Origins and Applications of Political Policing in Argentina

Author(s): Laura Kalmanowiecki

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 2, Violence, Coercion, and Rights in the
Americas (Mar., 2000), pp. 36-56
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Originsand Applicationsof
PoliticalPolicingin Argentina
by
Laura Kalmanowiecki
Themilitary
coupthatoustedPresident
HipolitoYrigoyen
frompowerin
forArgentine
1930hadprofound
September
implications
societyandpoliandusedin a moreovert
tics.After1930,military
powerwas consolidated
andpoliticalinitiatives
cametocountonthearmedforces
andviolentfashion
to providewithforcewhatwas lackingin majoritarian
support.
Repressive
thearmedforcesas thefinalarbiter
politicswereinstitutionalized,
enshrining
ofthenation'spoliticaldestiny
(HalperinDonghi,1961;White,1991).
The periodof reactionthatfollowedthe 1930 military
coup has been
decade"(Rock,1993: 173). Oligarchic
dubbed"theinfamous
dominance
in
thepoliticalsystemwenthandinhandwithwhatmanyobservers
andsocial
characterized
as a conspicuous
on Britainepitomized
scientists
dependence
bytheRoca-Runciman
pactof 1933(Rock,1987:214-223;Pla, 1969: 105;
whorejecttheindictment
ofthisdecade
Galasso,1969).1Curiously,
analysts
inovercoming
as successful
andviewArgentina
thecrisisofthe1930sdraw
toanother
moreattention
aspectofthisperiod:thesystematization
ofa surveillancemachine.Fraga(1991) andAguinagaandAzaretto(1991) convey
whentheypointto theextensive
respectratherthancriticism
information
after1932byPresident
serviceestablished
the
AgustinP. Justoto monitor
The military
military,
politicalparties,and society.2
coup thatdeposedthe
middle-class
UnionCivicaRadicalpartygovernment
ofHipolitoYrigoyen
and establishedGeneralJoseFelix Uriburuas president
was profoundly
and censorship,
and purgeswithinthearmyand the
repressive,
tortures,
Butafter
a majorsetbackintheApril1931elections,
policebecamerampant.
inwhichtheRadicalssucceededdespitetherevolutionaries'
aimoferadicatfrompolitics,Uriburuhad to withdraw
frompower.In
ing Yrigoyenism
is an assistant
of sociologyat RowanUniversity.
She is the
LauraKalmanowiecki
professor
authorofPolice,Politics,and Repressionin ModernArgentina(2000) and is revisingher
dissertation,
"MilitaryPowerand Policingin Argentina,
1900-1955,"forpublication.She
David Rock,RicardoSalvatore,
thanksDiane Davis, Luis Fleischman,PatriceMcSherry,
fortheirremarks
andsuggestions
onanearlierversionof
CharlesTilly,andtheLAP reviewers
thisarticle.
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 111,Vol.27 No. 2, March2000 36-56
C 2000 LatinAmerican
Perspectives

36

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/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

Kalmanowiecki

37

toUriburu's
dreamoforderanddiscipline
contrast
insocialandpoliticallife,
ofAgustinP. Justothatfollowedseemedutterly
thegovernment
moderate
and "civilian."Underhistenureas minister
ofwarduringtheAlvearpresiand modernization
dency(1922-1928),a majorprofessionalization
of the
armyhadtakenplace.His beingan engineer
no doubtenhancedhiscivilian
withinitialmeasuresthatincludedthereleaseof political
image,together
prisonersand the restoration
of freedomof the press. His slogan was
"nationalconciliation"(Wesson,1986: 199; Goldwert,1972: 43; Rock,
1987:218).
Still,1930markeda qualitative
changeintheuse ofthecoercivepowerof
thestateagainstopposition
movements
andonethathadlong-lasting
effects.
ofwhathappenedafterthe1930military
Detailedexamination
coup anda
oftheJusto
reevaluation
administration
revealstheestablishment
ofthemeans
ofrepression,
andinformation-gathering
andtheir
extraction,
coordination,
actionagainstputative
enemiesoftheregime.
diversion
toextralegal
The new perspective
on thisdecade thatI wantto provideshiftsthe
emphasisfromitseconomicandexclusionary
ofa suraspectstothecreation
veillanceapparatus
thathadnotpreviously
existedandthatsurvivesto this
thatfollowsbyassertday.Thecynicalreadercanrejectthedetailednarrative
ingthatanArgentine
doesnotneedmuchcommonsensetobe awareofconin thecountry
after1930.In my
and surveillance
spicuousstaterepression
torepression
view,thisanalysisallowsus togo beyondthecasualreferences
accountstodemonstrate
theconstruction
foundinmosthistoriographic
ofa
immuneto
police and military
apparatusthathas remainedconspicuously
Thisprocesslackedbindanddemocratic
anyformofaccountability
control.
between
theagentsofgovernment
andthepeople,inhibiting
ingconsultation
theprotection
a crucialaspectof democracy:
ofcitizensfroman arbitrary
and Stephens,
state(Tilly,1997;Norden,1996a;Rueschemeyer,
Stephens,
1992;McSherry,
1997b).
Statecoercionhad of coursebeen used before1930 againstworkers,
and thepoliticalopposition(Rock, 1975; Waisman,
socialists,anarchists,
thegov1989;Walter,
1977).Whenthepolicewereunabletocontainstrikes,
itwas thedemocratiernment
calledinthearmyandthenavy.Furthermore,
tolaborunrestwithlargethatresponded
callyelectedRadicalgovernment
scale repression.
was epitomizedby theeventsof the
Bloodyrepression
TragicWeekof 1919,in whichthearmyand thepolice crushedstriking
in 1921-1922.Likeandbythearmy'smassacreofruralworkers
workers,
ofelectionsbytheInterior
thepolice
wise,themanagement
Ministry
granted
fullcontroloverfraudandcoercion.

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38

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

After1930,however,
something
different
wascreated.
Thegovernment
of
actedagainstthoseitviewedas a threat
"witha harshness
thatsurUriburu
hadyetseen"(Horowitz,
passedanything
Argentina
1990: 13).Deportations
andtorture
ofanarchists
andcommunists
offoreigners
becamewidespread,
andatleastfivepeoplewereexecuted(Horowitz,
1990;Bayer,1989).MemTheirleaders
bersoftheRadicalpartywerepurgedfromtheadministration.
thenationwerebeateninpolicestations.
Torture
was also used
throughout
who supported
theoustedgovernment.3
In
againstRadical armyofficers
theassaultagainstsocietyhada hiddenandproactive
addition,
underpinning.
ofespionageandsurveillance
was established,
A broadnetwork
andpolice
was extendedto newtargets.
Thoselabeledas posinga threat
repression
to
ofthestatenowincludedcommunists
thesecurity
andRadicalswhohadbeen
expelledfrompower.
In spiteofhisliberalappearance,
Justoupheldandsystematized
torture
He didnotconsiderthesetacandmadethemmoreefficient.
andsurveillance
deviationinherited
fromtheformer
ticsa perverted
nationalist
integralist,
obscuredgreatambition,
regime.His "benigndemeanor
andpotentpolitical
skillsin supportof it, notexcludinga talentfordeviousmanipulation"
an expression
usedbyWaisman(1989:
1987:72). Borrowing
(Crassweller,
be saidthattheJusto
thatfollowed
faction
70) todescribethisperiod,itmight
the"nationalist"
Uriburufactionand inaugurated
proscriptive
democracy
can be termed"liberal" only in the Orwellianpoliticaldiscourseof
Argentina.
SOLDIERS, COPS, AND VIGILANTES
fallintotwocategories.
In oneview,the
StudiesofthepoliceinArgentina
butattenuated
extensions
henceunworthy
ofthemilitary,
policearenothing
of attention.
Indeed,academicresearchin LatinAmericain generalhas
institution
becausethe
neglectedthestudyofthepoliceas an independent
hasobscuredtheirtruecharacter
ofthemilitary
as distinct
ubiquity
political
and social actors.Militaryinterventionism
since 1930 has been seen as
responsibleforArgentina'stroubledpath to democratization
(Rouquie,
thatcontrolling
1986;Fontana,1984;Norden,1996a).Ithasbeensuggested
themilitary
anditsautonomous
ruleand
powerwouldputan endtomilitary
stateviolence(Stepan,1988;Rouquie,1986)andthatthedeveloparbitrary
mentof politicalengineering
skillswouldhelpciviliansto do this(PionBerlin,1991).

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

39

TheelectionofPresident
CarlosMenemin 1989following
theprevious
electedgovernment
of theoppositionpartyreflectedthe
democratically
ofdemocracyin Argentina.
consolidation
of
However,recentdescriptions
Argentine
"thindemocracy"
(Munck,1997)raisequestionsas towhether
the
and intelligence
forceshave abandonedtheirroles as
military,
security,
guardiansof democracies.Indeed,as McSherry(1997b) has shown,even
thoughMenemhas reducedthemilitary
budgetand thesize of thearmed
forces,an internalsecuritymissionis stillthemainstayof themilitaryforces(butcf.Norden,1996b).Besides,analystspreoccupied
security
with
of thearmedforcesassumethatthemilitary
is theonly
thecivilianization
theroleofthepolice.I believethat
agentofsanctioned
violence,neglecting
thepolicehavea politicalroleandthatthedegreetowhichtheyadoptmiliandaimscan tellus a greatdeal aboutnationalpolitics.
taryorganization
A secondviewconsiders
thepoliceseparateactorsbutsimplyas specialofcrimeandpublicspace(Johnson,
istsinthecontrol
1990;Socolow,1990;
Thepolicehave
SlattaandRobinson,1990).Thisviewis similarly
simplistic.
repeatedly
playedmajorpartsin repressive
policiesand in strugglesfor
totheerosionofthegovpower.Whentheyarevenalorbrutal
theycontribute
ernment's
Theinvolvement
ofthefederalpoliceandthe
politicallegitimacy.
BuenosAirespoliceforcesintheterrorist
attackon theJewishheadquarters
in 1994,thekillingofthejournalist
JoseCabezasin 1997,andothercriminal
actslead us intoa dizzyinglabyrinth
of victimsandperpetrators
involving
extremists
and racketeers,
thieves
policemenand military
men,right-wing
andthugs,banditsandrogues(McSherry,
1997a;Fleischman,
1999).
Throughrecentjournalisticaccountswe are introduced
intothedark
worldofthePatasNegras(as theBuenosAiresprovincial
policearecalled),
members
oftheTripleA (AlianzaArgentina
former
which
Anticomunista),
as an unofficial
functioned
extensionof therepressive
forcesof thestate,
members
ofthe"taskforces"thatperpetrated
former
torture
anddisappearances duringthe"dirtywar,"and membersof theprovincialand federal
theStateIntelligence
andtheintelligence
networks
policeforces,
Secretariat,
ofthearmyandthenavy,amongothers.
Drugtraffickers,
provincial
andfederal police, privatesecurityagencies,and military
personnelcoexistin
suchas Arcaingeles,
andProlatin4
without
civiliancontrol.
organizations
The mereattempt
to answerquestionssuchas "On whosepayrollare
they?thearmy's?thepolice's?"opensupa Pandora'sboxinwhichnoonein
is abovesuspicion.Then-Radical
thepoliceforceorthegovernment
Senator
Fernandode la Rua statedbluntly,
(nowPresident)
"Nobodyknowswhom
they[theintelligence
services]are workingfor"(quotedby McSherry,

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40

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

inArgentina
1997a: 162).Unfortunately,
itseemseasytocrosstheboundariesbetween"legitimate"
and"illegitimate"
violence,as itis notalwayspossibletodistinguish
betweensoldiers,
police,andcommoncriminals
(Chevigny,1995;Kalmanowiecki,
1991).
An analysisof therole of military
and police organizations
thatis not
toa civil-military
focuscouldproveuseful.In Argentina
restricted
itis difficulttodistinguish
themilitary
fromthepolice,as theformer
participates
in
thepatrolofpublicspaces,thecontrolofcollecdomesticpolicingthrough
tiveaction,andtheapprehension
ofrealorimaginary
law-breakers.
Should
as half-police,
Itis difficult
someorganizations
be characterized
half-army?
thepolicefromthearmedforceswhenonedefinestheroleof
todistinguish
eachas theprotection
ofthestateagainstinternal
orexternal
threats
(Bayley,
1975: 329). This functional
distinction
becomesblurredwhentheirtasks
role(Kalmanowiecki,
overlap,as in themilitary's
counterinsurgency
1998;
insteada continuum
frommilitary
to police,I
Mazower,1997). Suggesting
wouldlookbeyondthemilitary
institution
as a referent
forstateviolenceand
ofthepolicethatacknowledges
call foran examination
theshifting,
porous,
andoverlapping
borders
within
thecoerciveapparatus
ofthestate.Ithasbeen
thearmedforces"(Col. Gussaidthat"after1930civilianscouldnotcontrol
tavoCaceres,quotedbyMcSherry,
1997b:27). One shouldwonderwhether
civilianscouldcontrolthepolice.
Ratherthanassumingtheexistenceofa continuous
threadofauthoritariin one often
ofArgentine
anism,I willexplorethebrutalunderside
history
ignoredlocusofviolence:thepoliceandthebuildingofa repressive
reperstateresulted
in a repressive
toireafter1930.5The transition
toa militarized
unlikeanything
thathadpreviously
existed.A secretstate
policeapparatus
within
thestatemovedforward
tooccupya spaceaboutwhichquestionswere
notto be asked.As before,itmovedin obscurity
in searchof enemiesof
theincumbent
regime,butnowitbecamea reserveddomainofpolicy(see
ofstateandsociety,
closedto
O' Donnell,1992)intheinterstices
completely
externalcontroland accountability.
Arroganceand contemptbecame
in an expandedsecretapparatus
ingrained
ofthestatethatsystematized
its
to includesurveillance,
repressive
repertoire
instigation,
espionage,blackIntheirstruggle
mail,andvetting.
against"subversion,"
represented
bycomandthepolicebecameintermingled,
munismandRadicalism,themilitary
eachperfecting
itsgraspofdomesticpoliticalpolicing.Decades beforethe
in the 1960s,theArgentine
doctrines
wereconsolidated
nationalsecurity
andsecuarmywasinvolvedincivilianpoliticsandhadcreatedintelligence
tomonitor
theinternal
realm(see McSherry,
ritystructures
1997a).How did
Justosucceed in creatingan apparatusthatwould survivelaterregime
changes?

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

41

THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ARGENTINE POLICE: AN OVERVIEW
Afterthefederalization
of thecityof BuenosAiresin 1880,itspolice
becamethepoliceofthefederalcapital,directly
subordinate
tothepresident
theminister
oftheinterior,
andtherangeofpolicingactivities
through
was
The capitalpolicegaveup areasofinfluence,
narrowed.
notwithout
resistance(see Gayol, 1996; Kalmanowiecki,
2000). By thenArgentinahad
becomea dynamiccapitalistsocietyorganizedarounda dependent
export
toprovidethepolicewithan organiccode
sector.In spiteofseveralattempts
ofrulesand obligations,
to be ruledby ad hoc presidential
theycontinued
decrees,laws, edicts,and ordinances(Mejias, 1913: 32-38; Carracedo
Nuniez,1928). Accordingto theReglamento
General,issuedin 1885,the
capitalpoliceserveda dualpurpose:theprotection
oflaw andorderandthe
security
ofthestate(Rodriguez,1981:63).6
Itwas Col. RamonL. Falcon,appointed
chiefofpolicein 1906,wholaid
thefoundations
ofthe
(Fentanes,1955: 166). He dividedthemainactivities
ofhierarchical
a principle
functional
policefollowing
reordifferentiation,
sectionsandassigning
themtodivisions.Themain
ganizingthepreexisting
was theSecurity
component
Division,theuniformed
policeon street
patrol
distributed
ofthecapital,in chargeof
amongthedifferent
policeprecincts
TheInvestigative
Divisionconsisted
of
publicorderbroadlydefined.
chiefly
thepoliticalpoliceandthecriminal
police(also calledthejudicialpoliceor
in plainclothes.The police also includedthe
detectiveforce),operating
DivisionandtheJudicial
Administrative
Division(Rodriguez,
1975;Lopez,
1911: 238-241).
themurder
Politicalconflict-including
ofFalconandhisaidebyananarofthecentenary
thereinforcechistin 1909-and thecelebrations
stimulated
mentofthepoliceanda majorincreaseinpolicepersonnel.
Thus,policepersonnelwereincreasedfrom4,170 in 1907 to 5,372 in 1911.7 (No further
inthefollowing
increaseinmanpower
occurred
decades.)By 1914theBuehad alreadydevelopedmoderncrime-fighting
nos Airespolicedepartment
mobilepatrols,
crimelabs,a detective
functions,
including
branch,andnew
and training
1990: 125; Rodriguez,1975).
recruiting
practices(Johnson,
on policingandtheshareofallocationsassignedto
Likewise,expenditures
until
of theinterior
did notchangesignificantly
thepoliceby theminister
encursolegal,Memoriade
1941(Resumen
generalde la cuentade inversio'n
Hacienda,1900-1941).Mostofthemoneythatwas assignedto policing
and securitywas spentto coverthesalariesofpersonnel.This was a top
prioritycomparedwithotherexpenses such as technological
improvements.ThebulkofpolicingexpenseswenttotheSecurity
Division(between

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42

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

ofthepolicein
Forexample,outofthetotalexpenditures
60 and70 percent).
Divisionand69 perwenttotheInvestigative
1928($307,711.93),8 percent
Division
Division.In 1912theclaimsoftheInvestigative
centtotheSecurity
peakedat 9 percent.
and the middle-class
Industrialconflict,the expansionof anarchism,
policeexpansion.
intothepoliticalarenaspurred
forincorporation
struggle
more
thandeveloping
aroundthestaterather
wascentered
Thepolicesystem
(see EmsleyandWeinberger,
intheAnglo-American
tradition
contractually
of the
1991; Bayley,1977).8 In thefollowingdecadesthebasic structure
ofthefederal
policein 1943-1944.
policeforcesvariedlittleuntilthecreation
followingthe 1930 military
was undertaken
A majorpolice restructuring
thatfollowedwas of short
thedivisionintoprefectures
coup,andalthough
the proceduresinitiated,
especiallyby Chiefof Police Luis J.
duration,
lefta lastingimprint
onthe
Garciaafter
AgustinJustowaselectedpresident,
Through
publicfundraising
ofthepoliceforceanditspractices.
organization
citizenswereprofundsfrom
prestigious
coordinated
bythepoliceprecincts,
The
of
new
modern
the
institution.
weapons,
to
modernize
acquisition
cured
anda policebroadcasting
communications
system,
vehicles,an up-to-date
network
meantthatBuenosAiresbecamemoreheavilypoliced.But there
thatledBuenosAirestobemorepolicedthaneverbefore
wereotherfeatures
totheassaultonthepublicandprivatespheresbya
andthatwereconnected
extended.
hadbeengreatly
statewhosecapabilitiesofintervention
POLITICAL POLICING DURING
THE JUSTO ADMINISTRATION
As I havepointedout,after1930 politicalpolicingbecametheproper
partsofthesecret
businessofthepolice,andpracticesthatbecameroutine
suchas monitoring,
shadowing,
infiltration,
surveillance,
policerepertoire,
thecapacityforcontestation
affected
andcovertoperations,
strongly
vetting,
changesoccurredunder
and resistanceof variousactors.Two important
werefurther
bureaucratized
andrepression
Justo.
control,
First,surveillance,
becamecustomary.
to centralauthorities
Second,
androutinized;
reporting
theauthorities
watchedgroups
increasedgreatly;
surveillance
anticipatory
at collectiveaction.
andwerereadytoquellanyattempt
carefully
realorimagined,
ofthisstoryinthethreat,
I shouldlocatethebeginning
toarmedinsurrection
posedbytheRadicalparty'stacticaldecisiontoresort
electionsas ithaddonebefore
infraudulent
from
andabstention
participation
ofpro1916 (Rouquie,1982: 266). The consequencesof theparticipation

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

43

Radicalgroupswithinthearmy("Legalists")as keyactorsin thisinsurrecintheliterature

tionary
strategy
areusuallyunderemphasized
onthe1930s.
Conspiratorial
activity
againstthegovernment
begansoonafter
Yrigoyen
intheelection
was oustedin 1930andincreasedaftertheRadicals'triumph
ofApril1931was nullified
1972:40-48).TheLegalistinsurrec(Goldwert,
tionsofFebruary
1931(headedbySeveroToranzo),July1931(ledbyGrego1932(headedbyPomar,AtilioCattaneo,andBenjamin
rioPomar),January
andDecember1933(conAbalos),December1932(directed
byCattaineo),
ductedbyPomarandRobertoBosch) weresuccessively
crushed.Cattaineo
andinitially
in the
has claimedthatJustoactedwithduplicity
participated
inhispowerstruggle
toOrona
1931conspiracy
againstUriburu.
According
intheconspiracy,
(1971: 139-162),however,
Justo
wasnotinvolved
although
he benefitedfromits repercussions
(Luna, 1972: 90; Cattaineo,1959:
84-144).ElectionsweresetforNovember8, 1931,and theRadicalswere
andthearrest
oftheirleaders.
excludedthrough
anddeportation
proscription
The crucialreasonforthefailureoftheserebellions
wastheefflcient
netand infiltration
thatwas inaugurated
workof surveillance
to confront
the
threatof Radical insurrection.
Althoughconspiracyleaderssuspectedits
was doomedfromitsincepexistence,
theydidnotknowthattheirstruggle
Fromas earlyas April1931thePoliticalOrderBranchofthepolicehad
tion.9
information
underway.Conspirators
werefollowed
abouttheconspiracies
and theirtelephones
tapped(policedossiersof JuanCarlosVasquez,Col.
ofthepresidency
FranciscoBosch,andRobertoBosch).The secretary
also
sentregular
withcopiesandtranscriptions
ofintercepted
letters
from
reports
theirsecretcodes broken(ArchivoJusto,Box 98, Docutheconspirators,
ment146).
foritsownsakewasunderway.The
Fetishism
forcollecting
information
maritime
for
police,thenavy,and thearmydevelopedtheirownnetwork
ontheactivities
oftheconspirators
withthelocal
andcollaborated
reporting
Division.10
and
policeandtheInvestigative
Military
intelligence
operations
withthepolice continued
untiltheend of Justo's
collaboration
thereafter
Conditionsin theprovincesand nationalterritories
thatwere
presidency.
seenas contributing
tothespreadofcommunism
ora return
ofRadicalism
prompted
intelligence
operations
bythearmedforces.The scopeofinternal
a contentious
policingbythearmywas still,however,
issue,as thefollowing
exampleillustrates.
in theChamberof Deputiesand
Beforetheelectionsformembership
inMarch1934,President
somelegislatures
Justoappointed
Brig.Gen.Julio
Costaofthe3d Divisionmilitary
observer
oftheelectionsintheprovinceof
SantaFe."1PoliceagentsfromtheInvestigative
Divisionofthecapitalpolice

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44

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

inRosario,theintegral
weresubordinated
tothechiefofthe11thRegiment
dated
memorandum
nationalist
Col. Emilio Faccione. In a confidential
localpolicesupport
ofRadicals,presentMarch1, 1934,Faccionereported
Box
conversation
as evidence(ArchivoJusto,
ingan intercepted
telephone
MinisterofWarGen.
46, Document28). Disturbedbythismemorandum,
toCostathatsincetheprovManuelRodrigueznotedin an urgent
telegram
thedutyoftheoffiincehadnotbeentakenoverbythefederalgovernment
so as notto
cerssentto superviseelectionswas limitedtotheindispensable
ofthearmy(Archivo
Box 46,Document
29).12
Justo,
jeopardizetheprestige
instructions
totheSecret
On February
28, 1934,Rodriguezgavefurther
in theprovincesof SantaFe andTucumain.
These officers
Serviceofficers
fortheir
ofinformation
divisioncommandrespective
weretobe instruments
aboutdevelopments
ers. Whereastheirmissionwas to learneverything
ofthearmyendowed
"theirstatusas officers
theelections,
beforeandduring
topacifythespirits"
andtheywereexpectedtobe the
themwiththeauthority
In sum,theirmandatewas ambiguous
"eyesandearsoftheircommanders."
Box 46,Documents29
actions(ArchivoJusto,
enoughtoallowforcollateral
and30).
In collaboration
inenlarging
thescopeofhismandate.
Faccionepersisted
onthelocalsituation.
He personDivisionhereported
withtheInvestigative
a "Radicalpimp."On March13, 1934,at therequestof
allyinterrogated
activity
Rodriguez,he wrotea six-pagereportthatemphasizedcommunist
In hisview,SantaFe's Governor
LucianoMolinasand
theuniversity.
within
forthespreadofcommunism,
anarchism,
thelocal policewereresponsible
totakeaction.SantaFe was
anditwasnecessary
Radicalism,andrevolution
thefollowing
takenoverbythenationalgovernment
year."
ofthemilitary
andthepolice
indicate(1) thecollaboration
Thesereports
ofthemiliandcontrol
indomesticsurveillance,
knowledge
(2) thetop-down
ofwartoCosta),and(3) theexpanactions(fromJustototheminister
tary9s
of"extremists"
andcriminalization
sionofmilitary
(as Faccione
monitoring
It mightbe suggestedthatFaccione's
andcommunists).
labeledanarchists
but
wassimplyanexaggeration
associatedwiththeelectoralsituation,
report
wasencountered
bytheYrigoyenithiswas notthecase.A similarsituation
whohadwontheelectionsintheprovince
of
staGovernor
AmadeoSabattini,
and
Cordobain 1935(Luna,1972: 148-149).Duringhistenureas governor,
and
especiallyin 1937, Sabatiniwas burdenedwithdeceitfulinformants
oftotalanarchy
andpushingforfederal
a situation
armyreports
portraying
hehadbeena
Infact,wellbeforeSabattini
waselectedgovernor
intervention.
targetofbothpoliceandarmysurveillance.14

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/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

45

werelinkedtoconspiracies
Radicalpoliticians
Finally,
andarrested
bythe
and theArgentine
hundreds,
armywas purgedof activeLegalistofflcers.
Althoughafterthe1935NationalConvention
theRadicalpartydecidedto
andparticipate
inelections,
abandonitsabstentionism
surveillance
ofomnipresent
conspiracies
persisted.
Secretservicesusedcovertanddeceptive
tacabouttheirsuspects.Facilitative
ticsto gatherinformation
operations
were
in whichtheundercover
workpromotedtheconspiracyby
implemented
intheplot(Marx,1988:65). Thesesecretservices
playingthewillingpartner
ofthePoliticalOrderBranchofthecapital
appeartohavebeenanoutgrowth
withthearmy
police,butit seemsthattheyoftenexchangedinformation
services.Theresources,
intelligence
geographical
coverage,andcapabilities
Undercover
ofthesesecretservicesarestriking."5
carriedoutby
operations
secretservicessharedan obscuretraitofpoliticalpolicingwiththeirEuropeancounterparts:
politicalpoliceoftenhelpedtheiradversaries
"bygiving
andtroopstogroupsthatotherwise
importance,
means,attention
wouldhave
disappeared"
(Berliere,1997:47).
of JorgeAnlibalGenzanoepitomizestheeffectiveness
The infiltration
A former
and rangeof theintelligence
network.
memberof theSecurity
Squadronofthecapitalpolice,Genzanobecamea passionateYrigoyenista
ofbeingtooexalted-anda friend
Radical-accused byotherYrigoyenistas
a prominent
Radicalintellectual.
He collaborated
inJauofArturo
Jauretche,
La Vispera,wherehemetothermembers
retche'snewspaper,
ofFORJA,the
Radicalnationalist
headed(theservices
dissident
youthgroupthatJauretche
referred
to FORJAas the"Jacobins").
Genzano'srevolutionary
imagewas
on MartinGarcia-"planned
even reinforced
by a long imprisonment
ofthisS.S. and . .. aimedat strengthening
his
accordingto theinstruction
Boxes 100,97,Documents15,50).
revolutionary
standing"
(Archivo
Justo,
an obstacle:How couldGenzano
Infiltration
by thisagentencountered
The secretservices
gainthetrustof Pomar,theleaderof theconspiracy?
activialreadyknewthatPomarwasverycuriousaboutotherinsurrectionary
tiestakingplace in thenavy(ArchivoJusto,Box 100,Document7: 49).
inMontevideo
a meeting
was arranged
ThankstoJauretche,
betweenPomar
andGenzano(AgentS.0.1), whohandedhima listof navymen.Genzano
hismeeting
withPomar,whopromised
tousehimas a liaisonoffldescribed
intomyeyes,
cerbetweenciviliansandthemilitary:
"[He] lookedintensely
embracedme,andtoldme 'Ahora,a cumplir'[Now,do yourduty].So, in
I report
toyouthefollowing."
Genzanoalso
compliancewiththiscommand,
No wonderRadical
ontheactivities
ofRadicalretired
reported
armyofficers.
werea completedisaster!
insurrections

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46

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Thestate'sexpandedpolicingcapacitieswerealso usedagainsttheother
thecommunist
movement
was
mainpoliticaltargets,
communists.
Whether
within
was offarlessimportance
than
actuallygrowing
thelabormovement
withtherepression
of
thebeliefthatitwas.16SocialOrderwassoonentrusted
buttheagencybecameoverwhelmed
bythisexpansionofthe
communism,
was therefore
refurbished
to
scope of its activities.The police structure
theSpecialBranch,wascrenewtasks,anda newpolicesection,
accomplish
ated(Memoriasde la PoliciaFederal,1931; 1932;Silveyra,1936).
havebeenmajorfeatures
oftheinfamous
Special
Secrecyandimpunity
Branchfromits inception.The practicesinaugurated
by it can be traced
decades.The agentsCusell,Lombilla,andAmoresano
through
subsequent
ofthetorture
ontheirvictimsand
wereknownfortheferocity
theyinflicted
in racketeering
fortheirexpertise
andinstigating
actionsthatwouldendin
Some of themcontinued
to plytheir"trade"and train
policeintervention.
in the1940s and 1950s.Theyhad
newrecruits
duringPer6n'spresidency
licensetoactwithcompleteimpunity.
Thefrequent
confusion
abouttheoriginsofthePoliticalOrderandtheSpecialBranch(see,e.g.,Rouquie,1982;
RodriguezMolas, 1987:94-100)is a tellingexampleoftheroutinepolice
branches
towhich
without
practiceofrenaming
publicnoticeandtheextent
ofsecretpoliceforces(see Emsley,1997).
secrecyis characteristic
weretakenin 1931
ofcommunism
Thefirst
stepstowardthesurveillance
whocreateda SecretOffice
byCol. CarlosRodriguez,
security
subprefect,
andclassifying
with16 foreign
employeeswhosesole taskwas translating
mailin collaboration
withthePostalandCustomBureaus.This officewas
on theinitiative
ofChiefofPolice
closedin December1931butre-created
underFedericoDonadioandthen,
Garciain 1932as theSpecialBranch,first
of 1933,underJoaquinCusell.Information
previously
fromthebeginning
to thenew section,whichwas
producedby Social Orderwas transferred
promptly
putto work(Bertollo,1950:9).
As Table1 suggests,
theSpecialBranchevolvedata formidable
pace.As
aboutcommunists
was detachedfrom
soon as it was set up, information
2,851dossiersalreadyavailableatSocialOrder.Between1932and1935the
Thenumber
ofarticlestranslated
numbers
ofdossierscreatedalmosttripled.
jumpedfrom636 in 1932to 1,159in 1933and3,264in 1934,andreviewsof
journalsandnewspapers
jumpedfrom193in 1932to3,356and2,298in 1933
inthebranch'scapaand1934,respectively.
Thismayreflect
boththegrowth
bilitiesforlearningaboutitsnewlydefinedtargetandtheattention
paidby
andbecomingabletodetect
theorganizers
tofinding
outaboutcommunism
werehiredwithspecialattention
toskillinforeign
it.Newrecruits
languagesFrench,Italian,and Yiddish(LibroCopiadorde Notas,Secci6nEspecial,

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

47

TABLE 1

Special BranchActivitiesfrom1932 to 1945

1932

1933

1934

1935

1945

Existingdossiers
2,851
Dossiersproduced
2,851
Arrested
underinvestigation
1,416
Arrested
formisdemeanors
135
Proceedings
instituted
9
inpublicareas
311
Surveillance
in unionshops
388
Surveillance
636
Articlestranslated
Reviewofjournals/newspapers
193
50
Raids
authorities 12
withmilitary
Cooperation

5,200
2,349
2,282
108
6
574
586
1,159
3,356
736
9

6,063
863
1,109
188
5
405
710
3,246
2,298
427
11

6,529
476
458
322
4
390
901
1,370
2,201
64

12,271

1,471
312
2,741
2,926
373

oftheInvestigative
Divisionbetween1931and 1945.
Source:Policememoirsandmemoirs

confirm
1933-1934:151,231,457).The 1945figures
thattheSpecialBranch
was activethroughout
the1930sandearly1940s.
Practicesthatwouldbecomeroutinein theSpecialBranchincludedthe
ofideologicalinformation
aboutpublicemployees,
gathering
students,
and
international
in therepression
collaboration
of communist
armydraftees,
suspects(LibroCopiadorde Notas,SeccionEspecial,1933-1934:295-447),
ofareasdefined
andthemonitoring
as trouble-prone,
theuseoftorincluding
tureandillegalraids.
As I havestated,surveillance
increasedthestate'scapacityto actat the
nationallevel.ThroughagenciesliketheSpecialBranchthecapitalpolice
inthedevelopment
wouldactdirectly
and/or
collaborate
oflocalpolicingin
tocommunism
areasthatwerepredisposed
becauseofstructural
conditionsintheprovinces
Cusellbecamean expertinMarxiananalysis.Forinstance,
ofBuenosAiresandCordoba,local policeforcesweresubordinated
to the
Special Branchand collaboratedin theexpansionof "nationalarchives"
fromthesemissions.17
resulting
Thearmyalsoparticipated
inthisenterprise.
InOctober1933,intheprovince of Cordoba,thechiefoftheInformation
Sectionofthemilitary
comCuselltoarchivescontaining
mand,Maj. RodolfoLuque,introduced
abunof communists,
classifiedin termsof militantsand
dantdocumentation
ofthe"BolCusellcredited
organizations."8
Luquewithdeepunderstanding
Box 54, Document
shevikproblemandthelocal situation"
(ArchivoJusto,
inthenationalterritories
12: 6). In fact,as I havesuggested,
andinprovinces
a parallelinformation
likeCordobaandSantaFe thearmyprovided
serviceto
thenationalauthorities.

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48

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

CONCLUSION
Contrary
tothemythofa consensualheydayofpolicing,itsoriginsareto
be explainedas a responsemoreto pressingpoliticalandsocialchallenges
(Palmer,1988;Bayley,
thanto long-standing
problemsofdailycriminality
realorimagined,
confronted
bysuccessivegovern1975; 1990).The threat,
mentshada majorimpacton thestyleofpolicingadopted.Threatstoestabledto
after
theBolshevikRevolution
lishedstatesandthefearofcommunism
theexpansionof politicalpolicingin bothdemocraticand authoritarian
In Argentina,
policeandmilipoliticalpolicingcameto dominate
regimes.
Theneedforitwasbelievedtostemfrom
thecountry's
contentaryactivities.
Social mobilizarootedintheforeign
tiousnature,
originsofitspopulation.
was triggered
beforethenewpoliticalinstitutions
could
tionin Argentina
ofcivilstrife
a highleveloflegitimacy,
theeliteperception
attain
aggravating
thesocialorder(Waisman,1987).The absenceof a directly
as threatening
ofwarsmayhavecoaexternal
enemyandthelimitedcharacter
threatening
1997a: 37; Cenlescedtodrawthearmyintothecivilianrealm(McSherry,
teno,1994).It is beyondthescopeofthisarticleto delveintootherfactors
mentality,
thatledthearmedforcestoexpandtheirrole,suchas themilitary
authoritarian
ideology,andfearofthepopularclasses(Nunn,1983;Potash,
its physicalpresencethroughout
the
1981; McSherry,1997a). Certainly,
in thedevelopment
oftheeconomyandinfraanditsinvolvement
country
structure
gaveitbroadernationalscopethanthepolice.
variedas a funcInanyevent,theformofpolicingandpoliceorganization
inArgentina's
ofcontentious
politics.
tionoftheplaceofthemilitary
history
oftheregime
As I haveshown,the1930coupincreasedtherepressiveness
intherecruitinpolicing.Thatis reflected
intervention
andspurred
military
oftheenemy.
ofthechiefsofpoliceandideologicaldefinitions
mentpattern
untilSeptember
1955,when
From1880,whenthecapitalpolicewascreated,
men,mostof
Peronwas ousted,30 of47 chiefsofpolicehadbeenmilitary
theminactiveservice.(Mostcivilianchiefsofpolicehadbeennominated
by
Radicalpresidents.)
A distinction
shouldbe made betweenan institutional
captureof the
influences
atthelevelofattiandmorecapillary
organization
bythemilitary
Inthisregard,
ofthepoliceinstitution
theorganization
tudesandworldviews.
toSkolnickand
lines
was
not
to
According
unique Argentina.
alongmilitary
ofthepolicealongmilitary
lineswasa historical
acciFyfe,"theorganization
modelsbeenavailable,policeforces
dent"(1993: 178); had otherefflcient
Thus,themilitary
providedan
mightwellhavebeenorganizeddifferently.
whichweredesignedin the
modelforlargeorganizations,
organizational
fashion.
samehierarchical

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

49

in thebeliefin the
Atthesametime,thepolicementality
was grounded
contentious
natureoftheArgentine
due toitsCreoleandimmipopulation
In thisview,sharedbyreformist
grantcomposition.
policeofflcers,
it was
ingenuous
tothink
thatthepolicecouldmaintain
publicorderwithout
a militarizedpolice(Romay,1909-1912;Kalmanowiecki,
2000).A "siegementality"canbe tracedtothejustifications
provided
byChiefFalconforcrushing
anarchists:
police civiltaskswereassociatedwitha stateof internalwar
ordissension,
identified
as "foreign"
againstanysignofrebellion
invariably
was attributable
notonlytoforeign
immi(cf.Ludtke,1989)."Foreignness"
thegermof dissentand dissolution,
grantsbutto anyonewho introduced
including
policemenwhodemandedhighersalaries(ArchivoMinisterio
del
warwas further
Interior,
1908,Legajo 6096).Themythofaninternal
elaboratedafterFalconwas murdered,
allegedlybya "terrorist
nucleus,"a myth
thatis stillstrong
atpolicetraining
institutions.
ofnationalsecurity
Longbeforethedoctrine
becamedominant,
therewas
a beliefthatdissident
groupsconstituted
"dangerous
pollutants,
capableof
and potentially
theentiresociety"
debilitating,
contaminating,
destroying
(Norden,1996a:243; Cant6n,1971: 147-161).In thepoliceconstruction
of
"subversive"
or "seditious"activities
includedanychaltheenemywithin,
lengeto orderandmorality
(Guy,1991).'9Thiswas a Manicheanworldof
internal
enemiesandepidemicsreminiscent
ofmedievaltimes.20
of1930setupa militarized
Thetransition
repressive
policeapparatus
that
hadnotpreviously
existed.Thepolicewereplacedattheserviceofthenew
regimeand becamea highlypoliticizedforce.Police and military
forces
ofincumbent
andwerediverted
becamepoliticalinstruments
to
governments
actionagainstputative
enemiesoftheregime.In thecontext
ofthe
extralegal
wouldideallydisappear,sincethe
Peroniststate,theneed forrepression
worker
policeweretoservesocialjustice,thepeople,andtheArgentine
(Kalofthe
manowiecki,
2000). In fact,thePeronista
policebecamea mainstay
andwereusedagainstthepoliticalopposition
andanyattempt
at
government
The police were endowedwitha statusthat
pursuinglabor autonomy.
removed
themfrom
civilian
WhenPer6nwasoustedfrom
jurisdiction.
power
in 1955,therewasa military
takeover
oftheupperechelonsofthepolicehierconceivedas theonlymeanstopurgetheinstitutions
ofPeronism.
The
archy,
policewerealreadyan autonomous
agencywitha strong
corporate
identity
Afterthe1976military
thatcouldbe putto workforanygovernment.
coup
an
of
the
terrorist
became
they
integralpart
state,and its chief,Ram6n
Recentattempts
Camps,grantedthemcompleteimpunity.
by democratic
suchas thatofRau'lAlfonsin
toreform
thepoliceandthemiligovernments
taryand subjectthemto civiliancontrolhaveprovedtroublesome
(Brysk,
and Tiscornia,1996). This leads to the disturbing
1994; Maier,Abregui,

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50

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

notionthattheinitialform,style,and organizational
schemesadoptedby
onceinstitutionalized,
arequiteresistant
policingregimes,
tochange.
Theexpansion
ofpolicinganditsJanus-faced,
roleinsecuring
ambiguous
orderamiddissentraisestroubling
issues regarding
thecompatibility
of
politicalpolicinganddemocratic
governments
(Mazower,1997).Thewideviolencein Argentina
seemstocastdoubton
spreaduse ofstate-sponsored
forpacification.
thenotionthatpolicingis responsible
NOTES
a guaranteed
1.Thispactprovided
market
forArgentine
meatonterms
favorable
toBritain.
2. Potash(1981: 135-136)alludestothecreation
ofthisintelligence
network,
foundedon
thebasisofinformation
gathered
byintelligence
military
personnel
andthecapitalpolice.Justo's former
privatesecretary,
MiguelRojas,toldPotashthattheinformation
collectedbyJusto
was keptin hispersonalarchiveanddestroyed
afterhisdeathin 1943.In fact,notall ofthese
weredestroyed,
somethathethought
documents
revealedevents
although
Rojas hadeliminated
thesecretservices(Fraga,1993:372,396). Therecently
thathepreferred
to concealregarding
releasedJustoArchiveandsecretpolicedossiersconfirm
theexistenceofsuchan intelligence
service(Potash,personalcommunication,
1993).
3. TheseincludedBrig.Gen.ErnestoBaldasarre,
MiguelCardalda,PastorToranzo,and
ofBaldasarrewerethechiefofpolice,Col. EnriquePilotto,
others.Presentduringthetorture
ofthepenitentiary,
IsmaelVifias.Rejecting
Col. JuanBautistaMolina,andthedirector
theaccuPilottodefensively
assertedthatif Baldasarrehad reallybeentortured
sationsof torture,
he
thattoPilottointhelongchattheyhadhadinthecellarofthepenitentiary
wouldhaveconfided
(Archivo
Uriburu,
Legajo20,Document
240).Fora detaileddescription
ofthevictims,
see Boffi
(1933: 233-243).
4. Mopol,a clandestine
thatseekstoendcrimewithdeathsquads,emerged
organization
afterthecollapseofthemilitary
regime(Salinas,1997: 280-281).Some of itsmembershad
themilitary
belongedto"taskforces"during
regimeandby 1994occupiedimportant
positions
intheBuenosAiresprovincial
withsimilarorganizations
in
police.Theyalso hadconnections
wasa clandestine
thefederal
militarized
fromraidsondiscos
police.Prolatin
groupthatprofited
withtheallegedpurposeofcombating
TheArcangeles
wereanother
drugtrafficking.
right-wing
theinterests
of former
withinthefederal
civil-military
groupaimedat defending
repressors
police(Salinas,1997:226-229;see also DutilandRagendorfer,
1997;FernandezLlorenteand
Balmaceda,1997;McSherry,
1997a; 1997b).
5. In hisanalysisofstate-sponsored
violencein CentralAmerica,RobertHolden(1996:
civilsocietyitself.On the
435-459)callsfora focusonnonmilitary
agentsofthestateandwithin
has beenbuilt,see Halperfn
needto modifythehistorical
imageon whichArgentina
Donghi
(1988).
6. Although
a federalpoliceforcewas notformally
createduntil1943-1944,thecapital
meanstocarry
outcertain
activipolicehadthecapacityandthetechnical
intelligence-gathering
thenation.Theseprovisions
weredelineatedin Article3 of the1885 Reglatiesthroughout
or subversive
mento,whichincluded"guardingagainstand repressing
anyplot,conspiracy,
movement"
(Fentanes,1979:45).

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Kalmanowiecki
/POLITICAL POLICING IN ARGENTINA

51

to includethefollowing
7. At thesametime,theInvestigative
Divisionwas reorganized
withpoliticalaffairs;
Social Order,in chargeof anarchists,
sections:PublicOrder,entrusted
and PersonalCustodyof thePresident.
communists,
socialists,and moband laboractivities;
1975:358-359;1981: 184;BlackPublicOrderwouldlaterbecomePoliticalOrder(Rodriguez,
welder,1990: 80).
8. According
scholarJoseNicolasMatienzo(1926: 453), thenational
totheconstitutional
than
executivepowerin Argentina
soughtto preserveitspoliticalpowerin thecapitalrather
ittolocalpowersorthemunicipality.
As a meanstothatend,thepoliceforcewasput
relinquish
in thehandsofthenationalgovernment
undertheminister
oftheinterior.
ofthe1930swerenotparticularly
careful
9. As Goldstraj(1957: 275) notes,theplotters
andtheywerealso divided(Cattaneo,1959: 84-87;Villalba,1994).
themselves,
10. Forexample,in 1934thearmycomplained
thatitlackedtheresourcesto infiltrate
the
oftheexilesinUruguay
andsuggested
involvement
through
agentsoftheInvestigative
activities
Box 98, Document33).
Division(ArchivoJusto,
oftheLogia San Martinthatconspired
11.In 1921Costahadbeena member
againsta return
ofYrigoyento power(Orona,1965: 105).
thedepoliticization
ofthearmyandwas untilhisdeathin
12.Rodriguezsoughttopromote
1936theonlyofficer
(Potash,1981:124-135;White,1991:63).
February
fullytrusted
byJusto
13.LetterfromCol. FaccionetoBrig.Gen.Rodriguez,
March13,1934(ArchivoJusto,
Box
Democratic
governor
was
46, Document50). Luna(1972: 137-155)arguesthattheProgressive
fortheupcoming
Inhisview,the
needtoprepare
elections.
oustedbecauseofJusto's
presidential
was one oftheJustogovernment's
SantaFe intervention
mostarbitrary
andunjustifiable
acts.
andtheproArmysuspicionsmayhavebeenrootedin thepreviousYrigoyenadministration
SantaFe ChiefofPoliceRicardoCaballero(see Korzeniewicz,
1993:
laborpoliciesofformer
1-31).
14.Thechiefofthe3dDivisionhadreceivedinformation
aninformant
thatAlvear,
through
a movement
witharmyofficers
(ArchivoJusto,Box 99,
Sabattini,and otherswereplotting
Document9, May 12, 1934).
whenPomarsuspected
that1stSgt.JesusBugalloandCpl.ClementePerez
15.Forinstance,
wentto workto replace
andsuspendedthem,thesecretservicepromptly
mightbe informers
them.WhenBugalloandP6rezwerefinally
expelled,thesecretservicesalreadyhadin place
theformer
another
byC. 1,designation
informant,
corporalAyala,"whowillnowbe controlled
inthisS.S." (ArchivoJusto,
thatis incorporated
Box
adoptedfora newelementofinformation
99, Documents48 and50).
hadrisenin the1930s,thelabormovement
16. Although
andlabormilitancy
communism
hadnotbecomeapoliticalactoruntilPer6n'sseizureofpower(CollierandCollier,1991:333).
thesemissionscouldprovediscouraging.
Ofonesuchmissionintheindus17. Sometimes
forcommunist
infiltration
becauseofitsnavalarsenal,itis
trialcityofZarate,a crucialtarget
estab"Thattherewereno tracesoftheexistenceofcellsinthearsenal,meatpacking
reported:
leadsonetopresume
thatthesewereinanother
zone"(ArchivoJusto,
orpaperfactory
lishment,
Box 45, Document70, March20, 1933;see also Document72, March23, 1933).
inC6rdobaandcreatedtheimpression
overstated
thesituation
18.Policeandmilitary
reports
Box 54,Documents26, 38,
ofa provinceundersiegebyanarcho-communism
(ArchivoJusto,
45, 51, 128,253, Year 1937).
ofsubversion:
"sectarianism"
fourcategories
19. In 1909thepolicehadalreadyestablished
andthe
socialagitation),
"foreigners
seekingrevolt,"
(anarchism,
"partyism"
(politicaldisorder,
insane" striving
forcollectivecrime),"dissolutejournalism,"and "socialists"
"criminally
(Memoriasde la PoliciaFederal,1909).
oftheexecutioners
ofthe"dirty
20. On theManicheanworldview
war,"seeGraziano(1992).

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