NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER, VS. VAL L.

VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENT.
Gr 168203 3/9/2010
Facts:
Val Villanueva was an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Norte
Electric Cooperative (ANECO) for a 3 year term (2001-2003). His term was extended until
2006 due a subsequent redistricting of the area in which he represents. He was elected as
Barangay Chairman of Barangay 12, in the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte
and also elected as President of the formerly known Association of Barangay Captains (now
known as Liga ng mga Barangay) of Cabadbaran which makes him an ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran.
The General Manager of ANECO sought opinion from the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) on whether Villanueva still qualifies to be a member of the ANECO
Board of Directors. The response from the NEA was that Villanueva can no longer serve as a
member of the ANECO BOD because he is already considered to have been automatically
resigned from the position after taking the oath of office as Liga President.
Villanueva then sought the opinion of the DILG regarding his disqualification as a member of
the ANECO BOD. The DILG Provincial Director then stated that they are not in the position to
give an official opinion because they do not have jurisdiction over the matter but stated that
Villanueva is not a regular member of the Sangguniang Bayan and instead occupied the
office in an ex-officio capacity (an opinion based on the fact that Villanueva was not duly
elected by the registered voters of Cabadbaran, but occupied the position because of being
the president of the Liga).
Villanueva requested for review and reconsideration of the disputed opinion of the NEA and
was denied which prompted Villanueva to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the RTC. The RTC then filed a Temporary Restraining order NEA
and ANECO and their representatives allowing Villanueva to continue joining in meetings or
sessions of the BOD. NEA and ANECO filed separate motions and both were denied by the
RTC. Even a motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the NEA filed a petition with the
SC.
Issue:
WON Villanueva can still continue to be a member of the ANECO BOD after being an exofficio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran.
Held:
No. Although the disqualification mandated by the provisions [of PD 269] pertains to elective
officers of the government, except barrio captains and councilors, the same is equally
applicable to an appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which is an elective
office. The prohibition should be construed to refer to a person holding an office, the
assumption to which, while generally determined by an election, is not precluded by
appointment. The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent incumbents of elective
offices from exerting political influence and pressure on the management of the affairs
of the cooperative. This purpose cannot be fully achieved if one who is appointed to an

elective office is not made subject to the same disqualification.

Section 7 (8), Article II of the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District
Elections issued by the NEA Main Office, through its Board of Administrators, on June 23,
1993, provides:
Section 7 - Qualification for Board of Directors. - Bona fide members who possess the
following qualifications are eligible to become and/or to remain as member of Board of
Directors:
1. He/she is a Filipino citizen
xxxx
8. He/she does not hold elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective
position above the level of a Barangay Captain.
x x x x[17]
The Memorandum[18] dated February 13, 1998 issued by the NEA Main Office states:
2.3.1. Book III, Article Three, Sec. 446 of R.A. 7160 listed the composition of the
Sangguniang Bayan which includes, among others, the President of the Municipal Chapter of
the Liga ng mga Barangay x x x. As such, therefore, they are considered as an ex-officio
member of the Sanggunian, as likewise provided for in Rule XXIX, Article 211 (d) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160.
2.3.2. All coop officials and employees who are subsequently elected to the post of
President of the Municipal Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay, after having won in
the barangay elections, shall be considered automatically resigned upon taking his/her
oath of office as Liga President.
Decision reversed and set aside. Petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed.
200 scra 271 1991
Ganzon v CA
200 SCRA 271 (1991)
Facts: Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local
Government Code of 1991 (recently signed into law by the President) 18 which provides (as
to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension
xxx xxx xxx
b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90)
days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of
the first suspension.(emphasis supplied)

The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders the first, the second and the
third. As shown earlier, the first and the third orders have already been served. It is only the
second order which seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision which states that
the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order
should not be served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason why,
under the bizarre circumstances of this case where the respondent Secretary has chosen
to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of consolidating the several
administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage we cannot allow the concept of
simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would
follow then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second
order would have started on 5 August 1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this
was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension
orders, including the second order). The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4
October 1991.
It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still
an existing preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil
Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. 20
One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar
as the said case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order.
Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive suspension
has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second preventive suspension has been
served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension
order is concerned.
Issue: When will petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as
mayor of Iloilo City. Is it only after 19 October 1991 as claimed by respondents, or at some
earlier date? The answer to this question would depend on how petitioner has served the
preventive suspension orders issued against him.
Decision: As to the petition (docketed CA-G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of
Appeals, which involves the question of the validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly
been served, petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that it was the proper remedy for
his reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been served and ended. 21 As
we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision
and in the light of the finding of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has
been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also become moot and
academic, warranting dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents
are ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective
immediately.
The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become moot

and academic. The Region Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before which petitioner's action
for prohibition (Special Civil Action No. 18312) is pending is also ordered to dismiss the said
case for having become moot and academic insofar as petitioner prays therein to enjoin his
(second) preventive suspension.
This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first, second, third
and fourth preventive suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the merits thereof. Also,
as decreed in the main decision of 5 August 1991.
. . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on
account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts
committed prior to August 11, 1988. . . .
180050 4/12/2011
Navarro v. Ermita
2011 April 12
URGENT MOTION TO RECALL Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated
on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of
them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in
the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability.
This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
Petitioner:

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA

Taxpayers and Residents of Surigao del Norte
(Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial Board)

Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

representing the President of the Philippines
Senate of the Philippines
represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT
House of Representatives
represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
Movants-Intervenors:
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.
MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON
VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON.

MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL

Elected officials of Surigao de Norte province in the May 2010 elections
Facts:
Brief Recap
2 Oct 1996: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into law
Income

82.69M/year

Population

106,951

Land Area:

802.12 sq. km

3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of province. 
People from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Dinagat Islands voted.
Affirmative Votes:
Negative Votes:

69,943
63,502

President appoints interim set of provincial officials

1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office
10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area requirements)
Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010
This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of
movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties.
COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared final
and executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a non-province.
Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would have to be nullified, and a special
election would have to be conducted for various positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for
Surigao del Norte.
Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the
2010 case decision. (Cong Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were
declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still candidates in the May 2010
elections.)
Other Pertinent laws:
LGC. Sec 386. Barangay - no min land area requirement
LCG. Sec 442. Municipality - 50 sq km BUT
(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR:ARTICLE 13.Municipalities.(a) Requisites for CreationA municipality shall
not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(iii) Land areawhich must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square

kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed
municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT
(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities.(a) Requisites for creationA city shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of
one (1) or more islands. "
LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE9.Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. "
Petitioners
Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)
Respondents
Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)
Movants-Intervenors
The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the
LGC
The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more
islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement
The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case - matter of equity and fair play,
undue burden on those who have relied on the inoperative law.
Issue: WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land
area requirement?
Held: Yes
SC:

Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355, definitively show the clear legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement
Please see pertinent laws
With respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section
442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively.
This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of
the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGCand to
reflect the true legislative intent.
Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if
it has not been passed
Dispositive: Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional.
Excerpt: Debates in congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ". The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if
we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like to
divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng
minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local
Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own
idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make
a generalization."

190681 6/21/2010
G.R. No. 190681
June 21, 2010
DR. EDILBERTO ESTAMPA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF
DAVAO, Respondent.
Facts:
Dr. Edilberto Estampa Jr. was appointed as Medical Officer VI at the Government of Davao
City Health Office on Feb. 1, 2001. This position made him head of the Task Force Unit which
was assigend to deal with any untoward event taking place in the City and Disaster
Coordinator of the Davao City Health Office.
A bomb exploded on March 4, 2003 at the passengers' terminal of the Davao International
airport, killing 22 and injuring 113 people. Dr. Estampa, having just arrived at home (around
6pm), was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He learned of the bombing incident
between 7 to 8pm. His wife arrived at 9pm from work at the Davao Medical Center, where
most of the victims were brought for treatment, and told him just to stay home, which he did.
On March 6, 2003, Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health
Office, required Dr. Estampa to explain why he was not able to respond to the bombing
incident. Dr. Estampa submitted his explanation. The explanation satisfied Dr. Roberto
Alcantara and found that the presence of Dr. Estampa is indispensable considering that there
are other medical practitioners present. Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed, however,
he did not bother to endorse the case to a superior officer or to the City Legal Office with his
recommendation. After 10 months, Dr. Josephine Villafuerte, the Davao City Health officer
queried the head of the City's Human Resource Management Office regarding the status of
the case against Dr. Estampa for failing to respond to the bombing incident which prompted a
verification and investigation. Dr. Estampa was required to answer the charges against him.
The Assistant City Legal Officer submitted an investigation report finding a prima facie case
against Dr. Estampa for Neglect of duty and recommending the filing of a formal charge
against him. The City Mayor approved the report and signed the formal charges. Dr. Estampa
filed his answer and supporting documents.
Dr. Estampa was found guilty of grave neglect of duty and recommended for dismissal. The
city mayor approved the recommendation and dismissed Dr. Estampa who in turn moved for
reconsideration but was denied. This prompted him to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission.
The CSC denied Dr. Estampa's appeal and affirmed his dismissal. A motion for
reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit. A petition for review with the Court of
Appeals was also denied due to lack of merit affirming the resolutions of the CSC.
Issue:
WON the Court of appeals erred in affirming the decision of the City Legal Officer and the
CSC finding Dr. Estampa, Jr. Guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to respond to the March
4, 2003 Davao Bombing.
Held:

No. Dr. Estampas defense is not acceptable. A persons duty to his family is not
incompatible with his job-related commitment to come to the rescue of victims of disasters.
Disasters do not strike every day. Besides, knowing that his job as senior medical health
officer entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal sacrifice, he had the choice to
resign from it when he realized that he did not have the will and the heart to respond.
Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter in the house, he could have taken her to
relatives temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work. But he did not. And when
his wife arrived shortly at 9 p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife was six
months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted her to work away from home up to the
evening. What marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even care to call up his
superior or associates to inform them of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result,
the city health office failed to provide the needed coordination of all efforts intended to cope
with the disaster.
171873 7/9/2010
G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010
Municipality of Tiwi
vs Antonio Betito
Ponente: Del Castillo
Facts:
On June 4, 1990, this court issued a decision finding National Power Corporation liable for
unpaid real estate taxes on its properties in Albay. This properties consisted geothermal
plants in Tiwi and in Daraga. Previously, these properties were sold in an auction, of which
the Province of Albay acquired ownership.
Later, NPC and Albay entered into a MOA where Albay agreed to settle its tax liabilities and
NPC will make an initial payment upon signing of the agreement, and the rest will be paid in a
monthly instalment.
Then on August 3, 1992, then mayor Corral of Tiwi requested Governor Salalima to remit the
rightful taxes shares of Tiwi. Salalima replied that the request cannot be granted as the initial
payment was only an earnest money and that the total amount to be collected was still being
validated.
RTC: The trial court held that petitioners answer to the complaint failed to tender an issue,
thus, partial judgment on the pleadings is proper. It noted that petitioners did not specifically
deny under oath the actionable documents in this case, particularly, the Contract of Legal
Services and Resolution No. 15-92. Consequently, the genuineness and due execution of
these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was deemed established.
CA: The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the genuineness and due execution of
the Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92 was impliedly admitted by
petitioners because of their failure to make a verified specific denial thereof. Further, the
answer filed by the petitioners admitted the material averments of the complaint concerning

Tiwis liability under the subject contract and its receipt from the NPC of a total of
P146,579,661.84 as realty taxes. Petitioners cannot claim that the subject contract required
ratification because this is not a requisite for the enforceability of a contract against a local
government unit under the express terms of the contract and the provisions of the Local
Government Code (LGC). Also, petitioners are estopped from questioning the enforceability
of the contract after having collected and enjoyed the benefits derived therefrom.
Issues: (1) The amount of award of attorneys fees to respondent is unreasonable,
unconscionable and without any proof of the extent, nature and result of his legal service as
required by the purported contract of legal services and pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.(2) The application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or
summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case at bar.(3) The
purported contract of legal services exceeded the authority of the late Mayor Corral and
should have been ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to be enforceable.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the
complaint tenders several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of
all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on
those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings .
In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners
(as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing
to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution. The
generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners answer admits all
the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis. For this reason, a remand of
this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of justice and in order to expedite the
disposition of this case which was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle
the issues that can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand only those issues that
require a trial on merits as hereunder discussed.
The foregoing considerations cannot be brushed aside for it would be iniquitous for Tiwi to
compensate respondent for legal services which he did not render; or which has no
reasonable connection to the recovery of Tiwis share in the subject realty taxes; or whose
weight or value has not been properly appraised in view of respondents admission in his
Complaint that the opinion issued by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio
(in which respondent had no clear participation) was instrumental to the recovery of the
subject realty taxes.

292 scra 678 7/20/1998

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent
to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of
an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when
public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law
because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a
private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized
by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of

the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but
a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section
19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental
or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language
-- from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict
construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter
of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of
action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use
whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent

domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its
authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property,
once all legal requirements are complied with.
268 scra 586 2/20/1997
Moday vs CA
Date: February 20, 1997
Petitioners: Percival Moday, Zotico Moday and Leonora Moday
Respondents: CA, Judge Evangelista Yuipco, and Municipality of Bunawan
Ponente: Romero
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway
Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before the
RTC. The municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land
upon deposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. The RTC granted the
motion. It ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid
leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review
the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one
of the acts enumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that
the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, the Municipality had erected
three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the
Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which
is made of concrete.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and
resolution of the CA and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of
Bunawan is null and void.
Issue:
WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held:

Yes

Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent
domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be
for public use and there must be just compensation.
The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for BP 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation
proceedings were initiated. What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the
municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
Resolution No. 43-89.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm
action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, Section 153 of B.P. Blg.
337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid
on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to
issue.
109713 4/6/1995
Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors
April 6, 1995 | Davide, Jr.
Facts: Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the election for chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Batangas. The proclamation was made by the Board of
Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which
showed Mercado winning by one vote (49 to 48) over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P.
Pangilinan.
Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results of the election.
He alleged that the BET Chairman was inebriated during the counting of the votes and that he
had invalidated some of them without consulting the other members. The Board of Election
Supervisors (BES) ordered a recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed the
earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected
SK Chairman by the BES.
Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC praying for the
annulment of Pangilinans proclamation by the BES and for the DILG to recognize him as the

duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor. He assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act
on the protest filed by Pangilinan, claiming that it was in the nature of an election protest
properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section
252 of the Omnibus Election Code.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that Resolution No. 2499 of
the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting SK elections. It
held that the BES, which is under COMELEC jurisdiction, is the final arbiter of all election
controversies within its level.
Issue:
(1) WON BES could be the final arbiter of SK elections (WON COMELEC Resolution No.
2499 is valid and constitutional)
(2) WON RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mercados protest regarding the decision of BES
Held:
(1) YES. SK elections are not like elective barangay officials, the contests of which are vested
in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original jurisdiction over such contests.
(2) NO. HOWEVER, the petition of Mercado to reverse the dismissal orders of the RTC (~in
effect, to recognize RTCs jurisdiction over the election controversy) is granted under the
operative fact doctrine.
197 scra 52, 1991
BASCO v Pagcor
GR 91649
197 SCRA 52, 65
May 14, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy, waiving the
Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal
protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise
legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is
therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local
governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the
power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of

LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply
means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection
clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that
some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.