Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1460 [INSURANCE]
A. Interpretation of insurance contracts; contract of adhesion:
[G.R. No. 119599. March 20, 1997]
MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OFAPPEALS and TKC MARKETING
CORPORATION,respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
the arrest of the vessel and made a formal claim for the amount
ofUS$916,886.66, representing the dollar equivalent on the policies,
for non-delivery of the cargo. Private respondent likewise sought the
assistance of petitioner on what to do with the cargo.
Petitioner replied that the arrest of the vessel by civil authority was not
a peril covered by the policies. Private respondent, accordingly,
advised petitioner that it might tranship the cargo and requested an
extension of the insurance coverage until actual transhipment, which
extension was approved upon payment of additional premium. The
15.
carriage from the port of Rio del Grande, Brazil, to theport of Manila.
stand a voyage of twenty days to Manila and another twenty days for
Said cargo was insured against the risk of loss by petitioner Malayan
Insurance Corporation for which it issued two (2) Marine Cargo Policy
Petitioner maintained its position that the arrest of the vessel by civil
(or F.C. & S. Clause) rules out detention by ordinary legal processes.
Cargo Clause or the F.C. & S. Clause. However, with the deletion of
The appellate court added that the failure to deliver the consigned
the Institute War Clause but also under the Theft, Pilferage, and Non-
petitioner was also required to further pay interest at the rate of 12%
[2]
per annum on all amounts due and owing to the private respondent by
virtue of the lower court decision counted from the inception of this
case until the same is paid.
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that since the vessel was
prevented at an intermediate port from completing the voyage due to
its seizure by civil authorities, a perilinsured against, the liability of
petitioner continued until the goods could have been transhipped. But
court stating that with the deletion of Clause 12 of the policies issued
contractual liability.
2. In ruling that there was constructive total loss over the cargo.
3. In ruling that petitioner was in bad faith in declining private
respondent's claim.
raise the same before this Court. Likewise, petitioner cannot submit
for the first time on appeal its argument that it was wrong for the Court
of Appeals to have ruled the way it did based on facts that would need
inquiry into the evidence. Even if inquiry into the facts were possible,
such was not necessary because the coverage as ruled upon by the
Court of Appeals is evident from the very terms of the policies.
deletion of the Free from Capture or Seizure Clause would leave the
It also argued that petitioner, being the sole author of the policies,
assured covered solely for the perils specified by the wording of the
policy itself; (c) the rationale for the exclusion of an arrest pursuant to
the wide and varied range of risks that were covered.[3] The subject
CO., are content to bear, and to take upon them in this voyage; they
The exception or limitation to the "Perils" clause and the "All other
Clause 12 called the "Free from Capture & Seizure Clause" or the
(Underscoring supplied)
this warranty shall not exclude collision, contact with any fixed or
operations" and yet it also stated that "the deletion of the F.C. & S.
because the F.C. & S. Clause under the Institute War Clauses can
account of its heading "Institute War Clauses." This Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals when it held that ". . . Although the F.C. & S.
Clause may have originally been inserted in marine policies to protect
against risks of war, (see generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of
Admiralty Section 2-9, at 71-73 [2d Ed. 1975]), its interpretation in
This Court finds it pointless for petitioner to maintain its position that it
in a state of war.
adopted.[17]
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the other
issues presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the decision of
the Court ofAppeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
vs.
farepaying passenger. . . . . . . .
P1,500.00
P2,000.00
PAREDES, J.:
Section 4. Injury sustained by the wrecking or
On February 7, 1957, the defendant Equitable Insurance and
Casualty Co., Inc., issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the
a cyclone. . . . . . . .
xxx
P3,000.00
xxx
xxx
This policy shall not cover disappearance of the Insured nor shall it
shall result, independently of all other causes and within sixty (60)
days from the occurrence thereof, in the Death of the Insured, the
insured:
Amount of Insurance
__________
P1,000.00
vvvvv
account of fire which broke out on said vessel, resulting in the death
On April 13, 1957, Simeon del Rosario, father of the insured, and as
the sole heir, filed a claim for payment with defendant company, and
Currency, being settlement in full for all claims and demands against
26, 1957, insured under out ACCIDENT Policy No. 7136, causing the
and costs.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Besides, on the face of the policy Exhibit "A" itself, death by drowning
is a ground for recovery apart from the bodily injury because death by
bodily injury is covered by Part I of the policy while death by drowning
that it was not their intention that the payment of P1,000.00 to the
amounts that may be recovered for death for bodily injury, yet, there is
plaintiff and the signing of the loss receipt exhibit "1" would be
not specific amount mentioned in the policy for death thru drowning
although the latter is, under Part VI of the policy, a ground for recovery
the policy in question, said intention of the parties should prevail over
the contents of the loss receipt "1" (Articles 1370 and 1371, New Civil
P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the insured but the policy
Code).
does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in
the trial court, are well taken, for they are supported by the generally
xxx
xxx
xxx
had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff so that there
party who cause the obscurity (Art. 1377, N.C.C.), which, in the case
at bar, is the insurance company.
had not acted in bad faith in refusing to pay plaintiff's claim, the Court
litigation.
elevated the case to this Court, stating that the genuine issue is purely
1174). Calanoc v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-8151, Dec. 16,
legal in nature.
1955.
All the parties agree that indemnity has to be paid. The conflict
centers on how much should the indemnity be. We believe that under
generalexceptions clause thereof. Both the trial court and the Court of
After joinder of issues, the parties asked the trial court to render
judgment based on the following stipulation of facts:
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Exhibit "A";
2. An armored car of the plaintiff, while in the process of transferring
cash in the sum of P725,000.00 under the custody of its teller,
7. Demands were made by the plaintiff upon the defendant to pay the
Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila on June 29, 1987, was robbed
amount of the loss of P725,000.00, but the latter refused to pay as the
of the said cash. The robbery took place while the armored car was
(b) any loss caused by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of the
the driver Magalong and guard Atiga were charged, together with
that Atiga and Magalong are not its "officer, employee, . . . trustee or
(b) orders defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 as and for
from plaintiff's Pasay Branch to its Makati Head Office. Quite plainly
forthwith.
SO ORDERED. 2
The trial court ruled that Magalong and Atiga were not employees or
representatives of Producers. It Said:
The Court is satisfied that plaintiff may not be said to have selected
appealed decision.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the conclusion of the trial court that
Magalong and Atiga were neither employees nor authorized
representatives of Producers and ratiocinated as follows:
the insured and strictly against the insurance company (New Life
sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have
and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense (New Life
employees in the transfer of the money and payroll from its branch
Enterprises Case, supra, p. 676; Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Court
driver to transfer its funds from one branch to another, they effectively
ordinary sense.
alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding it
liable under the insurance policy because the loss falls within the
factor. 6 It asserts that the power of control over Magalong and Atiga
provides:
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. There is "labor-only"
contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does
not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the
workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such
employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be
armored car and was responsible for his faithful discharge of his
not its employees since it had nothing to do with their selection and
It should be noted that the insurance policy entered into by the parties
Timber Corp. is not applicable to all cases but only when it becomes
necessary to prevent any violation or circumvention of the Labor
compensation. 14
construction. 18
hazard. Seldom does the insurer assume the risk of all losses due to
conditions they deem best upon their obligations not inconsistent with
public policy.
quoted:
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
(b) any loss caused by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of the
drivers and the security guards each shall supply to Producers are not
the light of the criteria provided for in Article 106 of the Labor Code, a
question of fact. Since the parties opted to submit the case for
judgment on the basis of their stipulation of facts which are strictly
limited to the insurance policy, the contracts with PRC Management
P.D. No. 532, and the information therefor filed by the City Fiscal of
used then the term "employee," it must have had in mind any
But even granting for the sake of argument that these contracts were
not "labor-only" contracts, and PRC Management Systems and
Unicorn Security Services were truly independent contractors, we are
satisfied that Magalong and Atiga were, in respect of the transfer of
Producer's money from its Pasay City branch to its headoffice in
Makati, its "authorized representatives" who served as such with its
vs.
MELO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
insured the same building with two other companies, namely, The
Country Bankers Insurance for P56,000.00 under Policy No. PDB-801913 expiring on May 12, 1981, and The Development Insurance for
P400,000.00 under Policy No. F-48867 expiring on June 30, 198l.
While the three fire insurance policies were in force, the insured
December 28, 1980. Fidelity was accordingly informed of the loss and
No. 76399).
maliciously represented that the building at the time of the fire was
The motion for extension was not filed on April 19, 1986 which was
the 15th day after receipt of the decision because said 15th day was a
Roberto Garcia, when actually it was a Marcelo Garcia who was the
lessee.
14., Rollo of G.R. No. 75605). The motion for extension was granted
On May 24, 1983, the trial court rendered a decision, per Judge
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, ruling in favor of Fidelity. In sustaining the defenses
set up by Fidelity, the trial court ruled that Paragraph 3 of the policy
was also violated by Verendia in that the insured failed to inform
by the appellate court on April 30, 1986 (p. 15. ibid.), but Fidelity had
in the meantime filed its motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1986
(p. 16, ibid.).
Verendia filed a motion to expunge from the record Fidelity's motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the motion for extension was
Manila (80 Phil. 160 [1948]) Bello vs. Fernando (4 SCRA 138 [1962]),
The motion to expunge was denied on June 17, 1986 (p. 27, ibid.) and
22, 1986 (p. 30, ibid .), the petition herein docketed as G.R. No.
matter was not definitely settled until this Court issued its Resolution
the petition for review on certiorari now docketed as G.R. No. 76399.
(p. 54, Rollo of G.R. No. 76399) and thereafter given due course.
Before we can even begin to look into the merits of the main case
(at p. 212.)
In the instant case, the motion for extension was filed and granted
before June 30, 1986, although, of course, Verendia's motion to
expunge the motion for reconsideration was not finally disposed until
July 22, 1986, or after the dictum in Habaluyas had taken effect.
Seemingly, therefore, the filing of the motion for extension came
Reduced to bare essentials, the issues Fidelity raises therein are: (a)
whether or not the contract of lease submitted by Verendia to support
which would forfeit his benefits under Section 13 of the policy and (b)
couple of days after the effectivity of the insurance policy. When the
1980, it appears that Robert Garcia (or Roberto Garcia) was still
Verging on the factual, the issue of the veracity or falsity of the lease
contract could have been better resolved by the appellate court for, in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the jurisdiction of this
Court is limited to the review of errors of law. The appellate court's
findings of fact are, therefore, conclusive upon this Court except in the
following cases: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
1981 that an adjuster was able to locate him. Robert Garcia then
findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals in
Authority (NISA) to the effect that he was not the lessee of Verendia's
making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same
house and that his signature on the contract of lease was a complete
Ironically, during the trial, Verendia admitted that it was not Robert
Garcia who signed the lease contract. According to Verendia, it was
signed by Marcelo Garcia, cousin of Robert, who had been paying the
The contract of lease upon which Verendia relies to support his claim
rentals all the while. Verendia, however, failed to explain why Marcelo
for insurance benefits, was entered into between him and one Robert
had to sign his cousin's name when he in fact was paying for the rent
in terms that are clear and unambiguous, that all benefits under the
fact, the Provincial Assessor of Rizal had assessed the property's fair
in his behalf to obtain any benefit under the policy". Verendia, having
is even incomplete as the blank spaces for a witness and his address
[1980]).
are not filled up. More significantly, the same receipt states that
petition in G.R. No. 76399 is GRANTED and the decision of the then
vs.
UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
1 Fidelity appears to have agreed with the appellate court that it had
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVII at
Lucena City, jointly deciding Civil Cases Nos. 6-84, 7-84 and 8-84
error in the petition in G.R. No. 76399. It must have likewise realized
storey building situated at Iyam, Lucena City. The facts show that
On July 30,1981, Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. issued Fire
up his claim with Equitable Insurance, the Claims Manager told him to
November 12, 1981 under Fire Insurance Policy No. 71547 in the
by the otherinsurance
amount of P700,000.00.
P200,000.00.
Corporation (Exhibit "C" No. 6-84) was of the same tenor, as said
letter dated February 22, 1983, and signed by Vice-President
Elma R. Bondad, said "we find that certain
policy conditions were violated, therefore, we regret,
we have to deny your claim, as it is hereby denied in its entirety."
was received from the insured) until they are fully paid;
2. In Civil Case No. 784, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff Julian Sy and against
the defendantReliance Surety and Insurance Co.,
and thereafter the court below rendered its decision on December 19,
said judgment of the trial court, hence this petition the cruxwherein is
follows:
Petitioners contend that they are not to be blamed for the omissions,
alleging that insurance agent Leon Alvarez (for Western) and Yap
Kam Chuan (for Reliance and Equitable) knew about the existence of
persons may accept policies without reading them, and that this is not
negligence per se. 15 But, this is not without any exception. It is and
insurer.11
...
And considering the terms of the policy which required the insured to
declare other insurances,the statement in question must be deemed t
the insured was furnished by the petitioner itself when the facts
with all the stipulations on his side, in order toentitle himself to the
risk does not attachand the policy never becomes a contract between
991, Vol. II, 8th Ed.,) A void or inexistent contract is one which has no
commenced
(Tongoy vs. C.A., 123 SCRA 99 (1983); Avila v. C.A., 145 SCRA,
1986).
hesitate
cific causes or reasons for the denial of his claim, reasonfor which his
January 31, 1984, or after more than one (1) year had
equity. . . . 21
We have perforce to reject this theory of the court below for being
contrary to what we have heretofore declared:
It is important to note the principle laid down
by this Court in the case of Ang vs. Fulton Fire Insurance Co. (2
SCRA 945 [1961]) to wit:
The condition contained in an insurance policy that claims must be pr
esented within one year
after rejection is not merely a procedural requirement but an important
matter essential to a prompt settlement of claims against insurance
companies as it demandsthat insurance suits be brought by
the insured while the evidence as to the
origin andcause of destruction have not yet disappeared.
In enunciating the above-cited principle, this Court had definitely
settled the rationale for the
necessity of bringing suits against the Insurer
within one year from the rejection of the claim. The contention
of the respondents that the one-year prescriptive period does
not start to run until thepetition for reconsideration had been resolved
by the insurer, runs counter to the declared purpose
for requiring that an action or suit be filed in the Insurance
Commission or in a court of competent
jurisdiction from the denial of the claim. To uphold respondents'
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside: (a) the
time.
for the Angat Hydroelectric Project. FEEI agreed to complete the work
within 120 days from the signing of the contract, otherwise it would
PARAS, J.:
filed by the Contractor shall be answerable for the same and for any
and all damages that the Corporation may suffer as a result thereof.
1963, both FEEI and Philamgen wrote NPC requesting the assistance
(a) Should the Contractor fail to complete the construction of the work
the surety bond the answer for the cost of completion of the work. In
the Corporation shall have the power to take over the work by giving
notice in writing to that effect to the Contractor and his sureties of its
after receipt of the same, Philamgen did not pay as demanded but
contended instead that its liability under the bond has expired on
(b) ... It is expressly agreed that in the event the corporation takes
over the work from the Contractor, the latter and his bondsmen shall
continue to be liable under this contract for any expense in the
completion of the work in excess of the contract price and the bond
70). In the resolution of September 20, 1976, the petition for certiorari
was given due course (Rollo, p. 85). Petitioner's brief was filed on
November 27, 1976 (Rollo, p. 97) while Philamgen failed to file brief
within the required period and this case was submitted for decision
without respondent's brief in the resolution of this Court of February
25. 1977) Rollo, p. 103).
In its brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE GIVEN NOTICE TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT PHILAMGEN OF ANY EXISTING OBLIGATION
WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM EXPIRATION OF THE BOND TO HOLD
SAID SURETY LIABLE THEREUNDER, DESPITE PETITIONER'S
Both defendants are also ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00
II
dated July 19, 1983 is not sufficient despite previous events that it had
III
of Appeals.
The bone of contention in this case is the compliance with the notice
July 19, 1963, when FEEI informed NPC that it was abandoning the
bond.
the same date. Moreover, on August 1, 1963, the fact that Philamgen
was seasonably notified, was even bolstered by its request from NPC
for information of the percentage completed by the bond principal
prior to the relinquishment of the job to the latter and the reason for
said relinquishment. (Record on Appeal, pp. 193-195). The 30-day
notice adverted to in the surety bond applies to the completion of the
work by the contractor. This completion by the contractor never
materialized.
which arises the continued liability of the surety under its bond as
The surety bond must be read in its entirety and together with the
vs.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Sycip, Salazar, Luna &
Electric, Inc. was within the effective date of the contract and the
DE CASTRO, J.:
Resolution of this Court dated April 29, 1970, (Rollo, No. L-31878, p.
58), because the petitioners in both cases seek similar relief, through
Inc., et al."
SO ORDERED.
B. As a consensual contract:
at 6% from the date of the filing of the complaint, and the sum of
It appears that on March 14, 1957, private respondent Ngo Hing filed
an application with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Company
(hereinafter referred to as Pacific Life) for a twenty-year endownment
policy in the amount of P50,000.00 on the life of his one-year old
back Pacific Life again strongly recommending the approval of the 20year endowment insurance plan to children, pointing out that since
1954 the customers, especially the Chinese, were asking for such
coverage (Exhibit 4-M).
It was when things were in such state that on May 28, 1957 Helen Go
Pacific Life in Cebu City wrote on the corresponding form in his own
insurance, but having failed in his effort, he filed the action for the
Hing. The latter paid the annual premuim the sum of P1,077.75 going
petitioners.
commission for being a duly authorized agebt of Pacific Life. Upon the
payment of the insurance premuim, the binding deposit receipt
(Exhibit E) was issued to private respondent Ngo Hing. Likewise,
petitioner Mondragon handwrote at the bottom of the back page of the
application form his strong recommendation for the approval of the
insurance application. Then on April 30, 1957, Mondragon received a
The decisive issues in these cases are: (1) whether the binding
deposit receipt (Exhibit E) constituted a temporary contract of the life
insurance in question; and (2) whether private respondent Ngo Hing
concealed the state of health and physical condition of Helen Go,
which rendered void the aforesaid Exhibit E.
3-M). The letter stated that the said life insurance application for 20-
year endowment plan is not available for minors below seven years
that:
old, but Pacific Life can consider the same under the Juvenile Triple
Action Plan, and advised that if the offer is acceptable, the Juvenile
Non-Medical Declaration be sent to the company.
the policy offered; otherwise, the deposit shall be reftmded; and (3)
effect from the date of such medical examination, for such period as is
that if the applicant is not ble according to the standard rates, and the
that on said date the applicant was insurable on standard rates under
not be in force at any time, and the premium paid shall be returned to
its rule for the amount of insurance and the kind of policy requested in
the applicant.
the application.
for the amount of insurance and/or the kind of policy requested in the
the company, that the latter's branch office had received from the
and/or amount ..., the insurance shall not be in force and in effect until
subject for processing by the insurance company; and that the latter
will either approve or reject the same on the basis of whether or not
the Company and shall have paid the full premium thereof. If the
applicant does not accept the policy, the deposit shall be refunded.
insurance applied for shall not have been in force at any time and the
the agent, no liability shall attach until the principal approves the risk
and a receipt is given by the agent. The acceptance is merely
conditional and is subordinated to the act of the company in approving
or rejecting the application. Thus, in life insurance, a "binding slip" or
"binding receipt" does not insure by itself (De Lim vs. Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, 41 Phil. 264).
April 30, 1957 (Exhibit 3-M), Pacific Life disapproved the insurance
14). In this first place, there was no contract perfected between the
indubitably aware that said company does not offer the life insurance
respondent was, therefore, only taking the chance that Pacific Life will
approval of the application in question along with his proposal that the
plan for children less than seven years. Nonetheless, the record
his one-year old daughter, aside from being an insurance agent and
At this juncture, We find it fit to quote with approval, the very apt
who later came up to this Court, from his dissenting opinion to the
the state of health and piysical condition of his daughter Helen Go.
quite conninced that this was so. Ngo Hing, as father of the applicant
Wher private regpondeit supplied the required essential data for the
herself, was precisely the "underwriter who wrote this case" (Exhibit
insurance application form, he was fully aware that his one-year old
of May 6, 1957) (Exhibit 4-M), specifically admits that said Ngo Hing
was "our associate" and that it was the latter who "insisted that the
have been duly apprised of the rejection of the application for a 20-
Life would have verified the same and would have had no choice but
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated December 14,
1995[1] and its Resolution dated February 22, 1996[2] in CA-G.R. CV
Mondragon and Great Pacific Life Assurance Company from their civil
C. As a contract of indemnity:
against all risks with private respondents South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. (South Sea) and Charter Insurance Corp.
(Charter). The pipes and fittings covered by Invoice Nos. MSPC-1014,
states:
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. It found that the damage to
Act since it was filed only on April 17, 1986, more than two years from
the goods is not due to manufacturing defects. It also noted that the
the time the goods were unloaded from the vessel. Section 3(6) of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that "the carrier and the ship
respondents are "all risks" policies which insure against all causes of
unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the
date when the goods should have been delivered." Respondent court
the other cases[9] cited therein does not support respondent court's
view that the insurer's liability prescribes after one year if no action for
indemnity is filed against the carrier or the insurer. In that case, the
shipper filed a complaint against the insurer for recovery of a sum of
money as indemnity for the loss and damage sustained by the insured
the complaint.[7]
Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states that the
carrier because under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the suit
carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability for loss or
against the carrier must be filed within one year after delivery of the
damage to the goods if no suit is filed within one year after delivery of
goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. The
the goods or the date when they should have been delivered. Under
court said that "the coverage of the Act includes the insurer of the
goods."[10]
brought within one year. But the liability of the insurer is not
extinguished because the insurer's liability is based not on the
contract of carriage but on the contract of insurance. A close reading
of the law reveals that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act governs the
relationship between the carrier on the one hand and the shipper, the
consignee and/or the insurer on the other hand. It defines the
obligations of the carrier under the contract of carriage. It does not,
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36 dated August 30, 1983 in Civil Case No. 82-4416 entitled
"Jose Lara and Arsenio Paed v. Willy Garcia, Emilio Macasieb,
Domingo Natividad, Willy Manuel, and Paramount Insurance Co. Inc."
ordering petitioner to pay private respondents an aggregate sum of
SO ORDERED.
a passenger jeepney with Plate No. PUJ K5-826, owned and operated
and friends from Manila to Pangasinan. The said jeepney was then
Natividad under its policy, using the "no fault" clause under the
Gerona, Tarlac, a Ford truck F-600 with Plate No. WL-628, then driven
in the amputation of his right arm while Paed suffered serious physical
On or about June 5, 1978, Lara and Paed filed a criminal case against
injuries which incapacitated him to work for more than two (2) weeks.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2227 before the Municipal Trial Court
of Gerona, Tarlac. 5
of the two (2) vehicles, namely: Natividad and Garcia as well as the
Accordingly, Lara and Paed filed on September 17, 1978 a civil case
for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 82-4416 against Garcia,
After protracted proceedings which lasted for almost five years, the
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the latter to
pay jointly and severally plaintiff Jose Lara, the amount of P15,000.00
During the trial of Criminal Case No. 2227 for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Damage to Property, accused Manuel pleaded guilty to the
crime charged on September 18, 1979, and was accordingly,
sentenced to imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor maximum
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 10
In the interim period, a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila on November
19, 1981 and the records of the case were burned to ashes.
Subsequently, on January 25, 1982, plaintiffs (herein private
respondents Lara and Paed) filed a petition for reconstitution of the
judicial records of the case 11 which was approved without any
opposition in the order of the court dated November 4, 1982. 12
On February 17, 1983, the court reiterated its order before the
reconstitution of the judicial records declaring defendants Natividad,
Manuel and Paramount in default in view of their continued failure to
appear during the trial of the case and allowed the plaintiffs (Lara and
Paed) to make a formal offer of exhibits and considered the case
submitted for decision. 13
restraining order on July 30, 1984 as prayed for and enjoined the
respondents from enforcing the Decision dated August 30, 1983 and
the Writ of Execution dated July 10, 1984, both rendered and issued
with summons and that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not authorized to
Petitioner now claims that the Decision of the trial court dated August
30, 1983, should be set aside since the court has not validly acquired
jurisdiction over its person, not having been validly served with
that it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable
the said proceedings. It alleged that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not its
prevails. 24
The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings,
including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty.
Segundo Gloria stated that he represented the defendants Natividad,
Manuel and Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance
It is worth noting that this is not the first time petitioner raised the
order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. 22
Luna," this Court had the opportunity to rule that "the mere filling of
clearly and categorically placed the petitioners liability for all damages
accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such
out of the use of their vehicles shall not be less than P12,000.00.
case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if
To the mind of the Court, the instant petition is filed merely to derail its
execution. It took Paramount almost six years to question the
jurisdiction of the lower court. Moreover, as earlier adverted to, the
justification in law and in fact for the reopening of a case which has
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, dated August 30, 1983, is
long become final and which in fact was already executed on July 18,
1984. Time and again, this Court has said that the doctrine of finality
liable to pay respondents Jose Lara and Arsenio Paed the amount of
P50,000.00 each which is the limit of its liability under the insurance
policy and sound practice and at the risk of occasional error, the
policy minus the amounts of P5,000.00 and P800.00 which it paid for
law. 27
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Claiming its right of subrogation PHILAMGEN sought recourse
This case deals with the liability, if any, of a shipowner for loss of
cargo due to its failure to observe the extraordinary diligence required
by Art. 1733 of the Civil Code as well as the right of the insurer to be
In its complaint PHILAMGEN alleged that the sinking and total loss
of MV Asilda and its cargo were due to the vessels unseaworthiness
FELMAN.[3] It ruled that MV Asilda was seaworthy when it left the port
seaworthiness. Thus the loss of the vessel and its entire shipment
to the negligence of the captain and his crew, in which case, Art. 587
of the Code of Commerce should apply.
rights and legal actions which the shipper had against FELMAN, the
engine room and cargo holds of the vessel. At that instance, the
shipowner.
reads -
for fresh eggs. They loaded the empty boxes for eggs and about 500
cases of Coca-Cola bottles on deck.[4] The ship captain stated that
around four oclock in the morning of 7 July 1983 he was awakened by
the officer on duty to inform him that the vessel had hit a floating
log. At that time he noticed that the weather had deteriorated with
strong southeast winds inducing big waves. After thirty minutes he
observed that the vessel was listing slightly to starboard and would
not correct itself despite the heavy rolling and pitching. He then
ordered his crew to shift the cargo from starboard to portside until the
In this connection, we wish to call attention to the fact that this vessel
master of the vessel stopped the engine because the vessel was
believe strongly that had her cargo been confined to those that could
have been accommodated under deck, her stability would not have
been affected and the vessel would not have been in any danger of
capsizing, even given the prevailing weather conditions at that time of
sinking.
the vicinity of the sinking. Considering that the ships hatches were
on its deck, the vessel was rendered unseaworthy for the purpose of
carrying the type of cargo because the weight of the deck cargo so
come only from the vessels deck cargo. It is settled that carrying a
unstable.
be shown that the deck cargo will not interfere with the proper
Finally, with regard to the allegation that the vessel encountered big
waves, it must be pointed out that ships are precisely designed to be
able to navigate safely even during heavy weather and frequently we
hear of ships safely and successfully weathering encounters with
typhoons and although they may sustain some amount of damage,
the sinking of ship during heavy weather is not a frequent occurrence
and is not likely to occur unless they are inherently unstable and
unseaworthy x x x x
We believe, therefore, and so hold that the proximate cause of the
sinking of the M/V Asilda was her condition of unseaworthiness
arising from her having been top-heavy when she departed from the
Port of Zamboanga. Her having capsized and eventually sunk was
bound to happen and was therefore in the category of an inevitable
occurrence (underscoring supplied).[6]
We subscribe to the findings of the Elite Adjusters, Inc., and the Court
must be stressed at this point that Art. 587 speaks only of situations
not apply, and such situation will be covered by the provisions of the
on the face of the policy.[12] Thus Sec. 113 of the Insurance Code
Commerce.
Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, (c)ommon carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case x x x x" In the event of loss of goods, common carriers are
subrogation will not work in this case.In policies where the law will
generally imply a warranty of seaworthiness, it can only be excluded
by terms in writing in the policy in the clearest language.[13] And
where the policy stipulates that the seaworthiness of the vessel as
between the assured and the assurer is admitted, the question of
firm in at least two (2) instances has dispensed with the usual
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
between the Assured and the Company shall not prejudice the
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the
x x x"[16]
which the assured may have against the third party whose
the realistic fact that cargo owners cannot control the state of the
vs.
AQUINO, J.:
Fireman's Fund and Insurance Company (Fireman's Fund for short)
and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines appealed
from the order dated October 18, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing their complaint against Jamila & Co., Inc.
(hereinafter called Jamila) for the recovery of the sum of P11,925.00
plus interest, damages and attorney's fees (Civil Case No. 65658).
The gist of the complaint is that Jamila or the Veterans Philippine
What is now to be recounted shows the lack of due care on the part of
the lower court and the opposing lawyers in their management of the
reimbursement from Jamila, and that Jamila and its surety, First
case. Such lack of due care has given the case a farcical ambiance
Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc., failed to pay the amount of the loss
Upon defendants' motions, the lower court in its order of July 22, 1966
obliterated its victory without any reason therefor, filed a motion for
based on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the complaint did not allege that
In the same order the lower court dismissed the complaint as to First
Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. on the ground of res judicata. It
appears that the same action was previously filed in Civil Case No.
56311 which was dismiss because of the failure of the same plaintiffs
and their counsel to appear at the pre trial.
Firestone and Fireman's Fund moved for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal. The lower court on September 3, 1966 set aside its
order of dismissal. It sustained plaintiffs' contention that there was
no res judicataas to First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. because
Civil Case No. 56311 was dismissed without prejudice. Later, First
Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. filed its answer to the complaint.
However, due to inadvertence, the lower court did not state in its order
of September 3, 1966 why it set aside its prior order dismissing the
complaint with respect to Jamila.
In this appeal Firestone and Fireman's Fund contend that the trial
2207 requires the debtor's consent; that legal subrogation takes place
in the cases mentioned in article 1302 of the Civil Code and the
instant case is not among the three cases enumerated in that article,
and that there could be no subrogation in this case because according
to the plaintiffs the contract between. Jamila and Firestone was
entered into on June 1, 1965 but the loss complained of occurred on
May 18, 1963.
With respect to the factual point raised by Jamila, it should be stated
that plaintiffs' counsel gratuitously alleged in their brief that Firestone
and Jamila entered into a "contract of guard services" on June
1, 1965. That allegation, which was uncalled for because it is not
found in the complaint, created confusion which heretofore did not
exist. No copy of the contract was annexed to the complaint.
That confusing statement was an obvious error since it was expressly
alleged in the complaint that the loss occurred on May 18, 1963. The
fact that such an error was committed is another instance
substantiating our previous observation that plaintiffs' counsel had not
exercised due care in the presentation of his case.
sue directly Jamila in its own right. Without resolving that contention,
whole or in part paid by another" (83 C.J.S. 576, 678, note 16, citing
to recover the amount of the loss from Jamila and First Quezon City
Insurance Co., Inc. Firestone had tacitly assigned to Fireman's Fund
its cause of action against Jamila for breach of contract. Sufficient
ultimate facts are alleged in the complaint to sustain that cause of
action.
On the other hand, Fireman's Fund's action against Jamila is squarely
sanctioned by article 2207. As the insurer, Fireman's Fund is entitled
to go after the person or entity that violated its contractual
commitment to answer for the loss insured against (Cf. Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. vs. Heald Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1032; Rizal Surety &
Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24043, April 25, 1968,
23 SCRA 205).
The trial court erred in applying to this case the rules on novation. The
plaintiffs in alleging in their complaint that Fireman's Fund "became a
party in interest in this case by virtue of a subrogation right given in its
favor by" Firestone, were not relying on the novation by change of
creditors as contemplated in articles 1291 and 1300 to 1303 of the
Civil Code but rather on article 2207.
Article 2207 is a restatement of a settled principle of American
jurisprudence. Subrogation has been referred to as the doctrine of
substitution. It "is an arm of equity that may guide or even force one to
pay a debt for which an obligation was incurred but which was in
the property and all remedies which the insured may have for the
recovery thereof. That right is not dependent upon, nor does it grow
PARAS, C.J.:
out of, any privity of contract, or upon written assignment of claim, and
the petitioner ,Filipinas Cia. de Seguros, fire policy No. 29333 in the
456,142 SE 2d 18).
submitted to the petitioner its claim under the policy. The salvage
same is set aside with costs against defendant-appellee Jamila & Co.,
goods were sold at public auction and, after deducting their value, the
Inc.
SO ORDERED.
The present action was filed on August 6, 1946, in the Court of First
that the insured merchandise were burned up after the policy issued
States and Germany on December 10, 1941, and that the payment
appear:
the English courts which first the Daimler case applied this new
peace of Treaties of 1919 and the Mixed Arbitral established after the
The United States of America did not adopt the control test during the
First World War. Courts refused to recognized the concept whereby
American-registered corporations could be considered as enemies
World War II revived the problem again. It was known that German
and other enemy interests were cloaked by domestic corporation
structure. It was not only by legal ownership of shares that a material
influence could be exercised on the management of the corporation
horse."
The United States did not, in the amendments of the Trading with the
may add that, in Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 Off
Enemy Act during the last war, include as did other legislations the
came within the meaning of the word "enemy" as used in the Trading
with the Enemy Acts of civilized countries not only because it was
controlled by enemies.
Law) require that the premium paid by the respondent for the period
the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding the case, stated that the main issue
hinges on the question of whether the policy in question became null
and void upon the declaration of war between the United States and
Germany on December 10, 1941, and its judgment in favor of the
respondent corporation was predicated on its conclusion that the
policy did not cease to be in force. The Court of Appeals necessarily
assumed that, even if the payment by the petitioner to the respondent
was involuntary, its action is not tenable in view of the ruling on the
validity of the policy. As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeals held that
"any intimidation resorted to by the appellee was not unjust but the
In the case of an ordinary fire policy, which grants insurance only from
exercise of its lawful right to claim for and received the payment of the
year, or for some other specified term it is plain that when the parties
insurance policy," and that the ruling of the Bureau of Financing to the
effect that "the appellee was entitled to payment from the appellant
contractual rights of the parties, so far as not vested. lost. (Vance, the
was, well founded." Factually, there can be no doubt that the Director
MING, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a day had passed
when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in
their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming,
was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun
was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and
was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, an Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming
on July 19, 1991, which averred:
That on or about July 11, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Lam Po
Chun by then and there mauling and strangling the latter, thereby
inflicting upon her mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her death thereafter.
On May 15, 1995, Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of the
There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the
finding that Yip Wai Ming killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro
The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of
floor of the hotel (p. 14, tsn, October 13, 1993, p. 66, tsn, September
1, 1993). When they reached Room 210, appellant got the key from
Angel Gonzaga and informed the latter that they do not need any
The accused being detained, he is credited with the full extent of the
After staying for about an hour inside Room 210, the couple went
down to the lobby of the hotel. Appellant asked the front desk
SO ORDERED.
(p. 69, Rollo.)
During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the
hotel until his return at 11 oclock in the evening, he did not call his
and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam
Po Chun. The heated discussions lasted for thirty (30) minutes and
thereafter subsided.
In the following morning, that is, July 11, 1993, at around 9:15, the
Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock was
opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead
lying face down on the bed covered with a blanket. Appellant removed
210.Cariza, who became curious, went near the wall dividing her
the blanket and pretended to exclaim My God, she is dead but did not
room and Room 210. She heard a cry of a woman as if she cannot
even embrace his fiancee. Instead, appellant asked the room boy to
go down the hotel to inform the front desk, the security guard and
At about 10 oclock a.m., Gwen delos Santos, together with two lady
companions, arrived at the lobby of the Park Hotel. The receptionist
other hotel employees to call the police (pp. 8-27, tsn, October 18,
1993).
condition of the doors and windows of the room as well as the body of
together with Gwen delos Santos and the latters companions, left the
the victim and the other surroundings. They found no signs of forcible
entry and they observed that no one can enter from the outside
not to disturb his fiancee at Room 210. He also ordered not to accept
except the one who has the key. The police also saw the victim
any telephone calls, no room cleaning and no room service (pp. 37-
the blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter was
already in state of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has
been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The police calculated that
Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July
11, 1993 (pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).
toured China and Macao together in 1992. In April, 1993 the two
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned
29,1993.
that her life was insured with the Insurance Company of New
beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the
It was on the bases of the foregoing facts that appellant was charged
before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for the crime of murder
committed against the person of Lam Po Chun.
(pp. 3-7, Appellees Brief, ff. p. 176, Rollo.)
that the findings of fact of the trial court are based mainly on the
shower, the two had breakfast in the hotel restaurant, then they went
showed that the call was made at 6:44 P.M. on July 11,
Chun at their hotel room but the phone just kept on ringing with
nobody answering it. The group had dinner at the delos Santos house
in Tondo. After dinner, Gwen delos Santos brother and sister-in-law
arrived. They insisted in bringing their guest to a restaurant near
Manila Bay for coffee, but it was full so they proceeded to Tia Maria, a
Mexican restaurant in Makati.
Finally, the delos Santos family brought Andy Yip back to the Park
Hotel, arriving there at around 10:30 PM. Before the delos Santos
group left, there was an agreement that the following morning
at the front desk to give Lam Po Chun some medicine for headache
tour.
unanswered, he went back to the hotel front desk and asked the hotel
staff to open the door for him. The room was dark. Accused-appellant
store, he called Lam Po Chun but no one answered his call. From
accompanied him a P20 or P30 tip but his smallest bill was P100. He
went to a side table to get some smaller change. It was then when he
noticed the disordered room, a glass case and wallet on the floor, and
brought the group to the house of her aunt, Edna Bayona, at Roces,
Quezon City. From Roces St., Gwen delos Santos brought the group
to her home in Balut, Tondo. Using the delos Santos telephone,
accused-appellant called his office in Hongkong. The PLDT receipt
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT COMMITTED A CRIME OF MURDER AGGRAVATED
BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF OFFICER ALEJANDRO YANQUILING, JR.
V
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE WITNESSES OF THE ACCUSED ARE INCREDIBLE.
VIII
1993. Marriage date was set for August 29, 1993. This date was only
a month and a half away from the date of death of Lam Po Chun. In
IX
the half hour. It is not the kind of crime that a man would commit
INFORMATION.
The trial court would have been justified in finding that there was
The trial court, in arriving at its conclusions, took the various facts
presented by the prosecution, tied them up together like parts of a jigsaw puzzle, and came up with a complete picture of circumstantial
evidence depicting not only the commission of the crime itself but also
herself under a nickname. The entries in the form are in block letters
uniformly written by one hand. Below the printed name Lam Po Chun
are Chinese characters which presumably are the Chinese translation
of her name. Nobody was presented to identify the author of the block
handwriting. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court made any
comparisons, such as the signature of Lam Po Chun on her passport
(Exh. C), with her purported signature or any other entry in the form.
It needs not much emphasis to say that an application form does not
form for insurance, fill it up at home before filing it with the insurance
insured obviously can not afford to pay, in the absence of any showing
company. In fact, the very first sentence of the form states that it
merely forms the basis of a contract between you and NZI Life. There
There is evidence in the record that the family of Lam Po Chun did not
like her relationship with accused-appellant. After all the trouble that
court stated:
Indeed, Yip Wai Ming testified that he met Andy Kwong in a restaurant
in Hongkong and told Yip and Lam Po Chun should be married and
there must be an insurance for her life . . .
(p. 33, RTC Decision; p. 66, Rollo.)
Sept. 22, 1992. But accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming did not testify on
and 10 A.M. of July 11,1993, the time when Cariza Destresa, the
September 22, 1992. The entire 112 pages of the testimony on that
September 29, 1993. All the 100 pages of the testimony on that date
the alleged advice of Andy Kwong. It is usually the man who insures
himself with the wife or future wife as beneficiary instead of the other
identify Lam Po Chun from pictures shown during the trial. She could
way around. Why should Lam Po Chun, with her relatively small
not have done this unless she really saw and met the victim at the
salary which is not even enough to pay for the monthly premiums,
insure herself for such a big amount. This is another reason why
doubts arise as to the truth of the insurance angle.
July 11, 1993 up to the time the body was discovered late that
Santos, her sister Monique, and their mother, touring Metro Manila
Q. If we use thirty six (36) hours to forty eight (48) hours, will you
agree with me that it is possible that the victim was killed in the
scene of the crime during the above mentioned hours, the prosecution
A. It is possible.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Based also on your autopsy report, were there signs that the victim
put a struggle?
WITNESS:
A. There were no injuries in the hand or forearms or upper arms of the
victim. So, there were no sign of struggle on the part of the victim.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. And your basis in saying that there was no struggle on the part of
the victim was that there were no apparent or seen injuries in the
hands of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. PASCUA:
A. It is possible also.
ATTY. PASCUA:
WITNESS:
victim?
WITNESS:
ATTY. PASCUA:
Dr. Lagonera placed the probable time of death as July 10, 1993 (tsn,
victim?
Dec. 14, 1993, p.108). It is undisputed that at around 8:30 A.M. of July
WITNESS:
A. No injuries at the back, all in front.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. All in front, meaning in terms of probability and based on your
professional opinion, the attack would have come from a frontal attack
or the attacker would have come from behind to inflict the frontal
injuries of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. It can be the attack coming from behind in the front or both, sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
of the victim, would it be more probable that the attack came from in
front of the victim?
The trial court stated that if the victim had been dead from 10 to 12
hours at 11:35 oclock in the evening, it is safe to conclude that she
WITNESS:
A. Yes, it is possible, Sir.
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (U.S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil.
have been other people who were able to gain entry into the hotel
510 [1906]; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]). Every hypothesis
The trial court stated that there was no sign of any forcible entry into
the room, no broken locks, windows, etc. The answer is
simple. Somebody could have knocked on the door and Lam Po Chun
could have opened it thinking they were hotel staff. Unfortunately,
Detective Yanquiling was so sure of himself that after pinpointing
accused-appellant as the culprit, he did not follow any other leads. In
the course of his interviews with witnesses, his purpose was simply to
nail down one suspect. His investigation was angled towards pinning
down Yip Wai Ming. In fact, Gwen delos Santos testified that
guilt beyond reasonable doubt have not been met in the case at bar.
Yanquiling talked to her over the telephone almost daily urging her to
change her testimony.
time of death precisely between 9:15 and 10 A.M. Both were not
giving the probable time of death, the police officer who merely looked
at the body and saw the blood oozing out of the victims nose and
mouth must have simply guessed such time, plucking it out of thin
air. The trial court accepted the erroneous timing, conveniently placing
On July 16 and July 19, 1993 Lam Po Chun was already dead. If
room after accused-appellant left with the delos Santos family. Other
Peter Humphrey was still in Australia on July 11, 1993, how could he
occupy with his girlfriend the next door room, Room 211, on that date
The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony of Cariza Destresa,
a 19-year old cultural dancer occupying with her Australian boyfriend
Peter Humphrey, the adjoining Room 211. Destresa testified that while
she was in Room 211 at about 9:15 oclock on the morning of July
11,1993, she heard banging sounds in Room 210, as if somebody
was being thrown, and there was stomping on the floor. The banging
sounds lasted about thirty (30) minutes, an improbably long time to kill
a woman. Destresa stated that she placed her ear near the wall and
heard the cry of a woman having difficulty in breathing.
The witness heard the banging sounds between 9:15 and 9:45 A.M. of
same day, Destresa states that she stayed in Room 211 for 3
months. She later changed her mind and said she stayed there only
memory as to dates and time is shown by the fact that when asked as
witness, Peter left on May 29, 1993; arrived in June and July; left in
stated, July 29, 1993. Pressed by the prosecuting attorney if she was
June; arrived in July; left on July 13, 1993. Destresa was confused
sure of said date, she changed this to July 16,1993. Pressed further:
stating at the start of her testimony that she was jobless, but later
declaring that she was a dancer with the Rampage group and
performed in Dubai.
Destresa testified at one point that she heard an argument between a
man and a woman in a dialect she could not understand. This was
supposed to be on the evening of July 11,1993. At that time, the victim
had long been dead. Destresa gave various contradictory statements
This Court notes that accused-appellant did not file any complaint or
testimony. To our mind, the trial court gravely erred in relying on her
charges against the police officers who allegedly tortured him. But he
testimony.
Accused-appellant was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the
killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that
there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on
series of circumstantial evidence. He had no personal knowledge of
Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accused-appellant stated
that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked
him to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his
stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and
beer over his face. When he could no longer bear the pain, he
This Court has carefully gone over the record of this case. We simply
of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to
and unbroken and that the finding of guilt excludes any other
is a blot on the peace and order situation in the Philippines and must
the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could
have killed the victim for her money and valuables does not speak
DIMAYUGA, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Orders of the respondent Judge dated March 19, 1980 and June 10,
1980 granting the prayer in the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 9210 and
SO ORDERED.
Opposition to Petition.
When the petition was called for hearing on March 19, 1980, the
respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, presiding Judge of the then
interest in the policy (Gercio v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Canada, 48 Phil.
71).
was denied in an Order June 10, 1980. Hence, this petition raising the
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DESIGNATION OF THE IRREVOCABLE
BENEFICIARIES COULD BE CHANGED OR AMENDED WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF ALL THE IRREVOCABLE BENEFICIARIES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE IRREVOCABLE BENEFICIARIES HEREIN,
ONE OF WHOM IS ALREADY DECEASED WHILE THE OTHERS
ARE ALL MINORS, COULD VALIDLY GIVE CONSENT TO THE
CHANGE OR AMENDMENT IN THE DESIGNATION OF THE
IRREVOCABLE BENEFICIARIES.
We are of the opinion that his Honor, the respondent Judge, was in
error in issuing the questioned Orders.
Needless to say, the applicable law in the instant case is the
Insurance Act, otherwise known as Act No. 2427 as amended, the
policy having been procured in 1968. Under the said law, the
beneficiary designated in a life insurance contract cannot be changed
the parties is the law binding on both of them and for so many times,
can the insured's creditors seize the policy or any right thereunder.
... it is settled that the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
The insured may not even add another beneficiary because by doing
so, he diminishes the amount which the beneficiary may recover and
such agreements are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy or public order, they shall have the force of law between
them.
elements for its validity and does not in any way violate the law,
morals, customs, orders, etc. leaving no reason for Us to deny
sanction thereto.
appellee,
vs.
EBRADO, defendants-appellants.
cannot tolerate. Ergo, We cannot help but conclude that the lower
court acted in excess of its authority when it issued the Order dated
March 19, 1980 amending the designation of the beneficiaries from
"irrevocable" to "revocable" over the disapprobation of the petitioner
insurance company.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Orders of the
respondent Judge are hereby nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN, J.:
This is a novel question in insurance law: Can a common-law wife
named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter?
On September 1, 1968, Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by
The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Policy No. 009929 on a whole-life for
P5,882.00 with a, rider for Accidental Death for the same amount
Buenaventura C. Ebrado designated T. Ebrado as the revocable
beneficiary in his policy. He to her as his wife.
On October 21, 1969, Buenaventura C. Ebrado died as a result of an t
when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. As the policy was in
force, The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. liable to pay the coverage
in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the
premiums and interest thereon due for January and February, 1969, in
the sum of P36.27.
Policy No. 009929 whole life plan, dated September 1, 1968 for the
that she and the insured Buenaventura C. Ebrado were merely living
Pascuala and Exhibit 7 for Carponia Ebrado; 3) that during the lifetime
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the
deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the
insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia T. Ebrado.
Carponia Ebrado filed claim with the Insular Life Assurance Co. which
was contested by Pascuala Ebrado who also filed claim for the
1970.
After the issues have been joined, a pre-trial conference was held on
July 8, 1972, after which, a pre-trial order was entered reading as
follows: +.wph!1
insurance company filed this action against the two herein claimants
Carponia and Pascuala Ebrado; 7) that there is now due from the
Insular Life Assurance Co. as proceeds of the policy P11,745.73; 8)
that the beneficiary designated by the insured in the policy is Carponia
but although the insured made the option to change the beneficiary,
proceeded to have the parties submit their evidence for the purpose of
same was never changed up to the time of his death and the wife did
the pre-trial and make admissions for the purpose of pretrial. During
not have any opportunity to write the company that there was
Upon motion of the parties, they are given ten (10) days to file their
simultaneous memoranda from the receipt of this order.
Appeals, but on July 11, 1976, the Appellate Court certified the case
It is patent from the last paragraph of Art. 739 of the Civil Code that a
word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the
resolve this void in the Insurance Law. Article 2011 of the New Civil
being legally married and that the marriage of the insured with the
other defendant Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado was valid and still existing
laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be
2012 of the same Code, "any person who is forbidden from receiving
new Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The
mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside: any person who cannot
insurance policy of the person who cannot make the donation.5 Under
donations from each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code
provides: +.wph!1
and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible treat it as a will
nuptial and filial rights of the legitimate family There is every reason to
hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those
between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies
since the same are based on similar consideration As above pointed
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of
remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that
action.
of and undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part
(According to) the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the
24, Titl. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is very reason
objective.
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of
action.
scrutiny. It would be to indict the frame of the Civil Code for a failure to
contrary, the law plainly states that the guilt of the party may be
proved "in the same acting for declaration of nullity of donation. And, it
the law which embodies a deeply rooted notion of what is just and
SO ORDERED.
the policy."
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the lower court is hereby
REGALADO, J.:
59.940 metric tons not 600 tons at $395.42 a ton CNF Manila. The
of filing of the complaint, and is modified with respect to the third party
fishmeal in 666 new gunny bags were unloaded from the ship on
reimburse third party plaintiff the sum of P25,471.80 with legal interest
from the date of payment until the date of reimbursement, and (2) the
the ship's agent and the arrastre contractor. The condition of the bad
order was reflected in the turn over survey report of Bad Order
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals are as follows:
F with the findings on the extent of shortage or loss on the bad order
bags totalling 227 bags amounting to 12,148 kilos, Exhibit F-1. Based
formal claim statement was also presented by the plaintiff against the
vessel dated December 21, 1976, Exhibit B, but the defendant Filipino
Policy No. M-2678 for the sum of P267,653.59 for the goods
kilos each from Bangkok, Thailand to Manila against all risks under
lay the burden, to adduce evidence showing that the alleged loss to
the cargo in question was due to a fortuitous event precludes his right
untenable.
The "all risks clause" of the Institute Cargo Clauses read as follows:
The term "all risks" cannot be given a strained technical meaning, the
language of the clause under the Institute Cargo Clauses being
unequivocal and clear, to the effect that it extends to all
Generally, the burden of proof is upon the insured to show that a loss
arose from a covered peril, but under an "all risks" policy the burden is
not on the insured to prove the precise cause of loss or damage for
which it seeks compensation. The insured under an "all risks
insurance policy" has the initial burden of proving that the cargo was
in good condition when the policy attached and that the cargo was
damaged when unloaded from the vessel; thereafter, the burden then
The very nature of the term "all risks" must be given a broad and
Ltd. 11 the basic rule is that the insurance company has the burden of
proving that the loss is caused by the risk excepted and for want of
much less any evidence that the bags of cargo had burst as the result
showing that spillage would have been a certainty, there may have
been good reason to plead that there was no risk covered by the
contemplated, and covers all losses except such as arise from the
prove merely that the goods he transported have been lost, destroyed
gunny bags in which the fishmeal was packed was such that they
from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruction whether he
could not hold their contents in the course of the necessary transit,
has or has not any title in, or lien upon or possession of the property
that time, the foreign buyers assumed the risks of loss of the goods
C & F contracts are shipment contracts. The term means that the
price fixed includes in a lump sum the cost of the goods and freight to
the named destination. 21 It simply means that the seller must pay the
from the seller to the buyer when the goods pass the ship's rail in the
between him and the shipper of the goods operates to vest in him an
port of shipment. 22
Moreover, the issue of lack of insurable interest was not among the
defenses averred in petitioners answer. It was neither an issue agreed
upon by the parties at the pre-trial conference nor was it raised during
the trial in the court below. It is a settled rule that an issue which has
not been raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process. 23 This is but a permuted restatement of the long
settled rule that when a party deliberately adopts a certain theory, and
the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he
SO ORDERED.
insurance thereof without the consent of the LESSOR then the policy
is deemed assigned and transferred to the LESSOR for its own
benefit; x x x[1]
DECISION
4. On the day that the lease contract was to expire, fire broke out
PADILLA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside a decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
INSURANCE LAW
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING
PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY ON THE BASIS OF A
STIPULATION WHICH IS VOID FOR BEING WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION AND FOR BEING TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON
CKS and the Cha spouses is valid insofar as it provides that any fire
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
DECLARE THE CONTRACT OF LEASE ENTERED INTO AS A
provide.
wagering, is void.