SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR.

, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the
Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on
December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it
appears that he had joined the United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant
Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having
occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's
parents' abode and transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud R.
Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce
against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No. 14313 of that court
and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R.
Arca answering the complaint alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940 although she was
directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other
things that defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve months preceding the
institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to relate
here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their
separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United States at that time and she was not with him then
it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United
States without her. She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he had always supported her and
her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied,
furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility
for they were separated by about 10,000 miles from each otherPlaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for divorce by
defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her
answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding
filed by defendant Alfredo Javier.
In July, 1941 that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma
Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American
wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy,
defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce
one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis and defendant Alfredo Javier
married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).
Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca, another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage
they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938
sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife and child, and on August 13, 1940, he
filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having
received a copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of Mobile
County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but that
appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile
County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the obligation to support his child Alfredo Javier, Jr.?
HELD:
NO. With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy and consequently she forfeited her
right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority.
Pursuant to the provisions of Articles 194-208 of the Family Code, whereas, the children who should have been given support must have
already finished their schooling by the time the decision was rendered. The amount of support to be paid was computed from the time they
entered college until they had finished their respective studies, in the case at bar Alfredo Jr. is already 21 years old and enable to finish his
tertiary studies.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's
demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case
after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own
house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other
than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and
indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and
induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the
plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so
far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of
Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs.
Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a
mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to
time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled
by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing
the question under consideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband shall render support to his wife regardless that the latter is outside the conjugal domicile?
HELD:
YES. Pursuant to Article 195 of the Family Code, par. 1 spouses are obliged to support each other to the whole extent, whereas in the case
at bar, the respondent questioned his wife abandoning their conjugal home therefore, she must not receive any support from him but there is
a compelling reason that the wife decided to left their conjugal dwelling. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will
not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view
to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the
habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by
which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so
far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect
whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Caloocan City and
GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.
FACTS:
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are, as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the
petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for
him.
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before
Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question whether or not the public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and
holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935,
filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the complainant
manifested that because of the defendants judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it was futile and a useless
exercise to claim support from defendant. Because of such manifestation, and defendants assurance that he would not pursue his
counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect, admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which
admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the
child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the
Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for support, especially so because the order of the
trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice. The petition is not impressed with merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners contention of having lack of filiation against the respondent is valid?
HELD:
NO. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However,
paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence
or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Pursuant to Article 202 of the Family Code, the provisional character of
support judgment is due to the needs of the changing recipient and the changing ability of the provider that any judgment support does not
become final. In the case at bar,The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived
being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of
the cause. Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary
and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ESPIRITU VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed
by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common
law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they
were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second
child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up,
stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying
expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back
to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was
sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was
afraid of being arrested. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this
Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's
decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion
that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita is entitled for the custody of her children?
HELD:
NO. Pursuant to Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age unless the parent
chosen is unfit. Although Reynaldo has an assignment in Pittsburgh, it is only a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase
of a steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are
completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the
completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent
with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer
applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two
years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody
to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by
her behavior. THE PETITION IS GRANTED.

AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and
in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their
school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and
his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action
for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved . 4
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot
to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7,
1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a
report to the principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that
killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have
been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm
that killed Alfredo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school or administrator is liable for damages inflicted upon by the accused to Pablito Daffon?
HELD:
NO. The court ruled that the petitioner against the contention of the respondent couldnt invoke Article 219 of the Family Code. The
respective liabilities of the school shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by
their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the
teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were
committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held
liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades. In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in
the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend
them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Federico Ylarde and Adelaida Doronio vs. Edgardo Aquino, Mauro Soriano, CA
Concept:
Specific Cases on the Concept of Fault or Negligence (Liability of Teachers)
FACTS:
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher in the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution in Tayug, Pangasinan; Mariano Soriano
was the principal in that school The school was littered with several concrete blocks, remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in
World War II In 1962: Sergio Banez, another teacher, started burying the blocks one by one because the hug stones were serious hazards to
the school children; he was able to bury 10 blocks by himself 2.
Oct. 7, 1963: Edgardo Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, after class dismissal Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered
them to dig beside a 1-ton concrete block in order to make a hole where the stone can be buried The work was left unfinished so they came
back the following day with 4 of the original 18: Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde They dug until
the excavation was 1 meter and 40 cm deep, then teacher Edgardo Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside,
throwing out the loose soil Once the depth was right, they all got out; Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole
while he went to see Banez who had the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope; allegedly, Aquino told the children
not to touch the stone before he left A few minutes after he left, the 3 kids (Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde) playfully jumped into the pit;
without any warning, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block, causing it to slide down towards the opening Alonso and Alcantara were
able to scramble out of the excavation on time, but Ylarde got caught by the concrete block before he could get out, pinning him to the wall
in a standing position and he sustained several injuries (hematoma, contusion, abrasion, fractures, ruptured urinary bladder) and received a
very poor prognosis 3.Oct. 11 (3 days later): Novelito Ylarde died 4. Ylardes parents filed a suit in the CFI Pangasinan for damages
against private respondents Aquino (teacher) and Soriano (principal)
CFI: Dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: 1) The digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work
Education; 2) Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautions person; and 3) The demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence
CA: Affirmed the CFIs decision
ISSUE/S: WON both private respondents can be held liable for damages; subdivided into:
1.WON Soriano can be held liable for damages (NO)
2.WON Aquino can be held liable for damages (YES)
3.WON Ylardes death was due to his own reckless imprudence (NO)

HELD:
YES. They left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance SC: The negligent act of Aquino in
leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Pursuant to Article 219 of the
Family Code, those given the authority and responsibility under the preceeding article shall be principally and solitarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiary liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. Therefore, the teachers in the
case at bar shall be liable for the damages.

[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decisioni[1] of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9,
1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the
fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.

The Courts Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218ii[7] and 219iii[8] of
the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.iv[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.v[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.vi[11]

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.vii[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause
of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of
the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given
the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.viii [13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the
accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule.ix[15] The power of the court to award
attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.x[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees
against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact
admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.xi[17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appealsxii[18] and that of the trial court.xiii[19]
The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy,
Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.