.
777
Ibid., p. 64.
778
Ibid., p. 65.
775
378
SISMIs Niger reporting.779 According to both WINPAC and the White House, Foley
never raised any concerns about the credibility of SISMIs reports.780 He was,
however, concerned that US intelligence on Niger was specifically and directly tied to
SISMI. The reference in an unclassified speech might reveal sources and methods,
the WINPAC Director told the White House.781
How about if the President cited uranium-from-Africa to British intelligence,

the White House asked.782 The British information was already unclassified. It was
already out there.783 Besides, the UKs MI6 had the Second Source who had
confirmed elements of the Niger reporting. The Second Source had confirmed that
Zahawies trip to Niger in 1999 had been an attempt to purchase black-market
uranium. The President wouldnt be citing SISMI if he was citing the British
government.
Foley agreed to the White House proposal.784 As long as it was attributed to

the UK, the President could cite uranium-from-Africa. He could have his nuclear
punchline.
On January 28, 2003, President Bush delivered his State of the Union address.
President Bush argued that Iraqis had been given every opportunity to disarm and yet
they still refused to do so. As evidence of Iraqs noncompliance, the President listed
the WMD-related activities that Iraq still could not account for. He cited Team B
779
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid., p. 66.
781
Ibid., pp. 64-65.
782
Ibid., p. 65.
783
Ibid., p. 65.
784
Ibid., p. 66.
780
379
intelligence that had been strengthened by the disinformation operation: Curveball,
Harith and Red River, the tubes, and now Niger, the UKs Second Source. WINPAC
had cleared the President to say the sixteen words.
It is up to Iraq to show
exactly where it is hiding
its banned weapons, lay
those weapons out for the
world to see and destroy
them as directed. Nothing
like this has happened.
[]
Figure 38 President Bush delivers the

State of the Union address, January 28,
2003. Source:
From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the

late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons
labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare
agents and can be moved from place to a place to evade
inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these
facilities. He has given no evidence that he has
destroyed them.
[]
The British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
380
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted
to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable
for nuclear weapons production.
Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these
activities. He clearly has much to hide.
The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he
is deceiving.785 [Authors emphasis.]
Thanks to WINPAC, President Bush had been able to make the case for war
that the neocons indeed, the President himself had wanted to make. The neocons
did not need evidence to know that Iraq had WMDs. They only needed evidence to
convince everyone else that they were right. They only needed evidence to
manufacture the consent of Joe Public. In the 2003 State of the Union address, the
Presidents evidence was essentially propaganda: Team B intelligence mixed with
disinformation. Curveball, the tubes and the sixteen words were cited to convince
people of the memes WMD component. While the President stopped short of
accusing Saddam of complicity in 9/11, the State of the Union address implied the
memes al-Qaeda component very heavily. The President asked Americans to
imagine al-Qaeda armed with Iraqs chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
Before September the 11th, many in the world believed

that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical
agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks
are not easily contained.
785
381
Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and
other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It
would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into
this country to bring a day of horror like none we have
ever known.
We will do everything in our power to make sure that
that day never comes.786
Since September 11, 2001, the neocons had been fighting tooth and nail with
the Intelligence Community for control over the public case for war with Iraq. Team
B cells interpreted intelligence to fit the neocons preconceived conclusions. A
disinformation operation manufactured evidence to bring the Intelligence
Communitys consensus in line with the Team Bs. Propaganda was planted in the
press. Analysts were pressured to the clear the case the neocons wanted to make. With
Tenets acquiescence, WINPACs control over the clearance process and the Team B
propaganda in the State of the Union, the neocons were finally victorious over the
Intelligence Community. The neocons victory was the Presidents sixteen words.
Powell
The Bush administrations war campaign would not end with the State of the Union.
In the address, the President announced that that US would ask the UN Security
Council to meet on February 5 to consider Iraqs ongoing defiance of the world.
Secretary of State Colin Powell would present US intelligence about Iraqs illegal
786
Ibid.
382
weapons programs; its attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors; and its links
to terrorist groups, the President said.787 The announcement was news to Powells
chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson.788
The Presidents announcement meant that Powell, Wilkerson and the State
Department would have less than a week to put together the best case they could
against Iraq. Powell, a career military officer, believed strongly in the authority of the
President and wanted to serve Bushs agenda.789 He also believed Iraq was certain to
have at least some WMDs somewhere. He knew Saddam would have to be dealt with
sooner or later. However, Powell was not a neocon. A moderate in the administration,
the Secretary of State wasnt keen to stake his credibility on the neocons cooked
intelligence. After the sudden announcement of Powells UN presentation, the
neocons in the Office of the Vice President handed the Secretary of State a forty-eight
page script of what theyd like him to say.790 Dont worry, they told him. The script
had been vetted by WINPAC.791 Powell likely knew the neocons were setting him up.
The first thing Powell did was throw out the neocons script.792 WINPACs
okay wasnt good enough. The Secretary of State did not want to cite any information
that Intelligence Community analysts did not fully support.793 In the days before the
presentation, Powell, Wilkerson and analysts from the State Departments INR met
with DCI George Tenet and his Deputy DCI, John McLaughlin to vet every line of
787
Ibid.
789
Ibid., p. 128.
790
Ibid., p. 129.
791
792
793
788
383
Powells speech.794 The marathon sessions often went all night. Powell wanted to be
sure that everything he would say was backed by solid intelligence. If a line wasnt
supported, the Secretary of State wanted it out.795
By the end of February 4, 2003, Powell believed he had the best supported
case against Iraq that he could make. The tubes were in. The tubes were officially
for centrifuge rotors since Tenet had shoehorned the Team B analysis into the
majority position of the October NIE. Iraqs alleged mobile BW facilities were in.
Curveballs reports had apparently been confirmed by Red River; the facilities would
be the centrepiece of Powells presentation. Uranium-from-Africa, however, was out.
Everyone involved in vetting Powells presentation knew that SISMIs Niger

reports were wildly implausible. Tenet knew. McLaughlin knew. INR had assessed
the reporting highly dubious even before the Niger Documents has surfaced. INR
would have made sure Powell knew that uranium-from-Africa was based on forgeries.
Did the White House want Powell to cite the Presidents nuclear punchline anyway?
Probably. On February 4, 2003, the day before Powells presentation, the State
Department effectively killed uranium-from-Africa. The UNs IAEA had requested
the US provide information on Iraqs alleged uranium procurement attempts. The
State Department handed over copies of the Niger Documents to the IAEA.796
Once the IAEA had the documents, it was only a matter of time before they
were declared forgeries. The Bush administration would have to distance itself from
uranium-from-Africa. If the White House was pressuring Powell to cite SISMIs
794
Ibid., p. 66.
796
795
384
Niger reporting, it stopped once it knew the documents were about to be exposed. The
State Department could trust the IAEA to leak the story to the press. The headline
would read, Coalition Faked It, says UN.797
On February 5, 2003, Colin Powell

delivered his presentation to the UN
Security Council. My colleagues, every
statement I make today is backed up by
sources, solid sources. These are not
assertions. What were giving you are
facts and conclusions based on solid
Figure 39 Secretary of State Colin

Powell addresses the UN Security
Council, February 5, 2003. Source:
intelligence, the Secretary of State

began.798 Immediately to his left sat DCI George Tenet, a silent testament to the
Intelligence Communitys support for the speech.
In the 80-minute presentation, Powell held up a vial of simulated anthrax and

displayed computer generated images of mobile BW facilities.799 The facilities, he
said, had been confirmed by several eyewitnesses. Curveball. Red River. An Iraqi
major. And suddenly a new, fourth source now, a mysterious civil engineer.800 The
Secretary of State also talked up Iraqs procurement of aluminium tubes. Sure, the
tubes were controversial, Powell acknowledged.801 They could be used as rocket
motor bodies. But all the experts agreed the tubes could be adapted for centrifuge use,
he said. Powell had cited the DOEs long-held position that the tubes could not be
797
Charbonneau, Louis. op. cit.

Powell, Colin. UN presentation. February 5, 2003. op. cit.
799
Ibid.
800
Ibid.
801
Ibid.
798
385
used as rotors without substantial modification. He didnt mention that adapting the
tubes for centrifuge use would be like turning a Yugo into a Cadillac. Powell,
Tenet and the Intelligence Community had done the best they could with what they
had. They wanted to support the administrations policy, but didnt want to lie.
Uranium-from-Africa, the Presidents nuclear punchline, was nowhere to be heard in
Powells UN presentation.
What Went Down
The Iraq War conspiracy was not about influencing the decision to go to war. The
conspiracy sought to influence the way in which the war was sold. In the aftermath of
9/11, the neocons in the Bush administration developed a meme to justify regimechange in Iraq: Iraq is a threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like alQaeda. One day, Saddam could arm a terrorist group with a chemical, biological or
even nuclear weapon to attack the US. The only way to protect America was to
remove Saddam from power.
The neocons believed in the meme almost like an article of faith. Saddam was
a tyrant. As such, his WMDs were the pillars of his regime, the source of his power.
He would never give them up. He would use them to attack the United States in any
way he could. For the neocons, Saddams hatred for America and the freedom it
represents would drive the dictator to ally with groups he would otherwise oppose.
Iraqs secular Baathist regime would eagerly join forces with religious extremists if it
would further their common cause: the destruction of the United States. For the
neocons, evidence of the threat from Iraq was irrelevant. They did not need evidence
386
to know that Iraq would arm al-Qaeda to attack the US. They only needed evidence to
convince the rest of us that they were right.
The neocons wanted to tell the public without equivocation that Iraq had
WMDs and supported al-Qaeda. They wanted to cite specific evidence of Iraqs alQaeda ties and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs to convince
people that Iraq was a threat. For the neocons, the Intelligence Community was too
incompetent, too cautious and too biased. Its standard of proof was too high, its
conclusions too dependent on hard evidence. The neocons knew the Intelligence
Community would not find enough evidence to support the meme. They knew theyd
have to find it themselves.
In the run up to the war, the neocons set up at least two Team B cells,
WINPACs Team B and the Wurmser-Maloof Project in the Pentagon, which
interpreted intelligence to fit the neocons preconceived conclusions. The Team Bs
cherry-picked evidence that suggested Iraq had WMDs and supported al-Qaeda while
dismissing as deception evidence that contradicted the predetermined truth. In the
absence of evidence, the intelligence cells filled in the gaps and assumed Iraq was
hiding its WMDs and support for al-Qaeda.
The Team B cells stovepiped dubious, ambiguous and disingenuous

intelligence to senior Bush administration officials. WINPACs Team B interpreted
the Iraqi tubes as centrifuge rotors even though they were clearly intended for rockets.
WINPAC also cherry-picked Curveball as evidence of Iraqs secret BW program
despite growing concerns about the asylum-seekers credibility. In the Pentagon, the
387
Wurmser-Maloof Project found Iraqs Salman Pak facility, a counterterrorism training
camp, to be compelling evidence that Saddam was training terrorists to attack the US.
A Team B cell may also have interpreted Zahawies 1999 mission to Niger as an Iraqi
attempt to buy black-market uranium. Once the neocons had the evidence of what
they had already assumed was true, they wanted to cite it publicly to convince
everyone else that they were right. There was just one problem: the Intelligence
Communitys consensus judgment.
The neocons could not make the case for war that they wanted to make unless
the Intelligence Communitys consensus agreed. During the run up to the war, the
neocons could get individual agencies to agree with them. They could get DIA on
their side and the CIAs WINPAC to clear anything they wanted. But that didnt
matter. Other Intelligence Community members, such as DOE, INR, NESAF and
CTC, would force changes to the neocons public case if it wasnt supported by the
available intelligence. The National Intelligence Council, which coordinates the
Intelligence Communitys consensus, would force the Bush administration to water
down its rhetoric and replace Team B propaganda with consensus, compromise
language that was far less alarmist and far less compelling. Before the neocons could
make the case they wanted to make, the Intelligence Communitys consensus would
have to be brought in line with the Team B cells. The Intelligence Community would
need excuses to sign off on the Team B analyses.
A disinformation operation manufactured evidence so the Intelligence

Community would clear the neocons case for war. The neocons allies, the Iraqi
National Congress and SISMI, coached defectors, laundered forgeries, created echo
388
chambers and multiple sources to bring the Intelligence Communitys consensus in
line with the Team Bs. When the disinformation didnt work, they planted the stories
in the press so that everyone would hear about it anyway. The operations purpose
was to help the neocons make the case for the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its
WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda.
In weeks following September 11, Vice President Cheney could not say that
Iraq had anything to do with the attacks. The INC coached the Salman Pak defectors
to claim Iraq was training Islamic militants in al-Qaeda-style tactics. The Vice
President could only refer to Iraqs pre-Gulf War WMD programs. SISMIs October
report claimed Iraq had bought uranium from Niger. The NGIC text-box claimed the
aluminium tubes would make poor choices for rockets. The INCs Haideri, a former
civil engineer, claimed he had worked on dozens of secret Iraqi weapons sites. The
operation was trying to influence the Intelligence Community so the Vice President
could make the case he wanted to make.
Only the NGIC text-box successfully influenced the consensus. The text-box
undermined DOEs assessment and gave the DIA the excuse it needed to agree with
WINPACs Team B tubes analysis. SISMIs October report was too limited and
lacked needed detail. Haideri failed a lie detector test in Thailand. No one believed the
Salman Pak defectors. Because DIA had signed on to nuclear and no one disputed
WINPACs BW assessment, Cheney could now use compromise, consensus
language. He could refer vaguely to Iraqs weapons of mass destruction programs
and WMD capabilities. He couldnt refer specifically to Iraqs nuclear or BW
389
programs. He couldnt say Iraq supported al-Qaeda. He couldnt cite Team B
intelligence to support the meme.
The consensus stayed the same through January 2002 and the Presidents State
of the Union address. Although the Axis of Evil speech was clearly influenced by the
Wurmser-Maloof Project, the Intelligence Community would only let the President
imply Iraq, Iran and North Korea would ally with terrorists against the US. He had to
use compromise, consensus language. He couldnt say al-Qaeda; he had to say
terrorists. He couldnt refer directly to Iraqs nuclear, BW and chemical weapons
programs. He had to put the memes WMD components in terms of what the Iraqis
would like to do, not in terms of what they are doing.
One week after the State of the Union, the INC tried to launder the Salman
Pak story through a CIA contact in a rival opposition group, the Officers Movement
for Salvation of Iraq. Former DCI R. James Woolsey, the INCs Washington
representative, arranged the DIA to interview Mohammad Harith, a former major in
Iraqs Mukhabarat. SISMI sent the CIA transcriptions of the Niger Documents in its
February report. Each had appeared in the same week. Each had improved over the
previous disinformation. The Intelligence Community knew the INC was pushing the
Salman Pak story, so the story had to be laundered through someone else. Harith had
been coached to confirm Curveballs reports of mobile BW facilities. He also passed a
lie detector test. SISMIs February report provided more details of the Iraq/Niger
uranium deal and referenced prior intelligence, Zahawies 1999 mission to Niger. The
operation had adapted to make its fake intelligence seem more credible. The same
week, the same improvement, the same operation.
390
The operation had much more success this time. The DIA, desperate for an
excuse to agree with WINPACs BW analysis, breathlessly assessed Harith confirmed
Curveball. Similarly, SISMIs February report was DOEs excuse to conclude Iraq
had started reconstituting its nuclear program. Only the Officers Movement for
Salvation of Iraq failed to influence the Intelligence Community. When Vice
President Cheney appeared on Meet the Press, Face the Nation and Late Edition for
his March media blitz, he could now say Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons and had
an active BW program. He could not say Iraq would arm al-Qaeda with WMDs to
attack the US. To help the Vice President make the case, the INC planted a story in
The New Yorker to say it for him. Cheney promoted the INC article on the air. The
INC was working for Cheney.
The Bush administrations media campaign to hype the threat from Iraq would
coincide with the first anniversary of September 11. The neocons wanted to cite
specific intelligence to support the meme. They wanted to cite Team B intelligence:
the tubes were centrifuge rotors, Iraq had mobile BW facilities, and Saddam had tried
to buy uranium from Africa. While the Intelligence Community had reached a
consensus on Iraqs WMD programs, there was still no consensus on the underlying
evidence. DOE and INR still disputed the tubes. Curveballs mobile BW labs were
back to being unconfirmed now Harith had been determined a fabricator. NESAF and
INR still disputed the Niger reporting. The Intelligence Community would not let the
neocons cite Team B intelligence publicly. Despite the disinformation operation, the
Team B intelligence still wasnt strong enough.
391
In late-August 2002, Vice President Cheney railed against the Intelligence
Community in a speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention. Intelligence is
an uncertain business, he stated pointedly. Saddam was hiding the evidence of his
nuclear program. He was hiding his BW facilities. He was hiding his ties to terrorists.
Analysts should not expect solid evidence of Iraqs WMDs, the Vice President said.
The Intelligence Communitys standard of proof was too high. Saddam was too good
at denial and deception. One week after the Vice Presidents speech and one week
before the start of the White House war campaign, the operation kicked into gear
again. Once again, the operation would try to bring the Intelligence Community in
line with the Team B analyses and clear the case for war the Vice President wanted to
make.
In the week before the war campaign, the Modification Intelligence claimed
Iraq had asked about increasing the tubes internal diameters, which is precisely what
DOE had assessed Iraq needed to do before the tubes could be used as centrifuge
rotors. Red Rivers sub-source corroborated specifically Curveballian details the
mobile BW facilities were based on fermentation and some had been built inside
railcars. The Second Source confirmed elements of SISMIs Niger reports. The
Intelligence Community needed excuses to clear Team B propaganda for the case for
war, the disinformation operation was trying to provide them.
When the Bush administration began the media campaign, there still was no
consensus that the tubes were evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. The Modification
Intelligence hadnt worked. The DOE had not changed its assessment that the tubes
were most likely for rockets. However, the White House got around the Intelligence
392
Community by leaking WINPACs Team B analysis to The New York Times. During
the media blitz, Cheney and Powell cited The New York Times article and Rice
referred to aluminium tools. Although President Bush cited the tubes in his UN
address, he probably dropped a caveat at the last minute that the Intelligence
Community had told him to add. DCI George Tenet then had to shoehorn WINPACs
Team B tubes analysis into the majority position of the National Intelligence
Estimate.
In the media campaign, the Bush administration had to refer to Iraqs

reconstruction of its dual-use biological facilities to suggest Iraq had a secret BW
program. Curveballs mobile BW facilities were unconfirmed until mid-September
when the UK forwarded its report from Red River. The UK information arrived in
time for Defense Secretary Rumsfelds congressional testimony on Iraq, in which he
cited Iraqs mobile facilities. UN inspections wouldnt be able to disarm Saddam,
Rumsfeld warned. The mobile facilities were impossible to find.
The UK did not forward its report from the Second Source, however. While
WINPAC was happy to clear the President to cite the Niger reporting in his UN
address, INR and NESAF wanted it out. SISMIs reports were unconfirmed and not
credible. The Intelligence Community forced the White House to substitute the
Presidents nuclear punchline with acquire-fissile-material and Saddam-meets-withscientists. It was consensus, compromise language; far less alarmist and far less
compelling.
393
Following the UN address, the Bush administration was absolutely relentless
trying to get uranium-from-Africa cleared for the case for war. Uranium-from-Africa
was the nuclear punchline, the case for wars money shot, part of the simple equation.
Tubes. Then uranium. Saddam is working on nuclear weapons. The White House
tried four times to clear the reference and each time the Intelligence Community
forced them to take it out again. When the reference was inserted in the Presidents
Cincinnati speech, DCI George Tenet intervened personally to get it removed. Tenet
had helped the administration get the tubes into the NIE. He wasnt going to budge on
Niger
The operation was trying to help the President make the case the neocons
wanted him to make. Thanks to the Second Source, uranium-from-Africa was Exhibit
A in the UKs campaign for war. When it became clear the Intelligence Community
wasnt going to budge on Niger, SISMI leaked the Niger Documents to Rocco
Martino. The intelligence peddler was a one-man echo chamber. He took the dossier
to Frances DGSE and Panoramas Elisabetta Burba. In November, the Niger echoes
werent getting through and the West African Businessman appeared, another
apparently independent source for the Iraq-Niger agreement. The West Africa
Businessman confirmed elements of a black-market uranium deal that did not exist.
Elisabetta Burba was supposed to write a story about the Iraq-Niger deal,
another echo in the chamber. She was not supposed to investigate the dossier. She was
not supposed to hand the Niger Documents over to the US Embassy in Rome. Once
the forgeries reached the Intelligence Community, Im pretty sure they would have
known what was going on. SISMI had known exactly what it was doing. Not only had
394
the Italians forwarded reports based on forged documents, they had corrected the
forgers mistakes so the Intelligence Community wouldnt find out. SISMI had likely
given the forger feedback to make his forgeries more credible. SISMI director Nicolo
Pollari had personally vouched for the reports source twice. Once they got the Niger
Documents, Tenet and the Intelligence Community had to have known that, just like
the Iraqi National Congress, SISMI was running disinformation against the US.
SISMI had to have had some serious political cover. The content of Doc 8 would have
been a hint from whom.
I think our forger had powerful friends and Tenet knew it. In December 2002,
Tenet gave in to the neocons. WINPAC would clear the case for war on its own. With
WINPAC in charge of the State of the Union address, the President could have his
nuclear punchline; he could cite Team B intelligence. WINPAC cleared the sixteen
words: The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa. When Powell brought the Intelligence
Community back in for his UN presentation, the first thing to go was uranium-fromAfrica. The Niger Documents were leaked to the UN, which leaked them to the press.
But by then, it was far too late.
The Dogs of War
President Bush looked resolute as he addressed the United States on the evening of
March 19, 2003. My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are
in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to
395
defend the world from grave danger, he said.802 The President had ordered an
airstrike on Saddams Dora compound in Iraq. The bunker-buster had hit forty-five
minutes earlier.803
Our nation enters this conflict

reluctantly yet, our purpose is sure, the
President continued. The people of the
United States and our friends and allies will
not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime
that threatens the peace with weapons of
mass murder. We will meet that threat now,
with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast
Figure 40 President Bush addresses

America, March 19, 2003. Source:
Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters
and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.804 The parallel with September 11
was clear. Removing Saddam from power would prevent another US terrorist attack.
In opinion polls taken just before the start of the war, 50 percent of Americans
believed Iraq was a threat that required urgent military action. 45 percent believed
Iraq was a threat that could be contained. Only 5 percent said that Iraq was not a
threat at all.805 61 percent of Americans believed Iraq was not cooperating with UN
weapons inspectors.806 A staggering 72 percent said that it was very or somewhat
802
Bush, George W. President Bush Addresses the Nation. The White House. Washington DC.
March 19, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html Accessed:
December 5, 2007.
803
804
Bush, George W. Address to the Nation. March 19, 2003. op. cit.
805
Poll: Losing Patience with the UN. CBS News. March 10, 2003.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/18/opinion/polls/main544511.shtml Accessed: December 5,
2007.
806
Ibid.
396
likely that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11 attacks.807
When the President addressed the nation on March 19, the American people
supported military action by nearly a 2-to-1 margin.808 The neocons propaganda had
worked. America believed that Iraq was a threat because of its WMDs and support for
terrorists like al-Qaeda. America believed the meme.
On March 20, 2003, the President gave the order for the full-scale ground
invasion of Iraq. 183,000 US and Coalition troops would move north from Kuwait
into Iraq and then charge 400km to Baghdad.809 Saddams regime would collapse
within three weeks. The Iraq War had begun.
807
Selling an Iraq-al Qaeda Connection. CNN. March 11, 2003.

http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/11/Iraq.Qaeda.link/ Accessed: December 5, 2007.
808
Berman, Ari. Polls Suggest Media Failure in Pre-War Coverage. Editor & Publisher. March 26,
2003. http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1848576
809
397
Sixteen Words: Theoretical Section
398
The [Bush administration] aide said that guys like me were in what we call the
reality-based community, which he defined as people who believe that solutions
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. I nodded and murmured
something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. Thats not
the way the world really works anymore, he continued. Were an empire now, and
when we act, we create our own reality. And while youre studying that reality
judiciously, as you will well act again, creating other new realities, which you can
study too, and thats how things will sort out. Were historys actors and you, all of
you, will be left to just study what we do.
Ron Suskind, Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush. The
New York Times. October 17, 2004.
399
My thesis is the anatomy of a conspiracy, an examination of the manufacture of

consent in the 21st Century. In Sixteen Words, the narrative section of my thesis, I
detail the conspiracy from the terrorist attacks of September 11 until the outbreak of
the Iraq War in March 2003. The conspiracy consisted of two parts, broadly speaking.
The first, the Team B intelligence cells that cherry-picked weak and dubious evidence
to support preconceived conclusions Iraqs WMDs or Iraqs support for terrorists
like al-Qaeda. The second was the disinformation operation that targeted the news
media and US Intelligence Community. The operation sought to strengthen Team B
intelligence so the Intelligence Community would clear President Bush to make the
case for war that he wanted to make. Ultimately, the target of the conspiracy was not
the Intelligence Community, the press or the Bush administration. The conspiracy did
not seek to influence the decision to go to war, but rather the way in which the war
was sold. The conspiracys target was the public. The conspiracys objective was the
manufacture of consent, to convince the public of the meme: Iraq is a threat because
of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda.
In this theoretical section, I will argue that the Iraq War conspiracy was the
practical application of Straussian political theory. Straussian theory, named for
political theorist Leo Strauss, provides a framework to understand both the Team B
analysis and the disinformation operation. Strauss work also explains the necessity of
the manufacture of consent. Whereas the narrative section of my thesis explains the
how of the conspiracy, my theoretical section will examine the conspiracys why.
400
Who was Leo Strauss? He was born to an orthodox Jewish family in
Kirschhain, Germany in 1899.810 At the University of Marburg in 1917, Strauss was
drafted into the German army and served as an interpreter during the First World War.
He returned to his studies at the end of the war and in 1921 received a Doctor of
Philosophy from the University of Hamburg. Strauss held a position at the Academy
of Jewish Research in Berlin from 1925 until 1932, when he left Germany to study in
France and England.811 After the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party, Strauss was
prevented from returning. Most of his family perished in the Holocaust.812
Strauss eventually settled in the United States. In the late-1940s, he began

teaching political science at the University of Chicago where he developed an ardent,
almost zealous following among his students.813 When he died in 1973, he was
praised as the greatest teacher of political science since Machiavelli and the best,
and the Wisest, and the most just.814 Today, Strauss is something of a guru among
American neoconservatives and is considered to have influenced many of the
intellectual architects of the Iraq War.815
In 1999, two of Strauss former students, Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt,
authored an essay, Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (By Which We Do Not
Mean Nous).816 The paper argued that Strauss political philosophy had applications
810
Roth, Walter. Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago. Chicago Jewish History. Vol. 28, No. 2.
Spring, 2004. p. 4. http://www.chicagojewishhistory.org/pdf/CJH.2.2004.pdf Accessed: October 5,
2007.
811
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987. p. 1.
812
Roth, Walter. Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago. op. cit., p. 7.
813
Ibid., p. 4.
814
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. op cit., p. 1.
815
Hersh, Seymour M. Selective Intelligence. The New Yorker. May 12, 2003.
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact Accessed: October 5, 2007.
816
Schmitt, Gary J. and Abram N. Shulsky. Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (by Which We
Do Not Mean Nous) in Kenneth L. Deutsch and John A. Murley (eds.), Leo Strauss, the Straussians,
401
for intelligence analysis. Both Shulsky and Schmitt are prominent neoconservatives
and close to the Bush administration. Schmitt is a senior fellow at the Project for the
New American Century, a neoconservative think-tank associated with Paul
Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney.817 In 2002, Shulsky became the
director of the Office of Special Plans, a Team B successor to the Wurmser-Maloof
Project, responsible for the Pentagons analysis of Iraq intelligence in the run up to
the war.818 In addition to Shulsky and Schmitt, Strauss taught Paul Wolfowitz as an
undergraduate. Noted Straussian Harvey Mansfield taught Elliot Abrams, a member
of Bushs National Security Council, and Richard Perle, chairman of Bushs Foreign
Policy Advisory Board. Perle was the mentor of Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Douglas Feith, who established the Pentagons Team B cells, the WurmserMaloof Project and its successor, Shulskys Office of Special Plans.819
Although Strauss is influential among the Bush administrations neocons, I

should be clear that neoconservatism is not synonymous with Straussianism. It is not
the case that all Straussians are neoconservatives or that all neoconservatives are
Straussians. According to Irving Kristol, one of neoconservatisms many
godfathers, neoconservatives generally agree that lower taxes stimulate economic
growth, traditional cultural values should be strengthened and that foreign policy
should reflect ideological interests as well as national ones.820 One can adhere to
and the American Regime. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. pp. 407-412.
http://www.turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/leo_strauss_and_the_world_of_intellige
nce.pdf Accessed: January 27, 2007.
817
Statement of Principles. The Project for the New American Century. Washington DC. June 3,
1997. http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm Accessed October 5, 2007.
818
Hersh, Seymour M. Selective Intelligence. op. cit.
819
Ibid.
820
Kristol, Irving. The Neoconservative Persuasion. The Weekly Standard. Vol. 8, Iss. 47. August
25, 2003.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=3000&R=785F27881
402
neoconservative principles without being a Straussian. That said, I will argue that
Strauss work is important for understanding both Team B analysis and the
surrounding disinformation campaign. I will argue that the Iraq War conspiracy was
the practical application of Straussian political theory.
What is Straussian theory? The question is surprisingly difficult to answer. In

his lifetime, Leo Strauss wrote dozens of books, articles and commentaries, all of
which are notoriously difficult to interpret. It is widely accepted that Strauss
deliberately wrote in a way that would conceal his true beliefs from the majority his
readers.821 Strauss works, it is said, contain two separate teachings. A casual reading
communicates Strauss surface, or exoteric teaching, which he intended as
deception. Strauss real beliefs, his esoteric teaching can only be discerned through
careful and deliberative study of his texts. Writing in this fashion, Strauss hoped that
only his most careful readers would learn his true views. Due to the uncertainty
surrounding Strauss true teaching, much of this theoretical section will examine
what, precisely, Straussian political theory actually is.
Strauss exoteric teaching is readily apparent. In essays such as What is

Political Philosophy? and Political Philosophy and History, and in books like
Natural Right and History, Strauss rails against the influence of historicism in
Western society. Historicism is the idea that no political philosophy can be valid
beyond its historical situation. There is no natural law, no universally right way of
821
For e.g. see, Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. op. cit. pp. 18ff. and Smith, Steven
B. Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2006. pp. 1ff.
403
life.822 Strauss contends that for historicists, there is no point asking, what is the best
regime? because the answer will be conditioned by subjective values that change
over time.823 In his works, Strauss suggests historicism is founded on flawed
assumptions, is self-contradictory and leads inexorably to nihilism, which has serious
social consequences.824 If there is no right way of life, he argues; why not accept the
suffering of others as the dispensation of fate? German philosopher Martin Heidegger,
whom Strauss describes as the most radical historicist, ignored the question of the
best regime when he joined the Nazi Party.825 Nihilist Friedrich Nietzsche prepared a
regime which, as long as it lasted, made discredited democracy look like a golden
age.826 For Strauss, the antidote to historicisms pernicious influence was the study
of philosophy. By reading old books, one could discern the truth, the unchanging,
universal principles of a natural law that addressed the nature of the best regime.827
A casual reading of Strauss leads one to conclude that he was a passionate critic of
historicism and nihilism and a believer in the eternal principles of philosophys
natural law.
However, a closer reading of Strauss texts reveals his esoteric teaching, his
true beliefs. In this theoretical section, I will argue that Strauss secretly agreed with
the views he seemed to attack. He was not only a historicist, but a nihilist as well. For
Strauss, all modes of thought were historically conditioned. All standards of truth,
from Platos theory of the forms to the scientific method, were essentially arbitrary.
822
Strauss, Leo. Political Philosophy and History in What is Political Philosophy? : and other studies.
Glencoe, Ill: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959. p. 57.
823
Strauss, Leo. What is Political Philosophy? in What is Political Philosophy? : and other studies.
Glencoe, Ill: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959. p. 26.
824
Ibid., pp. 21ff.
825
Ibid., p. 27.
826
Ibid., p. 55.
827
Strauss, Leo. Political Philosophy and History. op. cit., p. 68.
404
Philosophy had discovered that there was no God, no natural law and that the only
universally right way of life was to act in ones own self-interest. Truth has no
foundation other than ones belief in it. A careful reading of his work reveals that
Strauss himself was secretly a historicist who had been led inexorably to nihilism.
Strauss did not believe historicism and nihilism were false, only that they were
dangerous.
Underlying Strauss esotericism is his belief that nihilism is destructive for

society. For Strauss, there were three kinds of people in the world: the Vulgar, the
Gentlemen and the Wise. The Wise are the philosophers. They could study
philosophy and withstand the deadly truth of nihilism. Motivated solely by their own
self-interest, the philosophers create the natural law, the application of which would
result in the best regime in terms of the happiness of its citizens. Strauss taught that
the vast majority of people are the Vulgar. For the Vulgar, philosophy was dangerous
because it revealed the truth that the natural law was neither obligatory nor rational if
it conflicts with ones self-interest. Strauss feared that if the Vulgar learned the truth,
society would collapse. Therefore, the natural law had to be made to seem obligatory
and rational. And this, I will argue, was the function of the Gentlemen.
Strauss taught that although the best regime is the philosophers absolute rule,
the best possible regime is the secret kingship of the philosophers.828 Several
commentators have suggested that Strauss implies his students, the Straussians, are
the philosophers and, as such, should seek absolute rule over the Vulgar.829 If
828
Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1952. p. 17.
For e.g., see Lobe, Jim. The Strong Must Rule the Weak: A Philosopher for an Empire. Foreign
Policy In Focus. May 12, 2003. http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305strauss_body.html
829
405
absolute rule is not possible, then they should rule in secret. They should influence
those in power. I will argue in this theoretical section that this understanding of
Straussian theory is incorrect. The Straussians are not the Wise in Strauss teaching,
but the Gentlemen.
I will argue that when Strauss refers to the rule of philosophers, he is actually
being quite literal. The Wise are literally the classical philosophers Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle, and other great thinkers of antiquity. The natural law, which provides for
the best regime, is the principles of classical philosophy, principles discerned from
texts such as Platos Republic for example. As noted previously, Strauss, as a nihilist,
believes that all standards of truth are essentially arbitrary. Truth has no foundation
other than ones belief in it. I will argue that Strauss, disillusioned with modern
political science after it failed to recognise the threat of Hitler, decided to affirm the
old political science as his new standard of truth. For Strauss, principles drawn from
the texts of classical philosophers were true absolutely. He taught that the Gentlemen
had a responsibility to apply the principles of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to the
affairs of government. This was the best possible regime, the secret kingship of the
philosophers.
Strauss students, the neocons, are the Gentlemen. The Gentlemen are not
quite philosophers, but reflections or imitations of the Wise. They are the potential
philosophers for whom Strauss writes his books.830 Even though the natural law is
neither obligatory nor rational, the Gentlemen have a responsibility to impose it on the
Vulgar as if it is. (The Vulgar, of course, includes you, me and everyone else.) By
Accessed: October 12, 2007. Also, Shorris, Earl. Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George Bush, and the
Philosophy of Mass Deception. Harpers Magazine. June 2004.
830
Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing. op. cit., p. 36.
406
using noble lies to teach philosophys natural law, the Straussians spare the
Vulgar from nihilisms deadly truth while bestowing the benefits of the natural laws
best regime.
Furthermore, I will argue that Strauss doctrine of esoteric writing not only
communicates his true teaching, but provides the mechanism through which the
Straussians can secure the philosophers secret rule. In his book Persecution and the
Art of Writing, Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasi-objective method of
determining an authors true teaching. However, it is actually an exercise in
eisegesis, a method to twist a texts meaning into anything the reader would like.
Strauss uses esoteric analysis to twist ancient texts to reveal his own true teaching. I
will argue that Strauss intended his method to produce the noble lies the Gentlemen
need to convince the Vulgar that the natural law is both obligatory and rational.
Strauss taught that the Gentlemen should apply esoteric analysis to texts the Vulgar
believe are authoritative (for example, the Vulgars religious texts, traditions or even
the language of objective evidence). Through esoteric analysis, Straussians could
twist the authoritative texts true teaching to conform to the principles of
philosophys natural law. These disingenuous interpretations, or noble lies, compel
the Vulgar to obey the natural law without subjecting them to philosophys dangerous
truths. Thus, the Straussians establish the secret kingship of the philosopher and the
best possible regime.
In essence, Straussian theory could be called neoclassicism on the sly.

Strauss taught that principles drawn from classical texts, such as Platos Republic or
Thucydides The History of the Peloponnesian War, should be applied to the affairs of
407
modern-day government as absolute truths. Straussians apply esoteric analysis to
authoritative texts to convince the public that classical principles are both rational and
obligatory. In this theoretical section, I will argue that the Iraq War conspiracy was
the practical application of Straussian political theory. The Straussians were the
neocons, the authoritative text was intelligence, esoteric analysis was Team B
analysis, and the absolute truth was the Socrates nature of tyranny. The nature
tyranny provided the template from which the neocons derived the meme: Iraq is a
threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. The neocons did
not need evidence to know Iraq was a threat. They only needed evidence to convince
the rest of us, the Vulgar, that they were right.
As a practical application of Straussian political theory, the neocons believed

they had a responsibility to teach us about the nature of Iraq by disingenuously
interpreting our authoritative texts. I will argue that Team B analysis is esoteric
analysis applied to the authoritative text of intelligence. Both Team B and esoteric
analysis cherry-pick those fragments of the text that support a preconceived
conclusion. Both explain away evidence that contradicts the preconceived conclusion
by assuming deception. In the absence of evidence, Team B analysis uses the
preconceived conclusion to fill in the gaps. In the absence of evidence, esoteric
analysis uses the preconceived conclusion to read between the lines. Team
B/esoteric analysis does not describe an objective reality but is in fact an instrument
of control. The aluminium tubes, the Salman Pak facility, Curveballs mobile
biological weapons labs and Zahawies official visit to Niger were all fragments of
the intelligence text cherry-picked to convince the Vulgar of what the Gentlemen
408
believed was an absolute truth: Iraq was a threat because of its WMDs and support for
al-Qaeda.
I will argue that the disinformation campaign against the Intelligence

Community was necessary because the Intelligence Community would not let the
neocons cite their noble lies publicly. For the Intelligence Community, the neocons
Team B intelligence was too weak to include in the United States official case for
war. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Italian military intelligence service,
SISMI, ran a disinformation campaign, which manufactured evidence that
strengthened the Team B fragments. The campaign provided the Intelligence
Community with evidence that seemed to confirm the Team Bs assumptions
evidence of Iraqs deception and evidence that filled in the gaps in the intelligence
text. Strengthening the Team B fragments, the campaign hoped the Intelligence
Community would clear the President to make the case for war the neocons wanted
him to make. The Presidents case was a pack of noble lies to convince the Vulgar
of the absolute truth derived from the nature of Iraq, the meme. The practical
application of Straussian theory is the Presidents sixteen words: The British
The theoretical significance of this thesis is that, first and foremost, it

documents the conspiracy to manufacture consent for the Iraq War. To my
knowledge, no journalist, government body or private researcher has put together an
explanation for the facts that is as detailed and as well-supported as mine. Many wellrespected and award-winning journalists have examined the Bush administrations use
409
of intelligence in the run up to the war. However, journalists have tended to
investigate the elements of the conspiracy in isolation. The New Yorkers Seymour
Hersh, for example, has written extensively on the Pentagons Team B cells, the
Wurmser-Maloof Project and the Office of Special Plans. Peter Eisner of The
Washington Post and Knut Royce of Newsday have authored a book on the Niger
Documents. Recently, The Los Angeles Times Bob Drogin has made headlines with
his investigation of Curveball. No one has examined the conspiracy in its entirety. No
one, that is, apart from me. I have read everything I could find. I have judiciously
studied discernable reality, as it were. The principal significance of this thesis is that it
demonstrates how the Bush administration sold the Iraq War.
Secondly, this thesis is significant because it demonstrates important aspects

of Straussian political theory that have heretofore gone unnoticed. The thesis shows
Straussian theorys reliance on classical texts as its standard of truth. Also, I will
demonstrate that esoteric analysis is more than Strauss method to communicate
dangerous truths. Esoteric analysis is in fact an instrument of social control. The
method is used to compel our obedience to the secret kingship of classical
philosophers.
Finally, this thesis is significant because it describes the Iraq War conspiracy
in terms of the practical application of Straussian theory. As Straussians, the neocons
were convinced of their own superiority and certain of the philosophical truth. They
distracted us with disingenuous arguments, noble lies, about aluminium tubes,
terror training camps, mobile labs and uranium from Africa. The neocons thus denied
us our democratic right to debate the Iraq War on its merits. My hope is that they will
410
be remembered for that. Whether intended or not, the practical application of
Straussian theory is a subversion of democracy. Its legacy will be the nightmare that
is post-war Iraq.
411
Literature Review
In this literature review, I will examine several important commentators on Strauss.

Despite Strauss esotericism, there is a general consensus about the content of his
secret teaching. Strauss only appears to be a believer in a transcendent natural law. In
reality, Strauss shares the views he seems to attack. He does not believe historicism
and nihilism are false, only that they are dangerous for society. Commentators agree
that esoteric analysis does not uncover the true teaching of ancient writers as Strauss
seems to claim. Strauss uses esoteric analysis to twist ancient writers to communicate
his own true teaching. I shall demonstrate this consensus in my review of Strauss
most significant commentators, Shadia Drury, Peter Levine and Nicholas Xenos.
Although I agree with this consensus, broadly speaking, I will demonstrate

that there is much that Drury, Levine and Xenos have missed and, in some cases,
gotten completely wrong. I will argue that Strauss true teaching includes an
affirmation of classical principles as his new standard of truth. I would also add that
esoteric analysis is instrumental for the practical application of Straussian theory.
Esoteric analysis is more than a means of communication; it is a means of social
control. Strauss method provides his students a way to twist the Vulgars
authoritative texts to appear to support principles derived from classical philosophy.
In this way, the Gentlemen compel the Vulgar to obey the secret rule of the Wise.
Straussian theory is essentially neoclassicism on the sly.
Finally, I shall demonstrate how my conception of Straussian theory can be

applied to better understand an important essay by two of Strauss former students. I
412
shall review Shulsky and Schmitts Leo Straus and the World of Intelligence (By
Which We Do Not Mean Nous), which examines the Intelligence Communitys
analytical methodology from a Straussian perspective. I shall show that Shulsky and
Schmitt are nihilists like Strauss, have affirmed classical principles as absolute truths
and use esoteric analysis to compel the Vulgars obedience to the secret kingship of
the philosopher.
Shadia Drury
In her book The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, Shadia Drury notes that Strauss
surface teaching attacks that which esoteric teaching intends to defend.831 Drury
suggests that Strauss is only an anti-historicist on the surface. In reality, Strauss did
not believe that historicism was false, only that it was dangerous. In Leo Strauss and
the American Right, Drury interprets Strauss in terms of the Second World War and
the Holocaust.832 She argues that Strauss was convinced that historicism and nihilism
had infected Germanys Weimar Republic and had resulted in the rise of Hitler and
the Nazi Party. The Weimar Republic, Germanys democratic experiment in the
1920s, had been too tolerant of Nazis and Communists. Unsure of its own values,
Weimar had been unable to take action against or even condemn ideologues that
sought its destruction. Drury argues that for Strauss and his students, Weimars belief
that all values are relative enabled the Nazis rise to power.833
It is this fear of value-relativism which underlies Strauss esotericism.

Although Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasi-objective method for finding an
831
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. op. cit., p. 35.
Drury, Shadia B. Leo Strauss and the American Right. New York: St. Martins Press, 1999. p. xii.
833
Ibid., p. 114.
832
413
authors true teaching, Drury notes that his method of interpretation is notoriously
lacking in clarity and rigor.834 She concludes that esoteric analysis is an exercise in
eisegesis, a philosophy in disguise.835
It is neither possible nor fruitful to use the method

unless one has already accepted his philosophical
assumptions: assumptions about what is wise and
foolish, noble and ignoble, true and false. Those who
use the method share a conception of the good, the true
and the useful They know that the truth is unpalatable
to the city. They know what sort of beliefs are useful
to the political order. They know which philosophers
are wise and which are foolish. They know the wise
conceal the truth and pay lip service to the salutary
myths. In contrast, the unwise either believe the salutary
myths or believe that the truth can be openly declared
without causing harm What is important about
Strausss method is not its form but its content. The
method is inseparable from Strausss philosophy; it
contains particular assumptions about the nature of the
world, of philosophy, of human nature and of political
life.836
834
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. op. cit. p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
836
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
835
414
Thus, Drury argues that Strauss does not apply esoteric analysis to the works
of ancient writers to discover their true teaching. Instead, he uses esoteric analysis to
twist the works of ancient writers so they communicate his own true teaching.837 The
reason he does this is because he believes that the truth is dangerous.
What is Strauss dangerous truth? For Drury, Strauss true teaching is that
philosophy undermines all moral values. Strauss believed that if the Vulgar
discovered this truth, then they may submit to the rule of another Hitler-esque
dictator, just as Heidegger did. Thus, Drury writes that for Strauss,
the esoteric-exoteric style is necessary not only to

protect the philosophers from persecution in societies
hostile to philosophy, but to protect society from the
anti-religious and anti-moral nature of philosophical
truth which endangers society. This style allows the
philosopher to endorse the salutary myths necessary for
the preservation of society while revealing the truth for
those who are fit for it. In this way, the philosopher
discharges his social duty, which is to lie nobly. The
existence of God and His immutable Law is one of the
most pious frauds that the philosopher can perpetuate. If
the vulgar discovered, as the philosophers have
837
Ibid., p. 15.
415
always known, that God is dead, they might behave
as if all is permitted.838 [Authors emphasis.]
For Drury, esoteric writing is the noble lie which conceals the dangerous truth
that there is no God and no reason to act morally. By writing esoterically, Strauss
believes he is fulfilling his social responsibilities. He communicates the dangerous
truth to the potential philosophers while preventing the Vulgar from destroying
society and themselves. for Strauss, religion and morality are two of the biggest
but most pious swindles ever perpetrated on the human race. But paradoxically, there
would be no human race were it not for these swindles. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that they be sustained and nurtured.839 Drury suggests that Strauss feared
what would happen if the Vulgar learned there were no God and no morality other
than their own self-interest. Through esoteric analysis, Strauss twists ancient writers
so he can safely communicate the truth to the potential philosophers while it remains
safely concealed from the Vulgar.
While Drury is correct that Strauss method is eisegesis, I would suggest she
has not grasped the full implications of esoteric analysis. Esoteric analysis is more
than a way to safely communicate the truth to potential philosophers. In this
theoretical section, I will argue that Strauss method is an instrument of social control.
Strauss true teaching suggests that esoteric analysis should be applied to the Vulgars
authoritative texts to prove the texts support for the principles of classical
philosophy; that is, texts such as intelligence reports and principles such as Socrates
838
839
Ibid., pp. 33-34.

Ibid., p. 20.
416
nature of tyranny. In this way, Straussians are able to convict the Vulgar of the
obligatory character of classical principles.
Drury argues that for Strauss, the philosopher must not only conceal the
dangerous truth, he must strengthen societys salutary myths.840 She suggests that
Straussians, as philosophers, seek to preserve societys traditional values and
religious beliefs, not because they believe they are true, but because they believe they
keep the Vulgar in check. Again, I would suggest that Drury has not grasped the full
implications of Strauss true teaching. The salutary myths are more than traditional
values and religious beliefs. They include all of societys authoritative texts such as
legislation, historical records and, importantly, the language of empirical evidence.
While Drury is correct that Straussians strengthen societys faith in these authorities,
I will argue that they do so because authoritative texts are the media to which they
apply esoteric analysis. It is these salutary myths that are interpreted disingenuously
to convince the Vulgar that classical philosophys natural law is both rational and
obligatory. For the Straussians, our belief in these authorities is a prerequisite for the
secret kingship of the philosophers.
Drurys mistake is her assumption that when Strauss refers to the secret rule of
philosophers, he is referring to the secret rule of himself and the Straussians. Drury
notes that for Strauss, the best regime is when philosophers rule openly and
absolutely.841 She argues that Strauss recognised that the best regime was not
possible, however. Instead of the open and absolute rule of philosophers, Strauss
taught his students to seek the best possible regime, the secret rule of
840
841
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 28.
417
philosophers.842 Drury notes that for Strauss, the philosophers secret rule depends on
the chance occurrence of princes friendly to philosophy.843 She interprets this to
mean that Straussians, as philosophers, seek to serve as advisors to those in power.844
What kind of advice will philosophers provide? As noted previously, Strauss

secret teaching is that philosophy undermines all moral values. Drury notes that
Strauss philosophers will rule according to the principles of natural right, which
actually contains no principles of human conduct at all.845 Strauss concept of natural
right is in fact governed by self-interest. For Strauss, philosophers are interested in
only one thing: continued philosophy. Actions and regimes are only good insofar as
they make philosophical life possible. The only reason the absolute rule of
philosophers is the best regime is because it is the best regime for philosophy. And so
Drury concludes that in principle, Straussians will support any action that would
bring a city closer to the rule of the philosophers.846 In practice, however, they will
lend support to any regime, no matter how ignoble, if it is deemed necessary in the
circumstances, and if the means required to overthrow it are likely to result in greater
turmoil and disorder.847 In other words, Drury is suggesting that Straussians in Nazi
Germany would support Hitler if not supporting Hitler would endanger philosophy.
To be clear, I absolutely agree with Drurys interpretation of Strauss and the

morality (or lack thereof) of philosophers. For Strauss, philosophy revealed that there
were no God and no eternal moral principles other than ones own self-interest.
842
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 34.
844
Ibid., p. 90.
845
Ibid., p. 90.
846
Ibid., p. 112.
847
Ibid., p. 112.
843
418
Philosophers know that all values are arbitrary, so why should they care if a regime
kills six million innocents if it does not affect the philosophical life? However, the
critical point on which I absolutely disagree with Drury is that Strauss and the
Straussians consider themselves philosophers.
I would suggest that Drury has fundamentally misunderstood how Strauss

intends the secret kingship of the philosopher. She contends that it is the Straussians
who rule in secret by advising the friendly princes in power; she suggests the
neocons, as Straussians, are the philosophers. In her essay Leo Strauss and the
Grand Inquisitor, Drury argues that the neocons pay lip service to societys moral
codes, but in reality recognise that morality is essentially arbitrary.848 Thus she
suggests the neocons do not believe that morality applies to them. The only good
actions are those which serve their self-interest, i.e. those which that bring the US
closer to the absolute rule of philosophers, which is to say the absolute rule of the
neocons. For Drury, the neocons believe the end the best regime for philosophy
justifies any and all means.849
Furthermore, Drury suggests that the neocons, as philosophers, seek to

strengthen societys salutary myths and that this was the function of the Iraq War.850
Strauss taught that Western societys decadence, its sloth, its moral-relativism would
one day lead to its destruction. Drury argues that for the neocons, war is an antidote to
the United States moral decay. War encourages sacrifice, patriotism and respect for
tradition, the belief that our way of life is the best way of life, which are all salutary
848
Drury, Shadia B. Leo Strauss and the Grand Inquisitor. Free Inquiry. Vol. 24, No. 4, June/July,
2004. http://www.secularhumanism.org/library/fi/drury_24_4.htm Accessed: October 5, 2007.
849
Ibid.
850
Ibid.
419
myths necessary for the survival of the state. For Drury, Saddam Hussein was an
invented enemy and the justification for the war, Iraqs WMDs and support for
terrorists, a cynical propaganda exercise. The neocons did not really believe Saddam
was a threat; he was their excuse to strengthen their control over the US.851
As mentioned previously, Drury has fundamentally misunderstood how

Strauss intends the secret kingship of the philosopher. I would suggest that the
Straussians are not the philosophers but the princes friendly to philosophy. They
are the Gentlemen through whom the philosophers exercise their secret rule. Who
then are the philosophers? What Drury has missed is that Strauss reference is actually
quite literal. For Strauss, the philosophers are Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the other
great thinkers of antiquity. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are the Straussians secret
advisors.
Strauss understood that the principles of classical philosophys natural law,

such as the nature of tyranny in Platos Republic, were part of the philosophers
surface or exoteric teaching. Just as Drury argues, Strauss believed that the
philosophers true, esoteric teaching indicated that the only reason they wanted to
apply the natural law was because it served their own self-interest. The application of
classical principles would result in the best regime for philosophy. And so,
philosophers would not go to any great extremes to impose the natural law on society.
They would not sacrifice their lives for the natural law. Instead, philosophers, much
like Heidegger, would accept the status quo and philosophize as best they could. As
Drury notes, in practice, philosophers will lend support to any regime, no matter how
851
Ibid.
420
ignoble, if it is deemed necessary in the circumstances, and if the means required to
overthrow it are likely to result in greater turmoil and disorder.852
The difference between Strauss and the philosophers is that even though
Strauss knows antiquitys natural law is neither rational nor obligatory, he wants to
apply it anyway. For Strauss, the application of the principles of classical philosophy
will not only result in the best regime for philosophy, but will also produce peaceful
regimes and happy citizens. The philosophers do not care about peace and happiness
if it conflicts with the philosophical life. Strauss, however, does. Although he knows
the natural law is neither rational nor obligatory, he believes its application will result
in the best regime in terms of human happiness. He wants to apply principles from
Platos Republic because he believes they will make people happy.
Drury contends that Straussians govern according to the principles of natural

right, which actually contains no principles at all. However, I will argue the neocons
govern according to the principles of the natural law, which they have derived from
the study of classical texts. For the neocons, these principles are not salutary myths
but absolute truths. The neocons are not philosophers. They are Gentlemen. As Drury
herself notes, Strauss is well-known for his claim that the political solution par
excellence is the rule of gentlemen.853 The Gentlemen are people capable of
harboring the noble self-deceptions without which the city cannot exist. They are the
people who believe that the just life is the happy life, and that the life dedicated to the
service of others is truly the most pleasant life. They are people who believe that the
852
853
Ibid., p. 82.
421
noble is choiceworthy for its own sake.854 As I will argue, the Gentlemen bring about
the secret kingship of the philosophers by applying classical principles to the affairs
of government.
I agree with Drury that Straussians seek to strengthen societys salutary

myths and that the Iraq War served to encourage American patriotism and respect for
traditional values. I would contend, however, that Straussians do not strengthen
salutary myths arbitrarily. Rather, these myths are the Vulgars authoritative texts to
which Straussians apply esoteric analysis. As I will argue, the neocons use esoteric
analysis to twist authoritative texts so they appear to support the principles of the
natural law. Through disingenuous interpretations, they thus convince the Vulgar to
obey the teachings of classical thinkers. In terms of Iraq, the neocons justification for
the war, Saddams WMDs and support for terrorists, was derived from the nature of
tyranny in Platos Republic. The neocons therefore believed the meme was an
absolute truth which had to be taught to the Vulgar through the misinterpretation of
their authoritative texts in this case, the text of intelligence. Saddam Hussein was
not an invented enemy, as Drury claims. As Gentlemen, the neocons had an almost
cosmic certainty that Iraq was a threat to the US. I will argue that for the neocons, the
meme was inextricably entwined with Iraqs nature.
Peter Levine
In his book Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities, Peter Levine makes a
compelling case that Strauss true teaching drew heavily on the work of Friedrich
854
Ibid., p. 82.
422
Nietzsche.855 Like Drury, Levine concludes that Strauss seemingly passionate attacks
on historicism and nihilism are part of his exoteric teaching. While Strauss appears to
be a believer in natural law, in actual fact he was a Nietzschean nihilist. Levine
argues that for Strauss, there was no God, no truth and no natural morality.856 For
Levine, nihilism emerges from Strauss work like a solution to a puzzle.857
Levine suggests that while Strauss exoteric teaching is intended as deception,

it does not necessarily contradict his esoteric teaching.858 For example, he notes that
Strauss Natural Right and History criticises historicists for their inconsistency.
Strauss asks, if historicism is correct that all human thought and action is conditioned
by history, then why should historicism be exempt from its own verdict? Historicism
itself must be historically conditioned as well.859 Levine argues that although Strauss
appears to be denouncing the doctrine as self-contradictory, Strauss is actually himself
a historicist and is willing to be ruthlessly consistent.860 Strauss applies historicism
to itself. He thus undermines the foundation of rationality by making no reason
appear better than any other.861 For Levine, Strauss conclusion that historicism
necessarily leads to nihilism thus indicates that Strauss himself is a nihilist.
Levine also notes that Strauss never offers any substantive arguments against
nihilism. Instead, he focuses solely on its alleged immoral effects. No Straussian text
ever mentions such philosophical critics of nihilism as Wittgenstein or Habermas,
855
Levine, Peter. Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995. pp.
152ff.
856
Ibid., pp. 153-154.
857
Ibid., p. 153.
858
Ibid., p. 157.
859
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. p. 25.
860
Ibid., p. 157.
861
Ibid., p. 157.
423
Levine writes.862 In other words, Strauss never argues that historicism or nihilism are
wrong, only that they are both dangerous. Levine argues that
[Strauss] endorses the cultural relativism that he puts in

the mouths of Nietzsche, Weber, and Heidegger, his
apparent enemies. He attacks these thinkers for doing
damage to the tradition of natural right, which is the
source of the vitality of the West, and therefore for
committing a crime in the terms of herd morality-but
he never claims that they are wrong from a perspective
that is beyond good and evil.863
Levine contends that Strauss does not really believe that a transcendent moral
code can be found by reading old books. If a natural law does exist, Levine asks,
then why does Strauss never state its content? His solution is that Strauss only claims
to have discerned the natural law because he wants to stem the advance of nihilism
and moral relativism among the masses.864 Following Nietzsche, Strauss understands
all morality and all modes of thought are essentially groundless. Rationalism, based
on unevident assumptions, is hollow.865 [H]istorical scholarship rests, ultimately,
on a groundless choice to pursue a certain kind of arbitrary procedure. Even
Science is but one historical, contingent form of mans understanding of the
world866 Thus, Levine argues that Strauss does not really believe a natural law
862
Ibid., p. 166.
Ibid., p. 161.
864
Ibid., p. 163.
865
Ibid., p. 155.
866
Ibid., p. 156.
863
424
exists. He only pretends he does because he wants to turn back from this spectre of
groundlessness, ubermenschlich, to produce a comforting illusion for the herd.867
In this theoretical section, I will argue that Straussian theory is essentially

about the application of the principles of classical philosophys natural law to the
affairs of government. The neocons, as Straussians, see these principles as
transcendent and universal; they are absolute truths. For the neocons, Socrates nature
of tyranny applies equally to Hieros Syracuse as it does to Saddam Husseins Iraq.
That said, I actually agree with Levines conclusion that Strauss was secretly a
Nietzschean nihilist. I agree that Strauss understood all human thought as essentially
arbitrary there was no God, no historical or scientific truth, no universal morality
and, thus, no natural law. For Strauss, there is no true morality beyond ones own selfinterest. In Natural Right and History, he writes that
The radical historicist refuses to admit the transhistorical character of the historicist thesis. At the same
time he recognises the absurdity of unqualified
historicism as a theoretical thesis. He denies, therefore,
the possibility of a theoretical or objective analysis,
which as such would be trans-historical, of the various
comprehensive views or historical worlds or
cultures.868
867
868
Ibid., p. 155.
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. op cit., p. 26.
425
Strauss himself refuses to admit the trans-historical character of the historicist
thesis. Strauss himself recognises the absurdity of unqualified historicism as a
theoretical thesis. Therefore, Strauss denies the possibility of a theoretical or
objective analysis. Levine is right. Strauss is a Nietzschean nihilist. However, I
would suggest that there is an important element of Strauss true teaching that Levine
has missed. As I will argue, even though Strauss knows that nothing is essentially
rational or obligatory, he wants to apply classical principles to the affairs of
government as if they are. Why classical principles? Why not?
In Nietzschean/Heideggerian terms, all standards of truth are essentially

arbitrary. As a nihilist, Strauss believes the scientific methods only basis as a
standard for truth is its affirmation as such. Strauss argues in several essays that the
scientific method, specifically the new political science, had failed to recognise the
reality of Hitlers Germany. He suggests that that the old political science, namely
the teachings of classical philosophers, was wise to many ages and grasped the
essential character of all political situations.869 Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
understood the nature of tyranny and would have known what Hitler was and what he
was about to do. After the experience of our generation, Strauss writes, the burden
of proof would seem to rest on those who assert rather than those who deny that we
have progressed beyond the classics.870 I would suggest that Strauss nihilism is
utilitarian to some degree. With the failure of the new political science to stop the
Holocaust, Strauss has decided to affirm the old political science as his new standard
of truth. Strauss believes that the application of philosophys natural law will result in
869
Strauss, Leo. An Epilogue in An Introduction to Political Philosophy : Ten Essays. Hilail Gildin
(ed.) Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989. p. 135.
870
Strauss, Leo. Restatement on Xenophons Hiero in What is Political Philosophy? : and other
studies. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959. p. 101.
426
happy citizens and peaceful regimes and because of this, therefore, it is better than
the scientific method. For Strauss and the Straussians, nothing is true. So the
principles of the natural law may as well be true absolutely.
The natural law is thus both a salutary myth, as Shadia Drury would
describe it, and an absolute truth. As mentioned in my review of Drury, Strauss does
not consider himself a philosopher. I would contend that his affirmation of the natural
law is why. As I will argue, Strauss understood the natural law was part of classical
philosophers exoteric teaching. While the natural laws application would result in
happy citizens and a peaceful regime, the philosophers only applied the natural
because it was in their own self-interest. That is, its application would result in the
best regime for philosophy. Strauss affirmation places him firmly in the camp of the
Gentlemen, the people capable of harboring the noble self-deceptions without which
the city cannot exist.871 The Gentlemen believe that the just life is the happy life,
and that the life dedicated to the service of others is truly the most pleasant life. They
are people who believe that the noble is choiceworthy for its own sake.872 Unlike the
philosophers, Strauss is willing to apply the natural law because he values human
happiness.
As I will argue, the task of the Straussian is to convince the Vulgar that
principles from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are both rational and obligatory. Esoteric
analysis is applied to authoritative texts to make them appear to support the natural
law. However, Levine, much like Drury, sees Strauss method as a way for Strauss to
preserve the illusions of the herd while revealing the secret of nihilism to those
871
872
Ibid., p. 82.
427
clever enough to follow the hints. Esoteric analysis is principally a method to safely
communicate Strauss true teaching, rather than, as I will suggest, an instrument of
social control. Straussians twist the herds illusions so they more closely resemble
the illusion par excellence, the natural law of classical philosophers.
Nicholas Xenos
Levine and Drury agree that Strauss esotericism was intended to protect society from
what he considered deadly truths historicism and nihilism. In Leo Strauss and the
Rhetoric of the War on Terror, Nicholas Xenos argues that Strauss surface teaching
was also intended to deceive Americans that he was a defender of democracy. For
Xenos, Strauss was a closet fascist. He argues that Strauss true teaching not only
reveals that he secretly agrees with the positions he ostensibly attacks, but also that he
was thoroughly committed to authoritarianism and absolute right. Xenos contends that
Strauss hated liberal democracy because of its inability to make absolute judgments,
its inability to take action.873 He argues that Strauss students, the neocons, have
drawn on the same fascist principles as the foundation for Americas imperial
project in Iraq.874
Xenos recognises that Strauss texts have two teachings: To one audience
was addressed the so-called exoteric meaning of their texts, which was the edifying,
superficial level, while to another audience was addressed an esoteric meaning, which
is embedded in the text but which only some people are capable of drawing out.875
873
Xenos, Nicholas. Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror. Logos. Vol. 3, No. 2. Spring,
2004. p. 5. http://www.logosjournal.com/xenos.htm Accessed: October 5, 2007.
874
Ibid., p. 5.
875
Ibid., p. 6.
428
He notes that Strauss believed that philosophy is inherently subversive and, as such,
has to conceal itself, to go underground. The philosopher must conceal what he is
actually doing.876 Xenos contends that Strauss did not begin writing esoterically until
after he arrived in America. This is an issue concerning Strauss that people gloss
over too easily. The question, starkly posed, is why did Strauss himself start to write
in this esoteric/exoteric manner only after he came to an open society, to the United
States?877
For Xenos, Strauss had to mask his true teaching because it was too noxious to
express openly in a liberal democracy. Strauss was secretly an anti-democrat, a
committed anti-parliamentarian. As a staunch opponent of democracy, Strauss
sought a return to an era of absolute right and authoritarian rule.878 Xenos argues that
Strauss wrote esoterically so he could communicate his true support for fascism
without the Vulgar democratic public finding out.879
Xenos argues that, prior to arriving in America, Strauss wrote openly about his
fascist sympathies. For example, he notes that in 1932, Strauss criticised German
philosopher Carl Schmitt from the political right.880 Strauss argued that Schmitts
criticism of liberalism was actually within the bounds of liberalism because liberalism
had become the dominant view since Hobbes. To adequately criticise liberalism, one
first had to obtain a perspective that pre-dated liberalism itself, pre-dated Hobbes.
Strauss argued that Hobbes was the source of the liberal idea that there was nothing
intrinsic about good or evil. Good and evil only existed in ones judgment of them.
876
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
878
Ibid., p. 5.
879
Ibid., p. 10.
880
Ibid., p. 4.
877
429
Strauss criticised Schmitt for criticising liberalism without first going back to the
moral absolutes that existed prior to Hobbes.881 In other words, Xenos argues that
Strauss only disagreed with Schmitt in that he had not based his anti-democratic
arguments on pre-Hobbesian moral absolutes. Strauss believed Schmitts conclusions
about liberal democracy were perfectly valid.
Xenos cites two further examples of Strauss fascism. After Hitlers rise to
power in 1933, Strauss, living in France, wrote to Schmitt asking for help in getting
entre to Charles Maurras, the French right-wing Catholic leader of the Action
Franaise.882 Xenos implies Strauss thus supported Maurras and his fascist agenda.
In his second example, Xenos cites a private letter Strauss wrote to another
philosopher, Karl Lwith, in 1933.883 In the letter, Strauss argued that it was possible
to be against Hitlers newly enacted anti-Jewish measures from the principles of the
political right. Strauss suggested that one did not need to believe in the inalienable
rights of man to agree that the Nazis persecution of the Jews was wrong. Jewish
persecution was wrong from a fascist, authoritarian and imperialist perspective.
Strauss suggested that Lwith read Caesars Commentaries to see that under imperial
rule the subjected are spared and the proud are subdued.884 For Xenos, Strauss use
of fascist principles to justify his arguments indicates his support for said principles.
I would suggest that Xenos has fundamentally misunderstood Straussian

political theory. Strauss was not a closet fascist. In this theoretical section, I will argue
that Straussians believe it is their responsibility to bring about the secret rule of the
881
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 4.
883
Ibid., p. 4.
884
Ibid., p. 4.
882
430
philosophers classical thinkers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. As such, they
use disingenuous arguments to teach the Vulgar concepts of philosophys natural
law. Xenos does not realise it, but this was precisely what Strauss was doing in the
above cited examples.
Although Strauss did criticise Schmitt from the perspective of political right, I
would contend Strauss did not care what Schmitt concluded about liberal democracy.
Strauss point was to convince Schmitt in the existence of moral absolutes. For
Straussians, moral absolutes are authoritative texts that they can twist to support
philosophys natural law. Moral absolutes and other such texts are the media through
which the Straussians believe they can control the Vulgar. If Strauss had successfully
convinced Schmitt to affirm pre-Hobbesian moral absolutes, what else might Strauss
have attempted to teach him? Strauss letter to Karl Lwith provides a hint.
Xenos has completely missed the intent of Strauss 1933 letter. Strauss is not
endorsing fascist, authoritarian and imperial principles. He is using the dominant
principles of Nazi Germany, which happen to be fascist, authoritarian and imperial, in
what seems a courageous, if desperate, attempt to convince Lwith that Hitlers antiJewish measures are wrong. Strauss cites Caesars Commentaries because it is
Lwiths authoritative text, not because he thinks it is authoritative himself. I would
suggest that Strauss asked to meet with Action Franaises Charles Maurras for
precisely the same reason. In 1933, Maurras looked as if he might rise to power in
France, much like Hitler had in Germany. Strauss would likely have used fascist
principles to teach Maurras to spare the subjected, the French Jews.
431
Xenos does not address Strauss true teaching on classical philosophys
natural law directly. Although he argues that Strauss secretly agreed with Heideggers
view of historicism, Xenos suggests that Strauss broke with Heidegger on the
application of resoluteness: In this post-Nietzschean world, where nothing really
matters anymore, one possible moral position to take is to say: well, you choose
something and you adhere to it with resoluteness; you affirm it, even though there is
really no foundation for it other than your affirmation of it.885 Where Heidegger
believed one should affirm societys morality as the dispensation of fate, Strauss
wanted to affirm the notion of absolute truth, according to Xenos. However, Xenos
does not explain what absolute truth Strauss wanted to affirm. As I mentioned in
my review of Levine, I suspect Strauss decided to affirm the old political science as
his new standard of truth. I will argue that Strauss and the Straussians absolute truth
was classical philosophys natural law, such as the nature of tyranny in Platos
Republic.
It is somewhat surprising that Xenos has failed to connect Strauss absolute

truth with the principles of philosophys natural law. In his essay, Xenos notes
several classical concepts the Straussians have introduced into the present-day
political discourse. For example, he notes the prevalence of regime, an important
Straussian word, in the Bush administrations pre-war rhetoric. Xenos argues that
Strauss regime is a concept applied from Aristotle.
Regime is the term that Strauss used to translate the

Greek politeia, an Aristotelian category, and Strauss
885
Ibid., p. 17.
432
understood it to meanwhat it more or less does mean
in Aristotle the form of a city; that is, its essence as
opposed to the unformed humans, the matter, that the
city forms. Aristotle, in Book Three of the Politics,
makes the case that there are different kinds of
politiesdemocracies, aristocracies, and so onand
that in each case, if one changes into another one it
changes essentially; it changes its form into something
else. And the citizens are different, they are changed
the citizen of a democracy is not a citizen in an
aristocracyso it is a total transformation of the citys
essence, a formal transformation.886
In this theoretical section, I will argue that Strauss taught that classical
concepts, such as Aristotles nature of regimes and Socrates nature of tyranny, were
absolute truths that should be applied to the present day.887 Although Xenos notes
several classical concepts the Straussians have introduced into the political discourse,
he seems not to realise their significance. Xenos even quotes from Strauss On
Tyranny in which Strauss states that
one cannot understand modern tyranny in its specific

character before one has understood the elementary and
886
Ibid., p. 12.
Incidentally, the neocons absolute faith in Aristotles concept of the regime explains why there
was so little planning for post-Saddam Iraq. The neocons would have assumed that once Saddams
tyranny had transformed into a representative democracy, the Iraqis themselves would change
essentially too. Iraqs new democratic citizens were supposed to take care of post-war planning on
their own.
887
433
in a sense natural form of tyranny which is premodern
tyranny. The basic stratum of modern tyranny remains,
for all practical purposes, unintelligible to us if we do
not have recourse to the political science of the
classics.888
Although Xenos does not realise it, Strauss is saying precisely what he means
in the above quotation. One needs to understand the classical nature of tyranny to
understand modern tyranny. In this theoretical section, I will argue that the nature of
tyranny was the lens through which the neocons understood Iraq. The nature of
tyranny provided the template from which the neocons derived the meme: Iraq is a
threat because of its WMDs and support for terrorists like al-Qaeda. For the neocons,
the meme was thus an absolute truth, inextricably linked to Iraqs nature.
Shulsky and Schmitt
Shulsky and Schmitts Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (By Which We Do
Not Mean Nous) is an important essay for several reasons. As mentioned previously,
Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt are prominent Straussians and neoconservatives. In
2002, Shulsky ran the Office of Special Plans, the successor to the Pentagons Team
B, the Wurmser-Maloof Project. The Office of Special Plans became responsible for
much of the Pentagons intelligence analysis on Iraq. In their essay, Shulsky and
Schmitt criticize the Intelligence Communitys analytical methods from a Straussian
perspective. Shulsky and Schmitts article ties Team B analysis to Leo Strauss.
888
Strauss, Leo. On Tyranny. New York: Free Press, 1991. p. 25. Cited in ibid., p. 8.
434
As I will argue, Strauss esoteric teaching is about the application of classical

principles to the affairs of government. Straussians use esoteric analysis to twist
authoritative texts so they appear to support classical principles, such as the nature of
tyranny in Platos Republic. In this way, Straussians are able to convince the Vulgar
that classical principles are both rational and obligatory. Straussian theory, Strauss
esoteric teaching, is a kind of neoclassicism on the sly.
Shulsky and Schmitts essay is a perfect example of Strauss clandestine

neoclassicism. Drawing on Strauss criticisms of social science, the authors contend
that the Intelligence Communitys analytical methodology is based on two flawed
assumptions. First of all, the methodology assumes one can make useful predictions
about foreign governments by relying solely on empirical evidence and without
acknowledging differences among regimes.889 Shulsky and Schmitt argue that
Strauss understood from his study of the tradition of political philosophy from
Aristotle, most of all that, in political life, universal human nature is encountered
not in its unvarnished state, but as reflected through the prism of the regime.890 For
Strauss, it was thus foolish to try and deduce theories that apply to tyrannies and
democracies alike;891 to do so assumes that tyrannies and democracies are essentially
the same, i.e. that they have the same nature. According to Shulsky and Schmitt,
political philosophy prepared one for a much better understanding of the world than
did the scientific social science because philosophy emphasizes the distinction
between regimes as a basic political fact.892 The study of political philosophy is an
889
Schmitt, Gary J. and Abram N. Shulsky. op. cit., p. 409.

Ibid., p. 409.
891
Ibid., p. 409.
892
Ibid., p. 410.
890
435
antidote to the idea that tyrannies and democracies might have similar strategic
goals.893
Shulsky and Schmitts second criticism of the Intelligence Communitys

methodology is that it assumes that intelligence data is reliable; that is, the
Intelligence Community downplays the possibility of deliberate deception.894 As
social scientists, intelligence analysts assume that they can have the same confidence
in their data as atomic physicists: An atomic physicist neednt be concerned with the
possibility that the particles he studies are attempting to mislead him into thinking that
they behave otherwise than they in fact do.895 For Shulsky and Schmitt, however, it
was clear that analysts could not trust intelligence data. Although it should be
obvious that some regimes are more inclined to be open than others, the influence
of social science had blinded the Intelligence Community to that fact.896 To
counteract the deliberate deception of some regimes, the authors suggest Strauss
doctrine (or discovery, they add) of esoteric writing i.e., the idea that, at least
before the Enlightenment, most serious writers wrote so as to hide at least some of
their thought from some of their readers.897
As I will argue, Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasi-objective method

to uncover the true teaching of ancient writers. In reality, however, he uses it to twist
ancient writers texts to communicate his own true teaching. Esoteric analysis is an
exercise in eisegesis. In their article, Shulsky and Schmitt are essentially suggesting
that, one, intelligence analysts should assume that classical philosophys distinction
893
Ibid., p. 411.
Ibid., p. 409.
895
Ibid., p. 408.
896
Ibid., p. 409.
897
Ibid., p. 409.
894
436
between regimes is a basic political fact and, two, that intelligence analysts should
use Strauss method to dismiss anything that contradicts this preconceived conclusion
as deception. In this theoretical section, I will argue that this is precisely how the
Team B cells analysed intelligence in the run up to the Iraq War. They applied
esoteric analysis to the intelligence text to prove what they had already assumed to
be true; specifically, that Iraq was a threat because of its WMDs and support for alQaeda.
As mentioned previously, Levine has noted that Strauss was likely a

Nietzschean nihilist.898 Although Strauss appears to attack nihilism, he never levels
any substantive arguments against it or even states that it is false. For Levine, Strauss
secretly agrees with the views he attributes to his enemies, Heidegger and Nietzsche.
Strauss believes that there is no truth. There are only historically prescribed ways of
thinking. I suspect that in their essay, Shulsky and Schmitt have adopted Strauss
mode of writing. They, too, have an esoteric teaching that they attribute to their
enemies. When the authors discuss esoteric analysis, they do not describe its details or
how they expect it to be applied to intelligence. Instead, they describe what critics
have said about Strauss method.
Many critics argued that it gave license for fanciful and

arbitrary interpretation of texts; once one asserted that
an authors true views might be the opposite of those
that appear on the surface of his writings, it might seem
that the sky was the limit in terms of how far from the
898
Levine, Peter. Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities. op cit., p. 153.
437
authors apparent views one could wander. However,
the deeper reason for the unpopularity of this doctrine
was different; after all, Strauss was a piker compared to
the very popular (at least for a while) doctrine of
deconstructionism which gave readers complete carte
blanche when it came to interpreting texts, and which
completely lacked the rigor Strauss brought to the
problem of textual interpretation.899
Notice that Shulsky and Schmitt never say the critics are wrong, only that they
are inconsistent. As Levine has noted, Strauss attacked historicists on the grounds that
they were inconsistent too.900 Strauss does not say historicists are wrong. He argues
that if historicists were consistent, they would apply historicism to historicism itself
and then they would be nihilists. For Levine, Strauss himself was a historicist who
was willing to be ruthlessly consistent.901 Strauss was a Nietzschean nihilist. I
suspect that Shulsky and Schmitt are themselves ruthlessly consistent and share the
view they attribute to Strauss critics. Once one asserts the intelligence texts true
meaning is the opposite of that which appears on the surface, then the sky is the
limit in terms of fanciful and arbitrary interpretations. One might even be able to
claim that rocket motor bodies are actually components for uranium enrichment
program.
899

Levine, Peter. Nietzsche and the Modern Crisis of the Humanities. op cit., p. 157.
901
Ibid., p. 157.
900
438
Shulsky and Schmitts attack on Strauss unnamed critics is a ruse to explain
their own true teaching. They continue that the real reason that Strauss doctrine is so
unpopular is political in origin. For the critics (really Shulsky and Schmitt),
the notion of esoteric writing is clearly at odds with

the main political tenet of the Enlightenment, i.e., that a
good polity can be built on the basis of doctrines that
not only are true but are also accessible: their truth can
be self-evident (to quote the Declaration of
Independence) to the average citizen. Even those postmoderns who no longer believe that it is possible to
discover any truths at all on which a free polity might
be based somehow still cling to freedom of speech,
which was originally defended on the grounds that the
propagation of anti-republican heresies can do no harm
as long as prorepublican truths are left free to refute
them.902
The post-moderns are Shulsky and Schmitt as well. Just like Nietzschean
nihilist Strauss, they no longer believe it is possible to discover any truths at all.
Certainly, they do not believe one can discover any self-evident truths; that is,
truths which are accessible to everyone, the Vulgar, the Gentlemen and the Wise
alike. Once again, the post-moderns are criticised for their inconsistency. They do not
believe in truths; yet they believe in freedom of speech, which is no longer serves its
902
439
original purpose if there are no truths. I would suggest that for Shulsky and Schmitt,
freedom of speech now serves a new purpose: Anti-American truths can do no harm
as long as noble lies, the results of esoteric analyses, are left free to refute them.
Shulsky and Schmitts attack on the critics of esoteric analysis is actually a

description of how they intend to apply Strauss method. As nihilists like Strauss,
Shulsky and Schmitt know there is no truth and that the scientific method is only a
historically conditioned way of thinking. They affirm a new standard of truth, the
principles of classical philosophys natural law, such as the classical teaching on
nature of regimes and the nature of tyranny. Applying esoteric analysis to the
intelligence text, the sky is the limit in terms of fanciful interpretations. Anything that
contradicts the preconceived truth can be dismissed as deception. The Intelligence
Communitys assessments can do no harm as long as Team Bs assessments, its noble
lies, are free to refute them. As Shulsky and Schmitt conclude, Strausss view
certainly alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely linked to
deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope,
to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is
the exception.903
903
Ibid., p. 410.
440
Strauss True Teaching
What is Straussian theory? As noted previously, Strauss is a notoriously difficult

scholar to interpret. It is widely accepted that Strauss works contain two separate
teachings. Strauss surface or exoteric teaching is intended to deceive the majority of
his readers. His true views, his esoteric teaching, can only be discerned through
careful and deliberative study of his works. However, it is important to remember that
although Strauss is difficult, he is not impenetrable. He wants us to find the truth. He
just wants us to work for it first. In this section, I will argue for my interpretation of
Strauss true teaching.
I shall demonstrate that Strauss hints strongly that he has a secret teaching,
which he believes is dangerous for society. While Strauss appears to be a passionate
critic of historicism and nihilism, he secretly agrees with Nietzsche and Heidegger.
For Strauss, the truth is dangerous. Nihilism led to the rise of Hitler, World War 2 and
the Holocaust.
I will argue that although Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasiobjective method to determine a writers true teaching, he applies the method to
ancient writers to communicate his own true teaching. Strauss method is an exercise
in eisegesis. In his analysis of Halevis The Kuzari, Strauss reveals that although he
agrees with Nietzsche and Heidegger, he also affirms the truth of the natural law of
classical philosophers. Strauss teaches that the natural law should be affirmed for its
own sake and not out of self-interest. To that end, Strauss indicates that one must use
disingenuous arguments to convince the public that classical principles are both
441
rational and obligatory. I will argue that for Strauss, the instrument of this deception
was esoteric analysis itself. Straussians apply esoteric analysis to authoritative texts to
compel the publics obedience to an assumed truth, principles derived from classical
philosophy. As I have noted previously, Straussian political theory is essentially
neoclassicism on the sly.
One of the most important books for understanding Strauss esotericism is

Persecution and the Art of Writing. In the book, Strauss outlines why some writers are
compelled to mask their true teaching from the majority of their readers: fear of
persecution. 904 Strauss illustrates his point with an example of a historian who doubts
his totalitarian governments interpretation of the history of religion. If the historian
wants to avoid the gulag, he has two choices. He can share his true views only with a
trusted group of students or he can author his book with the truth written between the
lines.905 Writing between the lines, the historian does not attack the governments
view of religion, but instead attacks the liberal view, which he secretly endorses.
He would of course have to state the liberal view before

attacking it; he would make that statement in the quiet,
unspectacular and somewhat boring manner which
would seem to be but natural; he would use many
technical terms, give many quotations and attach undue
importance to insignificant details; he would seem to
904
905
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
442
forget the holy war of mankind in the petty squabbles of
pedants.906
The passage is a hint that Strauss himself has concealed a teaching for fear of
persecution. The description of the historians writing style is a perfect match for his
own. Every one of Strauss books is boring, overly technical and filled with
quotes and insignificant details. The hypothetical historian is a wink to the reader
that Strauss is actually writing about himself. He is implying that his true teaching
may be very different from that which appears on the surface of his works.
Strauss continues that while the historians true teaching is carefully hidden
from government censors, a very select and intelligent few will be able to detect it.
The young men who love to think, as he put it, will be able to see through the
historians deception and recognise his true teaching.
Only when [the historian] reached the core of the

argument would he write three or four sentences in that
terse and lively style which is apt to arrest the attention
of young men who love to think. That central passage
would state the case of the adversaries more clearly,
compellingly and mercilessly than it has ever been
stated in the heyday of liberalism, for he would silently
drop all the foolish excrescences of the liberal creed
which were allowed to grow up during the time when
906
Ibid., p. 24.
443
liberalism had succeeded and therefore was approaching
dormancy. His reasonable young reader would for the
first time catch a glimpse of the forbidden fruit.907
The intelligent young man knows the truth almost instinctively. He detects
that the historians true teaching is synonymous with the case of the adversaries.908
Thus, Strauss hints that he may secretly agree with the views of his own adversaries.
His true views may be synonymous with that of his ostensible enemies, Nietzsche and
Heidegger.
As noted in my literature review, Strauss never raises any substantial

arguments against historicism and nihilism in works such as Natural Right and
History. He argues that historicists are inconsistent because historicism, when applied
to its own arguments, leads inexorably to nihilism. Strauss never argues that nihilism
is false, only that it is dangerous.909 As Shadia Drury points out, Strauss hints that
writing between the lines is necessary to avoid more than just governmentsponsored persecution.910 Strauss believed that if the truth was revealed to the masses,
they would hurt themselves and having been hurt, would naturally be inclined to hurt
in turn him who pronounced the unpleasant truths.911 For Strauss, philosophers had
to conceal the truth, not just for their own protection, but out of social
responsibility. Deception was necessary to protect the puppies of their race.912
907
Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Ibid., p. 25.
909
Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. op cit., p. 26.
910
911
Ibid., p. 36.
912
Ibid., p. 36.
908
444
Strauss true teaching held that the truth itself was dangerous for society. The
dangerous truth was that there was no truth.
As I have noted, Peter Levine has argued that Strauss was secretly a
Nietzschean nihilist. In What is Political Philosophy?, Strauss states the case of
his adversary, Nietzsche, clearly, compellingly and mercilessly, just like his
hypothetical historian.913 Strauss problem with Nietzsche was not that he was wrong,
but that he was indiscreet. Nietzsche had made the truth too accessible; he had
communicated his teaching too widely. The results had been disastrous.
Being certain of the tameness of modern western man,

[Nietzsche] preached the sacred right of merciless
extinction of large masses of men with as little restraint
as his great antagonist had done. He used much of his
unsurpassable and inexhaustible power of passionate
and fascinating speech for making his readers loathe,
not only socialism and communism, but conservatism,
nationalism and democracy as well. After having taken
upon himself this great political responsibility, he could
not show his readers a way toward political
responsibility. He left them no choice except that
between irresponsible indifference to politics and
irresponsible political options. He thus prepared a
913
Strauss, Leo. What is Political Philosophy? op. cit., p. 54.
445
regime which, as long as it lasted, made discredited
democracy look like a golden age.914
For Strauss, the popularity of Nietzsches nihilism had made Germans

irresponsibly indifferent to all forms of government. The Weimar Republic,
committed to tolerance of all political views, could not condemn, much less destroy,
factions which sought democracys destruction. Although Strauss secretly agrees with
Nietzsche, he blames him for preparing the rise of the Nazi Party and, consequently,
the murder of his family in the Holocaust. Strauss dangerous truth is that there is no
God, morality or truth. There is no natural law, no right way of life. There is no
reason to care about the suffering of others. There is no reason to care if one lives
under a fascist, communist, socialist or democratic regime. For Strauss, people needed
to believe in something, anything so that they would stand up for one another and not
acquiesce to the rule of a Hitler-esque dictator.
And so, the persecution of which Strauss writes is a result of the publics
acceptance of nihilism. In Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss indicates that
earlier writers believed that the gulf separating the wise and the vulgar was a
basic fact of human nature which could not be influenced by any progress in popular
education: philosophy, or science, was essentially a privilege of the few.
[Philosophers] were convinced that philosophy as such

was suspect to, and hated by, the majority of men. Even
if they had had nothing to fear from a particular political
914
Ibid., pp. 54-55.
446
quarter, those who started from that assumption would
have been driven to the conclusion that public
communication of the philosophic or scientific truth
was impossible or undesirable, not only for the time
being but for all time.915
Only the Wise, the few, were capable of philosophy, of withstanding the
deadly truth. They knew that sharing the truth with the rest of us, the Vulgar, would
be always be undesirable. For Strauss, esoteric writing was a noble lie.
Philosophers had always concealed the truth of nihilism for our own good. Noble lies
are in everyones best interests whether we know it or not.916
However, Strauss true teaching goes beyond nihilism and beyond simply
concealing the truth from the Vulgar. As I will argue, even though Strauss knows that
there is no natural morality, he wants to apply classical philosophys natural law as if
it is both rational and obligatory. He wants to apply principles derived from classical
texts such as Platos Republic. For Strauss, classical principles are his standard of
truth. Applying esoteric analysis to ancient writers, Strauss not only communicates his
teaching that the Vulgar must be compelled to obey the rule of the Wise. He
demonstrates how to do it too.
In Persecution, Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasi-objective method

to uncover the true teaching of careful writers. As Drury has noted, however,
915
916
Ibid., p. 35.
447
Strauss method of interpretation is notoriously lacking in clarity and rigor.917
Esoteric analysis is in fact a method of eisegesis, a way to twist any text to support
any true teaching the reader might like to find. In esoteric analysis, the reader
assumes the authors true teaching and cherry-picks parts of the text which support
the assumption. If a part of the text contradicts the preconceived truth, the reader can
dismiss it as the authors deliberate deception. The reader uses the preconceived true
teaching to read between the lines or fill in the gaps in the text. The authors
silences thus become evidence he is hiding the truth. Strauss method can be applied
to any text to demonstrate disingenuously that it supports a preconceived conclusion.
Strauss uses esoteric analysis to twist ancient writers so they communicate his
own true teaching. In Persecution, Strauss analyses three works by three preEnlightenment writers: Guide for the Perplexed by Maimonides, The Kuzari by
Yehuda Halevi and Baruch Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise. Strauss
discovers in each work what he wants to teach us; specifically, the truth that he
secretly agrees with Heidegger and Nietzsche and his belief that the Vulgar need to be
compelled to obey the natural law of classical philosophers.
The first clue that Strauss analyses reveal more than the surface would
suggest is his choice of subjects Maimonides, Halevi and Spinoza. In several of his
works, Strauss argues that to understand a writer correctly, we must try to understand
him as he understood himself, which is to say we must take seriously the possibility
that what he teaches is simply true.918 What we should not do, according to Strauss, is
assume that the writers thought is a product of his historical situation. If we deny the
917
918
Drury, Shadia B. The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss. op. cit. p. 10.
For e.g., see Strauss, Leo. Political Philosophy and History. op. cit., p. 68.
448
possibility that a writer has discovered the truth, we will lack the incentive to
understand his thought seriously.919 And so, for Strauss, understanding a writers
historical situation is not relevant for interpreting the writers work. In keeping with
this surface teaching, Strauss analyses mention almost nothing of the lives of his
subjects. Strauss appears to consider Maimonides, Halevi and Spinozas respective
historical situations irrelevant for understanding their true beliefs.
Far from being irrelevant, however, Strauss seems to have selected

Maimonides, Halevi and Spinoza on the basis of their respective historical situations.
Each is a Jewish scholar who authored controversial works about interpreting texts
with multiple meanings. Each was forced to flee their homes because of religious
persecution. Maimonides wrote Guide for the Perplexed on the interpretation of the
Torah. In the 12th Century, the Almohades conquered Maimonides city, Cordoba,
Spain, and forced the Jewish community into exile.920 Yehuda Halevis The Kuzari
takes the form of a dialogue which instructs on the tenets of the Jewish religion. The
intolerance of the Almoravids in Islamic Spain moved Halevi to undertake a perilous
journey to the Holy Land.921 In his Theological-Political Treatise, Baruch Spinoza
examined the Bible and the Torah as historical documents. Spinozas parents had
narrowly escaped the Portuguese Inquisition. For his unorthodox interpretation of the
Scriptures, Spinoza was issued the writ of cherem, effectively excommunicating him
from the Jewish community.922 The historical situations of each writer Strauss
examines are thus very similar. In fact, they are very similar to Strauss own historical
919
Ibid., p. 68.
Maimonides. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. January 24, 2006.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimonides/ Accessed: October 5, 2007.
921
Judah Halevi. The Jewish Encyclopedia. 2002.
http://jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=643&letter=J Accessed: October 5, 2007.
922
Baruch Spinoza. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. January 10, 2005.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ Accessed: October 5, 2007.
920
449
situation. As a refugee from Nazi Germany, Strauss would have identified with the
lives of each of the scholars he interprets in Persecution. It seems Strauss may not
have considered a writers historical situation as irrelevant as he would have us
believe. Strauss is telling us that the teaching he attributes to Maimonides, Halevi and
Spinoza is actually his own.
Strauss analysis of Halevis The Kuzari is of particular importance. Written

as a dialogue, The Kuzari is the story of a pagan king (the eponymous Kuzari) who
wants to know which religion he should follow. The king summons a philosopher, a
Christian scholastic, a doctor of Islam and, finally, a Jewish scholar, a Rabbi. In
Halevis dialogue, the Rabbi successfully rebuts the arguments of the other three and
eventually, he convinces the king to convert to the Jewish faith. The traditional
interpretation of Halevis work is as a defense of Judaism against the attacks of
philosophers and of followers of other religions. Through the scholar character,
Halevi criticises philosophy, Christianity and Islam and defends Judaism from
criticism. Strauss interpretation strays far from the source text, however. In his
convoluted analysis, Strauss deliberately twists the text so he can speak through
Halevis characters.
Strauss analysis concentrates on the conversations between the king and the
philosopher and the king and the Jewish scholar. In the analysis, Strauss transforms
Halevis philosopher into a Martin Heidegger/Friedrich Nietzsche character. The
scholar becomes Strauss himself. The philosopher and the scholar each try to
convince the Kuzari, the king, to join his respective religion.
450
At first glance, the philosopher in Strauss analysis does not seem very
historicist at all. Strauss identifies the religion of the philosophers as the Law of
Reason or the rational nomoi. The rational nomoi is Platos Laws, the teachings of
classical philosophers.923 In Strauss analysis, the philosophers have established the
rational nomoi to address the unchanging needs of man as man.924 The rational
nomoi is the natural law, the unchanging, universal principles which describe the
nature of the best regime. In the analysis, the religion of the philosophers is classical
philosophys natural law.
Strauss interpretation soon establishes, however, that although the

philosopher considers Platos Laws to be the best way to order society, he does not
consider them in any way obligatory.925 The philosopher tells the Kuzari that should
he decide to become a philosopher, he does not have to live by the principles of the
rational nomoi. Instead, the king could continue in his ancestral religion, adopt a preexisting one, or invent his own.926 Questions of religion can be decided on the basis of
expediency because the philosopher denies divine revelation and, as such, the
relevance of all actions.927 Although it would be preferable if the Kuzari chose
build a society based on Platos Laws, the rational laws par excellence, he does not
have to. The application of the rational nomoi is neither rational nor obligatory if it is
not expedient to do so.
As we continue through the analysis, Strauss reveals why the philosopher is so

indifferent towards his own religion. The rational nomoi turns out to be composed of
923
Ibid., p. 116.
925
Ibid., p. 117.
926
Ibid., pp. 114-115.
927
Ibid., p. 115.
924
451
two elements, which Strauss names the Law of Reason and the Natural Law.928 The
Natural Law is synonymous with Platos Laws, the principles of classical philosophy,
and is part of the philosophers exoteric teaching. According to Strauss, the essential
purpose of any exoteric teaching is government of the lower by the higher, i.e.
government of the Vulgar by the Wise.929 This is not to say that the Natural Laws
application will not result in the best regime in terms of the happiness of citizens. For
Strauss, the Natural Law is an exoteric teaching because the character of the
arguments supporting it are at best, a likely tale.930 The Natural Laws true purpose
is not as it appears.
In Strauss analysis, the philosopher is motivated to apply the Natural Law

solely by his own self-interest, which is the second element of the rational nomoi: the
philosophers esoteric teaching, the Law of Reason. The only reason the philosopher
wants a society based on Platos Laws, the exoteric teaching, is because it will result
in the best regime for contemplation, i.e. it will result in the best regime for
philosophy. For philosophers, that the Natural Law also produces the happiest citizens
is something of an accidental by-product. Ultimately, the philosopher does not care if
a regimes citizens are happy or miserable, or if the regime is warlike or peaceful. The
philosopher is only interested in continuing a life of philosophy and, as such, the
Natural Law is by no means obligatory. A society that refuses to follow the laws of
Plato would make a life of philosophy more difficult, but not impossible. The Law of
Reason is the minimum rules a philosopher has to observe to continue being capable
of contemplation.931 They do not provide for an inner attachment to society. They are
928
Ibid., p. 137.
Ibid., p. 121.
930
Ibid., p. 121.
931
Ibid., p. 136.
929
452
essentially the rules of conduct of a philosophising hermit.932 If a society is hostile
to philosophy, the Law of Reason advises the philosopher to adapt to the societys
requirements as much as possible or simply leave. The philosopher will not risk his
life so that the regime will adopt the Natural Law. If the philosopher does not have to
act in the interests of others, he will not do so.
And so, Strauss philosopher tells the Kuzari that, as a philosopher, he can
build a society based on Plato or, if this is not expedient, he can follow the precepts of
the religion society requires. Should, for example, the king choose to adhere to Islam,
he could even go as far as to defend his faith with the sword.933 He should persecute
whomever his expedient ideology deems reasonable to persecute. According to
Strauss, philosophers even consider legitimate the killing of bestial men, of men on
the lowest level of humanity.934 There is no right or wrong. All that really matters is
continued contemplation. In his analysis, Strauss philosopher does not require any
external displays of morality at all.
As noted in my literature review, Shadia Drury reaches a similar conclusion.

She argues that Strauss philosophers are governed according to the principles of
natural right, which actually contains no principles of human conduct at all.935 The
only real natural right is self-interest. For Strauss, philosophers are interested in only
one thing: continued philosophy. Actions and regimes are only good insofar as they
make philosophical life possible. The only reason the absolute rule of philosophers is
the best regime is because it is the best regime for philosophy. Drury concludes that in
932
Ibid., p. 137.
Ibid., p. 115.
934
Ibid., p. 117.
935
933
453
principle, Straussians will support any action that would bring a city closer to the
rule of the philosophers.936 In practice, however, they will lend support to any
regime, no matter how ignoble, if it is deemed necessary in the circumstances, and if
the means required to overthrow it are likely to result in greater turmoil and
disorder.937
As I suggested previously, Drurys assumption that Strauss and the Straussians

equate themselves with the philosophers is incorrect. In his Halevi analysis, Strauss is
clearly not the philosopher. The dead giveaway here is that the philosopher openly
tells the Kuzari the truth, which Strauss would never do. Instead, the philosopher is
much more like Nietzsche. Strauss problem with Nietzsche was not that he was
wrong, but that he was indiscreet. Nietzsche had made the truth too accessible; he had
communicated his teaching too widely. For Strauss, the popularity of Nietzsches
nihilism had made Germans irresponsibly indifferent to all forms of government.
Although he secretly agrees with Nietzsche, Strauss blames him for the way for
preparing the rise of the Nazi Party. Strauss blames Nietzsche for the Nazis murder
of his family.
In his analysis of Halevi, Strauss is actually represented by the Jewish scholar.

The scholar attacks philosophy because it leads to doubt and anarchy: the
philosophers do not agree to a single action or a single belief.938 However, it is
important to note that despite this, the scholar secretly agrees with the philosopher.
Strauss writes that the scholar accepts the philosophers view of the Natural Law.
He tacitly asserts that the Natural Law is not obligatory and does not command or
936
Ibid., p. 112.
Ibid., p. 112.
938
937
454
presuppose, an inner attachment to society.939 Speaking through the scholar, Strauss
admits that he tacitly agrees with Nietzsche and Heidegger. Strauss, the scholar, is
essentially a nihilist.
What makes the scholar different from the philosophers is that even though the
he knows that the natural law is neither rational nor obligatory, he wants to apply it as
if it is. As I have argued, the only reason the philosophers want to apply the natural
law is because it serves their own self-interest. For the philosophers, the natural laws
application is intended to produce the best regime for philosophy. That it also happens
to produce the best regime in terms of happy citizens is more or less an accidental byproduct. The scholar understands the natural law is governmental, a means to an
ends, not an ends unto itself. Despite this, the natural law is the only part of the
rational nomoi that the scholar accepts.940 The scholar acts as if he were blind to the
non-governmental part of the Law of Reason, or to the aim which it is destined to
serve: he deliberately disregards that non-governmental part, or its aim which is
assimilation to the God of Aristotle.941 In other words, the scholar accepts the
natural law but rejects its ultimate purpose: assimilation to the God of Aristotle, i.e.
the continuation of the philosophical life, which, for Strauss, leads to nihilism. Unlike
the philosopher, the scholar does care if citizens are happy or miserable, if a regime is
warlike or peaceful.
Strauss writes that the scholar has discovered the deepest reason why
philosophy is so enormously dangerous. If the philosophers are right that that the
natural law is not obligatory, then natural morality, strictly speaking, is no morality
939
Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid., p. 138.
941
Ibid., p. 138.
940
455
at all.942 There is no essential difference between the natural law and the morality
essential to the preservation of a gang of robbers. There is no essential difference
between the rule of Plato and the rule of Hitler. The only genuine morality is that
which is believed and obeyed. As such, the scholar knows that if the natural law
appears obligatory and rational, it becomes, for all intents and purposes, true.
The natural law becomes real when it is believed and obeyed. To this end,
Strauss has the scholar adopt the language of religion: Only a law revealed by the
omnipotent and omniscient God can make possible genuine morality. Moreover,
he argues that: Society has to present to its members certain rules as obligatory in
order to supply these rules with the degree of dignity and sanctity which will induce
members of society to obey them as much as possible. He goes on to argue that
Only revelation can transform natural man into the guardian of his city, or, to use the
language of the Bible, the guardian of his brother.943 If the natural law seems
obligatory and rational, if it is believed and obeyed, then it is just as true as anything
else. In fact, the natural law may as well be an absolute truth.
The scholars defense of religion is thus a defense of morality. Religion is the

medium through which the masses can be controlled and morality compelled. In his
concluding remarks, Strauss, referring to the scholar, is also clearly referring to
himself.
In defending Judaism, which, according to him, is the

only true revealed religion, against the philosophers, he
942
943
Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid., p. 140.
456
was conscious of defending morality itself and
therewith the cause, not only of Judaism, but of
mankind at large. His basic objection to philosophy was
then not particularly Jewish, nor even particularly
religious, but moral. He has spoken on this subject with
remarkable restraint: not being a fanatic, he did not wish
to supply the unscrupulous and the fanatic with
weapons which they certainly would have misused. But
this restraint cannot deceive the reader about the
singleness of his primary and ultimate purpose.944
And so, Strauss seems to leave us with unanswered questions. Although

classical philosophys natural law should be affirmed for its own sake, the only true
morality is that which people follow. Without the weight of revelation behind it, no
one will follow the classical philosophys natural law. How does one make the natural
law seem obligatory and rational? How does one make the natural law seem ordained
by God?
I would contend that Strauss has not left these questions unanswered. He has
shown us how. Not only does esoteric analysis reveal the problem, it provides the
solution too. If esoteric analysis can transform Halevi into Heidegger, surely it can
turn Moses into Plato and Jesus into Aristotle. What Strauss is saying, without overtly
saying it, is that esoteric analysis can give the natural law the authority it needs to be
genuine morality. Esoteric analysis can read the natural law into societys
944
Ibid., p. 140.
457
authoritative texts, which is precisely what the Straussians do to compel the Vulgar to
obey the Wise.
As noted in my literature review, Shulsky and Schmitts attack on the critics

of esoteric analysis is actually a description of its application. As nihilists like Strauss,
Shulsky and Schmitt know that there is no truth and that the scientific method is only
a historically conditioned way of thinking. They affirm a new standard of truth, the
principles of classical philosophys natural law, such as the nature of regimes, the
nature of tyranny. Like Strauss scholar, they affirm the natural law for its own sake.
It accords with their values happy citizens and peaceful regimes. If people believe
the natural law, it may as well be true. In fact, it may as well be an absolute truth.
Shulsky and Schmitt convince everyone else to agree with them by applying
esoteric analysis to an authoritative text: the text of intelligence. With esoteric
analysis, the sky is the limit in terms of fanciful interpretations. They read classical
principles into the intelligence text so the Vulgar are compelled to obey and believe. It
does not matter that their arguments are effectively deception. The more the natural
law is believed, the truer it becomes. As Shulsky and Schmitt state, Strausss view
certainly alerts one to the possibility that political life may be closely linked to
deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope,
to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is
the exception.945 Thus, esoteric analysis is more than a way for Strauss to
communicate the dangerous truth of nihilism. It is simultaneously the answer to
nihilism. Esoteric analysis is an instrument of social control, a way to compel the
945
458
Vulgar to obey the rule of classical philosophers. Once again, Straussian theory is
essentially neoclassicism on the sly.
In the following sections, I will demonstrate that the Iraq War conspiracy was
a practical application of Strauss true teaching. The meme, Iraq is a threat because of
its WMDs and support for terrorists, was derived from classical philosophys natural
law, the nature of tyranny as described in Platos Republic. As nihilists, the Bush
administrations neocons understood the meme to be as true as anything else. Their
belief in the meme made it true. Further, I will demonstrate that esoteric analysis is
Team B analysis. The neocons Team Bs applied esoteric analysis to intelligence, a
text just as authoritative as the Bible, to make it appear superficially to support the
meme. In this way, the neocons sought to give the nature of tyranny the authority of
revelation, so to speak. I will also argue that the disinformation operation
strengthened the Team Bs intelligence fragments so the Intelligence Community
would clear the case for war the neocons wanted to make. Manipulating the press and
the Intelligence Community, the Iraq War conspiracys ultimate goal was to make the
meme appear both rational and obligatory, which, for the neocons, was just as good as
true.
459
The Meme
The Iraq War conspiracy begins with the meme. Developed in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, the meme justified war with Iraq: Iraq was a threat because of
its weapons of mass destruction and support for al-Qaeda. One day, Saddam could
arm al-Qaeda with a chemical, biological or even nuclear weapon to attack the United
States. The only way to keep America safe from Iraqs WMDs was to remove
Saddam from power. In the run up to the war, the Bush administration repeatedly
publicised the meme in speeches, press releases and leaks to the media. The Iraqi
National Congress (INC) planted evidence to support the meme with intelligence
services and in the press. Throughout 2002, the meme was repeated and repeated and
repeated until it was part the public consciousness, an accepted fact. Of course
Saddam had WMDs. Of course he supported al-Qaeda. Of course he was a threat. The
meme was how the Bush administration sold the Iraq War.
In this section, I will argue that the meme was part of the practical application
of Strauss true teaching. As a nihilist, Strauss believed that all standards of truth were
essentially arbitrary. He taught his students to view modern day tyrannies through the
lens of classical texts. The neocons, as Straussians, used the nature of tyranny as
described in Platos Republic to understand authoritarian regimes from the USSR to
Saddam Husseins Iraq. Straussian author Natan Sharanskys writing on tyranny had a
great impact on President Bush personally. Through Sharansky, Strauss influenced the
Bush administrations foreign policy, in particular its strategy to win the War on
Terror. I will further argue that the neocons derived the meme from Platos nature of
tyranny. For the neocons, Saddam needed WMDs and to support al-Qaeda because it
460
was a tyrants nature to attack external enemies. The tyrant has to stir up wars to
ensure his own survival. He will pursue war in any way he can. Thus, the neocons
believed that if Saddam could develop weapons of mass destruction, he would. If he
could ally with al-Qaeda, he would. The nature of tyranny compelled Iraqs
aggression towards the United States. The neocons belief in Iraqs WMDs and
support for al-Qaeda was inextricably entwined with their recognition of the regimes
true nature. They did not need evidence to know the meme was true. They only
needed evidence to convince the rest of us, the Vulgar, that they were right.
As noted previously, Strauss was secretly a nihilist. For Strauss, all human
thought and all standards of truth were historically conditioned. The scientific method
does not describe an objective, external reality, but is instead a set of arbitrary rules
that only determines the truth to the extent that society believes it does. Strauss did
not believe scientific truth was any more real than truth determined by any other
arbitrary method. For Strauss, the scientific method was as objective as, say, peering
outside Platos cave.
However, Strauss real issue with the scientific method was not its objectivity.
Strauss was against science, and social science in particular, because of its moral
consequences. Social science had failed to understand the threat of Nazi Germany.
[W]hen we were brought face to face with tyranny with a kind of tyranny that
surpassed the boldest imagination of the most powerful thinkers of the past our
political science failed to recognise it.946 For Strauss, a social science that cannot
speak of tyranny with the same confidence with which medicine speaks, for example,
946
Strauss, Leo. On Tyranny. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000. p. 23.
461
of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena for what they are. It is therefore not
scientific. Present day social science finds itself in this condition.947
Strauss argued that one could learn far more about tyranny from reading
classical texts than by practicing social science. In Restatement on Xenophons
Hiero, Strauss writes that [o]nce we have learned again from the classics what
tyranny is, we will be enabled and compelled to diagnose as tyrannies a number of
contemporary regimes which appear in the guise of dictatorships.948 Although he
admits that present day tyrannies are different from classical tyrannies, he argues that
present day tyranny cannot be understood adequately except within the classical
framework.949 Reflecting on social sciences failure, Strauss concludes bitterly that
[a]fter the experience of our generation, the burden of proof would seem to rest on
those who assert rather than those who deny that we have progressed beyond the
classics.950
As I noted in my literature review, I suspect that Strauss nihilism was actually

utilitarian to some degree. If all standards of truth are essentially arbitrary, why not
affirm the standard of truth that would have recognised Nazi Germany as a threat?
Why not abandon the scientific method for the classical understanding of tyranny? I
suspect that Strauss affirmed the truth of classical texts much like the scholar in his
analysis of Halevis The Kuzari. Unlike the philosopher, the scholar does care if
citizens are happy or miserable, or if a regime is warlike or peaceful. He accepts
philosophys natural law (i.e. the nature of tyranny in Platos Republic) but rejects
947
Strauss, Leo. Restatement on Xenophons Hiero. op. cit., p. 95.

Ibid., p. 95.
949
Ibid., p. 96.
950
948
462
philosophys ultimate goal, which, for Strauss, is the truth of nihilism. In other words,
Strauss does not affirm the truth of classical texts because classical texts will be more
accurate than the scientific method. He affirms classical texts because the truth will be
more moral. As Straussians, the neocons affirmed the nature of tyranny in Platos
Republic as their standard of truth.
In Book Nine of Platos Republic, Socrates converses with Adeimantus about

tyrannys essential nature, the ways in which tyrants can universally be expected to
behave. Socrates argues that a tyrant rules through fear and deception. The tyrant
needs to justify internal oppression and distract his subjects from the misery of their
daily lives. The tyrant will be overthrown unless the people have a reason to need
him. All tyrants, argues Socrates, need constant war, the constant threat of an external
enemy, in order to save themselves from popular revolt.
when [the tyrant] has disposed of his foreign

enemies by treaty of destruction, and has no more to
fear from them, he will continue to make trouble abroad
in order that the people may continue to need a leader,
and in order that high taxation may reduce them to
poverty and force them to attend to earning their living
rather than plotting against him.
Clearly.
And if he suspects anyone of having ideas of freedom
and not submitting to his rule, he will find an excuse to
get rid of them by handing them over to the enemy. For
463
all these reasons the tyrant must be always be provoking
war.951
For Socrates, war is the only way the tyrant can justify his rule. War is the
excuse the tyrant needs to eliminate his enemies and compel his subjects
acquiescence. Without an enemy to fight, the tyrant will soon be finished. External
aggression, necessary for the regimes security, is thus part of the nature of tyranny.
The nature of tyranny was a significant influence on the Bush administrations

foreign policy. The work of Natan Sharansky, a neoconservative writer, former Soviet
dissident and Israeli minister, draws heavily from Strauss and the nature of tyranny.
Sharanskys book, The Case for Democracy had a particular impact on President
Bush. In early 2005, the President told The Washington Times that The Case for
Democracy offered a glimpse of how I think about foreign policy. Sharansky
should be on opinion makers recommended reading list, he continued.952 Later,
President Bush told CNN that The Case for Democracy summarizes how I feel. I
would urge people to read it.953
Although Sharansky never mentions Platos Republic explicitly in The Case

for Democracy, he describes tyranny in the exact same terms that Socrates does.
Nondemocratic regimes stay in power by controlling their populations, he writes.
This control invariably requires an increasing amount of repression. To justify this
repression and maintain internal stability, external enemies must be manufactured.
951
Plato. The Republic. H.D.P. Lee (trans.), Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965. pp. 340-341.
Suellentrop, Chris. My Sharansky. Slate Magazine. January 26, 2005.
http://www.slate.com/id/2112699/ Accessed: December 10, 2008.
953
Ibid.
952
464
The result is that while the mechanics of democracy make democracies inherently
peaceful, the mechanics of tyranny make nondemocracies inherently belligerent.
Indeed, in order to avoid collapsing from within, fear societies must maintain a
perpetual state of conflict.954 In other words, tyrants can only stay in power by
continuously stirring up war. For Sharansky and, by extension, President Bush,
tyrants require external enemies to legitimise their regimes and excuse internal
oppression.
Following Strauss, both Sharansky and the 1976 Team B viewed the Soviet
Union through the lens of the nature of tyranny. Sharansky argues in The Case for
Democracy that the USSRs belligerent foreign policy was a result of its efforts to
maintain internal stability. [Tyrants] find the threat of war a particularly attractive
device for justifying the repression that is necessary to control their subjects and
remain in power. By tapping into the strong national, religious, ethnic, or other
sentiments that an enemy arouses, regimes in fear societies rally their people to their
side and divert attention away from their subjects miserable living conditions and the
regimes failure to improve them.955 Sharansky argues that the Soviet regimes
ideological war against the West stabilized its rule for nearly seventy years.956
Moreover, the need for an external enemy affected the USSRs foreign policy.
Although Soviet citizens preferred peace to war, the regime found it relatively easy
to mobilize them against a particular country that was cast as an agent of Western
imperialism and aggression.957 Sharansky writes that Soviet military campaigns
against Finland in 1940, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Afghanistan in
954
Sharansky, Natan and Ron Dermer. The Case for Democracy. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004. p.
88.
955
Ibid., p. 83.
956
Ibid., p. 84.
957
Ibid., p. 86.
465
1979 were always justified by the need to defend communism from its capitalist
enemies. The external policies of the regime became an extension of the regimes
constant effort to maintain internal stability.958
In 1976, the neoconservative Team B panel described the Soviet Unions

motives in very similar terms. Team B, which included future Bush official Paul
Wolfowitz, believed that the USSR was taking advantage of Americas freeze on
nuclear arms to close the missile gap and develop first-strike capability. For the
neocons, the USSRs ultimate goal was not nuclear deterrence but nuclear war: the
destruction of the United States and the triumph of worldwide socialism. The Team B
report outlined why Soviet political and military thinking should be offensive.959
Principally, the USSRs internal conditions push the Soviet leadership toward an
offensive stance. Team B noted that the lack of any kind of genuine legitimacy
on the part of the Soviet government compels it to create its own pseudo-legitimacy
which rests on an alleged mandate of history and is said to manifest itself in a
relentless spread of the socialist cause around the globe. In other words, Team B
applied the nature of tyranny to the Soviet Union. The neocons saw the Soviet
government as compelled to pursue an offensive strategy in order to appear legitimate
in the eyes of the Soviet people.
The influence of the nature of tyranny can also be seen in the Bush
administrations pro-democracy agenda. Natan Sharansky was widely credited as
influencing President Bushs second inaugural address, delivered January 20, 2005.
958
Ibid., p. 87.
United States. Experiment in Competitive Analysis. Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative
View. Report of Team B. 1976. p. 14.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze10.pdf Accessed: July 11, 2008.
959
466
The President proclaimed that Americas vital interests and our deepest beliefs are
now one it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate
goal of ending tyranny in our world.960 In The Case for Democracy, Sharansky takes
the nature of tyranny to its logical conclusion if tyrannies are inherently aggressive,
then the only way to secure world peace is to replace tyrannies with democracies.
[N]ondemocratic regimes imperil the security of the world, he writes. [They] have
always been powder kegs ready to explode, but today the force of that explosion can
be far more lethal than it was in the past. In an age of weapons of mass destruction
and global terrorism, the dangers of ignoring the absence of democracy in any part of
the world have increased dramatically.961
According to the US governments National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism, [t]he long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the
advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.962 The
document indicates that tyranny is the ultimate cause of the terrorist threat, which is
seen as just another manifestation of tyrannies natural aggression. Populations with
no voice in their government are vulnerable to manipulation. Tyrants propaganda
blames the enemy i.e. the West for perceived injustices, providing a potent
motivation for revenge and terror.963 In other words, tyrants need for an external
enemy fosters a climate of anti-Western extremism in which terrorism flourishes. The
960
Bush, George W. President Sworn-in to Second Term. US Capitol. Washington, DC. January 20,
2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html Accessed: September 24,
2008.
961
Sharansky, Natan. op. cit., p. 88.
962
United States. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 2006. p. 9.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf Accessed: July 11, 2008.
963
Ibid., p. 9.
467
National Strategy notes that Democracy is the antithesis of terrorist tyranny.964 In
contrast to tyrannys culture of conspiracy and misinformation, democracy offers
freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of ideas, which can
expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda.965 Since
democracy does not need an external enemy to demonize, it therefore does not
produce as many terrorists. Thus the Bush administrations principle strategy for
winning the War on Terror reflects the influence of Strauss and the nature of tyranny.
Following Strauss, the Bush administrations neoconservatives saw Iraq and

other dictatorships through a neoclassical lens. As noted in my literature review,
Shulsky and Schmitt assert in Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence that
political philosophy prepared one for a much better understanding of the world than
did the scientific social science because philosophy emphasizes the distinction
between regimes as a basic political fact.966 Shulsky and Schmitt continue that the
study of political philosophy is an antidote to the idea that tyrannies and
democracies might have similar strategic goals.967 Drawing on Strauss, the authors
suggest that authoritarian regimes can only act according to their nature i.e. they
will never truly seek peace because external aggression is necessary for their survival.
In David Wurmsers book on US Iraq policy, Tyrannys Ally, the relationship

between external aggression and the nature of tyranny is a running theme. Wurmser
was on half of the Wurmser-Maloof Project, Douglas Feiths Team B cell in the
Pentagon. In the aftermath of September 11, Feiths office came up with the meme to
964
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.
966
967
Ibid., p. 411.
965
468
justify the Iraq War. Like Sharansky, Wurmser never mentions Platos Republic
explicitly in Tyrannys Ally (it is after all the secret kingship of the philosopher).
However he repeats the Socrates argument over and over again. Saddams external
aggression is part of the nature of tyranny. He needs the concept of enemy to threaten
his people and justify his regime.
Iraq is a problem because it is a totalitarian tyranny.

Such tyranny is, by its very nature, violent, aggressive,
and rabidly anti-Western. To deal effectively with Iraq,
the United States must strike not only at the tyrant but at
the institution of tyranny in Iraq.968
For tyrants, having an enemy against which to define
the struggle is indispensable. Abandoning the concept
of enemy or embarking on an introverted policy would
undermine the legitimizing structure of a tyrannical
regime, by exposing the factional motivation of its
repressiveness. An Arab nationalist state at war carries
the glorious standard of pan-Arabism; at peace, it
becomes no more than a petty dictatorship pursuing
factional tyranny.969
Precisely as Strauss instructs, Wurmser is using the classical conception of

tyranny to understand a modern day tyranny, Iraq. Wurmser argues that external
968
Wurmser, David. Tyrannys Ally: Americas Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein. Washington DC:
The AEI Press, 1999. p. 42. http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.318/book_detail.asp Accessed:
January 8, 2007.
969
Ibid., p. 60.
469
aggression is common to all tyrants just like Socrates does. Tyrants need an enemy to
legitimise the regime and to justify internal oppression, without which the tyrants
regime cannot survive. All tyrants are the same, regardless of their ideology. It does
not matter if a tyranny is fascist, communist or Arab nationalist. External aggression
is part of their nature.
the dark internal corruption of totalitarian repression

is the source of external aggression. States that launch
wars on their own people eventually escalate their
conflicts beyond their borders. They must justify their
repression in terms of a high moral purpose as a
putatively patriotic defense against fifth column
supporters of the foreign enemy. Tyrants portray
themselves as the agents and defenders of a noble cause,
variously fascism, or communism, or pan- Arabism.970
Thus, Wurmser argues that Saddam will never, ever give up his plans for
conquest. The US must accept that [t]he political objectives of Saddams regime will
never change. Iraq will pursue regional domination and will commit atrocities against
its own people and its neighbors as long as his regime remains in place.971
Would Saddam ever surrender his WMDs? For the neocons, the answer was a
resounding of course not! Wurmser argues that chemical, biological, and even
970
971
Ibid., p. 60.
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
470
nuclear weapons are the pillars of Saddams regime.972 Saddams survival depends
on weapons of mass terror to threaten his enemies, his neighbours and his own
people. If Saddam were to give up his WMDs, the Iraqi people would kill him
themselves. Disarmament would be tantamount to suicide. Thus, Wurmser derived the
memes WMD component from the nature of tyranny. For the neocons, Iraqs WMDs
became an absolute truth, an affirmation, an article of faith. Wurmser did not need
evidence to know Iraq had WMDs. He only needed evidence to convince the rest of
us he was right.
Would Saddam ally with anyone he could, even apparent ideological enemies,
to strike the US? For the neocons, of course he would! Wurmser also drew on
Socrates nature of tyranny to inform the memes terrorism component. For Wurmser,
all tyrants could be expected to direct their aggression towards the United States.
America represents the cause of freedom and, as such, is the tyrants greatest threat
Anti-Americanism among pan-Arabic nationalists

emerges from the same source as did Communist and
Nazi anti-Americanism: the nature of tyrannical
regimes. The hostility is a product of neither the U.S.
presence nor its policies. Since the concept of enemy is
essential to legitimize internal repression, neighbors or
superpowers that represent ideas antithetical to tyranny
are particularly threatening to the tyrant and are thus
considered the most dangerous of its foes. In the Middle
972
Ibid., p. 3.
471
East, those enemies are the United States and Israel
not because of what they have done, but because of who
they are, what they represent, and the fact of their
existence. External aggression, especially against
Western nations, is inherent to all such radical, utopian
movements, be they European or Arabic. AntiAmericanism is the battle cry of tyranny, not a genuine
call for liberation.973 [Original emphasis.]
According to Wurmser, the tyrants anti-Americanism is so intense that he will

do whatever is necessary to attack the West, even cooperate with an ideological
enemy. Secular regimes and religious extremists will ally out of a shared hatred for
the United States.

973
Ibid., p. 61.
472
In the run up to the war, the neocons used the exact same argument to justify
the memes al-Qaeda component: Iraq is a threat because of its support for al-Qaeda
and Islamic terrorists. The Intelligence Communitys terrorism experts had assessed
Iraq was highly unlikely to cooperate with al-Qaeda in an attack on anyone, let alone
the US. Saddam, as a secular Arab nationalist, saw Bin Ladens Salafist
fundamentalism as a greater threat to his regime than America. However, the neocons
argued that the Intelligence Communitys assessment was no more than an
unsubstantiated assumption. Iraq and al-Qaeda might join forces against the US
because of their shared hatred of Western values. The nature of tyranny compelled
Saddam to attack freedom any way he could, even if had to form an alliance of
convenience with al-Qaeda. For Wurmser and the neocons, an Iraq/al-Qaeda alliance
was derived from philosophys natural law and, as such, was another absolute truth,
another article of faith. The memes terrorism component was true, independent of
evidence. The neocons only needed evidence to convince the rest of us they were
right.
The meme to justify the Iraq War was part of the practical application of
Straussian theory. As a nihilist, Strauss had affirmed classical philosophys natural
law as his standard of truth. He taught that modern day tyrannies could be understood
within the framework of the classical texts. Following Strauss, neocons like David
Wurmser understood Iraq in terms of the nature of tyranny as described in Platos
974
Ibid., p. 70.
473
Republic. Iraq would never give up its WMDs and would ally with religious
extremists to attack America because external aggression was necessary for Saddams
survival. For the neocons, Iraqs WMDs and support for al-Qaeda were inextricably
entwined with its nature. The meme was an absolute truth, which was independent of
evidence. The neocons belief and obedience made it true.
In the next section, I will discuss how the neocons gave the meme the
authority of revelation, so to speak. The neocons applied esoteric analysis to an
authoritative text, the intelligence text, to make the meme appear rational and
obligatory. Esoteric analysis would supply the propaganda necessary to compel the
Vulgars obedience to the secret rule of the philosophers, the secret rule of Socrates.
474
Esoteric Analysis is Team B Analysis
As previously noted, Shulsky and Schmitts attack on the critics of esoteric analysis
is actually how they intend esoteric analysis to be applied. [O]nce one asserted that
an authors true views might be the opposite of those that appear on the surface of his
writings, they write, it might seem that the sky was the limit in terms of how far
from the authors apparent views one could wander.975 Shulsky and Schmitt
practically confess that esoteric analysis produces arbitrary and fanciful
interpretations of texts. Applied to intelligence, esoteric analysis can produce
evidence to justify any policy a government may like to pursue. In this section, I will
argue that esoteric analysis is Team B analysis. The neocons Team Bs used esoteric
analysis to twist intelligence to support the meme: Iraq is a threat because of its
WMDs and support for al-Qaeda. The Team Bs produced propaganda to compel our
obedience and belief.
Esoteric analysis and Team B analysis are for all intents and purposes
identical. In this section, I will argue that both Team B and esoteric analysis interpret
the text to fit a preconceived truth. Evidence that supports the truth is cherry-picked
while evidence that contradicts the truth is dismissed as deception. In the absence of
evidence, both Team B and esoteric analysis use the truth to fill in the gaps or read
between the lines. Thus, the absence of evidence becomes evidence itself. The
author of the text is hiding the truth. In short, both Team B and esoteric analysis
prove what the reader already knows to be true.
975
475
Strauss explains esoteric analysis in Persecution and the Art of Writing. As
Shadia Drury has noted, however, the method of interpretation is notoriously lacking
in clarity and rigor.976 Although Strauss presents esoteric analysis as a quasiobjective method to find an ancient authors true teaching, it is actually an exercise in
eisegesis. Strauss applies esoteric analysis to writers like Maimonides, Halevi and
Spinoza and twists them to communicate his own true teaching. Esoteric analysis
interprets the text to fit a preconceived conclusion.
The Rules of Certainty
Strauss discussion of esoteric analysis is, like much of his work, vague and diffuse.
To begin, he writes that an esoteric reader will not accept an arbitrary standard of
exactness which might exclude a priori the most important facts of the past, but will
adapt the rules of certainty which guide his research to the nature of his subject.977
The arbitrary standard is modern historical scholarship, which, for Strauss, was
borne out of historicism and thus excludes a priori the principles from classical
philosophy. What Strauss is saying is that an esoteric reader will not accept any
standard of truth that excludes classical principles, such as the nature of tyranny in
Platos Republic. Instead, the reader will adapt the rules of certainty depending on
the nature of his subject. The rules of certainty is an interesting choice of phrase.
Essentially, Strauss is saying that the esoteric reader will lower his standard of proof
until he finds what he wants to find.
976
977
476
According to the Robb-Silberman Commission, intelligence analysts
overestimated Iraqs WMD capabilities because they shifted the burden of proof,
requiring proof that Iraq did not have active WMD programs rather than requiring
affirmative proof of their existence.978 Analysts in the CIAs Center for Weapons
Intelligence Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC) raised the evidentiary
burden so high that they artificially skewed the analytical process.979 Effectively,
WINPACs Team B had adapted the rules of certainty to prove the preconceived
truth, Iraqs active WMD programs.
Like WINPACs Team B cell, the Bush administrations neocons also adapted
the rules of certainty to prove what they prove. In 1996, future-Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz told Studies in Intelligence, The serious policymaker cannot
ignore a 10-percent likelihood that could have a major impact on US security.980
Wolfowitz echoed the remark in a memo to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld a
few days after the September 11 attacks. In the memo, Preventing More Events,
Wolfowitz argued that if there was even a ten-percent chance that Saddam Hussein
was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that
threat.981 Wolfowitz believed the odds were far more than 1 in 10 and cited a
conspiracy theory that Iraq had been behind the 1993 World Trade Center
978
United States. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Charles S. Robb and Laurence H. Silberman. (Co-Chairs). Washington
DC: Government Printing Office. March 31, 2005. p. 168. http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html
979
Ibid., p. 169.
980
Davis, Jack. The Challenge of Managing the Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence PolicyRelations. Studies in Intelligence. Vol. 39, No. 9. 1996.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/intel_and_policy.htm Accessed: October 13, 2007.
981
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Thomas H. Kean. (Chair). Washington DC:
Government Printing Office. July 22, 2004. pp. 335-336. http://www.911commission.gov/report/index.htm Accessed: December 5, 2005.
477
bombing.982 As previously noted, Wolfowitz was briefly a student of Strauss while an
undergraduate at the University of Chicago. Just as Strauss instructs, Wolfowitz has
adapted the rules of certainty so that he can prove what he wants to prove: Iraq is
cooperating with al-Qaeda.
In fact, just about the entire Bush administrations senior officials adapted the
rules of certainty to justify war with Iraq. For example, Vice President Cheney, in his
speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in August 2002, noted that
Intelligence is an uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances.983 The Vice
President argued that the United States could not wait for absolute proof to take action
against Iraqs nuclear program. In September 2002, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice echoed the Vice President when she stated, The problem here is
that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear
weapons. But we dont want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.984 Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld also adapted the rules of certainty when it came to Iraq. In an
interview on Face the Nation, Rumsfeld argued it was not necessary to prove that
Saddam was a threat beyond reasonable doubt. The uncertainty alone justified US
military action.985 For the neocons, hard evidence was for the rubes, the chumps, the
people who had not learned the lessons of 9/11. Just as Strauss instructs, the neocons
and their Team Bs lowered their standard of proof so the intelligence would justify the
preconceived conclusion.
982
Ibid., p. 336.
Cheney, Richard. Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention. Nashville,
Tennessee. August 26, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html
984
Rice, Condoleezza. Interview. Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. CNN. September 8, 2002.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wolf.htm Accessed: October 12, 2007.
985
Rumsfeld, Donald H. Interview. Face the Nation. CBS Television Network. September 8, 2002.
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3631 Accessed: October 12,
2007.
983
478
Cherry-Picking
After he discusses adapting the rules of certainty, Strauss goes on to describe the
rules of esoteric analysis. As I have noted, although Strauss presents these rules as a
quasi-objective method to discover an authors true teaching, they are actually a
prescription for eisegesis. Strauss states that esoteric analysis is strictly prohibited in
all cases where it would be less exact than not doing so.986 However, immediately
prior to this, Strauss writes that the esoteric reader will not accept an arbitrary
standard of exactness which might exclude a priori the most important facts of the
past.987 So, Strauss is saying, one, the esoteric readers standard of exactness
should not exclude classical principles, i.e. the standard of exactness should be
based on classical principles. And, two, esoteric analysis is prohibited when it
produces a reading that is less exact, which is to say that esoteric analysis
encouraged if the text does not conform to classical principles already. In his typical
nebulous fashion, Strauss has told us to affirm classical principles as our standard of
exactness and use his method to read texts so they conform to that standard.
Strauss continues that Only such reading between the lines as starts from an
exact consideration of the explicit statements of the author is legitimate.988 [Authors
emphasis.] Again, Strauss definition of an exact reading is one which conforms to
classical principles, such as the nature of tyranny in Platos Republic. He is saying
that, firstly, one must consider all the authors explicit statements in terms of the
preconceived truth. He then explains that
986
Ibid., p. 30.
988
Ibid., p. 30.
987
479
The context in which the statement occurs, and the

literary character of the whole work as well as its plan,
must be perfectly understood before an interpretation of
a statement can reasonably claim to be adequate or even
correct. One is not entitled to delete a passage, nor
emend its text, before one has fully considered all
reasonable possibilities of understanding the passage as
it stands one of those possibilities being that the
passage may be ironic.989
Strauss starting point is his standard of exactness. If a passage does not

conform to that standard, Strauss is suggesting the reader consider all reasonable
ways to interpret it so it does. Once all reasonable possibilities have been considered
(including irony, as it were), if the passage still does not support the preconceived
truth, the esoteric reader is then entitled to delete the passage or amend its text. In
other words, Strauss method cherry-picks passages that can be reasonably
interpreted to support classical principles. The Team Bs did exactly the same thing.
Joe the WINPAC analyst and his red teams assessments of the aluminium
tubes are textbook examples of esoteric analysis in action. When Iraq was caught
trying to procure high-strength aluminium tubes, WINPACs Team B assumed that
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and interpreted the tubes to
support the conclusion. In late-June 2001, WINPACs personnel assessed that the
989
Ibid., p. 30.
480
tubes material, 7075-T6 aluminium, suggested a nuclear end-use. The assessment
continued that the tubes dimensions match[ed] those of a publicly available gas
centrifuge design from the 1950s, known as the Zippe centrifuge.990 Because the
tubes did not match Iraqs modern centrifuge design, the WINPAC personnel had
decided to compare the tubes to a design they resembled more closely: the Zippe
centrifuge from the 1950s. WINPACs Team B cherry-picked the centrifuge design
that supported its preconceived conclusion.
In the run up to the war, WINPACs Team B considered all reasonable ways
to interpret the tubes as centrifuge components. At first, Joe claimed that the Iraqis
would only have to cut the tubes in half and they would match the Zippe rotor
design. When the Department of Energy (DOE) pointed out that this was wrong, Joe
claimed the Iraqis would make more extensive modifications so the tubes would fit
the design.991 Again, DOE pointed out the problems with Joes analysis. Iraq would
face the considerable difficulties trying to turn its tubes from Yugos into
Cadillacs.992 Then, in August 2001, Joe came up with the Centrifuge
Frankenstein. Joe combined the dimensions of all the Zippe designs to make the
tubes inner and outer diameters appear to match. In spite of DOE, Joe decided that
Zippes wall thickness could be interpreted as 2.8mm, a closer match for the tubes
3.3mm wall thickness, and not 1mm as the centrifuge experts had insisted.993 It did
not matter that the Centrifuge Frankenstein was misleading. For Joe, all that mattered
990
Ibid., p. 90.
Albright, David. Iraqs Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact From Fiction. Institute for Science and
International Security. Washington DC. December 5, 2003. p. 13.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf Accessed: October 14,
2007.
992
December 5, 2005.
993
Ibid., p. 91.
991
481
was that the evidence fit the predetermined truth: Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program.
The Wurmser-Maloof Project, another Team B, also cherry-picked evidence to

support a preconceived conclusion. David Wurmser and F. Michael Maloof tried to
find evidence to confirm the memes al-Qaeda component: Saddams support for alQaeda. A few weeks after September 11, the Team B came up with Iraqs Salman Pak
facility. The Wurmser-Maloof Project cherry-picked features that supported their
assumption that Salman Pak was a terrorist training camp. For example, Maloof noted
reports that the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Mukhabarat, had trained non-Iraqis at
the facility.994 Salman Pak had also been part of Iraqs pre-Gulf War biological
weapons program and satellite imagery confirmed the presence of a airplane fuselage
at the site.995 For the Wurmser-Maloof Project, no more evidence was necessary to
conclude that Salman Pak was a significant concern. The Team B already knew
Saddam supported al-Qaeda from their understanding of the nature of tyranny.
Salman Pak could be reasonably interpreted to support the preconceived conclusion.
WINPACs Team B used esoteric analysis to evaluate Iraqs biological

weapons (BW) program as well. In October 2001, the Team B cherry-picked evidence
that confirmed its assumption that Iraq had secret BW facilities. The UNSCOM notes
suggested that Iraq had once considered developing mobile fermentation capability
994
Maloof, Michael F. Interview. The Dark Side. Frontline. PBS Television Network. January 10,
2006. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/interviews/maloof.html Accessed: October
17, 2007.
995
Ibid.
482
germ-producing trucks.996 An Iraqi defector, codenamed Curveball, had reported
through German intelligence that Iraq had built BW production units inside trucks and
railcars.997 For WINPACs Team B, Curveball and the UNSCOM notes supported the
conclusion that Saddam would never surrender the pillars of his regime, his WMDs.
They could be cited to prove what the Team B had already assumed was true.
The Wurmser-Maloof Project or a similar Team B may have cherry-picked the

Zahawie mission to support the memes nuclear component. In February 1999, Iraqi
Ambassador Wissam al-Zahawie travelled to Niger in Africa on an official mission. A
Team B would have focused on indications that confirmed that Saddams nuclear
reconstitution was underway. For example, Nigers chief export is yellowcake
uranium. Also, Iraq had already bought yellowcake from Niger in the 1980s for its
pre-Gulf War enrichment program. That Iraq already had several hundred tonnes of
yellowcake and no way to enrich it would have been seen as irrelevant. Zahawies
Niger mission would have only been important because it supported (superficially)
the preconceived conclusion: Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
Deception
The converse of cherry-picking evidence that supports the truth is assuming

deception when confronted with evidence that contradicts it. The assumption of
deception is a principal element of Strauss esoteric analysis. For Strauss, an esoteric
writer tries to hide his true teaching from the majority of his readers. He writes that
996
Drogin, Bob and Greg Miller. Iraqi Defectors Tales Bolstered US Case for War. The Los
Angeles Times. March 28, 2004. http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5958.htm Accessed:
October 17, 2007.
997
Ibid.
483
there is no better way of hiding the truth than to contradict it.998 A single subtle
contradiction may indicate the authors true views are the opposite of that which he
states explicitly.
if an able writer who has a clear mind and a perfect

knowledge of the orthodox view and all its
ramifications, contradicts surreptitiously and as it were
in passing one of its necessary presuppositions or
consequences which he explicitly recognises and
maintains everywhere else, we can reasonably suspect
that he was opposed to the orthodox system as such.999
In practice, these contradictions are so surreptitious that they can be found in

any text any text at all. Strauss method can thus be used to dismiss any explicit
statement that contradicts the preconceived conclusion. For Strauss, the real opinion
of the author is not necessarily identical with that which he expresses in the largest
number of passages.1000 By assuming deception, the reader can argue a text supports
any true teaching at all, even when the majority of the text explicitly states the exact
opposite.
In the run up to the war, the Team Bs assumed deception to dismiss evidence
that contradicted the predetermined truth. A perfect example is WINPACs initial
assessment of the Iraqi aluminium tubes. In late-June 2001, WINPACs Team B
assessed that the tubes were intended as centrifuge rotors for Iraqs enrichment
998
Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing. op cit., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 32.
1000
Ibid., p. 30.
999
484
program.1001 To explain away evidence that contradicted its preconceived truth, the
Team B had assumed Iraqs deception. For example, the Team B ignored that 7075T6 aluminium had not been used in rotors designs since the 1950s and that Iraq had
used more advanced materials, carbon fibre and maraging steel, in its pre-Gulf War
prototype. It reasoned that Iraq had chosen an archaic rotor design to deceive the US
if the tubes were intercepted.1002
The Team B also assumed Iraqs deception to explain away assessments that
the tubes were more likely for conventional rockets. The US Department of Energy
(DOE) had determined that the tubes specifications were exact match for an Iraqi
rocket design, the Nasser-81. However, WINPACs Team B concluded that
ambiguity was to be expected. Iraq was likely to claim that the tubes were for a
conventional or civilian use a use that cannot be discounted.1003 In other words,
the Team B assumed that Iraq was trying to deceive the US by procuring centrifuge
rotors that looked exactly like rocket motor bodies.
The Pentagons Team B, the Wurmser-Maloof Project, also assumed Iraqs

deception to dismiss evidence and analysis that suggested Saddam did not support alQaeda. For example, the Team B had assumed the Salman Pak facility was a training
camp for Islamic militants. However, Saddam was well-known for his distrust of
religious extremists and considered al-Qaeda a threat to his regime. According to
former UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, Salman Pak was an anti-terror training
camp.
1001

Ibid., pp. 69-70.
1003
Ibid., p. 199
1002
485
was a camp dedicated to train Iraq to deal with
Islamic fundamentalist terrorists Their number one
target was the Islamic Kurdish party, which later grew
into [al-Qaeda allied terrorist group] Al Ansar Iraq,
as part of their ongoing war against Islamic
fundamentalism, created a unit specifically designed to
destroy these people.1004
Yet Wurmser-Maloof Project dismissed Iraqs explanations for Salman Pak as

deception. Iraqs claims that Salman Pak trained anti-terror units were to be expected
because Iraq was trying to deceive the US. For the Team B, all the evidence that
suggested Iraq considered al-Qaeda a threat was part of an elaborate deception. The
Team B already knew Iraq and al-Qaeda were allies. Anything that suggested
otherwise was rejected.
WINPACs Team B also assumed Iraqs deception to explain away issues

regarding Curveballs credibility. The defectors reports on Iraqs alleged mobile BW
facilities had been contradicted by satellite imagery. Curveball had identified a
building, which he claimed housed the mobile labs. However, satellite photos had
revealed that this particular building was surrounded by a wall and thus inaccessible
to vehicles. Yet WINPAC did not question the defectors reporting. Instead, the Team
B assumed that the wall was a fake. Iraq had put up the wall to deceive the US and
undermine Curveballs credibility. According to the Robb-Silberman Commission,
Analysts use of denial and deception to explain away discordant evidence about
1004
Ritter, Scott. Interview in William Rivers Pitt, War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesnt Want You to
Know. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002. http://www.gaiaguys.net/WARONIRAQ.htm Accessed:
October 18, 2007.
486
Iraqs BW programs was a recurring theme in our review of the Communitys
performance on the BW question.1005 The Team B assumed deception because Team
B analysis is esoteric analysis.
Filling in the Gaps
Esoteric analysis cherry-picks evidence that supports the preconceived conclusion and
dismisses as deception evidence that contradicts it. Importantly, esoteric analysis is
also reading between the lines. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,
but evidence of the authors esotericism. The author is assumed to be concealing the
predetermined truth. As I have noted, Strauss contends that an author will sometimes
indicate his true teaching in a manner so vague that his true teaching could be
anything at all. Despite the authors explicit statements, his true views are only ever
implied in the text. He will not state his opposition to the orthodox view openly but
will instead contradict one of its necessary presuppositions or consequences.
Even then, the orthodox views presuppositions are only contradicted
surreptitiously or in passing.1006 Strauss leaves it up to the esoteric reader to
decide what the orthodox view is precisely; exactly where the author has contradicted
the orthodox view and what the contradiction has implied. For example, Strauss notes
that If a master of the art of writing commits such blunders as would shame an
intelligent high school boy, it is reasonable to assume they are intentional.1007 Yet
Strauss does not suggest what a supposed intentional blunder might indicate. He
leaves it to the reader to read between the lines any true teaching he might like to
find. An exact reader would find a true teaching consistent with the principles of
1005

1007
Ibid., p. 30.
1006
487
philosophys natural law, such as the nature of tyranny. For Strauss, the authors
silences can thus demonstrate that the author is hiding the truth. In other words, the
absence of evidence becomes evidence itself.
In Team B analysis, reading between the lines is filling in the gaps. When
the Team Bs could not find any evidence of Iraqs WMDs and support for al-Qaeda,
they used the preconceived conclusion to fill in the gaps in the intelligence text. The
absence of evidence thus became evidence Saddam was hiding his WMDs and alQaeda ties. During the run up to the war, the Team Bs interpretations of weak,
ambiguous or otherwise dubious intelligence rested on substantial, unsupported
assumptions. The Team Bs did not need evidence for their assumptions because they
assumed the evidence was being hidden.
One example of filling in the gaps is Joe the WINPAC analysts assessment
of the aluminium tubes. By August 2001, Joe seems to have conceded to the DOE that
the tubes did not match any known rotor design.1008 However, he still concluded that
the tubes were most likely intended for Iraqs centrifuge program. Before he came up
with his Centrifuge Frankenstein, Joe argued that no one knew for certain what would
have happened to the tubes once they had reach Iraq. In the absence of evidence, he
assumed that once the Iraqis got a hold of the tubes, they would modify them until
they could be used as centrifuge rotors.1009 Although there was no evidence the Iraqis
intended to turn their Yugos into Cadillacs, Joe had used the predetermined truth
to fill in the gaps in the intelligence text.
1008
1009
Ibid., p. 13.
488
The Wurmser-Maloof Project also read between the lines when assessing
Iraqs Salman Pak facility. The Team B already knew that Saddam supported
terrorists like al-Qaeda and had reporting that Salman Pak was a Mukhabarat-run
training facility.1010 However, no one knew for certain who was being trained at the
Salman Pak or what they were being trained to do. So, the Wurmser-Maloof Project
filled in the gaps in the intelligence with the predetermined truth. The fact that no
one knew precisely who was training at Salman Pak meant that Iraq was hiding
Salman Paks training of al-Qaeda. Just as in esoteric analysis, the Team B had used
its preconceived conclusion to read between the lines of the intelligence text.
WINPACs analysis of Iraqs biological weapons program is another case in

point. In the absence of evidence of an Iraqi BW program, WINPACs Team B
assumed that Saddam was hiding the program. The intelligence cell assumed the
Iraqis had developed an undetectable BW program, a mobile program. After
Curveball began reporting, WINPAC did not care that Curveballs claims could not
be corroborated. No other human sources had reported an Iraqi mobile BW program
and US satellites could not find any evidence that backed up Curveballs story. Again,
WINPACs Team B used its preconceived conclusion to fill in the gaps in the
evidence. The Team B assumed the mobile program was operating in complete
secrecy. Saddam was hiding the mobile facilities from satellite overflights. According
to the Robb-Silberman Commission, WINPAC did not consider the possibility that
the reason no one could confirm the facilities was because they were not there to
1010
United States. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Postwar Findings about Iraqs WMD
Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. S. Rpt. 109-331.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office. September 8, 2006. p. 82.
http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf Accessed: September 10, 2006.
489
begin with.1011 The Team B did not need confirmation because it already knew the
truth about Iraqs BW program. Using esoteric analysis, the Team B filled in the
gaps and assumed the absence of evidence was evidence itself.
A Team B analysing Zahawies mission to Niger would have also filled in the
gaps with the truth that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. In September
2001, no one knew why the Iraqis had travelled to Niger in 1999. However,
yellowcake was Nigers largest export and Iraq had bought Nigerien yellowcake for
its pre-Gulf War enrichment program. In the absence of evidence, a Team B would
have filled in the gaps and assumed that the Iraqis were trying to buy Nigerien
uranium again. And if the Iraqis were trying to buy uranium, then there could be only
one reason why the Nigeriens did not tell the US about it. A Team B would have
assumed that the Nigeriens were hiding Iraqs acquisition attempt because Iraq had
been successful. With Strauss method, a Team B would have read between the lines
that Iraq and Niger had signed a deal for black-market uranium.
The similarities between esoteric and Team B analysis strongly suggest that
they are one in the same. In Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss urges the
esoteric reader not to accept an arbitrary standard of exactness that does not include
classical principles and to adapt the rules of certainty that guide his research.1012
During the run up to the war, the neocons standard of exactness was the meme
derived from the nature of tyranny in Platos Republic. They adapted the rules of
certainty and claimed that the US could not wait for hard evidence of Iraqs WMDs
and al-Qaeda ties. In both esoteric and Team B analysis, a reader cherry-picks
1011
1012

490
evidence that supports the preconceived conclusion and dismisses as deception
evidence that contradicts it. In the absence of evidence, the reader uses the truth to
read between the lines or fill in the gaps. The absence of evidence becomes
evidence that the author is hiding the truth. Using Strauss method, the Team Bs
cherry-picked single-sourced, out-of-context or otherwise dubious intelligence and
stovepiped it directly to senior Bush administration officials. The Team B intelligence
seemed superficially to make a case that Iraq was a threat, but was in fact highly
misleading and essentially propaganda. As I have argued previously, this is exactly
how Strauss intended esoteric analysis to be applied.
The purpose of esoteric analysis is to twist an authoritative text so it appears to

support philosophys natural law. For the neocons, the meme, derived from the nature
of tyranny, was an absolute truth. As nihilists, their belief and obedience made it true.
As Straussians, they needed to compel the Vulgars belief and obedience to the meme,
to the secret kingship of the philosopher. Esoteric analysis applied to the authoritative
intelligence text could give the meme the authority of revelation, so to speak. If
backed by Team B intelligence, the threat from Iraq would appear rational. War with
Iraq would appear obligatory. The neocons needed to cite the Team B intelligence
publicly. As Shulsky and Schmitt noted, Strausss view certainly alerts one to the
possibility that political life may be closely linked to deception. Indeed, it suggests
that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope, to say nothing of the
expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the exception.1013
The Straussians intended to cite their fanciful interpretations to teach us, the Vulgar,
the truth about the nature of Iraq.
1013
491
The Campaign
The purpose of the Team B cells was to produce propaganda for the Bush
administrations war campaign. The neocons wanted the President to cite Team B
intelligence publicly to support the meme. In Persecution and the Art of Writing,
Strauss describes how easily the head of a government can manufacture the consent of
the masses.
[People] would admit, as a matter of course, that man

can lie and does lie. But they would add that lies are
short-lived and cannot stand the test of repetition let
alone of constant repetition and that therefore a
statement which is constantly repeated and never
contradicted must be true. Another line of argument
maintains that a statement made by a responsible and
respected man, and therefore particularly by a man in a
highly responsible or exalted position, is morally
certain. These two enthymemes lead to the conclusion
that the truth of a statement which is constantly repeated
by the head of the government and never contradicted is
absolutely certain.1014
1014
492
If the President repeated Team B intelligence constantly, he would convince
the public that Iraqs WMDs and support for al-Qaeda were absolutely certain. He
would compel their belief and obedience to classical philosophys natural law, which,
for the neocons, was just as true as anything else. Belief and obedience made it true.
So, the neocons wanted to include Team B intelligence in the official case for war, in
the speeches and statements of President Bush. The only problem was that the
Intelligence Community would not let them.
The Intelligence Community controlled the official case for war. The neocons
and their Team Bs could cherry-pick as much singled-sourced, fragmentary and outof-context intelligence as they liked. If the Intelligence Community judged that there
was not enough evidence to support the Team B conclusions, then the President could
not cite the neocons material publicly. The President would not be able to make the
case the neocons wanted him to make. He would not be able to persuade the Vulgar
that war with Iraq was both rational and obligatory.
The neocons needed to convince the Intelligence Community to clear the

Team B intelligence for the case for war. In Persecution and the Art of Writing,
Strauss describes the difficulty convincing a modern historian that an authors true
teaching is written between the lines.
if an author does not tire of asserting explicitly on

every page of his book that a is b, but indicates between
the lines that a is not b, the modern historian will still
demand explicit evidence showing that author believed
493
a not to be b. Such evidence cannot possibly be
forthcoming, and the modern historian wins his
argument: he can dismiss any reading between the lines
as arbitrary guesswork, or if he is lazy, he will accept it
as intuitive knowledge.1015
In Straussian terms, the Intelligence Community demanded explicit

evidence showing the author, Saddam, believed a not to be b that is, had
WMDs and supported al-Qaeda. As Strauss suggests, such evidence cannot possible
be forthcoming and so the Intelligence Community, the modern historian, wins the
argument. The Intelligence Community can dismiss Team B analysis as arbitrary
guesswork. For the neocons, however, this was an unacceptable situation.
The neocons were not content with losing the argument to the Intelligence
Communitys modern historians. As nihilists, the neocons believed that their
interpretation of the intelligence was just as true as the Intelligence Communitys.
They had affirmed a new standard of truth, a better standard. Classical philosophys
natural law could recognise tyranny for what it was. For neocons, the meme was an
absolute truth. Saddam and al-Qaeda could attack America with a biological, nuclear
and even chemical weapon at any moment. The neocons believed that it was their
duty to compel the Vulgars obedience to the secret kingship of the philosopher.
Hundreds of thousands of American lives could depend on it. Once Saddam was out
of power, no one was going to care what the justification for his overthrow had been.
Iraqis would be dancing in the streets. The US would discover secret WMD facilities
1015
Ibid., p. 27.
494
all over Iraq. They would find al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq, the neocons just knew it. If
the Intelligence Communitys modern historians needed explicit evidence to clear the
case for war, then explicit evidence was what they would have to have.
The disinformation operation manufactured evidence that strengthened the

Team B intelligence evidence that literally filled in the gaps in the intelligence
text. The operation coached defectors and laundered forgeries that made the Team Bs
assumptions explicit. Although the Team Bs did not need hard evidence to know Iraq
had WMDs and ties to al-Qaeda, the Intelligence Communitys analysts did. The
disinformation operation amended the intelligence text to bring the Intelligence
Communitys consensus in line with the Team Bs. The President would make the case
the neocons wanted him to make. He would cite Team B intelligence to compel the
Vulgars belief in the truth derived from the nature of tyranny, the meme: Iraq is a
threat because of its WMDs and ties to al-Qaeda.
Although Joe the WINPAC analyst had assumed Iraq would modify the tubes
for centrifuges, the centrifuge experts in DOE needed evidence to reach the same
conclusion. In August 2001, the DOE published an extensive assessment that
concluded the tubes could not be used as rotors without substantial
modifications.1016 In particular, the tubes internal diameters were too narrow to
enrich meaningful quantities of uranium. The DOE repeated its assessment in
December 2001. There was no evidence the Iraqis intended to invest the significant
time, energy and effort necessary to transform each tube into a centrifuge rotor. 1017
1016
1017

495
The DOE assessed the tubes were far more likely intended as components for Iraqs
Nasser-81 rockets.1018
In late-August 2002, the Modification Intelligence filled in the gaps for the
DOE. A foreign government service reported that Iraq had asked about increasing
the tubes internal diameters.1019 We now know that the report was false. We know
the Iraqis always intended to use the tubes as rocket bodies. Since the tubes were an
exact match for the rocket design, there is no reason Iraq would have asked about
increasing their internal diameters. It seems the Modification Intelligence was part of
the disinformation operation. The Modification Intelligence provided evidence that
Iraq intended the tubes for centrifuge rotors after all. The operation was trying to
bring DOEs conclusion in line with the Team B analysis, so the tubes could be cited
in the official case for war.
The Modification Intelligence failed to meet this objective, however. DOE did
not change its assessment of the tubes (it never would) and the Intelligence
Communitys consensus stayed the same. A week or so later, when the Bush
administration started its media campaign for war, White House officials had to find
another way to cite the tubes as Exhibit A in the case for Iraqs nuclear reconstitution.
The Team B analysis of the tubes was leaked to The New York Times.1020 On NBCs
Meet the Press with Tim Russert, Vice President Cheney cited the Team B
1018

Ibid., pp. 74; 211.
1020
Miller, Judith and Michael R. Gordon. US says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts. The
New York Times. September 8, 2002. http://www.realdemocracy.com/abomb.htm Accessed: October
20, 2007.
1019
496
intelligence in Judith Millers report.1021 Other officials, such as Secretary of State
Colin Powell, followed suit.1022 Although the Intelligence Community had not cleared
the tubes for the case for war, the Bush administration found a way to cite the Team B
intelligence anyway.
A few days later, much to DOEs alarm, President Bush cited the tubes in his
United Nations address as the climax of the White House media campaign. The
President stated that Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum
tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.1023 Citing Team B intelligence,
he could compel the publics belief in the truth derived from the nature of tyranny:
Iraq was secretly reconstituting its nuclear program.
The disinformation campaign also tried to fill in the gaps about Iraqs
Salman Pak training facility. In the absence of evidence, the Pentagons Team B, the
Wurmser-Maloof Project, had assumed the facility was training al-Qaeda terrorists.
However, the Intelligence Communitys terrorism experts, the Counterterrorism
Center (CTC) and the Office for Near Eastern and South Asian and African Analysis
(NESAF), could not conclude Iraq had provided al-Qaeda any kind of material
support.1024 There was no indication that the terror network had ever received Iraqi
1021
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network.
September 8, 2002. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1022
1023
Bush, George W. The Presidents Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. New York.
September 12, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html Accessed:
October 20, 2007.
1024
Pillar, Paul R. Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85, No. 2,
March/April, 2006. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligencepolicy-and-the-war-in-iraq.html?mode=print Accessed: October 20, 2007.
497
funding, weaponry or training.1025 If CTC and NESAF were going to be brought in
line with the Team B, they were going to need evidence first. They were going to
need evidence that Salman Pak was an al-Qaeda training camp.
The Iraqi National Congress coached two defectors, Abu Zeinab and Khodada,
to provide the evidence the terrorism experts needed. In interviews with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the defectors claimed to have witnessed Islamic militants
training to hijack civilian aircraft at Salman Pak. Although they said specifically that
they did not know if the militants were al-Qaeda, the training they described
recalled al-Qaedas September 11 attacks.1026 They further described training that
paralleled the terror networks bombing of the USS Cole.1027 Despite the defectors
evasiveness, the clear implication was that Iraq had trained al-Qaeda to attack the
United States. The Iraqi National Congress was part of the disinformation operation.
The opposition group had coached the defectors to fill in the gaps about Salman Pak
for the CTC and NESAF. If the terrorism experts could be brought in line with the
Wurmser-Maloof Project, then the President would be able to cite Salman Pak in the
case for war. He would be able to compel the publics belief in the truth, the memes
terrorism component.
The Intelligence Community saw through the Salman Pak defectors pretty
quickly, however. Abu Zeinab and Khodadas reliability was judged questionable
1025
Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islams War against
America. New York: Random House, 2003. p. 456.
1026
United States. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The Use by the Intelligence Community of
Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. S. Rpt. 109-330. Washington DC: Government
Printing Office. September 8, 2006. pp. 80; 82. http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiinc.pdf Accessed:
September 10, 2006.
1027
Ibid., p. 70.
498
and neither influenced CTC or NESAFs terrorism assessments.1028 There was still not
enough evidence to conclude Iraq had provided material support to al-Qaeda.
Although the INC tried to corroborate the Salman Pak reporting several more times,
the alleged al-Qaeda training camp was never cited in the official case for war.
Instead, the INC planted Abu Zeinab and Khodadas stories in the press.
November 2001 was Salman Pak media month. If the President could not cite
the Team B intelligence officially, the INC would make sure the public heard about it
anyway. Vanity Fair,1029 The New York Times1030 and the PBS series Frontline1031 all
fell for Abu Zeinab and Khodadas tales of Iraqs Islamic hijackers hook, line and
sinker. The defectors seemed to corroborate each other. Former CIA Director turned
INC stooge, R. James Woolsey gave the story his seal of approval. Certainly no one at
the White House objected to headlines that implied Iraqs responsibility for
September 11. For journalists looking for a scoop, the INCs story was too good not
to run. Salman Pak was front page news all over the world. Even though the
Intelligence Community would not clear the Team B intelligence for the case for war,
the disinformation operation ensured Salman Pak did what the neocons wanted it to
do: convince the public the truth about the nature of Iraq.
1028

http://web.archive.org/web/20020203080103/http://www.iraq.net/erica/news-e/archives/00000101.htm
1030
Hedges, Chris. Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism. The New York Times. November 8,
2001.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED81E39F93BA35752C1A9679C8B63&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1031
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/ Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1029
499
On an appearance on Meet the Press with Tim Russert, the Vice President was
asked about the Salman Pak defectors claims and did not dispute them.1032 In another
appearance a few months later, Cheney urged viewers to read a story the INC had
similarly planted in The New Yorker.1033 The Intelligence Communitys consensus
would not let the Vice President state the truth derived from the nature of tyranny;
that Iraq and al-Qaeda would ally against the US, their common enemy. In The New
Yorker article, the INCs coached defectors made precisely the case Cheney was not
allowed to make.1034 The INC was helping Cheney tell the public the truth about
Iraqs alliance with al-Qaeda.
The INC also coached defectors to fill in the gaps about Iraqs biological
weapons program. In the absence of evidence of a program, WINPACs Team B had
assumed Iraqs BW program was undetectable. Although much of the Intelligence
Community did suspect Iraq was secretly producing BW agent, the strongest
conclusion it could reach without hard evidence was that Iraq could have a secret
BW program.1035 The Intelligence Community would need evidence of secret Iraqi
weapons facilities to bring the consensus judgment in line with WINPACs Team B.
Once again, the INC coached defectors to fill in the gaps for the Intelligence
Community.
1032
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network.
December 9, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20011209.html Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1033
Cheney, Richard. Interview. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. NBC Television Network. March
1034
http://www.jeffreygoldberg.net/articles/tny/a_reporter_at_large_the_great.php Accessed: October 20,
2007.
1035
500
The INC coached Haideri, an Iraqi civil engineer, to tell US debriefers about
secret facilities he had helped build for the Iraqi military.1036 The facilities, he
claimed, were hidden under private homes and in subterranean wells around Iraq. One
was even located underneath Baghdads Saddam Hospital.1037 Although Haideri did
not directly link the facilities to BW agent production, the sites he described matched
descriptions of clean rooms for working with hazardous biological material. Like
the Salman Pak defectors, the civil engineers implication was clear. Iraq had
developed BW facilities that the Intelligence Community could not detect. However,
Haideri did not affect the Intelligence Communitys consensus judgment of Iraqs
BW program. The defector reportedly failed a lie detector test during his debrief in
Thailand.1038 The President would not be able to cite Haideris information in the case
for war.
Once again, the INC made sure everyone heard about Haideri anyway. In
December 2001, Haideri told his tales of underground weapons labs to Judith Miller
of The New York Times.1039 The article made a clear case for the memes WMD
component. Iraqs clandestine facilities were undetectable and unbombable. The only
way to protect America from Saddams WMDs was to remove the dictator from
power. Like the stories sourced to the Salman Pak defectors, Millers article made
headlines around the world.1040 Although Haideri was not cleared for the case for war,
1036
SSCI. Phase II: INC. op. cit., pp. 40-41.

Miller, Judith. An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites. The New
York Times. December 20, 2001.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E6DC103EF933A15751C1A9679C8B63&sec=&
spon=&pagewanted=all Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1038
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war Accessed: October
20, 2007.
1039
Miller, Judith. An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites. op. cit.
1040
McCollam, Douglas. The List. Columbia Journalism Review. Iss. 4. July/August, 2004.
http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2004/4/mccollam-list.asp Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1037
501
the INC made sure he did what he was supposed to do regardless. Haideris
information helped convince the public of the truth about the nature of Iraq. Saddam
was hiding his WMD facilities.
For WINPAC, Curveballs reports fit with the preconceived truth and
therefore did not need any further confirmation. The Team B had read between the
lines and assumed Iraqs mobile labs could not be confirmed because they were
well hidden.1041 However, the rest of the Intelligence Community needed more than
a single, unconfirmed source to conclude Iraq had developed a mobile program. To
bring the Intelligence Community in line with WINPACs Team B, Curveball would
have to be corroborated.
The INCs Mohammad Harith, a former major in Iraqs Mukhabarat, and the
highly classified Red River both attempted to corroborate Curveballs claims of
mobile BW facilities. The INC coached Harith to tell US intelligence officials that he
had procured equipment for mobile biological labs.1042 Although the former major did
not directly link the labs to BW agent production, he clearly implied the program was
illicit.1043 The DIA believed Harith had corroborated Curveball and changed the
Intelligence Communitys consensus BW judgment. However, the judgment changed
back a few months later when the National Intelligence Council determined Harith
was a fabricator.1044 Fortunately for the Bush administrations case for war, Red River
was able to fill in the gaps for the Intelligence Community. The same week as the
Modification Intelligence, the MI6 source confirmed Curveballs fermentation units
1041

1043
Ibid., p. 62.
1044
Ibid., p. 62.
1042
502
built inside trucks and railcars.1045 The disinformation operation had succeeded.
The Intelligence Community cleared US officials to cite the Team B intelligence
publicly.
In September 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cited Iraqs mobile

WMD capability in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.1046 A
week later, Prime Minister Tony Blair noted in his address to parliament that present
intelligence confirmed Iraqs mobile BW facilities.1047 In October 2002, the mobile
program was included in President Bushs Cincinnati speech, in which the President
outlined the nature of the Iraqi threat.1048 Curveballs reporting also became the
centrepiece of Secretary of State Colin Powells UN presentation in February
2003.1049 The disinformation operation had successfully corroborated the Iraqi asylum
seeker. The Team B intelligence had become part of the official case for war. Citing
Iraqs mobile program, the White House could compel the publics belief in the
memes BW component. The President could convince the Vulgar the truth derived
from the nature of tyranny: Saddam would never give up his biological weapons.
The Italian military intelligence service, SISMI, filled in the gaps about
Zahawies 1999 official visit to Niger. No one knew the why Zahawie had travelled to
1045
United Kingdom. Committee of Privy Councillors. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass

Destruction. Rt. Hon. Lord Butler. (Chair). London: The Stationary Office. July 14, 2004. p. 169.
http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/index.asp Accessed: December 5, 2005.
1046
Rumsfeld, Donald H. United States Department of Defense. Testimony of U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq. September
18, 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=284 Accessed: October 12,
2007.
1047
1048
Bush, George W. President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. Cincinnati Museum Center. Cincinnati,
Ohio. October 7, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html Accessed:
October 20, 2007.
1049
Powell, Colin. US Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council. New
York City, New York. February 5, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html Accessed: October 20, 2007.
503
Niger but in the absence of evidence a Team B would have assumed he was trying to
buy uranium. Laundering the Niger Documents, SISMI reported that not only had
Zahawie tried to buy uranium in Niger, but that he had been successful.1050 The
Nigeriens had agreed to sell black-market yellowcake to Iraq. As a result of SISMIs
reports, the DOE, which had refused to assess that the tubes were centrifuge rotors,
concluded that Iraq was indeed reconstituting its nuclear program.1051 The DOEs
revised judgment seems to have flipped the Intelligence Communitys consensus.
When Vice President Cheney later appeared on Meet the Press with Tim Russert, for
the first time he was able to say unequivocally that Iraq was pursuing nuclear
weapons.1052
However, SISMIs Niger reporting, much like the tubes, was vigorously
disputed within the Intelligence Community. The State Departments Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) and the CIAs Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian and African Analysis (NESAF) were both very skeptical of the reports.1053
Neither the US Embassy in Niamey nor Joe Wilsons investigation could substantiate
any of SISMIs claims. In its March 2002 assessment, INR concluded that the French
maintain complete control over Nigers mining operation and that it would be next to
impossible to secretly transport 500 tonnes of yellowcake to Nigers nearest
port.1054 Niger could not sell uranium to Iraq even if it wanted to. INR assessed
SISMIs reports to be highly dubious.1055 While WINPAC was ready to assume the
1050

1052
Cheney, Richard. Meet the Press with Tim Russert. March 25, 2002. op. cit.
1053
SSCI. Phase I. op. cit., pp. 38; 48.
1054
Ibid., p. 42.
1055
Ibid., p. 53.
1051
504
Nigeriens deception, INR and NESAF would need evidence before they would clear
the Niger reporting for the case for war.
Like the Modification Intelligence, the Niger Documents Codes A and B seem
intended to provide INR with evidence of the deception the Team B assumed had
taken place. While INR argued that the French controlled Nigers uranium mines,
Code A implicates the Commander of the Mining Base in the Iraq-Niger
conspiracy. Code B counters the problem of the yellowcakes transport by presenting
it as a fait accompli. According to Code B, the uranium has arrived at Cotonous port
and is ready to be shipped to Iraq secretly by sea. Codes A and B may have
provided the content of SISMIs final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal, the
March report.1056 If so, then Codes A and B seem to have been evidence intended to
bring INRs assessment in line with WINPACs assumptions.
WINPACs Team B did not need any more sources to confirm the Niger
reporting. However, the Intelligence Community would not clear Niger for the case
for war without independent corroboration. During the run up to the war, SISMI
strengthened the Team B intelligence to bring the Intelligence Communitys
consensus in line with the WINPAC. SISMIs director, Nicolo Pollari, vouched for
the reliability of the reportings source, a mole in the Niger Embassy in Rome, La
Signora.1057 In the same week as the Modification Intelligence and Red River, the
Second Source confirmed the Niger reporting to the UKs intelligence service,
1056
Ibid., p. 47.
Unger, Craig. The Wars They Wanted, The Lies They Needed. Vanity Fair. July, 2006.
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/07/yellowcake200607?printable=true&currentPage=a
ll Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1057
505
MI6.1058 As a result of the Second Source, Prime Minister Tony Blair cited Saddams
attempts to acquire uranium from Africa in his September 24 address to
parliament.1059 The Prime Minister had cited Team B intelligence to convince the
public the truth; the nature of Iraq. Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
The White House wanted to include the Niger reporting in the Presidents UN
address.1060 With the aluminium tubes, Niger was to have been the climax of the
Presidents case for war, his nuclear punchline. It was a simple equation tubes then
uranium. However, unlike Red River, MI6 did not share the Second Source with the
CIA.1061 While WINPAC was ready to clear the Presidents nuclear punchline without
confirmation, the Intelligence Communitys consensus forced the White House to
take out the reference to Niger.1062 The President had to make do with a much weaker
version of the same equation. The Niger reference was replaced with the acquirefissile-material argument.1063 Even though the Intelligence Community would not
clear Niger for the case for war, the White House had found another (albeit weaker)
way to teach the public the truth about Saddams nature; the memes nuclear
component.
1058
United Kingdom. Intelligence and Security Committee. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
Intelligence and Assessments. Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor. (Chair.) London: The Stationary Office.
September, 2003. pp. 27-28. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc0203.pdf Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1059
Blair, Tony. Iraq address. September 24, 2002. op cit.
1060
1061
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Background Paper on Purported Iraqi attempt to get
Uranium from Niger. April 3, 2003. p. 5.
http://www.paulweiss.com/files/upload/US%20v%20Libby%20DX64.pdf Accessed: October 21, 2007.
1062
Isikoff, Michael and David Corn. Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the
Iraq War. New York: Crown. p. 86. Cited in eRiposte, WMDgate Hubris and Uranium from
Africa: The 9/9/02 Pollari-Hadley meeting. January 3, 2007.
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/009535.php Accessed: August 15, 2007.
1063
506
The Bush administration still wanted Niger as part of its nuclear punchline and
the White House tried to insert the reference into the case for war several more times.
Each time, WINPAC was ready to clear the reference but the Intelligence Community
consensus forced its removal. To create more independent sources for the Niger
reporting, SISMI likely leaked the Niger Documents to the intelligence peddler,
Rocco Martino.1064 Martino tried to sell the dossier to French intelligence and then to
the Italian press. In November 2002, the West African Businessman contacted the US
Naval Criminal Investigative Service and confessed to arranging the uranium deal the
Niger Documents described.1065 Finally, Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet folded in December 2002. WINPAC could clear the case for war without
reference to the rest of the Intelligence Community. WINPAC cleared the Niger
reporting on the proviso that the President would attribute it to the British
government.1066
With WINPACs Team B in charge, the neocons had won control of the case
for war from Tenet and the Intelligence Community. President Bush could now
include the Sixteen Words in his State of the Union address. He could cite his nuclear
punchline: The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.1067
The President had cited Team B intelligence to compel the Vulgars obedience
to the rule of the Wise. He had made the natural law appear obligatory and rational.
He had convinced the public of the truth derived from the nature of tyranny. The
1064
Unger, Craig. op. cit.

1066
Ibid., p. 65.
1067
Bush, George W. President Delivers the State of the Union. The US Capitol. January 28, 2003.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html Accessed: October 20, 2007.
1065
507
President had made the case the neocons wanted him to make. The Sixteen Words
were the practical application of Straussian political theory.
508
Conclusion
Strauss is one of the political theorists whose work is most difficult to understand. His
writing is deliberately arcane, deliberately unclear; that said, Strauss is not
impenetrable. If he wanted to keep his secrets secret, then he would not have put them
in a book, disguised or not. The truth is Strauss wants to tell us the truth. He wants to
tell us what he knows. However, he wants us to work for it. I can see why the neocons
like him so much.
While Strauss is difficult, Straussian theory, once stripped of arcana, is not.

Straussian theory is essentially neoclassicism on the sly. For Strauss, there was no
truth except that which we believe and obey. Although a nihilist himself, he blamed
nihilism for preparing the rise of the Nazis. Weimar had been too tolerant, too free
and consequently, too weak to confront Hitlers thugs. Strauss blamed value-free
social science, and the scientific method generally, for failing to recognise the Nazi
threat. In the name of objectivity, social scientists had blinded themselves to Hitlers
evil. The judicious study of discernable reality, theories derived from objective facts,
could not stop the Nazis murder of almost every member of Strauss family. If all
standards of truth are arbitrary and meaningless, then a standard of truth that could
stop the Holocaust was preferable to one that could not. Strauss found his new
standard in the works of classical philosophers. Not only does Straussian theory apply
classical principles to the affairs of modern government, it seeks to compel the
publics belief in the principles through disingenuous arguments. If believed and
obeyed, classical philosophys natural law is just as true as anything else. Straussian
political theory is about the creation of truth.
509
Esoteric analysis is more than just a way for Strauss to twist texts so they
communicate his own true teaching. Esoteric analysis is an instrument of social
control. Applied to any text, Strauss method can produce any true teaching a reader
might like to find. Once one asserts a texts true meaning is the opposite of that which
appears on the surface, the sky is the limit, as it were, in terms of fanciful
interpretations. Strauss analysis of Halevis The Kurazi shows us how to compel the
Vulgars belief and obedience, how to create the truth. If they are going to be believed
and obeyed, classical principles must be given the authority of revelation. They must
be made to appear rational and obligatory. By applying esoteric analysis, a reader can
demonstrate that an authoritative text supports a truth derived from a classical
philosophy. The Straussian thus compels the Vulgars obedience to the secret
kingship of the philosophers.
The Iraq War conspiracy was the practical application of Straussian theory.
The neocons, as Straussians, applied the nature of tyranny to Saddams Iraq. Derived
from Platos Republic, the meme, Iraqs WMDs and support for al-Qaeda, became the
neocons absolute truth, independent of evidence. The neocons did not need evidence
to know Iraq was a threat. They only needed evidence to convince the rest of us they
were right.
Team B analysis is esoteric analysis applied to the authoritative text of

intelligence. In the run up to the war, the neocons Team Bs assumed the truth and
interpreted intelligence to fit the preconceived conclusion. They cherry-picked
evidence that supported their assumption and dismissed as deception evidence that
510
contradicted it. In the absence of evidence, the Team Bs used the preconceived truth
to fill in the gaps or read between the lines. The absence of evidence became
evidence Saddam was hiding the truth. He was hiding his WMDs and ties to terrorists.
Applying esoteric analysis, the Team Bs twisted the intelligence text to support the
meme, the truth derived from the nature of tyranny in Platos Republic. The Team Bs
were not trying to discern an objective reality. They were trying to create one. For the
neocons, the Team Bs supplied the propaganda necessary to compel our obedience to
the rule of the Wise.
The neocons believed that it was their duty to cite Team B intelligence
publicly. They wanted to include Team B intelligence in the official case for war. The
only problem was that the Intelligence Community would not let them. In the run up
to the war, a disinformation operation fabricated evidence that strengthened the Team
B intelligence. The operation aimed to bring the Intelligence Communitys consensus
judgment in line with the Team Bs. Although the Team Bs did not need evidence to
support their assumptions, the Intelligence Community did. SISMI and the Iraqi
National Congress created evidence that literally filled in the gaps in the intelligence
text. The operation made explicit that which the Team Bs had assumed. The
Modification Intelligence, the Salman Pak defectors, Red River and the Niger
Documents were all part of the same operation, the objective of which was to clear
Team B intelligence for the case for war. Because of the operations success, the
President was able to make the case the neocons wanted him to make. He cited Team
B propaganda to compel our belief in Strauss new standard of truth, classical
philosophys natural law. Through President Bush, Strauss hope of a secret kingship
511
of the philosophers was finally realised. The Iraq War conspiracy was the practical
application of Straussian political theory.
The usual critics, such as Noam Chomsky, have argued that the Bush
administrations claims of the threat from Iraq were largely disingenuous. The
neocons were only interested in controlling Iraqs vast oil wealth, Chomsky has
maintained, and did not really believe that Iraq had WMDs or ties to al-Qaeda.1068
My thesis demonstrates that this interpretation is too simplistic. Instead, the neocons
believed they could create their own reality, their own truth. In their reality, Saddam
was plotting to use al-Qaeda to attack the US with a nuclear weapon. The attack could
be years away. It could be days. But they knew for certain it was coming. In their
reality, the Iraqis were praying the US would invade Iraq and rid them of their hated
tyrant. Iraqis would greet US troops as liberators. There would be dancing on the
streets of Baghdad. The neocons believed in this reality with all their might. Not only
did they believe and obey, they compelled the belief and obedience of millions of
others. The neocons did everything they could to affirm Strauss new standard of
truth; but, try as they might, they could not make it true.
I can think of no worse an indictment of Straussian theory than the on-going

nightmare that is post-war Iraq. Saddam was not a threat. He did not have any WMDs
and considered al-Qaeda his mortal enemy. He was just another tin-pot dictator.
Saddam has now paid for his atrocities, but at what cost to ordinary Iraqis? The war
has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. More than two million have
been forced to flee their homes. Every morning, bodies are discovered on the streets
1068
Chomsky, Noam. A Modest Proposal. ZNet. December 3, 2002.

http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20021203.htm Accessed: December 26, 2008.
512
of Baghdad. Most show signs of torture. The Americans have found themselves in the
middle of a civil war with Sunni ex-Baathists on one side and Shiite fundamentalists
on the other. Despite the neocons predictions, there are no Jeffersonian democrats to
take power in Iraq. Although the neocons do not believe there is such thing as
objective reality, I think the Iraqis might beg to differ.
We should have been able to stop it. However, the neocons took away one of
democracys greatest strengths. They denied us our right to debate the necessity of
war on its merits. For the neocons, we were Vulgar and not to be trusted. They could
not trust democracy. So instead of allowing a real debate, they created the illusion of
one. We debated WMDs and al-Qaeda, tubes and uranium and terror training camps
and mobile labs. We did not debate reality. We debated images and memes. The Iraqi
threat was composed entirely from signs and simulacra. If an informed electorate is
necessary for democracys survival, the neocons are a greater threat to democracy
than Saddam could ever dream of being.
Straussian theory was a response to the horrors of Holocaust. After the

experience of our generation, Strauss writes, the burden of proof would seem to rest
on those who assert rather than those who deny that we have progressed beyond the
classics.1069 Strauss hoped the classical conception of tyranny could help us
recognise regimes that needlessly stirred up wars, regimes that shamelessly exploit the
publics fear of an external enemy, regimes that need to distract the public from own
powerful, relentless incompetence. Sadly, the classical conception of tyranny
describes the Bush administrations United States all too well. I would contend that
1069
513
after the experience of Iraq, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who
assert rather than those who deny that Straussian theory should ever be applied again.
514
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Sixteen Words

This thesis is presented for the degree of

Introduction: The Conspiracy

Chapter 1: The Aluminium Tubes

Chapter 2: Salman Pak

Strauss True Teaching

Esoteric Analysis is Team B Analysis

Friends and family. Thanks for everything.

John 8:32. Unofficial motto of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The White House

Army, Navy, Air

Center for Weapons

Near East Division

Office of Near Eastern,

Office of Russian and

Latin America Division

Office of Asian Pacific

*Some agencies/offices not shown.

Bundesnachrichtendienst. Germanys Federal Intelligence Service. The

Biological Weapons. Examples include anthrax and botulinum toxin.

Chemical Weapons. Examples include mustard gas and sarin gas.

Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA collects and analyses foreign

Counterproliferation Division. Part of the CIAs Directorate of

Counterterrorism Center. The CTC has the CIAs experts on terrorist

Direction Gnrale de la Scurit Extrieure. The Directorate-General

Defense Intelligence Agency. Part of the US Department of Defense, the

Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy. The DOE has the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Part of the US Department of Justice,

Iraqi National Congress. An Iraqi opposition group led by Ahmad

Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR analyses intelligence for the

Joint Intelligence Committee. The JIC coordinates the United

Secret Intelligence Service. The United Kingdoms foreign intelligence

National Intelligence Council. The US Intelligence Communitys center

National Intelligence Estimate. Authored by the National Intelligence

National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Part of the US Department of

National Security Agency. Part of the US Department of Defense, the

Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare. Italys Military

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. UN weapons inspection

Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control.

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Chemical, biological and nuclear

Figure 1 Vice President Dick Cheney, President

war. The President planned to win it.

Is this the time to attack Iraq?

Figure 2 Secretary of Defense Donald

strike a real blow in the War on Terror, then

Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime that might break

The Nature of Tyranny

According to neoconservative godfather Irving Kristol, one of the

Neoconservative scholar David Wurmser explained the nature of tyranny in

Iraq is a problem because it is a totalitarian tyranny, he writes. Such

For tyrants, having an enemy against which to define

Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction?

The US Intelligence Community

Inside the Directorate of Intelligence there are a number of independent and

Figure 3 DCI George

Robb-Silberman. op. cit., p. 580.

The Consensus Did Not Support the Meme

There was no firm evidence of an active Iraqi biological weapons (BW)

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the Intelligence Communitys consensus did

The Essential Problem

Whenever a US official delivers a public statement that refers to intelligence

Posted by Ahmed Kamel on November 20, 2000 at 16:06:11: