II.

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

F. Repeal of laws
G.R. No. 196271

February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH ALSAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru
its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197392
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

Facts:
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by

Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734. This law provided further refinement
in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM.
Congress passed RA No. 91401.This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to Nov 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15,
2001.it was later ratified.
RA 9333 reset the election on Aug 8 2011 but this was without ratification by a plebiscite.
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide
with the regular national and local elections of the country
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the elections in the May 2013 elections
Parties:
RA 10153 gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari ,Mandamus and Prohibition 5 filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman,Rep. Jacino
Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition vs COMELEC filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a
taxpayer ,Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters
from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
ISSUE# 1 Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates or necessitates the synchronization of
elections of the ARMM elections with the National and Local elections
Petitioners argue that there is no need to synchronize the elections of the ARMM with the National and
local level. Hence, it shouldnt be May 2013 (2 years after the ammended date of elections) until the
elections shpi;d be held.
Respondent OSG argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position,
cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
HELD: While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections.
Issue # 2 : whether RA 9333 and 10153 needs 2/3 vote of congress and majority vote in plebiscite
for ammending RA 9054
Petitioners challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because
they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These
provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved
by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose
Petitioner are saying that in every ammendment of Organic act of ARMM(RA 9054) there must be 2/3
vote of congress and plebiscite.
Held: In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A
need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which
it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law
by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.
Also, the clear intention of Congress isto treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Issue# 3 is the provision in RA 9054 requiring a supermajority vote of 2/3 of congress to ammend
it valid?
Petitioners aver that the requirement of supermajority vote of 2/3 of the congress is invalid because it
violates Sec 16(2) of the constitutition where only a majority vote is needed to pass a law.
Held: No
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills,
and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed
It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. xxx This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)
Issue# 4: III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite
requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Is it valid?
Petitioners aver that RA 9054 enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Sec 18 Article X Consti
Held: NO
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in
the autonomous regions. the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective. But what ammendment of the organic act needs a
plebicite?
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.the requirement refers only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure
of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family,
and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. 36

Issue# 5 what is the reasonable measure to fill in the elective officials from the time the elected
officials ednd their term until the synchronized elections?
Option 1. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
legislature cant extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin.
Option 2. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified
by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions
of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power
Option 3 The Court or congress has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials
in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years 71 as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Option 4 E. giving the Presidents Power to Appoint OICs is the most reasonable
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. the assailed law(RA 10153 which
gives the President the power to appoint ARMM elective officials pendign elections) facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint xxx. He shall also appoint xxx those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be "elective and representative of the constituent political units."
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real
and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to
"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."
The RA 10153 has limited circumstances where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of
governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically
be touched nor affected at all.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a
situation of necessity and as an interim measure
Issue# 5 does local autonomy of the ARMM prevail over the synchronization of elections?
Held: No
Petitioners argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local
elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from
the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections
one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the
other is clear.
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution
must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect.
regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law that synchronizes does not in
any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as
necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger
framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save
only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished
all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally
must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress.
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns.