A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS ANALYSIS

OF THE
CALIFORNIA STATE FIRE MARSHALS
SMOKE ALARM TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE CSFM REPORT
Years ago, beginning approximately during the mid-1960s, the makers of a device that they
hoped to sell as a fire and smoke detector began to place dishonest ads within the Fire Journal of
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The manufacturers claimed in paid advertising that
their devices would warn of a potential fire even before smoke or flames appeared. (Six copies of
these false ads are attached.) In time most of the members of the International Association of Fire
Chiefs (IAFC) believed the false performance claims and began promoting and helping to sell the
devices. The office of the California State Fire Marshal went beyond promoting the devices; the logo
of the CSFM was allowed to be displayed on the box as an apparent guarantee of quality. But the
device, a so-called smoke detector, was and is a fraud. It is so defective that it has resulted in fire
deaths and injuries numbering into the hundreds of thousands. But despite the carnage over 5
decades, the International Association is still helping to sell the device and to cover-up the
consequences.
Over the past 10 years there has been a concerted effort by individuals and organizations to
alert the public and especially the media to the horrors of this criminal operation. There have been
web sites created and videos produced that are exposing the fraud in a step by step basis, like
peeling back the layers of an onion. No doubt these revelations are creating concern among those
who have been actively engaged in helping to sell a device that has been so deadly. Because the
logo of the CSFM has been allowed to be used as a marketing tool by those who are defrauding the
people, the CSFM is in a rather precarious position. Seemingly, in an attempt to protect herself and
the office of the CSFM a Task Force was assembled to produce the Final Report that presumably
justified the past policies of the office regarding this deadly device. Of course, most or all of those
who put their names to this self-justifying report were themselves involved in the many decades
cover-up.

PART 1 THE MAGNITUDE OF THE AMERICAN FIRE PROBLEM

Page!1

THE U.S. MAY HAVE THE WORST FIRE EXPERIENCE IN THE ENTIRE WORLD
Perhaps the most significant words printed regarding fire loss within the United States were those of
the federal government.
The U.S. fire problem, on a per capita basis, is one of the worst in the industrial world.
To put this in context, the annual losses from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes,
earthquakes and other natural disasters combined in the United
States average just a fraction of those from fires.
Source: Fire in the United States, 13th Edition,
Federal Emergency Management Agency Page 1, Oct 2004
There is something horribly wrong about the fire loss record within the U.S., The most advanced
country on earth from a technological viewpoint is also probably the country suffering the greatest
destruction of property and lives by fire. The untold story behind these facts is that the fire regulatory
system was not so much concerned with protecting the people. Rather the primary intent of those

who created the fire codes and who enforced the regulations was to protect the profits, the
paychecks, the perks and the reputations of those in control of the operation.
THE FIRE MONOPOLY
Building fires within the United States not only cause enormous destruction, the devastations
also result in hundreds of billions of dollars in money exchanges. Many industries and hundreds of
thousands of businesses earn profits from the fire problem. Every government in America, at the
national, state and local level, makes very high fire protection expenditures. Millions of employees
enjoy the monies distributed because of fire. Damaged buildings need repair and replacement.
Insurance industries have built fortunes due to fire. Fire codes can add 10% to sometime near 50%
to the cost of construction. Many businesses sell what the codes mandate the public to buy.
Amazingly, the NFPA allows major businesses to put voting representatives the code committees so
they can write codes requiring building owners to purchase the wares they sell. The NFPA is a
private (not government) that has been allowed to create enforceable laws which is a rather unique
privilege. Thus it can be said that a very significant portion of all commerce in this country is fire
related.
The NFPA/UL combine controls a vast section of the U.S. commerce. Thousands of
businesses cannot sell into the American marketplace without first meeting the criteria of the
applicable NFPA codes and paying for the testing at the UL Labs. If you sell a product and are part of
the NFPA/UL club you can make millions of dollars but if you are an outsider there will be great
difficulty selling your wares because fire departments across this nation will attempt to ban what you
sell as not code complying. If your building suffers a deadly fire virtually without exception your
building can be ruled to have been not code complying because the codes are constantly
changing and it is impossible to remake the building every time the code changes.
Of course, when major loss of life occurs due to a building fire, the fire inspectors will
invariably find that the building was in violation of the codes and this absolves the fire authorities
from blame. All of this results in a close relationship between the fire authorities and the NFPA/UL
system and also those businesses that profit from fire. Within this framework of mutual cooperation a
phony smoke detector has been marketed into approximately 90 million U.S. homes.

PART 2 - ITS ALL AN BOUT MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Page!2

WATER IS FIRES NEMESIS

There is nothing else that has the fire killing power of water. And this ability to kill fire is
magnified when it is delivered in the form of a fine spray or fog. Twelve year old boy scouts are
taught how to kill fires. Just put water on it, its that simple. And a fine spray will increase its fire killing
ability tenfold. There is a problem however, by the time the firefighters reach the site of the fire and
lay out their hose lines the fire often has grown so large and has entered so many concealed spaces
, that it is difficult to get the water spray to the concealed areas. That is why sometime gaining
control of a building fire will require hours of effort.
THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL FIREFIGHTING PROBLEMS
The basic reason why fire is so devastating in the United States is related to two conditions.
One is that our homes and other buildings are loaded with easy to ignite and fast burning contents.
The second reason is because the water is not applied until long after the fire initiates. The fire
officials usually claim that because the running time from station to most fire sites is 5 minutes or
less, the remote firefighters provide the best protection. The truth is the running time is largely
irrelevant. What counts is the FREE BURN TIME. This includes the time that the fire grows

undetected until discovery, the time to call 911, the time to get the message to the local fire
department, the running time from fire house to the fire site and the time to locate the hydrant and
layout the hose lines. The free burn time is far more than adequate for the fire to grow large and kill
the occupants before the first hose line is charged. The inescapable truth is that the remote fire
departments can control the large building fires with thousands of gallons a minute flows, but a
remote fire department cannot prevent massive fire damage and/or loss of lives. Only fire control
capability at the site of the fire can do that.
ITS ALL ABOUT TRANSFERRING THE WATER APPLICATION TO THE FIRE SITE
If a home or most commercial buildings were fully equipped with a reliable and honest fire
detection system there would be close to a 100% certainty that the occupants would be alerted to
the early small fire or smoldering condition. This would allow the early fire to be immediately
terminated prior to the need of a fire department response. Just putting a lid on an overheated and
dried out stew on the kitchen stove would do the trick. Or possible unplugging a smoldering
appliance or pouring a glass of water on a lighted cigarette char on a sofa would avert a tragedy. If
the public was taught to have at the ready (in the laundry room or garage) a fire hose (1/2 or 3/8 inch
size) equipped with a spray nozzle even a larger flaming fire could be doused quickly. But a reliable
fire detection system and some easy instructions to the occupants would have one major
disadvantage to the fire establishment. The number of fire runs might be reduced by 70% or more
and the take from fire by businesses and the fire insurers would plummet.

Page!3

THE FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM CAN BE 99.9% EFFECTIVE AT CONTROLLING FIRE.

The fire sprinkler system is extremely close to a guarantee that there will be no major size
fire in a building and no fire deaths. However, prior to the beginning of the 20th century the fire
insurance executives realized that if the sprinkler system was allowed to be perfected and applied to
all buildings the number of serious fire would be approaching zero. Then the insurance rates that
could be charged would drop precariously and the entire industry would suffer financially. So from
1896 until the 1980s the NFPA code prevented the system from having application to virtually all the
buildings where nearly all the loss of life from fire occurred. During 1896, as soon as the NFPA was
created by the insurers a code was created that prevented the fire sprinkler system from being
applicable for the protection of lives in dwellings and most other buildings including the following
categories: hotels, motels, schools, office buildings including the high rises, hospitals,
nursing homes, apartment buildings, single family homes, houses of worship, bars,
restaurants, night clubs, dance halls, theatres, small stores, strip malls and most relatively
small commercial properties. The rules resulted in extremely few sprinkler installations
except for the highly hazardous large industrial and commercial properties. These property
types could produce losses so great that but a few such losses could bankrupt an insurance
system. Note that this voidance of on-site protection for the vast majority of buildings
in America preserved the near sole dependence on a remote fire station for fire
control.
A FEW EXAMPLES OF FIRE SPRINKLER OBSTRUCTIONARY
REGULATIONS
The 1969 NFPA sprinkler code set a 250 GPM minimum water flow and a 4 inch
supply line from the street to a home for an approved home sprinkler system. I believe
that under these (and some similarly obnoxious rules) the total number of homes sprinkler
protected from 1896 until into the 1970s was zero. Similar regulations kept all of the above
named types of buildings completely dependent on the remote fire departments.

I developed the Life Safety System (modernized and fully engineered sprinkler system)
during the early 1970s and gained approvals for my designs over much of the country.
Here is an example of the difference in design as opposed to the NFPA sprinkler code. I
designed a system covering 1.2 million square feet of a medical facility in Kansas City,
Kansas. The bid and installed price of my designed system was $0.35 per sq./ft. Prior to
my design a basement only conventional NFPA code approved system was bid at $2.88 per
sq./ft. The total cost of the LSS was less than million dollars and the total reduction in
the cost of constructing the building was more than 5 million dollars. Thus the trade-off
construction savings for my LSS exceeded 4.5 million dollars in a 50 million dollar
building. Obviously, there was enormous resistance to the technology I developed. In
trying to promote within-the-home automatic protection for human life I was subjected
to so much hostility and abuse that I was driven out of business three times. Such is the
strength of those who oppose economical and practical on-site protection.
SIMILARITY OF THE FIRE SOLUTIONS
The fire sprinkler system will put water spray on a building fire automatically
when the fire is still small and easy to control. This protection has the potential to come
very close to completely eliminating deaths and serious injuries due to building fires. A
complete and reliable fire detection system for the home will allow prompt manual fire
control by the occupants of the building. This protective system probably would reduce fire
deaths and injuries in homes by 70 to 80 percent; possibly more. If the early fire was not
snuffed out promptly at least there would be ample time to escape. But both systems would
tend to greatly reduce the reliance on the remote fire departments.

PART 3 THE BACKGROUND

WHY THE IONIZATION DEVICE HAS A 50% TO 80% FAILURE RATE
During 1965 manufacturers of a new type of fire detector called a Product of Combustion
POC detector began to advertise the devices within the Fire Journal of the NFPA. Initially this
device had been named a Product of Combustion (POC) detector because it was realized at the
time that the device did not detect real (visible) smoke. It detected aerosols that were at or near the
atomic level, far below the visible range.

Page!4

UL CALIBRATION TEST HAS ZERO PERTINENCE TO REAL WORLD FIRES

Initially the only testing of the ability of the ionization device to warn of smoke created by
smoldering fires was the UL Test Chamber. Within the test chamber a blower delivers fresh air
directly across a smoldering wick causing the wick to grow hot. Because the wick is glowing hot the
right sized particles (near atomic sized aerosols) are created. These aerosols are then delivered
directly into the detection chamber of the device before any agglomeration (binding together) can
occur. This calibration test had zero pertinence to the way the device would perform in the
real world. But on this most inadequate basis the device was approved for the purpose of
detecting smoke from a smoldering fire. To approve a device intended to protect human lives based
on very inadequate testing should be considered a felony.
Residential fire death rate increases nearly 20 percent over 1984 residential
death rate with over 100 million smoke detectors installed in American homes
Source: NFPA Fire Journal, November 1986, page 44

THE DEVICE DETECTS AEROSOLS, NOT SMOKE

A nuclear material is at the heart of the ionization device. Usually there is one microcurie of
Americium 241within the device. Americium emits the nucleus of the hydrogen atom, the smallest of
the atoms. Because it lacks an electron it is electrically charged and called an ion. One microcurie
of Americium 241 emits ions at the rate of 37,000 per second. An atom (or ion) is mind blowing
minute. This discharge of an enormous number of atomic sized particles creates an electrical current
across the detection chamber which is open to the atmosphere. Because the electrical current is
being created by a very large number of incredibly minute particles, only a very large number of
equally minute and numerous particles entering the detection chamber can interfere with the current
flow. A hot flaming fire can produce the incredibly small particles called aerosols that will cause the
device to sound. A smoldering type fire will not. Overcooked roasts, burning toast and very hot
showers also create the aerosols that will trip the device. That is why the device false alarms, things
other than fire will create the aerosols that will produce an alarm. This is why the ionization device
cannot be installed too close to the kitchen.
THE NFPA/UL COMBINE CONNED THE FIRE CHIEFS
The makers of the ionization type so called smoke detector blatantly lied about the ability of
their devices to reliably warn of fire. The performance lies began during 1965 and continued into
1980. Some of the false ads that appeared within the Fire Journal magazine of the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) are attached and are part of this report. (See six attached ads)
The Makers of the ionization devices were able to get the device certified by Underwriters
Laboratories (UL). The tests that qualified the devices for certification were inadequate and
dishonest. Thus the ionization devices were sold to the fire chiefs with inadequate and falsified
testing by UL and blatant and persistent performance lies delivered via the NFPA Fire Journal. Here
is a pertinent comment:
Underwriters Laboratories is, so to speak, in bed with the smoke alarm manufacturers.
Source: Richard Taylor, Senior Partner, Taylor and Martino, Mobile AL., August, 2009.
FIRE OFFICIALS PROMOTE THE FLAWED DEVICES
Due to the false performance claims which received a measure of credibility by appearing in
the Fire Journal and by displaying the UL Logo, most fire officials nationally began to promote and
help sell the devices. Many fire officials, believing the performance lies, petitioned their local
legislatures to enact ordinances and laws mandating installations in homes, apartment houses,
nursing homes, hotels and motels. More serious, the fire officials were helping to put dangerous
devices into homes. Hundreds of thousands of people were eventually killed and injured when the
fraudulent devices failed to sound as smoke, flames and toxic gases became deadly.

Page!5

FIRE OFFICIALS BEGIN TO REALIZE THE DEVICE IS A KILLER

Approximately 10 years after the fraudulent performance ads began in the Fire Journal the
fire officials began to realize that the devices had serious problems. For one, they false alarmed so
excessively that often they were intentionally deactivated. Secondly, at the time the fire death rate
had failed to go down indicating something was seriously wrong. To illustrate this problem I provide a
quote confirming that government officials became aware of the flawed nature of the device years
ago.
We put 50 million smoke detectors in buildings in America in a two year period and our
fire loss and death rate goes up. Were having a little trouble explaining these things.
Statement by Gordon Vickery, former head of the U.S. Fire Administration.
Source: Fire Engineering Magazine, September 1980.

THE ONE MILLION DOLLAR LIVE FIRE TEST PROGRAM

During 1978 the IAFC and the California Fire Chiefs Association (Cal-Chiefs) conducted
an extensive fire test program to determine the ability of ionization type detectors to reliably provide
an early warning when smoke or flames appeared. This research project cost more than a million
dollars and tested the devices with live fires (smoldering and flaming) within real homes. The testing
confirmed that the ionization device was so unreliable as to constitute an endangerment to the
occupants, especially when asleep. Following the testing, the man in charge of the testing, John
Gerard, Fire Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department made the following assessment of the test
program results.
Initially, following the IAFC/Cal-Chiefs test program the intent was to warn the public that the
ionization device was flawed and often deadly. Both the IAFC and the Cal-Chiefs created reports
(two reports) that would have alerted the public to the fraud. Also, Chief Gerard met with fire officials
in Salt Lake City and prepared a video, also for the purpose of warning the public regarding the
flawed warning device. However, the reports and the video were never released to the public. They
were buried. No doubt there were several reasons for the cover-up. But apparently the fire officials
became fearful that by exposing the fraud they would also be exposing themselves to retribution,
possibly even criminal charges. By 1970 the time the reports had been completed fire officials had
been helping to sell these phony smoke detectors to the public for about 10 years. Thousands of
fire deaths and injuries had already occurred due to failures to warn. So, the two reports and the
video were buried and decades of a cover-up began.
John C. Gerard, Fire Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department cited national
statistics showing battery powered devices have a 50 to 80 percent failure rate.
Source: Fire Chief Magazine, January 1980

Page!6

THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF THE IONIZATION DEVICE

The ionization device has three fundamental flaws that render it so inadequate for its role
that one must conclude that it is an anti-protection tool because it became a barrier to real and
reliable protection. Because both the NFPA and UL helped the makers of the device market it, and
because it was the cheapest of the available smoke and fire detectors, nearly all homes became
equipped with this device. Hundreds of thousands of preventable fire deaths and injuries have been
the end result of this abomination called a smoke detector. The three fundamental flaws of the
ionization device are:
1. The device is incapable of detecting real (large particulate) smoke. Thus a
smoldering type fire can be producing deadly levels of smoke and toxic gases for
an hour, sometimes more than two hours if flaming does not occur, with the
ionization device failing to warn. Of course, a prolonged smoldering fire will
eventually produce a deadly environment.
2. The device cannot detect aged smoke from a flaming fire. When the early and
small flaming fire is not very close to the ionization device the combustion particles
(aerosols) are diluted as they spread in all directions. When the fire grows larger the
concentration of aerosols increases and they move more rapidly toward the
detection device. In time the fire becomes large enough to cause the device to
sound. But by then the time available to round up the kids and leave the home may
be critically short. The flaming fire can become deadly super-fast. Often the
responding firefighters report the detectors were sounding when they arrived. But
that does not mean that they sounded before the occupants were subjected to life
threatening conditions..

3. The ionization device is especially prone to false alarm. The device may false
alarms so frequently that it is intentionally deactivated.
AGED SMOKE AND COOL SMOKE FAIL TO CAUSE AN ALKARM
Whereas a hot flaming fire will create the incredibly large number of incredibly small
aerosols needed to trip the device, when the flaming fire is still small and the ionization device is not
close to the fire, there may be a delayed alarm. As the combustion products move along a cool
ceiling the temperature drops fast and the minute aerosols agglomerate into large particles much as
water vapor will be converted into rain drops as the moist air rises along a mountain range. When
the hot combustion gases and minute particles from a flaming fire cool it becomes what is called
aged smoke.
Thick (visible) smoke from a smoldering fire and aged smoke from a flaming fire have
similar characteristics; they will fail to cause the ionization device to sound. The smoldering fire
requires considerable time to impair and to kill. The flaming fire can kill with amazing speed. That is
why a delayed alarm of a flaming fire can be quickly deadly. Both conditions can kill before the
firefighters arrive.
WHERE MOST FIRES OCCUR THE PROTECTION IS ZERO
One measures of the incompetence and arrogance of those who continue to lie to the public
regarding this device is the solution provided for the kitchen. More fires originate in the kitchen than
in any other room in the home. So, for 50 years the fire officials have been content to protect the
home solely with the detector type that cannot be installed in the kitchen because of the false alarm
problem. California homes are nearly 100% not protected against kitchen fires because there is
reluctance to tell the families the truth about its performance capabilities. To do so might raise
questions where the answers are embarrassing. This is a protect yourself, let the children burn
mentality.
It is truly alarming . . . it is so stunning and so horrifying and it is so hard to believe that its
something the people just dont know. Most smoke detectors dont detect deadly smoke
Source: Courtney Stewart, Senior editor, The Hook, Charlottesville, VA, July 2008

PART 4 THE CSFM REPORT

Page!7

THE DILEMMA FOR THE CALIFORNIA STATE FIRE MARSHAL

By 2010 the office of the California State Fire Marshal had been promoting and helping to
sell defective so-called smoke detectors for more than 30 years following the IAFC/Cal-Chiefs
testing of 1978. Because the 1978 tests proved the ionization device had a 50 to 80 percent failure
rate (as stated by Chief John Gerard,) the number of deaths and injuries within California has to
have been enormous. Making matters worse, many letters and reports had been sent to the CSFMs
office warning of the defects of the device and requesting that the public be informed of the dangers.
These warnings had been ignored. Because the CSFM specifically certified the flawed devices as
being reliable, clearly there would be major repercussions when the truth came out. But, the truth
was gradually being outed. A number of legal actions for wrongful deaths had been filed and won.
Some fire officials had left the ranks and were warning the public about the endangerment.
Live fire testing at Texas A&M University was confirming that the device was a killer.
Engineering Professor Russell had been installing these devices in a home and then creating fires
while monitoring the performances of fire and smoke detectors. Routinely the ionization device failed
to respond to smoke. Because the state fire marshal had ignored the warnings and had stubbornly

refused to provide the truth to the people, full disclosure of the consequences of this fraud during
2011 could have been disastrous for the CSFM and many other fire officials.
So the CSFM faced a dilemma. If she told the truth to the people many would question why
she had not warned them of the problem years earlier and saved many lives. But if she continued to
hide the truth the final result might be even worse. That is when the CSFMs Task Force report was
made.
After an hour, we had 50 percent of the smoke detectors, ionization smoke detectors, not
sounding. You saw it. I saw it, our eyes dont lie. The smoke was there it was scientifically
measured on both sides of the smoke detectors. Its clearly thick and the smoke detectors
were not going off. I call that a big problem. Their (ULs) science isnt any good.
Source: Dr B. Don Russell, Texas A&M University, Texas, USA
CSFM REPORT ACTUALLY CONFIRMS IT TO BE A SCAM
The CSFM assembled officials and others that could be harmed if the full truth emerged. A
claimed analysis was conducted. A report was prepared. The obvious intent of the CSFMs report
was to counter the information and facts that were being developed and disseminated that would
eventually force the fire officials to provide full disclosure to the people. As will be revealed within my
report, the CSFMs report does not succeed in hiding the reality of this fraud. In addition there is a
great abundance of other available facts and information confirming the selling program is nothing
but a very deadly scam, such as is evidenced by the following quote:
"A smoke detector that activates 19 minutes after smoke reaches its sensing
chamber is like an airbag that deploys 19 minutes after a car accident."
Source: Judge David E Schonthaler, Mercer v BRK trial finding for the victims, May 1998
THE CSFM REPORT IS AN INCOMPETENT COVER-UP
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has recently confirmed in writing
that the ionization device has in excess of a 50% failure rate; which is horribly high for a device
protecting children. The problem for the CSFM and those officials who gave their names to the latest
cover-up attempt is that - the information presented within the CSFMs report actually supports
the claim that the devices are often the basic cause of fire deaths and injuries.
Ionization smoke alarms are dangerous because they lull people into a false sense of
security. Source: David Isaac, member, Australian Standards association. 2007

Page!8

THE TRUTH LIES IN THE OMISSIONS

The CSFMs report is irrelevant to a determination of whether or not the device is an honest or
dishonest device because it omits the most important factors. It was not what was covered by the
report but rather what was not reported that was most significant. Below I comment on some of
the serious omissions within the CSFMs report. Many additional omissions could be added.
1. For 16 years the makers of the ionization devices advertised within in the NFPA Fire
Journal that their devices would sound before smoke or flames appear. These lies were
never challenged by the IAFC or the CSFM. This is an omission from the CSFMs report
2. During 1974, Phase 1 of the federally financed Dunes Tests was under the control of
Richard Bukowski, an engineer employed by UL. During the testing on average the
ionization device required in excess of one hour to respond to the smoke created by
smoldering fires. Thus by the time of the Dunes Tests Phase 1 was completed, there was
clear evidence confirming that the manufacturers had advertised blatantly false
performance claims for about the prior 10 years. Therefore there was evidence that the
makers committed fraud and UL was a co-conspirator in this fraud. The CSFM report

ignored this criminal activity. (A report providing details of typical Dunes fire tests 2 and
10 is attached.)
3. After the Dunes Tests confirmed that the ionization device was essentially useless for
warning of smoldering fires, to save face and to allow the continued selling of the device,
UL created a fraudulent smoldering fire test putting Ponderosa Pine sticks on a hot plate
and raising the temperature to approximately 700 degrees Fahrenheit. (A description of
this UL fraudulent test for smoldering fires is attached)
4. Because of the performance of the device in the non-pertinent test chamber, the makers of
the devices claimed that the device would detect smoke in a home before the obscuration
rose above 4%. It was a lie.
5. After the 1958 Lady of Angels school fire in Chicago (95 pupils and teachers killed) the
Operation School Burning Tests were conducted by the Los Angeles Fire Department.
These tests eventually led to the IAFC setting 4% smoke density as the maximum tolerable
level that would permit safe passage along an exit path. However the flaming fire tests at
UL allowed the smoke to rise as high as 37% (about 9 times the IAFC tolerable level) with
the devices a mere 17.7 feet from the fire with no obstructions between. Yet, consistently
the fire officials have seen no problem associated with the ability to detect flaming fires
while claiming it provided adequate time to safely leave a burning home.
6. When the Prudential Building burned during 1986 the ionization type so-called smoke
detectors in the elevator lobbies on floors 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 failed to operate
even though thick smoke enveloped them for about 2 hours. Yet they all tested OK after the
fire was extinguished. The reasons why these devices failed to sound and the potential
consequences was not discussed in the SFM report. (A report on the Prudential Building
fire is attached.)
7. The ionization device can detect near atomic sized aerosols but cannot detect combustion
particles in the visible range (smoke). When fire inspectors test installed ionization
detectors in apartment houses they do so with a spray can that emits he right size (near
atomic size) particles. Thus the fire inspectors test provides a false positive test and the
occupants are assured their devices are working. But when a smoldering fire develops the
device likely will not sound for as long as an hour, often longer. This routine practice of
deceiving of the public with a false smoke detector tester has not been discussed within
the CSFMs report. (An ad for the smoke detector tester is attached.)
I think the ionization alarm is responsible for as many as 10,000 deaths since 1990
Source: Chief Jay Fleming, Boston Fire department. December 2007

Page!9

PART 5 - AN ENGINEERS ANALYSIS OF THE CSFM REPORT

Page 3 of the report contains this statement: When people were in homes with
interconnected smoke alarms the alarms sounded in more than half (53%) of the fires . . .
COMMENT: Interconnected systems are not the most common type. Rather, they are better quality
and more complete systems. Yet, according to the report, they sounded during only 53% of the fires.
That equates to a criminal level detector performance. Why hasnt the CSFM warned the people
about this scandalous high failure rate?
On pages 2 and 3 of the report the various data indicating the percent of the time the
ionization devices sounded under fire conditions seem to conflict with each other. The problem is that
once one lie is told it leads to additional lies to conceal the first one.
On page 4 references are made to the UL 217 standard. The implication is that when a
smoke detecting device complies with the UL 217 standard the device is reliable. But UL is currently
planning to revise the 217 standard because it is allowing excessively high smoke densities.

Page!10

On pages 7, 8 and 9 there is an extensive discussion of the nuisance alarms which often
result in the detectors being intentionally deactivated. This discussion confirms that the ionization
device, which detects microscopic (near atomic sized) aerosols, has a high rate of false alarming.
This discussion in turn confirms that the CSFM is well aware of this defect that results in
deactivations. Obviously, deactivations result in fire deaths. Knowing that the false alarming problem
results in fire deaths, one has to wonder why the office of the CSFM has been helping to sell this
device for about 50 years when better technology (that seldom false alarms) has been available all
along.
On page 11 references are made to families failing to test their alarms every month. An
honest and reliable smoke detector should not be so prone to failure that monthly testing is needed.
One wonders if the CSFM has warned the people that pushing the test button is a very inadequate
test. And has she notified the public that the spray can fire inspectors use to test ionization devices
(that is labeled a smoke detector tester) provides a false test? That deceptive test leaves the
occupants falsely believing the device will detect real smoke?
On page 12 the CSFM report states that fire service personnel are not trained to collect
samples of damaged smoke alarms that will be submitted for analysis This is an interesting
comment. After 50 years of smoke alarm failures to warn and fire deaths resulting, it appears to me
that the CSFM would have been anxious to find out why they are false alarming and why they are
failing to warn. It is my belief that rather than trying to collect the devices following a fire many fire
officials are intentionally sweeping the charred and deformed devices out with the trash to prevent
lawyers identifying them for future legal actions.
On page 12 it is reported that 97% of all home fires are not reported to fire departments. To
me this seems excessively high but it also implies that the number of smoke detector failure is far
higher than being reported. When a house fills with smoke and the device fails to sound the
occupants will often correct the problem and not make a report. Then the failure is not documented.
On page13 the CSFM report states that when their smoke detectors sound, only 8% percent
of the time do the occupants assume there is a fire. Apparently 92% of the time they assume it is
only one more false alarm. It appears that the CSFM is confirming that she has been helping to sell a
device so prone to false alarming that many occupants will ignore the warning. Then many will
deactivate the protection leaving a home unprotected
On page 14 it is noted that California Law requires that the so-called smoke detector must
comply with UL 217. This would be an excellent requirement if UL had not falsified fire tests to help
sell a dangerous device.
On page 17 it is reported that steam from a shower and cooking can trigger a false alarm.
That is because these conditions create the near atomic sized aerosols that will trigger the device.
Unfortunately, a smoldering fire that produces real (visible) smoke and deadly toxic gases will not
trigger the device until the smolder evolves into a flaming fire, or nearly so, at which time it may be
too late to escape.
On page 19 the CSFM report states that the polyurethane foam in residential upholstered
furniture and mattresses are two leading causes of the deaths and injuries. That is true enough. But
knowing this, why hasnt the CSFM delivered advisories to all California families warning them that
the ionization device is unable to detect the visible smoke created by a smoldering fire such as one
ignited by a lit cigarette on a sofa. Granted, after an hour, perhaps two, that smoldering area may
heat up to be nearing the ignition point of the material. Then the device will finally sound but it may
be too late.
On page 20 the CSFM report says it is the responsibility of the occupants of a home to
maintain and test their devices. Fine, but the CSFM has not yet explained to the public that the
primary cause of failures to warn is the inability of the device to detect real (visible) smoke and
that when the device is not close to the early flaming fire the warning may be dangerously late.

Page!11

On Page 21 it is reported that 54% of the time when a fire occurs in a home the detectors
had missing or disconnected batteries. So, one could ask the CSFM this question; why havent you
(as Californias the No. 1 protector of lives against fire) advised the public that the ionization device
is unreliable and false alarm prone and therefore recommended better protection?
On page 22 under item 6 it is claimed that modern furnishings have reduced escape times
from 17 minutes to 3 minutes. This is nonsense promoted by so-called experts that are either not
very bright or else willing to make ludicrous claims that in some way justify the ongoing fire death
rate. Check out videos of flashover conditions produced long ago where flaming fires produced
flashover conditions within 5 minutes. How could there have been a 17 minute escape time when
actual fire testing had confirmed that flashover conditions were occurring in less than 5 minutes. The
truth is that fires that initiate as flaming fire were able to destroy lives extremely fast when the selling
of the ionization devices were first being promoted during the mid-1960s. Remember the Cocoanut
Grove Night Club fire of 1942 where 492 people died in a flashover fire, within a fireproof building
no less? How much escape time did they have?
On page22, item 8 reports that during smoldering fires the photoelectric detector can warn
sooner than the ionization device. This is an understatement that misleads. The truth is that the
photoelectric device likely will sound within one minute after smoke enters the detection chamber
whereas during actual fire tests (Dunes Tests Series 1) the average time for the ionization device
exceeded one hour after real smoke (not aerosols) entered the detection chamber. Many times it
failed to sound at all.
On page 23 it is reported that a single smoke alarm in most existing homes will not provide
adequate protection. True enough. So why did the NFPA gut the original NFPA 74 Code (1966) that
required detectors in every room and rewrite it to put credence to the con men who claimed (at that
time) one ionization device was superior protection to a full house of inferior detectors?
On page 24 there are perhaps the most honest statements in the whole report. It states,
There is a lack of data points collected regarding the performance and history of smoke
alarms associated with fatal residential fires. A review of NFPA 921 reveals little or no
standardization of approach to examining smoke alarm effectiveness as part of a post fire
origin and cause investigation, so even a few data points collected is subject to individual
bias and inconsistent collection. Of course the NFPA does not want to collect honest data on the
relationship of the ionization device and fire deaths. Such knowledge could result with legal actions
against the NFPA. As paid protectors of the families the CSFM had a Duty of Care to investigate the
relationship between a defective warning device and fire deaths, but even the letters and reports
sent to the CSFM warning of detector failures were ignored.
On page 25, item 5 asks for new regulations to prohibit the installation of ionization devices
within 20 feet of any cooking device. Why is the top fire official of California unable to create proper
and needed regulations without being a captive of the NFPA?
On Pages 24 to 29 The CSFM report lists a great many recommendations, mainly for
someone else to do. So I ask these questions. Aside from making these recommendations in the
2011 report, has the CSFM written to the various organizations that supposedly will do what is
recommended? If letters or reports have gone out from the office of the CSFM relative these
recommendations please send copies to me. If the CSFM has enacted or completed any of the
recommendations that could be accomplished by the CSFM, I would appreciate being brought up to
date on the changes or improvements. Has anything actually been accomplished since the CSFMs
report was finalized during 2011? Or is the listing of recommendations merely an effort to convince
the readers that the office of the CSFM is seriously concerned about the safety of the public? Has
the CSFM at least notified the public that more fires start in the kitchen than in any other room in the
home and that photoelectric smoke detectors (preferably with built-in heat detectors) are necessary
in the kitchen? This would be at least one easy step toward common sense fire safety for the home.

We have five million ionization smoke alarms in this state that may fail in the time of need.
Source: Roger Johnson, Indiana State Fire Marshal, September 2007
CONCLUSIONS
These are my conclusions as a professional Fire Protection Engineer.
1. The ionization so-called smoke detector has in excess of a 50% failure rate and is
not a satisfactory device for installation in homes, especially homes where small
children live. I believe that approximately 40,000 children have been wrongfully
burned to death when the defective device failed to warn in time during house fires.
2. Approximately 95% of all fire deaths (due to building fires) are caused by home
fires.
3. Underwriters Laboratories falsified fire tests to help those selling ionization
devices.
4. The NFPA cooperated with those who were defrauding and endangering the public.
5. The California State Fire Marshal has failed to properly inform the public of the
limitations of the ionization device and because of that many fire deaths and
injuries have occurred.
6. A complete fire detection system, including honest smoke detectors with built-in
heat detectors, plus a reliable means to control the early fire would dramatically
reduce fire deaths and injuries, possibly by an excess of 70%.
7. For many years real and superior smoke detectors have been available but few were
sold because fire officials were telling the public that the ionization device offered
adequate protection. It did not.
8. The spray can that is labeled a smoke detector tester does not provide an honest
test of the ionization device. Fire inspectors deliver false security when they test
with these devices.
9. When people die or are injured in a house fire and the fire investigator reports to
the media that the detectors were not working detectors the reporters assume
that they were not maintained properly; therefore they assume the fault lies with the
victims. However, probably in most cases the failure to warn was due to the
inherent flaws of the device, not the fault to the victims. This device is NOT a
working smoke detector the day it exits the factory door.
10. The CPSC has had full information regarding the dishonesty related to the
ionization marketing program but so far has failed to require a recall or to issue
adequate warnings to the public. Therefore, this agency bears some of the
responsibility for the ongoing fire deaths and injuries.
I call for the immediate removal of the fraudulent and deadly ionization so-called smoke
alarms from all stores and homes before more people are needlessly maimed or killed.
Source: Marc McGinn, Chief of the Albany, California Fire Department, July, 2010

Page!12

PART 6 - WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE WILL BURN CHILDREN?

THERE IS A LEGAL DUTY TO REPORT A CRIME
Today there is an enormous amount of evidence to confirm that the marketing of the
ionization device was and is a criminal operation and the deaths and injuries are into the hundreds of

thousands. Much of the information can be found on these two web sites:
www.smokealarmwarning.org and www.firecrusade.com. About 150 children are
being either killed or injured throughout the United States each week because the
smoke detector fraud is still being kept from the people. Those who know of the
dangers associated with this deadly device have both a moral and legal obligation to
report and explain the scam to authorities, especially to the U.S. justice department.
Failure to do so could result in criminal charges. By law if you know of a crime,
especially one so deadly, and fail to report it or, even worse, help sell the device, you
may be charged with a crime.
One of the cleverest and most lucrative cons ever pulled off in America
has been executed by some of the smoke detector promoters.
Source: Patton Report No. 49, The Smoke Detector Fraud, October 1976 by R M. Patton
THE FACTS ARE IRREFUTABLE
It has been proven many times over that the ionization device has an excess of a 50%
failure rate. The CPSC has now admitted it is writing. Doubters need only go to Texas A&M and
witness fire tests by Professor Russell where smoldering fires fail to cause the device to sound. The
Aquarium test is a test where the ionization device is put into an aquarium while foam rubber
smolders until the smoke becomes so thick that it is difficult to even see the device; yet it sits there
enveloped in smoke and remains silent. The reality is the device is a fraud and the evidence is so
clear that only those who fear the truth will deny the truth.
The New Zealand Safety Councils positionis: ionization
smoke alarms should bebanned from sale in New Zealand.
Source: David Calvert, New Zealand Safety Council, June 2007

Page!13

WEB SITES CONTAIN THE PROOFS

The web sites listed above contain all the evidence needed to prove the device to be a killer.
No one of reasonable intelligence can deny that when a warning device intended to warn of a fire
fails to warn human lives are at risk. With that knowledge, one has to wonder why seemingly good
quality fire officials would help hide the truth from the public. With about 300,000 or more house fires
a year it cannot be denied that thousands of children have been killed and horribly injured by the
failure of the CSFM and other fire officials to provide full disclosure to the public. Probably most of
those who helped hide the dangers from the public have children of their own. So how could they lie
about this evil? How could they sleep nights knowing that when a neighbors home begins to burn
the warning device they promoted will likely fail to warn? Here is what a trial attorney had to say
about this problem.
The point about smoke detectors is that they are not neutral; theyre a positive evil.
Some of the ads are outright lies. If a manufacturer lies to you and says that
your home is safe, then it should have to pay for damages that result.
Source: Lawyers Alert magazine article dated July 8, 1985. Quotes from
Edward M Swartz, attorney, after winning a case against Sears for
selling defective smoke detectors that killed three children.
WHAT KIND OF PERSON SIGNED THE CSFM REPORT?
When fire officials saw dead bodies carried from homes how did they justify their silence?
What kind of person signed his/her name to that CSFM report? As a man who raised three children, I
consider any person who believes that a 50% or worse failure rate (for a device protecting children)

to be either stupid or incredibly corrupt. Will those who cooperated in the CSFMs cover-up be tried
as criminals and see prison time? In my opinion they should. I believe that at least three of those
listed as members of the CSFM Report voted against adopting the report. They should not be
considered to be among those who helped cover-up the crimes.
Recommending, selling, or installing ionization smoke alarms, a criminal act of negligence?
Source: Adrian Butler, co-founder of the World Fire Safety Foundation and its web site. 2007

PART 7 - REAL SOLUTIONS TO HOME FIRE DEATHS ARE BEING IGNORED

KITCHEN FIRES CAN BE DRAMATICALLY REDUCED
The very best protection for the kitchen fire would be a fire sprinkler head, 1/8th to 1/4th inch
orifice depending on existing pipe size and pressure within the home. It should be rated 286 degrees
Fahrenheit arranged so the spray will hit the stove top. The very high temperature rating would make
sure it would not open except during an actual fire (a high temperature rating would not compromise
the protection but it would allow a stovetop fire to be extinguished manually before the sprinkler is
activated and water is discharged). A kitchen sprinkler could be fed off the cold water pipe below the
kitchen sink. A very small orifice would be needed because of limited flow from the pipe which may
be only 3/8 inch, but fire control and a warning would not require much water in a fine spray. Think
how many out of control kitchen fires this could prevent.
PRACTICAL RESIDENTIAL SPRINKLERS WERE CREATED AND DEFEATED
During the early 1970s I researched and developed criteria for protecting homes with an
engineered residential fire sprinkler system. I installed such systems at cost reductions that
sometimes were as great as 90 percent. Then Phil C. Favro, the California State Fire Marshal at the
time, incorporated many of my engineering advancements into the California Voluntary Standards
for Residential Sprinkler Systems, dated January 1982. Although this California standard would
allow fire sprinkler cost savings from 50% to perhaps 75%, very few California fire officials were
interested in it. Eventually a successor to Marshal Favro killed it. Whereas the fire chiefs say they
promote fire sprinkler systems for homes the Cal-Chiefs have ignored a solution that would reduce
protection costs by much more than 50%.

Page!14

NEAR 100% HOME FIRE SAFETY COULD BE ACHIEVED

There is no limit to the steps that the CSFM could take to improve home safety if there was a
real interest in in reducing fire deaths. The technology is available to provide a fire detection system
that will provide a near 100% prompt and reliable alert to both flames and smoke; but NFPA
regulations were altered to essentially ban that protection. If the occupants received a guaranteed
early warning of fire or smoke and were provided with an effective and easy to use fire control
system (small hose and fog nozzle) nearly all house fires could be terminated by the occupants
before the first fire truck arrived at the site. This would save many lives including the lives of many
firefighters. But a major reduction in home fires would reduce the need for close spaced public fire
departments. So far many of the practical solutions to home fires have failed to generate interest by
the IAFC, the Cal-Chiefs organization and the CSFM.
Smoke detectors were an unknown term to 99 percent of the population 10 years
ago. Today, millions of single family dwellings have them, yet there is no
reduction in loss of life from fire. This paradox has not been explained.
Source: Fire Chief Magazine, January, 1980.
WHY THE CHILDREN BURN

FEMA says that the annual losses from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes
and other natural disasters combined in the United States average just a fraction of those
from fires. (Source: Fire in the United States, 13th Edition, Federal Emergency Management
Agency Page 1, Oct 2004) Structural engineers are able to design incredibly tall buildings so
that they can withstand all normal stresses including weight and wind shear. A building
seldom collapses due to inadequate engineering. Unfortunately, fire protection engineering
leaves buildings in America ready to burn at an instants notice. Fire loss and fire deaths in
buildings could be reduced by at least 70% perhaps by greater than 95%. But there is one
major problem preventing a major reduction in fire losses. The solutions would significantly
reduce dependence on the remote fire departments for fire control and would also
dramatically reduce the excessive profits of those industries that exploit the fire problem. As
long as profits, perks, pay checks and bureaucratic prestige outweigh the lives of children
the fires will burn brightly in America.
Richard M. Patton,
Professional Engineer, Ohio (retired)
Professional Fire Protection Engineer (CA)
Author, The American Home is a Firetrap
Rmpatton7@gmail.com
September 10, 2015

Page!15

Note: The World Fire Safety Foundation thanks Mr Patton for granting permission to put this report
on its website. Minor typographical and grammatical edits have been made.