THE CAUSES OF WAR

Rutgers University

Political Science 324

Spring 2012

Professor Jack S. Levy

304 Hickman Hall; 732 932-1073
jacklevy@rci.rutgers.edu
http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/
Office Hours: after class (on CAC) & by appointment (in Hickman 304)
War has been a plague on humanity for thousands of years, from early hunter-gatherers,
to tribes and chiefdoms, to empires and early states, to the contemporary international
system. War takes place between states, within states, and between other kinds of political
organizations. Most of us would like to see an end to war, or, at a minimum, a reduction
in the horrible destructiveness of war. Despite the intellectual energy devoted to the
questions of what causes war and how to control it by philosophers, historians, political
scientists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, biologists, primatologists, and others
little consensus has emerged regarding what the causes of war are or how best to
identify those causes. It is perhaps not surprising that debates persist between various
disciplines, given their different assumptions and methodologies. But debate persists
within disciplines as well. No consensus has emerged among political scientists as to the
best theory of war, how we might construct or validate such a theory, or even the
appropriate criteria for evaluating competing theories of war. Historians, who are
generally quite skeptical about the possibility of constructing general theories about
anything as complex and context-dependent as war, rarely agree among themselves about
the causes of particular wars. This is true even in cases such as the First World War,
where most of the documents pertaining to the war are now available.
Our aim in this course is to gain a better understanding of the conditions, processes, and
events which lead to the outbreak and escalation of war. War defined generally as
sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations comes in enormous
varieties, including tribal wars, imperial wars, interstate wars, great power wars,
revolutionary wars, civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorism. Although different kinds of
war may exhibit some common themes pursuit of interests and fears of insecurity, for
example many of the more specific causes of war differ for different kinds of wars. A
theory of great power war (like the First or Second World Wars) will probably not
provide a very good explanation for the insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. A general
theory of all war would be too general and too watered down to provide useful
explanations of particular kinds of wars. For that reason we limit our focus in this course
to the causes of interstate wars.

True, interstate war is no longer the dominant form of warfare, as it was for most of the
last five centuries of the modern international system. Great power wars (between the
leading states in the system), which have done much to shape the nature of the state
system during the last half millennium, have disappeared since World War II (or at least
since the Korean War), and interstate wars in general have declined over that period.
Meanwhile, civil wars exploded in number since the 1960s before reaching a peak in the
1980s, and civil war, insurgency, and terrorism continues to be the most frequent form of
armed conflict in the world. Nevertheless, interstate war is still the most destructive form
of war and the one that has the greatest potential for fundamentally reshaping the
structure and evolution of world politics and the lives of many peoples. In addition, there
are enough danger spots in the world the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prospective
emergence of a nuclear Iran, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, the Korean peninsula, and the rise
of China as a rival to the United States to warrant a continued concern with the
phenomenon of interstate war.
Our primary aim is to understand the conditions under which interstate wars are most
likely to occur, to answer the question of Who Fights Whom, Where, When, and Why?
(as the late Stuart Bremer once asked). These are theoretical questions, and much of the
focus in the lectures and readings are theoretical in nature. We supplement our theoretical
analyses with a large number of historical illustrations, both in lecture and in readings on
particular wars, from the Peloponnesian War that engulfed the Greek world from 431404BCE to the 2003 Iraq War. These historical case studies will serve several purposes.
Individual wars are important in and of themselves, and are worth studying for their
historical value. I am also convinced that the best way to understand general theories of
war is to see how they work in particular cases. Theories are useful in abstracting from a
mass of detail in order to identify the underlying causal processes, but actual wars are
often quite complex, as historical studies will show. Understanding the causes of war
requires both theoretical knowledge and historical knowledge.
The course begins with an historical and theoretical introduction. We classify different
kinds of war and examine the evolution of interstate warfare over the last half millennium
and some significant changes in patterns of warfare during the last half century. We then
analyze the Clausewitzian conception of war as an instrument of state policy. Next, we
turn to the "levels-of-analysis" framework, which will serve as an organizing concept for
our theoretical survey of the causes of war. We consider "human nature" explanations for
war and ask what we mean by the question of "what causes war?"
We then turn to system-level "realist" explanations for war, beginning with a brief review
of realist theories of international politics. We give particular attention to balance of power
theory, power transition theory, and preventive war. Moving to the "dyadic" level of
analysis, we examine the deterrence model and spiral models of conflict, and then analyze

"Prisoner's dilemma" models. We next turn our attention to the "bargaining model of war"
and theories of crisis management. Our next subject is economic theories of war, which
cut across system and societal (domestic) levels. Our main focus here is on MarxistLeninist theories of imperialism, the liberal "trade promotes peace" hypothesis, and realist
critiques of the liberal view. Turning to the societal level, we examine the "democratic
peace" (the fact that democratic states rarely if ever go to war with each other). After
looking at the possible links between both ideology and religion and war, we then turn to
the diversionary theory of war and to the argument that the process of democratization
might actually make war more likely.
After a review of system, dyad, and societal-level theories of war (and the first exam), we
turn to the individual level and examine the belief systems and psychology of leaders. We
lay out a rational model of decision-making and then examine various ways in which
actual decision-making deviates from a rational decision calculus. Specific topics include
misperceptions and war and the psychology of threat perception and intelligence failure.
We also look at prospect theory, which emphasizes loss aversion and the high-risk
behavior its sometimes generates. We end our theoretical discussions with a look at
bureaucratic and organizational theories of war.
We finish up the course with more detailed explorations of the causes of World War I, the
"seminal conflict" of the 20th century, which is now approaching its 100th anniversary and
which will get a lot of attention in the next few years; World War II, the most destructive
war in history; and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is the closest the world has come to a
nuclear war and which will be observing its 50th anniversary this year.
READINGS
I have done my best to minimize your expenses for the class by limiting the number of
books to one and selecting the rest of the reading materials in the form of journal articles
and book chapters that are available for free on my Sakai site for the course.
Book
Jack S. Levy & William R. Thompson, Causes of War. Chichester, UK: Wiley- Blackwell,
2010.
The book is available for purchase at New Jersey Books (37 Easton Avenue; 732 253
7666) and on the internet. Kindle and Nook editions are also available. I have also asked
Alexander library to place copies of the book on reserve. The book will not be available on
my Sakai site.

Articles and Book Chapters (available on the course Sakai site, www.sakai.rutgers.edu)
In the order of appearance on the syllabus:
Steven Pinker, A History of Violence. Edge Master Class, 2001. Excerpt from
http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker
Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976. Book I, chap. 1.
Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence." In Schelling, Arms and Influence. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Chap. 1.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
Chap. 1.
Greg Cashman, "The Individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression." In Cashman,
What Causes War? New York: Macmillan/Lexington 1993. Chap. 2.
Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention Not a Biological Necessity." In Leon
Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., War. Rev. Ed. New York: Basic Books, 1968.
Pp. 269-74.
John J. Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for Power. In Robert J. Art and Robert
Jervis, eds., International Politics. 7th ed. New York: Longman, 2005. Pp. 50-60.
Stephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition. In Ira Katznelson
and Helen V. Milner, Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: W.W.
Norton, 2002. Pp. 197-230.
Edward Vose Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power." In Gulick,
Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955. Pp.
390-97.
Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning. In Robert J. Art and Robert
Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Tenth
ed. Boston: Longman, 2011.Pp.127-134.
Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle.
Trans. Charles Fullman. New York: Vintage, 1962. Pp. 224-46.
Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design. In
John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New
Debate. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Pp. 128-53.
Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York:
Chatham House Publishers, 2000. Chap. 1.
Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York:
Chatham House Publishers, 2000. Chap. 7.
Jack S. Levy, Preventive War and Democratic Politics. International Studies Quarterly,
52, 1 (March 2008): 1-24.
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary." In
Ralph K. White, Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War. New York: New York
University Press, 1986. Pp. 107-30.

Janice Gross Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through
Miscalculated Escalation." In Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of
Crisis Management. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991. Chap. 8.
Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983.Chap.5-6.
Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power." In Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. New
York: Free Press, 1988. Chap. 8.
Alexander L. George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management." In Alexander L.
George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, Col. Westview,
1991. Chap. 4.
Charles Callan Tansill, War Profits and Unneutrality. In Herbert J. Bass, ed.,
American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or Security? New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 39-52.
Michael W. Doyle, Commercial Pacifism: Smith and Schumpeter. In Doyle, Ways of
War and Peace. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Chap. 7.
John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." International Security,
19, 2 (Fall 1994): 87-125.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72, 3 (Summer 1993):
22-49.
Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes:
Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case." In Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., The
Internationalization of Communal Strife. London: Routledge, 1992. Pp. 118-46.
V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia."
International Security, 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95): 130-166.
Jack Snyder, "Transitions to Democracy and the Rise of Nationalist Conflict." In Snyder,
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W.W.
Norton, 2000. Chap 1.
Joe D. Hagan, Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs. Historical
Reality in International Relations Theory. International Studies Review, 3, 2 (Summer
2001): 5-46.
Janice Gross Stein, Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat. In
Neil J. Kressel, Political Psychology. New York: Paragon House, 1993, Pp. 367-92.
Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, 4
(Spring, 1988): 675-700.
Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur
War," World Politics, 28 (1976): 348-80.
Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict." In Manus I.
Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2000. Pp. 193-221.
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War. In Kagan, On the Origins of War and the
Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Chap. 1.

Herbert J. Bass, ed., American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or
Security? New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 1-7.
Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18,
4 (Spring 1988): 893-22.
John G. Stoessinger, In the Name of God: Hindus and Moslems in India and Pakistan. In
Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War. 11th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2011. Chap. 6.
John G. Stoessinger, The Sixty Years War in the Holy Land: Israel and the Arabs. In
Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War. 11th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2011. Chap. 7.
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf
War." International Security 16, 2 (Fall 1991): 5-41.
Steve A. Yetiv, The Iraq War of 2003. In Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The
United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2008. Pp. 118-44.
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some
Policy Implications. World Politics 24 (Spring 1972): 40-79.
James C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy." Atlantic Monthly, April
1973: 47-53.
F.R. Bridge & Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System, 18151914. London: Longman, 1980. Pp. 112-179.
James Joll, Origins of the First World War. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1992. Chap 2.
Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Chronology" and "Dramatis Personae." In Richard F. Hamilton
and Holger H. Herwig, eds. (2003) The Origins of World War I. New York: Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 507-24. No need to read, but use as a reference.
Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914." International Security
15, 3 (Winter 1990/91): 151-86. (Optional)
T.W. Mason, Some Origins of the Second World War. Past and Present, 29 (December
1964): 67-87.
Allan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War." In Esmonde M.
Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Pp.
189-224.
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999. Chap. 2.
Alexander L. George, The Cuban Missile Crisis. In Alexander L. George, ed.,
Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991. Pp.
222-68.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Student performance in the course will be evaluated on the basis of an in-class mid-term
examination and a paper. The mid-term exam, which will take place on Thursday March 8,
will include both true/false & multiple choice questions and an essay. For the essay, you
will select one question from a choice of two. The paper is a cross between a paper and a
take-home exam. You will choose one question from a choice of two, and write a 5-6 page
single space answer. The paper topics will be posted on my Sakai site on the first day of
Spring, March 20. Papers will be due April 16. There will be a two-week penalty-free
extension in the deadline on the paper (to April 30) for those who need it. Papers should be
submitted on my Sakai site (Assignments tab). They will be processed through the
Turnitin program, which detects plagiarism from internet sources and from the Turnitin
database of papers.
The exams and paper will be weighted approximately as follows for the purposes of
determining your final grade:
midterm exam - 40%
paper
- 60%
I will give some additional consideration to those who make important contributions to
class discussion, but this will only affect grades in borderline situations. There will be no
opportunities for extra credit through additional work.
Regarding the paper: I will ask two very general questions, from which you will answer
one. The questions will draw on material from both the first and second half of the course.
You will be expected to understand the various theories of war and be able to illustrate the
theories with historical examples from the course reading and from lectures (and from
previous course work and reading if you want, but that is not necessary). You are
responsible for the readings during the last two weeks of the term (after the formal April
16 due date for the papers), in the sense that you should incorporate relevant materials
from the readings into your paper if that material is relevant. You are not responsible for
the lecture material during the last two weeks of the term, but you are free to use that
material if you think it is appropriate.
You must take the exam as scheduled on Thursday, March 8. I will give make-up exams
only in cases medical illness or family emergency. If for any reason you are not able to
take the exam, you must inform me by email at jacklevy@rci.rutgers.edu on the day
of the exam or before. Otherwise a penalty will be assessed on the make-up exam. I
will ask for written verification of the reason for your absence.

I will send out a few announcements during the course by way of email from my Sakai site
to your Rutgers email. If you normally use a different email, please arrange for your
Rutgers email to be forwarded to your other account.
Some Rules
1) Academic Integrity. The University, the Political Science Department, and I each take
academic integrity very seriously. The University imposes heavy penalties for plagiarism
and other forms of academic dishonesty. If you do not understand what plagiarism or other
forms of academic dishonesty are, please see the Rutgers website on academic integrity:
http://teachx.rutgers.edu/integrity/policy.html
2) Electronic Devices
Please turn off your cell phones before entering the classroom. If you need to have your
cell phone on for medical or other reasons, please come and see me. You are free to use
laptop computers, IPADs, or other devices to take notes, to look at the syllabus or reading
material online, or to look up other factual material relating to the course, but not for any
other purpose texting or emailing is not permitted. No phones or other electronic devices
are permitted during the exam.
3) Attendance. I will not take attendance. Nor will I provide a summary of my lectures or
class discussion for those who miss class.

COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

number indicates the week of the term beginning January 17;
letters a & b represent the first and second lectures each week;
-- indicates multiple topics in a class period.
complete citations are listed earlier in the syllabus under "Readings"
1a.

Course Introduction (Tuesday, January 17)

course description, aims, organization, expectations, requirements, etc.

1b.

Theoretical Introduction (Thursday, January 19)

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 1

--

Historical Evolution of War

Steven Pinker, A History of Violence. Excerpt on Sakai.
Alternatively, watch the video at
http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker, focusing on the
section on "The Long Peace," about a sixth of the way in, starting just before
figure on The 100 Worst Wars & Atrocities.

--.

The Politics of War

Clausewitz, On War, book I, chap. 1
Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence"

2a.

The Levels of Analysis Framework (Tuesday, January 24)

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, chap. 1

--

Human Aggression
Greg Cashman, "The Individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression"
Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention Not a Biological Necessity"

--

What Do We Mean by the Question What Causes War?

2b.

Realist Theories of International Relations (Thursday, January 26)

John J. Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for Power
Stephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 2

10

3a.

Balance of Power Theory (Tuesday, January 31)

Edward Vose Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power"
Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning"
Case Study: World War I
Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power
Struggle, pp. 224-46

3b.

Balance of Power Theory (continued) (Thursday, February 2)

Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research
Design

4a.

Power Transition Theory (Tuesday, February 7)

Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions, chap. 1
Case study: The Rise of China
Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions, chap. 7
Preventive War
Jack S. Levy, Preventive War and Democratic Politics

4b.

The Dyadic Level (Thursday, February 9)

The Deterrence Model and the Spiral Model
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 55-63
Case Study: The 1967 Arab-Israeli War
Janice Gross Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through
Miscalculated Escalation"

5a.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Model (Tuesday, February 14)

Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity, chap. 5-6

5b.

The Bargaining Model of War (February 16)

Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power"
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 63-70
Crisis Management
Alexander L. George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management"

11

6a.

Economic Causes of War: Marxist-Leninist Theories of Imperialism

(Tuesday, February 21)
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 83-93.
Case Study: American Entry into World War I
Charles Callan Tansill, War Profits and Unneutrality

6b.

Liberal Theories of Interdependence and Peace (Thursday, February 23)

Doyle, Commercial Pacifism: Smith and Schumpter
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 70-77

7a.

The Societal Level (Tuesday, February 28)

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 4

--

The Democratic Peace

John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"

--

Ideology and Religion

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

7b.

The Diversionary Theory of War

Case Studies: The Falklands/Malvinas War and the Yugoslav Wars
Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes:
Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case" (skip pp. 125-27)
V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of
Serbia"
Democratization and Conflict
Jack Snyder, "Transitions to Democracy and the Rise of Nationalist Conflict"

8a.

Review (Tuesday, March 6)

8b.

Exam #1 (Thursday, March 8, in class)

12

9a.

Return Exams (Tuesday, March 20)

--

Individual Level Psychological Theories

Joe D. Hagan, Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs.
Historical Reality in International Relations Theory
The Rational Model
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 128-33

9b.

The Psychology of Threat Perception (Thursday, March 22)

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp, 133-61
Janice Gross Stein, Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of
Threat.

10a.

Misperception and War (Tuesday, March 27)

Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception"
The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence Failure
Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom
Kippur War"

10b.

Prospect Theory (Thursday, March 29)

Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict."

11ab. Historical Case Studies in the Causes of War (April 3 & 5)

Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War.
Herbert J. Bass, ed., American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or
Security? Introduction, pp. 1-7
Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War"
John G. Stoessinger, In the Name of God: Hindus and Moslems in India and
Pakistan
John G. Stoessinger, The Sixty Years War in the Holy Land: Israel and the
Arabs
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the
Gulf War"
Steve A. Yetiv, The Iraq War of 2003

13

12a.

Bureaucratic/Organizational Theories (Tuesday, April 10)

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 6.
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm
and Some Policy Implications.
Case Study: The United States in Vietnam
James C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy."

12b.

Theoretical Summary (Thursday, April 12)

Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 8.
Discussion of Papers

**

April 16 (Monday) - papers due (I will accept papers without penalty until April 30)

13a.

World War I (Tuesday, April 17)

F.R. Bridge & Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System,
1815-1914, pp. 112-179
James Joll, "The July Crisis 1914"
Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Chronology" and "Dramatis Personae"
No need to read, but use as a reference.
Optional: Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914"

13b.

World War II (Europe) (Thursday, April 19)

T.W. Mason, Some Origins of the Second World War
Allan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War"

14a.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (Tuesday, April 24)

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis, chap. 2
Alexander L. George, The Cuban Missile Crisis

14b.

A Reassessment of Theories of War (Thursday, April 26)