Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CYCLE MASTER
2010-2012
MEMOIRE ACADEMIQUE
PAR: Fernando PRIETO
MAY 2013
M. Bucchiccio Oliver, Head of Institutional Investor Sales at BNP Paribas, for the
inspiration
M. Sarter Stephan, Responsible for Master Thesis at RMS, for the patience and
assistance with paperwork.
And special greetings to M. Rakotondratsimba Yves, Teacher at ECE, for his tutoring.
Table
of
Contents
Asset
classes
......................................................................................................................
8
Volatility:
Standard
deviation,
Variance
and
Covariance
..................................................
10
Correlation
and
diversification
effect
...............................................................................
12
Volatility:
Historical
and
Implied
volatility
........................................................................
14
Volatility
Index:
example
of
the
VIX
.................................................................................
18
Volatility:
from
the
Smile
to
the
Skew
..............................................................................
21
Exposure
to
the
VIX
via
swaps,
futures,
options
...............................................................
24
Risk
adjusted
return:
Sharpe
ratio
and
some
others
.........................................................
29
Hypothesis
1:
Volatility
is
a
new
asset
class
......................................................................
36
Hypothesis
2:
Volatility
improves
risk-adjusted
returns
....................................................
42
Hypothesis
3:
Volatility
protects
from
Black-Swans
..........................................................
49
Our
conclusions
................................................................................................................
55
Circa
CAC40
CAGR
CAPM
CBOE
DAX
e.g
For example
ETF
ETN
i.e
That is
OTC
PF
Portfolio
Pp
Percentage point
S&P
SPX
S&P 500
SPXTR
VIX
I
Introduction
During my first internship at BNP CIB as equity and commodity derivatives sales
assistant, I was given the opportunity to discover a new category of products the bank wanted
to push: volatility products. A volatility product is defined as a security that provides
exposure to volatility alone without being affected by directional movements of the
underlying asset. This was a major surprise for me because as a Junior (and it was also the
case of not so junior people) volatility was a measure of risk.
Moreover, to simplify, some people spoke indifferently of volatility and variance. But
at that time the variance, for me, was not even a finance concept but a mathematical one. And
when I expressed my surprise to a sales I was working with, he answered: if you young
undergraduate, working for us on complex products in a daily basis and supposed to
understand, explain and sell these products are so lost, can you imagine the situation of the
clients? . That is why I decided to write my thesis on this new approach of a mathematical
and portfolio management concept. The goal of this study is to recreate the context and
constraints given to the banks that logically leaded to the creation of these products and
expansion of the market.
During the previous decades, liquidity has been the central concept of research in
finance. But the exhibit 1, a Google Ngram graphic (a Google Books tool analysing a
significant amount of books over time and giving as an output a graph showing how a phrase
have occurred in history) illustrates how, since the 90s, Volatility is the more commented
concept. We will see later that this date is in line with Variance Swaps creation!
Exhibit 1: Google Ngram graph for Liquidity and Volatility between 1930 and 2008
If some institutional investors and quants have started to work on this kind of project
in the 2000s, the intense development and growth of the volatility product market boomed
after the recent financial crisis and especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. Most of the asset classes declined sharply - a decline rarely explainable by the
fundamental methods of asset valuation. For example, in 2009, G. Subleys article
1
demonstrated that a 3000pts CAC40, the average level of 2009 (note that it reached its
lowest close level in March 2nd 2009, 2534.45pts), means that half of the underlying
companies are valued to a Price to Book-Value ratio of less than 1. He also demonstrates that
the multiples low levels are the result of an increasing uncertainty environment. In parallel of
that phenomenon, the correlation levels of the different asset classes increased dramatically.
In average from 1983 to 2007, the Equity and Commodities (considering the S&P500 and the
S&P GSCI) correlation level was 0,57: it increased to 0,91 during the 08-09 crisis.
What was the impact on for the portfolio managers? The Modern portfolio theory is
based on Markowitz approach of risk: it is measured by the standard deviation (or the
variance, its square). Then Markowitz derived the general formula to measure the standard
deviation of the whole portfolio of risky assets. Thanks to this formula he clarified the
relationship between the risk, the return, and the different assets correlation. Thus he was able
to demonstrate the impact of the correlation levels on the risk diversification: the global risk
level of a portfolio is less than the risk of carrying each asset independently if the correlation
coefficients are less than 1.
The challenge for the portfolio managers is to find an efficient way to diversify the
risk of their portfolios and optimize the return for each unit of risk. For that reason the asset
managers use different asset classes as they are exposed to different economical phenomenon
(e.g. when equities drop, the investors are supposed to sell it and invest in bonds and then
bonds will be negatively correlated to the equities). So what happen when the correlation
levels of the asset classes converge to 1? The level of undiversified risk carried by a portfolio
composed of these assets increases.
1
Analysed
in
(Surbled, 2009)
6
Our idea here is to consider the volatility as an asset class. By volatility we mean the
implied volatility, the level implied by the market as it is derived from the mark-to-market of
the options (calls and puts). To be more precise, it is the volatility level matching the Black
and Scholes formula and the prices of the options on the market (in other words the implied
volatility is the future volatility level estimated by the market). Structurally it is uncorrelated
to the other asset classes (especially on bear markets). In 2008 after Lehman collapse, the
implied volatility levels reached records high levels across all the markets (for example the
VIX has reached its highest level 80,86 2 months after the crash of Lehman) when, as
mentioned before, the other assets where declining.
So the first hypothesis is about the volatility, in other terms the products allowing an
exposure to the volatility of assets, can we consider this set of securities as a new asset class?
To test this hypothesis, we will design a framework to define what is an asset class. Then we
will study the different solutions offered by investment banks to buy volatility or variance
with different wrappers (like swaps, options or shares in funds Voledge-like) and see if they
meet the definition of an asset class.
Then it will be interesting to study the impact of diversifying a portfolio of risky assets
with these securities. While volatility has a given return and risk profile in a given market, the
question then is to know how the portfolio will react to it in different situations and over time.
Do these assets allow a statically significant improvement of the risk to return profile of our
portfolio? The second hypothesis will be then is that the integration of volatility to a portfolio
of risky assets does improve the risk to return profile.
Finally, my third hypothesis will derive from the precedent: as the implied volatility
takes advantage of the market uncertainty, then we will test the efficiency of these products to
hedge a portfolio against what Nassim N. Taleb so-called a Black Swan - those huge, not
anticipatable, and highly improbable market movements. For example, during the last
financial crisis, the incredible surge in volatilities of most markets and especially the
observation of a rare phenomenon - the recorrelation of the asset classes in a bearish market caused a "Black Swan" out of the scope of usual Risk Management Scenarios. We will try to
test the efficiency of these solutions in extreme scenarios like these.
Asset
classes
Asset classes are an asset allocation concept. The more frequent definition is: an
asset class is a set of assets that bear some fundamental economic similarities to each other,
and that have characteristics that make them distinct from other assets that are not part of that
class 2. The generally accepted traditional asset classes are: equities, bonds and cash. With
time, it is now widely recognised that there is some alternative asset classes: hard
commodities, soft commodities, real estate, and credits...
The idea of considering different asset classes is useful to diversify our exposure to
different economic factors or phases of a cycle. As this is out of the scope of this study we
invite the readers interested by the subject to consult the paper of Pim Van Vliet and David
Blitz Dynamic Strategic Asset Allocation: Risk and Return Across Economic Regimes to
know more about the asset allocation driven by the economic cycles. Our interest for that
theory here is limited to the proof it makes of the usefulness of the concept.
In this study we will use the following framework to define what an asset class is:
Does this asset class make sense as an economic factor? To answer that question
we can try to determine if the securities composing it have a homogeneous return
in a given economical context but it is also necessary to question the philosophy
2
Definition
in
(Greer,
1997)
8
Are the securities tradable? This criterion is in line with my intension of writing a
guide useful for the portfolio managers (and consequently close to the reality of the
market). This tradability criteria involve different questions:
The existence of the securities and the market access. Neuberger and
Hodges (Neuberger & Hodges, 1989) published the variance swap
replication portfolio method (with a portfolio of options) in 1990 and the
first var-swap was traded in 1993. At that time the var-swaps was a very
small market with very restricted market access for years. It proves you
need to test the availability of the securities to define them as an asset class
More in depth the question of the securities liquidity still pending. If the
liquidity of an asset class condition, it is clearly a parameter and by
consequence need to be defined
My researches on how to define an asset class in the academic literature was not much
successful and it appears that for now the asset classes are more the result some arguments of
authority or empirical evidences than on a precise framework resulting in a classification. If
the framework allowing an asset class classification is not in the core of this study, I decided
to draft one and to use it in order to test my first hypothesis: can we consider volatility as a
new asset class?
2
(1) X = E "( X E [ X ]) $
#
%
In other words, the variance is the average of the squared distances to the mean and
the standard deviation is the square root of it. The advantage of the standard deviation is that
it has the same dimension than the mean.
10
Now it is necessary to define the variance of a portfolio. When Markowitz defined the
standard deviation as a measure of risk, then he derived the general formula for the variance
of a portfolio of risky assets (3):
(3) 2P = w i2 i2 + wi w j i j i, j
i
ji
Where wi and w j are the respective weights of the assets i and j in the portfolio P
As this formula shows the dispersion is neutral to the mean. The sign of the distances to
the mean are completely neutral as they are squared. Again, this limit of the standard
deviation is important to note, as we will see later, this is not the case with tradable volatility
(cf the concept Volatility: from the Smile to the Skew).
If the variance is used to measure the variations of a variable with respect to itself, the
covariance will allow studying the simultaneous variation of variables from their respective
means. It can be noted indistinctly cov(X,Y) or X,Y . The covariance formula (4) is as
following:
(4) Cov(X,Y ) = E "#(X E [ X ])(Y E [Y ])$%
From this presentation of the covariance formula we can easily deduce a simple result:
1
(Xi E [ X ])(Yi E [Y ])
N
Where
Where
The lower the obtained result is, the more the series are independent and a move from one
will not impact the second. Conversely the higher it is, the more the series are linked. Two
independent variables have a zero-covariance.
11
ji
But what does the correlation coefficient i, j represent? The formula of it is:
(6) i, j =
cov(X,Y )
X Y
The formula (6) is easy enough to understand, the essential point is to understand the
relation between the correlation coefficient and the covariance for a given level of volatility of
the assets. Finally we can deduct the consequences on (2), and the relationship between assets
impact the volatility of the portfolio:
The more correlation we have between assets, the bigger the second term is. The
consequence is obviously a reduced impact on the non-systematic risk. At the
opposite, when we have low or negative correlation between the assets, then the
second term will be small or negative and we will reduce quicker the nonsystematic risk
The more assets we have, the smaller is the second term as the weights will be
reduced and the correlations range from -1 to 1 increase the effect. This lead us to
the exhibit 2 resuming the relation between the number of securities and the
portfolio variance
Non-Systematic risk
Systematic
risk
12
Number
of
securities
Now that the concept of correlation between assets and asset classes is clear, it is
interesting to have a look on the real situation of the markets on the previous years. How
assets are correlated? In the exhibits 3 and 3bis, we will present US and HK Equity as
different asset classes because if both are equity, they give an exposure to very different
economic factors (cf. the presentation of the Asset Classes concept).
Exhibit 3: Performance evolution between different assets since 2000
During the recent crisis,
traditionally de-correlated asset
classes moved in the same
direction, hence reducing
diversification benefits
300
250
Performance (%)
200
150
100
50
0
Jan-00 Aug-00 Mar-01 Oct-01 May-02 Dec-02 Jul-03 Feb-04 Sep-04 Apr-05 Nov-05 Jun-06 Jan-07 Aug-07 Mar-08 Oct-08 May-09 Dec-09 Jul-10
US Equities
European Equities
Hong Kong Equities
US Real Estate
US Bonds
Commodities
Diversified
-0.6
-0.8
-1
2005
2006
2007
2008
nd
2009
2010
Source: BNP CIB - Bloomberg, Data from 22 March 2005 to 25th August 2010.
These two exhibits perfectly illustrate the recent constraints on the portfolio managers:
as we can see, the diversification of assets during the normal periods and the recorrelation
of the assets when they really need diversification: during the crisis periods. In this context, a
structurally negatively correlated asset, like the volatility, should be appealing for the asset
managers: here started the adventure of the volatility products
13
1 n
(X n1 X)2
N 1 i=1
Where
Where N is the number of studied periods and then the number of distances
You could have expected an N as a denominator and not N-1 but as we only use some
distances (a sample of distances) then we are not averaging the whole population and
then it is necessary to use N-1 as un unbiased estimator
In practice, you can simplify the formula (7) by taking two simple assumptions: the
daily mean return of a stock is small enough to be replaced by 0 and you can use m
14
instead of m-1, then you are not using an unbiased estimator but a maximum
likelihood one. Then we have (8):
(8) 2n =
1 n 2
U n1
m i=1
There is much more to say concerning the implied volatility. Here we need to do a
small digression to the Black and Scholes PDE (Partial Differential Equation), derived from
the Merton mathematical model. The B&S PDE is a very easy and commonly used way to
price options.
We will start with the pricing formula of a Call option (9). The put formula is easily
deductible from the call formula and the object here is not to present the B&S model:
(9) C(S, t) = N(d1 )S N(d2 )Ker(T t )
S
2
ln( ) + (r + )(T t)
K
2
Where d1 =
T t
Where d2 = d1 T t
price of the option on the market (so-called the Mark-to-Market, or MtM) and the formula
result (3). Market operators use the implied volatility level (calculated as described above) as
a proxy of the expected volatility, which is the best traders forecast of the volatility during
the rest of the options life (the consistency of this hypothesis over time is function of the
hypothesis used but B&S model is based on flat volatility hypothesis).
For an illustrative purpose we present in exhibit 4 a analogy between the bonds and
the options in order to give a more empirical understanding of what the volatilities
(historical and implied) are when it comes to deal with derivatives instruments. The exhibit is
extracted from (Derman, 2003).
15
Options
actual short-
of an index
price.
Forward rates: the future realized rates,
fair.
It is interesting to study the relation between the historical and implied volatility.
Indeed if implied volatility is a good proxy of expected volatility (we use here an if because
it is easy to question the B&S model hypothesis) it is thought that if implied volatility does,
indeed, contain information in forecasting future realized volatility, then implied volatility
may be useful in predicting stock market returns. Consequently the relation between historical
and implied volatility is the key to forecast the latter and define a rewarding trading strategy.
Christina Chui4 demonstrates by statistical inference:
The correlation between the historical and the implied volatility for the S&P100 (using
the VIX for the implied volatility and the HVOEX for the historical volatility) and
Nasdaq100 (using the VXN for the implied volatility and the HVNDX for the
historical volatility) at the 1% level of significance
3
In
(Derman,
4
In
(Chiu,
2003)
May 2002)
16
The non-significant difference between the historical and implied volatility means for
the two index at the 5% level of significance
She also observe in the data some widely accepted empirical regularities relating to
the time series behaviour of volatility: persistence effect, mean reversion, asymmetric
reaction of volatility to the market changes, global increase in volatility levels over
time
However if the means are not significantly different, the data compiled by Chui
present a implied volatility higher than the historical one. This empirical observation could
lead to the hypothesis of an overpricing of the options (due to the positive relation between
implied volatility and price). If Chui did not investigate the question due to the high level of
risk implied by naked sell of straddles (volatility sell), some more recent studies (Wallmeier
& Hafner, 2007) reveal a strong negative volatility risk premium: strong enough to generate a
positive return.
17
18
19
Exhibit 6: The 10-Y daily returns and correlations of the S&P500 and VIX
Nega%ve'correla%ons'between'VIX'
and'S&P500'
VIX"Daily"close"
2004&
SPX$level$
1800"
1600"
1400"
1200"
1000"
800"
600"
400"
200"
0"
7/
31
/0
7/ 1"
31
/0
7/ 2"
31
/0
7/ 3"
31
/0
7/ 4"
31
/0
7/ 5"
31
/0
7/ 6"
31
/0
7/ 7"
31
/0
7/ 8"
31
/0
7/ 9"
31
/1
7/ 0"
31
/1
7/ 1"
31
/1
2"
VIX$level$
Prices$for$SPX$and$the$VIX$
90"
80"
70"
60"
50"
40"
30"
20"
10"
0"
2005&
2006&
!0.83&
!0.82&
2007&
2008&
!0.85&
!0.84&
2009&
2010&
2011&
!0.84&
!0.86&
!0.5&
!0.6&
!0.7&
!0.8&
!0.9&
!0.75&
!0.76&
!1&
SPX"Daily"close"
Correla4on&of&Daily&Returns&
20
volatility skew first (and probably discovered this irregularity in the smile). He suggested a
crash-o-phobia phenomenon5. As the skew is observed since the crash of 87, he suggests
that the markets fear another crash and price this event by charging more implied volatility on
low strikes. The empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis as a bearish market makes this
skew steeper and a bullish market less steep. Because the traders have to sell when the stocks
go down to stay hedged and because at those levels the stop loss orders fast the market drop,
this empirical observation makes sense.
Another explanation is related to trading strategies used by market agents and there
risk aversion (a development to the crash-o-phobia hypothesis). When a stock fall, the
demand, and thus the price for it will decline but demand for puts on the stock will increase
(resulting in short-sales for delta-hedge by market operators). This rational suggests that
investors indirectly set the level of implied volatility, as investors demand for calls and puts
set prices, and these prices, in turn, are used to imply the level of the implied volatility
indicators.
Finally a more fundamental explanation involves the leverage of the equity. When the
equity value declines, the leverage ratio of the companies increases and therefore makes the
equity riskier and sensitive to the market moves (cf. levered beta concept). The consequence
is obviously a higher implied volatility. This observation makes the implied volatility a
contrarian indicator, as it will spike more frequently on bearish markets than in bullish ones.
5
Mentioned
in
(Rubinstein,
1994)
21
Vola,lity(skew(
Equity'op*ons'
Implied(vola,lity(
Implied(vola,lity(
FX#op&ons#
Strike(
Strike(
In the case of an equity underlying, we do not have a volatility smile (first graph of the
exhibit 7) but a downward sloping curve also called volatility skew (second graph of the
exhibit). This asymmetric smile of volatility is the result of a non-lognormal probability
distribution of the underlyings return (remember that the Black and Scholes pricing model
involves a lognormal distribution of the assets prices). More precisely the volatility skew
presented in the second graph of the exhibit 7 is the result of a positively skewed distribution
of the underlyings return: this skewness will involve a heavier left tail and a less heavy right
tail, in other words a higher probability of loss.
The consequence of this probability distribution is that a deep-out-of-the-money call
will have a lower price than with a lognormal distribution (as the surface under the curve after
the strike is smaller than with the lognormal bell). The price difference will result in a reduced
implied volatility. This rational also works with the puts. If you consider a deep-out-of-themoney put, then the option pays off if the underlying price is below the strike. As this surface
is bigger than with the lognormal distribution then the price will be higher and consequently
the implied volatility also.
If we make the assumption that the previously mentioned positive risk adjusted return
of shorting implied volatility, it means that the skewness of returns is too high in comparison
to the actual volatility of markets (do not forget that the implied volatility is used as a proxy
of the expected volatility). Nassim N. Thaleb could answer with its barbell strategy: pay the
VIX premium can appear as a loss but in case of Black Swan in the equity market? Protection
is a cost until it protects you, then it is an asset.
22
Vola,lity(and(Time(to(maturity(
Implied(vola,lity(
All#op&ons#
Time(to(Maturity(
Short-term volatilities are higher than long-term ones. This is true for both historical
and implied volatility (which is normal due to the relation between the two) and can be
observed in our long term VIX spot graph (cf. exhibit 6). It suggests the empirically observed
mean-reverting property of the volatility. In other words, the instantaneous volatility (the limit
of the implied volatility of an at-the-money option as its time to maturity approaches zero)
tends to be flat.
Samuelson did a similar hypothesis related to the futures, the so-called the Samuelson
Hypothesis. In 1965, he said: it is a well known rule of thumb that nearness to expiration
date involves greater variability or riskiness per hour of per day or per month than does
farness. This hypothesis involves:
The mean reversion of volatility suggests that the value of the volatility in the long run
is equal to the average/historical volatility level. In markets where Samuelson
Hypothesis holds, the historical volatility is good proxy for the long-term expected
volatility level but it does not say anything about the short-term volatility
It has a impact on asset pricing as the futures will be affected via the margin calls
(positive function of volatility), the more volatility we have the more the traders will
have to post collateral to hedge there positions. This collateral is obviously costly. The
options will be affected via the hedging costs, if the traders price higher volatilities
near the maturity date, then the options will be more expensive.
23
A volatility swap allows the investor to bid on the increase (by taking the long
position) or decrease (by taking the short position) of the volatility, more precisely the
variance of the underlying. We consider K, the strike (solved in order to make the present
value of the contract equal to 0), the buyer will receive the Vega notional (because it is
expressed in USD) for each Vega (percentage point of the volatility) above the strike and pay
the Vega notional for each point below. The payoff formula is:
2
(10) Payoff = N var * ( realized
K2)
Where
N var is the notional allowing the contract to pay approximately the Vega
N var =
N vega
and N vega is the Vega notional. To demonstrate
2K
N vega "
* #(K +1)2 K 2 $%
2K
N
= vega * [ 2K +1]
2K
1
= N vega +
2K
=
And
1
is negligible in front of N vega
2K
24
2
Where realized
is
the
realized
variance
of
returns,
or
the
squared
volatility
A var-swap also needs to define in the term sheet the following parameters:
Annualization factor
252
Payo&
3#
2#
1#
0#
!1#
0#
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
!2#
!3#
Vola)lity&
Vola-lity#payo#
Var!swap#payo#
25
VIX Futures
VIX products are a second way to get an exposure to implied volatility. Indeed, if the
var-swaps are replicated via a portfolio of options on the studied asset (e.g. a var-swap on the
S&P 500 is replicable via a portfolio of options on the index), the VIX products work
differently. They allow an exposure to the VIX, which is a measure of the implied volatility of
the S&P 500. Basically, if we could invest on the spot VIX, the performance at maturity of
the VIX and the squared root performance of the var-swap could be the same.
In this context, the first products are the VIX futures; they started to trade in March
2004 at the Chicago Futures Exchange (ticker: VX).
Pricing: futures are quoted in points with a two decimals precision and
each point is valued at the multiplier
26
When an investor wants to maintain its exposure, he can roll his position (close its
present position and buy a new one in a later term). The problem with a long volatility
exposure is the frequent steep contango on the VIX term structure and the consequent cost of
this contango for the investor.
The second wapper offered by CBOE are the options in 2006. You can find quotation
and buy VIX calls and puts on the market. The options on VIX have a particular pricing and
settlement in comparison to other options, there is no nominal but a multiplier, like for
indexes, the premiums and payoffs are function of this multiplier. The fundamentals
characteristics of these options are:
Multiplier: USD100
Premium quotation: premium are in points and each point worth the
multiplier
27
The strength of VIX options are the leverage it allows in our exposition to the VIX
and the easy way it works. However if the value at expiration date is easy to understand, the
value of the option between the inception date and the expiration date is not equal to the
payoff value. The value at anytime is the result of different impacts and the global impact of
the different sensitivities can even engender a drop of the option price on the secondary
market when the VIX is in our favour but this is also true for puts protection so portfolio
managers should be able to deal with it.
28
Sharpe ratio
The Nobel laureate William F. Sharpe gave its name to this ratio allowing a measure
of risk-adjusted performance. Please note that the Sharpe index refers to the same indicator.
The idea here is to measure how much extra-return a security or portfolio gives me for each
unit of risk. The Sharpe ratio formula is:
(11)
Sharpe.ratio =
Where
rf
Where
r p rf
p
The strength of this ratio was the possibility to compare portfolios easily (as all the
information we need is directly and easily computable from the observed series of return).
Indeed, two portfolios can have different returns but the real question is how much risk (and
we all know risk is money) the extra-return will cost? Obviously the best investment is the
one with the higher Sharpe ratio, meaning that for each unit of risk the portfolio provide a
maximum extra-return to the risk-free rate, and a negative result will mean that risk-free
securities (or portfolio) is the best.
However a major weakness of this indicator is it requires normally distributed returns
(otherwise the standard deviation could be a highly inefficient measure of risk). Indeed we
have presented the standard deviation we commented that a major weakness of this measure is
the insensitivity to the sign. Therefore applied to a distribution of returns, the standard
deviation gives us accurate information only if the distribution is symmetrical to the mean.
29
Lelands indicator where presented in an article with a very meaningful title Beyond
Mean-Variance: Performance measurement in a non-symmetrical world, (Leland, 1999),
based on an interesting assumption: market returns are normal but not securities or portfolios
returns. Leland presents an enhancement of the Jensen Alpha (as the Jensen Alpha is based on
the CAPM and this model suppose that investors only care about mean and standard deviation
and by that rejects the eventual preference for positive skew and kurtosis) allowing the
preference for low kurtosis and positively skewed distributions.
To determine the Lelands Alpha we first need to compute the market price of risk
(noted b here) which, if market returns are normal, worth:
(14) b =
Where
Where
rf
30
Stutzer ratio
$ T t=1 '*
Where
rt
is the excess return of the portfolio on the benchmark over time (e.g. we
I
Where is chosen to maximize p . In this study we have defined this factor via an
Excel macro computing 1000 iterations. The calculation of this indicator is highly
calculation power consuming (e.g. 10 minutes on a Intel core i5 1.7Ghz). Which
probably explain why this indicator is not much popular.
(13)
StutzerIndex =
r
r
2I p
normal, and then it will worth the Sharpe ratio! Otherwise the Stutzer index will penalize high
kurtosis and negative skewness.
Indeed, regarding the Sharpe ratio we will have:
Ip =
Where
1 2
p
and
consequently
StutzerIndex = p
2
III
Methodology
The goal of this research paper is to try to determine whether or not the volatility can
be considered as a new asset class and if an investment strategy using it to diversify a
portfolio of risky assets will allow a better risk-adjusted return (in particular in crisis periods).
The underlying hypothesis is that the negative correlation of volatility to the other asset
classes (observed in exhibit 3 and 6) will allow a better diversification but also an efficient
protection against Black Swans. This research will require an inductive approach: we will
design different portfolios and analyse them thanks to risk-adjusted indicators in order to
determine what investment strategy has the better risk adjusted return profile.
Description of data
Equity exposure:
The Standard and Poors 500 Index is widely regarded as the best single gauge of the
U.S. equities market, this world-renowned index includes 500 leading companies in leading
industries of the U.S. economy. Although the S&P 500 focuses on the large cap segment of
the market, with approximately 75% coverage of U.S. equities, it is also an ideal proxy for the
total market. Then, we have decided to consider an exposure to the SPX for the equity pocket
of our portfolio.
At this stage we faced a difficulty to manage the dividends paid by the index as the
SPX is adjusted to reflect the payment of the dividends to the investors (originating an
underestimation of the returns as our portfolio strategy suppose to reinvest them). Please note
that we passed through this difficulty by using the S&P 500 Total Return index. The Total
Return version of the SPX simplifies the management of the dividends by making the
hypothesis that the investor reinvests the dividends (after tax, based on the hypothesis of an
US investor) in the SPX. This hypothesis fits better to our model and do not impact
significantly our monthly rebalancing strategy. Our SPXTR time series are based on the dailyclose returns extracted from the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) via the
Wharton Research Data Service.
32
Volatility exposure:
As mentioned earlier, this study will focus on the VIX as implied volatility indicator.
This is to be consistent with the equity pocket of our portfolio but also because the VIX
presents major strengths: it is investable, has a large span of securities using it and presents a
good liquidity. Please remember that if the spot VIX is not directly investable, we have seen
in Exposure to VIX via swaps, futures and options what the more frequent VIX instruments
are.
We have decided here to use VIX futures: in particular we have used the S&P 500
VIX Mid-Term Futures Index. Indeed this index offers to investors directional exposure to
volatility through publicly traded futures markets, and seeks to model the outcome of holding
a long position in VIX futures contracts. This index allowed us to integrate a large part of the
transaction costs for the volatility pocket and to integrate the rolling strategy which is out of
our scope but represent a real issue with VIX futures: as commented earlier, the steepness of
the volatility term-structure generates an important rolling cost. For the same reason we have
decided to use the VIX mid-term futures instead of the VIX short-term futures (the rolling
cost is less important as the steepness of the slope is decreasing for the farer terms).
The liquidity is important for our study because it is measured via the bid/ask spread
and we have not integrated it in our model. The more liquid is the index, the smaller is the
bid/ask spread, the smaller is the over performance implied by this hypothesis. Consequently,
as the VIX presents a good liquidity (as shown in exhibit 5), it avoids us the difficulties and
transactions costs that a liquidity management could imply for the investors (this good
liquidity parameters have allowed us to suppose a reduced bias in the study by not including
the bid/ask spread in the returns). Note that we did not include it because we have not found
the appropriate time series. Our VIX time series are the daily-close levels extracted from
Bloomberg.
Bonds exposure:
With the pari passu rational about the coherence between the asset classes, we
needed to use US bonds for the fixed income exposure. The idea was to avoid a debtor
picking bias and consequently we have decided to choose US Government 10Y Bonds to
bench the bond asset class performance (which is a classic choice for this asset class). The
10 years maturity is due to our investment horizon, if we are analysing a long-term period, it
makes sense to use long-term maturities. Moreover, it allows us to maintain an important
33
duration in the portfolio without a complex bond investment strategy. The 10 years bond
yields are extracted from the U.S. Department of the Treasury database.
To finish, all the levels, prices and yields are based on daily-close time-series covering
an almost eight years period starting in January the 1st 2004 and ending in August the 31st
2012. The time horizon was limited in the past by the creation of the firsts derivatives
instruments on the VIX.
Analysis methodology
If the academic and theoretical aspects are part of our investigations, this study targets
to be useful for a finance industry professional with no experience in volatility products. The
thesis should be an answer to:
How volatility, if considered as a new asset class, will impact in terms of return
and risk a portfolio of risky assets?
The first hypothesis involved in this paper is that volatility is an asset class. But
volatility is most widely known as a measure of risk, that is why the first step is explain why
we can consider that the volatility, whatever the underlying is, can be considered as an asset
class meanwhile there are products allowing exposure to it. We tried in the previous Asset
classes section of this paper to define a framework allowing us to define if a set of securities
is an asset class or not. The framework we have defined takes into account:
34
The second hypothesis is that volatility is a good portfolio diversifier and improves the
return of a portfolio for a given level of risk. Our approach here is to simulate different
portfolios (with different assets exposure and different weights for each asset classes). We
have used 3 asset classes: volatility, equity and bonds. First, we will analyse two traditional
portfolios and then test different volatility exposure levels. The portfolio will be rebalanced to
maintain the chosen asset class weights the first working day of each month.
To resume the properties of our portfolios will be:
For the volatility exposure, we will try a 5% and 10% long asset
allocation to the VIX trough the S&P Mid-term Futures Index
The transaction costs are not captured in the study due to the absence of
information but could be easily captured via a simple bid/ask spread
(not computed here due to the lack of information)
The weights in the portfolio are arbitrary and based on different studies we have used
for this paper. The reason is that during crisis periods the only performing asset are the
volatility products and the optimisation gives us a 100% of VIX products, which is a nonsense and/or out of the scope of our study. Then we will compare the risk and return profiles
of the different portfolios over the long run.
The third hypothesis is about the efficiency of using variance to hedge a portfolio
against a Black Swan. Here we will suppose a dynamic exposure to the VIX in order to avoid
paying the negative risk adjusted premium of the volatility. The gearing optimization is, in
our opinion, out of the scope of this study and consequently we will consider a flat 10%
exposure to the VIX based on the distance between a moving-average of the VIX and the spot
VIX to trigger the exposure. Then we will implement the same analysis of the risk and return
than for the second hypothesis.
35
IV
-
Results
Hypothesis
1:
Volatility
is
a
new
asset
class
Hypothesis origin
Asset class and diversification are two portfolio management concepts useful when it
comes to control the risk carried by a portfolio (please find more details on these two concepts
in the previous sections Asset classes and Correlation and diversification effect). For years,
markets have split the two concepts and many industry professionals have considered, for
example, a smart stock picking were enough to protect a portfolio against systematic risk (by
opposition to the idiosyncratic risk which is not diversifiable). However if this diversification
scenario, based on a single asset class, may be rewarding in terms of return, it also bears
hidden risks like a potential increase in assets correlation or a change in the risk-adjusted
return.
They have based their diversification on a simplistic interpretation of the
diversification as described on the exhibit 2: if I have enough different securities in my
portfolio, with a good allocation between smid and large caps, with a mix between defensive
and pro-cyclical stocks and an exposure to international equity, then Im diversified and I
receive the equity required rate of return. However in a single asset class, it has been proven
that it exists some hidden correlations between securities and these correlations became more
visible in bear markets (when you need the most the diversification benefits!). Moreover the
following exhibit 10 illustrates the same phenomenon between many asset classes during the
financial crisis.
Exhibit 10: Asset class correlation in normal and crisis periods
Exhibit'10'*'Asset'class'correlations'of'2004'to'2006'(2007'to'2008)
Equity
FY04/to/
FY06
Equity
////1.00
Bonds
////0.02
High/yield/bonds ////0.51
Hedge/funds
////0.77
Commodities
///(0.22)
Private/equity
////0.77
Real/Estate
////0.56
FY07/to/
FY08
////1.00
////0.22
////0.87
////0.80
////0.52
////0.84
////0.85
Bonds
High/yield/bonds
Hedge/funds
Commodities
Private/equity
Real/Estate
FY04/to/ FY07/to/ FY04/to/ FY07/to/ FY04/to/ FY07/to/ FY04/to/ FY07/to/ FY04/to/ FY07/to/ FY04/to/ FY07/to/
FY06
FY08
FY06
FY08
FY06
FY08
FY06
FY08
FY06
FY08
FY06
FY08
////1.00 ////1.00
////0.39 ////0.40 ////1.00
///(0.01) ////0.18 ////0.54
///(0.06)
0.00 ///(0.07)
////0.28 ///(0.01) ////0.61
////0.46 ////0.31 ////0.44
////1.00
////0.74
////0.55
////0.80
////0.91
////1.00
////0.06
////0.77
////0.47
////1.00
////0.80
////0.75
////0.63
////1.00
///(0.23)
///(0.19)
////1.00
////0.65
////0.44
////1.00
////0.61
////1.00
////0.85
////1.00
////1.00
36
Equities and bonds: if these two asset classes were traditionally the
mainstay of asset class diversification, it is possible that the increasing
relationship between investment banking and structured financing
could be the cause. Another hypothesis is based on the development of
the hedge fund industry and the growing success of the cross-asset
financial products. A loss in a position could generate a cash pulling via
the margin/collateral calls and force to close other positions and affect
the related asset classes
The research on these hidden risks has allowed the creation of securities giving an
exposure to them. Here comes the divergences: do we simply have to consider these sets of
securities as derivatives because their value is derived from other securities or we have to
try take into account the specific economical sense of these securities and finally split the
derivative family into different asset classes. In other words, the hypothesis we are doing
here is the prominence of the substance over the form.
37
We have decided to consider the implied volatility and not the historical volatility for
two main reasons:
In our opinion financial asset have to be oriented to the future (as most
of them are valued to the actualized value of future cash flows).
Consequently, we consider the implied volatility (which, as we have
demonstrated in Volatility: Historical and Implied volatility, is a good
proxy of the expected volatility) is the more appropriate volatility for
this hypothesis
38
In our opinion this debate is out of the scope of this research paper and in particular in
this part of the paper and we will only argue with a Warren Buffet quotation6 the market
value of all publicly traded securities as a percentage of the countrys business that is, as a
percentage of GNP has certain limitations in telling you what you need to know. Still, it is
probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given moment. And as you
can see, nearly two years ago the ratio rose to an unprecedented level. That should have been
a very strong warning signal.
At the end of the day, the market value of a company is supposed to be equal to the
present value of the future cash flows it will generate and an equity index like the SPX
measure the change of this sum of present values. If the market can be irrational and/or
manipulated, in the long run, they do reflect the health of economy. As a consequence, if the
SPX has a strong economical sense, then necessarily the implied risk of it, the VIX, has
also an economical sense: it measures the vision of the market on the market/economy
health. However it is important to note that there is a potential limitation to the hypothesis
here: the underlying must have a strong economical sense to make this hypothesis consistent
based on our framework.
Criterion 2: The tradability of the securities including:
Here we have to distinguish two kinds of instruments: the publicly traded securities
and the securities traded OTC. In the first category we will have the VIX futures, options and
ETN. For this category of securities, there is no problem of returns measure. The VIX is an
index with a public calculation methodology and the instruments mentioned have a value
based on the VIX times a multiplier. The returns of that category of securities are not subject
to any calculation difficulty.
For the OTC securities, the securities are made and priced on demand. In this case the
bank and the client can agree on a particular return calculation. Moreover, for the variance
swaps in particular, the calculation of the realized volatility can be subject to discussion.
Different formulas can apply as commented in Volatility: Historical and Implied volatility
(e.g. the difference between the formula 7 and 8). The banks also smooth them margins
engendering a difference between the actual price of the product and the expected price.
6
In
the
Fortunes,
an
interview
of
Carol
Loomies
39
In the mean time this differences have a limited impact on the payoffs of the securities
and are more subject to impact the rounding and the price of the products on the secondary
market than the approach of the return measure. As a consequence, if there are some
discrepancies in return calculations between securities, the return calculation is feasible and
globally homogeneous.
The principal products allowing an exposure to volatility have been presented in the
previous section Exposure to the VIX via swaps, futures, options. The question of the
existence and tradability of the securities is then answered in the state of the art of this
research paper. However we have to note that the complexity of the product reduces the
span of the potential clients and market regulations may require an accreditation of the
investors.
The remaining question is about the market access: this question is closely related to
the previously mentioned point of investor accreditation. We are here talking about very
specific products and consequently they are not as easy to access than equities or even bonds
but the CBOE is a large stock exchange with large coverage and lot of brokers allow at good
price a market access. Consequently we can then consider that the market access is good
and not difficult for market operators allowed to trade such products.
As mentioned earlier we have decided to do not consider the question of the liquidity
in this study. However the figures of the exhibit 5 shows a large and growing volumes for
volatility products.
Criterion 3: The homogeneous risk and return profile of the considered securities
The first question here is to know if the securities we are considering for an exposure
to the implied volatility. As mentioned earlier we do not have data series for options and
swaps but it is interesting to study as an example the different terms strategies for futures. The
exhibit 11 illustrates how different are the returns over the long term depending of the chosen
term however the profile (i.e. the directionality) of the series are similar. The difference
between the series are essentially due to the rolling cost.
40
VIX$Returns$
!800.00!!
!700.00!!
!600.00!!
!500.00!!
!400.00!!
!300.00!!
!200.00!!
!100.00!!
!"!!!!
1/3/06! 1/3/07! 1/3/08! 1/3/09! 1/3/10! 1/3/11! 1/3/12! 1/3/13!
S&P!500!VIX!ST!Futures!Index!
S&P!500!VIX!MT!Futures!Index!
VIX!Spot!
If we have seen with the previous exhibit that we can have different returns but a
common directional exposure to the VIX, do these securities have a homogeneous risk/return
profile? If this question is close to the previous one, we will focus here more on the payoff.
Indeed what make the shares and bonds common families of asset; it is also the common
philosophy of the products (and not only of the underlying). Part of it is the payoff. At this
point we are touching a limit of our hypothesis: as we have different derivatives products
allowing an exposure to the implied volatility with extremely different philosophies (the VIX
futures pays the expected volatility when the var-swaps at maturity pays the different between
the implied and realized volatility). This point avoids considering all volatility products as
a homogeneous asset class but this result, in our opinion, only weakens our results and
not invalidates them.
As a conclusion, volatility (for the purpose of this study the SPX volatility) satisfies
most of the defined criteria required by our framework and then we can conclude that the
volatility of the major indexes can be considered as a de facto new asset class. We are
convinced that if the wrappers can weakens our conclusions, at the end of the day the driver
of the products returns (and underlying risk) is the level of risk measured by the market:
which is a common base to all these products. Then we cannot reject this first hypothesis
and it drives us to our second hypothesis: what is the impact of this new asset class on a
traditional portfolio?
41
Hypothesis origin
As commented earlier, the volatility presents a negative inner delta to its underlying.
This negative correlation between the two could allow a portfolio manager to consider the
volatility as an equity hedge. Unfortunately, in the exhibit 6, we have highlighted a varying
level of correlation between the VIX and the SPX. This particular relation was also observed
in other indexes as demonstrated in (Wallmeier & Hafner, 2007) with the Deutscher
Aktienindex (DAX) and EuroStoxx50 index (ESX). Based on this observation, using the
volatility as an equity hedge is challenging, as the correlations between the implied volatility
index and the underlying index are conditional and not stable over time (cf. exhibit 6), but a
selectively applied long volatility position may provide significant diversification benefits,
particularly in times when the diversification benefits of other assets break down, such as in
the last two quarters of 2008.7
The question here is to measure this gain, if there actually is a gain, to invest part of
the portfolio in VIX instruments? But in finance industry we know (or should know) that
gains come with risks and then it is important for us to determine the impact on the
distribution of the portfolio return.
7
Quotation
from
(Szado,
2009)
42
Full equity portfolio: we have invested the portfolio nominal in the total
return SPX. This allows getting an equity-diversified portfolio
Returns')distribu-on)
Por$olios(performance(
0.12"
1400000#
0.1"
0.08"
0.06"
1000000#
0.04"
Mix#
1/
3/
11
#
1/
3/
12
#
1/
3/
09
#
1/
3/
10
#
1/
3/
06
#
1/
3/
07
#
1/
3/
08
#
0"
Full#Equity#
Full#Bonds#
)5.4%"
)4.8%"
)4.2%"
)3.6%"
)3.0%"
)2.4%"
)1.8%"
)1.2%"
)0.6%"
0.0%"
0.6%"
1.2%"
1.8%"
2.4%"
3.0%"
3.6%"
4.2%"
4.8%"
5.4%"
0.02"
600000#
Mix"
Portfolios)modelling)/)Distribution)analysis
Mix
Full.Equity
Return
0.02%
0.03%
St.dev
0.79%
1.48%
CAGR
5.56%
7.11%
St.dev.p.a
12.54%
23.51%
Kurtosis
...........7.10 ...........3.68
Skewness
...........2.74 ...........2.07
Sharpe.ratio
...........0.41 ...........0.29
Full"equity"
Full"bonds"
Full.Bonds
0.02%
0.65%
4.62%
10.36%
...........6.95
...........2.65
...........0.41 (8)
Note: The exhibit returns the following ranking (based on the Sharpe ratio and skew): 1st Mix, 2nd Full
Bonds, and 3rd Full Equity
To begin please note that these results come from a sample of 1,698 observations of
returns on a daily basis between January, 3rd 2006 and September, 28th 2012. This large
sample allows us to consider it as significant in regard to the analysed underlying. This is
particularly true when we know that the VIX futures started to trade in 2004.
8
The
risk-free
rate
is
the
average
3
months
US
Treasuries
rate
over
the
period.
43
Another important note is about the rebalancing date. At this stage we have tried to
analyse the impact of different dates on the mixed portfolio (trying the 2nd and 3rd Monday of
the month) without any substantial difference. Indeed the idea was to be sure we are not
biasing our model by choosing an arbitrary rebalancing date (the 1st Monday of each month).
The bigger impact we have found is on September, 16th 2011 with a difference of USD27,243
for a portfolio value ranging from USD1,189,707 and USD
1,216,950 (c. 2.3% of the
nominal). We have decided to mention this spread for each portfolio but not to analyse each
underlying portfolio as we consider this spread negligible (it is 2.3% in 6 years, the risk free
rate).
The first observation we can do based on the exhibit 12 is the non-normal distribution
of the returns. We all know that for years the finance literature has considered asset returns
normally distributed. However, nowadays this hypothesis is known as unrealistic but still in
use through widely used models and indicators based on it. For example the Sharpe ratio (and
the derived indicators like the Roy Safety ratio, etc., only works for normally distributed (or at
least symmetric distributions). Here we have a limited but real skewness and a high kurtosis
(ranging from around 4 for the full equity portfolio to more than 7 for the others). With such
returns we can consider the Sharpe ratio biased: that is why we have introduced the Stutzer
index and the Leland alpha.
The other observations we can do based on these usual indicators are mentioned
here following:
The CAGR of the full equity portfolio is the highest and the bonds have
a more limited return. This result is not surprising when we consider
the potential risks of each investment position. The mixed portfolio has
presented a return in the resulting range (which is normal as the
portfolio is a mix of the two)
44
Mixed + VIX portfolio: with 64% invested in equity, 46% in bonds and
the remaining 10% in the S&P VIX Medium Term Future Index. This
portfolio allows us to measure the impact of introducing VIX exposure
in a classically diversified portfolio
Exhibit 13: Classic vs. VIX exposed portfolios, returns and distributions
Por$olios(performance(
1000000#
1/
3/
06
#
1/
3/
07
#
1/
3/
08
#
1/
3/
09
#
1/
3/
10
#
1/
3/
11
#
1/
3/
12
#
600000#
Mix#+#VIX#
Mix#
Full#Equity#
Full#Bonds#
0.25%
0.2%
0.15%
0.1%
0.05%
0%
!0.05%
Equity#+#VIX#
Portfolios)modelling)/)Distribution)analysis
Mix$+$VIX
Mix
Equity$+$VIX
Return
0.02%
0.02%
0.02%
St.dev
0.57%
0.79%
1.15%
CAGR
4.98%
5.56%
6.14%
St.dev$p.a
9.01%
12.54%
18.28%
Kurtosis
$$$$$$$$$10.41 $$$$$$$$$$$7.10 $$$$$$$$$$$5.17
Skewness
$$$$$$$$$$$3.25 $$$$$$$$$$$2.74 $$$$$$$$$$$2.38
Sharpe$ratio
$$$$$$$$$$$0.51 $$$$$$$$$$$0.41 $$$$$$$$$$$0.32
!5.4%%
!4.7%%
!4.0%%
!3.3%%
!2.6%%
!1.9%%
!1.2%%
!0.5%%
0.2%%
0.9%%
1.6%%
2.3%%
3.0%%
3.7%%
4.4%%
5.1%%
1400000#
Returns')distribu-on)
Mix%+%VIX%
Mix%
Equity%+%VIX%
Full%equity%
Full%bonds%
Full$Equity
0.03%
1.48%
7.11%
23.51%
$$$$$$$$$$$3.68
$$$$$$$$$$$2.07
$$$$$$$$$$$0.29
Full$Bonds
0.02%
0.65%
4.62%
10.36%
$$$$$$$$$$$6.95
$$$$$$$$$$$2.65
$$$$$$$$$$$0.41 (9)
Note: The exhibit returns the following ranking (based on the Sharpe ratio and skew): 1st: Mix+Vix,
2nd: Mix, 3rd: Full Bonds, 4th: Equity VIX and 5th: Full Equity
9
The
risk-free
rate
is
the
average
3
months
US
Treasuries
rate
over
the
period.
45
Please note that the same observations about the sample can be applied here as we
have made a work of data harmonisation previous to the analysis and portfolio simulations.
Regarding the rebalancing dates, the same work has been performed for this data
series on the two new portfolios: they both present rebalancing, the first between the equity
and the VIX and the second between the equity, the bonds and the VIX. The maximum
reached for the former portfolio is USD18,749 on August, 15th 2011 (at the date this amount
represented 1.6% of the nominal value, less than the accrued risk-free rate) and for the latter
portfolio the spread reach USD36,573 (at the date 3% of the nominal portfolio but decreasing
to 2% at the end of the sample) on the same day.
The analysis of the returns distribution obviously lead us to the same conclusions
about the non-normality of the distributions than for the classic portfolios but we can also add
some interesting observations:
The VIX participate to increase significantly both the kurtosis (from 3.6
to 5.2 for the equity portfolio and 6.9 to 10 for the mixed portfolio) and
the skew (respectively from 2 to 2.4 and from 2.7 to 3.2) of the
distributions. These observations are a positive perspective for the 3rd
hypothesis of this study. Indeed the more skewness and kurtosis we
have, the less we are exposed to black-swans. Indeed, if we have high
kurtosis it statistically means that most of the returns are around the
average and the positive skew means that most of the remaining returns
are at the right of the mean. This observation can be made between the
two benchmark and the VIX exposed portfolios
46
1st: Mix+VIX, 2nd: Mix, 3rd: Full Bonds, 4th: Equity VIX and 5th: Full
Equity
If the normal distribution of the returns is very comfortable for modelling purposes, as
mentioned earlier the goal of a portfolio manager is to maximize the return (by increasing the
average of the distribution) reduce the risk (by reducing the area of the distribution bellow 0,
the risk surface).
Then
the
measures
of
risk-adjusted
returns
are
supposed
to
allow
a
ranking
between
the
strategies.
The
Sharpe
ratio
is
one
of
them
but we know that it is based on the
normal distributions and needs symmetry around the mean to be accurate (because it is based
on the standard deviation and it penalizes in the same way a bad or a good deviation to
the mean).
Exhibit 14: Sharpe vs. Leland and Stutzer
Portfolios)modelling)/)Distribution)analysis
Mix$+$VIX
Mix
Equity$+$VIX
Sharpe$ratio
$$$$$$$$$$$0.51 $$$$$$$$$$$0.41 $$$$$$$$$$$0.32
Leland$Beta
$$$$$$$$$$$0.35 $$$$$$$$$$$0.52 $$$$$$$$$$$0.77
Leland$Alpha
$$$$$$$$$0.022 $$$$$$$$$0.017 $$$$$$$$$0.006
Stutzer$to$Rf
4.12%
1.96%
2.58%
Stutzer$to$Bonds
0.29%
0.00%
0.30%
Full$Equity
$$$$$$$$$$$0.29
n.a
n.a
1.38%
0.10%
Full$Bonds
$$$$$$$$$$$0.41
n.a
n.a
2.43%
n.a
(10)
Note: Indicators return different rankings but the Mix+VIX is always the better risk-adjusted
investment
10
The
market
price
of
risk
based
on
Leland
model
was
calculted
considering
the
SPXTR
as
the
market
and
the
average
3M
Treasury
over
the
period
as
risk
free
rate.
The
result
was
b=1.45.
47
Stutzer comments the first argument in his paper (Stutzer, 2000), his
work is posterior to Lelands and he comments on the strength of his
indicator. Lelands indicator accuracy is based on the relationship
between the passive portfolio expected return (the market) and the
models measure of risk. In other words, to a certain level risk is
assigned a required performance level, but for example Leland did not
try to explain the level of risk free rate. The market and risk free rates
are inputs in Lelands model but how can we be sure of the values?
As a conclusion we can affirm that the VIX is the better diversifier tested here.
Moreover another point has not been considered here but should be of interest to finance
professionals: if the VIX with only 10% of the portfolio diversify better than the bonds, then
it allows the portfolio manager to free more nominal for the active management than the
historical diversifier: the bonds. Then we cannot reject this second hypothesis and it drives
us to our third hypothesis: can we use selectively the volatility to protect a portfolio in case of
a Black-Swan?
48
Hypothesis origin
The more the SPX is bear, the more the VIX will pike
The VIX exposure has increased the skew and the kurtosis of the return
distribution. It means that we are limiting our important losses and the
population of returns around the mean (close to 0% as we are on a daily
basis)
Nevertheless we also have seen that long VIX exposure presents a negative riskadjusted return; in other words an exposure to the VIX is very expensive! This is even more
true when we have a contango on the VIX futures term structure (which is the normal
situation11). So the question here is double, it is about cost and risk management:
Can we reduce the price of the VIX exposure by using a punctual and
conditional exposure system?
11
Please
refer
to
the
BNP
Paribas
VIX
Handbook,
(BNP
Paribas, 2010)
49
50
Por$olio'sensi+vity'to'VIX'
exposure'
4000000"
3000000"
2000000"
1000000"
0"
0%" 10%"20%" 30%" 40%" 50%"60%" 70%" 80%" 90%"100%"
Por0olio"FV"
12
The
concept
is
presented
in
(Rubinstein,
51
The exhibit 15 presents the relation between the final portfolio values of the portfolio
and the sensitivity of the mechanism to the VIX volatility. We can observe a clear pike at
11%. We can also observe that the extreme values are close to the reference portfolios: for a
0% distance we are close to the Equity and permanent VIX exposure performance because we
are almost every time VIX exposed. It is interesting to observe that we are underperforming
here the original portfolio due to the more frequent rebalancing (when we rebalance we sell
the performing assets and buy the bear ones; if it is done too frequently then we break the
compounding effect on the bull assets). The other extreme (100%) is exactly the performance
of the VIXTR because we never activate the VIX exposure.
Optimisation of the mechanism for the mixed portfolio:
The same optimization work has been performed for the mixed portfolio. Regarding
the moving average for comparability reasons and because this is more related to the VIX
than the other assets composing the portfolio, we have decided to do not change the 5Business day moving average.
Regarding the parameter relating the portfolio performance to the VIX exposure, we
have performed the same sensitivity analysis. We were aware that the results should be
similar because what this parameter do is optimising our exposure to the VIX Mid-Term
future Index but we did not know how the portfolio will react to this new rebalancing
movements. For this second portfolio we have decided to use the same parameter to trigger
our exposure to VIX: 11%.
Exhibit 16: Distance to the moving average optimization for the mixed portfolio
Por$olio'sensi+vity'to'VIX'
exposure'
2000000"
1500000"
1000000"
500000"
0"
0%" 10%"20%" 30%" 40%" 50%"60%" 70%" 80%" 90%"100%"
Por0olio"FV"
Note: As expected the optimized parameter value is the same, however we can see that the shape of the
result line is different.
52
Por$olios(performance(
Returns')distribu-on)
0.2"
3000000#
2500000#
2000000#
1500000#
1000000#
500000#
0.15"
0.1"
0"
'5.5%"
'4.9%"
'4.3%"
'3.7%"
'3.1%"
'2.5%"
'1.9%"
'1.3%"
'0.7%"
'0.1%"
0.5%"
1.1%"
1.7%"
2.3%"
2.9%"
3.5%"
4.1%"
4.7%"
5.3%"
1/
10
/0
6#
1/
10
/0
7#
1/
10
/0
8#
1/
10
/0
9#
1/
10
/1
0#
1/
10
/1
1#
1/
10
/1
2#
0.05"
Mix#+#dyn#VIX#
Equity#+#dyn#VIX#
Mix"+"dyn"VIX"
Equity"+"dyn"VIX"
Mix#+#VIX#
Equity#+#VIX#
Mix"+"VIX"
Equity"+"VIX"
Portfolios)modelling)/)Distribution)analysis
Mix$+$dyn$VIX Equity$+$dyn$VIX
Mix$+$VIX
Equity$+$VIX
Return
0.03%
0.07%
0.02%
0.02%
St.dev
0.85%
1.22%
0.57%
1.15%
CAGR
7.87%
20.34%
4.98%
6.14%
St.dev$p.a
13.47%
19.42%
9.01%
18.28%
Kurtosis
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 28.99 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 38.20 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$9.13 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$4.41
Skewness
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$4.76 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$5.35 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$3.08 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$2.25
Sharpe$ratio
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.58 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$1.05 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.55 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.34
Note: The exhibit returns the following ranking (based on the Sharpe ratio): 1st Equity+dyn VIX, 2nd
Mix+dyn VIX, 3rd Mix+constant VIX and 4th Equity+constant VIX
We have performed on the new portfolios the same analysis than for the previous
ones. The exhibit 17 resumes our results. The key points of interests are:
53
Exhibit 18: Constant vs. dynamic exposure to VIX, impact on risk-adjusted returns
Portfolios)modelling)/)Distribution)analysis
Mix$+$dyn$VIX Equity$+$dyn$VIX
Mix$+$VIX
Equity$+$VIX
Sharpe$ratio
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.58 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$1.05 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.55 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.34
Leland$Beta
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.09 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.27 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.33 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$0.72
Leland$Alpha
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 0.073 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 0.184 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 0.026 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ 0.010
Stutzer$to$Rf
10.23%
15.19%
4.12%
2.58%
Stutzer$to$Bonds
7.23%
15.61%
0.29%
0.30%
(13)
Note: If the Leland and Stutzer indicators does not change the ranking they clearly shows the
superiority of the dynamic exposure mechanism
The distributions of the portfolios are clearly not normal (especially the distributions
of the new portfolios) so we have applied them the risk-adjusted measures robust to nonnormality. If the indicators does not change the ranking here, it clearly demonstrate the
superiority of the new strategy. As a consequence we cannot reject this third and last
hypothesis.
13
The
calculation
of
the
market
price
of
risk
necessary
for
the
calculation
of
the
Leland
Beta
has
not
change,
as
we
have
not
changed
our
benchmark.
The
result
is
b=1.45.
54
Our
conclusions
Our goal with this research paper was to give an insight of what the volatility is and
the real impact it can have on a portfolio. If we faced real limitations during our research (lack
of access to market information, the technical aspect of the subject leading most of the papers
about volatility to be destined to quants people, limits in coding for the modelling), we are
satisfied by our results.
First we have tried to define a framework to define what an asset class really is
because we have found that on the subject, very few people rationalize them choice. We are
aware that this question is purely academic in contradiction with our mind-set of writing a
paper destined to financial markets professionals but as our research has been done in an
academic context we consider that the hypothesis has a legitimate place in this study.
Furthermore we have tried to apply this practical philosophy to our demonstration using the
market reality as a central criterion.
Our second hypothesis was the entry point to the quantitative aspect of our paper. We
have attempted to find an answer to the asset recorrelation problem of portfolio managers.
Indeed the recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the normality and the
superiority of the chaos: the victory of Mandelbrot on Sharpe. In parallel, progress in
derivatives products and finance industry in general has open a world of new asset classes:
hidden asset classes. Based on volatility, one of them, we have successfully increased the
risk-adjusted return of different portfolios and we have submitted our resulting portfolio to an
analysis with indicators robust to non-normal returns.
To finish, we have tried to enhance our results by implementing a tool reducing the
cost of this powerful diversifier. When most of the studies have stopped the analysis by
highlighting the cost of an exposure to volatility instruments, we have described and tested an
efficient way to boost them effect without leveraging our portfolio: by reducing the cost using
it parsimoniously. If the VIX (our proxy for the implied volatility in general) is not investable
via the spot, the spot is a powerful indicator of danger zone thanks to its negative inner
delta and future oriented properties (it is derived from options). We have used it to define our
investment strategy on VIX futures. This has allowed us to pass from a 6 to 20% CAGR for
the same portfolio. Who today can afford not earning 13% extra yield yearly? The next
improvement could be to try to find a way to use a varying gearing for the exposure to the
VIX!
55
V
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