G.R. No.

L-2189

November 3, 1906

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL.,DefendantsAppellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to
overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as
defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four
years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine,
and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of
them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor,
and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said
appellants to pay their proportionate share of the costs
of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in
the event of insolvency and failure to pay their
respective fines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that
during the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was

organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of

Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and
establishing in its stead a government to be known as
the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one
Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this
conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the
military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the
furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward
the end of December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to
Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the
steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the
Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city of
Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was
perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in
Hongkong that at these meetings new members were
taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the
enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of
money by national and private loans to carry on the
campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and
commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were
granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the
officers thus appointed to raise troops and take
command thereof; and that the conspirators did in fact
take the field and offered armed resistance to the
constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in
their design of overthrowing the Government because of
their failure to combat successfully with the officers of
the law who were sent against them and of the failure of
the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

It further appears from the evidence that the appellant

Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was
an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote
and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that,
to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him
secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte,
Bautista was present, taking part in several of the
above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans of the
conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at
one of these meetings Bautista, in answer to a question
of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparations
had been made and that he "held the people in
readiness." chanrobles virtual law library
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon,
united with the conspirators through the agency of one
Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to have been a prime
leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of
Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and
nominate and appoint certain officials, including a
brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed
revolutionary forces; that at the time when the
conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of
Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the said
Muoz whereat plans were made for the coming
insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muoz
offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the
signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing
the troops; and that at a later conference he assured
the said Muoz that he had things in readiness,
meaning thereby that he had duly organized in
accordance with the terms of his

commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united
himself with the conspirators; that he had accepted the
appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of
the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking
any further action in the matter, and merely because he
did not wish to vex his friend Muoz by refusing to do
so, and that when Muoz offered him the appointment
as brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone," and
that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila
organizing the conspiracy at that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
These statements, however (except in so far as they
corroborate the testimony of Muoz as to the fact that
he had several interviews with Puzon at which plans
were entered into for the advancement of the cause of
the conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the
light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself at
the time when he was first arrested, part of which is as
follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence,
and occupation? - A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in
Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age;
married; by profession a teacher of primary and
secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion,
No. 195, district of
Quiapo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not

know him, but by name,
yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have organized

absolutely nothing in respect to this
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in

these Islands and with what object he came here? And if
you know it to be true, through whom did you get such
information? - A. In the first place I had notice of his
coming to the Islands as well as his object by reading
the newspapers of Manila, and secondly because J. R.
Muoz told me the same on one occasion when I was in
his house to visit
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give

you any commission for it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said
employment and although they gave me an order to
organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had
neither the confidence nor the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. Did you acquire this information through any other

person? - A. No, sir; I have no more information than
that which I have
mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by
Ricarte? - A. Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in
this organization, and who is it who invited you to join
it? - A. J. R. Muoz, who is general of division of this new
organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking
me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of
signal corps, to which I, on account of his request and in
view of the fact that the said Muoz is a friend of mine

Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor

the will to carry out what was intrusted to you, why did
you accept employment as general of the brigade? - A. I
accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a
friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the
obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not
deny that he made this statement, but he attempted to
explain it away by saying that when he made it he was
so exited that he did not know just what he was saying.
He does not allege that improper means were taken to
procure the confession, and it was proven at the trial
that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the
result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or
promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to
be an intelligent man and was for eighteen years a
school-teacher and later a telegraph operator under the
Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he
held a commission as an officer in the signal corps of
the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and

intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he

was so excited as not to know what he was saying when
he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it
inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record
in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence
against him in the light of the decisions of this court in
the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los
Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio
Nuez et al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United
States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528),
and United States vs.Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off.
Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished
from these and like cases by the fact that the record
clearly disclose that the accused actually and
voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and
in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of
conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the
appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
In the first of these cases - the United States vs. De los
Reyes - the accused was charged with treason, and the
court found that the mere acceptance of a commission
by the defendant, nothing else being done either by
himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of
treason within the meaning of the law, but the court
further expressly held that -

That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the

playing of the game of government like children, the
secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags
and seals and commission, all on proper, for the
purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the
visionary . . . should not be dignified by the name of
treason.
In the second case - the United States vs. Nuez et al. -wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the
court held that, aside from the possession of
commissions in an insurgent band, there was no
evidence to show that it they had committed the crime
and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never
united with any party of brigands and never had been in
any way connected with such parties unless the
physical possession of these appointments proved such
relation," and that it appeared that each one of the
defendants "were separately approached at different
times by armed men while working in the field and were
virtually compelled to accept the
commissions." chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it
was contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he
was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a
commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion
that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such
confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine
laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of
such an appointment, when it is not shown that the
possessor executed some external act by the virtue of
the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the

guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique

Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record
was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant
was found at his house."chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et
al. there was testimony that four appointments of
officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in
the house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in
said case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere
possession of the documents of this kind is not sufficient
to convict," and held, furthermore, that there was
"evidence in the case that at the time these papers
were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he
went to one of the assistant councilmen of the barrio in
which lived, a witness for the Government, showed him
the envelope, and stated to him he had received these
papers; that he didn't know what they were and
requested this councilman to open them. The coucilman
did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it
to the councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this
envelope contained the appointments in question and
that the appellant did not act under the appointment
but immediately reported the receipt of them to the
authorities." chanrobles virtual law library
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might
appoint a person in no wise connected with them to
some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that
such person would afterwards accept the commission
and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible
that such an appointment might be forwarded in the
mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of

the person thus nominated, and that such appointment

might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding
all this, the person in whose possession the
appointment was found might be entirely innocent of all
intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized
the conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to
send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not
unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein
it has been proven that such appointments have been
concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the
officers of the law they might be used as evidence
against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is
shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven
that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment
as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact
may properly be taken into consideration as evidence of
his relations with the
conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open
court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason
should be applied in this case, but this court has always
held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal
courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring
to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense
from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional
provision is not applicable in such cases. ( In reBollman,
4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)chanrobles
virtual law library

The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction

of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest
substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds
from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising
funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it
does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of
the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he
received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what
the contents of the bundle was, nor that ever, on any
occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these
bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the
bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he
destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any
dealings with the conspirators in relation to the
conspiracy or the object for which it was
organized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

hereby reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and

sentence before us, in so far as it affects the said
Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his
proportionate share of the costs of both instances de
oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should be
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set
a liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence
of the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco
Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby,
affirmed, except so far as it imposes subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to
pay their respective fines, and, there being no authority
in law of such provision, so much of the sentence as
undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin",
ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y DE LOS SANTOS alias
"Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias
"Romy", CONSTANTINO LENESES Y MARILLANO
alias Alexander Remonte y Marillano alias "Alex
Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior",
defendants, CONSTANTINO LENESES Y
MARILLANO alias "ALEXANDER REMONTE Y
MARILLANO" alias ALEX REMONTE, defendantappellant.

After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance

herewith, when the record will be returned to the trial
court for execution. So ordered.c

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31657 January 31, 1984

G.R. No. L-32264 January 31, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO VENGCO Y DAVID alias "Edwin",
ROGELIO ENCARNACION Y DE LOS SANTOS alias
"Roger Pusa", ROMEO SOLIBA Y REDOBLA alias
"Romy", CONSTANTINO LENESES MARILLANO alias
Alexander Remonte y Marillano alias "Alex
Remonte", and LEON DAVID alias "Junior",
defendants, LEON DAVID alias "Junior", defendantappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Tagalo, Gozar & Associates and Ricafort, Laxamana &
Nacpil Law Office for defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:
hese appeals are interposed by Constantino Leneses
alias "Alex Remonte" and Leon David alias "Junior" who,
together with three others, were charged in Criminal
Case No. 87918, for the murder of Charlie Celadea y
Lim in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XX. The lower court adjudged them guilty thereof, and
sentenced both of them to reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00, and to
pay the costs.
The information filed against said appellants recites:

That on or about the 24th day of August

1967, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, at night time, and with the
use of superior strength to insure and afford
impunity, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one, CHARLIE CELADEA Y LIM, by
then and there stabbing the latter with
bladed and pointed instruments which they
were then armed, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon said CHARLIE CELADEA Y LIM mortal
and fatal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death moments
thereafter. (p. 2, Rollo of L-31657 & L-32264)
The version of the prosecution was unfolded by
prosecution witnesses Go Hong, Rolando Quiane, Purita
Delgado, and Dr. Mariano de Lara, Chief of the MedicoLegal Division, Manila Police Department.
Go Hong testified that in the evening of August 24, 1967
he was in his house at 2815-A Bagac Street, Tondo,
Manila when he heard a commotion outside. Looking out
of the window he saw Charlie Celadea being stabbed
by Edwin Vengco while three others, one of whom he
recognized as appellant Constantino Leneses, were
moving away from the victim, all of them armed with a
dagger, an ice pick and a weapon with pointed blade.

He went out of the house and lifted Celadea from the

ground when he noticed that the latter was bloody in all
parts of his body. The victim was brought to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced
dead upon arrival.
Rolando Quiane testified that about midnight on August
24, 1967 he and his brother were conversing on a
sidewalk along Bagac Street, near the corner of
Corrigidor Street, Tondo, Manila, when a taxicab came
and stopped at the place where they were. Charlie
Celadea alighted from the taxicab. Thereafter, at about
30 meters away, a group of five persons, among whom
were Edwin Vengco and Leon David came towards them.
As there was an incident between Charlie Celadea and
Edwin Vengco three or four nights before, when the
latter chased the former and threw bottles at him,
Quiane invited Charlie Celadea to go with him inside
the apartment where he and his brother were living, to
avoid the group. Celadea would not go with them and
so Quiane and his brother went inside their apartment.
They then heard Charlie Celadea knocking at the door
of, and calling his sister at, the latter's house across the
street. After a while Quiane heard the voice of a girl
Calling for help. Quiane opened the door of the
apartment and saw Charlie Celadea lying down on the
ground bleeding.
The testimony of Rolando Quiane was corroborated by
Go Hong and Purita Delgado who declared that about
midnight of August 24, 1967 while she was sleeping in
the house of "Ate During" the sister of Charlie Celadea,
along Bagac Street, Ate During woke her up and she

heard a commotion outside the house. When she

peeped through the opening of the window, she saw her
"Kuya Charlie" leaning against the wall of the house
being held by two men, one of whom was appellant
Leon David, on his hands. Thereafter, another person
approached the one being held by the two and stabbed
him, followed by two more men who also stabbed him.
There were several thrusts with pointed instruments
hurled at Charlie until one of them ran away, followed
by three others, leaving the tall one who continued
stabbing Charlie, then already prostrate on the ground.
Dr. Mariano de Lara conducted the autopsy on the body
of the deceased and his post-mortem findings show that
the deceased sustained eleven (11) stab wounds mostly
located in the chest and abdomen and one in the back.
Five (5) of the stab wounds were fatal.
The defense of Constantino Leneses alias "Alex
Remonte", is denial and alibi. He contends that earlier in
the afternoon of August 24, 1967, he was at the tailor
shop near Jose Abad Santos Boulevard waiting for a pair
of pants the tailor was making for him. While waiting
there, Edgardo Vengco, Rogelio Encarnacion, Romeo
Soliba and Leon David arrived and invited him to go with
them. They went to the house of Leon David where they
had a drinking spree. He became dead drunk that he
was taken to his house in Balintawak where he stayed
the whole evening unconscious and regained
consciousness only the following morning.
Appellant Leon David denied participation in the crime
committed, contending that only Edwin Vengco, Roger,
Romeo and Alex attacked and killed Charlie Celadea.

He testified that about 10:30 in the evening of August

24, 1967 he went home to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of cigarettes to his mother. He then proceeded to
the house of Edwin Vengco and joined the group,
namely: Vengco, Romy, Roger and Alex in a drinking
spree. Vengco even asked money from him for the
jeepney fares of the three. Knowing Vengco to be a
tough guy and a "siga-siga", he gave the latter money.
After about five minutes, he separated from them and
proceeded to go home. On the way, he saw at a
distance of about eight meters a person being ganged
up by Edwin Vengco and his companions. Vengco and
Alex were stabbing the person with bladed weapons,
while Roger and Romy were holding the hands of the
victim. He shouted at them not to do it and then left the
place because he was afraid that he might be
implicated.
Further, Leon David denied the truth of the testimony of
Purita Delgado who Identified him as one of the persons
who held the victim by his hands when the latter was
being stabbed by Edwin Vengco and his companions.
However, on cross examination, he could not say what
reason or motive could have induced Purita Delgado to
testify falsely against him.
The defense also presented Melquiades Nuque, a taxi
driver, who declared that he was about 20 meters from
the place of the incident which occurred in the evening
of August 24, 1967. He saw Vengco, Alex and the others
assaulting the victim, but appellant Leon David was not
one of them,

Appellants put squarely in issue the credibility of Go

Hong, Rolando Quiane and Purita Delgado averring that
the lower court erred (1) in relying purely on the
testimony of these three witnesses; (2) in not
considering the individual participation of each of the
accused there being no proof of conspiracy; and (3) in
not holding that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is insufficient to convict him.
The trial court committed no error in finding appellants
Constantino Leneses and Leon David guilty of the crime
charged.
1. WE have consistently held that when there is no
showing of improper motive on the part of witnesses for
testifying against an accused, the fact that they are
neighbors, friends or relatives of the victim does not
render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of
full faith and credit. Purita Delgado saw her "Kuya
Charlie" leaning on the wall by the window of the house
of her Ate During about a meter away, being ganged up
by appellants and their companions, when she peeped
through the window. The place was bright because of
the two mercury lamps in front of the house. Go Hong,
husband of Ate During, immediately went to the
assistance of the victim after the assailants had ran
away.
2. As found by the lower court, a circumstance highly
indicative of the guilt is the fact that soon after the
commission of the crime, Leon David left Manila for
Cavitewhere he hid himself until he was arrested on
February 2, 1970. His explanation for hiding that he was
afraid of Edwin Vengco does not impress Us because if

he was really innocent, as he claimed to be, he would

not have gone into hiding and would even tell the
authorities what transpired that evening. The truth is,
he would have no reason to be afraid of anyone,
including Edwin Vengco who has no reason to go after
him, he having done nothing wrong against him. On the
contrary, he was not afraid to shout at Vengco and his
companions not to assault the victim and later to testify
in court with respect to their participation in the
incident.
3. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses have not
been shown to suffer from any inconsistency and/or
contradiction. In fact, the testimony of only one witness,
if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.
(People vs. Argana, 10 SCRA 311). Alibi, which is the
defense of Constantino Leneses, is weak since it is easy
to concoct. Courts view it with caution and accept it only
when proved by positive, clear and convincing evidence.
The positive Identification of appellant Leneses as one
of the perpetrators of the crime dwindles the defense of
alibi.
The crime committed is murder, qualified by abuse of
superior strength. The People's evidence relative to the
commission of the crime, the manner of its perpetration
and the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
not disputed. Appellant Leon David and his witness, the
taxi driver, confirmed these facts. The conspiracy
among therein appellants and their companions is easily
discernible from their conduct. The way in which they
assaulted Charlie Celadea and their conduct sometime

before and immediately after the stabbing, clearly show

that they had agreed to kill him. The rule is that "if it is
proven that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their acts, although
apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them
is proven (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed. by
Niblack, pp. 1402-3; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868,
875). (Cited in People vs. Velez, 58 SCRA 21, 31).
WE agree with the trial court that "no generic
aggravating circumstance was sufficiently proved by the
prosecution, the elements of nighttime, evident
premeditation and treachery, not having been
established by its evidence. On the other hand, no
mitigating circumstance was shown by the evidence of
the defense. The medium of the penalty prescribed for
the offense should be imposed on the accused. The
penalty to be imposed isreclusion perpetua, it being the
medium of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death for murder."
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with the modification that appellants pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P30,000.00. (People vs. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. L-6325152, Dec. 29, 1983)
SO ORDERED.

manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice

of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accusedappellant.

"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured
shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the
government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

DECISION

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned

and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

For automatic review is the decision [1] promulgated

on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.
6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.

The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3

Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around
10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip
from an unnamed informer about the presence of a
marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at
Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [3] The
prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao,
Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed
a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M.
Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I.
Balut. Inspector
Parungao
gave
them
specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest
the cultivator of same.[4]

QUISUMBING, J.:

In an Information dated September 26, 1996,

appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about
September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill,
Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who was caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did
then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194
kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic)

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day,

said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for

the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly

being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the
nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at
the place pinpointed by their informant. The police
found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
from appellant's hut.[5] PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his.[6] The police uprooted
the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants.[8] Appellant was
then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon
microscopic examination of said plant, she found
cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive
indication for marijuana.[10] She next conducted a
chemical examination, the results of which confirmed
her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of
uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a
white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the
above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test
for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]

The prosecution also presented a certification from

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the
growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of
Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated
Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [12] This
lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the
lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.[13]
As its sole witness, the defense presented
appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M.,
September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable
farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person
whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something." [14] This unknown
person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were
present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about
the marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
[16]
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana.[17]
The police then took a photo of him standing in front
of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his
hut, where another photo was taken of him standing
next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.[18] The

police team then brought him to the police station at

Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a
barangay
peace
officer
of
Barangay
Sawmill,
accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a
grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate
in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him
to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be
put in a bad situation."[19] At the police headquarters,
appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the
marijuana plants seized by the police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there
were ten other houses around the vicinity of
his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.
[21]
The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito)
Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had
a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana
plants were found was located between his house and
Carlito Pascua's.[22]
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal
witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's
claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the
lot he was cultivating.[23] Tipay presented a sketch he
made,[24] which showed the location of marijuana plants
in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as
well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the
marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old
hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of
Carlito Pascua.[25] Tipay admitted on cross-examination
that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the
measurements.[26] He further stated that his basis for
claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the

seized plants was the information given him by the

police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to
the location of said plants.[27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court
held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and
ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to
death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns
consideration:

the

following

errors

for

our

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS
DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF
THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS
WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED
THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana
plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence
against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection
correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed
because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful
search. First, the records show that the law enforcers
had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found
in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme

Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S.

Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against
unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not
places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the records clearly show that there was no
search made by the police team, in the first place. The
OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question
were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about
five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were,
in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when
they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants
were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The
instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view"
doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and
confiscation made by the police team on the finding
that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search
warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site
merely to make a verification. When they found the said
plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a
search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the
plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed
overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said
plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was
not legally occupied by the accused and there was no
fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep

trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to

protect, hence, no search warrant was required."[30]

handedness of law enforcers, regardless

praiseworthiness of their intentions.

of

the

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a

search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant.Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.[32] Such
evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[33]

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's

contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For
the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant

issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause.From the declarations of
the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had
at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search
appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name
to them. The place where the cannabis plants were
planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that
there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that
the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to
them. We need not underscore that the protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants.[34] The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by

the police who have the right to be where they
are; and

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid

warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;

and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.[35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified
that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant.[36] Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded
the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the
police
team
was
dispatched
to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot
the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain
view"
applies
only
where
the
police
officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

[37]

Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was

not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to
"look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were
not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that
just because the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection
afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches
by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
is
the
immunity
of
one's person, which includes his residence, his papers,
and other possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the
right of personal security"[40] of the individual. As
appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be
protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are
persons, not places.[41] To conclude otherwise would not
only mean swimming against the stream, it would also
lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune
against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be
in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private
place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person
in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his
bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue,
that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained
during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second

issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana

plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They
are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves
around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized
marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against
appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution
suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied
on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he
was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made
in the absence of any independent and competent
counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police
verification; under custodial investigation. His admission
is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of
the constitutional fiat that admission given during
custodial investigation is not admissible if given without
any counsel."[42]

Appellant now argues that his admission of

ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be
used against him for being violative of his right to
counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was
error for the trial court to have relied upon said
admission
of
ownership.He
submits
that
the
investigation conducted by the police officers was not a
general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on
the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant
theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed
down to him, competent and independent counsel
should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the
prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of
regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to
his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional
right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes
otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet
under custodial investigation when he admitted to the
police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to
competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had
not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute
any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse
him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not
sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have

competent and independent counsel preferably of his

own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[43] An investigation begins when it
is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
[44]
The moment the police try to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain informationfrom a person
suspected of having committed an offense, he should at
that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.[45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a
tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well
as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police
operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked
to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the
police was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did
not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana
so we just asked him and I think there is no need to
inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are
just asking him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from
appellant, the police was already investigating appellant
as a suspect. At this point, he was already under

custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even

if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation
is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."[48] As
a
suspect,
two
armed
policemen
interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a
barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest him.
[50]
From these circumstances, we may infer that
appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of
action in a significant way, even before the actual
arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police
made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the
marijuana plants.
Moreover,
we
find
appellant's
extrajudicial
confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a
confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.[51] The records show that the
admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an
accused during the investigation, without the assistance
of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his
formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being
violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay. [52] Even if the
confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was
made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible

in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or

even if it had been voluntarily given.[53]
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before
an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused
is the author thereof.[54] The evidence arrayed against
the accused, however, must not only stand the test of
reason,[55] it must likewise be credible and competent.
[56]
Competent evidence is "generally admissible"
evidence.[57] Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence
"of such a character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."[58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two
pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the
offense charged. These were the seized marijuana
plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession
of ownership of said marijuana plants to the
police. Other than these proofs, there was no other
evidence presented to link appellant with the offense
charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial
court's part to have admitted both of these proofs
against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs
to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana
plants were obtained in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for
having been conducted without the requisite judicial
warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly
establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain

a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or

necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To
reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to
prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an
unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the
police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also
violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession
was made without the assistance of competent and
independent
counsel,
as
mandated
by
the
Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict
appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's
requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation
must have the services of competent and independent
counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial
evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove
appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved..."[59]To justify the conviction
of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that
quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence. The
prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and

cannot draw strength from the weakness of the

evidence for the accused.[60] Absent the required degree
of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized marijuana plants
linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably
tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render
these inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."[62] Nor can the confession obtained during
the uncounselled investigation be used against
appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him.[63] Without
these
proffered
but
proscribed
materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining
evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence
necessary
to
warrant
appellant's
conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his
favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he
is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution's
evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the
evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the
decision
promulgated
on
February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him

the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE

for
insufficiency
of
evidence. Appellant
is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from
confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accusedappellant.

Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.

6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996,
appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about
September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill,
Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who was caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did
then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194
kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic)
manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice
of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured
shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the
government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned

and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

For automatic review is the decision [1] promulgated

on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating

The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3

Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around
10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip
from an unnamed informer about the presence of a

marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at

Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [3] The
prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao,
Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed
a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M.
Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I.
Balut. Inspector
Parungao
gave
them
specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest
the cultivator of same.[4]

Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon

microscopic examination of said plant, she found
cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive
indication for marijuana.[10] She next conducted a
chemical examination, the results of which confirmed
her initial impressions. She found as follows:

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day,

said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the
nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at
the place pinpointed by their informant. The police
found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
from appellant's hut.[5] PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his.[6] The police uprooted
the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants.[8] Appellant was
then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime

"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the

above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test
for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of

uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a
white sack with markings.
xxx

The prosecution also presented a certification from

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the
growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of
Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated
Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [12] This
lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the
lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.[13]
As its sole witness, the defense presented
appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M.,
September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable
farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person
whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something." [14] This unknown

person then brought appellant to the place where the

marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut.[15] Five armed policemen were
present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about
the marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
[16]
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana.[17]
The police then took a photo of him standing in front
of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his
hut, where another photo was taken of him standing
next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.[18] The
police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a
barangay
peace
officer
of
Barangay
Sawmill,
accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a
grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate
in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him
to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be
put in a bad situation."[19] At the police headquarters,
appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the
marijuana plants seized by the police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there
were ten other houses around the vicinity of
his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.
[21]
The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito)
Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had
a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana

plants were found was located between his house and

Carlito Pascua's.[22]
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal
witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's
claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the
lot he was cultivating.[23] Tipay presented a sketch he
made,[24] which showed the location of marijuana plants
in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as
well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the
marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old
hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of
Carlito Pascua.[25] Tipay admitted on cross-examination
that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the
measurements.[26] He further stated that his basis for
claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the
seized plants was the information given him by the
police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to
the location of said plants.[27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court
held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and
ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to
death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns
consideration:

the

following

errors

for

our

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS
DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF
THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS
WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED
THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana
plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence
against the accused?

(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt

beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection
correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed
because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful
search. First, the records show that the law enforcers
had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found
in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S.
Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against
unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not
places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the records clearly show that there was no
search made by the police team, in the first place. The
OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question
were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about
five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were,
in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when
they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants
were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The
instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view"
doctrine.

The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and

confiscation made by the police team on the finding
that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search
warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site
merely to make a verification. When they found the said
plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a
search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the
plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed
overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said
plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was
not legally occupied by the accused and there was no
fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to
protect, hence, no search warrant was required."[30]
The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a
search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant.Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.[32] Such
evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[33]
In the instant case, there was no search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause.From the declarations of
the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had
at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search

appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name

to them. The place where the cannabis plants were
planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that
there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that
the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to
them. We need not underscore that the protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants.[34] The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For
the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they
are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence

without further search.[35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified
that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant.[36] Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded
the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the
police
team
was
dispatched
to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot
the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain
view"
applies
only
where
the
police
officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
[37]
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was
not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to
"look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were
not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that
just because the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection
afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches
by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
is
the
immunity
of
one's person, which includes his residence, his papers,
and other possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the
right of personal security"[40] of the individual. As

appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be

protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are
persons, not places.[41] To conclude otherwise would not
only mean swimming against the stream, it would also
lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune
against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be
in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private
place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person
in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his
bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue,
that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained
during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second
issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They
are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves
around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized
marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against
appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution
suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied
on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he

was asked who planted them. It made the following

observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made
in the absence of any independent and competent
counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police
verification; under custodial investigation. His admission
is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of
the constitutional fiat that admission given during
custodial investigation is not admissible if given without
any counsel."[42]
Appellant now argues that his admission of
ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be
used against him for being violative of his right to
counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was
error for the trial court to have relied upon said
admission
of
ownership.He
submits
that
the
investigation conducted by the police officers was not a
general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on
the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant
theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed
down to him, competent and independent counsel
should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the
prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of
regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to
his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional
right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes
otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet

under custodial investigation when he admitted to the

police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to
competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had
not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute
any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse
him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not
sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[43] An investigation begins when it
is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
[44]
The moment the police try to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain informationfrom a person
suspected of having committed an offense, he should at
that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.[45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a
tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well
as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police
operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected

marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked

to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the
police was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did
not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana
so we just asked him and I think there is no need to
inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are
just asking him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from
appellant, the police was already investigating appellant
as a suspect. At this point, he was already under
custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even
if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation
is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."[48] As
a
suspect,
two
armed
policemen
interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a
barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest him.
[50]
From these circumstances, we may infer that
appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of
action in a significant way, even before the actual
arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police
made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the
marijuana plants.
Moreover,
we
find
appellant's
extrajudicial
confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a
confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and

independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it

must be in writing.[51] The records show that the
admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an
accused during the investigation, without the assistance
of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his
formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being
violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay. [52] Even if the
confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was
made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.[53]
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before
an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused
is the author thereof.[54] The evidence arrayed against
the accused, however, must not only stand the test of
reason,[55] it must likewise be credible and competent.
[56]
Competent evidence is "generally admissible"
evidence.[57] Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence
"of such a character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."[58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two
pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the
offense charged. These were the seized marijuana
plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession
of ownership of said marijuana plants to the
police. Other than these proofs, there was no other

evidence presented to link appellant with the offense

charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial
court's part to have admitted both of these proofs
against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs
to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.

In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial

evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove
appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.

First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana

plants were obtained in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for
having been conducted without the requisite judicial
warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly
establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain
a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or
necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To
reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to
prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an
unlawful search and seizure.

The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved..."[59]To justify the conviction
of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that
quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence. The
prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the accused.[60] Absent the required degree
of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized marijuana plants
linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably
tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render
these inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."[62] Nor can the confession obtained during
the uncounselled investigation be used against
appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him.[63] Without
these
proffered
but
proscribed
materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining
evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence
necessary
to
warrant
appellant's
conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his
favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.

Second, the confession of ownership of the

marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the
police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also
violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession
was made without the assistance of competent and
independent
counsel,
as
mandated
by
the
Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict
appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's
requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation
must have the services of competent and independent
counsel during such investigation.

In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he

is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution's

evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the
evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law."[64]

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN,

JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND
JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE
and MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y
GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

WHEREFORE, the
decision
promulgated
on
February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him
the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for
insufficiency
of
evidence. Appellant
is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from
confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII, QUEZON
CITY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
These consolidated cases originated from the decision
rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y
Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the victims compensatory damages of
P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages
of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic review
of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition
for review on certiorari of said decision, the recourse
taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short

that long period of wait for a final resolution of his

fate." 1
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons
designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered
a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2,
1983.
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to
include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one
of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty"
during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by
court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at
that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as
counsel de parte for Juan Escober.
A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution
presented its evidence, summarized by the Solicitor
General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:
One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic),
Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was
formerly a co-security guard of appellant
Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by
the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is
located inside a walled compound about 50
meters away from the residence of its
owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months

prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved

by Domingo Rocero for being always absent
and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8,
tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14,
1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983).
At the time of the incident on December 3,
1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in
the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left
his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening
after he was relieved by appellant Juan
Escober. On his way home, he passed by
Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he
saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel
Samson drinking beer with three
companions, one of whom he later Identified
as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 411, tsn, April 22, 19831.
After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente
Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply as he usually does after
office hours, accompanied by his 13-year
old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany
On their way, he saw appellant Escober at
his post. At the office, the two children
watched a television program, as their
father proceeded to the bathroom to take a
bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three
companions rode a tricycle and proceeded
to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon
alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the

little door of the gate. Appellant Escober,

peeped thru the hole and opened the door.
Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober,
the former asked Punzalan to wait outside,
while he (Abuyen) and his two other
companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov.
9, 1983].
At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs.
Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her
husband and two children. On her way, she
noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide
open with the appellant Punzalan standing
there. She shouted why the gate was
opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly,
she heard of shot coming from the direction
of the garage; and when she looked thereat,
she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober
walking towards the gate. So, she rushed
back inside the house to contact her
husband through the intercom. But since the
intercom was out of order, she hurriedly
went outside and met appellant Escober
who volunteered the information "that he
was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].
Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was
inside the bathroom, when he heard the
gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her
(sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her
(sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on the floor,
both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic)
daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E'

fun of blood. He also observed that

everything was scattered in his office, with
all Ms drawers opened. Later, he found out
that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of
the drawers was lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn,
Sept. 14, 1983].
Immediately, he went out and shouted for
help from his wife to bring out the car as
their children was (sic) stabbed and
bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while
her eldest son drove a second one. After
Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded
children inside the two cars, they were
brought to the Chinese General Hospital
where they were pronounced dead upon
arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp.
13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
It was about 8:45 in the evening of
December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator
Oscar Francisco was dispatched to
investigate the incident. And, since the
victims were already brought to the Chinese
General Hospital, he was instructed to
proceed thereto. When he arrived at the
hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found
the victims already dead. Whereupon, he
conducted a cursory examination of the
victim and indicated on two separate
sketches (Exhibits "C" and "D"), the 12 and
11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and
Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he

proceeded to the scene of the crime, where

he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and a
police photographer, who arrived to assist
him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5,
1983].
Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a bloodstained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which
the former said was found beside the pool of
blood inside the room where the incident
happened. In the course of his investigation,
Francisco noticed that the drawers inside
the office of Vicente Chua were forcibly
opened with its (sic) contents scattered.
Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he
likewise learned that cash amounting to
P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one
of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning
at the Police Headquarters appellant
Escober, the security guard on duty then at
the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who
voluntarily gave his version of the incident
(Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the
written statements of the victims' parents,
Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also
taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December
8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his
investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at
the left hand margin thereon the following
notations: "Detained the accused allprima

facie case exist(s) and that accused is

probably guilty thereof. No bail
recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].
Subsequently, on the morning of December
10, 1982, the police apprehended the
appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up
was readily Identified by the victims'
mother, Una Chua, as one of those she saw
standing at the open gate of their
compound during the night of the incident
on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another
statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken
on December 10, 1982 from the victims'
mother to supplement the previous
statement she gave on December 8, 1982.
Also taken on even date were the
statements of Security Guard Jesus
Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and that of Virginia
Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the
suspects who claimed that her son, Amadeo
Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4]
companions, including the herein two
appellants, in the commission of the crime.
Even appellant Punzalan waived his
constitutional rights under custodial
investigation and voluntarily and willingly
gave his statement (Exhibit "M") wherein he
did not only admit his participation in the
commission of the crime, but also
implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 2526, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December

13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal,
Police Investigator Francisco named the five
[5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde,
Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo
Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias
Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only
the herein two appellants were
apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]. 2
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the
witness stand to testify in his defense. His testimony is
deed in his Brief, thus:
Escober was then a Security guard and
belonged to the Western Private Detective
Security since January 1, 1982 and was
assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce
St. Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon
City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw
Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he
reported for work. When his companion left
and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the
guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr.
and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the
guardhouse dirty and also because after the
security guard leaves, the security guard on
duty must clean it. There was a janitor but
the security guards used to clean the
guardhouse. As security guard, he had a
gun but on this occasion he left it in the
locker because he was cleaning the
guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the

garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him

because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to,
and two men [also accused named Does as
they are also still at large] entered and one
man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the
gate. Escober was not able to talk to Alorte
alias Abuyen because when Alorte came,
one of his companions aimed a gun at
Escober and also a knife and they said they
would kill him. He does not know the man
who aimed a gun at him. He only knows
Alorte because he Alorte used to be his coguard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then
asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pickup car inside the garage and the other man
was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and
his companion went up the Vising Electrical
Supply. Escober does not know the real
name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is
Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the
man who was left near the gate but he
knows him by face and he was then in the
courtroom and he pointed to the person who
answered by the name of Macario Punzalan,
Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not see
what Punzalan was doing because he,
Escober, was made to climb the vehicle
(pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the
locker. He was not able to get that gun when
these four men entered because a gun was
already pointed at him. Alorte took
Escober's gun from the locker because he
was formerly a security guard at Vising

Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does

not know why Alorte did not continue his
work there. After 5 minutes, after the two
men went up the office, they came down
and talked to the man guarding Escober and
Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was
able to avoid it and after that, the four men
suddenly left. Escober went down from the
pickup and he heard Vicente Chua calling
him and he responded. Chua asked him to
call Mrs. Chua at the house because,
according to Chua, their children were
stabbed. So Escober went to the house and
called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him,
Alorte and his companions were no longer at
the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left.
Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she
and he, together, returned to Vising
Electrical Supply and upon reaching the
place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could
not understand him because he was
speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back
and got the car, parked it and returned to
the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the
office, he was bringing his son and placed
him at the parked car of the office. When
Chua returned to the office (after he called
Escober) and came back out, Escober saw
him with his son and placed him at the
balcony. The two children who were stabbed
were carried in two cars because there were
only two cars at the driveway. Escober
opened the gate. He does not know to what

hospital they went. After that, he called

Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he
could help him (Escober) call the police.
Jeffrey was not able to call the police
because when Jeffrey gave him a directory
and asked him (Escober) to look for the
telephone number of the police but he told
Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes
were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police
came and after that, the owner of the
security agency arrived. Other policemen
not in uniform also arrived. They
interviewed Escober and forced him to go
with them to the police precinct. He refused
because the owner of the agency had not
then arrived. When owner arrived, he called
another security guard to guard the Vising
Electrical Supply. The police and the owner
of the security brought Escober to the
precinct to get his statement and there the
police was forcing him to adroit he was the
one who robbed and killed the children of
the Chuas and he told them do not know
everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that
she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte
inside the garage is not true because he
was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their
children were being stabbed. When Alorte
and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was
finding (sic) to call him (Escober). When he
was brought to the precinct, the investigator
was typing something. Escober could
recall/remember only his signature. He

Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the

defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He
narrated it there exactly. The signature
there are his. He knows the police who
investigated him but he does not know the
person. Escober was at the precinct when
he signed his statement. He was there up
(sic) October 3, 1983, the date he testified
in court (tsn, 2-13). 3
Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise
testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is
found in his Brief as follows:
PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his
direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35,
Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at
"the market of Monumento." In the
afternoon of 3 December 1982, according to
PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of
fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a
place near Abonce Beer House;
ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions
whom he introduced all his relatives; after
several drinks, he was requested to join the
group to proceed to another place for which
reason they boarded a tricycle; and the
group stopped 'at a place with a high gate'
because ABUYEN/ ALORTE wanted 'to drop
by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9,
1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked at the little
door and the security guard (PUNZALAN
Identified accused Escober as the security

guard) opened the door and they greeted

each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed
PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and
thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two
companions entered the compound (TSN,
pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).
PUNZALAN further testified that he waited
for half an hour for the group; that while
waiting he heard the mourn (sic) of a child
that he was then about to enter the
premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE and
his two companions and saw them with
blood stains in their arms;' that
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions
started running and he followed them; that
in response to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE
stated that he stabbed the two [2] children';
and that they boarded a taxi and he was
brought back to our place where we are
selling apples' (TSN pp. 14- 18, Nov. 9,
1983)
PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of
10 December 1982 at the Monuments
market. No lawyer assisted him during his
custodial investigation despite the fact that
he informed the police officers that he has a
lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was
he informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless,
the police investigator proceeded to
interrogate him. He disclosed that he was

invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and

that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce
Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that,
when Exh. M was presented for his signature
he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many
statements thereon are not correct that he
nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he
was already tired and was forced to sign it
after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected
me to water therapy and he could not
endure the pain, when they gave (him) the
electric shock treatment;" and that the
portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are
those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-B
(TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ). 4
On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was
promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his
manifestation in open court immediately after the
promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the
same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay
entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel
for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed
another motion for reconsideration for the said accused,
which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an
exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated
November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the
petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober

contends that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION
IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER ...;
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING
AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER,
TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED
PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY
GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED
ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE
GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION,
AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS COACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF
KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE
RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF
FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF
THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING
THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE
VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER 'PETITIONER)
REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE
HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS
REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE
IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS

SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL

LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF
JANUARY 10, 1984. 5
These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for
Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his
conviction on the following grounds:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND
OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND
IN BAND. 6

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT

THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD
BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT
PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO RE
MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF
THE THREE OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY ININVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors,

particularly the objection interposed to the form and
substance of the decision under review. Accusedappellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and
void for it does not conform with the requirement of
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution and that it
was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of
the proceedings had been transcribed.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT,

AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY;

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January

10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space,
with a number of handwritten notations and insertions.
It reads:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT

THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME
WAS ROBBERY;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the

above-named accused of Robbery with
Homicidedefined in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among
others, that on or about December 3, 1982,
in Quezon City, said accused conspiring,

confederating and mutually helping one

another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation again persons
robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering
the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village,
Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00
and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of
said robbery employed personal violence
upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany
Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting
thereby multiple serious mortal wounds
directly causing their immediate deaths, to
the damage of their heirs.
Prosecution evidence consisted of the
testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua,
Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V.
Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero
and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z"
with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence
consisted of the testimonies of the two
named accused above and some exhibits,
contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records,
Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.
In view of the foregoing evidence, and
considering the memoranda of both parties,
the arguments and authorities cited therein,
this Court finds that the material allegations
of the above information are facts, and that
accused Juan Escober y Geralde and
Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty
of the charges of Robbery with Double

Homicide, as principals by indispensable

cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3,
with no mitigating circumstances, and
attended by aggravating circumstances of
cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission
of the crime, taking advantage of number
and superior strength, treachery, in band,
among others, and that the defenses and
excuses of the accused are unnatural,
incredible, contradictory and
uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing
to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the
following: The unlikely garbage throwing
reason of accused Juan Escober in opening
the gate of the compound in question,
against the testimony of his co-accused
Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their
part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of
firing a gun just before the exit of the coconspirators of Juan Escober, and
volunteering the information that he was
not hit. The version of Juan Escober
regarding his actuation during the half-hour
robbery homicide was replete with
contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted
being fetched by, going with and talking to,
immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the
said compound, and later acting as lookout
for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds
further that the group took some drinks, not
to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to
strengthen their resolve better to commit
the crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan

Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the amended information,
this Court holding firmly that when a hired
security guard opens the compound under
his protection to four men who turn out to
be robbers and murderers or when a former
security guard accompanies and meets with
said malefactors immediately before the
commission of the offense and stands guard
at the gate and flees with said malefactors
then the burden of proof is shifted to him to
exculpate and excuse himself by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence, which
the named accused failed to do, but
succeeded only in insulting this Forum of
Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifications
for the brutal and merciless killing of
innocent and helpless children on the
occasion of that robbery in question, of
being held-up at gunpoint, of coincidentally
being in the act of throwing garbage and
being fired at but not getting hit but not
knowing so many vital details a truthful
witness would certainly not forget, among
others, thus that this court after a total
appreciation of all the evidence on record is
convinced that there being apple (sic)
circumstances present that could only
possibly point to the guilt of said accused
for the most heinous (sic) crime that
deserves the highest penalty, Hereby

sentences the said accused Juan Escober y

Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the
legal punishment provided by Article 294,
Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines, which is DEATH and orders
the said accused further to pay the heirs of
their victims compensatory damages of
P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and
moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said
heirs, jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10,
1984. 7
Every decision of a court of record shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based ...
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard.
The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent
judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions
without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material
allegations of the Amended Information were the facts
without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits
supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of
accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly
replete with contradictions without pointing out what
these contradictions consist of or what "vital details"
Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He
also found the crime to have been attended by the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime,
superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others,"

but did not particularly state the factual bases for such
findings.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v.
Colayco, 64 SCRA 480, reiterating Montelibano v.
Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular
Government 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular
Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil.
746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:
Without the concrete relation or statement
in the judgment of the facts alleged and
proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass
upon and determine the issue raised in
litigation, inasmuch as when the facts held
to be proved are not set forth in a judicial
controversy, it is impossible to administer
justice, to apply the law to the points
argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant
who has the law on his side.
It is not sufficient that the court or trial
judge take into account the facts brought
out in an action suit, the circumstances of
each question raised, and the nature and
condition of the proofs furnished by the
parties. He must also set out in his decision
the facts alleged by the contending parties
which he finds to have been proven. The
conclusions deduced therefrom and the
opinion he has formed on the issues raised;
then only can be intelligently set forth the
legal grounds and considerations proper in

his opinion for the due determination of the

case.
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof
extremely difficult. Without a particularization of the
evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the
findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible
for the appellate court to determine whether or not such
findings were sufficiently and logically supported by the
evidence relied upon by the trial court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have
appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-judge to
administer justice in this case in the most speedy and
expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our
admonition that judges do not have to wait for the
transcription of stenographic notes before rendering
judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings
personally taken by them. For this is what respondent
judge did. The records show that he took copious notes
of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he
apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of
the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the
case suffered some delay due to the failure of
stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the
transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not
the sole concern of courts and judges. More than this is
the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the
primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge
lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the

decision rendered by another trial court in the case of
People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We
said:
At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim
view of the apparently indifferent attitude
displayed by the trial court towards a
murder case it has tried as shown by the
rendition of a decision, the body of which
contains only 63 lines spread out over less
than three typewritten pages, doublespaced and wide-margined. While brevity
should characterize a court's decision and
length is not necessarily determinative of its
quality, the lower court in deciding this
murder case nonetheless should
haveoutlined in greater and more
satisfactory detail the evidence presented
by both prosecution and the defense, the
facts as found by the trial judge based on
the evidence on record and the
jurisprudence and the authorities
supporting the court's decision.
This trial judge failed to do. There is not one
single citation of authority in the decision.
The issues raised by the appellant include
allegations of concocted testimony, the
nature of a dying declaration,
premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and
superior strength. The issues raised are

quite serious and they deserved better

treatment. [Emphasis supplied].
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984
does not conform to the requirements of Section 9,
Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have
been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a
new judgment. However, since the records of the case,
including all evidence necessary for a determination of
the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are
now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in
this case in order to accord the accused-appellants their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a
principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of
robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to
prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in
question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant
to said nefahous plan. These acts consist of- [1] his
alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his
co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina
Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined,
after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the
information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The
prosecution further attempted to show that the gunfiring was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and
that Escober's version of the incident is too replete with
contradictions to merit belief.
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that
the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by

itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes an evil
motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations
convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of
Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at
the knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo
Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same
would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that
Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse
that could be attributed to him is lack of better
judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum
precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from
the premises being guarded persons who have not
demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it
must be remembered that having been co-employees,
Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not
surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact,
even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced
Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having
allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:
20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka
sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply,
ilang beses mo ng nakita si
Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa
iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
S Dalawang beses ko na po
siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon,
una noong buwan ng

Septyembre at pangalawa
noong buwan November 1982.
21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita
mo siya sa lugar na iyan?
S Una binisita niya ako at
pangalawa mayroon siyang
kasamang babae at hindi ko na
siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee
Seng Electrical Supply. 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the
prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was a
mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen
observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a
common experience that a person allows himself to be
shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on
earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was
in cahoots [sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps
the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to
be rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up,
mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he
were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is
too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 10
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated
within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found
by the trial court, a time too short to enable
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or
scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for
Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it considering the
unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and
the need for immediate escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the

air and not at Escober, the same could have been done
to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime
rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober
was not a part of the criminal plan are further bolstered
by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the
preliminary investigation, and extra-judicial statement
of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April
16, 1986, submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B
during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The
pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement
reads:
FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka
si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay
matagal ng magkakilala?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir,
dahil po sa guardiya po dati
yung Alorte.
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang
guardia [referring to Escober]
PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang
naka guardia noon. [duty]
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng
pag-uusap nila ano pa ang
ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po
nakikita sir.
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa
bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba
po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober
nakita mong umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga
sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa
akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko
po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman
pinatay.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil
hindi ko po alam nga ang
dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto
kong mahuli yung Abuyen,
sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang
utak eh. 11

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial

statement reads in part:
... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle
at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng
bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng
Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay
kumatok ako at binuksan naman ako ng
guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko
muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay
niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay
bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril
sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya.
Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong
baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito.
Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON
at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman
ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate
ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa
pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si
Escober na hindi an pala ginapos nitong si
KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya
pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos
kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila
at tumakbo na kami ... 12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating
from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may
ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence.
Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even
responsive to the question being asked. The
spontaneous and candid manner by which it was given
lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte

wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the

statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E
scober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly
corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed
at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be
taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere
ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a
poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its execution.
On the other hand, We see no reason why
Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity
in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice
is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the
blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as
this where the crime charged is indeed very grave and
serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there
may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness.
Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe
that it was this sense of justice and fairness that moved
him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession.
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was
not hit does not prove either that he was a coconspirator. It was but natural that he would want to
inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be
concerned with his safety and well-being. The
motivation attached to said act by the prosecution is
therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the
test of logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to
a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the testimony of
Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at
the garage where the shot sounded to have come from

and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with

Escober about a meter behind.
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy
of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was
the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her
statement to the police. She gave her statement on
December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been
apprehended. So, soon after the violent incident her
appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty
when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of
better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job
resulted in the tragic event.
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of
Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of
the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from
being susceptible to other interpretations.
Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the
shooting, he called his companions and ran away from
the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the
same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions
started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This
was precisely the moment when the malefactors were
fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at which point
Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the
pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua
claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind
Abuyen/ Alorte, who was not walking, but running away
from the scene of the crime.
Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret
the situation she described having seen. She was then
in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate

of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to

keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of
Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision
of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her to
determine for certain the distance between
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was
merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.
Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the
separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that 'they
[referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking
towards the gate; they were nagmamadali [in a
hurry]." 13This description given by Lina Chua does not
jibe with the impression gathered from her previous
statement of seeing Escober walking behind
Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the
'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali"
corroborates Abuyen/ Alorte's declaration that after
firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime,
and tills can be interpreted to mean that Escober was
indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
The fact that the accused was at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission is
not, by itself, sufficient to establish his
criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty
as co-principal in the crime charged, the
existence of conspiracy between the
accused and the actual killers, must be
shown, and the same degree of proof
required for establishing the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence
of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to

exist as clearly and convincingly as the

commission of the crime itself. 14
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this
regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
[1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and
[2] that his acts during the commission of the crime,
such as the opening of the gate and having been behind
Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed pursuant to
said nefarious plot. This being the case, the
prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in
Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the
incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on
this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved 15 and its corollary rule that the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. 16
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during
the commission of the crime and his having opened the
gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers
make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could
have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion
for the two hapless victims. But convictions can never
rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends
having been denied his rights to remain silent and to
counsel during the custodial investigation, the
preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement
for lowing:

17

is prefaced by the

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM

NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong
sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang
usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang
PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG
PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman,
ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at
pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng
Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling
tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng
salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng
paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong
mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng
abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng
paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa
iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang
bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag
magbigay ng anomang pahayag na
maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng
anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para
ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.

Tanong Pagkatapos na
malaman mo, maipaunawa sa
iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng
iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim
ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas,
nahahanda ka bang magbigay
ng isang malaya at kusang loob
ng salaysay?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Nahahanda kang
magbigay ng salaysay kahit na
walang abogado na
sumusubaybay sa iyo habang
ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
Sagot Opo.
Tanog Lubos mo bang
naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi
maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng
anomang uri ng karahasan
upang maging saksi laban sa
iyong sarili?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Sa kabila ng lahat ng
mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa
iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng
salaysay?
Sagot Opo.

Sgd. M
Jr.
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional
question in Escober's extra-judicial statement, 18 the
latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement.
This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative
on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly
inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to
counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical
manner by which the police sought to inform Escober
and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a
blatant disregard for individual comprehensive ability
arising from differences in intelligence level, educational
background and personal experiences. No effort was
exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood
what was being told, considering his low educational
attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so-called
"informing" done by the police in the case at bar was
nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act,
performed not so much to attain the objectives of the
fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance
thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police
respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for
Punzalan was misleading. It gives the impression that
the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by
Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during
the custodial investigation.
Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to
counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's extrajudicial
statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For
this reason, aside from the fact that it was done without

the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not

valid. 19 Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence. 20
With respect to Punzalan not having been represented
by counsel during the preliminary investigation, suffice
it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an
absence of preliminary investigation, should have been
raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is
uniform and consistent in ruling that:
The question of absence of a proper
preliminary investigation is also better
inquired into by the Court below. When so
raised, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the
trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the
information but hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require
the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As
stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478
(1 961), this is the proper procedure since
the 'absence of such investigation did not
impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render it defective. Much less did
it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. The right to a preliminary
investigation, being waivable does not
argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been
done being to remand the case in order that
such investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of

preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not
this Court. Reason is not wanting for this
view. Absence of preliminary investigation
does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived.
Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are
matters to be inquired into by the trial
courts, not an appellate court. 21
While it may be conceded that it would have been more
judicious for the trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio
for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his coaccused Escober, such failure did not constitute
prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the
proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no
evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of
Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show
that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal
zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present his
defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final
analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have
suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to crossexamine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding
Punzalan's presence at the scene of the
crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was merely
corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and
Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution who
were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had

established the fact of robbery and we are convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such
plan. It is incredible that his three companions would
fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring
him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking another
eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight
from the scene of the crime with his companions and his
failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the police
what he knew about the crime after reading it in the
newspapers further demonstrate his knowledge of the
plan.
While it has been established that Punzalan's
participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and
as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two
helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility
therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction
that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of
the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they
did not actually take part in the homicide unless it
clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide. 24
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in
Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate
release from confinement is ordered, unless detained for

some other crimes. Accused- appellant Macario

Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of
P60,000,00,
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a)
holding that the 1-1/2 page, single-spaced, decision of
the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste,
sentencing the accused at bar to the supreme penalty
of death without specification of the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, upon which his
conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls
short of the constitutional requirement that every
decision of a court of justice clearly and distinctly state

the facts and the law on which it is based; (b) acquitting

the accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with
homicide on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding the
other accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of
the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.
a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole
Court en banc is unanimous as to the utter failure of the
trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to conform to the
mandatory constitutional requirement that a decision
must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is
based. Normally, in such cases, the case would have to
be remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a
new judgment that does conform to the constitutional
mandate but the Court, since all the briefs have been
filed, opted to review the record and the evidence and
to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;
b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its
judgment finding the accused Macario Punzalan, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide, even as it reaffirms the settled doctrine
in Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as conspirators in
the commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty
as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in

the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they

endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic
principle that once a conspiracy or community of
criminal design is shown, then the actual mode of
participation in a crime of any of the accused, whether
he be a lookout posted outside the scene of the robbery,
is of no moment, since the act of one conspirator is the
act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of the
Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v.
Macalalag and most recently affirmed in the 1987 case
of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr. Justice Feliciano in
Ms scholarly separate opinion; and
c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the
Court is confined to the case of accused Juan Escober
with ten members voting to acquit him and four
members dissenting from his acquittal. On my part, I
have given him the benefit of the doubt and voted for
his acquittal. The superior and immutable rule is that
the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by virtue of the constitutional
presumption of his innocence, which presumption must
prevail unless overturned by clear, competent and
credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main
opinion of the Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan,
the evidence as to the existence of a conspiracy
between the accused Juan Escober and the robberskillers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery
appears to be inadequate and therefore failed to
produce the required moral certainty of his guilt.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the

concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him completely.
I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the
complicity of Juan Escober in the robbery and in the
killing of two children while the robbery was underway.
It is an easy task after a crime has been consummated
for us to surmise how the mind of an accused should
have operated during crucial moments and to state how
an accused should have behaved to avoid the possibility
of his being implicated as a co-principal and conspirator.
Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and
according to predictable patterns of behaviour in real
life. The minds of ordinary persons (and I see nothing
special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused
security guard), seldom behave in predictable ways.
Seemingly negligent or even inexplicable behaviour is
not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every security
guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed
can be accused of complicity in a crime even if evil
persons choose that particular moment of indiscretion
to barge into the premises. I agree with Justice Fernan
that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been proved with the degree of
certainty required under our penal laws.
I would also like to make some observations about the
Court's apparently unqualified adherence to the
precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad (9 Phil.
1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to 1927 cited in
the separate opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator
should not necessarily or automatically be found guilty

of everything that happens while the crime, object of

the conspiracy, is being committed.
It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to
prevent the other crime committed on the occasion of
the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he would
be guilty as a principal in the complex crime or other
crime even if he had absolutely no part in it. I may have
no statistics to prove it but I believe
that conspiracy improperly handled could send more
innocent persons to jail than any other principle in
criminal law.For instance, many accused persons
protesting they had nothing to do with a crime have
been convicted of malversation or estafa simply
because the documents evidencing the crime somehow
passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is
simply not paying any attention during a drinking party
where the details of a robbery, car-napping, or murder
are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant prosecutor,
be convicted of the resulting crime and all its
consequences.
I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of
robbery with homicide. My observations are simply
aimed at an unqualified adherence to the principle that
the accused must always endeavor to prevent the other
crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew
nothing about. Or that he must run away and leave his
companions before the second crime is committed.
Every case must be judged on its separate facts and
notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a
person may still be acquitted of the other crime about
which he had no knowledge at all For instance, if the

innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had

been the children of Punzalan, certainly he cannot be
held guilty of parricide. Or if a band of robbers rape a
woman inside a house not knowing he is the wife of
their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally
responsible for all the consequences or happenings
during the commission of the planned crime should not
apply. The precedents fromMacalalad are impressively
cited by my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges
should still be cautioned to look beyond the unqualified
rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout or
anybody else similarly situated should be automatically
convicted for something about which he was completely
ignorant. The consequences of sending an innocent
person to j ail for a crime where he had no participation
are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an
unqualified rule.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting :
With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Fernan to the extent that it would
acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the other hand, like
to add somewhat to the reference made in the majority
opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is
correctly held liable for robbery with homicide.
We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober.
The prosecution theory, as found by the majority
opinion, was that Juan Escober was a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with
homicide. According to the majority opinion, the
prosecution sought to prove that Escober joined in the

community of design, a conspiracy, which was shown in

respect of the other accused, by referring to the
following particular acts of Escober:
[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the
gate of the compound to his coconspirators;
[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua
behind Abuyen, the alleged mastermind,
after the gun shot; and
[3] his having volunteered the information
to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit.
The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand
gun by Abuyen was a mere ritual designed to avoid or
deflect suspicion from Escober and that Escober's
version of the incident [was] too replete with
contradictions "to merit belief"
The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the
malefactors by Escober was absolutely indispensable for
the commission of the crime of robbery and for the
killing of the two (2) children of Mr. and Mrs. Vicente
Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of
opening a gate upon hearing a knock is, of course, an
innocent gesture. It is important to bear in mind,
however, that Escober was a security guard; that he had
seen and recognized Abuyen through the peephole in
the pedestrians' gate before opening that gate; and
surely the least that can be expected of a security
guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he
must exclude from the premises being guarded persons

who have not demonstrated any lawful reason for

wanting to enter such premises. If one assumes that
Escober had not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at
the very least utterly reckless for him to have opened
the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact
that Escober was acquainted with Abuyen was no
justification for letting Abuyen and his gang come in.
Upon the other hand, the circumstance that Escober
knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that
Escober was indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if
Escober was totally unacquainted with Abuyen, that
probability would not of course exist It must further be
noted that Escober himself, who had thoughtfully left his
gun in a locker before opening the gate of the
compound, 1 did not claim that he had been coerced by
Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the
compound. 2 If he had in fact been forced into opening
the gate by Abuyen and company, it would have been
the simplest and most natural thing in the world for him
to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy,
however, conveniently explained later that he had
pointed his gun at Escober, almost apologetically, after
Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and
the other malefactors into the compound.
Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and
thereupon turning to the garage from whence the sound
of the shot came, she saw Abuyen walking towards the
gate with Escober about a meter behind. 3 It must not
escape notice there was no suggestion by any
witness that Escober was then chasing and trying to
capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to his
duties might be expected at least to try to do. The

majority opinion does try to suggest that because Mrs.

Lina Chua, in the separate trial of Abuyen, had said that
Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate;
they were in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be
regarded as 'indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte Escober
himself had not claimed that he had somehow
summoned his courage and sought to capture Abuyen
immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober,
fired a shot at him but had missed. Thus, the suggested
interpretation would seem unreal and excessively
generous to Escober. There was also no evidence that
Escober was trying to flee or hide himself from Abuyen.
The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to
be believed at all, was that Escober was acting in
concert with Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the
escape of Abuyen and his companions.
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the
prosecution. The majority opinion, however, rejects
totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as suffer[ing] from
inaccuracy and as being susceptible to other
interpretations" in the premises, when "taken in
conjunction with the extrajudicial confession of Abuyen."
It must be observed, with respect, that the majority
opinion so discarded Mrs. Chua's testimony upon
the totally speculative ground that it is not contrary to
human psychology and experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua
having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would
in seeking vengeance deliberately and baselessly
implicate Escober in the robbery and the killings as a
"sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this
speculation at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs. Chua's
testimony runs counter to the prevailing jurisprudence

which has been summed up in the following terms

inPeople v. Roxas:
... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and
Paterno to the deceased sufficient to render
their testimony doubtful nor enough to
discredit their credibility. The credibility of
witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced
simply because of their close relation to the
victim. For it is not to be lightly supposed
that the relatives of the deceased would
callously violate their conscience to avenge
the death of a dear one by blaming it on
persons whom they know to be innocent. 4
It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had
fired a shot, presumably in the air, in order to create the
impression that Escober was not part of the conspiracy.
Escober claimed that the shot had been fired
at him while he was inside the van in the garage, and
advised Mrs. Chua that he had not been hit by the
shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this
connection is that if the robbers had really wanted to kill
Escober in order to prevent Escober's later Identifying
them, there was absolutely nothing to prevent them
from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua
had been stabbed to death brutally to prevent them
from Identifying the robbers; yet, if E scober is to be
believed, the robbers made no more than a token, half
hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an adult male and
a security guard, would not Identify them. Escober was
not even tied up and blind-folded. It is hence difficult to
appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's counsel

that Escober would be the "stupidest person on earth" if

he allowed himself "to be shot by a gunto avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots with the malefactors."
Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No bullet hole
was found in the van where Escober claimed to have
been crouching when Abuyen shot at him. 6 Upon the
other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be regarded
as a cheap method for supporting a profession of
innocence on the part of Escober. Escober's counsel was
simply begging the question.
In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon
statements made by co-accused Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon
an extrajudicial statement of Abuyen (accused in a
separate criminal case) to support the position that the
gun play was not mere play-acting and that Escober was
not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements
coming from Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be
taken with great caution. For it must be recalled that the
testimony of accomplicesprincipals confederates or
conspirators while admissible and competent, comes
from a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice
Malcolm cautioned, such testimony must be "scrutinized
with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
corroborated,credibility is affected."7 It should also be
pointed out that the statement of Punzalan adduced in
this connection in the majority opinion,
appearsdisjointed and totally unrelated to the question
in response to which it was given. The statement of
Punzalan, in other words, would appear, not
spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority

opinion) but rather to have been deliberately thrown in

for the purpose of exculpating Escober. Thus:
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa
bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba
po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to
Escober] nakita mong umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga
sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa
akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi
ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman
pinatay.
PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil
hindi ko po alam nga ang
dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto
kong mahuli yung Abuyen
sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang
utak eh. (Emphasis supplied)

To accept and to accord full credence to statements of

proven conspirators to all appearances designed to
avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who had made
the robbery and double homicide possible to begin with,
while rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina
Chua solely because she was the mother of the slain
children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice
and fairness' to Abuyen from whose mind the
conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms were
splattered with the blood of the two (2) young children
of Mrs. Lina Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to
assume casually that Mrs. Lina Chua was bereft of that
same 'sense of justice and fairness."
While each of the acts of Escober cited by the
prosecution might not, considered in isolation from the
others, be sufficient to show participation in the
common criminal design, it is submitted that where
those acts areconsidered together, and viewed in the
light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and their other two
companions did, and did not do, they constitute more
than adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion
of the trial court that Escober was guilty. After all, it was
not this Court but the trial judge who examined all the
evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his
conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper,
must be given great weight.
We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion
finds guilty of robbery with homicide. There is no
question that Punzalan participated in the common
design to commit robbery. He acted as lookout for the

gang of robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house

which was ransacked and where the victims were slain;
unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual
stabbing of the two (2) innocent children of Vicente and
Lina Chua. Even so, the majority opinion, stressing that
Punzalan's participation in the conspiracy to commit
robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him
responsible for robbery with double homicide.
Because the above rule on this matter and its
underlying ratio have not always been well understood
and because a handful of decisions of this Court contain
language or have reached results which, at first glance,
may seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it
should be useful to examine in some detail the
development of that rule and to mark out its present
scope and shape.
The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously
reaffirmed by the Court en banc most recently in People
v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June 1987) in the
following terms:
The crime committed by the accused is
Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1), of the
Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was shot
to death during the robbery. We have
repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide
resulted during or because of the robbery,
even if the killing is by mere accident,
robbery with homicide is committed; it is
only the result obtained, without reference
or distincttion as to the circumstances,

causes, modes or persons intervening in the

commission of the crime that has to be
taken into consideration. (People vs.
Guiapar, No. L-35465, May 31,1984,129
SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].)
Further, whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the commission of the
crime are also guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually
take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent
the homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs.
Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261; and U.S. vs.
Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) In this instance,
the evidence on record is bereft of any
showing that any of the accused tried to
prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What is
shown instead is that they merely stood
watching and did nothing when one of their
companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session
of October 21, 1974, 29; Deposition, Id., 3,
5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in
robbery with homicide should be understood
as a generic term and includes murder.
(People vs. Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25,
1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)

The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated

upon as long ago as 8 October 1907 in U.S. v.
Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the
Supreme Court, said:
... While it does not appear that this
defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself
struck the fatal blow which caused the
death of Rufino Calderon he must be
adjudged guilty as principal of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide with which
he is charged, it having been proved that he
was present, ad.ded, abetted, and took part
therein. The testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution fully establishes the guilt of
the defendant as a principal in the
commission of the robbery, and, even were
we to disregard his confession, which he
repudiated at the trial of' the case, and
wherein he admitted he was present at the
killing of Rufino Calderon, we would,
nevertheless, be compelled to find him
guilty of the crime of robo con homicide
(robbery with homicide). The supreme court
of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the
Penal Code touching the complex crime of
robo con homicidio has frequently decided
that, where the complex crime has been
committed, all those who look part as
principals in the commission of the robbery
are guilty as principals in the commission of
the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it
appears that the endeavored to prevent the

unlawful killing. (Decisions of the supreme

court of Spain, April 30 and February 23,
1872, and June 19, 1890. See also Viada,
vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).
Accepting as true the exculpatory
statements of the accused in his repudiated
confession, it does not appear therefrom
that he made any genuine effort to prevent
the murder of Rufino Calderon.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until
1925 when U.S. v. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) was
decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice Romualdez wrote, for
the Court:
The liability of the other appellants Andres
Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente Caballero
and Alejandro Picate, consist in having
conspired and taken part in the robbery.
They must not be held responsible for the
homicide which was not the subject matter
of their conspiracy and in which they did not
have any intervention, for it was performed
by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper
punishment, therefore, for them is the
penalty for robbery in band within the limits
of which the trial court has imposed upon
them. 9

But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated

from Macalalad, the Supreme Court went back to the
Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked and applied the
Macalalad rule without even mentioning the deviation in
Basisten:
xxx xxx xxx

In the first place it may be said that the

evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause clearly shows that the appellants are
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
and must therefore be punished in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is
clearly established that the appellants,
together with an armed band of more than
four persons, committed a robbery and that
on the occasion of such robbery a homicide
was committed. The crime which they
committed therefore falls clearly within the
provisions of said article. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, July 13, 1871; 3
Viada, Commentaries on the Penal Code, p.
347.) Whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all principals in the
commission of the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide, although they did
not actually take part in the homicide,
unless it clearly appeared that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10
From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied
and re-applied many times by the Court. The following
list does not purport to be exhaustive:
1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940);
2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952);

3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953);

4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);
5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L8919,28 September 1956; 52 O.G. 6532
(1956);
6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958);
7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534
(1960);
8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393
(1961); and
9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962).
In 1967, People v. Pelagic, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v.
Basisten, was indeed cited by the Court. A close scrutiny
of the facts in Pelagio will, however, show that the result
there reached does not really represent a departure
from theMacalalad rule which, as noted above, had
been reiterated many times since the
1925 Basisten case.
Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a
particular house in G. Villanueva St., Pasay City. Only
Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried out the
robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as the lookout and
posted himself at the gate of the house; two (2) others
actually entered the victim's premises; the fourth was
ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the
getaway. The robbery was carried out as planned. But,

when the two (2) robbers who had gone up the house
came down and out into the street, they failed to find
Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the
next block where they found the fourth conspirator
waiting for them inside a taxi. The two (2) robbers
boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave,
however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite direction
and blocked the taxi's way. A man alighted from the
jeepney and started towards the taxi. One of the
robbers recognized the man as a police officer and
ordered his companions to shoot which they did, killing
the police officer. Pelagio later explained to his
associates that he had fled before the two (2) robbers
had completed their job because he, Pelagic, had seen
someone slip out of the house being robbed apparently
to summon the police. In a per curiam decision, the
Supreme Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from
robbery with homicide to simple robbery. The Court said:
Even the decision under appeal recites that
when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo
hurried out of the victim's house after the
robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled
from his lookout post because the pair,
Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at
the gate where the was supposed to have
stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it
was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner
of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where
then they saw Armando Manalang waiting
for them in a taxi and that it was only when

these three had taken to the said taxi, and

the cab was about to leave, that the
shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When
the homicide was committed, therefore,
Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least
intervention or participation as might justify
penalizing him likewise for the said killing.
So far as the records disclose, the
conspirators were agreed only on the
commission of robbery; there is no evidence
that homicide besides was determined by
them when they plotted the crime. All these
warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio
from any responsibility for the said killing.
(People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) ...
Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the
robbery, had abandoned the conspiracy and dissociated
himself from his co-conspirators even while the robbery
was still in process and certainly before the unfortunate
policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were
about to escape in a taxi. Because of such
abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy,
whatever may have been the subject thereof, was over
and done with, so far as concerned Pelagio.
Abandonment and dissociation are clear equivalents of
efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad,
would exculpate one from liability for the homicide but
not for the robbery.
It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the
Supreme Court resumed application and reiteration of
the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:

(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);

(2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969);
(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974);
(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976);
(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977);
(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977);
(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694
(1977);
(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979);
(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981);
(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982);
(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982);
(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984);
(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539
(1984); and
(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178
(1986).
Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by
promulgating Pelagio, as Mr. Justice Antonio had
mistakenly supposed in his concurring opinion in People
v. Adriano. 12 Examination of the cases listed above will

show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it

originated in a case involving a band (en cuadrilla), has
in fact not been limited by the Court to situations where
a band was present. Indeed, the great majority of the
above cases are conspiracy cases where the technical
elements of a band 13 were absent.
We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v.
Adriano, 15 which also need to be considered. A close
examination of the facts will show that Abalos and
Adriano do not represent true departures from the 1907
Macalalad rule.
In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long
drinking bout with two (2) other comrades got into a
taxi and directed the driver to take all four of them to
the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Bulacan, in the early
hours of the morning. Abalos was seated beside the
driver; the other three (3) were in the back seat. Two (2)
of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the
subdivision, Abalos and Mendiola then directed the
driver to enter the subdivision. Abalos signalled
Mendiola that he would hold up the driver. Abalos drew
out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at
the same time demanded the driver's earnings and
boxed him three (3) times on the back. The driver
refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried
to fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's
resistance, plunged his seven and a half inch blade
through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos
and Mendiola hastily left the taxicab, forgetting all
about the driver's earnings, and fled. The taxi driver

suffered a massive hemorrhage which brought on death.

Abalos and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of
attempted robbery with homicide. The Supreme Court
through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the conviction of
Abalos but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted
robbery, citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The
reference to Basisten in this case, however, appears
quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly found a
few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all,
whether for robbery (holdup) or for homicide. Mr. Justice
Aquino wrote:
As already noted [Abalos] said in his
confession that he was intoxicated when he
stabbed the cab driver, he and his
companions had been ng continuously
sometimes before the crime was
prepetrated. Intoxication mitigates his
liability. It was not habitual nor intentional
(Article 15, Revised Penal Code). The holdup
was not the offspring of planning and
deliberation. It was a fatal improvisation
dictated by an impromptu
impulse. 16 (Emphasis supplied).
Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a
band, there was in point of fact no occasion for
application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of
the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were
simply principals by direct participation in the
attempted robbery.
People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of
five (5) security guards of the Rice and Corn

Administration. The security guards were hacked with

an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the floor. The
malefactors numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial
court found four (4) guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. The precise question before the Court was
whether the decision of the trial court holding four (4)
persons, including one Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of
robbery with homicide and sentencing them to death
should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo
should be held guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six
(6) justices plus one (1) concurring justice held that
Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6)
other members of the Court voted for affirmance in
toto of the trial court's judgment. 17 The facts
in Adriano as found by the Court showed that there
were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of
robbery, which included Leonardo Bernardo and all the
other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one for the
commission of the multiple murder, which did not
include Leonardo Bernardo. The per curiam decision
read, in relevant part:
... The awareness that just one of them
being known and arrested would lead to the
apprehension of the other participants in the
robbery, the common design of liquidating
the possible witnesses to avoid the grim
possibility of their being all brought before
the bar of justice entered the minds of
those specifically named above, and moved
to act accordingly. Quite obviously Mariano
Domingo did nothing to prevent the killing
which he himself hinted at as the next

practical move to take following the

consummation of the robbery. The
conspiracy Lo hill, born of the exigency of
the situation, therefore clearly involved
Apolonio Adriano, Mario San Diego, Mariano
Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is
yet to be apprehended. Their respective
acts clearly were directed to the same
object and for the same purpose. Once the
conspiracy is established, which may be
done by mere circumstantial evidence, as
direct evidence is not so easily obtainable
(People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People
vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285; People vs. Mejia,
55 SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA
516; People vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the
conspirators are all liable as co-principals,
regardless of the extent and character of
their respective participation in the
commission of the crime(People vs.
Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Phones,
84 SCRA 167).
The Court, however, finds Leonardo
Bernardo seemingly unaware of the
intention to kill the guards.The Idea of
killing them arose only when Mariano
Domingo called the attention of Apolonio
Adriano to his being known by the guards,
being one of them. By that time the robbery
had been consummated, the jeep driven by
him (Leonardo Bernardo) with Plate No. J-

14362, was already loaded with bags and

carton boxes containing the stolen money...
... It was clearly only at the spur of the
moment, so to speak, that Mariano Domingo
and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San
Diego and Pedro Miranda, thought of having
to kill the guards,entirely without the
knowledge of Leonardo
Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller
and later conspiracy (to kill the five guards) within the
larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the Rice and
Corn Administration), he was found guilty of robbery
only and his sentence reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the result reached in Adriano is
compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.
What may be stressed, in resume is that the result
reached by the Court in respect of the accused Punzalan
is in line with the rule first elaborated in U.S. v.
Macalalad (1907) and most recently reaffirmed
in People v. Pecato(1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case
whose rule was over-turned the very next year after it
was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the
Court has today affirmed once more the MacalaladPecato doctrine evidences its discriminating regard for
settled rules.
That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is
important for another reason. To have disregarded
Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close to
discarding the basic rule on conspiracy, that is, once a

conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown,

then the concrete modality of participation in a crime
becomes secondary for determination of liability "the
act of one is the act of all." To require affirmative proof
that the subject of the conspiracy in this case embraced
not just robbery but also the double homicide, is to lose
sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the nature of things,
is almost always only indirectly or circumstantially
shown, by proof of concerted acts rather than by e.g., a
written plan of action. To require such affirmative proof
would also be to impose a very heavy (and quite
unnecessary) burden on our law enforcement agencies,
a burden which under present circumstances of rampant
violent crime and severely limited governmental
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law
on conspiracy is infused, in important degree, with the
objective of deterringconspiracies to commit crimes and
the implementation of such conspiracies. A man's
capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a
conspiracy to commit crime (whether or not a band, in
the technical sense of Article 296, Revised Penal Code,
materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal
group is greater than the sum total of the particular acts
of the individual members of the group. The result here
reached by the Court in respect of Punzalan may be
seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve
that objective of deterrence.
Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about
holding a man, who knowingly joins a conspiracy to
commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes which are
causally connected with the conspiracy. 20 No one
complains about the same rule in tort law. One who

joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own

the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges
his will into the common felonious intent. A person who
embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have
cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have
taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get rattled,
that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and
fight back, or that something else may go awry, and
third persons may get killed or injured in the course of
implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself
from such liability, the law requires some overt act on
the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent
commission of the second or related felony or to
abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy.
I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both
Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery
with homicide and that accordingly, both should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to Idemnify the heirs of the victims in the
amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages to
such heirs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Melencio-Herrrera, Sarmiento, and Padilla, concur and
dissent:

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a)

holding that the 1-1/2 page, single-spaced, decision of
the trial court presided by Judge Oscar Leviste,
sentencing the accused at bar to the supreme penalty
of death without specification of the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, upon which his
conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls
short of the constitutional requirement that every
decision of a court of justice clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based; (b) acquitting
the accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with
homicide on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c ) finding the
other accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of
the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.
a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole
Court en banc is unanimous as to the utter failure of the
trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to conform to the
mandatory constitutional requirement that a decision
must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is
based. Normally, in such cases, the case would have to
be remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a
new judgment that does conform to the constitutional
mandate but the Court, since all the briefs have been
filed, opted to review the record and the evidence and
to render judgment accordingly in order to avoid further
delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;

b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its

judgment finding the accused Macario Punzalan, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide, even as it reaffirms the settled doctrine
in Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as conspirators in
the commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty
as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic
principle that once a conspiracy or community of
criminal design is shown, then the actual mode of
participation in a crime of any of the accused, whether
he be a lookout posted outside the scene of the robbery,
is of no moment, since the act of one conspirator is the
act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine of the
Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v.
Macalalag and most recently affirmed in the 1987 case
of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr. Justice Feliciano in
Ms scholarly separate opinion; and
c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the
Court is confined to the case of accused Juan Escober
with ten members voting to acquit him and four
members dissenting from his acquittal. On my part, I
have given him the benefit of the doubt and voted for
his acquittal. The superior and immutable rule is that
the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by virtue of the constitutional
presumption of his innocence, which presumption must
prevail unless overturned by clear, competent and

credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main

opinion of the Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan,
the evidence as to the existence of a conspiracy
between the accused Juan Escober and the robberskillers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery
appears to be inadequate and therefore failed to
produce the required moral certainty of his guilt.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:
While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him completely.
I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the
complicity of Juan Escober in the robbery and in the
killing of two children while the robbery was underway.
It is an easy task after a crime has been consummated
for us to surmise how the mind of an accused should
have operated during crucial moments and to state how
an accused should have behaved to avoid the possibility
of his being implicated as a co-principal and conspirator.
Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and
according to predictable patterns of behaviour in real
life. The minds of ordinary persons (and I see nothing
special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused
security guard), seldom behave in predictable ways.
Seemingly negligent or even inexplicable behaviour is
not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every security
guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed
can be accused of complicity in a crime even if evil
persons choose that particular moment of indiscretion
to barge into the premises. I agree with Justice Fernan
that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan

Escober has not been proved with the degree of

certainty required under our penal laws.
I would also like to make some observations about the
Court's apparently unqualified adherence to the
precedent in the 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalad (9 Phil.
1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to 1927 cited in
the separate opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator
should not necessarily or automatically be found guilty
of everything that happens while the crime, object of
the conspiracy, is being committed.
It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to
prevent the other crime committed on the occasion of
the principal crime, object of the conspiracy, he would
be guilty as a principal in the complex crime or other
crime even if he had absolutely no part in it. I may have
no statistics to prove it but I believe
that conspiracy improperly handled could send more
innocent persons to jail than any other principle in
criminal law.For instance, many accused persons
protesting they had nothing to do with a crime have
been convicted of malversation or estafa simply
because the documents evidencing the crime somehow
passed their hands. A person who is in a stupor or is
simply not paying any attention during a drinking party
where the details of a robbery, car-napping, or murder
are planned could, in the hands of a brilliant prosecutor,
be convicted of the resulting crime and all its
consequences.
I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of
robbery with homicide. My observations are simply
aimed at an unqualified adherence to the principle that

the accused must always endeavor to prevent the other

crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew
nothing about. Or that he must run away and leave his
companions before the second crime is committed.
Every case must be judged on its separate facts and
notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a
person may still be acquitted of the other crime about
which he had no knowledge at all For instance, if the
innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had
been the children of Punzalan, certainly he cannot be
held guilty of parricide. Or if a band of robbers rape a
woman inside a house not knowing he is the wife of
their look-out, the rule on all conspirators being equally
responsible for all the consequences or happenings
during the commission of the planned crime should not
apply. The precedents fromMacalalad are impressively
cited by my teamed colleague, but I believe all judges
should still be cautioned to look beyond the unqualified
rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout or
anybody else similarly situated should be automatically
convicted for something about which he was completely
ignorant. The consequences of sending an innocent
person to j ail for a crime where he had no participation
are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an
unqualified rule.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting :
With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Fernan to the extent that it would
acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon the other hand, like
to add somewhat to the reference made in the majority

opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is

correctly held liable for robbery with homicide.
We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober.
The prosecution theory, as found by the majority
opinion, was that Juan Escober was a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with
homicide. According to the majority opinion, the
prosecution sought to prove that Escober joined in the
community of design, a conspiracy, which was shown in
respect of the other accused, by referring to the
following particular acts of Escober:
[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the
gate of the compound to his coconspirators;
[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua
behind Abuyen, the alleged mastermind,
after the gun shot; and
[3] his having volunteered the information
to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit.
The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand
gun by Abuyen was a mere ritual designed to avoid or
deflect suspicion from Escober and that Escober's
version of the incident [was] too replete with
contradictions "to merit belief"
The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the
malefactors by Escober was absolutely indispensable for
the commission of the crime of robbery and for the

killing of the two (2) children of Mr. and Mrs. Vicente

Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of
opening a gate upon hearing a knock is, of course, an
innocent gesture. It is important to bear in mind,
however, that Escober was a security guard; that he had
seen and recognized Abuyen through the peephole in
the pedestrians' gate before opening that gate; and
surely the least that can be expected of a security
guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he
must exclude from the premises being guarded persons
who have not demonstrated any lawful reason for
wanting to enter such premises. If one assumes that
Escober had not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at
the very least utterly reckless for him to have opened
the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact
that Escober was acquainted with Abuyen was no
justification for letting Abuyen and his gang come in.
Upon the other hand, the circumstance that Escober
knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that
Escober was indeed part of the criminal conspiracy if
Escober was totally unacquainted with Abuyen, that
probability would not of course exist It must further be
noted that Escober himself, who had thoughtfully left his
gun in a locker before opening the gate of the
compound, 1 did not claim that he had been coerced by
Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the
compound. 2 If he had in fact been forced into opening
the gate by Abuyen and company, it would have been
the simplest and most natural thing in the world for him
to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy,
however, conveniently explained later that he had
pointed his gun at Escober, almost apologetically, after

Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and
the other malefactors into the compound.
Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and
thereupon turning to the garage from whence the sound
of the shot came, she saw Abuyen walking towards the
gate with Escober about a meter behind. 3 It must not
escape notice there was no suggestion by any
witness that Escober was then chasing and trying to
capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to his
duties might be expected at least to try to do. The
majority opinion does try to suggest that because Mrs.
Lina Chua, in the separate trial of Abuyen, had said that
Abuyen and Escober were warning towards the gate;
they were in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be
regarded as 'indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte Escober
himself had not claimed that he had somehow
summoned his courage and sought to capture Abuyen
immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober,
fired a shot at him but had missed. Thus, the suggested
interpretation would seem unreal and excessively
generous to Escober. There was also no evidence that
Escober was trying to flee or hide himself from Abuyen.
The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to
be believed at all, was that Escober was acting in
concert with Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the
escape of Abuyen and his companions.
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the
prosecution. The majority opinion, however, rejects
totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as suffer[ing] from
inaccuracy and as being susceptible to other
interpretations" in the premises, when "taken in

conjunction with the extrajudicial confession of Abuyen."

It must be observed, with respect, that the majority
opinion so discarded Mrs. Chua's testimony upon
the totally speculative ground that it is not contrary to
human psychology and experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua
having lost two (2) of her children to the robbers, would
in seeking vengeance deliberately and baselessly
implicate Escober in the robbery and the killings as a
"sacrificial lamb." There appears no basis for this
speculation at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs. Chua's
testimony runs counter to the prevailing jurisprudence
which has been summed up in the following terms
inPeople v. Roxas:
... Neither is the relationship of Victorino and
Paterno to the deceased sufficient to render
their testimony doubtful nor enough to
discredit their credibility. The credibility of
witnesses cannot be assailed as prejudiced
simply because of their close relation to the
victim. For it is not to be lightly supposed
that the relatives of the deceased would
callously violate their conscience to avenge
the death of a dear one by blaming it on
persons whom they know to be innocent. 4
It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had
fired a shot, presumably in the air, in order to create the
impression that Escober was not part of the conspiracy.
Escober claimed that the shot had been fired
at him while he was inside the van in the garage, and
advised Mrs. Chua that he had not been hit by the
shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this

connection is that if the robbers had really wanted to kill

Escober in order to prevent Escober's later Identifying
them, there was absolutely nothing to prevent them
from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua
had been stabbed to death brutally to prevent them
from Identifying the robbers; yet, if E scober is to be
believed, the robbers made no more than a token, half
hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an adult male and
a security guard, would not Identify them. Escober was
not even tied up and blind-folded. It is hence difficult to
appreciate the "keen observation" of Escober's counsel
that Escober would be the "stupidest person on earth" if
he allowed himself "to be shot by a gunto avoid
suspicion that he was in cahoots with the malefactors."
Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No bullet hole
was found in the van where Escober claimed to have
been crouching when Abuyen shot at him. 6 Upon the
other hand, a shot fired in the air can only be regarded
as a cheap method for supporting a profession of
innocence on the part of Escober. Escober's counsel was
simply begging the question.
In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon
statements made by co-accused Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon
an extrajudicial statement of Abuyen (accused in a
separate criminal case) to support the position that the
gun play was not mere play-acting and that Escober was
not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements
coming from Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be
taken with great caution. For it must be recalled that the
testimony of accomplicesprincipals confederates or
conspirators while admissible and competent, comes

from a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice

Malcolm cautioned, such testimony must be "scrutinized
with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not
corroborated,credibility is affected."7 It should also be
pointed out that the statement of Punzalan adduced in
this connection in the majority opinion,
appearsdisjointed and totally unrelated to the question
in response to which it was given. The statement of
Punzalan, in other words, would appear, not
spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority
opinion) but rather to have been deliberately thrown in
for the purpose of exculpating Escober. Thus:
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa
bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba
po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to
Escober] nakita mong umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga
sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa
akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi
ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman
pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil
hindi ko po alam nga ang
dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto
kong mahuli yung Abuyen
sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang
utak eh. (Emphasis supplied)
To accept and to accord full credence to statements of
proven conspirators to all appearances designed to
avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who had made
the robbery and double homicide possible to begin with,
while rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina
Chua solely because she was the mother of the slain
children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If one
must, without requiring proof, impute a 'sense of justice
and fairness' to Abuyen from whose mind the
conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms were
splattered with the blood of the two (2) young children
of Mrs. Lina Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to
assume casually that Mrs. Lina Chua was bereft of that
same 'sense of justice and fairness."
While each of the acts of Escober cited by the
prosecution might not, considered in isolation from the
others, be sufficient to show participation in the
common criminal design, it is submitted that where
those acts areconsidered together, and viewed in the
light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and their other two
companions did, and did not do, they constitute more
than adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion

of the trial court that Escober was guilty. After all, it was
not this Court but the trial judge who examined all the
evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his
conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper,
must be given great weight.
We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion
finds guilty of robbery with homicide. There is no
question that Punzalan participated in the common
design to commit robbery. He acted as lookout for the
gang of robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house
which was ransacked and where the victims were slain;
unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual
stabbing of the two (2) innocent children of Vicente and
Lina Chua. Even so, the majority opinion, stressing that
Punzalan's participation in the conspiracy to commit
robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him
responsible for robbery with double homicide.
Because the above rule on this matter and its
underlying ratio have not always been well understood
and because a handful of decisions of this Court contain
language or have reached results which, at first glance,
may seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it
should be useful to examine in some detail the
development of that rule and to mark out its present
scope and shape.
The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously
reaffirmed by the Court en banc most recently in People
v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June 1987) in the
following terms:

The crime committed by the accused is

Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1), of the
Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was shot
to death during the robbery. We have
repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide
resulted during or because of the robbery,
even if the killing is by mere accident,
robbery with homicide is committed; it is
only the result obtained, without reference
or distincttion as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be
taken into consideration. (People vs.
Guiapar, No. L-35465, May 31,1984,129
SCRA 539, 553554 [1984].)
Further, whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the commission of the
crime are also guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually
take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent
the homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs.
Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [19261; and U.S. vs.
Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) In this instance,
the evidence on record is bereft of any
showing that any of the accused tried to
prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What is
shown instead is that they merely stood
watching and did nothing when one of their

companions shot the victim. (T.s.n. session

of October 21, 1974, 29; Deposition, Id., 3,
5.) Additionally, the term 'homicide' in
robbery with homicide should be understood
as a generic term and includes murder.
(People vs. Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25,
1981, 106 SCRA 22 [1981]. )
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated
upon as long ago as 8 October 1907 in U.S. v.
Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the
Supreme Court, said:
... While it does not appear that this
defendant [Fructizoso Esguerra] himself
struck the fatal blow which caused the
death of Rufino Calderon he must be
adjudged guilty as principal of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide with which
he is charged, it having been proved that he
was present, ad.ded, abetted, and took part
therein. The testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution fully establishes the guilt of
the defendant as a principal in the
commission of the robbery, and, even were
we to disregard his confession, which he
repudiated at the trial of' the case, and
wherein he admitted he was present at the
killing of Rufino Calderon, we would,
nevertheless, be compelled to find him

guilty of the crime of robo con homicide

(robbery with homicide). The supreme court
of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the
Penal Code touching the complex crime of
robo con homicidio has frequently decided
that, where the complex crime has been
committed, all those who look part as
principals in the commission of the robbery
are guilty as principals in the commission of
the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it
appears that the endeavored to prevent the
unlawful killing. (Decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, April 30 and February 23,
1872, and June 19, 1890. See also Viada,
vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).
Accepting as true the exculpatory
statements of the accused in his repudiated
confession, it does not appear therefrom
that he made any genuine effort to prevent
the murder of Rufino Calderon.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until
1925 when U.S. v. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) was
decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice Romualdez wrote, for
the Court:
The liability of the other appellants Andres
Pasquin Placido Heusca Vicente Caballero
and Alejandro Picate, consist in having

conspired and taken part in the robbery.

They must not be held responsible for the
homicide which was not the subject matter
of their conspiracy and in which they did not
have any intervention, for it was performed
by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper
punishment, therefore, for them is the
penalty for robbery in band within the limits
of which the trial court has imposed upon
them. 9
But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated
from Macalalad, the Supreme Court went back to the
Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked and applied the
Macalalad rule without even mentioning the deviation in
Basisten:
xxx xxx xxx
In the first place it may be said that the
evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause clearly shows that the appellants are
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide
and must therefore be punished in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1 of article 503 of the Penal Code. It is
clearly established that the appellants,
together with an armed band of more than
four persons, committed a robbery and that
on the occasion of such robbery a homicide
was committed. The crime which they
committed therefore falls clearly within the
provisions of said article. (Decision of the

Supreme Court of Spain, July 13, 1871; 3

Viada, Commentaries on the Penal Code, p.
347.) Whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all principals in the
commission of the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide, although they did
not actually take part in the homicide,
unless it clearly appeared that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide. 10
From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied
and re-applied many times by the Court. The following
list does not purport to be exhaustive:
1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940);
2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952);
3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953);
4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);
5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L8919,28 September 1956; 52 O.G. 6532
(1956);
6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958);
7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534
(1960);

8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393

(1961); and
9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962).
In 1967, People v. Pelagic, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v.
Basisten, was indeed cited by the Court. A close scrutiny
of the facts in Pelagio will, however, show that the result
there reached does not really represent a departure
from theMacalalad rule which, as noted above, had
been reiterated many times since the
1925 Basisten case.
Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a
particular house in G. Villanueva St., Pasay City. Only
Pelagio and three (3) others actually carried out the
robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as the lookout and
posted himself at the gate of the house; two (2) others
actually entered the victim's premises; the fourth was
ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the
getaway. The robbery was carried out as planned. But,
when the two (2) robbers who had gone up the house
came down and out into the street, they failed to find
Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the
next block where they found the fourth conspirator
waiting for them inside a taxi. The two (2) robbers
boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave,
however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite direction
and blocked the taxi's way. A man alighted from the
jeepney and started towards the taxi. One of the
robbers recognized the man as a police officer and
ordered his companions to shoot which they did, killing
the police officer. Pelagio later explained to his
associates that he had fled before the two (2) robbers

had completed their job because he, Pelagic, had seen

someone slip out of the house being robbed apparently
to summon the police. In a per curiam decision, the
Supreme Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from
robbery with homicide to simple robbery. The Court said:
Even the decision under appeal recites that
when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo
hurried out of the victim's house after the
robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled
from his lookout post because the pair,
Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at
the gate where the was supposed to have
stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it
was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner
of Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where
then they saw Armando Manalang waiting
for them in a taxi and that it was only when
these three had taken to the said taxi, and
the cab was about to leave, that the
shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When
the homicide was committed, therefore,
Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least
intervention or participation as might justify
penalizing him likewise for the said killing.
So far as the records disclose, the
conspirators were agreed only on the
commission of robbery; there is no evidence
that homicide besides was determined by
them when they plotted the crime. All these
warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio

from any responsibility for the said killing.

(People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) ...
Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the
robbery, had abandoned the conspiracy and dissociated
himself from his co-conspirators even while the robbery
was still in process and certainly before the unfortunate
policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were
about to escape in a taxi. Because of such
abandonment and dissociation, the conspiracy,
whatever may have been the subject thereof, was over
and done with, so far as concerned Pelagio.
Abandonment and dissociation are clear equivalents of
efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad,
would exculpate one from liability for the homicide but
not for the robbery.
It may be observed that very soon after Pelagic, the
Supreme Court resumed application and reiteration of
the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:
(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);
(2) People v..Pujinio, 27SCRA1186(1969);
(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974);
(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976);
(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977);
(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977);

(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694

(1977);
(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979);
(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981);
(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982);
(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982);
(12) People Lot Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984);
(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539
(1984); and
(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178
(1986).
Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by
promulgating Pelagio, as Mr. Justice Antonio had
mistakenly supposed in his concurring opinion in People
v. Adriano. 12 Examination of the cases listed above will
show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it
originated in a case involving a band (en cuadrilla), has
in fact not been limited by the Court to situations where
a band was present. Indeed, the great majority of the
above cases are conspiracy cases where the technical
elements of a band 13 were absent.

We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v.

Adriano, 15 which also need to be considered. A close
examination of the facts will show that Abalos and
Adriano do not represent true departures from the 1907
Macalalad rule.
In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long
drinking bout with two (2) other comrades got into a
taxi and directed the driver to take all four of them to
the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Bulacan, in the early
hours of the morning. Abalos was seated beside the
driver; the other three (3) were in the back seat. Two (2)
of the four (4) comrades got off before reaching the
subdivision, Abalos and Mendiola then directed the
driver to enter the subdivision. Abalos signalled
Mendiola that he would hold up the driver. Abalos drew
out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at
the same time demanded the driver's earnings and
boxed him three (3) times on the back. The driver
refused to surrender his earnings and apparently tried
to fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's
resistance, plunged his seven and a half inch blade
through the driver's right cheek. Unnerved by the
sudden, profuse bleeding of the, wounded driver, Abalos
and Mendiola hastily left the taxicab, forgetting all
about the driver's earnings, and fled. The taxi driver
suffered a massive hemorrhage which brought on death.
Abalos and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of
attempted robbery with homicide. The Supreme Court
through then Mr. Justice Aquino upheld the conviction of
Abalos but found Mendiola guilty only of attempted
robbery, citing in this connection U.S. v. Basisten. The
reference to Basisten in this case, however, appears

quite unnecessary for the Court had explicitly found a

few pages that there in fact was no conspiracy at all,
whether for robbery (holdup) or for homicide. Mr. Justice
Aquino wrote:
As already noted [Abalos] said in his
confession that he was intoxicated when he
stabbed the cab driver, he and his
companions had been ng continuously
sometimes before the crime was
prepetrated. Intoxication mitigates his
liability. It was not habitual nor intentional
(Article 15, Revised Penal Code). The holdup
was not the offspring of planning and
deliberation. It was a fatal improvisation
dictated by an impromptu
impulse. 16 (Emphasis supplied).
Since there was neither conspiracy the presence of a
band, there was in point of fact no occasion for
application of the doctrine of Macalalad nor of
the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were
simply principals by direct participation in the
attempted robbery.
People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of
five (5) security guards of the Rice and Corn
Administration. The security guards were hacked with
an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the floor. The
malefactors numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial
court found four (4) guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. The precise question before the Court was
whether the decision of the trial court holding four (4)
persons, including one Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of

robbery with homicide and sentencing them to death

should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo
should be held guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six
(6) justices plus one (1) concurring justice held that
Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple robbery. Six (6)
other members of the Court voted for affirmance in
toto of the trial court's judgment. 17 The facts
in Adriano as found by the Court showed that there
were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of
robbery, which included Leonardo Bernardo and all the
other malefactors; 18 another, smaller, one for the
commission of the multiple murder, which did not
include Leonardo Bernardo. The per curiam decision
read, in relevant part:
... The awareness that just one of them
being known and arrested would lead to the
apprehension of the other participants in the
robbery, the common design of liquidating
the possible witnesses to avoid the grim
possibility of their being all brought before
the bar of justice entered the minds of
those specifically named above, and moved
to act accordingly. Quite obviously Mariano
Domingo did nothing to prevent the killing
which he himself hinted at as the next
practical move to take following the
consummation of the robbery. The
conspiracy Lo hill, born of the exigency of
the situation, therefore clearly involved
Apolonio Adriano, Mario San Diego, Mariano
Domingo and possibly Pedro Miranda who is
yet to be apprehended. Their respective

acts clearly were directed to the same

object and for the same purpose. Once the
conspiracy is established, which may be
done by mere circumstantial evidence, as
direct evidence is not so easily obtainable
(People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People
vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285; People vs. Mejia,
55 SCRA 453; People vs. Carino, 55 SCRA
516; People vs. Cadag, 2 SC RA 388), the
conspirators are all liable as co-principals,
regardless of the extent and character of
their respective participation in the
commission of the crime(People vs.
Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Phones,
84 SCRA 167).
The Court, however, finds Leonardo
Bernardo seemingly unaware of the
intention to kill the guards.The Idea of
killing them arose only when Mariano
Domingo called the attention of Apolonio
Adriano to his being known by the guards,
being one of them. By that time the robbery
had been consummated, the jeep driven by
him (Leonardo Bernardo) with Plate No. J14362, was already loaded with bags and
carton boxes containing the stolen money...
... It was clearly only at the spur of the
moment, so to speak, that Mariano Domingo
and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San
Diego and Pedro Miranda, thought of having
to kill the guards,entirely without the

knowledge of Leonardo
Bernardo... 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller
and later conspiracy (to kill the five guards) within the
larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of the Rice and
Corn Administration), he was found guilty of robbery
only and his sentence reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the result reached in Adriano is
compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.
What may be stressed, in resume is that the result
reached by the Court in respect of the accused Punzalan
is in line with the rule first elaborated in U.S. v.
Macalalad (1907) and most recently reaffirmed
in People v. Pecato(1987,). U.S. v. Basisten, a case
whose rule was over-turned the very next year after it
was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That the
Court has today affirmed once more the MacalaladPecato doctrine evidences its discriminating regard for
settled rules.
That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is
important for another reason. To have disregarded
Macalalad-Pecato would have come too close to
discarding the basic rule on conspiracy, that is, once a
conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown,
then the concrete modality of participation in a crime
becomes secondary for determination of liability "the
act of one is the act of all." To require affirmative proof
that the subject of the conspiracy in this case embraced
not just robbery but also the double homicide, is to lose
sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the nature of things,
is almost always only indirectly or circumstantially

shown, by proof of concerted acts rather than by e.g., a

written plan of action. To require such affirmative proof
would also be to impose a very heavy (and quite
unnecessary) burden on our law enforcement agencies,
a burden which under present circumstances of rampant
violent crime and severely limited governmental
resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law
on conspiracy is infused, in important degree, with the
objective of deterringconspiracies to commit crimes and
the implementation of such conspiracies. A man's
capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a
conspiracy to commit crime (whether or not a band, in
the technical sense of Article 296, Revised Penal Code,
materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal
group is greater than the sum total of the particular acts
of the individual members of the group. The result here
reached by the Court in respect of Punzalan may be
seen to reinforce the capability of our law to achieve
that objective of deterrence.
Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about
holding a man, who knowingly joins a conspiracy to
commit a crime, responsible for all the crimes which are
causally connected with the conspiracy. 20 No one
complains about the same rule in tort law. One who
joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co- conspirators; he merges
his will into the common felonious intent. A person who
embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have
cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have
taken his chances that a co-conspirator may get rattled,
that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and
fight back, or that something else may go awry, and

third persons may get killed or injured in the course of

implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself
from such liability, the law requires some overt act on
the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent
commission of the second or related felony or to
abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy.
I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court that both
Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery
with homicide and that accordingly, both should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to Idemnify the heirs of the victims in the
amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages to
such heirs in the amount of P200,000.00.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126531. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA
CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS
alias KIRAT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO

PUNZALAN Y ZACARIAS alias Kirat were convicted of
murder by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the
killing of Eric Hierro. Both accused were sentenced to
death and ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the
heirs
of
Eric
Hierro P50,000.00
plus P35,000.00
for actual damages, P100,000.00 for moral damages
and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages. The case is
now with us on automatic review.
The records show that at around 6:00 oclock in the
evening of 21 May 1995 Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal
and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in the house of
the latter. Sometime later, Hierro and Visbal went out to
buy mango at a nearby sari-sari store. Accused Gilbert
Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and a certain Edwin Menes
were at the time in front of the store. As Menes
approached Hierro the latter warned Menes, Dont touch
me, my clothes will get dirty. Suddenly Menes punched
Hierro on the face, followed by Elijorde who also boxed
Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who kicked Hierro at
the back. Hierro and Visbal ran for their lives. They
sought shelter at Contemplados house. After some three
(3) minutes, Hierro went out of the house to go home
together with Visbal and the latters wife.
As they walked home, Visbal noticed the accused
Elijorde, Punzalan and Menes waiting for them. As Hierro
and company drew near, Punzalan kicked Hierro at the
back for the second time. Visbal tried to retaliate by
punching Punzalan on the face but was held back by his
wife. Hierro ran away pursued by Elijorde. They were
followed by Visbal. Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the

back. When Hierro fell down, Elijorde placed himself on

top of Hierro who was now raising his arms defensively
and pleading, Maawa na kayo, huwag ninyo akong
patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo. Despite the
pleas of Hierro for mercy, Elijorde stabbed him with a
knife on the chest and then fled. Visbal and his wife
brought Hierro to the hospital where he died soon after.
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue,
Bulacan, conducted a post-mortem examination of Eric
Hierro, and reported that the cause of his death was
shock resulting from multiple stab wounds in the thorax
penetrating the aorta and vena cava.[1]
Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes
alias Nonong[2] were
accordingly
charged
in
an
Information for murder of Eric Hierro qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. But only Elijorde and Punzalan were arrested
and tried.Menes has since remained at large.
Both accused contend that the court a quo erred in
finding that treachery qualified the killing of Hierro to
murder, and in finding Punzalan guilty of murder by
reason of conspiracy with Elijorde. The defense argues
that Punzalan did not conspire with Elijorde because the
only participation of Punzalan in the commission of the
offense was his kicking of Hierro twice: first, after Hierro
was boxed by Elijorde and Menes in front of the nearby
sari sari store, and the second time, when Hierro was on
his way home; that Punzalan remained in the place
where he kicked Hierro and did nothing more; that he
did not join or cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing and
stabbing the deceased; and, that the acts of kicking

Hierro were neither in pursuance of the same criminal

design of Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the
attainment of the same objective of killing Hierro.

Q: Now, you said that Eric Hierro went to the store to

buy mango, do you know the reason why there
was a boxing incident?

Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan,

the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is
guilty of murder. To convict him as a principal by direct
participation in the instant case, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and his co-accused Elijorde be
proved. That, precisely, is wanting in the present
case. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the
crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by conjecture.[3] To hold an accused guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.[4] Hence, conspiracy exists
in a situation where at the time the malefactors were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to
bring about the death of the victim.[5] In a great majority
of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts
done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable
inference that the doers thereof were acting with a
common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every
case is determining whether the particular acts
established by the requisite quantum of proof do
reasonably yield that inference.[6]

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Clearly, the testimony of eyewitness Benjamin Visbal

narrated the circumstances surrounding the killing of
Hierro, to wit:

Q: What was the reason?

A: When Nongnong approached Eric, Eric stated,
"Dont touch me, my clothes will become dirty."
Q: Who is this Nongnong?
A: Edwin Meneses,[7] Your Honor.
Q: When Eric Hierro said that what did
Menes(es ) do?

Edwin

A: He suddenly punched Eric Hierro.

Q: When Eric Hierro (was) punched what did this
Gilbert Elijorde do?
A: Gilbert Elijorde also punched Eric Hierro.
Q: How about Reynaldo Punzalan?
A: Reynaldo Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back, Your
Honor.
Q: That was during the first incident?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: You mean to say they were three at that time?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Now, after that Eric Hierro went home?

A: The three of them were waiting for Eric Hierro but

during the chasing it was only Gilbert Elijorde who
chased us.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q; What did Edwin do during the second incident?

Q: How long did Eric Hierro stayed (sic) at that place?

A: He did nothing.

A: For about three (3) minutes, Your Honor.

Q: How about Kirat?

Q: When Eric Hierro went out you went with him

together with Eric Hierro?

A: He kicked Eric Hierro at the back.

Q: After that what did you do?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Together with your wife?

A: I cant (sic) do anything, Your Honor, because I was

being held by my wife.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How about Eric Hierro what did he do?

Q: When the three of you went out what happened?

A: He ran away x x x x

A: While we were walking home this Kirat (Reynaldo

Punzalan) suddenly kicked Eric Hierro at the back.

Q: While Eric Hierro was running did you see that

Gilbert stab Eric at the back?

Q: Do you mean to say aside from the first incident

Kirat kicked Eric Hierro, (during) the second
incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: That was the first stab that was made by Gilbert is
that correct?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: When you were approaching, how many of them
were there waiting for Eric Hierro?

Q: What happened to Eric when he was stabbed at

the back?
A: He continued running, Your Honor.

Q: And how about Gilbert what did Gilbert do?

A: He continued chasing, Your Honor.
Q: How about your wife where was your wife?
A: At my back, Your Honor.
Q: When you met Eric Hierro at a certain point what
did you actually see?
A: That was when I saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro right
on the chest.
Q: And when Eric Hierro was already lying (facing?)
up?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And Gilbert was on top of Eric Hierro?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How many times?
A: Only once, Your Honor.
Q: During those incidents where was Kirat?
A: He did not run after Eric Hierro. He remained in
front of the house of my cousin Rodel.

On the basis of the above testimony, the only

involvement of Punzalan was kicking Hierro at the back
before the latter was pursued and stabbed by accused
Elijorde. After kicking the victim, Punzalan remained
where he was and did not cooperate with Elijorde
in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter would be
killed. There is no other evidence to show unity of
purpose and design between Punzalan and Elijorde in
the execution of the killing, which is essential to
establish conspiracy. His act of kicking Hierro prior to
the actual stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself
demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose
and action. For it is possible that the accused Punzalan
had no knowledge of the common design, if there was
any, nor of the intended assault which was committed in
a place far from where he was.The mere kicking does
not necessarily prove intention to kill. The evidence
does not show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a
knife and that he intended to use it to stab the victim.
[8]
Neither can Punzalan be considered an accomplice in
the crime of murder. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice in the commission of the
offense, the following requisites must concur: (a)
community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice. The cooperation that the law
punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be

executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable

either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as
an accomplice that the accused must unite with the
criminal
design
of
the
principal
by
direct
participation. There is nothing on record to show that
accused Punzalan knew that Elijorde was going to stab
Hierro, thus creating serious doubt on Punzalans
criminal intent.[9]
In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to
commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from
different acts directed against one and the same person
is individual and not collective, and that each of the
participants is liable only for his own acts.
[10]
Consequently, accused Punzalan must be absolved
from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro. It may be
emphasized that at the time accused Elijorde intervened
in the assault, Punzalan had already desisted from his
own acts of aggression. He did nothing in fact to assist
Elijorde in the immediate commission of the
murder. Moreover, the act of kicking by Punzalan prior
to the actual stabbing by Elijorde was evidently done
without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of
the latter as that design had not yet been revealed prior
to the killing of Hierro.
As regards the kicking of the victim by Punzalan,
which the latter admits, there is nothing on record to
show that the kicking resulted in any injury on any part
of the body of Hierro. Neither is there any evidence that
the victim was hit at all when Punzalan kicked him. Of
what then can Punzalan be held liable?

With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde,

the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended
the killing of Hierro thus qualifying the crime to
murder. Treachery exists when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make. The fact that a verbal
confrontation accompanied by physical assault by the
group of Elijorde preceded the actual killing did not
negate the treacherous character of the stabbing which
resulted in the death of Hierro. After the first physical
assault which sent Hierro retreating and seeking shelter
in the house of a friend, the victim did not expect that
the accused would persist in inflicting harm upon him
who, unaware of the impending danger, proceeded
home with his friends. Unfortunately, however, Elijorde
was waiting for the deceased and pursued him to his
end. After stabbing Hierro at the back, and if only to
ensure the success of his criminal design, accused
Elijorde persistently chased his unarmed quarry until he
finally overpowered his victim and delivered the fatal
stab on his chest. In one case, treachery was present
where the accused stabbed the victim with a bladed
weapon even as his hands were raised and he was
pleading for mercy.[11] In another case where the
accused who was armed with a revolver had an
altercation with the victim, fired at him, pursued
him, and
when
cornered
he
(victim) threw himself on the floor, raised his hands and
begged the defendant not to shoot him as he was
already wounded, but the malefactor just the same shot

him thrice, we held that there was treachery in the

killing.[12]
We likewise agree with the trial court when it
disregarded the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superiorstrength alleged in
the Information. No sufficient evidence exists to show
that the requisites of evident premeditation were
present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender decided
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating
that he had clung to his determination to commit it;
and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and for his conscience
to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to
hearken to its warnings.[13] Where there is no showing
that the accused Elijorde prior to the night of the
commission of the crime resolved to kill the victim nor
proof that such killing was the result of meditation,
calculation or resolution on his part, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated against him.
[14]
Moreover, the time interval of three (3) minutes
between the first and the second assault on Hierro is too
brief to have enabled Elijorde to ponder over what he
intended to do with Hierro. The circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is absorbed in treachery; hence, it
cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating
circumstance when treachery is already present.[15]
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 is reclusion
perpetua to death. As regards the accused Gilbert
Elijorde, the killing although qualified by treachery was

not attended by any generic modifying circumstance;

consequently, the penalty to be imposed upon him must
be the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.[16] With
respect to the accused Reynaldo Punzalan, he should be
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence.
Although not objected to by the accused, we modify
the award of damages adjudged by the court a quo in
favor of the heirs of the victim, particularly with regard
to the moral and exemplary damages. The award
of P100,000.00 for moral damages may seem excessive
considering the purpose of the award which is not to
enrich the heirs but to compensate them for injuries to
their feelings.[17] For this reason, an award of P50,000.00
may be adequate and reasonable. [18] The exemplary
damages awarded by the trial court may be deleted
since they are granted only when the crime is
committed with one (1) or more aggravating
circumstances. In the instant case, treachery may no
longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance
since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance
in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which
would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary
damages was already absorbed in the treachery. [19] But
the indemnity for death fixed at P50,000.00 and the
actual damages representing uncontested funeral
expenses of P35,000.00 should be affirmed.
On the part of accused Reynaldo Punzalan as there
is no finding of criminal responsibility against him, only
accused Gilbert Elijorde should bear the liability for such

civil indemnity as well as the actual and moral

damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a
quo is MODIFIED. Accused GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA
CRUZ is found GUILTY of MURDER and is accordingly
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused REYNALDO
PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged and is ordered RELEASED FROM CUSTODY
IMMEDIATELY unless legally held for another cause. In
this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report
to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days
from receipt hereof. Accused ELIJORDE is solely held
responsible for the payment to the heirs of the victim
Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, P35,000.00
for
actual
damages
and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERT CRISANTO D. LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATOZ
TRADINGCORPORATION, respondents.[G.R.
No. 157781. April 11, 2005]FACTS:
Lee is Atoz Trading Corporations sales manager.
Having p ersonally found Ocean Feed Mills, Lee
handled said account. Whenever the Ocean Feed Mills remit
their payment, it goes to Lees account at UCPB and then Lee
would withdraw that money from UCPB, sometimes in cash and
sometimes in the form of managers check payable to Atoz
Trading. However, during the trial, Atoz Trading
Corporations cashier testified that she did not receive
any payment from Ocean Feed Mills. When Lee ceased
reporting for work, Atoz audited some of the accounts handled
by him. It was then that Atoz discovered Ocean Feed

Mills unpaid account. Atoz thus notified Ocean Feed Mills

that Lee was no longer connected with the corporation, and
advised it to verify its accounts. However, Ocean Feed
Mills informed Atoz that they have already fully settled
their accounts and even made over payments. The
President of Atoz claimed that he went to Paraaque,
accompanied by his counsel and some policemen, and
tried to locate Lee and that upon finding him they asked
him to remit the payments made by Ocean Feed Mills
to Atoz Trading Corporation. The trial court rendered
judgment finding Lee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine
(9)counts of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner
appealed the decision which the CA dismissed, hence this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can be convicted for the crime
of estafa thru conversion(art. 315, par. 1-[b] of the
revised penal code), lacking the element of formal
demand before the filing of the cases against him.
RULING:
The petition was denied for lack of merit.Contrary to
petitioners proposition, prior demand need not be
made formally. Demand is not an element of the felony
or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal
complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be
convicted of the felony under Article315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or
property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary where there is evidence of
misappropriation or conversion. However, failure to
account upon demand, for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
Demand need not be formal. It may be verbal. In
Barrameda v. Court of Appeals,

the Court ruled that even a query as to the whereabouts

of the money is tantamount to a demand. In the present
case, the prosecution adduced proof upon crossexamination of the petitioner Lee that he failed to return
the funds held in trust before the complaint for estafa
was filed against him. Further, the cashier of Atoz
Trading Corporation stated that the accused did not
remit the payments of Ocean. It is evident that the
accused assumed the right to dispose of the remittances as
if it were his own, thus, committing conversion with
unfaithfulness and a clear breach of trust.

cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears,

however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections for the position of member of
the House of Representatives of the Third district of
Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for
Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to
have merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A.
No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Teves vs. Comelec

FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of
Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March
30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition
to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section
3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division
disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the

HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within
the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to

society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was
convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official

or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest.

xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision
are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the
public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such
an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest.

However, conviction under the second mode does not

automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in
the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use
his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary
or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he
intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by
transferring the management thereof to his wife
considering that the said transfer occurred before the
effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of
such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section
3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43530

August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on
appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and
sentencing him to suffer two years and four months
of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of
ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an
habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the
law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose
Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and
C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the
accused in the act of making an opening with an iron
bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the
last named street. At that time the owner of the store,
Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The
accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and
in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and
placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared

unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial
judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting
attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that,
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense
by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation. The attempt to commit
an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical
fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no
doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he had started to
make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which,
due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did
not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But
it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal
sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish
its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which,
upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of

entering by means of force or violence another person's

dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this
offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of
some personal property belonging to another. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the record from which
such purpose of the accused may reasonably be
inferred. From the fact established and stated in the
decision, that the accused on the day in question was
making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall
of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical
conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by
means of force said store against the will of its owner.
That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering
the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the
inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is
nothing in the record to justify a concrete
finding.1avvphil.et
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in
offenses not consummated, as the material
damage is wanting, the nature of the action
intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from
the nature of the acts executed (accion medio).
Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that
by their very nature, by the facts to which they
are related, by the circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things
connected therewith, they must show without any
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation
of a crime. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against

the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as

a punishable act, must not and can not furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted nor
frustrated crimes. The relation existing between
the facts submitted for appreciation and the
offense which said facts are supposed to produce
must be direct; the intention must be ascertained
from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in
order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice,
that the mind be able to directly infer from them
the intention of the perpetrator to cause a
particular injury. This must have been the
intention of the legislator in requiring that in order
for an attempt to exist, the offender must
commence the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts
performed must be such that, without the intent
to commit an offense, they would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he
says that "the overt acts leading to the commission of
the offense, are not punished except when they are
aimed directly to its execution, and therefore they must
have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense."
Considering says the Supreme Court of Spain in
its decision of March 21, 1892 that in order to
declare that such and such overt acts constitute
an attempted offense it is necessary that their
objective be known and established, or that said
acts be of such nature that they themselves
should obviously disclose the criminal objective

necessarily intended, said objective and finality to

serve as ground for the designation of the offense:
....
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so
hold that the fact under consideration does not
constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to
dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606,
and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein
cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this
offense is committed when a private person shall enter
the dwelling of another against the latter's will. The
accused may be convicted and sentenced for an
attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the
evidence and the following allegation contained in the
information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar
forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and
unfastening another for the purpose of entering said
store ... and that the accused did not succeed in
entering the store due to the presence of the policeman
on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise
produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly
approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances
of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is
presumed. (U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S.vs. Silvano,
31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs.
Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215;
U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must
be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions,
inasmuch as the record shows that several final
judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered
against him and in his favor, the mitigating

circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the

wall should not be taken into consideration as an
aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very
fact which in this case constitutes the offense of
attempted trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the
consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if
committed with force, is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty
corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to
degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Because of the presence
of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating
circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its
maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same
Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of
his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and
the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass
to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the
aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
sentenced to three months and one day of arresto
mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay
the costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

That on or about the 28th day of October,

1990 at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, at Barangay Bonga-Lower,
Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with the use of bladed weapon, with lewd
design and intent to lay with NATIVIDAD B.
BAAL, a married woman, by means of
force, threats and intimidation did then and
there willfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge with the
aforesaid Natividad B. Baal against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 106493 September 8, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO DIO Y BOTABARA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

(p. 1, Rollo)

MELO, J.:

The narration of the factual backdrop by the Office of

the Solicitor General supported as it is by the
evidentiary record, is hereby adopted, to wit:

For the non-payment of the meager debt of P1,00.00,

accused-appellant Ernesto Dio would have Us believe
that the alleged victim of a violacion de una
mujer voluntarily offered her body as payment therefor
on October 28, 1990. To bolster this theory of consent to
the sexual conjugation, accused-appellant claims in the
appeal before Us that he and Natividad Baal are lovers.
Thus, accused-appellant finds it ironic to have been
charged with rape supposedly consummated in this
manner:

On October 28, 1990 at around 9:00 o'clock

in the morning in Lower Bonga, Bacacay,
Albay, complainant Natividad Baal was
tethering the carabao in the place where it
wallowed in the mud about sixty (60)
meters away from her house. The area was
filled with coconuts and anahaw trees
typical of a provincial setting (pp. 6-7, TSN,
Jan. 27, 1992).
While she was watching the carabao,
appellant suddenly appeared from behind
her and immediately choked her neck. He

then removed his left hand and placed it on

her mouth. With the used of his right hand,
he got a knife and poked it on her neck. She
was not able to scream as she was
overwhelmed by fear. He then dragged her
to an area where there were so many
anahaw trees. Upon reaching there, he
pushed her down and pinned her with his
body. He then lifted her skirt and tore the
panty she was wearing. With the knife still
poked at her neck, he succeeded in raping
her in a kneeling position. She tried in vain
to push him away but she was overpowered
by him (pp. 7-9, TSN, Ibid.).
After complainant was raped, she was
threatened by appellant not to report the
matter to anyone otherwise he will kill all
the members of her family. He then walked
away casually (p. 11, TSN, Ibid.).
After appellant had gone away, complainant
went to the house of her parents-in-law.
After arriving thereat, she was informed that
her husband had already left for the cockpit.
She then went home without telling them of
the incident (pp. 11-12, TSN, Ibid.).
When complainant's husband arrived at
around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day, she told him of the incident. Her
husband became furious but they could not
decide whether or not they should report
the matter to the police for fear of any

retaliation appellant might make (p. 12,

TSN,Ibid.).
Finally, on November 29, 1990 they went to
report the matter to the police. Complainant
also went to the Municipal Health Office to
have a physical check-up. Unfortunately, the
doctor was not around and a staff member
of the doctor told her that a medical
examination was not necessary anymore
since she was already a married woman (pp.
13-14, TSN, Ibid.).
Appellant was subsequently charged with
the crime of Rape.(pp. 71-74, Rollo.)
The defense, on the other hand, came up with its own
diametrically opposed version premised on denial, alibi,
and the married woman's acquiescence:
Accused Ernesto Dio denied having anything
to do with the crime attributed to him. He
testified that on October 28, 1990, he was
at home making mats. He and Natividad
Baal were lovers. Their relationship started
on July 22, 1990 when Natividad borrowed
money from him. On July 27, 1990,
Natividad again borrowed money from him.
He then told her: "You have not paid yet the
previous loan and again you are borrowing
money from me." Natividad answered him
that she would instead offer herself to him.
On several occasions, he and Natividad had
sexual intercourse. This was repeated for

the last time on October 20, 1990 at the

anahaw plantation. While there, Natividad
told him that her husband harmed her.
Natividad then proposed to him that they
better elope. He did not accede to such
request prompting her to inform her
husband about their relationship. Hence, the
crime of rape filed against him. (TSN, April
3, 1992, pp. 3-8).
(pp. 36-37, Rollo.)
Efforts exerted below by accused-appellant to secure
exoneration from the charge failed to draw the desired
reaction from the trial judge who opined, in the course
of pronouncing accused-appellant's culpability for the
misdeed, that the mass of evidence presented by the
People is enough to negate accused-appellant's
profession of innocence.
Accused-appellant now impugns the trial court's verdict
by arguing that the court erred:
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
COMPLAINANT DID NOT OFFER ANY
TENACIOUS RESISTANCE AND THAT SHE DID
NOT EXERT ANY EFFORT TO HAVE HERSELF
EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN.
II

. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND IN
NOT GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
III
. . . IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON THE GROUND THAT HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
(p. 34, Rollo.)
To the general query of whether accused-appellant's
supplication for exculpation is legally acceptable amidst
the factual ambiance of the case at bar, we recall and
re-echo the oft-repeated principle in adjective law that
the Court has almost invariably placed great reliance on
the findings of trial courts based on facts directly
available to them as disclosed by the parties during
trial. The findings of trial courts, are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which, if
considered, would have affected the result of the case
(People vs. Abuyan, 211 SCRA 662 [1992]). It is this
maxim which precisely precludes us from re-evaluating
factual matters which spring from judgment on the
credibility of witnesses, inasmuch as these points are
better addressed to the trial judge for his resolution.

Even then, and if only to rectify accused-appellant's

misimpression, We nonetheless have to stress that
Natividad Baal's story inspires belief for it is highly
improbable for her, a married woman with a young
child, to expose herself to humiliation and
embarrassment, if her accusations were not true
(People vs. Avila, 192 SCRA 635 [1990]). This was
graphically, if a bit ungrammatically depicted by the
court a quo in its decision, to wit:
It is not an easy and comfortable act to face
authorities and report in details, divulge and
demonstrate of a heinous crime rape,
committed on oneself. This was done so by
Natividad Baal, the victim, bravely in front
of her husband, authorities, investigators
and the public. She was attacked, dragged
and savagely raped by the accused herein,
a "de sangre" of that sort, in an uncalled for
portion of the earth. After the savage act,
the accused resorted to threats for the
victim not to squeal the incident. The filthy
moment has to be tided up, hence, this
redress of grievances the victim has to hold
on.
(p. 19, Rollo.)
Nor does the failure of complainant to report the
incident immediately detract from her credibility, her
hesitation being attributable to accused-appellant's
death threats, not to speak of the natural reluctance of
a woman having to admit in public her having been
raped (People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596 [1992]).

Accused-appellant invokes alibi by saying that on

October 28, 1990, he was then at home making mats.
This Court has consistently ruled that alibi is a weak
defense because it can easily be fabricated or
concocted. In order for this form of exculpation to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused proves that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far
away that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission (People vs. Bernardo, et al., G.R.
No. 97393, March 17, 1993, citing People vs. Caday, 208
SCRA 781, [1992]). Here, accused-appellant has not
shown by clear and convincing evidence that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime,
considering that, by his own admission, his house was
only one kilometer away from Natividad's house which,
in turn, was more or less 60 meters from the place
where the alleged rape was committed. Furthermore,
accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over his
positive identification by Natividad as her rapist.
Accused-appellant contends that complainant did not
exert sufficient resistance to his sexual advances which
primarily shows that the sexual act was voluntary.
Verily, accused-appellant himself admits that Natividad
tried to resist his lewd advances, only, so he argues, this
resistance is not sufficient. This argument is bereft of
merit for in rape cases it not necessary that the victim
should have resisted unto death (People vs. Aquino, 197
SCRA 578, [1991]). And, death was not too far away
from Natividad, pointed as the knife was at her jugular.

This circumstance constituted indeed sufficient threat or

intimidation to make her submit to accused-appellant's
sexual assault for fear of her life. (People vs. Oliva, 215
SCRA 759 [1992]).
Accused-appellant also agues that the crime ascribed
against him is bereft of credence because Natividad
failed (a) to exert efforts to have herself medically
examined and (b) to present in court he torn pair of
panties.
A medical examination is not an indispensable element
in a prosecution for rape (People vs. Saldivia, 203 SCRA
462 [1991]). Thus, the absence thereof will not by itself
result in accused-appellant's exoneration because a
judgment against an accused depends upon the
evidence offered and as long as such evidence
convinces the court of the guilt of the accused, a
conviction therefor is proper (People vs. Orteza, 116
Phil. 424 [1992]; 3 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976
ed., p. 1701). In fact, the lack of medical examination on
Natividad cannot be ascribed to any negligence on her
part. This matter was adequately explained by her
during her cross examination, to wit:
Q You did not submit any
medical certificates to show if
you had injuries sustained in
your vagina or any parts of your
body, is it not?
A We went to the Municipal
Health Office but we were not
able to see the doctor. But the

woman there told us that a

medical certificate is no longer
needed since I am already
married.
(p. 14, TSN, Jan. 27, 1992.)
Too, the non-presentation of complainants' torn pair of
panties is not fatal to the prosecution's case inasmuch
as Natividad herself narrated in detail and in a
straightforward manner how accused-appellant was
able to rape her, and despite the rigorous crossexamination by accused-appellant's counsel, she
remained consistent in her testimony.
As a last ditch effort, accused-appellant concocted a
love-affair script to the effect that he and Natividad
were lovers, claiming that their amorous relationship
started sometime on July 22, 1990. Such defense cannot
be accorded any credence (People vs. Sarol, 198 SCRA
286, [1991]) for if complainant and accused-appellant
had in fact been lovers, complainant would not have
immediately reported the matter to her husband, such
demeanor being anathema to an illicit affair (People vs.
Sarol, supra.) Moreover, it is unthinkable for
complainant, who has some means for livelihood, to
borrow money from accused-appellant who was
struggling for survival together with his nine children
and wife. Equally unacceptable is accused-appellant's
thesis that Natividad was a willing participant to the
sexual congress as payment for the petty loan of
P100.00, inasmuch as there was no indication that
Natividad is a barrio temptress who will go to the extent

of giving her body to every creditor upon demand for

liquidation of her debt.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

In view of the foregoing considerations, We find that the

court a quo did not err in finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
However, in addition to the imprisonment sentence
imposed, accused-appellant should indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P50,000.00 (People vs.
Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the sum Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
as indemnity to the victim, with costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMELIANO TRINIDAD, accused-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On the sole issue that the adduced evidence is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of two crimes of Murder and one of Frustrated Murder
with which he has been charged, accused Emeliano
Trinidad appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.
From the testimony of the principal witness, Ricardo
TAN, the prosecution presents the following factual
version:
The deceased victim, Lolito Soriano, was a fish dealer
based in Davao City. His helpers were TAN, a driver, and
the other deceased victim Marcial LAROA. On 19 January
1983, using a Ford Fiera, they arrived at Butuan City to
sell fish. In the morning of 20 January 1983 SORIANO
drove the Fiera to Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
together with LAROA and a helper of one Samuel
Comendador. TAN was left behind in Butuan City to
dispose of the fish left at the Langihan market. He
followed SORIANO and LAROA, however, to Buenavista
later in the morning.
While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a
member of the Integrated National Police, assigned at
Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City,

asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on

the way to Davao City. TRINIDAD was in uniform and
had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .
38 caliber revolver. SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and
TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about
5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the
Fiera. Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the
accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached the
stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised
them to drive slowly because, according to him, the
place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two
gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did
not actually see the shooting of LAROA but he witnessed
the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the
sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head.
TRINIDAD had used his carbine in killing the two victims.
TAN then hurriedly got off the Fiera, ran towards the
direction of Butuan City and hid himself in the bushes.
The Fiera was still running slowly then but after about
seven (7) to ten (10) meters it came to a halt after
hitting the muddy side of the road. TAN heard a shot
emanating from the Fiera while he was hiding in the
bushes.
After about twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes, when a
passenger jeep passed by, TAN hailed it and rode on the
front seat. After a short interval of time, he noticed that
TRINIDAD was seated at the back. Apparently noticing
TAN as well, TRINIDAD ordered him to get out and to
approach him (TRINIDAD) but, instead, TAN moved
backward and ran around the jeep followed by
TRINIDAD. When the jeep started to drive away, TAN

clung to its side. TRINIDAD fired two shots, one of which

hit TAN on his right thigh. As another passenger jeep
passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and ran to
the second. However, the passengers in the latter jeep
told him to get out not wanting to get involved in the
affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled until a member of the
P.C. chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for
Butuan City.
TRINIDAD's defense revolved around denial and alibi. He
contended that he was in Cagayan de Oro City on the
date of the incident, 20 January 1983. At that time, he
was assigned as a policeman at Nasipit Police Station,
Agusan del Norte. He reported to his post on 19 January
1983 but asked permission from his Station Commander
to be relieved from work the next day, 20 January, as it
was his birthday. He left Baan, his Butuan City
residence, at about 3:00 P.M. on 20 January 1983 and
took a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City. He arrived at
Cagayan de Oro at around 8:00 P.M. and proceeded to
his sister's house at Camp Alagar to get his subsistence
allowance, as his sister was working thereat in the
Finance Section.
At his sister's house he saw Sgt. Caalim, Mrs. Andoy,
one Paelmo, in addition to his sister. Sgt. Caalim
corroborated having seen TRINIDAD then.
Continuing, TRINIDAD claimed that he left Cagayan de
Oro for Butuan at lunch time on 21 January 1983
arriving at the latter place around 6:00 P.M., and went to
his house directly to get his service carbine. He was on
his way to Nasipit to report for duty on 21 January 1983

when he was arrested at around 6:00 P.M. at

Buenavista, Agusan del Norte.
After joint trial on the merits and unimpressed by the
defense by the Trial Court** sentenced the accused in
an "Omnibus Decision", thus:

2) to indemnify the heirs of Marcial Laroa

and Lolito Soriano the amount of P30,000.00
each; and
3) to pay the cost. (p. 14, RTC Decision, p.
28, Rollo).

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, this

Court finds Emeliano Trinidad GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Murder and Frustrated Murder.

Before us now, TRINIDAD claims that the Trial Court

erred in giving full faith and credit to TAN's testimony
who, TRINIDAD alleges, was an unreliable witness. That
is not so.

In the Frustrated Murder, there being no

mitigating circumstance, and taking into
account the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused Trinidad is meted
out a penalty of:

We find no variance in the statement made by TAN

before the NAPOLCOM Hearing Officer that when
TRINIDAD boarded the Fiera in Buenavista, he (TAN) was
not in the vehicle, and that made in open Court when he
said that he was with TRINIDAD going to Butuan City on
board the Fiera. For the facts disclose that when
TRINIDAD boarded the Fiera in Buenavista, TAN was still
in Langihan distributing fish. The Fiera left for
Buenavista, driven by SORIANO between 6:00 to 7:00
A.M., while TAN followed only at 11:00, A.M. in another
vehicle. So that when TRINIDAD boarded the Fiera in
Buenavista, TAN was not yet in that vehicle although on
the return trip from Butuan City to Davao City, TAN was
already on board. In fact, TAN was the one driving. TAN's
testimony clarifying this point reads:

1) 8 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision

mayor medium;
2) to indemnify the complainant the amount
of P 5,000.00; and
3) to pay the costs.
Likewise, in the two murder cases, Trinidad
is accordingly sentenced:
1) to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in
each case;

Q Did you not say in

your direct
examination that
you went to
Buenavista, Agusan
del Norte?

A We were in
Langihan and since
our fishes were not
consumed there, we
went to Buenavista.
Q Now, what time
did you leave for
Buenavista from
Langihan?
A It was more or less
at 6:00 to 7:00
o'clock.
Q You were riding
the fish car which
you said?
A I was not able to
take the fish car in
going to Buenavista
because they left
me fishes to be
dispatched yet.
Q In other words,
you did not go to
Buenavista on
January 20, 1983?

A I was able to go to
Buenavista after the
fishes were
consumed.
Q What time did you
go to Buenavista?
A It was more or less
from 11:00 o'clock
noon.
Q What
transportation did
you take?
A I just took a ride
with another fish car
because they were
also going to
dispatch fishes in
Buenavista.
Q Now, who then
went to Buenavista
with the fish car at
about 7:00 o'clock in
the morning of
January 20, 1983?
A Lolito Soriano and
Marcia Laroa with
his helper.

xxxxxx
Q Now, when this
fish car returned to
Butuan City who
drove it?
A Lolito Soriano.
Q Were you with the
fish car in going
back to Langihan?
A Yes, sir. (T.S.N.,
December 6, 1985,
pp. 53-54).
Felimon Comendador, also a fish vendor, and a resident
of Butuan City, testified that he saw TRINIDAD riding in
the Fiera on the front seat in the company of TAN,
SORIANO and LAROA, when the Fiera stopped by his
house at Butuan City (TSN, November 5, 1985, pp. 3233).

The other inconsistencies TRINIDAD makes much of,

such as, that TAN was unsure before the NAPOLCOM
Hearing Officer whether TRINIDAD was wearing khaki or
fatigue uniform but, in open Court, he testified
positively that TRINIDAD was in khaki uniform; and that
while TAN declared that TRINIDAD was wearing a cap,
prosecution witness Felimon Comendador said that he
was not but was in complete fatigue uniform, are
actually trivial details that do not affect the positive
identification of TRINIDAD that TAN has made nor
detract from the latter's overall credibility.
Nor is there basis for TRINIDAD to contend that the
absence of gunpowder burns on the deceased victims
negates TAN's claim that they were shot "point-blank."
Actually, this term refers merely to the "aim directed
straight toward a target" (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary) and has no reference to the
distance between the gun and the target. And in point
of fact, it matters not how far the assailant was at the
time he shot the victims, the crucial factor being
whether he did shoot the victim or not.
TRINIDAD's defense of alibi is inherently weak and
cannot prevail over the straightforward and detailed
descriptive narration of TAN, thus:
Q Now, from Butuan
City, where did you
proceed?
A We proceeded to
Davao.

Q Did you in fact

reach Davao on that
date?
A No, sir.
Q Could you tell the
Court why you failed
to reach Davao?
A Because we were
held-up.
Q Who held-up you?
A Emeliano Trinidad,
sir.
Q Are you referring
to accused Emeliano
Trinidad whom you
pointed to the court
awhile ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you tell the
Court how did
Emeliano Trinidad
holdup you?
A When we reach
between El Rio and
Afga, Trinidad

advised us to run
slowly because this
place is dangerous.
Then suddenly there
were two gun
bursts.
Q Now, you heard
two gun bursts.
What happened?
What did you see if
there was any?
A I have found out
that Lolito Soriano
and Marcial Laroa
already fall.
Q Fall dead?
A They were dead
because they were
hit at the head.
Q You mean to
inform the Court
that these two died
because of that gun
shot bursts?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you actually

see Trinidad
shooting the two?
A I did not see that
it was really Trinidad
who shot Laroa but
since I was already
alerted by the first
burst, I have seen
that it was Trinidad
who shot Soriano.
Q What was the
firearm used?
A Carbine, sir.
xxxxxx
Q Now, after you
saw that the two fell
dead, what did you
do?
A I got out from the
Ford Fiera while it
was running.
xxxxxx
Q From the place
where you were
because you said

you ran, what

transpired next?
A I hid myself at the
side of the jeep, at
the bushes.
Q While hiding
yourself at the
bushes, what
transpired?
A I heard one gun
burst.
Q From what
direction was that
gun bursts you
heard?
A From the Ford
Fiera, sir.
Q After that, what
happened?
A At around 20 to 30
minutes, I moved
out from the place
where I hid myself
because I wanted to
go back to Butuan,
Then, I boarded the
jeep and sat at the

front seat but I

found out that
Emeliano Trinidad
was at the back
seat.

A I moved
backward.

Q When you found

out that Trinidad
was at the back,
what happened?

A He followed me.

A He ordered me to
get out.
Q Now, when you
got down, what
happened?
A When I got out
from the jeep,
Trinidad also got
out.
Q Tell the Court,
what happened after
you and Trinidad got
out from the jeep?
A He called me
because he wanted
me to get near him.
Q What did you do?

'Q Now, what did

Trinidad do?

Q While Trinidad
followed you, what
happened?
A I ran away around
the jeep.
Q Now, while you
were running around
the jeep, what
happened?
A The driver drove
the jeep.
Q Now, after that,
what did you do?
A I ran after the jeep
and then I was able
to take the jeep at
the side of it.
Q How about
Trinidad, where was
he at that time?

A He also ran, sir.

Q Now, when
Trinidad ran after
you what happened?
A Trinidad was able
to catchup with the
jeep and fired his
gun.
Q Were you hit?
A At that time I did
not know that I was
hit because it was
sudden.
Q When for the first
time did you notice
that you were hit?
A At the second
jeep.
Q You mean to
inform the Court
that the jeep you
first rode is not the
very same jeep that
you took for the
second time?
A No, sir.

Q Now, when you

have notice that you
were hit, what did
you do?
A At the first jeep
that I took I was hit,
so I got out from it
and stood-up at the
middle of the road
so that I can catch
up the other jeep.'
(TSN, December 6,
1985, pp. 44-49)
TAN's testimony remained unshaken even during crossexamination. No ill motive has been attributed to him to
prevaricate the truth. He was in the vehicle where the
killing transpired was a witness to the actual happening,
and was a victim himself who managed narrowly to
escape death despite the weaponry with which
TRINIDAD was equipped.
The defense is correct, however, in contending that in
the Frustrated Murder case, TRINIDAD can only be
convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had
commenced the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of
causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as,
that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion,
and there was a spare tire which shielded the other
parts of his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was
not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound

inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his

death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused
not having performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death (People vs. Phones, L32754-5, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia,
L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497).
But while the circumstances do spell out the two crimes
of Murder, the penalty will have to be modified. For, with
the abolition of capital punishment in the 1987
Constitution, the penalty for Murder is now reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua (People vs. Lopez, et al. G.R. No. 71876-76,
January 25, 1988 citing People vs. Gavarra, No. L-37673,
October 30, 1987; People vs. Masangkay, G.R. No.
73461, October 27, 1987). With no attending mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, said penalty is imposable
in its medium period or from eighteen (18) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. The
penalty next lower in degree for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is prision mayor,
maximum, to reclusion temporal, medium, or from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months (Article 61, parag. 3, Revised Penal
Code).
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused Emeliano Trinidad
for the crimes of Murder (on two counts) and Attempted
Murder, having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
his conviction is hereby AFFIRMED and he is hereby
sentenced as follows:
1) In each of Criminal Cases Nos. 79123-24
(Nos. 96 and 99 below) for Murder, he shall

suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)

years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the
heirs of Marcial Laroa and Lolito Soriano,
respectively, in the amount of P30,000.00
each; and to pay the costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. 79125 (No. 100
below) for Frustrated Murder, he is hereby
found guilty only of Attempted Murder and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum; to indemnify Ricardo Tan in the
sum of P5,000,00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO
CAMPUHAN Y BELLO, accused.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita[1] finally did
away with frustrated rape[2] and allowed only attempted

rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute

books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another
emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by
considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of
a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary
view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that
concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming
lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better
intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since
after all any attempted fornication would be considered
consummated rape and punished as such. A
mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be
considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the
moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim since by it he attained his objective. All the
elements of the offense were already present and
nothing more was left for the offender to do, having
performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime
and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect
penetration was not essential; any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ, however slight, was
sufficient. The Court further held that entry of
the labia or lips of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was
sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape.
We distinguished consummated rape from attempted
rape where there was no penetration of the female
organ because not all acts of execution were performed
as the offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts.[3] The inference that may
be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration

of the vagina is not required for rape to be

consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is
enough to raise the crime to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of
penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or
lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of
the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a
conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the
penis into the lips of the female organ was considered
synonymous with mere touching of the external
genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,[4] the
crucial doctrinal bottom line is
that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in
relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of
penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the
ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be
tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the
requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be
gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips
of the female genitalia has not been established, the
crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in
determining whether rape has been committed either in
its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise,
no substantial distinction would exist between the two,
despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction,
threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the
difference between life and death for the accused - a
reclusive life that is not evenperpetua but
only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate
extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on

another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed

attempted but consummated rape, what then would
constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be
thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be
possible in light of the view of those who disagree with
this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found
guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a
quo to the extreme penalty of death,[5] hence this case
before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.[6]
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25
April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the afternoon, Ma.
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old
Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of
their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two
(2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo
Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the
drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!"[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas
or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into
Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several

times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He

pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path.
Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were
living within their compound, to chase the accused.
[8]
Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who
answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused
at the back of their compound until they were advised
by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead
of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination
of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medicolegal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact
and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his
defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the
charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who
allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to
run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in truth
Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on
his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing
both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this
fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and
became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused
him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained
himself from hitting back when he realized she was a
woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to
stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call
for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and
threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo

immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but

Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance
to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was
not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo
saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised
his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this
moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente
prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall
instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence,
the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of
statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of
death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages,
and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the
credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her
narration should not be given any weight or credence
since it was punctured with implausible statements and
improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and
experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for
him to commit the rape considering that Crysthels
younger sister was also in the room playing while
Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for
her daughters. Their presence alone as possible
eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened
within the family compound where a call for assistance
could easily be heard and responded to, would have
been enough to deter him from committing the crime.
Besides, the door of the room was wide open for
anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo

insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon

could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual
contact when from where she stood she could not have
possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs
of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the
absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthels private parts more than
bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite
heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo
with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before
Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly
"already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis
into Crysthels vagina." The gravamen of the offense of
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the
Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old
when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty,
fromreclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible
penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended
party being below seven (7) years old. We have said
often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge
took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not
an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia
by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.[10] But the act
of touching should be understood here as inherently
part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum.

In People v. De la Pea[11] we clarified that the decisions

finding a case for rape even if the attackers penis
merely touched the external portions of the female
genitalia were made in the context of the presence or
existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration.
Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a
limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could
not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless
held that rape was consummated on the basis of the
victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried,
but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all
likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the
victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva,[12]or
that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of
her vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape
cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape
of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina,
or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for
an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.[14] As
the labias,which are required to be "touched" by the
penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface,
to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majoraor the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the
female genital organs that are visible in the perineal

area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the

hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons
pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The
next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and
the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface
is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair
but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath
the labia majora is the labia minora.[15] Jurisprudence
dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated,[16] and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing
of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
eitherlabia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been
confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ,"[17] but has also progressed into being described
as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment of the
drawbridge."[19]But, to our mind, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel
of passion."

A review of the records clearly discloses that the

prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of
proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate
Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we
grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act
of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt
the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital
contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what
she saw upon entering her childrens room Corazon
plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis
on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative
position to them as to enable her to see clearly and
sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It
should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon
Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a
kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a
way that the chest of the accused is pinning
down the victim, while his right hand is
holding his penis and his left hand is
spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration
that Primos kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from
the side of the accused and the victim would have
provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis
supposedly reaching Crysthels external genitalia,
i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc.,
since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his
movements from Corazons sight, not to discount the

fact that Primos right hand was allegedly holding his

penis thereby blocking it from Corazons view. It is the
burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon
could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her
account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not
enough that she claims that she saw what was done to
her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly
demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in
this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint
of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all
achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the
doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod
over the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from
pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely
appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully
witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans
instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and
persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully
well that his dastardly acts have already been
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of
his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo
upon learning of Corazons presence would have been to
pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his
pants down. The interval, although relatively short,
provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not
only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.

What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the

accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the
court Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated
her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of
confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape
in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the
possibility of Primos penis penetrating her vagina,
however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement
denying penetration,[21] obviously induced by a question
propounded to her who could not have been aware of
the finer distinctions betweentouching and penetration.
Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this
reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is
yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language
is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult
interpretation that because the penis of the
accused touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor
can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the
victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the
middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of
her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish
sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate

Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that
Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an
erection.[23] On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that
Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus
showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able
to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having
breached Crysthels vagina is belied by the child's own
assertion that she resisted Primos advances by putting
her legs close together;[24] consequently, she did not
feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about
what Primo did to her.[25] Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where
penetration was not fully established, the Court had
anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was
consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the
inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no
longer visible.[26] None was shown in this case. Although
a child's testimony must be received with due
consideration on account of her tender age, the Court
endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her
story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally
guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to
conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of
Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal
officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness body to

conclude from a medical perspective that penetration

had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained,
although the absence of complete penetration of the
hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that
there was sexual contact between the accused and the
victim.[27]
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and
a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the
testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be
productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results.
It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis
of the accused in reality entered the labialthreshold of
the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was
consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that
separates attempted rape from consummated rape will
significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All
the elements of attempted rape - and only of attempted
rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the
accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower
than the imposable penalty of death for the offense
charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven

(7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal,

the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty
to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of
which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding
accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of
statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay
damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433

March 30, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan,
mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the
ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate
drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo
Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor.
Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so
she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas
or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees and
hishands holding his penis with his right hand
Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko
iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her
blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside
who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her
brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within
their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was
apprehended. They called the barangay officials who
detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as
Crysthel s hymen was intact
Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and
wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled
him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the

extreme penalty of death

Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be entered
for rape to be consummated
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration but her vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped
Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis
with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to
attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
the possibility of Primo's penis having breached
Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion
that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs
close together and that she did not feel any intense
pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray
ko, aray ko!
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual
contact between the accused and the victim
Rivera v. People

G.R. No. 166326

January 25, 2006

Lessons Applicable: attempted murder

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
April 1998: Ruben Rodil stopped working as a taxi
driver after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He
was cited as a Bayaning Pilipino by ABS-CBN for saving
the would-be victim. His wife is a manicurist and they
have 3 children.
May 2, 1998 1:00 pm: Ruben went to a nearby store
to buy food. Edgardo, his neighbour, mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support and
soon a heated exchange of words ensued.
May 3, 1998 7:30 pm (Sunday): Ruben with his 3
year-old daughter went to the store tobuy food and to
look for his wife. Suddenly, the brothers Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo emerged from their house and
ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben
with fist blows so he fell to the ground. While lying on
the ground, Edgardo hit Ruben 3 times with a hollow
block on the parietal area (narrowly missing the middle
which is fatal) while Esmeraldo and Ismael continued
mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted:
"Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed
to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at
the back. The policemen on board a mobile car arrived
so Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. The doctor
declared his lacerated wound in the parietal area was
slight and superficial and would heal from 1-7 days.

Esmeraldo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, Ruben arrived at

his house, banged the gate andchallenged him and his
brothers to come out and fight. When he got out, Ruben
punchd him and they wrestled but Edgardo pushed
Ruben aside and Esmeraldos wife pulled him away and
brought to their house.
Ismael: He tried to pacify them but Ruben pulled his
hair. Once he got free, he fled to their house and did
not see Edgardo in the scene.
Edgardo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, he was throwing
garbage in front of their house when Ruben arrived. He
quickly went inside as Ruben banged the gate, ordered
him to get out and even threatened to shoot him.
Esmeraldo went out to ask what Rubens problem was
but it led to a fist fight. He rushed outside and pushed
Ruben who fell to the ground. Ruben stood up, grabbed
his hair and in the process, Rubn hit his head on a lamp
post.
Eyewitnesses Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo:
revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack of petitioners
RTC: Frustrated murder
CA: Attempted murder
Petitioned
o They should be held criminally liable for physical
injuries only since no intent to kill and even if they had
intent to kill, the prosecution failed to prove treachery
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly held it as attempted
murder.
HELD: NO. petition is DENIED for lack of merit. CA
AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION indeterminate

penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in

its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period,
as maximum. No costs.

When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but

intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted.
Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo.
o evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by
the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which
the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused
Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the 3
brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim,
and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that
one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and
proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it 3 times;
and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that
made them desist from their concerted act of trying to
kill Ruben
o If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of
two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the

crime intended to be committed.
overt or external act - some physical activity or
deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its completetermination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense
o Reason: so long as the equivocal quality remains, no
one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is
o overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense
They attacked the victim in a sudden and
unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his 3year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to
his life. He had no chance to defend himself and
retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized
assault of the 3 siblings. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if
the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected,
giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself, there would be treachery
o There being conspiracy by and among petitioners,
treachery is considered against all of them

Velasco v. People

G.R. No. 166479 February 28, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was
cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his
house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him.
Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out of the tricycle,
approached the complainant and fired at him several
times with a .45 caliber pistol. Velasco missed his first
shot but the second one hit the complainant at the
upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. But,
Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6 more
but missed.
After being reported as wearing a vest or a
chaleco, the police, composed of SPO4 Romulo
Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven
pursued and caught Velasco who was on board a
motorized tricycle to the highway going to Barangay
Banaoang in Calasiao town with a firearm protruding
from the waistline
Velascos Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at
a friends house in Lingayen, Pangasinan and between
6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen
car of Berting Soriano then alighted at the corner of
Banaoang diversion road to ride a tricycle where he
heard a jeep behind him blowing its horn and when he
looked back he saw three men on board pointing their
guns at him.
RTC: guilty of attempted murder appreciating

treachery in the commission of the crime sentenced to

suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of
prision correccional, as minimum to Eight (8) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay
P2,696 as actual damages
CA: Affirmed RTC
Velasco filed a petition for certiorari
o he had no motive to harm, much less kill, the victim
for he was total stranger and since the identity of the
assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and
his alibi gains weight and value and that the testimony
of Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative
of the victim
ISSUE: W/N Velasco is guilty of attempted murder
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
it was not physically impossible for Velasco to be at
the crime scene when the crime was committed since it
only takes a 10-minute ride from the place where he
allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to
the crime scene
Even without a ballistic report, the positive
identification by prosecution witnesses is more than
sufficient to prove accuseds guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
It must be stressed that motive is a state of (ones)
mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element
of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved.
In fact, lack of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons
have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all. Even

in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored

rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there
is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive
assumes significance only where there is no showing of
who the perpetrator of the crime was.
o since petitioner has been positively identified the
lack of motive is no longer of consequence
relationship could strengthen the
witnesses credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit
The fact that the shooting occurred in broad daylight
does not render its commission impossible. The fact
that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of the
people, does not mean that he is innocent of the crime
charged or that he is incapable of doing it.
The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he
was unarmed left private complainant with no option
but to run for his life. treachery
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts
but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce
the felony by reason of some cause other than his own
desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony.
Petitioner already commenced his attack with a
manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant
seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private
complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is
not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient
to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder,
since the accused did not perform all the acts of

execution that would have brought about death

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within
the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of
the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium period.

Baleros v. People
G.R. No. 138033

February 22, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student
of the University of Sto. Tomas, stayed at Room 307 with
her maid Marvilou.
December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid
Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in front of her
bedroom door.
December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity
party with Robert Chan and Alberto wearing a barong
tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes
lent by Perla Duran and leather shoes.
December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the
Building wearing a white t-shirt with fraternity symbols
and black shorts with the brand name Adidas from a
party. He requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go
up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at that time

only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito

could not produce the required written authorization, he
let him in because he will be a tenant in the coming
summer break. Joseph was awaken by Chitos knock so
he glanced the alarm clock and let him. He saw him
wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt.
December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y
David (Chito) forcefully covered the face of Martina
Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical with dizzying effects. This awakened Malou.
She struggled but could not move because she was
tightly held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked
him and got her right hand free to squeeze his sex
organ causing him to let her go. She went for the
bedroom door and woke up Marvilou. She also
intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa
kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako". Malou proceed to Room
310 where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard
Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were
staying and seeked help. She saw her bed in a mess
and noticed that her nightdress was stained with blue.
Aside from the window with grills which she had
originally left opened, another window inside her
bedroom which leads to Room 306 was now open.
December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his
roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were asked by the
CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in
their Unit when Rommel Montes went inside and found a
grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito.
It contained white t-shirt with fraternity symbol, a Black
Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an
underwear and socks.

Chito pleaded NOT Guilty

13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates,
Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato
Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a
week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph
told him that something had happened and asked him
to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and
since no one was there they went to Room 401 where
Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at Room 306
the day before.
handkerchief and Malous night dress both contained
chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree
burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of
her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been
pressed
RTC: guilty of attempted rape
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape
HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING
Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape.
GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to
30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00,
with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or
intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2)

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned
article of the same code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the
pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some
physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
Chito was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch
her private part
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the
petitioner do not determine attempted rape, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion
under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that
this term is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or

material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an

innocent person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried
while relating to her classmates what she perceived to
be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for
attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was
disturbed, if not distressed

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26298

January 20, 1927

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-appellant.
Hermogenes Caluag for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila finding the defendant guilty of the
crime of consummated rape and sentencing him to
suffer seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.

The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11

months old and the evidence is conclusive that the
defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with
her, but there may be some doubt whether he
succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being
disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and
the sister of the child. The physician who examined the
genital organ of the child a few hours after the
commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of
the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an effort
had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying
before the court he expressed doubts as to whether the
entry had been effected. The mother of the child
testified that she found its genital organ covered with a
sticky substance, but that cannot be considered
conclusive evidence of penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender
age that penetration was impossible; that the crime of
rape consequently was impossible of consummation;
and that, therefore, the offense committed should be
treated only as abusos deshonestos. We do not think so.
It is probably true that a complete penetration was
impossible, but such penetration is not essential to the
commission of the crime; it is sufficient if there is a
penetration of the labia. In the case of Kenny vs.
State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316)
where the offended party was a child of the age of 3
years and 8 months the testimony of several physicians
was to the effect that her labia of the privates of a child
of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to the
hymen and the defendant was found guilty of the
consummated crime rape.

There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of

the genital organ of the offended party, the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be
found guilty of frustrated rape, but in view of the fact
that he was living in the house of the parents of the
child as their guest, the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must
therefore be imposed in its maximum degree.
The judgment appealed from is modified and the
defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime
of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve
years of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.
So ordered.

People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724

April 3, 1990

Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan,
19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College, arrived at her boarding house after
her classmates brought her home from a party. She
knocked at the door of her boarding house when a
frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a
knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he

ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door

which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside,
they used the back door to the second floor. With his left
arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking
a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs.
When they reached the second floor, he commanded
herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room.
They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her
hitting her head on the wall. With one hand holding the
knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take
off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra,
pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor
and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as
told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his
penis entered her. He then laid down on his back and
commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of
his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had
both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the
next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her
and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then
another then she jumped out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18
meters in front of the boarding house and knocked on
the door. When there was no answer, she ran around
the building and knocked on the back door. When the
policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around
her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to
the boarding house where they heard and saw
somebody running away but failed to apprehend him
due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar

Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.

Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.
HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P30,000
Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate
that the attempted and consummated stages apply to
the crime of rape.
Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must
be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment
when he has performed all of the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his
intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily
desists from proceeding further, it can not be an
attempt.
in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains
his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is

sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,

without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina
is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the
accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule
out penetration of the genital organ of the victim.

People v. Listerio

G.R.No. 122099 July 5, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Conspiracy, Attempted or Frustrated
Stage
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
Criminal Case No. 91-5842 and Criminal Case No.
91-5843 were filed against Agapito Listerio y Prado and
Samson dela Torre y Esquela
Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado
and Samson dela Torre y Esquela pleaded not guilty to
the crimes charged. Their other co-accused have
remained at large.
May 14, 1991:
o Marlon Araques Version: Marlon and his brother
Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a
sum of money from Tino. Having failed they turned
backAs they were passing Tramo near Tinos place, a

group composed of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre,

George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio
Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead
pipes and bladed weapons. Jeonito Araque from behind
with 3 stab wounds: 1. upper right portion of his back, 2.
lower right portion and 3. middle portion of the left side
of his back causing him to fall down. Marlon was hit on
the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya
with lead pipes and momentarily lost consciousness.
When he regained consciousness 3 minutes later,
Jeonito was already dead and the group fled. He was
brought to the hospital for treatment of his forearm and
the shoulder
o Agapito Listerios Version: Agapito Listerio is a 39
years old, married, side walk vegetable vendor and a
resident of Purok 4.
1:00 pm: He was in store of Nimfa Agustin drinking
beer with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao
2:00 pm: He went to his house and slept
5:00 pm: Remolador and Gininao woke him up and
told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track
6:00 pm: 2 policemen passed by going to the house
of Samson de la Torre while he was chatting with
Remolador and Gininao and invited them for
questioning. But, the two were sent home. He was
handed a Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marlon
Araque, implicating him for the death of Jeonito Araque
and the frustrated murder of Marlon Araque. When he
confronted Marlon as to why he was being included in
the case, the latter replied because you ejected us
from your house
Dr. Manimtims Autopsy Reports:
o Marlon Araque: 2 wounds on the forearm and the

shoulder were caused by a sharp object like a knife

while the other 2 were caused by a blunt instrument
such as a lead pipe
o Jeonito Araque: 3 stab wounds were inflicted from
behind by a sharp, pointed and single-bladed
instrument like a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar
instrument. Considering the involvement of a vital
organ and a major blood vessel, the first wound was
considered fatal. Unlike the first, the second and third
wounds were non-fatal. The first and second wounds
were inflicted by knife thrusts delivered starting below
going upward by assailants who were standing behind
the victim
RTC: Attempted Homicide only on the basis of Dr.
Manimtims testimony that none of the wounds
sustained by Marlon Araque were fatal
ISSUE: W/N there is a conspiracy for frustrated homicide
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of
moral damages in Criminal Case No. 91-5843 is
DELETED;
2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 91-5843 of
Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision
Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

After finality of this Decision, the records shall be

remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
which is directed to render judgment based on the
evidence against Samson dela Torre y Esquela.
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for
criminals do not write down their lawless plans and
plots. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a
joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may
and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite
acts, conditions and circumstances, which vary
according to the purpose accomplished. Previous
agreement to commit a crime is not essential to
establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient that the
condition attending to its commission and the acts
executed may be indicative of a common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective
It is necessary that a conspirator should have
performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his conconspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators

 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it

denotes an intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose
o all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus
criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill
the victims
conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is
unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wound
because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all
Treachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. That circumstance qualifies
the crime into murder.
o all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead
pipes, blocked (hinarang) the path of the victims
effectively cutting off their escape
The commission of the crime was also attended by
abuse of superior strength on account of the fact that
accused-appellant and his companions were not only
numerically superior to the victims but also because all
of them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes,
purposely used force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the persons attacked. However,
this aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in
treachery. In the light of the finding of conspiracy,
evident premeditation need not be further appreciated,
absent concrete proof as to how and when the plan to
kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out.

What determines whether a felony is attempted or

frustrated is whether or not the subjective phase in the
commission of an offense has been passed (NOT gravity
of the wound)
Subjective phase
o portion of the acts constituting the crime included
between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with the prior acts, should result in the consummated
crime.
Objective phase
o Forward the subjective phase
o period occupied by the acts of the offender over
which he has control that period between the point
where he begins and the point where he voluntarily
desists.
If between these two points the offender is stopped
by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary
desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed
and it is an attempt.
If he is not so stopped but continues until he
performs the last act, it is frustrated
frustrated when: (subjective phase is completely
passed. Subjectively the crime iscomplete)
o the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony
o the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrators will
attempted felony: (offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense)
o the offender commits overt acts to commence the
perpetration of the crime
o he is not able to perform all the acts of execution

which should produce the felony; and

o his failure to perform all the acts of execution was
due to some cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance
intent to kill determines whether the infliction of
injuries should be punished as attempted or frustrated
murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical
injuries
o intent to kill of the malefactors herein who were
armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly
be doubted given the prevailing facts of the case
o can not be denied that the crime is a frustrated
felony not an attempted offense considering that after
being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result
of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlons
attackers apparently thought he was already dead and
fled

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13785

October 8, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS ADIAO, defendant-appellant.
Victoriano Yamzon for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of
the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was found
guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila and again he was found guilty of the crime of
frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of
P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The sole error assigned on appeal is that the lower court
erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the
crime of theft as dis closed by the facts appearing of
record. We have examined the evidence carefully and
from our study are unable to say that the proof is
contrary to the findings of the lower court. Stated in one
sentence, the defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs
inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80,
from the baggage of a Japanese named T. Murakami,
and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House,
where it was found by other customs employees.
Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the
crime can not properly be classified as frustrated, as
this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but
that since the offender performed all of the acts of
execution necessary for the accomplishment crime of
theft. The fact that the defendant was under
observation during the entire transaction and that he
was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom
House, is not decisive; all the elements of the

completed crime of theft are present. The following

decisions of the supreme court of Spain are in point:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some
fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act
of taking the fruit he was seen by a policeman,
yet it did not appear that he was at that moment
caught by the policeman but sometime later. The
court said: ". . . The trial court did not err . . . in
considering the crime as that of consummated
theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as
nothing appears in the record showing that the
policemen who saw the accused take the fruit
from the adjoining land arrested him in the act
and thus prevented him from taking full
possession of the thing stolen and even its
utilization by him for an interval of time. (Decision
of the supreme court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while
the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing
the theft, did not do anything to prevent it.
Subsequently, however, while the defendant was still
inside the church, the offended party got back the
money from the defendant. The court said that the
defendant had performed all the acts of execution and
considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the
supreme court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain
house and by means of a key opened up a case, and
from the case took a small box, which was also opened
with a key, from which in turn he took a purse

containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then placed

the money over the cover of the case; just at this
moment he was caught by two guards who were
stationed in another room near-by. The court considered
this as consummated robbery, and said: " . . . The
accused . . . having materially taken possession of the
money from the moment he took it from the place
where it had been, and having taken it with his hands
with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the
acts necessary to constitute the crime which was
thereby produced; only the act of making use of the
thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not
go to make the elements of the consummated crime.
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)
There exists the aggravating circumstance that
advantage was taken by the offender of his public
position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of articles
517 and 518, No. 5, of the Penal Code, and there being
present one aggravating circumstance compensated by
no mitigating circumstances, the penalty must be
imposed in the maximum degree.1awph!l.net
Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant
is sentenced to three months and one day of arresto
mayor, with the costs of all instances against him. The
merchandise in question, attached to the record as
Exhibit A, shall be returned to the lawful owner, T.
Murakami. So ordered.

People v. Hernandez

Posted on June 11, 2012 | Criminal Law |

Tags: Criminal Law Case Brief
FACTS
Defendant charged with statutory rape and convicted.
Victim was 17 years and 9 months old at the time of
intercourse and consented to the sex. At trial defendant
relied on penal code stating that there must be intent or
criminal negligence to commit the crime and that one
is not capable of committing a crime who commits an
act under an ignorance or mistake of fact which
disapproves any criminal intent.
ISSUE
Whether mistake of fact regarding the victims age is a
defense to statutory rape.
RELEVANT STATUTE
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with
a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of
the following circumstances: 1. Where the female is
under the age of 18 years
HOLDING/REASONING
Yes, conviction overturned. The policy goals of the
statutory rape law are not to penalize the female for

underage sex, but to prevent the male from indulging in

the act. Society, by passing the law, has said that it is
beneficial for the woman under 18 to avoid sex because
there are social, moral, and personal values which are
preserved by the abstinence. When the male engages
in intercourse, he does so assuming the risk of her age
and consciously intends to proceed regardless of the
age of the female and the consequences of his act.
But, if he reasonably believes the woman is above the
age of 18, he has subjectively eliminated the risk by
satisfying himself on reasonable evidence that the crime
cannot be committed. If the man is misled by the
reasonable belief, there is no intent. The inclusion of
mistake of fact as a legitimate defense does not detract
from the aforementioned policy goals. The deterrence
mechanism is not interfered with when the male is
misled or reasonably believes the female to be under
the age of 18.
We hold that in the absence of a legislative direction
otherwise, a charge of statutory rape is defensible
wherein a criminal intent is lacking.
COMMENT
This is not the majority position. Mistake of fact at
common law is not typically a defense for statutory
rape.