ATTY. ROMULO B.

MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191618
November 23, 2010
Facts:
1.) Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal) questions the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized according to Section 4, 2 Article VII of the Constitution which states that The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
2.) He states that in Buac vs COMELEC, it was declared that "contests involving the President and the
Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasijudicial power." On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of
the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.
2.) Whether the creation of the PET is unconstitutional for being a violation of Paragraph 7, Section 14 pf
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
3.) Whether the designation of the members of the Supreme Court as members of the PET is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
1.) Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that
the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Petitioner appeared as counsel for PGMA in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate FPJ
before the PET.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. Because judicial inquiry, as
mentioned above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution.
His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional
acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of
an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts power of judicial review.
2.) According to Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez, the Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are
electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act
respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the
President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long
recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate
has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be
filed after the proclamation of the winner.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Supreme Courts constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of
election contests involving our countrys highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in
connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power.
Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound
and tenable.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of the SCs power to judge presidential and vicepresidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as
restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr intended the
Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To
this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without
intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to
resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for
the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
3.) Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution states that The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable" 44 is apportioned to courts of justice.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State
of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a
microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.