1.

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition
before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs
to use CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights.
Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of
citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall
seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to
the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning,
implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and

programs and in the decision-making process;

d) The right to participate in the decision-making process
concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or
activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and
public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the
potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be
served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution
and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of
harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to
exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to
enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and
regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected
area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal
damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public
health impact of a project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring
their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a
party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in
view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this
issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that
they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available
only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a

duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB

and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to
a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior
to the other.

(3) the water needs of the residents in the subject area was
already being well served by the petitioner.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first

the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse
by mandamus is taken.

RTC denied the appeal and upheld NWRB Decision. RTC denied
MFR.

2. Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Margarita Adala

Facts: Respondent filed on October 24, 2002 an application with
the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain
waterworks system in Sitios San Vicente, Fatima and Sambag in
Brgy. Bulacao, Cebu City.
At the initial hearing of Dec 16, 2002 during which respondent
submitted proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements of
Notice and public at, herein petitioner MCWD, a government
owned and controlled corporation created pursuant to PD 198
which took effect upon its issuance by then Pres Marcos on May 25
1973, as amended, appeared through its lawyers to oppose the
application.
In its opposition, petitioner prayed for the denial of respondent's
application on the ff grounds:
(1)petitioner's Board of Directors had not consented to the
issuance of the franchise applied for, such consent being a
mandatory condition pursuant to PD 198,
(2) the proposed waterworks would interfere with petitioner's
water supply which it has the right to protect, and

NWRB granted Adala's application after hearing and an ocular

inspection of the area was already being well served by petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Section 47 of PD 198, which vests an "exclusive

franchise" upon public utilities is constitutional and may be relied
upon by MWCD in its opposition of Adala's application for a CPCRuling: No.
Sec 47. Exclusive Franchise- No franchise shall be granted to any
other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial
water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and
to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents
thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution however, shall
be subject to review by the Administration. There being no
consent on the part of its board directors, petitioner concludes
that respondent's application for CPC shall be denied.
Sec 47 of PD 198 is unconstitutional. The provision must be
deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Art XIV Sec 5 of
the 1973 Constitution.

3. Domingo vs. Rayala

546 SCRA 90
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III
at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala of the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC).

Rayala, however, posits that for sexual harassment to exist under

RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a
sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, reemployment, or continued employment; or the denial thereof
results in discrimination against the employee.

Issue: Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?

Held: Yes, Rayala committed sexual harassment.bIt is true that
Section 3, RA 7877, calls for a demand, request or requirement of
a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request
or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical
oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. All of the acts of Rayala
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondents acts result in creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.

4. TERESITA G. NARVASA v BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ

GR NO. 169449
Facts: The instant case stemmed from Three cases of sexual
harassment filed separately against Benjamin Sanchez by Teresita
Narvasa, Mary Gay dela Cruz and Zenaida Gayaton.

Dela Cruz claimed that sometime in February 2000, Sanchez

handed her a note saying, Gay, I like you.. Dela Cruz told
Sanchez that she would give the note to his wife, consequently the
latter grabbed the note from her and tore it into pieces. The act
was repeated when Sanchez sent a message to De La Cruz saying,
Ka date ko si Mary Gay ang tamis ng halik mo..
Gayaton also narrated that Sanchez, sometime in April 2002,
whispered to her during a retirement program, Oy flawess,
pumanaw ka met ditan while twice pinching her upper left arm
near the shoulder in a slow manner. She also received a text
messages from Sanchez like pauwi ka na sexy?, I like you,
Have a date with me, dont tell others that I told you I like you
because nakakahiya and Puso mo to pagbigay moto sakin, I
would be very happy and I slept and dreamt nice things about
you..
Narvasa claimed that Sanchez pulled her towards him and
attempted to kiss her during a field trip of officers and members of
the St. Joseph Multi Purpose Cooperative.
Based on the investigation, he was found guilty of the three
charges which caused his dismissal from the government service.
Issue: Whether the acts committed by Sanchez against the
petitioners constitute grave misconduct?
Held: The court held that Sanchez is guilty of grave misconduct. In
the case, grave misconduct possesses the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must manifest.
Sanchez act are in no doubt, intentional. Respondent was charged
with knowledge of the existence of the Anti Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss
her without consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his
intention to violate laws.
5. PEOPLE VS HASHIM
June 13, 2012

Facts:
The accused were charged as having been engaged in the recruitment
and deployment of workers without having previously obtained from the
POEA a license or authority to do so. They promised employment abroad
particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting the
persons of BBB and AAA to apply which employment however did not
materialize because in truth and in fact, the promised employment is
non-existent, in flagrant violation of the above-mentioned law and
causing damage and prejudice to said complainants. Instead of getting
decent jobs, they were forced to become sex workers to earn money and
became prostitutes. The lower court found the accused guilty of illegal
recruitment defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as principals by direct participation,
committed by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and SENTENCES each
of said accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P1,000,000.00 each; to pay each of the above victims P50,000.00
as moral
damages; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the amount of
exemplary damages in favor of the victims (private complainants) to be
reduced to P25,000.00 each.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages was proper.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It
held that Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act. Such law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days
after, victims found themselves in a situation that the law had sought to
prevent.
In Lalli, the Supreme Court increased the amount of moral and

exemplary damages from P50,000 to P500,000 and from P50,000 to

P100,000, respectively, having convicted the accused therein of the
crime of trafficking in persons.
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
xxx xxx xxx.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts.
In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent
and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers
is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when
she was trafficked as a prostitute in
Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being
committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified.
The Supreme Court found no legal impediment to increasing the award
of moral and exemplary damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any
logical reason why we should differentiate between the victims herein
and those in that case, when the circumstances are frighteningly similar.
To do so would be to say that we discriminate one from the other, when
all of these women have been the victims of unscrupulous people who
capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that accusedappellant was not tried and convicted of the crime of trafficking in
persons, this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and
not on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained in Lalli.
Hence the Decision of the Court of Appeals in is affirmed with
modifications. Accused-appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. Neneng
Awid is ordered to pay AAA and BBB the sum of P500,000 each as moral

damages and P100,000 each as exemplary damages and to pay the

costs.

6. Merida Waterworks District v Bacarro

FACTS:
Merida Water District, a government-owned and controlled
corporation4 that operates the water utility services in the
municipality of Merida, Leyte conducted a public hearing for the
purpose of increasing the water rate
March 7, 2002: Merida Water District received a letter from the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) that on March 5, 2002,
the LWUA Board of Trustees, per Board Resolution No. 63, series of
2002, confirmed Merida Water Districts proposed water rates.
September 3, 2002: Merida implemented a water rate increase of
P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption.
February 13, 2003: consumers of Merida Water District, filed a
Petition for Injunction, etc. because the rates are contrary to the
rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing
Merida filed a motion to dismiss (then later motion for
reconsideration) with the RTC due to failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198,
the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D. Nos.
768 and 1479 - denied
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA (then later motion for
reconsideration) - denied
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC
ISSUE: W/N there is lack of jurisdiction with the RTC since the
primary jurisdiction should belong to the NWRB under P.D. No.
1067. (The NWRB does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction)
HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED
petitioners failed to cite any law which impliedly grants the NWRB
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute regarding
the increase of water rates. A grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot

be implied from the language of a statute in the absence of a clear

legislative intent to that effect. An administrative agency with
quasi-judicial power is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and its
jurisdiction should be interpreted in strictissimi juris."
The doctrine of exhaustion does not apply when jurisdiction is
exclusive. An administrative agencys exclusive jurisdiction over a
certain dispute renders the courts without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same at that stage. The doctrine of exhaustion
applies "where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until
the administrative process has run its course. To cite Abe-Abe v.
Manta as the authority to support the allegation that the NWRB
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a
water rate increase is a strained construction of this Courts
pronouncements. Thus, petitioners contention that the RTC has no
jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates
is clearly without merit.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation
of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The
theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position
to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so It may be
added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the
courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all cases
a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its observance has
been disregarded require a strong showing of the inadequacy of
the prescribed procedure and of impending harm. Respondents
justify their failure to observe the administrative process on the
following exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies: (1) patent illegality; and (2) a denial of

due process. However, respondents fail to show that the instant

case merits the application of these exceptions.
Jurisprudence affirming the failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion due to a denial of due process involves instances when
the party seeking outright judicial intervention was denied the
opportunity to be heard. Here, respondents admit that Merida
Water District conducted a public hearing. . The existence of a
hearing for this purpose renders the allegation of a denial of due
process without merit. The failure of the respondents to show that
the instant case falls within the exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion necessitates in the due observance of exhausting the
proper administrative remedies before seeking judicial
intervention.
7. MMDA v. Jancom
Facts of the case:

After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom
won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste management project. A
BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19,
1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by
the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA
chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was
too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but
Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or
the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the
closure of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the
Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the
Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee

disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a
new waste management contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of
appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA
went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was
not binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions
precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was no valid
notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for
appeal instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only apply in
cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the
petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal
from the final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said
it has become final and gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in
any substantive aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the
court took it up just the same, if only to put the petitioners mind to
rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of
the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only
allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not
bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in
the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault;
though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his
signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should
comply with the conditions had not yet started to run because the
contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of
the Presidents signature.
HELD:

The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid
and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the
consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom
Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be
rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which
says: A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three such Members, is a decision or
resolution of the Supreme Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
8. Garcia vs. Corona
Facts:
The government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of
deregulation by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this
Court concluded in its November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad vs. Secretary
of Department of Energy. We struck down the law as invalid because the
three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to
achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A. No. 8180s
provisions on tariff differential, inventory requirements, and predatory
pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and

interfered with the free interaction of market forces.

Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10,
1998 a new oil deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress
excluded the offensive provisions found in the invalidated law.
Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to declare the new oil
deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article
XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. He specifically objected to Section 19
of R.A. No. 8479 which, in essence, prescribed the period for removal of
price control on gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set
the time for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry.
Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and
removing price control at a time when the market is still dominated and
controlled by an oligopoly would be contrary to public interest, as it
would only provide an opportunity for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing
and overpricing. He averred that Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is glaringly
pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people, and thus asked the
Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the
period for the removal of price control on gasoline and other finished
products and for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil
industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore
unconstitutional because within the short span of five months, the
market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3)
private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and Petron.
The objective of the petition is deceptively simple. It states that if the
constitutional mandate against monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-ended price
controls on gasoline and other oil products for as long as necessary. This
will allegedly prevent the Big 3 --- Shell, Caltex and Petron --- from pricefixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of price
controls as partial deregulation.
Issue:

WON Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is unconstituional?

Ruling:
We are not impressed by petitioner Garcias submission. Petitioner has no
basis in condemning as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by
Congress for the beginning of the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive for factoring the
depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to February
1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the
full deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has
already come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date,
the transition period has ended and it was expected that the people
would have adjusted to the role of market forces in shaping the prices of
petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date of full
deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be
impugned by this Court.

9. People vs Lalli

FACTS
Ronnie Aringoy asked Lolita Plando if she wants to work as restaurant
entertainer in Malaysia, since Lolita is interested, she inquired how she
could apply. Ronnie brought Lolita to Nestor Relampagos and Hadja Lalli.
The latter accompanied Lolita and other women in Malaysia by boat from
Zamboanga to Sandakan, Malaysia and then boarded a van going to Kota
Kinabalu. They were forced to work as prostitutes in pipen Club in
Labuan, Malaysia. Lolita worked as a prostitute from June 14 to July 8,
2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at least one customer
or more a night, and at most, she had around five customers a night.
They all had sexual intercourse with her. Lolita was saved by her brotherin-law who acted as a customer.
ISSUE
Is Lalli, Relampagos and Aringoy guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment

and trafficking in persons?

LAWS INVOLVED
Secs. 6&7 of RA 8042
ART 13 (F) LABOR CODE
RULING:
Its is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement
activities without the requisite authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in illegal
recruitment. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
an agency under DOLE created by EO No. 797 to take over the duties of
the Overseas Employment Development Board, issues the authority to
recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of Illegal recruitment by
three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is
deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage,
for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P500,00 but not more than P1,000,000 shall be imposed. In this case, the
trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found LAlli, Aringoy and
Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to
recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without POEA license. The
three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case,
in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required
by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the accused engage in this activity of
recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and
transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was
committed by three persons (Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos), conspiring
and confederating with one another.

10.TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent
FACTS:

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative,

registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and
organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang,
La Trinidad, Benguet.

ISSUE:

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created

under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is
authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial
purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

RULING:

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47
of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.

Yes.
The petition is meritorious.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources

Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system
in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application. LTWD
claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its
franchise is exclusive.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB
approved TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002
Decision,4 the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found
that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and
maintain a waterworks system.
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002
Resolution,6 the NWRB denied the motion.
LTWD appealed to the RTC.
In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRBs 23
July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled
TMPCs CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004
Order, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.

This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need
explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in
character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and
clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in
character.
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years.

11.Metro IloIlo Water District vs CA

FACTS
Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD), which was granted water rights

to extract and withdraw ground water within its jurisdiction. MIWD

filed an injunction case against private respondents (Nava et al.)
for withdrawing ground water within the formers jurisdiction
without securing a water permit from NWRC, which was still being
done upon filing the petition. Private respondents averred that the
RTC had no jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.
The RTC dismissed the petitions saying it had no jurisdiction and
that MIWD failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision, saying that NWRC has jurisdiction to
hear and decide disputes relating to appropriation, utilization and
control of water which was the subject matter of the case.
ISSUE:
WON NWRC had jurisdiction over the case. NO
RULING:
The petitions filed before the RTC were for the issuance of an
injunction order for private respondents to cease and desist from
extracting or withdrawing water from MIWDs well and from selling
the same within its service areas. The petitions focus on the
violations incurred by private respondents by virtue of their
alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water
within petitioners service area, vis--vis MIWDs vested rights as a
water district. At issue is whether or not private respondents
extraction and sale of ground water within petitioners service
area violated petitioners rights as a water district.
The instant case certainly calls for the application and
interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to
determine whether private respondents actions violate MIWDs
rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does
not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and
expertise of the water council as it necessitates judicial
intervention. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension
to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council,
in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust
of the petitions.
MIWD had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department
of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. The trial

court was not asked to grant MIWD the right to use but to compel
private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, the trial courts
jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right
to water use for which a permit was already granted.

12.

Go-Tan vs. Sps. Tan

Topic:
VI Local Government UnitsPonente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.Date:
September 30, 2008DOCTRINE: The doctrine of conspiracy under the
RPC is applicable to RA 9262. Therefore, offenders under such law are
not limited to those related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; but also include those acting
in conspiracy with them.

QUICK FACTS: Wife prays for the issuance of a Temporary Protective

Order against her husband and parents-in-law. Respondents herein are
only the parents-in-law as theyare contending that they cannot be
instituted as respondents in this case as they are not covered by RA
9262. FACTS:Contested Law: RA 9262On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L.
Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January
12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan
and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven,
in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)
(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004."Petitioners Contention: Petitioner Go-Tan contends that R.A. No.
9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of

R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to
R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.Respondents Contention: Spouses Tans were contending that
the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of
the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. They submit that
they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by
marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review.TC - Granted respondent spouses Motion To Dismiss and issued a
resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that,
being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the wellknown rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO &

JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE
PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTIVIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".

HELD: YES.RATIO: The ratio of the SC is anchored on the 4 points below:

(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and
their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely

to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic

abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."While the said provision
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
RPC.Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC, thus:SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code andother applicable
laws, shall have suppletory application. (2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another.(h) Engaging
in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or herchild. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;(3) Entering or remaining in the
dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and(5) Engaging in any form
of harassment or violence; x x x(3) In addition, the protection order that
may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the
offending husband, thus:SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection
orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts
mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net(b) Prohibition of the
respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x
x(4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of
the law, thus:SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed
to promote the protection andsafety of victims of violence against
women and their children. Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement,

the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application

here.